

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Noncompliance by the Syrian Arab Republic

Joint statement endorsed by Albania, Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and United States of America

1. We, as Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), express deep concern with the Syrian Arab Republic's continued noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement under the NPT in connection with its construction of an undeclared nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour.
2. We note that nearly eight years have passed since the IAEA Board of Governors found, based on the IAEA's technical assessment of the facility, that Syria's failure to declare the Dair Alzour reactor constituted noncompliance with Syria's obligations under its IAEA safeguards agreement. We further note with continued concern the IAEA Director General's finding that the Dair Alzour reactor had features comparable to the gas-cooled, graphite-moderated reactor at Yongbyon in the DPRK.
3. We deeply regret that Syria has failed to respond to the IAEA Director General's calls for it to cooperate with the IAEA in connection with unresolved issues arising from its noncompliance. We note with concern the IAEA Director General's confirmation that Syria has not engaged substantively with the IAEA regarding the nature of the site or other related locations since June 2008.
4. We stress that Syria's IAEA safeguards noncompliance remains a serious concern and constitutes noncompliance with Article III of the NPT.
5. We emphasize that full compliance with obligations under the Treaty is at the heart of the shared security benefits enjoyed by all NPT Parties, and that addressing



instances of noncompliance is essential to upholding the Treaty's integrity and maintaining the credibility of the IAEA safeguards system. Compliance with nonproliferation obligations is also a critical component of efforts to advance regional security and arms control.

6. We echo the call of the IAEA Director General and Board of Governors for Syria to cooperate with the IAEA fully and without further delay in connection with all unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and all related locations, and to provide the IAEA with access to all information, sites, material, and persons necessary for the IAEA to resolve all outstanding questions so that the IAEA can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear program.
