U.S.-Japan Fact Sheet on Nuclear Security Cooperation

I Minimization of Nuclear Materials

Japan and the United States are pleased that the highly enriched uranium (HEU) and separated plutonium fuels removed from the Fast Critical Assembly (FCA) have successfully reached the United States. Both countries have begun detailed discussions on the conversion of the Kyoto University Critical Assembly (KUCA) from HEU to low enriched uranium (LEU) fuels and the removal of all HEU fuels from KUCA, to which both countries committed at the Nuclear Security Summit in the United States in 2016. Both countries have discussed multiple fabrication parameters for the LEU fuel coupons and fabrication testing schedule. A tentative conversion timeline and subsequent removal of all remaining HEU to the United States have been discussed at the technical levels. The United States and Japan are also working to address additional HEU, including materials from the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST) and the Yayoi Research Reactor.

II Appropriate Management of Nuclear Materials

Japan reaffirms its fuel-cycle policy including reprocessing and development of fast reactors as a national choice, considering effective utilization of resources and reduction of the volume and harmfulness of high-level radioactive waste. Japan maintains its principle not to possess plutonium without specific purposes. Both countries acknowledge that Japan's implementation of this principle should lead to achieving the goal of reduction in the size of Japan's plutonium stockpile. Both countries are also confident that there is no concern about the consistency of this principle, given the fact that Japan has committed to firmly maintain the fast reactor development policy under the new strategy for fast reactor development.

The United States appreciates Japan's continuous efforts to strengthen its domestic system with a view to maintaining this principle, including the establishment of a new Act that strengthens governance of the entire reprocessing operation. The United States also welcomes Japan's ongoing process of expanding the capacity to store spent nuclear fuel such as the creation of additional interim storage for providing more flexibility over the medium-to long-term.

The United States considers Japan to be a model of transparency in its nuclear energy policies, applying state-of-the-art safeguards to its nuclear facilities and reporting annually on its plutonium inventory under the Guidelines on the Management of Plutonium.

Both countries stress that they do not share concerns regarding Japan's plutonium management. Based on the close and decades-old bilateral cooperation on these issues, both countries are confident that Japan will continue to manage its plutonium stocks in a way fully consistent with its non-proliferation obligations into the future.

III　Exchange of Classified Information in the area of Nuclear Security

In order to further strengthen cooperative efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, both countries welcome the progress of negotiations on a framework that enables the exchange of classified information in the area of nuclear security toward reaching an agreement at the earliest possible date. The framework further deepens bilateral cooperation at the U.S.-Japan Nuclear Security Working Group (NSWG) on a range of issues, including nuclear security training, physical protection of nuclear materials, safeguards, and transportation security.

IV.　Nuclear Security Working Group

The NSWG encouraged the United States and Japan to demonstrate leadership in strengthening nuclear security worldwide. The two countries held the 7th NSWG meeting at Tokyo in July, 2016. Both countries noted the progress made in such areas as nuclear security training, the physical protection of nuclear material, including the possibility of further collaboration on evaluation and reduction of material attractiveness, safeguards, and nuclear transport in materials. Both sides also continue to discuss advanced technical nuclear forensics capabilities that help to determine the provenance of interdicted nuclear materials to inform nuclear security improvements. The two countries have continued collaboration on curriculum development and delivery of seminars and training courses of the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN).

V　Partnering with Other Stakeholders

The United States is grateful to Japan for its successful G7 Presidency in 2016 and appreciates the emphasis on nuclear security in the G7 Ise-Shima Leaders' Declaration, G7 Foreign Ministers' Hiroshima Declaration on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation and G7 Statement on Non-proliferation and Disarmament. The United States expresses appreciation to Japan for playing a crucial role as the Chair of the Global Partnership in the implementation of the Action Plan in Support of the Global Partnership adopted at the Nuclear Security Summit in the United States in 2016. Keeping in mind that Japan will hold the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear terrorism (GICNT) Plenary Meeting co-chaired by the United States and Russia in June 2017, the United States and Japan continue to further strengthen efforts to combat nuclear terrorism.