Mr. Chairman,

I would like to congratulate you, Ambassador Enrique Roman-Morey on your assumption of the important post of Chairman for the Main Committee I. My delegation appreciated your professionalism in which you guided the third PrepCon and we are ready to lend you our utmost support as your steer the work of this committee.

Mr. Chairman,

This year marks the 70th year since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The implementation of the nuclear disarmament pillar of the concrete 64-item Action Plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference lags behind compared to the other pillars. In order to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime, we must aim to achieve progress in nuclear disarmament. In this 70th year of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan calls on all nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to take new joint actions towards this goal.

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), which was established to take forward the consensus outcomes of the 2010 NPT RevCon and jointly to advance the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas as mutually reinforcing processes, submitted a comprehensive working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.16), bearing in mind the 2015 outcome document. This NPDI working paper outlines many pragmatic and concrete proposals to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. We strongly hope that these recommendations will be reflected as much as possible in an outcome document of this Review Conference.

As a member of the NPDI, Japan fully supports the proposals, and we would
like to stress the following points as priorities from our national perspectives.

Mr. Chairman,

First is improving transparency by nuclear-weapon States. The principle of transparency, along with the other two principles of verifiability and irreversibility, must be applied to the process of nuclear disarmament. If the number of existing nuclear weapons is unknown, negotiations regarding nuclear weapons reduction are not possible. In addition, without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be verified, nor would States have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner. Therefore, increased transparency alleviates mistrust among states and is indispensable as a confidence-building measure and as a basis for a stable international and regional security environment. On this point, the transparency degree of the reports submitted by the nuclear-weapon States to the third PrepCon in 2014 was uneven among countries. All nuclear-weapon States should at least provide a baseline of the numbers of nuclear warheads, against which their nuclear disarmament measures can be concretely reviewed. Furthermore, nuclear-weapon States need not only outline past disarmament measures, but to focus on their most recent progress. Japan urges nuclear-weapon States to commit to utilizing a NPDI standing reporting form to make annual reports and to include numerical information. In addition, from a transparency and strengthening the NPT review process, Japan has submitted an additional working paper (NPT/CONF.2015/WP.32) which proposes that all States Parties have the opportunity to review the reports at the specific time during cluster I of the third PrepCon in 2019.

Mr. Chairman,

Second is deeper reduction of nuclear weapons and multilateralization of negotiations with all nuclear-weapons States. There have been developments in the field of nuclear disarmament since the 2010 RevCon, in particular the ratification and steady implementation of the New Start Treaty between the U.S. and Russia, as well as unilateral nuclear reduction measures implemented by France and the U.K. Japan welcomes these voluntary measures. However, it is indispensable for all nuclear-weapon States to comply with their unequivocal
undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons agreed in 2000 Review Conference. In addition, it is essential for all nuclear-weapon States to further reduce all types of nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons through a unilateral and bilateral basis, and eventually engage in multilateral negotiations with all nuclear-weapon States. In this regard, Japan expects that the current process of five nuclear-weapon States, or “N5 process”, will become a basis for eventual multilateral negotiations among N5. In particular, we appreciate China’s leadership as Chair of the glossary of nuclear terminology. We call upon nuclear-weapon States to continue their work on the glossary of nuclear terminology and to submit a report on an upgraded glossary during the next review process. Furthermore, pending the start of multilateral negotiation, Japan urges all nuclear-weapon States and other states possessing nuclear warheads to commit without delay in reducing their nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Third is an early commencement of treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT). An FMCT is an important building block in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We sincerely hope that the report adopted by the FMCT GGE and the draft treaty proposed by France will increase momentum for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). However, the vast majority of the international community is extremely frustrated by the CD’s long stalemate. If the CD continues to be unsuccessful in carrying out its duty and fails to rise above the current status quo, the raison d’etre of the CD will be called into question. We believe the best forum to negotiate an FMCT since there are all nuclear-weapon states and states possessing nuclear weapons. We continue to make our best efforts to begin an FMCT negotiation in the CD by 2020. If there is no progress in the CD by then, Japan proposes to consider negotiations outside the CD. Furthermore, until the entry into force of an FMCT, we strongly urge all nuclear-weapon States and states possessing nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Mr. Chairman,
Forth is the CTBT. The early entry into force of the CTBT is vital. Bearing in mind that the CTBT was opened for signature almost 20 years ago, Japan urges all countries that have not yet signed or ratified the Treaty, especially the eight remaining Annex 2 countries to take concrete actions to sign and ratify without further delay, and without waiting for other countries. The nuclear-weapon States should acknowledge once again that they have a special responsibility for the early entry into force of this Treaty. While the CTBT has not yet come into force, the fact that the nuclear test ban has been adhered to by the international community with very limited deviation is a proof that it has become a de facto international norm. We therefore call for early signature and ratification of the Treaty. Based on this reality, we strongly appeal to all nuclear-weapon States and other states that hold nuclear weapons to declare or maintain a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions until the entry into force of the Treaty, and we strongly urge all countries to refrain from any nuclear test. We believe that the new working paper on the CTBT that was recently submitted by Japan together with five other countries, which are active promoters of the CTBT, will contribute to the discussions at this Review Conference. As a country hosting the meeting of the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) that will be held in Hiroshima in August, and as a co-Chair of the Conference on Facilitating the 9th Entry into Force of the CTBT in September, Japan reaffirms its strong commitment and further support for the CTBT’s early entry into force.

Mr. Chairman,

Fifth point is humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. Joint statements and the three conferences that have been held since 2012 have brought more of an awareness to this issue. We expect that the issue of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons will contribute to strengthening the NPT regime. This issue should work for inclusive and universal discussion for all nuclear disarmament approaches, and should therefore not divide NPT States Parties. As the only country to have suffered atomic bombings, we believe that the discussions on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons should cross borders and generations, and work as a catalyst for nuclear disarmament. Furthermore, Japan supported the spirit of both joint statements on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that were delivered by Austria and
Australia during the General Debate, and we have joined them. Japan also supports a practical and concrete approach to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, and we reaffirm the necessity to continue to employ an appropriate security policy, taking into account the increasingly severe security environment that we currently face.

Mr. Chairman,

Finally, we believe that disarmament and non-proliferation education is a valuable tool to advance nuclear disarmament and that it can also deepen our understanding of the humanitarian issue. There are various approaches to achieve our common goal, but whatever the approach, disarmament and non-proliferation education can be promoted. Japan has a sense of urgency since the average age of atomic bomb survivors is around 80. It is therefore our primary task to pass on, particularly to younger generations, the tragedy that was caused by the use of nuclear weapons, the threat of diverse nuclear risks, and steps necessary to overcome these challenges. Moreover, this effort should be done with cooperation and collaboration among all actors, by using the recent ICT more effectively. Japan will continue to lead the international community in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation education, and to strive towards a peaceful and stable world free of nuclear weapons. In this regards, Japan requests this Conference in its outcome document, to call on the world’s political leaders and youth to visit Hiroshima and Nagasaki to witness the reality with their own eyes.

Thank you.