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# Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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## Third session

New York, 28 April-9 May 2014

### Nuclear disarmament post-New START

#### Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The Final Document of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons reaffirms the “unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI”.
2. Action 5 of the action plan spells out that the nuclear-weapon States “commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference”.
3. The present paper will focus on the fulfilment of action 4 of the 2010 action plan, which calls upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty). This call needs to be framed within the broader objectives set by action 3, which stipulates the commitment of nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral regional and multilateral measures. Other issues on nuclear disarmament have been dealt with in various working papers by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, such as a fissile material cut-off treaty ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.10](#)), the transparency of Nuclear Weapons ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12](#)), disarmament and non-proliferation education ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.14](#)), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.1](#)), non-strategic nuclear weapons ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.3](#)) and the reduced role of nuclear weapons ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.II/WP.4](#)).
4. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the unilateral measures undertaken in the past few years. We would welcome more activities in this regard. We note that, so far, the onus has been on bilateral dealings between the Russian Federation and the United States of America to work on bilateral nuclear



disarmament efforts. According to the Final Document of the Review Conference of 2010, a special responsibility lies with the States possessing the largest arsenals.

5. The Final Document also encourages the Russian Federation and the United States of America to “continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.” This emphasizes the fundamental conviction underpinning the action plan that nuclear disarmament is an ongoing endeavour which demands continuous progress. The 1995 decision on disarmament and non-proliferation states that with the end of the cold war and the ensuing easing of tensions, cooperation based on trust replaced the former antagonism.

6. The United States of America and the Russian Federation significantly reduced their nuclear arsenals after the end of the cold war. The successful completion of the Agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States of America concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, in December 2013, is also a very welcome development. 500 tons of Russian highly enriched uranium stockpiles (enough to fuel 20,000 nuclear weapons) have been converted into low-enriched uranium suitable for use as power reactor fuel. Efforts made first under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), and subsequently under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), are now being taken forward under the more comprehensive New START Treaty. With the full implementation of New START by 2018, the nuclear arsenals of the United States of America and the Russian Federation will return to the levels in existence before the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

7. In the light of this assessment, the obligations and commitments made at the Review Conferences since 1995, and in the spirit of the action plan, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative welcomes the offer made by the President of the United States of America, Barack Obama, on 19 June 2013 in Berlin to seek negotiated cuts with the Russian Federation and to further reduce deployed strategic nuclear weapons by up to one third. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expects that this offer provides a much needed perspective for the next round of nuclear weapons reductions in line with article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We hope that it will lead to progress in bilateral negotiations between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on a comprehensive reduction of nuclear weapons including non-strategic and non-deployed nuclear weapons, as the action plan of 2010 requires action with respect to all types of nuclear weapons.

8. While recognizing the positive impact of this trend in bilateral reductions, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recalls that this does not replace multilateral negotiations towards the ultimate elimination of all types of nuclear weapons regardless of their size and location, in accordance with article VI. Action 3 also recommends regional or multilateral measures, which have so far not materialized. In this context, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative expects that the ongoing dialogue among the nuclear-weapon States will lead to concrete and tangible results at the third session of the Preparatory Committee. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative looks forward to an intensification of this process, which must be a departure point or platform for future multilateral disarmament negotiations, particularly after the next bilateral United States-Russian disarmament round has been achieved.

9. The action plan stipulates that all nuclear-weapon States, not only the two States with the largest arsenals, should reduce all types of nuclear weapons in their stockpiles, deployed and non-deployed. Any build-up of nuclear arsenals runs counter to the obligations of nuclear weapon-States. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative remains deeply concerned about the reported build-up of nuclear arsenals by some States, against the clear intent of the international community to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In this context, we urge all nuclear-weapon States to continue, and in some cases, to start reducing their arsenals, with the objective of their total elimination.

10. Apart from this obligation, the action plan commits all nuclear-weapon States to refrain from developing or qualitatively improving nuclear weapons. They are called upon to end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

**On this basis, the 2015 Review Conference should:**

11. Welcome the ongoing implementation of New START and urge the United States of America and the Russian Federation to engage in a new round of negotiations and advance further steps in line with the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency.

12. Reiterate that the obligation to pursue nuclear disarmament concerns not only the two States with the largest arsenals and that, in due time, the other nuclear-weapon States should also take part in nuclear disarmament negotiations, bearing in mind that all States parties are called upon to engage in multilateral disarmament negotiations under the provisions of article VI. Pending such negotiations, nuclear-weapon States must undertake not to increase their nuclear holdings.

13. Call upon all nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to reduce their arsenals, regardless of their size, type or location, and to declare a moratorium on developing new warheads and new types of nuclear weapons, and on upgrading existing nuclear weapons or developing new missions for nuclear weapons. A further build-up of nuclear arsenals runs counter to the obligations under the action plan and article VI.

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