Joint Statement on Transport Security

24 March 2014

On the occasion of the Second Nuclear Security Summit held in Seoul, the Republic of Korea, on March 26-27, 2012, the leaders of the participating states of the Transport Security Gift Basket, namely France, the Republic of Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Japan issued an additional joint statement to express their further commitment to strengthen security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials to meet the intent of the Seoul Communiqué.

In this regard, the five participating states of this Basket conducted a table-top exercise (TTX) on November 12-14, 2013, in Tokyo, Japan, to share good practices, strengthen collaboration and promote the continuous improvement of transport operations. Participants included officials and experts from the five states as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency, and some observers from other states of the NSS, with facilitation by the World Institute for Nuclear Security, the World Nuclear Transport Institute, and the Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization. We, the five participating states of this Basket, on the occasion of the Third Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, share the attached TTX report with the other States.

Furthermore, we held two working group meetings to address the transport security issues amongst the representatives of the governments. As a result of the meetings, we decided to continue the working group activities until the next Nuclear Security Summit in 2016 and express our further commitment to work together for improving security in the transport of nuclear and other radioactive materials, including the following areas.

1. For appropriate national use of the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and the "IAEA Implementing Guide on the Security of Nuclear Material in Transport" (to be published)

(1) Current Status

- Much knowledge and experiences has been gained from past transports conducted throughout the world over the last decades. Historically, the security record of civilian transport of nuclear materials has been excellent and we must strive to maintain that record.
- Many countries have worked and continue working on the implementation of security measures
 regarding civil transport of nuclear materials, in compliance with the relevant international
 conventions and taking into account international recommendations as developed in
 INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.
- The IAEA Implementing Guide on the Security of Nuclear Material in Transport, which is soon

to be published by the IAEA, will be duly considered by states while implementing nuclear transportation-related measures.

(2) Future Activities

- The participating states of this Basket will consider <u>sharing information</u> on their efforts to implement their international obligations arising from the relevant international conventions and make proper use of the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and the "IAEA Implementing Guide on the Security of Nuclear Material in Transport" in their national practices, and cooperate with each other for more effective implementation, while protecting sensitive information.
- The participating states of this Basket may consider <u>conducting joint table-top exercises</u> for all transport modes (road, sea, rail and air) wherever and whenever feasible.
- The participating states of this Basket will propose to <u>share the results of above-mentioned</u> <u>activities with the IAEA and other states</u> while protecting sensitive information and actively <u>contribute to the IAEA's drafting efforts</u> of the Nuclear Security Series.
- Additional participating states are welcome, especially those who have experiences in rail and air transport.
- 2. For building close relationship among relevant government ministries and agencies as well as Centres of Excellence (CoE)/Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSC) to strengthen transport security and develop nuclear security culture

(1) Current Status

• In the area of transport security, collaboration among the relevant ministries and agencies as well as CoEs/NSSCs could be further enhanced with the exchange of more information such as good practices and lessons learned, while bearing in mind that sensitive information should be protected.

(2) Future Activities

- The participating states of this Basket propose to <u>closely communicate with CoEs/NSSCs</u> and <u>cooperate with relevant stakeholders to capture good practices and lessons learned</u> related to transport security and <u>share them among the participating states</u>.
- The participating states of this Basket will consider <u>including transport security into the training curricula</u> of the CoEs/NSSCs, and <u>dispatching experts</u> as instructors, where feasible, for education and training.
- When possible, the participating states of this Basket will <u>share the knowledge</u> obtained by the above-mentioned activities as much as possible <u>with other states</u> through activities such as training programmes, as a contribution to the efforts already conducted by the IAEA.

3. For research and development of nuclear security-related equipment and systems by related industries, relevant government ministries, agencies and CoEs/NSSCs

(1) Current Status

• Innovation of technology and development of new transportation methods, together with regulation and management, are utilized as measures to enhance nuclear security.

(2) Future Activities

- The participating states of this Basket continue to strongly <u>promote R&D</u> to improve effective transport security.
- The participating states of this Basket will <u>consider</u>, <u>where appropriate</u>, <u>cooperation in the development of technologies</u> to improve transport security.
- The participating states of this Basket will <u>encourage operators to introduce newly developed technologies to enhance the security of transportation</u>.
- 4. To assist other nations in the implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 Amendment as well as in the use, where appropriate, of the recommendations of INFCIRC/225/Rev5 and other IAEA guidances to acquire the capabilities to enhance the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in all modes of domestic and international transport

(1) Current Status

• Though the priority of the countries involved in international transport is domestic implementation of their international obligations and national regulations, many initiatives have been developed to help other states who request assistance to obtain expertise and technical support, for example, the UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. IAEA peer reviews also provide technical advice to beneficiary states on their national physical protection regime.

(2) Future Activities

- With due consideration to the necessary protection of sensitive information, the participating states of this Basket will consider <u>mutually exchanging information</u> on physical protection and the security of nuclear and other radioactive materials while in all modes of domestic and international transport, <u>in order to capture good practices and lessons learned</u>.
- The participating states of this Basket will consider <u>sharing good practices and lessons learned</u> <u>with other states</u> as much as possible in order to support them to implement international obligations and to use international recommendations such as INFCIRC/225/Rev.5.

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