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50 YEARS MSC

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The lone optimist

John Kerry's indefatigable Mideast diplomacy is tested to its limits | By Roger Cohen




Reaching out: John Kerry thanks a Swiss Air Force pilot after a helicopter ride across the Alps on his way home from the Syrian Peace Talks in Montreux.

When after his election in 1997 Tony Blair embarked on peace negotiations in Northern Ireland and refused to allow any setback to deter him, one of his close aides, Jonathan Powell, suggested to the prime minister that he had a “Messiah complex.” There is something of that complex about John Kerry, the US secretary of state.

Already defeated in the 2004 presidential campaign, with no ambitions for higher office, Kerry, 70, has brought to America's top diplomatic post a readiness to take political heat on the toughest dossiers: Iran and Israel-Palestine. In this he differs from his predecessor, Hillary Clinton, who viewed the job primarily through the prism of domestic political ambition. Kerry has restored diplomacy to the lexicon – the idea of tough give-and-take in pursuit of compromise. In an age of polarized certainties, the very notion of painful

trade-offs in the name of the suboptimal middle ground where peace is made had often appeared lost.

The Nov. 24 six-month interim deal between major powers and Iran constitutes the most important diplomatic event since 9/11. The ground has shifted.



Roger Cohen is a columnist for The New York Times.

Middle East

The warfare itch of the wounded has run its course in Washington. Negotiated largely between the United States and Iran, the deal marks the end of the traumatized alienation that has prevailed since the Islamic Revolution of 1979

first lodged the image of the bearded Islamist fanatic deep in the US psyche. The American acquiescence in November to a “mutually defined enrichment program” for Iran in any long-term agreement, and the Iranian commitment that “under no circumstances” will it “ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons,” constitute precisely the kind of painful compromise through which inimical relations may be reimagined. Yet the deal is now under threat.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has called it “a historic mistake.” The US Congress, generally in Netanyahu's thrall, has not been far behind. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor has demanded that Iran “irreversibly dismantle its nuclear stockpile and not be allowed to continue enrichment.” A bill that could impose further sanctions (and so scuttle the deal), authored by Senators Robert Menendez and Mark Kirk and backed by 59 co-sponsors in the Senate, also calls for complete Iranian

dismantling. This is precisely the Israeli position and tantamount to saying no agreement is possible.

Having acquired more than 18,000 centrifuges and a low-enriched stockpile of about 10,000 kilograms, Iran is not about to forgo enrichment entirely. The objective must be to ring-fence the acquired Iranian capability, subject it to vigorous international inspection, and reduce enrichment to a level where its use can only be for a peaceful, civilian program.

The alternative to such an agreement is a war of limited possible gains but limitless possible disasters, or living with a nuclear Iran (whether armed with a bomb or with the technology and enriched uranium for large-scale breakout). Some would call that a no-brainer.

Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian president, has come to Davos and declared,

continued on page 3

A global forum

By Wolfgang Ischinger

pants the opportunity to enhance their personal and political relationships and to better understand the positions of their partners or adversaries. While the early conferences were mainly a “transatlantic family meeting” focusing on European security, this family today meets with partners from across the globe and discusses a broader range of regional and global challenges.

Today, we welcome high-ranking participants from key rising powers, such as China, Brazil, and India. Both the

Arab uprisings and the debate about Iran's nuclear ambitions have brought leaders from the Middle East to Munich, sparking both controversial arguments and the opportunity for further dialogue on and off the conference stage.

Many urgent issues confront us in early 2014 – from the catastrophe in Syria and Iran's nuclear program to the NSA disclosures and European defense integration. Thus, only limited time will be available to celebrate our anniversary. But I hope you will pick up a copy

Wolfgang Ischinger, Germany's former ambassador to the US and the UK, is the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference since 2008.



of our book *Towards Mutual Security – Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference*, about which you will also be able to read in this edition of *The Security Times*. And I am thrilled that we will have a special anniversary panel on Saturday afternoon, which will bring together participants of the very first Wehrkunde conference with younger decision-makers.

Fortunately, the Cold War, the conflict that defined the agenda of the conference for decades, is long gone. But that does not mean that the Munich Security Conference's reason to exist has become obsolete. On the contrary: it may well be even more important in an era in which global governance in general, and international security in particular, is certain to become messier and more difficult to manage, and in which the transatlantic partners will have to both stick together as well as reach out to new partners. ■

Redefining the mission

NATO needs to better coordinate its collective defense, cost management and cooperative security strategies | By Alexander Nicoll



PICTURE ALLIANCE/LANDOV/MATJULIAN ACHAKZAI

The departure of NATO combat troops from Afghanistan this year will provide the cue for much public cogitation about the future of the Alliance. But when NATO leaders meet in Wales in September, they are most unlikely to seek to re-fashion it. In fact, the broad lines of the Alliance's post-Afghan future are already well defined.

At the time of the summit, there will still be plenty of uncertainty about the future of Afghanistan itself, and the multiple power struggles under way in the Middle East will be continuing. Against this background, leaders are likely to incline towards reasserting NATO's essential purposes.

These were set out with admirable clarity in the Strategic Concept of 2010, which defined three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. However, this does not mean that nations are devoting the necessary resources to achieve them. Important questions hang over members' willingness to participate in future operations, to maintain spending on defense and to co-operate to

obtain more effective capabilities.

The first core task, collective defense, is what defines NATO. Without a commitment to mutual defense in the event of an attack, there is no Alliance – though there is scope to consider again what, in the cyber-age, could be deemed an attack.

The second task, crisis management, has been NATO's primary focus since the end of the Cold War, with long-term operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan as well as smaller missions such as those in Libya and countering piracy off the Somali coast. Meanwhile, NATO members have participated in many other operations, notably in Iraq but also in Africa and elsewhere.

The end of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is being seen in some capitals as a watershed. But in fact, there is no obvious reason why demand for intervention in the world's hotspots should decline. In the past year, there have been two French-led expeditionary actions in Africa, and repeated calls for Western intervention in Syria's civil war. Like

the Libyan revolution in 2011, situations that prompt sudden action can rapidly arise, and are impossible to predict.

What is in question is the willingness of NATO governments to intervene. Their publics are weary of such actions. The British parliament's rejection in August 2013 of action against Syria over its use of chemical weapons provided evidence of this.



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Nevertheless, NATO's planners will assume that there will be more operations, and that the Alliance, as a primary instrument for crisis management, will be called upon again to lead some of them. Such operations may be unlikely to be as far away as Afghanistan, but could well be in parts of Africa.

This means there should be an emphasis on learning the lessons of past missions and on keeping up skills and collaborative experience through exercises. Most importantly, NATO would be rash to relax pressure on members to reform armed forces so as to make them more deployable and flexible. While NATO's European members still have some two million people under arms, a low proportion of them are deployable on crisis management missions.

The third core task, cooperative security, is the area where there is most scope for adapting the Alliance to deal with a changing world. Though talk of a 'global NATO' is hardly heard anymore, non-member nations such as Australia and South Korea have been active participants in ISAF, and strong partnerships with them will continue to be important as the United States 'rebalances' its military focus towards the Pacific. It is also important to work more in tandem with the European Union – and it was notable that Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen addressed the December 2013 EU summit session on defense.

An initiative can also be expected under which NATO would assist fragile states in building the capacity of their security establishments – and so help to ward off future crises that might demand intervention.

However, there remain question marks over NATO's ability to fulfil its goals. First – as mentioned – is the degree of willingness to commit to future interventions, and to maintain forces that can rapidly intervene. Second is the will to commit resources to defense as a whole: defense spending has been falling significantly in the United States and many European countries, and is likely to continue to do so. Rasmussen, for whom the September summit will be the last in his post, has been seeking to rekindle public awareness with his 'Defense Matters' initiative.

Third is the awareness of and commitment to NATO itself in member states' corridors of power. For many Americans, NATO means 'Europe' and is synonymous with inadequate commitment to sharing the world's defense burdens. In

Leaving Afghanistan, and what's next? Pakistani trucks transport NATO and US military vehicles out of Afghanistan, July 25, 2013.

Europe, civil servants plainly admit that commitments to the Alliance do not gain sufficient traction with their colleagues and political masters. This raises a question over NATO's long-term endurance – though this is countered by the fact that, when crises have arisen, leaders have repeatedly turned to NATO for military intervention.

The final question hangs – as it has done for many years – over NATO members' willingness to embark on more effective cooperation with each other so as to obtain together better capabilities than they are able to maintain alone with reduced budgets. Two years ago, Rasmussen said his Smart Defense cooperation initiative offered 'a new way for NATO and Allies to do business.' But members have hardly embraced it as such: there is some progress, but much more could be done. This perhaps is the greatest barrier to NATO's capacity to forge a post-Afghan future. ■

Beyond burden-sharing

What the Asian pivot, the NSA spying scandal and European austerity mean for the future of NATO | By Stanley R. Sloan

In the wake of the shift in American commitments and resources toward Asia, revelations of US spying on allied leaders has strained transatlantic relations at a time when allies are contemplating the relevance of NATO to their security requirements. Is this community of shared values and interests, with NATO at its heart, worth maintaining? If transatlantic ties are still important to North American and European democracies, does this relationship need an institutional core and, if so, is NATO up to the task?

Economic conditions throughout the alliance have forced governments to reduce discretionary spending. For most of them, this has entailed further cuts in military budgets, and therefore in forces available for use by NATO. The United States, as part of the "pivot" toward Asia, has been shrinking its military presence in Europe, which some Americans believe is long overdue.

American policy is driven in part by traditional burden-sharing concerns. From Senator Mike Mansfield in 1961 to former Secretary of Defense Bob Gates in 2011 and current Pentagon chief Chuck Hagel in 2013, Americans

have consistently chided Europeans for not bearing a sufficient share of the collective security burden. This perception drives both the perpetual US burden-sharing complaint and the hope (or expectation) that the European Union will become sufficiently cohesive to allow the United States to abandon its leading role in the alliance. These sentiments are decades old, but are often dressed up in new clothing to suit the style of the times.

That a burden-sharing issue continues should not be surprising. In an alliance of democracies, national leaders will attempt to provide the highest level of security for their nation at the lowest possible cost. For the United States, NATO's largest single economy and generally the alliance's most ambitious foreign policy actor, the cost imposed by smaller allies is their reliance on whatever defense efforts the United States is willing and able to maintain.

NATO has always been more than a simple military alliance, representing values and interests shared by the member states. Yet the organization never has had the mandate from the member states required to put those shared

values and interests into action, save for the field of military cooperation. Over the past several years, NATO communiqués and its new strategic concept have reflected the need to take comprehensive approaches to security. Such approaches call for focusing the allied security eye on the broad range of factors that create security challenges, and to address those factors before crises turn to armed conflict.

The next important step toward NATO's future might well be trying to move beyond the traditional parameters of the burden-sharing debate in order to build consensus behind the idea of the transatlantic alliance as a central coordinating point for cooperative efforts to promote peace and security, rather than simply to deal with armed conflicts.

NATO, in some ways, already has moved in this direction. The wide range of cooperative security efforts found in the partnerships the alliance has established on a global scale provides a test bed for the possible transformation of NATO from an organization perceived only as a "military alliance" to one that relies increasingly on diplomatic and economic instruments of security,

backed up by a still-relevant set of interoperable military capabilities.

Such an approach would not let allies off the hook for providing required military capabilities for security of the collective, but it would broaden the possibilities for integrating more effectively



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on the transatlantic level the non-military instruments of security available to all allied governments.

However, this and other suggestions to improve NATO cooperation will seem like rearranging chairs on the deck of the Titanic if the alliance loses political support in its member states. With US secrets leaker Edward Snowden enjoying "temporary asylum" in Russia, the issue of how to deal with Putin's authoritarian government has now taken on a new

sense of urgency. Crises in the Middle East will continue to challenge US and European interests.

There are those on both sides of the Atlantic who see the current transatlantic crossroads as an opportunity to dispense with the paternalistic US role in the alliance, leaving European countries finally to take responsibility for their own security. European advocates of "more Europe" in defense are joined by Americans who argue that only by removing the US "crutch" will the Europeans learn to stand on their own, relieving the United States of both responsibilities and financial burdens.

As a convinced Atlanticist, I believe the United States should continue to refine its presence in Europe while maintaining a forward air, land and sea presence sufficient to support contingencies in Europe or in the Middle East region. It should also tailor the force to ensure that it will support joint training with our allies as well as demonstrate that the United States wants to continue an effective military partnership with the NATO allies and partners. This would not be a presence shaped to "defend" Europe from an attack that is not

coming, but rather would seek to maintain the capability for the United States and the Europeans to combine forces under a NATO command when political decisions are made to act militarily on behalf of allied interests.

At the same time, allied governments should enhance their collective ability to use NATO to promote effective utilization of non-military instruments of security, ranging from intelligence sharing and concerted diplomatic efforts to building consensus for economic incentives (assistance) and sanctions. Planning at NATO should increasingly bring allied political advisors into the mix with military officers to promote broad-based approaches to security threats and opportunities.

Perhaps it is the time to have a wide-ranging debate about these issues, hopefully infused with the belief that transatlantic cooperation remains vital to nations on both sides of the Atlantic. If NATO remains perceived as, and only acts as, a military alliance, the institutional framework for the transatlantic community will be sorely lacking the relevant commitments and tools needed to deal with 21st century challenges. ■

After Afghanistan

In an era of intervention fatigue NATO has to define its future course | By Theo Sommer



Mission accomplished?

GNP. A massive economic collapse seems likely once the bulk of the ISAF forces and the international organizations grouped around them leaves the country.

Worse, however, is the political situation. President Hamid Karzai's erratic leadership has been characterized by dysfunctional governance, financial mismanagement, and pervasive graft. The political consensus between the different Afghan factions has frayed. Reconciliation with the Taliban has been attempted but only half-heartedly, while a political settlement including all the neighbors in the region has not even been broached.

NATO plans to withdraw the last combat troops by the end of 2014. No one knows what will happen after that. The options include renewed civil war, ethnic partition, a return of the Taliban, or a post-Karzai administration with enough Western support to manage the transition to a more peaceful and prosperous future.

Beyond Afghanistan, NATO faces the fundamental question of its continuing purpose. The allies have finally grasped a lesson they could have learned much earlier: that military interventions, with or without a UN mandate, whether for apparently compelling national interests or for humanitarian reasons, regularly turn out to be more difficult than expected, last longer and cost more than planned, and rarely produce the desired result.

Americans and Europeans alike have become more reluctant to rush into ultimately unwinnable wars. The resounding "No" of the British House of Commons to involvement in Syria, the skepticism in the US Congress that forced President Barack Obama to drop his attack plans, and the overwhelming rejection of another Middle-Eastern war by the European public clearly reveal a new mindset. Even the French now seem worried about getting bogged down in the desert sands. The new grand coalition government in Germany is prepared to assume more responsibility within the alliance, but its reluctance to deploy combat troops is undiminished. To that extent, its "culture of restraint" lives on – and it appears to be catching on elsewhere.

NATO strategists argue that the alliance should remain focused on expeditionary forces for contingencies beyond its borders. Refocusing on territorial defense would amount to strategic regression, they believe.

They realize, of course that, absent an unambiguously existential threat like that posed by the former Soviet Union, the allies will react quite differently to contingencies arising in far-away regions. Donald Rumsfeld's concept of "coalitions of the willing" is back in full force.

When Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen talks about post-Afghanistan NATO morphing from operational engagement to operational readiness,

one would like to know what kind of contingencies should we be thinking of? The alliance must be able to meet any eventuality, he says, but where is even a vague allusion to what these contingencies might be?

And, how can NATO resolve the dilemma that coalitions of the willing depend to a large extent on contributions from the "unwilling" to maintain joint NATO assets such as AWACS surveillance aircraft, forward bases in Germany and elsewhere, or integrated command structures?

With defense budgets being squeezed and slashed everywhere, intervention fatigue is powerfully reinforced by a growing awareness that political ambitions must be tailored to diminishing military means; that punching continuously above our weight is going to be self-defeating.

For 60 years, NATO has served us well. We must not abandon it, nor let it wither away. As a "fleet in being," to use a historical metaphor, safeguarding



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our security, it is still extremely valuable. It should not, however, go out in search of monsters to slay. Lawrence Freedman is right: just existing is its vital role in this day and age – "it does not need to be active and busy." Such a minimalist rationale may not satisfy the NATO insiders. But outsiders – our politicians, our publics – will increasingly insist on being heard.

Experience indicates that no mammoth organization easily adapts or reforms under its own steam. Perhaps it is time to set up a high-ranking international commission to conduct a wide-ranging debate about the present problems of the Atlantic Alliance and define its future course?

How can the allies still benefit from military cooperation, albeit at a lower level of threat and activity? Do they still share enough interests and values to provide the indispensable basis of trust, especially after the NSA snooping scandal? These questions need to be answered.

Fifty years ago, when the allies were quarreling about what should be accorded priority, defense or détente, the Harmel Report – based on the work done by a Special Group of Representatives – defined a wide-ranging compromise that served to reassert alliance unity and cohesion. Ultimately, it blazed the trail to the West's victory in the Cold War. A similar joint effort today could set the scene for NATO to play a meaningful, realistic and convincing role in the globalized world over the next decades. ■

The lone optimist



Wall Street Journal: "American diplomacy now has three major tasks: to define a level of Iranian nuclear capacity limited to plausible civilian uses and to achieve safeguards to ensure that this level is not exceeded; to leave open the possibility of a genuinely constructive relationship with Iran; and to design a Middle East policy adjusted to new circumstances."

I do not believe a long-term nuclear deal is possible in hermetic isolation – that is to say

without a breakthrough toward a constructive US and European relationship with Iran. The Iranian nuclear program has done many things – but producing a weapon or any significant electricity is not among them. It has been a political statement – an expression of Iran's rejection of American tutelage, an assertion of technological pride, and a proclamation of revolutionary independence. It will require a political solution that goes beyond a dis-cussion of centrifuges.

The Islamic Republic has made its point. To keep hammering at it will condemn Iran to marginalization and impoverishment. The West is not what it was in 1979. We have entered the Age of Reluctance. No single power has the treasure or inclination to impose its will. It is unlikely that a more propitious moment will come for a deal. Yet, as with Israel-Palestine, the interests entrenched against one another are powerful. For more than six months now Israelis and Palestinians have been negotiating under Kerry's auspices. That is the only achievement: keeping the parties in a room. Otherwise, the signs are bad. There has been a steady uptick in violence. Settlement construction continues in the West Bank, infuriating Palestinians. An Israeli ministerial committee has advanced legislation to annex settlements in the Jordan Valley. Saeb Erekat, the chief Palestinian negotiator, has suggested this "finishes all that is called the peace process." The Palestinian Authority is undemocratic and corrupt. The promise of a Palestinian election has gone nowhere. So, too, has the promise of Fatah-Hamas reconciliation.

The Israeli government has several members who find the notion of a Palestinian state risible.

Then there is the rebounding Israel-is-a-Jewish-state bugbear: Netanyahu wants Palestinians to recognize his nation as such. His argument is that this is the touchstone by which to judge whether Palestinians will accept "the Jewish state in any border" – whether, in other words, the Palestinian leadership would accept territorial compromise or is still set on reversal of 1948 and mass return to Haifa. Mahmoud Abbas, the Palestinian president, says no; this "nyet" will endure. For Palestinians, such a form of recognition would amount to explicit acquiescence to second-class citizenship for the 1.6 million Arabs in Israel; undermine the rights of millions of Palestinian refugees; and demand of them something not demanded from Egypt or Jordan in peace agreements.

One way to avoid discouragement over an Iran deal is to conclude that Israel-Palestine is even more difficult. Perhaps that consoles Kerry. A better, more inclusive, less violent Middle Eastern

order can be built. Iran and the United States have much to learn from each other. Their enmity is outdated. Israel will be safer in the long run with an Iran that has demonstrated its nuclear program is only peaceful, restored to its rightful place among nations; an Iran with cordial, even profound, disagreements with the United States but not at war with it, an Iran with closer ties to Europe. Cheap allusions to 1938 are a poor template for Israel in the 21st century. But they are persistent.

Just because diplomacy is back, does not mean it will succeed. Kerry's Messiah complex will be tested to the limit. ■

As the Munich Security Conference celebrates its fiftieth year, the anniversary meeting is likely to be the scene of many pleasant encounters, as friends old and new gather to discuss global issues of defense and security. Much less pleasant is that many of the problems facing the participants are all too familiar. And there is no shortage of new crises and challenges crowding onto our agenda.

The European Union, solid bedrock of German foreign and security policy, has gone through a rough patch with the debt and banking crisis. Much of our attention is focused inwards to rebuild confidence in the EU and to strengthen both its competitiveness in a globalized economy and its internal social and political cohesion. Success in that endeavor is critical to our ability to act beyond our immediate borders.

South and east of the Mediterranean a political awakening rocked the established order in early 2011. Three years later, we see a few hopeful developments, such as in Tunisia, where an inclusive process of political reform is underway. Yet, we also see many worrying developments. In some places a return of repression, in others a fragmentation of political and state order that threatens to destabilize the whole region of the Sahel, and worst of all, the unabating carnage in Syria, where peaceful protest was brutally suppressed, gradually turning an opportunity for political transition into the nightmare of a bloody civil war.

In Europe's eastern neighborhood, the people of Ukraine, not for the first time, but more intensively than ever before, are struggling to set their own course for the future. Tensions are running high, with a real danger of still greater bloodshed and ultimately, new dividing lines on our continent.

The transatlantic relationship, always the core of the Munich Security Conference and at the same time the core of Germany's



"A vibrant, strong Franco-German core at the heart of the EU is the indispensable first step towards a peaceful, prosperous Europe and a more cohesive and proactive European foreign, security and defense policy." German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier (l.) meets his French counterpart Laurent Fabius, Jan. 21, 2014 in Paris.

for the lack of diplomacy, the lack of creativity, the lack of institutions to peacefully settle disputes and conflicting national interests and the lack of sober assessments of the cost of war. Rereading the accounts of those weeks in 1914 is a powerful reminder of the enduring value of diplomacy for a world as interconnected and interdependent as ours in the age of globalization. The complexity of our challenges defies easy answers. We need to be meticulous in our analysis, courageous in defusing tensions and creative in building a more sustainable and peaceful world.

Finally, 1914 holds another lesson to be reaffirmed. La Grande Guerre, as every French pupil learns to call it in school, was neither the first nor the last Franco-German war. But it was by far the bloodiest. When we remember the battles of the Marne and the Somme, the terrible slaughter in the trenches of Verdun, we are forcefully reminded not only of how far we have come in leaving this past behind us, but also of how crucial Franco-German reconciliation and cooperation is for practically every challenge that we face within and beyond our European Union. A vibrant, strong Franco-German core at the heart of the EU is the indispensable first step towards a peaceful, prosperous Europe and a more cohesive and proactive European foreign, security and defense policy. The centrality of this lesson is indeed not so new – and yet it has always required tenacity and creativity to translate it into practical action. To start with we could do nothing better than to re-invest all the tenacity and creativity we can muster into this relationship. ■

Throughout this year, we will remember the beginning of World War I. In our commemoration, we should point out the lessons those fateful weeks of July 1914 hold for diplomacy – or rather, what terrible price our continent paid

Rethink, retool, reaffirm

German foreign policy 25 years after the fall of the Iron Curtain

By Frank-Walter Steinmeier

security, is torn between great opportunities – such as the negotiations on a broad Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) promising to reinvigorate our economic and political ties – and the great challenges of the digital age that have exposed deep differences over the proper balance of liberty and security in the aftermath of leaked NSA documents.

At the same time, new powers have emerged beyond our shores, with entire economies having become part of the global production chain and millions of people lifted out of poverty in Asia, Latin America and Africa in that process we call globalization. But the rise of new powers poses new challenges. Old orders are put under strain, dependencies produce vulnerabilities and frictions, competing ambitions are not always easily reconciled. In a broader sense it is increasingly hard to satisfy the

demand for more and more efficient global governance, be it to address the challenges of climate change, of financial instability or of establishing reliable rules for cyberspace.

In order to deal successfully with these challenges, the European Union needs an integrated approach to foreign and security policy. This approach should not be based on strategy alone, but also include a pragmatic view of the available instruments as well as the conditions for their use. Germany has understood that it can only act as an influential country as part of a globally powerful Europe. Therefore, Germany feels responsible for developing such a European foreign policy to enable Europe to be a global player.

For that purpose, German foreign policy would do well to take stock of the solid foundations of the unprecedented period of

democracy, peace and prosperity in which we live, now in its seventh decade. But in order to secure those foundations for the future, it is no longer enough to simply repeat and reapply the conventional wisdom of years past. We need to ask ourselves tough questions and we need to think harder about creative answers. We need to rethink our assumptions and approaches in the face of new challenges. We need to retool the instruments of diplomacy and of security policy in the light of the difficult experiences of the last decade and we need to adapt them to the tasks of today and tomorrow. And finally, we need to reaffirm the very core that will continue to guide our foreign policy.

In order to rethink and to retool, I want to put on track a broad review of Germany's foreign policy over the course of the next twelve months. We will start by solicit-

ing an outside perspective from experts all over the world on the parameters and performance of our foreign and security policy. This will help to breathe new life into our German thinking. But what we need is more than a scholarly discussion. We want to initiate a broader public debate on the proper definition of our interests, the degree of our interdependence, the limits of our capabilities and the scope of our responsibilities. It is only on the basis of such a public debate and through a lively exchange with an informed public that we can build a responsible and sustainable German foreign and security policy.

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
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The founder: a hero

Angela Merkel The success story of the Munich Security Conference is and remains first and foremost linked to the name Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist. As a young lieutenant, he was one of those willing to risk their lives in the resistance to Hitler. After the end of World War II, the promotion of transatlantic relations was a matter very close to his heart. A key expression of this endeavor was the establishment of the International Wehrkunde Conference fifty years ago, later renamed the Munich Security Conference, which Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist developed within a short space of time into a central forum for exchanging views on transatlantic security policy and which he chaired until 1998. This conference offered an excellent opportunity for Germany to actively take part in the dialogue on the global political situation.

John McCain The Munich Security Conference, for me, will always be synonymous with Ewald von Kleist. It was Ewald who created the annual Wehrkunde conference fifty years ago. It was Ewald who turned it into the world's premier gathering for policymakers, military officials, civil society leaders, and journalists to debate the world's most pressing security challenges and strive to overcome them. And despite his passing last year at the age of ninety, it is Ewald who will always be Wehrkunde's deepest inspiration, just as he was my inspiration for over thirty years as well as a personal hero and friend to me.

I have known quite a few brave and inspiring people in my life, but never anyone quite as brave as Ewald von Kleist, who twice prepared to sacrifice his life to rid the world of one of the cruelest, most depraved, and dangerous tyrants in history. It is never easy to answer fully the demands of conscience and always to have the courage of your convictions. There is always some price to be paid to live that nobly.



Experts talking: Ewald von Kleist and Henry Kissinger.



Kleist's successors: former national security advisor Horst Teltschik (1998-2008, r.) and Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (since 2008).

Sam Nunn The Munich Security Conference has both influenced and paralleled my five decades of interest and involvement in the security field. At the helm at its founding in 1963, Ewald von Kleist was an inspirational figure and a hero – a man who through his leadership of this forum helped inspire, support, shape, and maintain NATO's firm and sustained response to the threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. He was also one of the first to recognize, in the early nineties, that the post-Cold War era presented both new challenges and new opportunities and that we must think anew. This remarkable forum has played an enormous role on numerous fronts during its five decades of influence.

Igor S. Ivanov When Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist inceptioned the Munich Security Conference, he realized that the division of Europe that had resulted from the outcome of World War II was a temporary phenomenon that did not reflect the longterm interests of Europeans in the East and in the West of our continent. The whole idea behind the Munich conference was to create a locus for an open dialogue between politicians, military leaders, and independent experts on how to build a new Europe that enjoyed democracy, security, and prosperity for all Europeans.

Today, this vision of the Munich Security Conference remains as compelling as ever. The Cold War ended more than twenty years ago, but Europe is not yet united.

Testimonials taken from: "Towards Mutual Security – Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference," (editor Wolfgang Ischinger, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).



Ewald von Kleist and German Defense Minister Franz Josef Strauß, 1962.



US SALT negotiator Paul Nitze, 1986.



German Chancellor Helmut Kohl with a wounded thumb, 1996.



Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton after signing the New Start Treaty in Munich, 2011.



German Chancellor Angela Merkel in a lively discussion with Afghan President Hamid Karzai, 2011.



Senator John McCain, United States, displaying The Security Times, 2012.



Nobel Peace Prize laureate Tawakkol Karman from Yemen, 2012.



Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen, Singapore, 2013.



President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Liberia, 2013.



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Two highlights of the MSC: Joschka Fischer (left picture, r.) telling Donald Rumsfeld: "Sorry, I am not convinced" (2003). Right picture: Vladimir Putin attacking the United States in 2007: "We are witness to an uncontrolled power that disregards the fundamental rules of international law."

A remarkable forum

Fifty Years of the Munich Security Conference

By Oliver Rolofs



PHOTO: K. HONIG



Guido Westerwelle (Germany), Hillary Clinton (US), Leon E. Panetta (US), NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen (from left).

In early 1963, at the height of the Cold War, a conference of German and international security experts and defense officials convened for the first time in the Bavarian capital Munich. Few, if any, of those present will have had an inkling that the "Wehrkunde Conference," as it was then known, would develop into arguably the world's leading independent foreign and security policy forum.

The Munich Security Conference (MSC), as the defense gathering is now known, is meeting for the fiftieth time, bringing together some of the most important decision-makers in the fields not just of defense and security but also of politics and economics. The history of the Munich Security Conference aptly illustrates the dramatic changes to the parameters of the global international foreign and security infrastructure.

At the time of the Cold War there were reasons enough for holding such a conference. The Berlin Wall shocked the Bonn Republic, as did allegations in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* that the West German military, the Bundeswehr, was not fit for purpose. The Cuban Missile Crisis had brought the world to the brink of a nuclear war.

In setting up the Wehrkunde Conference, which he chaired from 1963 to 1998, founder Baron Ewald-Heinrich von Kleist (1922–2013) aimed to bring together decision-makers and

officials to discuss individual security interests with US and European partners in an atmosphere of trust. His hope was that these exchanges would focus attention in Washington, London and Paris. At the time, his intention to strengthen transatlantic ties via a frank exchange of views was more than justified.

As a frontline nation in the Cold War, Germany lived under the constant threat of complete destruction in a nuclear-armed conflict. Throughout his life, Kleist's security credo was based on his understanding that security policy was responsible for saving lives and avoiding bloodshed. Kleist had been a member of the group of conspirators around Colonel Claus Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, who launched an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Adolf Hitler on July 20, 1944.

Wehrkunde Conference attendants from that era – former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former German Chancellors Helmut Schmidt and Helmut Kohl, former German Defense Minister Manfred Wörner or the Bavarian politician Franz Josef Strauß did succeed in drawing comprehensive attention to strategic security issues, underscoring Kleist's credo in an age of high-risk confrontation between East and West.

Both then and later there was not always agreement on security issues on both sides of the Atlantic. The conference was often used

as a neutral arena for settling differences, in particular the disputes over military burden sharing, the intricacies of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and decreasing defense budgets.

Newspaper headlines such as "NATO's beams are creaking," "Atlantic arm-wrestling in Munich," or "Harsh words in a club atmosphere" were evidence of controversial and heated discussions in the conference hall of, initially, the Hotel Regina, then the Bayerische Hof, now the traditional location for the annual meeting. But each time, the point made by German General Gerd Schmückle at the 18th Security Conference in 1981 usually prevailed: "Of course, we Europeans are complicated allies. But do you find better ones anywhere in the world?"

The end of the Cold War resulted in new debates in Munich. For von Kleist topics like building a common European security architecture, Washington's extended role as world policeman, NATO's eastward enlargement and the conflicts in former Yugoslavia became top agenda items. The new era was marked by a wave of system transformations throughout the world. However, it quickly turned out that this did not mean the "end of history" forecasted by Francis Fukuyama. In reality, the end of the bipolar order did not make the world any safer.

Adopting the motto "peace through dialogue" and renaming the meeting Munich Conference for Security Policy, the new conference director, Horst Teltschik, tried to further intensify the exchange of ideas between the North Atlantic partners, while for the first time also taking a look at the nations in Asia. Teltschik, a former advisor on foreign and security issues to Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was Director of the Munich Security Conference from 1999 to 2008.

By the beginning of the new millennium, the conference agenda was dominated by the asymmetric threats emanating from international terrorism and the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. This led again to controversial debates in Munich. The legendary exchange of blows on the eve of the third Gulf War in 2003 between US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer will always be remembered. Fischer's comment: "Sorry, I am not convinced", with which he confronted Rumsfeld, mirrored the attitude most Europeans then assumed towards the Iraq war and marked a low point in transatlantic relations.

In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated that the Cold War was still casting its shadow on the international scene. In his speech in Munich he harshly attacked the

United States, accusing it of provoking a new arms race as a result of its unilateralist policies., including statements such as "We are witness to an uncontrolled power that disregards the fundamental rules of international law," he ranted, adding "[America's] military adventures cost the lives of thousands of peaceful people" This frontal – albeit rhetorical – attack on Washington marked another watershed moment in the history of the Security Conference.

In 2008, Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger took over the chairmanship from Horst Teltschik. In the past few years, the former state secretary in the Federal Foreign Office and German Ambassador to Washington and London has further extended the thematic scope and the global outreach of the conference. It has become a global forum reflecting the shifts of power in the early 21st century and the changed security scenery in a world in which the gravity center of power and wealth is shifting eastward.

The Munich Security Conference has long since become an integral part of the international calendar of high-level meetings – the "Davos of security policy." Held at the beginning of each year, it provides information, orientation and networking opportunities for decision-makers as well as media leaders.

In 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin demonstrated that the Cold War was still casting its shadow on the international scene. In his speech in Munich he harshly attacked the

proceedings. Among the approximately 400 attendees from more than 70 countries there is also an increasing number of leading industrialists, joined by representatives of international and nongovernmental organizations.

The topics debated are no longer limited to strictly military issues. Thus, the effects of the financial crisis threaten to jeopardize the stability and security of states. Cyberwar, climate change, scarcity of energy and resources, population growth and migration have increasingly become a focus of interest, as they, too, pose potential threats to peace, stability and prosperity. More traditional security issues are, of course, by no means neglected. The ramifications of the revolutions in the Arab world and the turmoil in sub-Saharan Africa

Today, it is – more than ever – the task of the Munich Security Conference to bring the global security community together once a year for frank and fruitful discussions about foreign and security issues. As in the past half-century, eliciting fresh ideas and seminal visions for global peace, order and stability will remain its central concern in the next fifty years, too.

Oliver Rolofs is press spokesperson of the Munich Security Conference.

sented. The presence of senior Russian ministers such as Igor Ivanov, Sergei Ivanov, and Sergei Lavrov, and the attendance of such prominent American figures as Hillary Clinton and John McCain are very important ingredients; the United States Congress is consistently well represented as well. Discussions and speeches are frank and sometimes downright provocative, but the channels of dialogue are open.

John Kerry The Munich Security Conference has become a truly global security policy forum – and we need that kind of thoughtful, creative, nonpartisan input on tough issues now more than ever. We face tremendous foreign policy and national security challenges worldwide – from helping countries manage peaceful, democratic transitions in the Middle East and preventing violence, conflict, and terrorism from engulfing key partners to leading humanitarian responses to forestall drought, famine, and natural disasters.

We need a strong, prosperous, and confident Europe to meet these challenges – and Europe needs our unwavering commitment and support. As we look to the future demands that will define our alliance, we must continue to adapt to meet new threats and push forward a transatlantic renaissance to seize the common possibilities that lie ahead of us.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen When I arrived at NATO headquarters in Brussels in August 2009 to start my job as secretary general, the dates of the next Munich Security Conference were already blocked in my calendar. I was well aware of the conference's unique reputation as a focal point of the international security debate, and I was keen to contribute to that debate. So every year since 2009, I have looked forward to coming to Munich, to set out my vision for the Alliance, and to discuss new initiatives to turn that vision into reality. (...) If our experience over the past five decades is any indication, the fiftieth Munich Security Conference will provide an excellent opportunity to help set the stage for what will be a key year for NATO.



The Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facilities (UCF), 420 kilometers south of Tehran (picture from 2005).

AP/GETTY IMAGES/SEHOLZ MEHR

Rapprochement is not impossible

As non-Arab Middle East countries, Israel and Iran once had many shared interests | By Avi Primor

The current state of relations between Israel and Iran cannot be understood without at least some knowledge of ties between the two countries before the 1979 Iranian Revolution – and even about the relations between the two countries in the very first years of Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime. Israelis like to stress the ancient historical background of the exceptionally emotive relations between the two countries. Some 2,500 years ago, Emperor Cyrus the Great allowed the Jewish exiles in Babylon to return to Jerusalem, to rebuild their temple, and with it to revive their political framework. As a result, Cyrus is the only non-Jew who appears in the Holy Scriptures as someone akin to a saint or a truly righteous leader. If there is any comparison to be made between those ancient times and the 20th century, it must be the bonds between the Jewish state and Persia, physically separated from one another by the territories of common enemies. This is the natural background for the Tehran-Jerusalem alliance. Modern Iran is an Islamic country, part of the Islamic world surrounding Israel. Yet it is not an Arab country, hence it has contradictory interests when dealing with Israel.

In 1947, Iran voted together with the Arab countries in the UN General Assembly against the Palestine Partition Plan, thus rejecting the independence of a Jewish state. In 1950, however, Iran recognized Israel, and after Turkey became the second non-Arab Islamic country to do so. Officially there were no diplomatic relations between Iran and Israel, but in reality the two countries conducted a very intensive diplomatic relationship. Iran established a consulate in Jerusalem, and Israel established one of its most important embassies in Tehran, albeit an embassy that was never officially declared as such. The members of the Israeli diplomatic corps in Iran were not listed on the official list of foreign diplomats accredited in Tehran and published annually by the Iranian Foreign Ministry. Nonetheless, they were treated with all the honors and privileges of foreign diplomats, and even of very important diplomats, by all the echelons of the Iranian state. From 1953, the Israeli national airline El Al operated a daily flight from Tel Aviv to Tehran. This flight also served as the connection between Israel and East and South Africa. From Tehran, planes flew southwest to Nairobi and Johannesburg.

The El Al plane would also bring the diplomatic courier, collected by an Israeli embassy official in a car with diplomatic license plates at the airport. All this was in full view. Yet the El Al flights were not listed on the arrival/departure board of the Tehran airport and there was no official aviation agreement between the two countries. More important were the economic, political, military and security relations. When the relations between the two countries were severed by the Ayatollah regime in 1979, around 1,700 Israeli advisors and businessmen had to leave the country. Most of them served as advisors in various Iranian ministries, armed forces and secret services. Many represented Israeli firms with investments in Iran, mainly in city planning and construction and in the development of modern agriculture. The tremendous trade between the two countries, including Israeli arms exports, made Iran one of Israel’s top trading partners worldwide. The most spectacular aspect of the common interests between the two countries was the joint venture in exporting Iranian oil via Israel. When, as a result of the 1956 war against Egypt, the Suez Canal was closed, a pipeline was built between Eilat on the Red Sea and

Ashkelon on the Mediterranean, to transport Iranian oil to Israel. Eleven years later, after the Six Day War, another pipeline was built, ten times as big as the first one. It was destined to supply Europe via Israel with 350 million barrels of oil per annum under the camouflage of a neutral Canadian company. The investment in the pipeline, as well as in the tankers that carried the oil from Israel to Europe, was shared equally by



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the two governments. So was the ownership of the entire project. Under these circumstances, Israel, the main target of the Arab oil boycott 1967, and particularly after 1973, after the Yom Kippur War, never suffered from an oil shortage, nor did the Europeans or even the Americans. All this was abruptly halted by the Ayatollah’s regime. In the beginning, Israelis thought that the new regime’s stance would not

differ greatly from that of the Shah, believing that the raison d’État would lead the new master of Iran to renew the cooperation with Israel for its own benefit. The raison d’État of Ayatollah Khomeini was, however, something very different. His aim was not the strengthening of the Iranian state, but the imposition of Iranian Islamic leadership over the entire Islamic world, and particularly that of the Arabs. In pursuing this ambition, Israel was perceived as an obstacle. Precisely at the moment of the overthrow of the Shah, Israel signed its first peace agreement with the most important Arab country. Egypt was a traditional rival of Iran and in 1979 the only country in the world to grant asylum to the exiled Shah and his family. That does not mean that the Ayatollahs did not also have classical raison d’État considerations concerning Israel. When they were engaged in a fateful war against Iraq during the 1980s, they did not hesitate to purchase arms, including missiles and warplanes, from Israel, albeit in secret. Israel saw in this not only a commercial interest, but also a chance for a renewal of the extremely important cooperation with this giant neighboring country. After the Iran-Iraq war the Iranian regime returned to its ini-

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A platform for a broader agenda? Iran and six world powers reached a breakthrough agreement on Nov. 24, 2013, to curb Tehran’s nuclear programme in exchange for limited sanctions relief, in a first step towards resolving a dangerous decade-old standoff. British Foreign Secretary William Hague (left), US Secretary of State John Kerry (3rd from left), EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton.

The world powers and Iran signed an interim nuclear deal on Nov. 24, 2013, with plans to begin a new round of talks to reach a mutually agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran’s nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.

Compromise by all parties on the elements of the final comprehensive deal would be key to success. Former US Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz in an opinion piece for the *Wall Street Journal* on Dec. 2, 2013, outlined the three major tasks for American diplomacy right now: “To define a level of Iranian nuclear capacity limited to plausible civilian uses and to achieve safeguards that ensure that this level is not exceeded; to leave open the possibility of a genuinely constructive relationship with Iran; to design a Middle East policy adjusted to new circumstances”.

Further statements by informed US figures suggest that in a final deal, the US will ask Iran to accept strict limitations on its nuclear program beyond the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such measures include dismantling a significant portion of existing centrifuges and Low Enriched Uranium stockpiles (LEU); closure of Fordo, the second enrichment site near the city of Qom; elimination of the Ark heavy water research reactor; and intrusive inspections and monitoring that go beyond the NPT and its Additional Protocol.

Despite the negotiating parties committing to a deal based on the NPT, the fact is that the demands

Outlines of a compromise

A deal between Iran and the West seems possible | By Seyed Hossein Mousavian

addressed by the world powers to Iran go beyond the treaty, and most likely, as a member state of NPT, Iran would not accept to be singled-out and discriminated. A sustainable solution necessitates an end to the discrimination of Iran compared to other member states of the NPT. A realistic solution should distinguish between demands within the framework of NPT and those that go beyond it. Demands based on the NPT can be agreed upon permanently. Based on the NPT and the international regulations, a member state would demonstrate the maximum level of transparency by implementing the Safeguard Agreement, Additional Protocol and Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1. These three arrangements are the maximum transparency measures the world powers can expect. To be realistic, however, the EU3+3 and Iranian negotiators would have to deal with demands that go beyond the NPT. A sensible approach could be one of the following three scenarios. First, measures beyond the NPT would only be implemented for a specified period as a confidence building measure. Second, establishing an international consortium to oversee Iran’s enrichment program as proposed by former Iranian President Ahmadinejad, who added that US companies could



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the “Arab Awakening.” The revolutionary transitions in the Middle East changed the priorities of regional leaders: instead of advancing the WMDFZ initiative they now focus on domestic issues. Rising nationalism and populist sentiments, coupled with extremism and terrorism led by radical Salafists would definitely hamper progress towards WMDFZ in the Middle East. As the biggest victim of chemical weapons, Iran has always sought a world free of the threat, production and use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Instead, history shows that the US and the West supported Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons during the

The Comprehensive Agreement with Iran, however, could become the platform for a broader agenda. It could alleviate present concerns over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program and concurrently be recognized as a “model” to address future proliferation challenges in the region. In this scenario, Iran would tacitly take the responsibility to lead the Middle East toward complete nonproliferation and elimination of all types of WMDs. The following reasons provide the justification as to why Iran is the only country with the potential, capacity and credibility to take this leadership role: In 1974, Iran, followed by Egypt, was the first country to propose a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East that led to the 1974 UN General Assembly resolution. Although the issue has been on the agenda for more than three decades, it has yet to be realized. In 1990, Egypt, followed by Iran, proposed a WMDFZ in the Middle East. To this day, Iran has maintained its support for the zone. As the biggest victim of chemical weapons, Iran has always sought a world free of the threat, production and use of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons. Instead, history shows that the US and the West supported Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq war, which killed and injured 100,000 Iranians. Iran has pioneered banning all WMDs through the passing of a religious edict or fatwa. The Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s fatwa declares the use of nuclear weapons and all other types of weapons of mass destruction are “haram” or forbidden – constituting a sin, being useless, costly, harmful and a serious threat to humanity. Tehran has provided more than 5,000 man-days of inspections to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) since 2003, the most during the Agency’s history, including access to facilities that have gone beyond the realm of the NPT for a decade. Since 2004, Iran has proposed the adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocol and continuous on-site inspections at key facilities, limiting the expansion of Iran’s enrichment program and a policy declaration of no reprocessing, immediately converting all enriched uranium to fuel rods. In return, Iran seeks recognition of its rights to enrichment and normalization of Iran’s status under G8 export controls. Iran has called for an “international consortium.” Former Iranian President Ahmadinejad during his September 2005 speech at the United Nations stated “Iran is prepared to engage in serious partnership with private and public sectors of countries in implementation of uranium enrichment program in Iran.” And last but not least, Iran has signed onto every WMD convention, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997; the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1996; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1970. Within such context, the world powers and Iran can agree on six principles: • No nuclear weapon in the Middle East. • A ban on production of plutonium and reprocessing in the Middle East. • Stopping the production of highly enriched uranium, with no enrichment beyond five percent in the Middle East. • No stockpiling beyond domestic needs for nuclear civilian use. • Establishment of a regional or international consortium for producing nuclear fuel. • Regional confidence-building and verification measures by creating a regional authority in charge of regulating nuclear development and verifying its peaceful nature in the region. This would be the best path to reach the “comprehensive package” deal on the Iranian nuclear dilemma. The next six months of diplomacy will be decisive and the world powers and Iran should be open to pursuing an agenda of long-term co-operation. Iran’s nuclear deal has the potential to begin controlling fissile material in the Middle East and take meaningful steps toward a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. ■

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Reporting the security challenges of the 21st century



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Aside from the fundamentalist hatred of Israel by the Iranian Ayatollahs (not necessarily the Iranian population), Israel merely serves as a propaganda means in Iran's ambition to dominate the Islamic world. Posing as the most stubborn and most loyal enemy of the common enemy – Israel – Iran strives to influence Arab public opinion over the heads of the Arab governments. The repeatedly promised destruction of Israel is not a real political aim of Iran, even though it would view such a destruction with much satisfaction.

So why does Iran need nuclear weapons? To begin with, it should be made clear that the idea of nuclear energy for Iran was not initiated by the Ayatollahs, but by the Shah. He was the one who initiated the project and he did so with the help of Israel. Israeli experts were behind the first Iranian nuclear plants. The idea was to create both civil nuclear capacity to enhance the economy, as well as a military capacity to be used to deter against the Iraqi dictatorship.

The nuclear venture is not merely the ambition of the regime, whether old or new, but of the entire population, including Iranians who oppose the regime. This is probably the reason why, in the long run, Iran will achieve its nuclear aspirations. We can only hope that when this happens, Iran will have a different regime. Nuclear arms in the hand of a liberal regime are a different story than nuclear weapons in the hands of the Ayatollahs.

In Israel, Iran's nuclear plans are seen as a mortal danger. In Israeli eyes, a fanatic regime motivated by religious hatred that openly promises the destruction to Israel can only develop nuclear weapons for one reason: to destroy Israel.

True, this is not a very rational way of looking at things. After all, attacking tiny Israel (20,000 square kilometers) with atomic weapons, would also be

Rapprochement is not impossible



destructive to Israel's neighbors, including Iran's best friends: Hamas, Hezbollah and Assad's Syria. What is more important is that Israel has the power to retaliate, even if the state is devastated. Submarines acquired by Israel over the last 20 years are equipped with nuclear missiles that can reach every city in Iran. Their purpose is to deter Iran.

Many Israelis, however, believe that we are not facing a rational regime, so we should not count on logical arguments such as the danger to Israel's neighbors, or Israel's deterrent power. They believe Israel must prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons at all cost.

In the recent past, the Israeli government placed some of its hopes on a joint American-Israeli military action to neutralize Ira-

nian nuclear plants. As a fall-back position, it hoped that the sanctions would bring Iran to its knees. Instead, the Israeli government today faces an American, and indeed an international community, eager to reach a compromise with Iran.

The Israeli government believes that as soon as the sanctions are lifted, Iran will resume its nuclear program, knowing that it is much easier to lift sanctions than to impose them anew. This causes great frustration for the Israeli government, but also for a great part of the Israeli public. Israeli leaders believe that Israel has lost not only the military option, but now sanctions as well.

One should, however, also try to evaluate the situation in its broader context. Are Iran and Israel doomed to be mortal ene-

mies forever? First of all: Nobody knows how long the Ayatollah regime will last. This regime already faces the opposition of the majority of its own people. A liberal pro-Western regime, corresponding to the wishes of the younger generation in Iran, will probably modify Iran's attitude towards Israel. The old common interest of these two countries separated by Arab neighbors might surge forward again.

Beyond that: It is clear that the dream of Ayatollah Khomeini to dominate the Muslim world is a total failure. At best, Iran leads the Shia part of that world, and this is a minority. The hostility of the majority Sunni world is becoming ever more dangerous for Iran, particularly with the political hostility of Iran's immediate Arab neighbors. Furthermore, if Iran and Syria benefit from Russian support, this is not only for economic reasons. To a great extent, Russia is deeply entangled in its own struggle against Sunni extremist elements. It therefore sees the support of the Shia elements as a kind of shield. This could also become a consideration for Israel.

True, Israel has peace agreements with two Arab Sunni states, Egypt and Jordan. It is negotiating with another Sunni-dominated entity, the Palestinians. Still, there is reason to be concerned by the penetration of extremist Sunni elements such as Al-Qaeda into its immediate neighborhood.

Israel is well aware of the fact that its allies in the struggle against Iran – Saudi Arabia as well as some of the Gulf States – finance these extremist elements. And this, besides the worrying factor that the Salafist movement has its origins and sources in Saudi Arabia.

Who knows if the future will not drive the enemies Iran and Israel once again to an objective alliance against the most extremist Sunni elements, nuclear deal or not? ■

No guns blazing

Intervention fatigue and austerity hamper EU-NATO defense planning

By Judy Dempsey

After a gap of seven years, European Union leaders gathered in Brussels last December to discuss security and defense issues. The debate was long overdue, given the immense changes in Europe's eastern and southern neighborhoods.

Even the paperwork is badly out of date. The only proper Security Strategy that the EU ever put forward was published back in 2003. Despite the changing geopolitical landscape, several member states, including Germany, have consistently refused to update it.

But most important is the double impact of the Euro crisis: saving Europe's common currency has for several years taken precedence over all other issues, especially foreign and security policies. Indeed, until late last year, the Euro crisis dominated every EU summit. That crisis, inevitably, also took its toll on defense spending as governments thought of ways to save and rein in their budget deficits.

In 2012, for example, France slashed its military personnel by 10 percent and reduced its rapid deployment capacity by a whopping 50 percent. Britain cut its armed forces by a fifth. In Spain, the armed forces were cut by 20,000 with further reductions on the way. The Netherlands scaled back its orders for new fighter aircraft, and Germany cut spending too. Denmark and Poland were rare exceptions

when they increased their defense spending.

This enormous pressure on defense budgets should have spurred governments into pooling and sharing military equipment and capabilities – how else would Europe be able to afford modern armed forces? Yet nothing of the sort happened. Indeed Europe lost a great chance to have its own

Judy Dempsey is a nonresident senior associate at Carnegie Europe and editor-in-chief of Strategic Europe.



genuine top-notch defense company when Chancellor Angela Merkel vetoed the merger of Britain's BAE Systems with EADS. Almost perversely, short-term national interests prevailed.

What all of this reflects is the fact that among European countries, there is very little appetite for military missions. Britain's parliament last year scuppered plans by Prime Minister David Cameron to intervene militarily in Syria. France, the lone exception to intervention fatigue, went it alone in Mali a year ago and again last December in the Central African Republic. EU leaders praised the French effort but offered almost no help.



Carl Fredrik Reuterswärd's sculpture "Non-Violence" outside United Nations Headquarters in New York.

No wonder then that the EU has never sent its battle groups into action. Launched with great fanfare in 2003, the battle groups were supposed to be Europe's crack rapid reaction forces. Highly trained for combat missions, they were supposed to be able to deploy within days. Yet when soundings were made in early December to get a battle group sent to the Central African Republic, Britain and other countries immediately and unequivocally said no.

Given this background, the biggest surprise was that the EU's defense summit in December produced any concrete results at all.

With most governments recognizing that the current impasse over the EU's security and defense policy was not acceptable, there were agreements to

develop "strategic enablers," such as drones, air-to-air refueling, cyber security and satellite communications. The European Commission will play a greater role since the 'strategic enablers' also have a civilian use.

The European Defense Agency (EDA), set up several years to reduce duplication and make savings, has always faced an uphill struggle. That now may be changing. The EDA received the green light to speed up procurement rules and harmonize standards among the member states.

These decisions are tied to specific timetables. Even though it will require much cajoling and focus by the Commission, Catherine Ashton, the EU's High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and her successor,

there is a real chance to get these projects off the ground.

Yet leaders failed to deal with the two biggest issues: the need for a strategy, and the impact the US pivot to Asia will have on the transatlantic relationship.

EU leaders shirked the issue of strategy for several reasons. First, the 28 member states have different security and defense cultures and different military experiences. These differences alone make it difficult to forge a European strategy.

Also, most Europeans simply do not feel threatened by the outside world. This makes it difficult for their leaders to agree on what constitutes common threats, undermining efforts to arrive at a European security strategy.

This doesn't mean, of course, that no such threats exist. In

Europe's Eastern and Southern neighborhoods and in the Caucasus, it isn't just the rise of radical Islamic movements that concerns Europe. Possible threats affecting Europe's interests and values range from the impact of high unemployment and political instability, demography and migration to competition for scarce water and energy sources.

Yet EU leaders avoided any discussion about how to deal with threats and conflicts. Just as there is no appetite to debate strategy, they show no desire to discuss the relationship between soft and hard power.

The second big issue summit leaders shirked concerns the state of the transatlantic relationship.

There was plenty of lip service about NATO's importance to the Western world, but no

attempt was made to end the long and debilitating dispute that has prevented NATO and the EU from working together. This is a problem because sooner or later both the EU and NATO will have to start asking hard questions about what happens to European defense as America's interest in Europe wanes.

It is not as if the Europeans don't know that Washington judges their unwillingness to take security and defense seriously very harshly. Time and again, US defense secretaries have castigated the Europeans for failing to develop their military capabilities and to share and pool resources. And time and again, Europeans have played deaf.

Add to that the fact that America is cutting its own defense budget. Most importantly, it is

shifting its attention away from Europe to Asia. Yet Europeans still seem to believe they can continue to take America's security guarantees as well as its military and financial commitment to NATO for granted. This is a dangerous and short-sighted assumption.

The Euro crisis seems to have been contained, and Europe's economies are finally taking an upward turn. Even so, it is difficult to see Chancellor Angela Merkel, President Francois Hollande or Prime Minister James Cameron engaging in a real discussion over strategy, threats and the future of the transatlantic relationship. Yet without a big push by Berlin, Paris or London to finally start tackling these issues, a strong European foreign policy will remain elusive. ■

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Security Challenges

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The times are out of joint again

Asia, Middle East, Africa: There is no hegemon, no nuclear discipline, no new balance of power to put it right – much as one hundred years ago in Europe

By Michael Stürmer

The year 2014 marks the centenary of the outbreak of World War I. It was, as George F. Kennan famously expressed it, the seminal catastrophe of the 20th century. What is the meaning, what is the message of the Great War today?

The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the crowns of Austria and Hungary, was the Danube monarchy's 9/11. After a long period of managing all kinds of conflicts short of war, summit diplomacy failed to deliver.

The uncertain alliances linking the Great Powers for better and for worse forced their own logic upon Europe's state chancelleries. In the summer of 1914 everybody had his own irrefutable rationale to accept war – a war long anticipated but never fully imagined to the brutal finish, although the American Civil War, half a century before, should have sufficed as a stern warning against the horrors of industrial warfare and its baneful political dynamism.

When the guns of August started thundering, war was seen by the masses as a relief from the boredom of peace. The leaders, as Christopher Clark tells us in his magisterial treatise (*The Sleepwalkers. How Europe Went to War in 1914*), were sleepwalking toward the edge, as both a reaffirmation of imperial strength and a wager against decline, upheaval and revolution.

Sir Edward Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary, hoping in vain that the Great Powers would recoil from the abyss, is on record for the realistic prediction: "The lights are going out all over Europe, and we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime." He was right – as he was right in his prediction: "Instead of a few hundreds of thousands of men meeting each other in war, millions would now meet, and modern weapons would multiply manifold the power of destruction."

Was it, as the writer Stefan Zweig put it, "emotional exuberance" that caused the great clash in 1914? Or was, what happened the first instalment of a Europe-wide civil war, with the Americans putting in a first brief appearance on the European stage? Was it, as Charles de Gaulle suggested in 1944, "the Thirty Years' War of our century," with the two interwar decades nothing but a delusional interlude? Or could the disaster simply be blamed on Germany and the Kaiser's vainglorious designs, as stated in the Treaty of Versailles, drawn up to make Germany pay endlessly for the damage done and save the West-



Europe's 9/11: The Serbian student Gavrilo Princip shooting down Archduke Franz Ferdinand. After the assassination of the heir to the imperial throne of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, diplomacy failed to prevent war. Can it do better in Asia 100 years later?

ern allies the pain of some well-deserved soul-searching?

By far the most important question remains whether 1914, somewhere some time, could happen again. The answer, one hundred years later, is less reassuring than one would hope. Europe and the Atlantic world seem to have moved beyond the likelihood of war. But throughout the Greater Middle East and around the Pacific Rim nothing can be excluded. There, a great deal of wisdom could be gleaned from the European experience of two world wars, the global turmoil of the inter-war years and the Cold War.

The Cold War, however, followed rules and patterns without precedent. According to Raymond Aron, the French strategist-philosopher, it was global, nuclear, and bipolar. The initial phase was characterized by the American nuclear monopoly. But

in 1949 the Soviet Union tested its first nuclear bomb, in 1953 the hydrogen bomb. In 1957 the "Sputnik" signalled to the world that soon intercontinental ballistic missiles would be part of the Soviet arsenal. In the double crisis over Berlin and Cuba (1958 – 1962) both superpowers moved close to the abyss. What they saw was not the promise of victory but the ashes of their national existence – and they recoiled. Soon after, the red telephones were established between the Kremlin and the White House. An unprecedented kind of superpower cartel emerged.

The subsequent phase of the Cold War was driven by both fear and reason. The superpowers set up a nuclear consortium, inviting Britain, France and the People's Republic of China to join while inventing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in order to keep insiders in and outsiders

out. However, Israel, India and Pakistan stayed aloof from the NPT System; they developed their own nuclear arsenals.



Flashpoint ASIA TENSIONS

On the geopolitical level, the Four Power Agreement on Berlin (1971) and the German-German Basic Treaty (1972) settled, for the foreseeable future, the German Question. Raymond Aron described the worldwide status quo as "paix impossible, guerre improbable." The existence of vast nuclear arsenals

forced upon the powers, whatever differences and conflicts they might continue to have, a policy of conflict control and war avoidance. Unlike 1914, when the powers took a wager against fate, the superpowers were united by a commitment to peace.

But this system is no more. It has survived only in a reduced and rudimentary form. New bidders for nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles complicate the game.

So what are the lessons from 1914 for today's world? It is a world without world order. The Cold War system will not come back. And there are, as in the pre-1914 years, totally new challenges. Global warming is merely one of them. It is already causing population shifts, mass poverty and social upheaval, most visibly throughout the Maghreb and Mashraf regions of the Greater Middle East.

What global warming will mean in the polar regions, where vast natural treasures seem to wait for exploitation, is anybody's guess. And technology creates novel areas of friction, notably the intrusion of cyber technology into nearly every dimension of human activity, including cybercrime, cyber-espionage and cyberwar. It carries with it both the promise of paradise and the threat of hell.

Geopolitical challenges come in two packages, one in the Far East, where China, much as Imperial Germany a century ago, keeps upsetting established relationships between the powers, not being able or willing to exercise restraint. This forces the US, already overstretched, into an ill-defined posture to keep the balance and to give reassurance to minor players.

"We are a Pacific power, and we are here to stay" – that was US President Barack Obama's message to Beijing when in 2012 he reactivated an out-of-use US Marine base in Australia. The Pax Americana and the Pax Sinica will have to learn how to coexist – or the world may see a sad encore, 1914 style, only worse.

While the Balkan zombies of the Ottoman Empire, instrumental in initiating the 1914 train wreck, have been put to rest during the last decade, throughout the Greater Middle East the demons of Ottoman rule and Western intervention are rising from their shallow graves.

What followed World War I, the war to end all wars, was, to quote David Fromkin, "a peace to end all peace." The settlements of 1919, imposed on the Levant from outside, are waning. The Arab state system of post-1945 vintage is bursting at the seams. At the same time, outside powers – Russia, China, and the US – are keen to defend and expand their interests in the region, Europe being among the also-rans. In the Greater Middle East there is no established code of conduct, no serious arms control, no confidence-and-security-building system; there is only a complex and unpredictable playing field with no bounds and deeply divided players in the middle and greedy spectators all around. A spill-over from fighting in the region cannot be excluded.

Similarities to Europe in 1914? As Hamlet, Prince of Denmark, famously remarked: "The time is out of joint." No hegemony, no nuclear discipline, no new balance of power is there to put it right – much as one hundred years ago. The long and the short of it: Beware of sleepwalkers in serious political affairs. ■



Nine million soldiers perished during World War I. Here: in the trenches of France and Flanders (left). War cemeteries all over Europe like this one near Verdun serve as a warning to future generations.



A maritime test of strength

Beijing believes the US lacks the will and the capacity to dominate the South China Sea | By Carlyle A. Thayer

A new Cold War is taking shape in East Asia between China and Japan. The new Asian Cold War is maritime in character with a geographic focus on the so-called first island chain that runs from the Kuril islands north of Japan to the Philippine archipelago in the south. The new Asian Cold War is more fluid than its European counterpart. It involves confrontation between China and two bilateral alliances, one between the US and Japan in East Asia and the other between the US and the Philippines in Southeast Asia. The new Asian Cold War sharpened last year when China began to aggressively challenge Japanese sovereignty over the Senkaku islands and Philippine sovereignty over a small shoal lying off its west coast. The Senkaku islands comprise five small islets and three rocky outcroppings covering a land area of eight square kilometres. They are located approximately 445 kilometres southwest of Okinawa. The Senkakus re-emerged as a point of tension between China and Japan in September 2012 when the new Japanese government led by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe purchased three of the islets from private owners. China claimed that Abe had nationalized its territory. China immediately deployed civilian paramilitary ships and civil marine surveillance aircraft to

the Senkakus where they continually intrude into Japan's territorial waters and airspace. Early last year China escalated its aggressive tactics when, in separate incidents, two People's Liberation Army (PLA) warships locked their fire control radar on a Japanese helicopter and Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessel. Also PLA warships regularly conducted military exercises in waters adjacent to the Senkakus, while Chinese J-10 jet fighters and H-6 bombers flew overhead. Japan responded to Chinese actions by permanently stationing Coast Guard ships around the Senkakus and by continually scrambling F-15 fighters to monitor flights by Chinese civil and military aircraft. In September, Japan identified China's first use of an unmanned aerial vehicle near the Senkakus. Japan threatened to shoot the drone down if it intruded into its airspace. China responded by declaring that this would be an act of war. Tensions in East Asia erupted after China unilaterally declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea including airspace over Japan's Senkaku islands. All aircraft – civilian and military – were required to obtain prior authorization before entering the ADIZ, follow prescribed procedures to identify themselves, or face “defensive emergency measures.” China also declared its intention

to establish other ADIZs “after necessary preparations.” Japan vehemently condemned China's ADIZ as a “profoundly dangerous act that unilaterally changes the status quo... [and] unduly infringes on the freedom of flight in international airspace.”

Flashpoint ASIA-PACIFIC

Carlyle A. Thayer is Emeritus Professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Japan demanded that China rescind it. The United States, South Korea, Taiwan and Australia joined Japan in protesting China's ADIZ. In late November the US, South Korea and Japan separately flew military aircraft through China's ADIZ without incident. The US dispatched two unarmed B-52s bombers. On Nov. 29, China announced that it had carried out its first patrol of its ADIZ. China also scrambled jet fighters to monitor two US surveillance aircraft and ten Japanese planes. China's declaration of an East China Sea ADIZ, following a year of continual pressure on the Senkakus, proved to be a tipping point. In December the Japanese cabinet approved the country's

first National Security Strategy and revised National Defense Guidelines. Japan also established its first National Security Council. Specifically citing China's intrusions into waters around the Senkakus, Japan gave priority to defending its islands in the southwest. Japan's defense budget was increased over the next five years to cover the procurement costs of twenty-eight F-35 stealth fighters, two Aegis destroyers, five conventional submarines, three surveillance drones, and the creation of a marine force equipped with seventeen tiltrotor aircraft and fifty-two amphibious vehicles. Prime Minister Abe also announced a policy of “proactive pacifism” under which Japan would play an enhanced leadership role in the region and strengthen its military ties with the US, South Korea, Australia and Southeast Asia. On Dec. 26, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, a burial ground for Japan's war dead which China's views as a symbol of Japan's past militarism and aggression. The Chinese media carried reports that senior Chinese leaders were so offended that they vowed not to meet with Abe. In January 2013 the Philippines took its territorial dispute with China to a United Nations Arbitral Tribunal for resolution. China responded by singling out the Philippines for special attention. In May 2013, Chinese paramilitary ships and a PLAN frigate suddenly appeared at Second

Thomas Shoal to prevent the Philippines from repairing a Landing Ship Tank (LST) that had been deliberately beached there in the late 1990s. The LST serves as a base for a handful of marines as a demonstration of Philippine sovereignty. Chinese paramilitary ships remain on station and continually harass Filipino fishermen and other commercial boats. Six days after China announced its ADIZ, Hainan province legislative authorities approved a new regulation requiring all foreign fishing boats and survey vessels to seek prior approval before operating in two million square kilometres of water claimed by the province. This represents nearly 60 percent of the waters included in China's nine-dash line claim to the South China Sea. According to the regulations foreign vessels that refuse to comply will be forced from Chinese waters or boarded and seized. The waters claimed by Hainan province overlap with the Exclusive Economic Zones proclaimed by the Philippines and Vietnam. Both countries lodged official protests. Manila declared, for example, that the regulation “is a gross violation of international law... escalates tensions... and threatens the peace and stability of the region.” Vietnam declared the measure “illegal and invalid.” On the same day that the Hainan province regulations were made public, China dispatched for the

first time its only aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, and an escort of two destroyers and two frigates to the South China Sea for a series of training exercises. The flotilla was shadowed by the USS Cowpens, a guided missile cruiser. On Dec. 5, a Chinese naval ship ordered USS Cowpens to leave the area where the Liaoning was operating. When it refused an Amphibious Landing Ship Dock crossed within 500 meters of the Cowpens' bow and stopped dead in the water. The USS Cowpens was forced to take evasive action. The US later lodged an official protest. The Cowpens incident raised regional concerns that China has decided to begin contesting the presence of US naval ships in the South China Sea. The deployment of the Liaoning aircraft carrier raised further concerns that China might follow through on its Nov. 23 declaration and establish an ADIZ over the South China Sea. China has instigated a new maritime Asian Cold War to disrupt the network of alliances linking Japan and the Philippines to the United States. China seeks to demonstrate to Tokyo, Manila and other regional states that the US lacks both the will and the capacity to respond to China's continual assertions of sovereignty over remote islets and shoals. China does not expect quick results and is preparing for a prolonged test of US resolve.

Peaceful rise or a new Cold War? Time to respect China's red lines

Appeasing domestic nationalist concerns comes at a strategic price for China | By Kishore Mahbubani

Does China's new assertive stance reflect a strong muscular government demonstrating that China will now behave like a normal great power? Or does it reflect a weak government that now has to bend to strong winds of domestic nationalism? We will never know the answer to these questions. But we can work out the implications for China if it continues down this assertive road. For every gain it makes on the regional front, it could pay a heavy price on the global front. This is the new dilemma that China will have to deal with.

China's leaders have argued that they have reacted strongly because they have been provoked. This is true. The Philippines wisely upped the ante when it deployed a naval destroyer around the disputed Scarborough Shoal in April 2012. The Chinese government could not be seen to be weak in its response. Similarly, when the Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda went ahead with the nationalization of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands on July 7, 2012, despite a direct request from President Hu Jintao not to do so, China was forced into a position of responding.

While some of these strong reactions were inevitable, it is unclear whether China worked out clearly the long-term consequences of these moves. They have dramatically changed global and regional perceptions of China. For over a decade or so, China had pulled off a geopolitical miracle by rising up the ladder of great powers without ringing any alarm bells. A large part of it was due to the wisdom China inherited from Deng Xiaoping who counselled that China should take a low profile, swallow bitter humiliation and avoid any kind of assertiveness. Deng was strong enough to pull this off. His successors clearly find it more and more difficult to persuade the Chinese population to continue heeding this wisdom.

Despite this, China's leaders can quietly pull back from some of the strong positions it has taken, as they have backfired. Let me cite three. Firstly, as I document in “The Great Convergence,” it was unwise of China to deposit a map containing the nine-dash line (that covered virtually all of the South China Sea) with a UN Commission in 2009 (see page 14). This nine-dash line will become an albatross around China's neck as it is entirely indefensible under contemporary international law, especially the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As China continues to grow and emerge as a global power, it will discover like the US that the UNCLOS will protect many of its global interests to have free and open access to seaways around the world.

So if China vigorously defends the nine-dash line, it will essentially be shooting itself in the foot as it will be undermining its own long-term global interests. Clearly China cannot withdraw the nine-dash line but it can quietly and privately “clarify” its meaning to indicate that it is only claiming some traditional rocks and islands within this area. Indeed, China has already given some ASEAN countries private assurances that it does not claim all the waters within the nine-dash line as territorial waters of China. To allow China to backtrack quietly from the nine-dash line, it may be best not to push China for a public or official clarification.

Secondly, it was unwise of China to be perceived as dividing ASEAN at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Phnom Penh on July 12, 2012. It will go down in China's diplomatic history as one of its lowest points since only one out of the ten ASEAN countries supported China's point of view at this crucial meeting.

But China paid an even heavier price than this short-term diplomatic loss. A strong and cohesive ASEAN community had quietly emerged as a geopolitical asset for Beijing as it ensured that ASEAN would not be captured or manipulated against China. By contrast, a divided ASEAN naturally provided geopolitical opportunities that China's rivals could exploit.



Kishore Mahbubani is the author of “The Great Convergence”, which the Financial Times selected as one of the best books of 2013.

American diplomats were right in asserting publicly that several ASEAN states had whispered to them privately that they welcomed a stronger American presence in Southeast Asia to balance a more powerful China. Fortunately, Xi Jinping has made cultivation of ASEAN a priority. That should help China.

Thirdly, Beijing's constant deployment of naval vessels and aircraft in the waters around the Senkaku and Diaoyu islands has turned Japanese public opinion strongly against China. Many

Japanese are now clearly apprehensive about China's rise. All this has helped Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's efforts to create a more “normal” Japan. He wants to drop his country's post-World War II pacifist culture and develop a defense policy and posture befitting its size. Many other countries, including the US and South Korea, are concerned by this new drift in Abe's policies. But they find it hard to restrain him as long as he enjoys strong domestic support, some of which is a result of a nationalist backlash against China.

One development that China needs to watch carefully is the growing dialogue and interaction between Russia, India, and Japan. These are the three largest neighbors China has to deal with. If they begin to cooperate closely out of a rising shared concern over China's perceived assertiveness, China may well sail into a more difficult global geopolitical environment.

China has consistently declared that it is committed to a “peaceful rise”. On balance, it is clear that this remains China's policy. But if it continues with its assertiveness over maritime disputes, it could dramatically alter global perceptions and attitudes towards China and also end up creating a more difficult global geopolitical environment for China.

Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan | By Zhang Weiwei

Sino-Japanese relations have never been so precarious since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972. Many observers now even compare the situation to that in Europe a century ago when the First World War was about to rage across the continent. This scenario may be exaggerated, as neither Beijing, nor Tokyo, nor Washington, wants a war in the region – that would be disastrous for their shared economic interests and global prosperity – but Beijing-Tokyo relations are indeed experiencing a dangerous drift.

While the Western media seem to focus on what they perceive as a more assertive China, most Chinese blame Japan for the Sino-Japanese predicament, and the Chinese view deserves some attention. From a Chinese perspective, the right turn in Japan's domestic politics is the major cause for the current status of Sino-Japanese relations, and this right turn is a product of three domestic developments in Japan: the country has experienced “two lost decades” which ended the proud Japanese economic miracle; the country has witnessed a string of weak leaders, literally 10 or so prime ministers replacing each other within ten

years; and the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster and other social woes have gripped much of the Japanese society. The combined economic, political and social malaises have shaped among the Japanese a strong sense of insecurity and their perception of China's rise as Japan's possible nightmare, given the historical grievances between the two countries. Japanese politi-

cians like Prime Minister Abe seems now to count on Japan's nationalism for more domestic support.

Despite the normalization of the diplomatic ties between Beijing and Tokyo, regrettably there has never been real reconciliation between the two peoples, as there has, for instance, between France and Germany, and the memory of Japan's war atrocities remain fresh and sharp in the minds of most Chinese. After all, it's a war that caused the deaths of some 20 million Chinese and destroyed the Chinese economy. Yet China is still faced with an unrepentant Japan and a Prime Minister who even refuses to call the war an act of aggression. Just imagine how the French or the British would react to a Germany that still used the Nazi flag and national anthem and whose chancellor and cabinet ministers still paid homage to Hitler's shrine?

Against this background, it took only a single event like Tokyo's decision to “nationalize” the Diaoyu (Senkaku) islands to spark a chain of strong reactions from China. Historically the Diaoyu islands, as part of Taiwan, were ceded to Japan after the Chinese empire was defeated in the first Sino-Japanese war in the 1890s. Towards the end of the Second World War, the Cairo Declaration of December 1943 issued by China, the US and Britain demanded that Japan return Taiwan and all other territories it had grabbed, to China. However, China's civil war broke out soon after, followed by the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, the Korean War of the early 1950s and the Cold War. Japan, under a peace constitution imposed by the US, became a US ally and has remained so up to now. In 1972, the US decided to return the “administrative rights” over the Diaoyu islands to Japan, which triggered sweeping protests from Beijing to Taipei to overseas Chinese communities across the world.

Beijing's record shows that the two sides agreed to set aside the dispute when they established diplomatic ties in 1972. Deng Xiaoping famously said at a press conference held in Tokyo in 1978 when the two sides signed the Peace and Friendship Treaty: “we have agreed to shelve the dispute for the future, and we believe our future generations will be more intelligent than us today in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the dispute.” He also advocated a sensible approach to the dispute: that the two countries should defer the issue and start joint exploration (of resources in the area), which to this author, remains the most feasible option for both sides. Obviously Japan's decision in 2012 to “nationalize” the disputed islands, as if

China's claim over the islands never existed, humiliated and angered most Chinese. With the coming to power of President Xi Jinping, a leader more confident of himself and his country, China has shifted its overall stance from what can be called “strategic ambiguity” to “strategic clarity.” Partly in reaction to the US “pivot to Asia” and to Japan's rising right-wing militarism, President Xi said that China will pursue peaceful development but others should do the same. Actually, between China and Japan, there are already four legal and political documents committing both sides to solve their disputes peacefully and through negotiations. Japan's unilateral action to “nationalize” the Diaoyu Islands was viewed by Beijing as violating this principle.



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Beijing's “strategic clarity” may be provocative to some, yet it may serve the interests of all the actors concerned to avoid strategic miscalculations, as Beijing has only stated its long-held positions in much clearer terms. In this regard, Beijing may have drawn something useful from its dealings with Taipei. Beijing officially advanced the theme of China's “peaceful rise” (later “peaceful development”) in 2003, but it adopted an Anti-Secession Law in 2005, which binds Beijing to adopt what's called “non-peaceful means” if Taiwan declares independence, a position that Beijing has held since 1949. And the law caused uproar from Taipei and the Western media at that time. But in retrospect, the law has paved the way for the dramatic improvements in Beijing-Taipei relations we witness now.

It's time for Japan, and the other parties concerned to know Beijing's red line, which is only a clearer expression of Beijing's long-held position, and Beijing, Tokyo and Washington should work together to defuse the tension between China and Japan, and the US could play a meaningful role as a facilitator in this regard, and after all, Washington does not share Prime Minister Abe's position on the Second World War, and China does not openly object to the US military presence in Japan, as it is viewed by many in Beijing as a “necessary evil” to check Japan's rising militarism, especially Japan's possible nuclearization.

China may overtake the US as the world's largest economy in less than a decade. In the history of the West, relations between an established power and rising power are often a zero-sum game, and the European history is full of examples of such conflicts. But for the first time, it's the rise of a non-Western power, with a totally different cultural tradition: China does not have a messianic culture of converting others; it has a long culture of building the Great Wall to defend itself from others rather than colonizing others; China is the only nuclear power to openly state that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons against other countries. China indeed hopes to establish “a new type of major power relationship” with the US, based on mutual respect for sovereignty, common interests and people-to-people friendship. But if the US treats China as an enemy, China may indeed become its enemy. History presents an opportunity to the two countries to become friends, rather than enemies, moving beyond the old logic of confrontation between established and rising powers. The two sides should grasp it and start in this direction perhaps with some meaningful initiatives to defuse Sino-Japanese tensions.



Chinese surveillance ships in contested territorial waters southeast of Minamikojima, Sept. 10, 2013.

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Has China's military moved closer to the driving seat of foreign and security policy? Soldiers taking part in a drill January 2014 in Sichuan Province of China.

Is the military driving China's foreign policy?

Never have the armed forces been so visible beyond the borders of the People's Republic | By Isabel Hilton

In January 2007, the Chinese military destroyed a communications satellite. It was one of their own, so the act was judged a demonstration of advancing capacity rather than aggression, but it was not without diplomatic consequences. It seemed to run contrary to China's stated opposition to the militarization of space and the debris it produced, the most ever recorded in a single incident, increased the volume of dangerous space junk by an estimated 10 percent and threatened the communications satellites of many other countries. International indignation was loud and widespread.

It was not the first time China's military appeared to complicate the life of the country's diplomats. Rapidly growing military expenditure in a rising China continues to attract concerned comment, as does Beijing's advancing space competence, evidenced most recently by the Jade Rabbit moon landing and a series of close proximity maneuvers involving three new satellites. Back on earth, China has made advances in jet technology, concluded sea trials for its first, albeit secondhand, aircraft carrier, developed an important submarine warfare capacity and unveiled a prototype Stealth fighter, Chengdu J-20, a revelation timed to coincide with a visit by the US defense secretary.

China is a long way from matching US firepower, but is focusing on developing cyber and space technology to support denial of access tactics against US forces, and to exploit what Chinese military analysts see as the strategic weakness of the US – its dependence on technology.

So far, so straightforward. But when China's growing naval power is set against the country's increasingly assertive policies in the South and East China Seas, it raises the question of which part of the sprawling Chinese state is driving which policies. Has China's military moved closer to the driving seat of foreign and security policy? In China's opaque political system the signals are, at best, are mixed.

Much of China's increased military budget is dedicated to a long overdue modernization of the army. Other elements, including the naval spending, reflect in part the need for one of the world's largest trading nations to defend long supply lines, should the need arise. On the other hand, China's military has also become more visible internationally as China's role in the world has grown: it is currently the most active peace keeper of the five permanent members of the Security Council and are no longer reluctant to get involved in international counter-piracy operations, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and the

evacuation of Chinese citizens in moments of crisis.

International peacekeeping missions serve to support the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) "New Historic Missions," which demand the capability to operate overseas. China's 2011 Defense White Paper laid out four national goals: to safeguard national sovereignty, security and national development; to maintain social harmony and stability; to accelerate the modernization of the armed forces; and to maintain world peace and stability. Never have Chinese forces been so visible beyond China's own borders. The question is: Does this activity simply indicate that China is responding to demands that it matches its increasing economic influence with a commensurate strategic maturity, or could it also signal a rising influence of the military in China's international actions?

In 2012, a number of international analysts expressed concern that China's armed forces were indeed growing increasingly assertive, most notably in China's sensitive regional politics. Their worries coincided with the escalation of Beijing's actions over its maritime disputes in the South and east China Seas, and the emergence of a number of previously reticent senior military officers, who began to make high profile public statements. These



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were frequently belligerent in tone on how China should meet its changing security and foreign policy needs and were taken by some commentators as a sign that the military was trying to impose its views on China's foreign policy and security posture.

Fostering indignant nationalism is certainly useful for budget discussions, but China's military has always had a prominent place in the People's Republic. In the early years of the revolution, China's politicians were also military leaders. That era ended with the death of Deng Xiaoping, the leader who began to modernize the armed forces after the Cultural Revolution and reduced the military's central role in politics.

The relationship between politics and the military remains peculiar to the Chinese Party-state in which the army belongs and answers to the Party. It has been a basic tenet of China's highly vertical political structure that the Party commands the gun and the two remain closely intertwined: career military officers are also Communist Party members; at company level and above, political officers make the decisions,

often in Party organizations which they lead.

The same is true at the highest levels of the Party-State. Since Deng's reforms, the Party General Secretary has served as President of the State Council. He chairs the PLA's highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission, itself a department of the Communist Party's Central Committee and composed largely of military officers. Formally, at least, the Party still commands the gun, and little in President Xi Jinping's record to date suggests that he has failed to assert control.

China appears curiously contradictory in the management of its increasingly important international role. Its foreign ministry is relatively powerless and real decisions are made elsewhere, sometimes in the service of local ambitions or turf wars. China's Ministry of National Defense is also a relatively small office with largely administrative and diplomatic duties. Senior military officers notoriously pursue sectoral, business and private interests, regardless of national policy interests.

China's more assertive stance in the East and South China Seas has been diplomatically counterproductive, driving its nearest neighbors to reach for the United States and undoing years of diplomatic reassurance that China's rise was not a threat. This policy may well have been driven by local military ambitions, but it may also reflect the difficulty of running a foreign policy that both reassures the neighbors and satisfies the domestic nationalist expectations that serve as China's core political narrative today.

The larger challenge for China's military is that, despite its growing budgets, it remains unfit for external action. The forces are too large and uncoordinated to be effective against a modern enemy. Recent developments would suggest that far from increasing its political influence, the military is about to enter a phase of a major reorganization that is firmly under political control.

China's military has been important as the guarantor of domestic security and of the Party's monopoly of political power. In recent years, rival domestic security forces, such as the People's Armed Police, gained so much ground under the patronage of the former security chief, Zhou Yongkang, that domestic security commanded a larger budget than external defense. In an important sign of Xi Jinping's political dominance, he recently created a new National Security Commission, which he

Much of China's increased military budget is dedicated to a long overdue modernization of the army. The prototype Stealth fighter Chengdu J-20 (picture) was unveiled to coincide with a visit by the US defense secretary.

Political Consultative Conference in 2008. In 2012, he also became a popular micro-blogger and a regular commentator in the Chinese media for his belligerent remarks on China's maritime disputes. He was among ten PLA generals who called for military preparations following the takeover by the Japanese government in the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, and advised that China should not be shy of taking forceful action against the Philippines over the South China Sea. He attracted attention, but the government took a different course, deploying civilian law enforcement ships in its dispute with the Philippines rather than the PLA Navy. General Luo was removed from the CPPCC in February last year. If his case is representative, China's military has a long way to go before it can challenge the Party for the political reins.

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chairs, reducing the risk that a Party faction could use a domestic security force to challenge his authority. Zhou Yongkang, the former security chief, is now under investigation for corruption.

With domestic security forces under his control, President Xi has launched a major reorganization of the PLA. The Chinese press reported recently that the

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Quiet deterrence

Japan needs a careful strategy to manage its strained ties with China

By Yoichi Funabashi

If the Cold War was a confrontation in central Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union over the geopolitics of the Eurasian continent, the 21st century could be characterized by tensions between the US and China over the geopolitics of the Asian-Pacific oceans.

Among the situations pointing towards such a future scenario are prevailing tensions between Japan and China over territorial rights to the Senkaku Islands (or Diaoyu, as they are known in China) in the East China Sea. Though Japan has long exerted administrative control over the Senkaku Islands, China has started to challenge this control directly, dispatching government vessels into waters under Japanese administrative control and brandishing its naval and air force power.

The challenge for Japan will be to form “quiet deterrence” by dealing with lingering territorial issues with the utmost calm and composure, and by maintaining strategic communications with China.

Tensions between Japan and China over territorial issues in the East China Sea cannot be considered separately from similar such disputes in the South China Sea between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) maritime countries. While until recently, China had tended to veer away from explicitly disputing the territorial issue of the Senkaku Islands, Beijing’s approach to territorial issues in the South China Sea has, in contrast, been markedly stronger, with China readily demonstrating its willingness to engage in military clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines.

From 2010 to 2012, at almost the same time as tensions were simmering between Japan and China in the East China Sea, Chinese vessels engaged in a protracted standoff against vessels of Vietnam and the Philippines over territorial rights in the South China Sea. Cases of anti-Chinese demonstrations also transpired in both countries within this same time frame.

The International Crisis Group (ICG), a leading international non-governmental organization advising on conflict prevention and resolution, notes in a report that this diplomatic offensive by China, manifested similarly in each of the aforementioned cases, is characterized by a tactic it terms “reactive assertiveness.” This terminology is

used to describe a tactic whereby China seeks to induce provocative actions by the other party in a dispute over territorial waters. Once the other party takes action, China then responds by pursuing strong countermeasures that it has had time to prepare in advance. Through such tactics, China has started to remold the status quo in its favor.

Framing the case of the Senkaku Islands in the context of this tactic, China, interpreting Japan’s decision to purchase the islands as a unilateral change to the status quo, implemented a series of pre-planned actions with the goal of changing the facts on the ground. The most important action in this regard was Beijing’s declaration of territorial baselines around the islands in September 2012, thus increasing the number and reach of its law enforcement patrols in an attempt to challenge Japan’s de facto control of its territorial waters.

China’s basic stance on territorial disputes is to seek to avoid at all costs the use of armed force in the resolution of land-based issues, and to adopt a cautious stance in that arena. Also, at times when there is a high risk that domestic stability may be put in jeopardy, China tends to seek a compromise with the neighboring country in land-based territorial disputes. When such cases involve ethnic unrest, China has demonstrated remarkable readiness to compromise on territorial land issues. However, China also shows a strong tendency to resort to the use of military force at times when it feels that its own negotiating position is weak in territorial disputes.

In the case of the Senkaku Islands, two factors overlay China’s stance: the first being China’s perceptions of its own military weakness against Japan and the United States, and the second being that the issue does not impact any domestic vulnerabilities such as ethnic tensions. In other words, the case of the Senkaku Islands is one in which it is difficult for China to exert self-control, and where perceptions of its own vulnerability are easily stimulated.

Above all, in the context of naval power, while China seeks to demonstrate its strength in this regard, it also has a propensity towards what could best be likened to a “naval power complex.”

Still, the biggest risk for Japan and the United States is the lack of transparency surrounding the build-up of China’s naval power and the manner in which it intends to project this power globally.

In October 2006, on the occasion of then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to China, Japan and China agreed to build a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” in line with a belief that, even in the presence of individual thorny issues, it is important to keep such issues under control so that they do not affect the entire Japan-China relationship. Since then, the leaders have repeatedly affirmed that the two countries will promote a “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests.”

However, after tensions flared up over the Senkaku Islands in 2010 and 2012, the modus operandi of the “mutually beneficial relationship based on common strategic interests” has mostly collapsed. And the domestic political dynamics in Japan and China only serve to undergird this situation.

In the case of Japan, we can point to, for example, the backlash of the conservatives against Japan’s post-Cold War efforts to overcome the issue of history, the decline of Japan’s national strength, the rise of identity politics including visits to Yasukuni Shrine by prime ministers from the Junichiro Koizumi Administration onwards, and the diplomatic gaucheness of the administrations led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ). Conversely, in the case of China, we can identify what Chinese intellectuals refer to as changes in China’s “political fundamentals.” Simply put, it is the manifestation of the unraveling of the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) one-party system of authoritarian rule and the chauvinistic nation-

alism that the CPC’s leadership has mobilized to offset this. The unraveling of CPC’s legitimacy is evident from several developments, including the end of China’s rapid growth, the sharp increases in wealth and income disparities between regions and individuals, corruption among CPC senior members, environmental degradation, uprisings by ethnic minorities, and counter-attack public opinions on the Internet.

The Japan-China relationship is confounded by the fact that Japan frequently becomes the primary target of outbreaks of Chinese nationalism. At times, the CPC elicits domestic nationalism and



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applies deliberate diplomatic pressure on opponent countries. When the opponent is Japan, this often takes the form of “patriotic collusive” nationalism between the CPC and government and the masses. Both 2010 and 2012 saw outbreaks of such “patriotic collusive” nationalism. For the Chinese leadership, Japan remains a whipping boy for quickly obtaining legitimacy. A more fundamental and long-term structural factor is the end of China’s path to a peaceful rise that had characterized the last 30 years. If China sees economic interdependence only from the perspective of power, this is not in China’s own best interests. “Interdependent peace” is nothing more than the concept of building peace by engagement. Japan-China tensions surrounding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands have shaken up the “strategic fundamentals” upon which Japan had premised its relationship with China. If China identifies the First Island Chain as “China’s seas” and fur-

ther demonstrates its “strategic will to the sea” by projecting naval power to the Second Island Chain, Japan runs the risk of losing a “surplus of security.”

It can be said that the question of how China’s “strategic will to the sea” may be steered toward contributing to the development of “principles of liberal international order” in the Asia-Pacific is the biggest strategic challenge facing the Asia-Pacific in the 21st century. This involves neither the containment of China, nor an encirclement of China. China is too big and too interdependent to attempt such an effort.

Accordingly, all countries have no choice but to pursue a strategy that combines assurance and dissuasion, or engagement and hedging. However, it is not possible to determine unambiguously what circumstances will cause such a strategy to tip between assurance and dissuasion. After all, the main purpose of a deterrence strategy against China is neither suppressing the rise of China, nor outdoing China; it is to make China understand that military expansion, particularly the expansion of naval power, will have the reverse effect on China’s future peace and security.

If China attempts to alter the “status quo” of the international order by using its newly acquired economic strength as leverage, the “interdependent peace” between Japan and China would no longer function. Should this happen, a vision for a multifaceted regional order based on “principles of liberal international order” must be developed. However, both the trade and investment needed for China’s growth evolve sustainably precisely because there is a peaceful environment. The primary contradiction of Chinese power is economic growth and the sustainability of development. China’s high growth will not last long – indeed, many observers believe that the high growth period has already ended – and issues of disparity and corruption could propel the CPC regime into a state of crisis. State-owned enterprises are turning into dinosaur-like entities that swallow up private enterprises. Furthermore,

China is quickly falling into the trap of middle-income countries.

The cost-effectiveness of the Japan-China battle over “administrative control” is decidedly asymmetric in nature. In order to continue to demonstrate its “administrative control,” Japan must always maintain a sense of alert on the ground. As Katsuji Nakazawa, a Chinese expert on security issues has said, “Japan can no longer rest.” While Japan is subject to a conventional war of “unless it wins, it will lose,” China is using guerrilla warfare tactics premised on the principle that “unless it loses, it will win.” Amidst the somber situation of Japan’s loss of the surplus of security provided by the sea, the weight of anti-Japanese pressure that uses China’s economic strength as leverage, and the perpetual onus of proving Japan’s administrative control of the Senkaku Islands, Japan has no other choice but to be prepared for a “long, long struggle.”

Japan should pursue a policy of “quiet deterrence.” It must be quiet so as not to incur China’s reactive assertiveness; that is, Japan must exercise self-restraint in order not to overreact to China’s provocations. Moreover, the deterrence must be quiet so as not to cause an outbreak of Chinese nationalism and not to tempt the Chinese government to enflame Chinese nationalism. The deterrence must also be quiet for Japan and the United States to jointly address this challenge by fully exercising the Japan-US alliance. Should Japan lose either its composure or its determination, should it let its strategically defensive posture waver, or should it lose self-control and overreact, this could give the United States a pretext for avoiding its obligation to defend Japan. Furthermore, a quiet approach is also required in order to achieve the widening of a China deterrence system in cooperation with the Japan-U.S. Alliance and other countries such as Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Singapore.


Finally, and paradoxically, the essence of “quiet deterrence” must be to maintain strategic communications with China, carry out risk and crisis management simultaneously, stabilize the bilateral relationship, and maintain peace.

Deterrence after all, is basically a sort of strategic communication. The firing up of nationalism in either country puts pressure on political leaders. Thus, quiet deterrence is required. ■

Hand in hand

Japan and Europe: Securing world peace for the next 50 years

By Fumio Kishida



For the past fifty years, the Munich Security Conference has magnetized those wishing for a more peaceful and stable Europe and beyond. The conference has extended its arms to the other sphere of the world, particularly the Asia-Pacific.

The Asia-Pacific is the epicenter of the rapid shift in the global power balance. The region is also the driver of global economic growth. These trends are incremental but decisive. The region is full of hope, yet not without anxieties. In a world where everything is connected, the peace, stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific are closely intertwined with those of Europe, and vice versa.

That is why Japan is ready to work even more closely with European partners.

Japan has pledged to be a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation. Our resolution is simple but robust: Japan is going to contribute even more proactively to securing peace, stability and prosperity of the international community, in cooperation with our partners.

Based on this principle, the government of Japan has already launched some new initiatives. They include the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) and the adoption of the National Security Strategy (NSS). The NSS presents in the clearest manner what and how Japan aims to achieve as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace.” Japan has consistently followed the path of a peace-loving nation, upholding freedom and democracy after the war.

As the year 2015 approaches, the 70th anniversary since the end of World War II, I would like to emphasize how much peace, democracy and human rights have

long formed an integral part of the identity of Japanese people. The NSS clarifies Japan will continue this path. The NSS also reveals how much importance Japan attaches to collaboration with Europe.

All major powers share responsibility for securing peace and prosperity in the world. Therefore, Japan will strengthen relationships, based on trust and cooperation, with our partners inside and outside of the region while deepening cooperation with the United States, our ally. In this context, Japan believes that cooperation with Europe, including through the EU and NATO, has vast potential which has yet to be fully cultivated.

Japan and Europe have both the capability and will to make this world safer and better. Our strength lies in our common belief in freedom, democracy, human rights, and other fundamental values. In particular, our shared commitment to the rule of law will be a beacon that guides the way for our future collaboration.

First, Japan and Europe should further cooperate towards

upholding maritime order based on the rule of law including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, since Japan and Europe highly benefit from “Open and Stable Seas.” Specifically, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight over the high seas is critical not only for global prosperity but also for stability.

Supporting coastal states in enhancing maritime law enforcement capabilities is one promising area. Japan and Europe are working together to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden. We can encourage the parties concerned in the South China Sea to conclude an effective and legally-binding Code of Conduct and ensure peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law – not by force or coercion. The EU decided to establish its maritime security strategy by June of this year. Japan is looking forward

to further collaborating with Europe based on our respective new strategies.

Second, Japan and Europe should further cooperate toward consolidating the rule of law in cyberspace. Our daily lives are thoroughly dependent on cyberspace. It is surprising and disturbing that there is no agreement in the international community on the rules to govern this global commons.

Japan believes that existing international law, including the UN Charter and international humanitarian law, applies to cyberspace. When we talk about cyberspace, geographical distance has no meaning. Cyberspace reminds us how closely interlinked are the securities of Europe and Asia, as well as other parts of the world.

Third, Japan and Europe need to ensure free access to, and sustainable use of, outer space. Preventing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) testing and avoiding collisions between satellites benefits us all. Japan and Europe should increase efforts to quickly realize an International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities. Technological advancement has

brought a massive opportunity and a new threat at the same time. Together, by strengthening the rule of law in this field, Japan and Europe can secure the benefits of outer space while minimizing the risks.

Our strength also lies in our commitment to peace supplemented by astute realism. Disarmament and non-proliferation demand such strength. As the foreign minister of the only country to ever suffer atomic bombings and as a person from Hiroshima, I would like to focus here on how Japan and Europe can cooperate towards a world free of nuclear weapons.

The world is still riddled with over 17,000 nuclear warheads. The Iranian and North Korean nuclear issues, as well as the threat of nuclear terrorism, are sources of serious concern for the international community. In pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons, we should be mindful of both the humanitarian consequences of their use and the reality of increasingly diversified nuclear risks.

Based on this recognition, I propose “three preventions” for non-proliferation: the prevention of the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states, the prevention of proliferation of materials, equipment as well as technologies which could contribute to nuclear weapons programs, and the prevention of nuclear terrorism.

I further suggest “three reductions” for nuclear disarmament: the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons, the reduction of the role of nuclear weapons, and the reduction of incentives for the development and possession of nuclear weapons. I would appreciate support and cooperation from Europe when propelling this initiative.

Non-proliferation and disarmament is an urgent challenge. Japan and Europe should substantially contribute to the success of the 2015 Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference and its process as well as the rapid entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

I am pleased to have worked with my colleagues from Europe including Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, and Turkey, among others, through the NPDI (Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative), an initiative to make practical proposals in this field.

The next NPDI meeting will be held in Hiroshima in April. I would like to send a powerful message towards realizing the lofty goal of a world free of nuclear weapons from a city on which the first atomic bomb was dropped. As for nuclear security,



Fumio Kishida is Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan.

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Japan and Europe should ensure that the Nuclear Security Summit 2014, to be held in the Hague, will bring about tangible outcomes. Regarding export controls, Japan and Europe should lead by example through implementing responsible export controls for arms and dual-use items and technologies, particularly to countries of concern.

These are some of the paths Japan and Europe can take hand in hand with other partners for the good of the world. We can drive change by exhibiting leadership anchored by our shared values as well as our commitment to peace and realism. I eagerly await taking these actions with our European friends. ■

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Managing Mali

France needs European support in the Sahel | By Nathalie Guibert

France is once more redrawing the map of its African military commitments. Its proposed aim is to respond to the threat posed by Islamic terrorism in the Sahel-Saharan region. On a tour of Mali, Niger and Chad at the start of January, French defense minister Jean-Yves Le Drian offered specifics: France's military presence in the Sahel – its 3,000-strong mission – ought to be more “flexible” and “closer to the problem,” he said.

Only five years ago, France hoped it would keep just two permanent bases on the African continent, dubbed “axes of cooperation” at the time. Now, Paris talks about around 15 support points. Under its plan, a dozen mini-bases tasked with intelligence gathering will be spread throughout the zone, operating in tandem with the garri- sons that the United States has deployed there. Historic French “pre-positioning” bases, though, will see personnel reduced.

As such, the overall picture includes legacy garrisons, capable of leading operations or functioning as reserve bases, such as Dakar in Senegal, Ndjame- na in Chad, Libreville in Gabon or Djibouti. And then there are landing sites – Douala in Cameroon and Abidjan in Côte d'Ivoire – from where reinforcements can be sent. Finally there are outposts (often hosting special forces), whose location shifts depending on the imperatives of counterterrorism. These include Atar in Mauritania, Gao and Tessalit in Mali, Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso and Zouar and Faya-Largeau in Chad.

In Niger, where France is renegotiating contracts for Areva's uranium mines, the country

announced on Jan. 1, that its Niamey base would become a “stronghold” devoted to intelligence gathering, with the deployment of two Reaper MQ9s. Niger had already begun playing host to an unit of American drones in 2013.



Nathalie Guibert is the defense correspondent of the French daily Le Monde.

Flashpoint SAHEL REGION

From there, the French army and its Nigerien allies will head to sites northeast of the country. Its targets are the Passe de Salvador and the Plateau de Mangani in Southern Libya, transit areas for criminal groups. This

From Senegal to Djibouti, then, France clings to the old cartog- raphy drawn up during the colonial epoch. But today, citing the “risks of weakness” (namely those deriving from failed states, in whose uncontrolled territories mafias and terrorist groups mingle) described in its 2013 Defense White Book, Paris is seeking an improved division of responsibilities with its allies. And this is not without its difficulties.

The terms of defense agree- ments renewed during Nicolas Sarkozy's presidency insist: “Everything ought to be done so that Africans can assure their own security.” It is old rheto- ric but now has added urgency. After all, in the midst of a finan- cial crisis, everything must also be done better – and for less.

Still, French military opera- tions, including those bringing out the big guns where neces- sary, will continue to be launched in the name of the country's

has meant ‘hit and stay’. But we have proved [in Mali] that we can change tack and do ‘hit and transfer’,” the French chief of the defense staff told a parliamentary committee late last year.



In the long term, France's involvement in Africa will be refocused on providing direct operational support, with assistance units serving alongside local forces.

“The aim is to afford the same help throughout the whole region – controlling zones, controlling borders, fighting traf- ficking – so that the countries cooperate much more amongst themselves,” defense sources say. Basic training of local forces can be conducted favorably under the banner of the European Union, Paris believes. President Francois Hollande has floated a figure of 20,000 African troops per year for this.

“France has lived up to its past,” Hollande has said in relation to Operation Serval in Mali. But some commentators say the country's past in Africa has instead caught up with it. Despite itself, they add, France has fallen back into its old role as the “policeman of Africa.”

But the executive sees this as unrealistic. Could we just let the jihadists take Bamako? Could we just sit back and do nothing when confronted with a looming massacre in the Central African Republic? it asks. And the gener- als, who once styled themselves the guardians of France's rela- tionship with Africa, today salute this policy as “brave.”

Yet Paris' choices doom it to walk a tight rope. The presidency heaps praise on multilateralism. But simultaneously it dispatches the country's army unilaterally,



taking charge without giving its partners a choice in the matter. France does not count on other European nations to fight side by side with its troops, with the exception of Britain. Instead, the country seeks out ad hoc coalitions that are able to overcome its deficits in its own capabilities, for example in terms of trans- portation, aerial refueling and intelligence.

This policy attracts criticism, even at the level of the French executive. Although the secu- rity of the old French backyard matters, the nation's economic interests are now elsewhere in emerging Anglophone countries

such as Nigeria, argue a number of French diplomats.

More generally, the multi-lay- ered character of the Sahel crisis makes finding new solutions nec- essary. Hence: “It is concerning to note that recent events in Mali did not merit a mention in the chapter on development aid of the 2014 French budget,” wrote IRIS analyst Serge Michailof in the French daily *Le Monde*.

“France is not the policeman who is there to protect this or that in Africa. It has got there before Europe, which will catch up with it,” Hollande declared at the Council of Europe on Dec. 20, 2013. ■

Sahelistan is how people in Paris call the 7,500 kilometers of desert that stretch from Senegal to Somalia. A vast area shot through with smuggling and drug traf- ficking routes. It's impossible to control, whether by the feeble African states of Mali, Niger and Chad or by France, the former colonial power. And yet, Paris keeps intervening militarily in the region.

France is currently involved in not one but two crisis areas. In January 2013 the socialist govern- ment of President Francois Hol- lande dispatched 2,500 troops to Mali to stop the advance of

Islamist rebels toward the capital Bamako. Eleven months later, on Dec. 5, 2013, Hollande gave 1,600 members of the French Army orders to suppress sectarian violence in the Central African Republic and to secure the coun- try's essential supply routes from Chad and Cameroon.

Both interventions came at inopportune times for the govern- ment in Paris. For years, France has been working to place rela- tions with its former colonies in Africa on a new footing. On his inaugural visit to Senegal in Octo- ber 2012, Hollande announced that the days of “Françafrique,” the dense web of secret politi-

cal, military and economic ties with which Paris had tried to uphold its outsized influence in francophone Africa, were over. From then on, Hollande pledged, France would treat the states of Africa as partners and friends, and would encourage the region's development.

By intervening in the conflicts in Mali and the Central African Republic (CAR), however, the Elysée Palace gives the impres- sion of remaining attached instead to continuity in French policy toward Africa. Ever since Fran- cois Mitterrand's 1990 speech at La Baule, in which he linked French development aid to progress in democratization, French heads of state have been preach- ing a new beginning in Franco- African ties – only to order in their forces, at the very next moment, on behalf of corrupt strongmen. Since releasing its colonies into indepen- dence, France has con- ducted 39 military deployments to influence affairs in the continent.

Still, those who would dismiss French activity in the Sahel Belt as neocolonial power politics do so prematurely. They disregard that matters there are multi-layered, and fail to recognize the complex- ity of the French predicament.

Alone among European govern- ments, Paris has for years been fol- lowing developments in the Sahel with concern. The 2008 white paper on defense and national security refers to the area as a “critical zone” for the security of France. Weak state structures, an expansion of lawless regions and the existence of criminal net- works were endangering national security, the paper found. These trends encourage undocumented migration, sectarian radicalism in majority Muslim countries and an

upsurge of fundamentalist sects in Christian regions, it stated. One consequence, the white paper found, was the expansion of Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the Sahel, where they came to dominate routes for trafficking everything from drugs to weapons of mass destruction.

Paris responded with elite troops, military advisers for secu- rity troops, money and material. Since July 2010 France has been “at war with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.”

Moreover, Paris is pursuing eco- nomic interests. Given growth forecasts of 6.5 percent in 2014, France regards the countries south of the Sahel zone as a new El Dorado that could help create an additional 200,000 jobs in France in the coming years. Not least for that reason is Paris trying to prevent important raw material sources from falling into the hands of terrorists and/or criminal gangs in the region.

only too gladly have passed on responsibility for resolving mili- tary conflicts to the West African economic community, ECOWAS. Its military capabilities, which France wanted to bring into position in April 2012 when Mali, after a military coup and the



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Flashpoint SAHEL REGION

subsequent proclama- tion of the “Islamic Repub- lic of Azawad,” was effectively partitioned by the Tuareg, Mali's army and the ECOWAS contin- gents proved too weak to fight the Islamists that had taken control of

the region.

The interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic came at inopportune times for the government in Paris.

The fact that France is cur- rently waging war in Mali and the CAR, however, is not due to either geostrategic or economic considerations. France's mili- tary interventions were caused far more by a combination of historical accountability and a lack of alternatives. Paris would

northern Mali. In the Central Afri- can Republic, following a coup in March 2013, it became clear that the 3,000-strong task force from Chad, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Guinea was poorly equipped, uncoordinated and so torn by internal conflict that it was incapable of stopping the spread

of chaos and violence in the coun- try, in which 800,000 people are currently fleeing from the rebels.

Paris also found itself facing skepticism from the EU. In Ger- many, a consensus quickly arose against chasing French interests, Mali and Central Africa were not in “the first circle of German secu- rity policy,” said Hans-Peter Bar- tels, a security expert of the Social Democrats. As early as during the Libya crisis in 2011, EU states sig- naled to France they their military would not be available militarily even in serious crises.


Yet what option did France have, feeling as it does account- able for decades of corruption and economic mismanagement in its former colonies, other than to take on the pleas for military assistance from government lead- ers in Mali and the CAR?

It must feel like the revenge of history for Paris. At a time in which the country is trying to place its relations with Africa on a new foundation, it is being forced into military conflicts that it neither wanted nor planned – and likewise lacks the support to disentangle itself from them.


Europe, and especially Ger- many, should recognize France's sorry predicament. With both of these conflicts, the right thing to do would be to support France politically, financially and mili- tarily. In addition to the recently agreed political and financial mea- sures it should support France in its efforts to establish a minimum of state structures in the Sahel Zone. Equally important is the development of a strategy to sus- tainably influence development in the region – for Europe's own security, and so that France can finally become an honest broker in and for Africa. ■



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Since early 2011, when two longstanding Arab rulers were toppled through popular uprisings, the Arab world and the Middle East have entered into what seems to be at least one or more likely two decades of turbulence. None of the region's countries will remain unaffected.

These turbulences arise from a mixture of domestic and geopolitical contests. On the local levels, we can expect to see continued struggles for power, and shifting alliances between the young demographic majority, the educated middle class and state-bureaucratic elites – as well as between Islamists and non-Islamists and between different schools of politicized Islam. Two protracted geopolitical conflicts – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the struggle for dominance in the Persian Gulf area – remain unresolved and highly explosive. A third flashpoint, the conflict in and over Syria, may actually shake the foundations of the state system in the Arab East. Add to this a renewed ideological struggle over the appropriate domestic order.

Today, competition over dominance in the Gulf and in the Levant is enmeshed with competition between different models of political Islam: the Salafi Saudi-Wahhabi model, the more modern approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Islamic-democratic model of Turkey's AKP and the Iranian example of an Islamic Republic. What is the West's reaction going to be?

We can safely assume that the main geopolitical issues of the region will not be resolved within the next five years or so. At the very best, domestic upheavals, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Syria, and security issues in the Gulf region can be managed, brought closer to a solution, or contained, but they will certainly remain on the global agenda even by the end of the decade.

With external players less willing and able to manipulate or even just influence developments, regional balances of power will gain importance. But the regional power balance is fluid. Some states have won since the beginning of the uprisings in 2010/2011, others have lost, and some are just muddling through.

Today, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia act as the main shapers of regional interstate dynamics. One small state – Qatar – has made constant efforts to join that club; one of the former major Arab players – Iraq – is still trying to recover from a long civil war rather than playing regional politics. It also seems that any managed transition in Damascus,

The dynamics of disorder

Power shifts and geopolitics in the Middle East | By Volker Perthes

will need to take Iranian influence into consideration.

At the same time, Iran's once considerable soft power among the public in Arab states has given way to a reputation for backing a sectarian, murderous regime. And the increasing confessional polarization of regional politics constitutes a real danger for Tehran: the more regional conflicts are constructed as a Sunni-Shiite confrontation, the more difficult it becomes for Iranian leaders to wield any influence or even be accepted among the Sunni majority of the Arab world. These risks and challenges will continue to shape the Iranian agenda, but they may be dealt with differently under Iran's new president Hassan Rohani.

Most likely we will see at least some serious attempts at détente with the West and, regionally, perhaps with Saudi Arabia. If successful, this would not only strengthen Iran's position, but also have an effect on regional dynamics in general.

Saudi Arabia could also be called a survivor. The Kingdom is seized by deep strategic insecurities, but it has once again become one of the poles in the regional field of forces. Its ruling elite is worried about the balance of power in the Gulf, about Iran's nuclear program and quest for superiority, about the sustainability of the regimes in Bahrain and Jordan, about the force of popular uprisings in the Arab world and about regimes that fail to manage such challenges. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and its model of election-based Islamic rule has been seen as a threat to the Kingdom's own ideological fundaments. Domestically, enormous socio-political challenges – not so different from the grievances that have fuelled the revolutions in Egypt, Yemen or Syria – as well as a difficult succession process at the top need to be dealt with.

On all these fronts, the Saudi leadership has so far been able to cope, muddling through with



The Syria conflict could shake the foundations of the state system in the Arab East: An Al-Qaeda fighter from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Syria. The Arabic-language inscription on his AK-47 professes allegiance to Al-Qaeda.



Flashpoint ARAB WORLD

interests too much. Riyadh has therefore backed a negotiated transfer of power in Yemen. It supports the uprising against the Assad regime, but it would rather see a secular authoritarian or democratic regime emerge in Syria than a Muslim-Brotherhood-led state. And it has clearly underwritten the coup against Egypt's Islamist president Morsi. Given its resources, Saudi Arabia remains a heavyweight in the region.

Despite heavy investments into its security apparatus, however, Saudi Arabia's military power remains limited, and the Kingdom's own security depends on

foreign labor and on US protection and would be extremely vulnerable without the latter. Its regional agenda also brought it into conflict with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

Two other states in the Arab East, Iraq and Syria, have both at times tried to dominate their respective neighborhoods. Today, after years of occupation and civil war, Iraq has slowly regained economic strength, but it has not been able to translate the withdrawal of US troops and its retrieval of effective sovereignty into a stronger position in the regional system. Rather, given its apparent inability to establish a viable non-sectarian political system and a workable relationship between Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdish region, the current territorial form of the Iraqi state may actually be at risk.

Syria, after more than two years of civil war, has not only lost its regional power status, it risks being lost entirely. While neither the regime nor the rebels seem able to win militarily, Syrian society is unraveling. At some point, a broad-based government may be established in Damascus and Syrians may form a new social contract, but this will take many years. The best-case future scenario is a decentralized or federal state; the worst case is the "Somalization" of the country.

Syria is unlikely to re-emerge as a strong, centralized state for decades. Its territorial integrity may well be threatened by secession or fragmentation. Instead of projecting power into neighboring countries, Syria has become a proxy within which other regional forces can let their geopolitical struggles play out. The disintegration of Syria would not be containable and might call into question the "Sykes-Picot borders" that have defined the post-Ottoman Middle Eastern state system.


Today we can already see that the territorial contours of Lebanon have begun to evaporate under the pressure of the

Syrian conflict. A zone of de-facto common Hezbollah and Syrian regime militia control has emerged between Baalbek and Homs, East and West of the Lebanese-Syrian border. Lebanon's political cohesion is threatened by the spillover of the war in Syria. Or could Lebanon's weakness for once become its strength if (and this is a big if indeed) local political forces begin to realize that all their respective regional patrons – Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran – will not be able to sustain and protect them in the long run?

Jordan, too, could be threatened in its very existence. Pressures are rising from the civil war in Syria and its regional overflow, from unfulfilled domestic reform demands, and from the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The monarchy doesn't seem to have too many options aside from tying the country as closely as possible to both the US and Saudi Arabia and trying to re-establish a social contract that offers better governance and a certain amount of welfare in exchange for the silent acceptance of policies that may not always be in line with widely shared ideological convictions. But what if such reforms do not come about? And what if Jordan's fragile domestic balance was threatened by a definitive failure of Israeli-Palestinian peace processes?

Given the ongoing and largely unpredicted domestic, transnational and regional turbulences that have been shaking the Middle East since the beginning of 2011, it is not surprising that regional observers have begun to mull over an impending end of the "Sykes-Picot order". More surprising is how many of them expect, warn against, or hope for a "new Sykes-Picot," – the establishment of a new regional order in the Middle East by today's great powers. These expectations are hardly realistic. Rather than speculating over the contours of a new Sykes-Picot, we should ask ourselves what happens if no regional order is re-established for a long time. Would the region be torn by a series of wars and civil wars? Or would the international community increasingly distinguish between a zone of disorder that reaches from the Levant to the Persian Gulf, and a North African zone of transformation stretching, despite all difficulties, from Egypt to Morocco?


The answer depends largely on regional actors. International players can help, assist in transformation processes, mediate, and even support stabilization efforts. But they cannot and should not try to pick winners in local power conflicts, or organize regional relations. ■



Coming full circle in Syria?

After years of civil war and a spreading Al-Qaeda presence, President Assad may yet become a Western ally

By Michael Lüders



Bashar al-Assad: from pariah to indispensable ally in the fight against Al-Qaeda?

For three years now, the Syrian civil war has been dragging on with no end in sight. The fronts remain the same: On the one side there's the regime of Bashar al-Assad, supported by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. On the other side are the rebels, trying to force Assad's demise by military means.

Recently, the balance of power within the rebel camp has shifted significantly, to the disadvantage of its pro-Western factions. They are organized under the Istanbul-based "National Alliance for Syria." The US and the EU, as well as the Gulf Emirate of Qatar, support this spectrum of exile Syrians, whose spectrum stretches from the secular nationalists to the Muslim Brotherhood. These groups, however, are occupied primarily with their own conflicts and have little or no public support within Syria.

The Free Syrian Army, another favorite of the West, has never been an army, but instead a loose alliance of small militias without a centralized command. An attempt by the "Alliance" to take over its political leadership failed across the board. And, in December, Washington suspended its support for the "Army," which was restricted to begin with, after one of its biggest weapons depots, chock full of American arms, was plundered by Sunni extremists.

The Syrian government's deal to destroy its chemical weapons in return for deliverance from US military strikes has greatly strengthened the position of Bashar al-Assad. Cleverly and ruthlessly, his army has gone about reconquering the Alawite homeland, the area of

central Syria that constitutes the core of Assad's power base.

Meanwhile the regime has retreated from the regions bordering Turkey and Iraq, leaving them to the rule of Sunni extremists who, besides Assad, have been the biggest winners of the past few months in Syria. Consisting of dozens of militias and gangs, they can be broken down into two main camps:

a) Jihadists seeking to establish a theocracy in Syria. They have neither an "international agenda" nor do they want to fight Israel or the West.

b) Groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda, many of them infiltrated from Iraq, which regard Syria as only the opening phase of their jihad against the West, Israel and Shi'a Islam. The two best-known factions of this group are the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

Until last summer, when US President Barack Obama opted against intervening in Syria militarily, the civil war there was simultaneously a proxy war between Washington and Moscow. Since then the conflict has evolved into a proxy struggle pitting Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Riyadh, like the Israelis, has been watching the rapprochement between Washington and Tehran with great apprehension. The Saudis see themselves as the guardians of the Sunni world and therefore regard Shi'a Iran as their foremost geopolitical, ideological and economic rival. In response to the ongoing negotiations between Iran, Tehran and the West over Iran's nuclear program, Riyadh has

redoubled its support for Sunni extremists in Syria. That, in turn, has prompted more and more Iraqi Shi'ites to fight on Assad's side.


In recent years, the US has focused its fight against Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups mainly in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. These, however, are yesterday's theaters of conflict. Today and tomorrow, Iraq, Syria and parts of Lebanon threaten to become the jihadists' core territory, in the immediate vicinity of Turkey. They are also very active in Libya, but that's another story.

US policy has not been a benign factor in this process. The US economic sanctions imposed during the 1990s on Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait drove practically the entire Iraqi middle class into poverty. The country's best hope for modernization and democracy was extinguished. After Saddam was toppled in 2003, instead of working to bolster the central government, the US occupation authority negotiated separately with the Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds, further accelerating Iraq's disintegration.

The current Iraqi government of Nuri al-Maliki primarily backs Shi'ite interests, while systematically denying the Sunni minority power and resources. In December, all 62 of the country's Sunni parliamentarians, all of them moderates, resigned their mandates in protest against the often brutal oppression by Maliki's troops and intelligence services.

The beneficiaries have been the Sunni radicals including the ISIS, which have conquered two large cities in the Anbar Province, Fal-

uja and Ramadi. Anbar borders on Syria, with brings us full circle: The war in Syria and the conflict in Iraq complement and condition each other. Iraq, Syria and parts of Lebanon are becoming al



Flashpoint SYRIA

Germany to help destroy Syrian chemical weapons

Germany will join international efforts to destroy Syria's chemical weapons stockpile, the country's foreign and defense ministries announced on Jan. 9. The decision followed a request from the UN and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Germany has until now refused to accept chemical weapons onto its soil. But Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said Berlin had "decided not to pull back from our responsibility." Waste from the destroyed weapons will be burned at a government facility in Munster.

Queda bastions. The entire "Fertile Crescent" stretching from Basra to Beirut threatens to become a theater of sectarian conflict.

Unfortunately, there are no straightforward policy prescriptions for the region's malaise. State power has eroded in large swathes of the Arab world and Pakistan and Afghanistan. Reasons for this include the failure of respective political elites, destructive Western occupation policies and, especially, the parallel existence of rural-feudal and urban-modern structures.

The middle classes, without whom a social progression towards industrialization and modernization cannot succeed, have proven too weak to seize power and enact reforms. Instead, the Arab states have reverted to defining themselves along sectarian, ethnic and regional lines. Instead of political parties and business leaders, clans and tribes are the measure of things. The military and intelligence services operate almost exclusively to secure the regimes of the respective dominant groups. And, in direct proportion to the decay of the state, violence spreads.

The civil camps are not seeking compromise with their opponents. That would be a sign of weakness and runs contrary to the tribal mentality. Instead, they seek to neutralize their rivals or, preferably, to eliminate them. The result, as Syria amply illustrates, has been self-destruction and unimaginable suffering for the civilian population.

Having begun in Syria, the process continues in Iraq and Lebanon. Tomorrow, the countries

affected next could be Turkey and Israel, and the day after tomorrow Europe, in the form of exported terrorism and massive refugee influxes.

The good news is that the jihadist movements are incapable of constructive politics. They recruit from the ranks of uneducated youths without jobs or future prospects. Their inclination toward senseless violence alienates civilian populations who, as evidenced in Iraq and Syria, have begun to rebel against the radicals.

In the long run, Al-Qaeda and jihadist Islam have no future in the region. As their incapacity for pragmatism and restraint continues to spread suffering, their backing among the population withers – unless, of course, unwise intervention policies such as the use of drones or military operations that kill hundreds or even thousands of civilians keep enflaming popular sentiment.

The bad news is that jihadist groups are decentralized and mobile, and their fighters are hard to catch. They can inflict great damage and remain immune to the standard means of political or military reprisal (regime change, sanctions, etc.).

For the foreseeable future, the Middle East will remain a region of great instability with politically incalculable effects. Bashar al-Assad knows that. Quite possibly, he could soon become an important ally in the fight against al Qaeda. In any case, from Beirut, the Europeans and Americans are preparing to reopen their embassies in Damascus. ■

CONFERENCE

ENERGY SECURITY THE NEXT GREAT GAME? GLOBAL IMPACTS OF THE SHALE REVOLUTION

28 May 2014, Berlin

The Munich Security Conference (MSC) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Forum are co-organising the second international »Energy Security« conference under the chairmanship of Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger (MSC) and editor Dr. Günter Nonnenmacher (F.A.Z.). The conference will be held in Berlin on 28 May 2014.

With global energy demand increasing and markets facing constant change, reliable energy supply has become the no. 1 topic on the agenda for national and international politics. The shale revolution, which began in the U.S., may well herald the next »Great Game« on the geostrategic map and the global energy markets. The first noticeable impacts and the associated challenges of global energy security take centre stage at the second international Energy Security Conference. The conference brings together decision-makers from politics and industry as well as renowned scientists and representatives of international governmental and non-governmental organisations.

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FOR EUROPE

The crisis in Ukraine continues – with no end in sight. It may be on Europe's periphery, yet it remains the European Union's central foreign-policy challenge. Even more importantly, in the longer term, Ukraine has the potential to become a game-changer in European policy – perhaps in a good way, or perhaps in a bad one.

The record so far is mixed. To its credit, within ten years, Ukraine has twice expressed an ambition to join Europe. The country has stepped out of Russia's long shadow with a determination not to be ignored even in western Europe. Equally important – the pro-European movement in Ukraine has become stronger. It is no longer limited to western Ukraine. This is not a temporary change in mood – it is a lasting trend, which cannot be ignored by either domestic forces or foreign powers.

The hopes placed in Europe gives the rage of Ukrainians over the situation in their country a positive force. That is the most important trump of the democratic opposition, which only has a chance so long as it is able to articulate both the rage and the hopes of the people.

Russia or the EU – the choice is not between rivals for political power. Yet it will certainly have consequences for political power. One can criticize the EU for many things, but imperial tendencies are not among them. When NATO expanded eastward, some Europeans felt uncomfortable because the alliance's military nature would awaken fears – or at least sensitivities – in Russia. But Moscow's resistance to closer EU ties with Ukraine cannot be interpreted along those lines. So what is really at stake here?

What's happening in Ukraine at the moment is a race between two business models, one of which is less attractive but stronger politically. What Russia has to offer is the Putin model including gas and oil supplies – and without Russia's great-power tradition. None of Ukraine's problems can



Ukraine's dilemma

The European Union must do more to help Kiev choose between East and West

By Janusz Reiter

be solved the Russian way. What drives the country eastwards is its own weakness – in the face of its own corrupt elite and Russian pressure.

In contrast, the alternative – the European Union – is not a power bloc but a way of life, which many Ukrainians today have themselves experienced. Yet while there is a danger of sliding east, they must strive to go west. That requires the self-confidence that the pro-European protesters have, but which many in Ukraine do not. The country is divided, fear wrestles with hope. East meets West in Ukraine more than in any other country.

A decision to associate with the European Union would not even take Ukraine close to solving its problems. But it would encourage the reform process. However,

the vote for a customs union with Russia is a barrier to reform – both political and economic.

That has serious ramifications for Europe. Firstly, the EU's eastern border is set to become a fault line, the focus of political, economic and social tensions. Secondly, if Ukraine drifts east, it will not only become more authoritarian in itself – it will also strengthen authoritarian and imperial tendencies in Russia. To be clear – Ukraine will not return into the shadow of its powerful neighbor without a fight. Thirdly, the conflict in Ukraine presents a long-term threat to hopes of a closer partnership between the EU and Russia in many areas including security policy. Brussels would have to not only turn a blind eye but also a deaf ear towards Kiev in order to



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ignore the Ukraine crisis and its links with Russia.

The logic behind the events is alarming. Freed from the self-restraint expected in negotiations with the EU, the government in Kiev now believes it is can get tough with its opposition. The more repressive it becomes, the more difficult it gets for the Europeans to continue to offer

an association accord. And if Ukrainians' hopes of Europe are dashed, nationalist movements may become stronger. Nationalism is perfectly suited to divide Ukraine and damage its reputation internationally. The pro-European opposition knows that only too well. The question is whether they can restrain the nationalist urges. If they do not succeed a dangerous rift will develop within the country, whose western part will increasingly question those holding power in Kiev. A divided Ukraine is still not very likely but remains a worst case scenario that must be contemplated.

The European Union must not only sustain its offer of association – it must make it even more attractive. There has to at least be discussion of abolishing or phas-

Escalating conflict: Ukrainian protesters in Kiev, Jan. 22, 2014.

ing out compulsory visas. Pro-European forces in Ukraine need a credible vision so as not to be portrayed as naive fools. If the crisis gets worse, there must be close coordination between the EU and the United States. The transatlantic community's common political goal is to preserve the chance for democracy in Ukraine. Both Europe and America have a fundamental interest in preventing Ukraine from sliding into chaos. But even if the current power struggle is resolved, the tug-of-war over Ukraine's future will continue for some time. What is important now is that the country has a chance to start over – under its own steam and with Europe's help.

Moscow's meddling

Europe and the US need to understand the importance of Ukraine to Vladimir Putin's worldview | By Dmitri Trenin



"Russia's role in Ukraine-related issues is huge, and needs to be understood by the European Union and the United States:" Vladimir Putin during a meeting with Viktor Yanukovich Dec. 17, 2013.

Ukraine as part of that world. To him, Ukrainians and Russians are one people, and Ukraine is not so much "ours" as "us".

Putin's Eurasian Union mega-project is designed to be a key part of Russia's new national idea. This is not a re-incarnation of the Soviet Union or of the czarist empire. Russia has neither the will nor the resources to impose itself on its former borderlands. The new states, for their part, have no desire to give up their independence to the former hege-

mon. Yet, there are real economic interests that make integration in Central Eurasia worthwhile. So far, the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia has been voluntary and generally beneficial to all its participants. However, it does not create the critical market mass needed to compete effectively with the two other big players in Greater Eurasia: the EU in the west and China in the east. Ukraine's accession to the process would significantly improve the balance.

Late last year, it was striking to hear Russian officials, from Putin to Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev to Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin, discuss in detail the calamitous consequences, for Ukraine's economy and people, of its joining in a deep free trade area with the EU. They were also the ones who bemoaned loudly the deep involvement of European politicians and US officials in the Kiev Maidan stand-off. The impression was that, apart from the obvious goal of seeking to

influence the Ukrainian public, the Russian leader and his associates were actually expressing their own concern for a country which they do not consider fully foreign, or irretrievably lost. And then they backed up their emotions with some real money.

In December 2013, the Russian government stepped forward to bail out Ukraine with its \$15 billion assistance package. This gave Viktor Yanukovich a breathing space as Ukraine faced an otherwise very likely default, but created a dependency on Moscow. By the same token, Moscow has tied its policy more closely to President Yanukovich and his Party of the Regions. Russia's stake in the future of Ukraine has grown, but its room for maneuver within Ukraine has narrowed.

At the same time, the more sanctions warnings the Ukrainian authorities receive from the United States and Europe, the more they are pushed toward Russia. The battle lines in Ukraine have been drawn, and the two sides' foreign backers have aligned themselves behind them.

2014 will be a trying year for Ukraine. The opposition is challenging the government directly, while Viktor Yanukovich is resolved to remain in power at all cost, so a showdown is unavoidable. Beneath the issue of Ukraine's geoeconomic and geopolitical orientation there is a deeper issue of Ukraine's own political and economic structure, and its national identity.

Russia's biggest problem is that virtually the entire Ukrainian elite, including Yanukovich and his party, do not want real integration with Russia. Their idea of "Ukrainianness" is inimical to Putin's notion of an Orthodox Slavic super-nation which embraces Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians. To restore the historical unity of Russia and Ukraine, Moscow would need a new elite in place in Ukraine, equipped with a new pan-Slavic/Eurasian idea.

This, of course, is a tall order. A move to bring Ukraine into an integration scheme with Russia, unless supported by a vast majority of the Ukrainian people, would backfire. It would lead to a waste of Russian resources, make Eurasian integration dysfunctional, and eventually likely result in Ukraine's new painful break-up with Russia.

Fortunately, Russia's future, or even its stature in the world, does not depend on whether Ukraine is integrated with it or not. Russia can be great – if it wishes and works hard for it – on its own. The issue is the nature, state and direction of the Russian economy and society, and the quality of the elites and the population at large.

Dealing with Ukraine is a test for Russia, but it is also a test for Europe and the United States. Russia's and Europe's stakes are particularly high. If the West, having been disappointed by Russia's refusal to follow it, now starts looking at Russia as the new



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adversary, with Ukraine

as a new East-West battleground, the situation will become dangerous. Similarly if Russia interferes directly and massively. Rather than promoting democracy or pan-Slavic unity, Moscow and the Western capitals, particularly Berlin, need to stay out of Ukraine as much as possible, while staying in touch with each other, controlling the risks for themselves and allowing the Ukrainian politico-economic factions and the Ukrainian people to define the country's national identity. This will probably take some time.

Little reason for “Resolute Optimism”

With ISAF going into its final year, the future of Afghanistan seems more uncertain than ever. A look at three scenarios | By Eric Chauvistré



Zhari, west of Kandahar: Suicide bombers killed one NATO soldier, a sheep herder and his daughter in a deadly assault on Jan. 20, 2014. The Taliban keep intensifying their campaign against the Afghan National Army and International forces.

The attack took place only seven kilometers away from the largest assembly of NATO forces in Northern Afghanistan: Several thousand troops, mainly German and American, are based here with Dutch fighter planes and US helicopters on constant alert. That did not deter insurgents from firing rocket-propelled grenades at a German convoy near Mazar-i-Sharif – only a few days into the year that will bring to a formal end the thirteen-year mission of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

Since there were no casualties, the attack did not make headlines in Germany. But for those concerned with the German military involvement in Afghanistan, it provided a glimpse into the future. Not only were German troops attacked in an area that hadn't seen any such incidents in years, it was also remarkable that the targeted convoy did not return fire but instead quickly withdrew to its base. Is that what the international mission will look like a year from now?

At its peak, the international ISAF force was made of 120,000 troops. By the end of this year, it is to be replaced by “Resolute Support,” a much smaller mission, officially limited to mentoring and training. According to official NATO figures, by mid-January, there were a total of 57,000 ISAF troops left in Afghanistan, 38,000 of which were American, 5,200 British and 3,135 German. The future mission will have a strength of about 10,000 to 12,000 international troops.

Germany has offered to send 600 to 800 soldiers after 2014, a size only just sufficient to run the last remaining German base near Mazar-i-Sharif and to send a handful of trainers to a nearby Afghan camp.

A year before the official end of the mission, ISAF has already reduced its footprint. Germany has completely withdrawn from the Badakhshan, Kunduz and Baghlan provinces where it used to maintain major bases. Apart from an undisclosed but presumably very small number of special forces of the *Kommando Spezialkräfte* (or KSK) and a small contingent in the ISAF headquarters in Kabul, nearly all German troops are now based in the heavily fortified camp outside Mazar-i-Sharif.

But what situation are they going to face next year? Will the by then dramatically reduced troops have no choice but to sit on the sidelines? Shall they plan for a quiet mission in a tense but stable environment? Will they see the resurgence of the Taliban? Or will they wake up to an all-out civil war? None of these scenarios can be dismissed outright at the moment.

Whatever situation commanders expect to confront in 2015, they cannot really prepare for it until after a security agreement between the US and Afghanistan enters into force. Although the agreement was approved by a Loya Jirga in November, it has not been signed by President Hamid Karzai. He wants to leave this potentially unpopular job to his successor, who will be elected in April. Although this uncertainty does not make planning easier, a deal will most likely be reached eventually – if only because Afghanistan depends on billions of Dollars and Euros in aid from the US and its allies.

Without an agreement that would grant immunity to US troops based in Afghanistan, the US government would pull out completely – Obama's “zero option.” This in turn would almost automatically trigger the departure of US allies as well, and not just for political reasons: they rely on the US for air support, medevac helicopters and back-up forces.

The most optimistic scenario is that the situation remains about as good or bad as it has been over the past two years. Since ISAF force levels have been gradually reduced, there will be no immediate changes. In northern



Journalist Eric Chauvistré has reported extensively on the Afghanistan conflict and has spent time embedded with German Bundeswehr troops serving in the ISAF mission there.

Afghanistan, German troops have kept a low profile for the past twelve months. This led to a sharp decrease in casualties on the German side.

In turn, however, Afghan forces have become the main target of the insurgents. Only recently, the German military had to admit that in 2013 “security incidents” involving Afghan forces went up

by 35 percent compared to the previous year. These figures may further increase when the Afghan army and police can no longer rely on “close air support” by ISAF troops.

German military officials nevertheless point out that the increased number of attacks on Afghan forces is a sign that the latter are actually using their newly-acquired skills and engaging in major combat operations. The other line of argument is that, at least in northern Afghanistan, the insurgents have not been able to take control over major centers.

However, in the North in particular, the takeover of entire provinces or cities by the insurgents was never the issue. The question is rather how illegal checkpoints, improvised explosive devices and suicide-attacks affect the life of the local population. Roads that may be safe for heavily armed international troops, can be dangerous for lightly armed Afghan police and even more dangerous for Afghan civilians.

While the current situation even in the relatively quiet north of Afghanistan does not exactly match the idea of a stable country, it is far from certain that even this situation will last for long. A recent US intelligence estimate on Afghanistan, leaked to the *Washington Post* in January, provides a far more pessimistic outlook. “In the absence of a continuing presence and continuing financial support, the situation would deteriorate very rapidly,” the intelligence services reportedly concluded.

This would mean, in the worst case, an all-out civil war creating millions of refugees. It is a scenario that cannot be counted out completely given the resources at hand: the influx of money into Afghanistan over the past twelve years was immense. And it is an open secret that every contract for a major construction project also included protection money that went into the hands of the established warlords. Arming and financing local militias, a central element of the US

counterinsurgency approach in Afghanistan, also contributed to the renewed strengths of regional warlords.



However, an all-out war is not really in the interests of the major players in Afghanistan as it would destroy the infrastructure and thereby cut off their own sources of income. A sustained war, which would probably require additional resources from outside, is also not in the interest of Afghanistan's neighbors. Even if one presumes that some of the neighboring countries want to see the US state-building project collapse or simply prefer a weak and unstable Afghanistan, they certainly don't want a full scale war with unpredictable effects on their own territory.

While no one really expects a complete takeover by the insurgents with the establishment of a Taliban state as it existed until 2001, some sort of power sharing arrangement with extreme Islamist groups is likely to come about eventually. In this “Taliban Lite” scenario, there will be no peace deal signed in Rambouillet, Camp David or Montreux. The arrangement may rather develop over time with, on the one hand, a weak, corrupt, autocratic, internationally funded and diplomatically recognized central government in Kabul and, on the other, a set of strong local players, including the Taliban, in the rest of the country.

Such a development may even bring about some sort of tacit agreement which commits the Taliban to not hosting Al-Qaeda or similar internationally active terror networks again – an easy to accept condition for the Taliban since Al-Qaeda and its affiliate have long found new battle-

grounds in Libya, Syria and Iraq. After twelve years of Western military involvement in Afghanistan, it is harder than ever to predict where the country is going. Most likely is a mix of the first and the third of the scenarios outlined above: The current situation may last for a while, and over time the influence of the Taliban and other insurgents may increase. The speed of this process will depend greatly on the risks NATO forces are prepared to take.

Given the small numbers of troops NATO members intend to keep in Afghanistan, most of them will never leave their bases. Indeed, one can expect that commanders will, by the beginning of 2015, mainly resort to undercover operations by special forces. The question remains if Western governments will be able to stick to that low-profile policy if and when things get out of control. Whatever happens, with Operation Resolute Support taking off next year, there is little room for resolute optimism.



BUNDESWEHR FOREIGN DEPLOYMENTS				
ISAF AFGHANISTAN, UZBEKISTAN 3.135		KFOR KOSOVO 660	ACTIVE FENCE TURKEY 281	UNIFIL LEBANON 175
		UNAMID SUDAN 10	UNMISS SOUTH SUDAN 16	MINUSMA SENEGAL, MALI 75
				ATALANTA HORN OF AFRICA 332
				EUTM MALI MALI 99

Data source: German Federal Government, Bundeswehr; Graphic: M. Schwartz

Watchful peace” in J.R.R. Tolkien’s epic *Lord of the Rings* denotes the period of relative calm when the dark lord Sauron is in hiding, but no real, lasting peace could ever be expected. The phrase might well have been coined for the security situation on the Korean Peninsula in 2013, after the tumultuous start of the year.

With the demise of the Lee Myung-bak government in South Korea, which had ended ten years of “sunshine policy,” optimists hoped for a change of inner-Korean relations for the better. They were soon disappointed. With a missile test in December 2012, North Korea tried in vain to influence the South Korean presidential election, and even before the inauguration of Park Geun-hye in February 2013, the third nuclear test marked the start of an escalating security situation.

While Western media still fantasized about reformist tendencies in Kim Jong-un’s New Year Speech, North Korea gradually ratcheted up tensions by cancelling the basic agreement of 1992 on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (January 25), the armistice agreement (March 8), declaring combat readiness (March 26) and then a state of war (March 30). The Pyongyang regime went on to close the border at Kaesong Industrial Complex (April 3) and recommended the evacuation of foreign diplomatic personnel (April 6), ultimately withdrawing workers from Kaesong. This however, was a dead end.

South Korea under its new president has remained remarkably calm. After 20 years of nuclear standoff South Koreans have become so used to them that the stock market barely flickered at each new menace. Seoul countered threats with symbolic shows of force like training exercises involving US long-range bombers, and waited until the time was ripe again for negotiations.

This episode showed clearly the limits of North Korea’s strategy of bullying, which has not been entirely unsuccessful over the last decades. Warning foreign diplomats of a coming war while at the same time wooing foreign tourists and investors does not work. The new North Korean doctrine, the so-called “byungjin line” – a strategic term borrowed from a policy of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-un’s grandfather – proclaims that the simultaneous development of a nuclear umbrella and economic development is not only possible, but mutually reinforcing.

There is some economic logic in this. The obvious scaling down of a large, under-equipped and under-fed army of more than one million peasant soldiers and its substitution by a more modern, smaller – although still large – and more specialized force able to hit the enemy with asymmetric warfare, and a nuclear umbrella making large-scale war unthinkable, opens new options for North Korea. Releasing some of the military rice reserves to better feed the population was one of these. However, this policy cannot

Watching: North Korean soldiers at the border village Panmunjom.



From watchful peace to lasting security

Tensions are easing on the Korean peninsula but Seoul needs more proactive policies | By Bernhard Seliger

be reconciled with long-term development goals. A piecemeal approach to investors, tourists, and South Korea’s enemies is not credible.

This does not mean that the North Korean threat is over. A policy of benign neglect would be wrong. It would likely lead to new provocations, like the 2010 sinking of the South Korean corvette “Cheonan” and the artillery attack on Yongpyeong Island.

Close cooperation between the US and South Korean forces and their tit-for-tat tactic of answering every new North Korean threat with a new show of force, including the deployment of stealth bombers, is not increasing tensions, but making confrontation less likely. And the final decision of North Korea to return to the negotiation table and to reopen the hard-hit Kaesong Industrial Complex, shows that the tactic was chosen rightly.

Certainly, the tensions of early 2013 were meant to test the new South Korean president. However, they also had a technical component – missile systems and nuclear systems have to be tested, if they are to be developed – and they also had a component of internal North Korean politics.

The military had always been dissatisfied with Kaesong, which

is an important foreign currency earner for North Korea, but far from becoming the new Shenzhen. No major South Korean conglomerate, let alone international investors, have chosen to locate in the zone, and the payoff from the project went mostly directly to Pyongyang, not to the military.

However, due to Kim Jong-il’s decision to stick with the project, until his death no opposition was possible. Certainly, the military saw an opportunity to get rid of the project with the advent of Kim Jong-Un.

While being economically less successful than originally planned, Kaesong had a huge impact on North Korean society. 53,000 North Korean workers working under South Korean conditions (meaning an uninterrupted production process, abundant energy, for North Korean standards generous treatment of workers including medical treatment etc.) are a huge potential for changing the way ordinary North Koreans think about the South.

That ultimately the military had to agree to reopen the complex, and even to improve to some extent its functioning, only shows how desperately North Korea needs the cash generated by this last surviving monument of Sunshine Policy.

While Park Geun-hye remained cool-headed in the crisis, she currently seems at a loss how to proceed with one of the signature policies, the Korean Peninsula trust process. While allowing minor shipments of humanitarian aid, the South has offered no policy proposals besides a half-hearted call for Kaesong internationalization. This, combined

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Flashpoint KOREAN PENINSULA

with North Korea’s traditional wariness of proactive policy initiatives from the South, has led to the current standoff – a watchful peace, but without prospects for improvement.

There are ways, however, in which such an improvement can at least be attempted. Lifting the ban on small-scale trade is an obvious one. Trade was completely banned after the 2010 incidents. However, commerce is

decades was not able to detect these deficiencies.

In the short run, Pyongyang and its diplomatic channels fell into a state of shock. In the long run, though Pyongyang hastened to declare its foreign and economic policies unchanged, the move was highly detrimental to the only remaining close partnership that North Korea maintains – with China. Jang was the regime’s China point man and business and political relations certainly were damaged.

The purge also offered new insights into the working of North Korea’s elite. The year 2012 with its frequent reshuffles of military posts was seen by some analysts as proof of the comfortable situation Kim Jong-un enjoyed as the undisputed center of power. Certainly, he is the rallying point of the Pyongyang elite. But already in 2012, he failed to seize control of profitable military trading interests. And the current purge was most likely also triggered by disputes over resources between the military and Jang’s men.

For now, the military has gained. In the long run however, the squandering of national wealth through the dumping of resources at up to half of world market prices to China will have to go on if North Korea follows its current path of pampering the new middle class without enacting real economic reform.

The new special economic zones, basically a good idea, will not work as long as the country remains internationally isolated, i.e. as long as the nuclear crisis is not solved. A partial opening is undoubtedly taking place. Last year for the first time more than 200,000 North Koreans visited China, and 93,000 hold a working visa, all of them potential agents of change in North Korea society. But such a partial opening is not enough to avoid a deepening crisis, not unlike the crisis East Germany faced in the late 1980s.

South Korea could relax and watch how the situation develops. However, instead of discreetly rallying support for future unification. President Park’s *trustpolitik* either on the Korean Peninsula or in the greater Northeast Asian area is leading nowhere. Granted, neither a more assertive China nor a Japan answering with its own brand of resurgent nationalism are easy-to-handle partners. But instead of dealing with them as they are, the South Korean president’s “I don’t shake your hand” attitude belies the intentions of *trustpolitik* and is only likely to exacerbate an already difficult situation.

Domestically, unnecessary ideological conflict driven by the government and the president’s opponents, clouds the goal of achieving a national consensus on unification policy. A heavy dose of *realpolitik* is necessary, to make *trustpolitik* finally work. 2014 will be the year, in which, after a superb start, and a subsequent lameness, President Park has to prove that her vision of a new, balanced policy on the Korean Peninsula is more than just empty posturing. ■

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Will the ice hold?

A consensus is emerging among stakeholders that Arctic challenges can only be tackled jointly
By Tobias Etzold und Stefan Steinicke



Tobias Etzold (L) and Stefan Steinicke specialize in EU external relations and Arctic policy at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP, Berlin).



Flashpoint ARCTIC CIRCLE

Currently, the Arctic region is opening up and increasingly attracting the interest of non-Arctic actors. One of the most significant developments has been the growing engagement of Asian countries in the region, most prominently China. In a relatively short time China shuffled the existing Arctic balance of power and emerged as a highly visible factor in Arctic geopolitics.

From a Chinese point of view, Arctic-driven climate change has a strong impact on Chinese security concerns, therefore Arctic developments should be dealt with by international institutions. Furthermore, China is highly interested in the emerging economic opportunities the region has to offer. This interest applies both to so far untapped resources of oil, gas and minerals but also to new shipping routes.

China is in the process of stepping up its cooperation with Iceland and Greenland. Non-Arctic countries call for involvement in future regional developments because of the expected significant consequences for them.

From this perspective, it becomes clear that, in the future, Arctic developments will not be driven exclusively by regional dynamics but also by economic, political and security developments in other parts of the world and interests of countries outside the region. Several Arctic countries, however, feel a slight unease about developments that could lead to an inter-

nationalization of Arctic issues. They stress the need to upgrade their regional security strategies, military capabilities and support infrastructure to safeguard their territorial integrity as well as their strategic interests.

Countries do not only invest in upgrading their capabilities for emergency response management scenarios (SAR duties or oil spills) but also for military operations. Russia in particular is revitalizing its former military installations in the region and also establishing new security centers. The chiefs of the Russian Air Force and Navy declared 2014 the year of a strengthened Russian presence as they regard the Arctic as a region of “utmost importance in terms of natural resources and strategic interests.”

For the US, the Arctic could become one of the most important future regions in terms of national security. In this context, the US Navy plans to be Arctic-ready by 2025. Canada is also investing in new patrol ships and surveillance systems aimed at securing its sovereignty and protecting its territorial integrity.

Against this background, the lack of a regional forum to discuss security related issues becomes apparent. The Arctic Council has no mandate to tackle hard security issues. The NATO-Russia dialogue could be one possible discussion forum but Canada has been explicitly against any NATO role in the region.

Nonetheless, increasing cooperation and confidence-building measures in security affairs are of utmost importance. According to US Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, multilateral security cooperation will even become a priority as “this will ultimately help reduce the risk of conflict.” The Arctic Security Forces Roundtable, a pool of all eight Arctic Council member states plus France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom seems to be a step into the right direction. ■

* Survey conducted among 514 executives of medium and large corporations in June-July 2013

For six decades now, the National Security Agency (NSA) has been snooping through telecommunications throughout the world, among foes and friends, America’s most secretive secret service was founded in 1952 during the Truman administration, out of an organization within the Pentagon. The mere existence of the NSA was kept classified for years, earning it nicknames such as “No Such Agency” and “Never Say Anything.”

Its mission is to monitor global communications and filter the data for usable information. Additionally the agency was responsible for the nation’s encryption program and defense of US telecommunications links. Nothing has changed in the mission, only the technology has become far more sophisticated and comprehensive. “Home to America’s code makers and code breakers” is how the agency praises itself on its Web site.

In August 2013, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that the NSA’s capacities enable it to access about 75 percent

Informant software. Subtract all spam (68 percent of total email traffic), and it becomes quite plausible that the NSA is accessing three-quarters of the relevant online communications in North America (the figures, by the way, were calculated in a 2013 study by Canadian network equipment maker Sandvine). That is a substantial slice of global communication, even when the mailers hail from Europe, Africa or Asia.

That has to do mainly with the structure of the Internet. Facebook, Twitter, Google, Yahoo, Ebay, Amazon – nearly all major electronic marketplaces, messaging services, search engines and social networks are based in the US, along with the two leading credit card companies MasterCard and Visa, and global payment service PayPal. Nearly the complete electronic infrastructure for billing is located in the US, which guarantees authorized access to much of global online payment information.

It’s a similar situation with cloud computing, which companies, universities

Well-charted territory

Why German outrage over NSA snooping is irrational

By Stefan Aust

“of all Internet communications” in the North American continent. James R. Clapper Jr., the US Director of National Intelligence, did not explicitly deny the report. But in defense of the NSA, he cited concrete figures for the first time regarding the extent of digital surveillance. In the course of its investigations into foreign espionage, the agency comes “into contact” with only 1.6 percent of international digital traffic, and NSA analysts select a mere 0.00004 percent of this data traffic for closer inspection, Clapper said.

Make no mistake – those are immense quantities of data. Today, about 1826 petabytes of information are transmitted daily throughout the world. (1 petabyte = 1,000,000,000,000,000 bytes). Accordingly, 1.6 percent of daily Internet traffic would equal 29 petabytes. To better understand that quantity, one would need about six million DVDs to store those 26 petabytes. Stacked on top of each other, they would produce a DVD tower about six kilometers high – every day.

And the 0.00004 percent with which the NSA analysts occupy themselves more closely, according to General Clapper, equals 73,000 gigabytes, which would require about 15,000 DVDs of storage. Using run-of-the-mill hard drives with a capacity of 1-terabyte would save space: 73 would suffice. Just for comparison’s sake, the entire stored content of the onboard computer on the Apollo 11 lunar module Eagle would fit about a million times over on those 73 hard drives.

A small rhetorical dissonance is a key element in the debate between the *Wall Street Journal* and Clapper. While the paper refers to “online communications” in the US, the intelligence chief used the term “global Internet traffic.” In the latter, the overwhelming bulk, nearly 75 percent, consists of transmissions of music, photos and video, downloading apps, and file sharing. It’s not very likely that the NSA cares much about the latest episodes of *Homeland*, *Breaking Bad* or the new *Goldplay* song.

No, the cyberspies are interested far more in emails and the like, which account for 2.8 percent of global online traffic – and can easily be filtered out of the rivers of data using modern surveillance programs like the NSA’s Boundless


and authorities use to store and process their data for bargain prices in external data centers. The most important cloud centers are operated by companies like Google, Microsoft and Amazon in the US, meaning that this data likewise falls under US jurisdiction. “The architecture of the Internet determines the political situation,” said Andy Müller-Maguhn, longtime spokesman of the Germany-based hacker group Chaos Computer Club (CCC).

Storing all data and transactions in a central location is a dangerous situation, Müller-Maguhn believes. It is “tantamount to an invitation to use the information for any and every purpose,” he said. German software maker SAP has begun offering its own cloud, as industrial companies in Germany and elsewhere have begun to understand the issues involved in putting all IT and communications data into US hands. If the Americans control the cloud as well, the gate to industrial espionage is wide open.

Not only is it technologically feasible to process all those gigantic amounts data, it is not even that expensive. The CCC hackers have calculated that digitally storing all phone calls made annually in Germany – about 200 billion minutes on landlines – in acceptable audio quality would cost no more than €6 million. Even adding the costs of equipping a data center, computing capacity, networking and human resources, and throwing in all 100 billion minutes called on mobile phones for good measure, the price tag would still not exceed €30 million, the hacker club says.

“That’s much cheaper than a single combat aircraft,” pointed out ex-hacker Maguhn, who now earns his money with encryption technology. “A Eurofighter costs €90 million, an F-22 about 115 million.” It’s a convincing comparison if digital surveillance is considered a weapon, which it most certainly is by the US security authorities: a weapon in the fight against terrorism. But it’s also become much more than that.

It seems, with global connectivity combined with the new surveillance technologies, as if a new golden age of espionage has dawned, in the political, military and economic spheres. The last time spying was in demand was during the Cold War,





Don't fear our democratic governments

It's not Big Brother who threatens our privacy and the security of our data.
The enemies are criminal hackers and foreign countries | By Toomas Hendrik Ilves

The 2011 Munich Security Conference included for the first time a special session on cyber-security. “This may be the first time,” I then predicted, “but it will not be the last.” And indeed, today we can see that cyber is actually at the core of discussions on security policy, overtaking terrorism.

If terrorism emerged in the first decade of the 21st century as a new threat to Western security, then cyberattacks rose to the fore in the second decade. Neither, of course, was new; major terrorist as well as cyberattacks had taken place earlier (the latter in my country, for example), yet awareness came with the dramatic escalation of the size and impact of the attacks.

I keep no tally of cyberattacks, hacking, and espionage, but from a subjective reading of the temperature in cyberspace it is quite clear: the issue has come to concern the highest levels of political leadership in the West to an unprecedented degree. General Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency and the United States Cyber Command, stated last July that there had been a seventeen-fold increase in cyber attacks on American infrastructure from 2009 to 2011, initiated by criminal gangs, hackers, and nations. In December 2012, the US Department of Homeland Security revealed an “alarming rate” of increase in attacks against power, water, and nuclear systems in the fiscal year 2012. The destruction of files in some twenty thousand Aramco computers, the Mandiant Annual Threat Report on Advanced Targeted Attacks, the “distributed denial of service” attacks on the New York Stock Exchange last year, hacking during the missile attacks against Israel, as well as countless other episodes – all indicate a rise in frustration and tensions that have not been before.

A country like Estonia, which is small and on many scales different from the United States, has been facing these problems for a long time. Praised by the United Nations e-Annual Report system as the “best of the best” e-government application of the past decade, ranked by Freedom House as first in Internet freedom for the third year in a row, Estonia is primarily remembered in the cyber literature as the first publicly known target of politically motivated cyber attacks in April 2007. These disruptive attacks inundated the websites of the government, parliament, banks, ministries, newspapers, television stations, and other organizations. However, by today's standards they were primitive, essentially overloading servers with signals from hijacked, hacker-controlled personal computers. Six years later, as computing power and informational technology dependency have increased enormously, cyber attacks are far more sophisticated, and our vulnerabilities are far greater.

At the same time, the visibility that resulted from the 2007 cyber attack in Estonia was also a blessing – as a result, we took cybersecurity seriously earlier than many others, and our allies took notice. In 2008, NATO opened its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn to enhance the Alliance's cyberdefense capability. It serves as a valuable source of expertise for both its sponsoring nations and NATO. The center's interdisciplinary approach to cyberdefense is unique: experts from different fields work together and share their knowledge, giving the center and its work a broader perspective. It published the so-called Tallinn Manual, groundbreaking research into the murky world of the applicability of international law vis-à-vis cyber warfare.

Estonia is extensively computerized in the fundamental operations of society and as well as our citizens' day-to-day lives. We have continued to push the envelope in developing e-governance to levels that few countries have been willing to follow up to now. 25 percent of the Estonian electorate votes online, over 95 percent of prescriptions are filled online. A recent report by the European Commission and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development rated Estonia as the most advanced European country in offering e-health services. Up to 98 percent of tax returns are filed online and have been since the beginning of the millennium, and almost all banking is done online. In December 2012, Estonia passed the one hundred million mark for digital signatures. Adding to this near 100 percent broadband coverage and countrywide Wi-Fi, Estonia is one of the most wired countries in overall terms, both with respect to services as well as to physical infrastructure.

Also, as a country so dependent on the digital world, we cannot help being a proverbial canary in the coalmine. Today, almost everything we do depends on a digitized system of one kind or another. Our critical infrastructure – our electricity, water, or energy production systems and traffic management – essentially interacts with, and cannot be separated from, our critical information infrastructure – private Internet providers, lines of telecommunications, and the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems that run everything from nuclear power plants to traffic lights and the delivery of milk to our supermarkets. As systems become more complex, threats become more sophisticated. Yet, as people's and society's technological dependence and the automatization of processes increases, our security consciousness decreases.

However, in reality, in a modern digitized world it is possible to paralyze a country without attacking its defense forces: the country can be ruined by simply bringing its SCADA systems to a

halt. To impoverish a country one can erase its banking records. Even the most sophisticated military technology can be rendered irrelevant. In cyberspace, no country is an island.

Cyber security therefore means defending our societies as a whole. The entire information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure must be regarded as an “ecosystem” in which everything is interconnected and functions in toto. We believe that today, both the input (that is, the data) as well as the process must be authenticated. In cyberdefense, we no longer need to defend merely stored data but the integrity of the digitized process.

The more we automatize processes, the more we allow machines to make decisions, the more we need to ensure that automatized processes operate on trustworthy data. If our power generation is run automatically on SCADA systems, we had better insure that those automatized decisions are made based on true,



Toomas Hendrik Ilves is President of the Republic of Estonia. He has also served as his country's ambassador to the United States.

PRIVATE

uncorrupted data. Feeding an automatic process bad or corrupted data is one sure way to create a disaster, since an automatic decision is based only on the information it receives. This is precisely the underlying idea behind the Stuxnet virus that made Iranian uranium enrichment centrifuges run out of control.

The rapid change of digitized society, and the security challenges that follow, compel us to rethink some of our core philosophical notions of modern society, such as privacy and identity as well as the relations between the public and private spheres. We in liberal democracies insist on two fundamental values that often come into conflict, and will increasingly do so the more we live in a digitized world. These two core values are privacy and transparency.

Unfortunately, despite the digital revolution of the last decade, the standard view of privacy and ethics in a majority of countries has not changed. It is the “Big Brother is watching” paradigm that rules the thinking, and it goes back to the age of totalitarianism when the idea of an all-powerful state following your every move became a standard metaphor. It is also known as the Orwellian nightmare.

However, it is dangerous to remain fixed on the idea of Big Brother at a time when the greatest threats to our privacy and the security of our data come from criminal hackers and foreign countries (often working together). In an age of

digital technology, it is not necessarily the government we should fear most, at least in the democratic parts of the world. This fear may have been more justified in the past, when only national governments had the ability to monitor citizens. Today, as we know, a single hacker can access the most intimate details of your digital and non-digital life, your finances, and your correspondence. Therefore, the issue is: “follow the money.” Big Data has replaced Big Brother as the one who knows most about you. (Perhaps we should talk about the “Little Sister” who knows all your secrets and tells everyone who knows how to ask.) So even in the light of ongoing heated debates on online privacy, it is first of all Big Data we should be worried about.

Intelligence agencies collect information on various people at home and abroad – that is what they have to do. As long as this takes place legally and morally, ensuring oversight and transparency, it is a necessary activity to prevent crime and terrorism. The problem today appears to be that intelligence agencies act like a child in a candy store, because most individuals' cyber behavior is so naive.

So the real issue with Big Brother is not so much the state collecting our data as our own behavior: we all have all kinds of applications on our iPads and smartphones. If we think all those free apps we download and the personal data we upload are really free, then we are very misguided indeed. These data are monetized. Our personal information and preferences in social media are monetized. There is no such thing as a free app. Still, we make our personal data available voluntarily – and then wonder when it is being used in ways that we failed to foresee.

Here again we touch upon automatized processes, because those data collected on us by browsers, cookies, search engines, or heart rate and exercise apps are collected automatically, without our knowing how they are used, by companies just making money or by cybercriminals. Virtually all breaches of computer security involve a fake identity, be it stealing a credit card number or accessing internal documents. Therefore, secure identity lies at the core of security online. A three-digit security code on the back of a credit card does not provide you with a secure identity, nor does an ordinary computer password. The fundamental question is whether you can be sure the person you interact with online is who he or she claims to be.

The key to all online security is a secure online identification system, but the nebulous fear of an imagined Big Brother prevents citizens in many places from adopting a smart-chip-based access key that would afford them secure online transactions. Yet as we have seen, the

real question is not whether our data is secure when we have government e-services, but rather what is being done with our data, period, in any format.

In Estonia, all citizens are issued a highly encrypted, chipped identification card that allows users to cryptographically sign digital documents and access hundreds of public and private e-services. At the same time, citizens are the legal owners of their own data. People can see what their data are being used for and by whom. This is where transparency meets privacy: we all have the right to see what data the state possesses on us and, far more importantly, how these data are used and by whom, and when they are accessed.

Eventually, countries will adopt a two-factor authentication system in one form or another, because it is the only thing that is currently secure. It will have to use a binary key code system, because that is the only one that has been proven to work so far. Many countries in Europe have adopted similar systems; however, they do not have the range of services behind them that we already have in Estonia. We just try to put as much online as possible.

In the future, Estonia hopes to connect its digital services and make them interoperable with its neighbors in northern Europe. In the longer run, we are looking toward uniting systems in all of Europe. Ultimately, government data will move across borders as freely as email and Facebook and follow the international flows of commerce and trade.

This all has an effect on our economy, both in Europe and beyond. The job of cyber security is to enable a globalized economy based on the free movement of people, goods, services, capital, and ideas. This can only be accomplished if online identities are secure.

Undoubtedly, the most effective means by which our societies could be safeguarded from cyberattacks would be to roll back the clock – to go back to the pen, typewriter, paper, and mechanical switch. We should give up on mobile phones, iPads, online banking, social media, Google searches – everything we have become accustomed to in the modern world. Yet that is not likely to happen, nor is it what we want. It is therefore crucial to understand that cybersecurity is not just a matter of blocking the bad things a cyberattack can do; it is one of protecting all the good things that cyber insecurity can prevent us from doing. Genuine cybersecurity should not be seen as an additional cost but as an enabler, guarding our entire digital way of life. ■

This article is taken from the book: “Towards Mutual Security – Fifty Years of Munich Security Conference,” (editor Wolfgang Ischinger, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014).

Cyber security

A challenge that can only be met through cooperation, honesty and integrity

By John Suffolk and Ulf Feger



The NSA affair with all its consequences has once again magnified the problems of cyber security. The wide international media coverage of cyber security has led to an intensive public debate about the issue. In this regard it became even more apparent that consumers, governments and companies alike face enormous challenges that they need to counter.

The complexity of the challenges for those using technology stem from a great number of factors:

- 1) There are too many devices being connected to the Internet that have variable security capability.
- 2) The rate of change in technology is accelerating on a daily basis.
- 3) Bad actors only need to be successful once while defenders of cyber security have to be constantly successful.
- 4) Most importantly, cyber security threats do not stop at territorial boundaries in relation to the product, the end-user or the “attacker.” Product value chains cross national borders and ICT companies purchase their components all over the world. Huawei for instance buys 70 percent of the components for its products outside the Chinese market. More than 30 percent of the components are purchased from US companies.

The reality is, as demonstrated by the recent revelations, global information, communications and technology (ICT) infrastructure can hardly be safeguarded as its interconnectivity and global nature generates a wealth of opportunity for breaching supply chains, products, services and even the opportunities for insider threat. If

we are passionate about the role that technology has in improving people's lives, improved prosperity and how it has made the world a better place, then we need to collectively work on solutions in order to reduce the risks for consumers, governments and companies.

But attempts to create true uniformity at international standardization have failed up till now. The global ICT industry has agreed on technical standards in most things except on security – this is not acceptable. What will it take to bring parties together to start deciding what we collectively need to do? More revelations? More data loss? More denial of service? More online crime?

In this regard, it is time to press the reset button on our approach to cyber security. Only if we cooperate across sectors and countries we will benefit from the increasing interconnectedness and technical progress, as part of a “safe” digital society. We have to ask ourselves how we want to work together in order to define and agree on new norms of behavior, new standards, new laws and create a new realism in the balance between privacy and security.

Whilst the debate is raging on the balance between security and privacy, no one is talking about honesty and integrity. We need honesty in the reality of national security, we need honesty in the role of the private sector in supporting national governments in national security matters, and above all we need governments and the technology industry to have integrity in their operations and their approach.

But collaboration, international laws and protocols are not of much use if technology we deploy is inherently insecure or if we do not drive to achieve a considerably higher standard in all things related to security. Let us not be downhearted as there is a lot we can do. Building cyber security into a vendor's product goes hand-in-hand with the protection of citizen data. Governments and enterprises should not be afraid to use their inherent buying power and demand more from their technology vendors. We have seen in every walk of life that vendors will dance to the tune of their customers – better products, better innovation, better service; better price equals a more sustainable business. Governments and enterprises must now make their vendors dance to the tune of better security considerations and performance.

Huawei seeks to contribute to the international debate. By providing our knowledge and experience we want to foster international cooperation. Moreover, we seek to give an insight into the transformations vendors are undergoing, and need to undergo, in order to meet the challenges of cyber security.

Huawei is investing heavily to build in cyber security into its end-to-end processes and to transform its global supply chain and the way it does business to cater for the never-ending cyber security challenge. In our second White Paper on Cyber Security, which was released in October 2013, Huawei provided detailed information about its end-to-end approach, including a practical overview of the approach Huawei takes to the design, build and deployment of technology



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

Huawei is a leading global information and communications technology (ICT) solutions provider. Through our dedication to customer-centric innovation and strong partnerships, we have established end-to-end advantages in telecom networks, devices and cloud computing. We are committed to creating maximum value for telecom operators, enterprises and consumers by providing competitive solutions and services. Our products and solutions have been deployed in over 140 countries, serving more than one third of the world's population.

that involves cyber security considerations, including overarching strategy and governance structure, its day-to-day processes and standards, staff management, R&D, security verification, third-party supplier management, manufacturing, delivery and traceability.

As technology moves fast we also have to continuously work on our processes and improve our approach. All our activities are driven by openness and transparency. This is why we constantly reinforce the implementation of our cyber security assurance system with a particular focus on independent

verification, external auditing and certification.

Huawei is prepared to closely work together with all governments, customers and partners to jointly tackle cyber security threats and challenges. However, despite the threats we are facing, digital technologies and the growth that ICT gives us on a daily basis, provide significantly more social and economic benefits than the cyber-criminals take away. Therefore, we will also in future take our responsibility seriously and encourage an open and effective dialogue with all relevant parties. ■



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