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
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
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The Gorbachev challenge and the defence of the West

MICHAEL HOWARD

It is inevitable, and appropriate, that current changes in Soviet policy, and the problems caused by those changes, should be associated with the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. Whatever the outcome of his régime, he will go down to history as one of the major figures of the twentieth century. Like such other great statesmen as Bismarck and Roosevelt – to name only the least controversial – he has had both the insight to perceive the necessity and the possibility of change, and the skill and the will-power to exploit them. Whether, like Bismarck, he will also have the capacity to recognise the bounds of the possible and to stabilise the new situation he has created remains to be seen. But clearly he is no bizarre aberration, a genetic accident like a reforming Czar, after whose reign the situation will return to the accustomed *status quo*. He has unleashed changes which are likely to be irreversible: his emergence, and his successes to date, indicate that developments are occurring within the Soviet Union, and have been going on quietly for some time, of which he is not so much the occasion as the result. The 'Gorbachev challenge' is systemic rather than personal. It demands long-term strategic reappraisals as well as short-term tactical ones.

It would be surprising if there had not been substantial change in the Soviet Union as a result of two generations of economic modernization. Only in pre-industrial agrarian societies can social and political structures remain frozen. Modernization – and the whole *raison d'être* of Leninist dirigisme is modernization – inevitably produces rising expectations, especially in competition with rival societies which are modernizing faster and more effectively. The Soviet attempt to preserve a controlled and stable society while simultaneously transforming a backward agrarian economy into one technologically competitive with the West was bound to run into increasing difficulties as the need for education produced a more inquisitive and acquisitive professional and administrative class. Like the Roman Catholic Church before it, the Communist Party has had to adjust to developments it can no longer prevent. It may be necessary for Soviet ideologists, and it is certainly

Sir Michael Howard is Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford University and President of the IISS.

This paper was presented to the conference 'NATO in the Fifth Decade', 27–30 September 1988, co-sponsored by the US Mission to NATO and the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC. It will be a chapter in a forthcoming National Defense University book, *NATO in the Fifth Decade*, to be edited by Keith Dunn and Stephen Flanagan.

convenient for their counterparts in the West, to view the Soviet Union as an unchanged and unchanging monolith, but this is not in accordance with the observable facts. Marxist theory itself gives the lie to such an analysis, for it teaches that, as means of production, and the economic relations they render necessary, change, so the political superstructure which reflects them must either accommodate itself or be destroyed.

Such changes may, however, be slow to develop. Even if irreversible, they are likely to be dialectical in nature, proceeding by hard-fought conflicts of opposites. Russian political culture has always produced cataclysmic rather than evolutionary change: leaps forward followed by long periods of reaction. Nor is there much reason to suppose that change will necessarily be towards the pattern of the bourgeois pluralistic democracies established, under very different circumstances, in the West, and whose value-systems we regard as normative. There are few figures in the Soviet Union, outside the unpopular Jewish community, who appear to regard such a development as practicable or desirable, and those who do so are unlikely to prevail. The worst abuses of human rights, the more outrageous persecution of political dissidents may be abated. The régime may relax its Pharaonic and counterproductive policy towards the children of Israel. But the West is likely to be faced for the indefinite future with a régime which, even if it has abandoned its chiliastic revolutionary goals, is both authoritarian in its treatment of its citizens and legitimised by a socialistic ideology. Those of us who dislike such characteristics will still have plenty to complain about.

But how *dangerous* would such a régime be? What kind of 'threat' would it continue to present to the West? What changes would we need to see in Soviet culture before we felt 'safe'? Authoritarian government as such, and even abuse of human rights, do not in themselves necessarily constitute a 'threat' in international relations. Indeed, authoritarian régimes, however badly they treat their citizens, usually introduce an element of *stability into the international system*. The United States has never shown great concern about the internal régimes of, to name only two, Turkey or Pakistan, and it accommodated itself philosophically to Franco's Spain. Nor did the authoritarian structure of the Russian Empire itself upset its partners in the Concert of Europe in the nineteenth century: in fact it was for long seen by its neighbours as the foundation-stone of the political order. It was the forces of democratic nationalism that were disruptive and, for better or worse, still are.

Social scientists in the nineteenth century, from St. Simon to Herbert Spencer, believed that as societies developed from a feudal structure based on land tenure to a bourgeois-democratic one based on industrialization, they would become inherently more pacific. The experience of the twentieth century has not borne this out. Bellicosity and militarism have been at least as evident in western bourgeois societies as they were in aristocratic ones, and in any case the process of democratisation itself, as we saw in Germany and Italy between the wars, is not irreversible. A

formal democratic structure, however pluralistic, is in itself no guarantee for peace.

Nevertheless it is true that fully democratic and open societies have *seldom if ever in the modern world gone to war with one another, and for* good reason. The legislatures of such polities tend to be more concerned with questions of domestic welfare than of foreign and military policy, and the greater the degree of political participation, the more is this likely to be the case. Further, wars cannot be effectively fought by democracies without the whole-hearted support of the mass of the population which it is almost impossible to obtain unless there is a clear and undeniable danger avertible only by war. But most important of all, democracy is unworkable without a free flow of reliable information. Such information not only engenders debate but eliminates misunderstandings. It is not so much the authoritarian structure or the increasingly discredited socialist ideology of the Soviet Union that should alarm the West, as the control and manipulation of information which its government uses to underpin both. Once this comes to an end, and the Soviet peoples have access to the same data as the West, we can begin to treat the Soviet Union as a reliable partner in international affairs. And although there is a long way to go, it must be admitted that progress over the past few years has given us some reason to hope for better things.

Even if fundamental changes are taking place in the Soviet system the direction and outcome of the change remains obscure and the time-span incalculable. Governments, whose attention is necessarily focused on the short run, will inevitably be cautious. Their spokesmen will make weighty statements to the effect that it is too early to judge and we must wait and see, as if that was the end of the matter. But of course it is not. Statesmen should not confine themselves to reacting to circumstances. They should have some vision of the way they wish to see the world develop, and some capacity to move it in that direction.

Decisions have to be made, both tactically in the near term and strategically in the long, as to how to respond to change. Our tactics are likely to go badly astray unless the strategy has been agreed, and strategy must be based upon long-term political appreciations. Unfortunately within the Alliance, these are likely to be diverse.

There are two stereotypical appreciations, the hawkish and the doveish, each of which will find exemplars in every country; but the United States, in spite of the advice of such experts as George Kennan and Marshall Shulman, tends always to incline towards the first, and the Europeans, always excepting the French, towards the second.

The most simplistic American analysis is based on geopolitics, a science which has not been held in high regard in Europe since the days of Hitler's guru Professor Haushofer. This sees the Soviet Union as possessing the Heartland of the World Island, pressing out to control the Rimland, whence it will seek to expand to control the world. Internal political change will not affect these long-term objectives, which are

inexorable unless met by the countervailing pressure of Oceanic power. But even those who do not avail themselves of such intellectually dubious underpinnings still regard conflict between Russian and Western power as secular, permanent, ineluctable, and base all their long-term strategic assessments on this appreciation. Any alternative assessment is in their view simply wishful thinking.

Europeans tend to base their analysis on a less stark approach. The foreign policy of States, we agree, is indeed shaped to a large degree by geographical circumstances, but these interact with economic, social and political evolution. Internal social structures and political pressures played as great a role as did geography in the expansion, and subsequent collapse of Swedish, French, British and ultimately German power. (Historically indeed it has usually been the Heartland that has been under threat from the Rimland rather than *vice versa*.) Social evolution changes the nature of societies and of their relations with their neighbours. Britain (alas) is no longer the country of Chatham and Palmerston, nor France that of Napoleon, nor Germany that of Ludendorff and Hitler. Is the Soviet Union still the country of Lenin and Stalin? Even if it is, how long will it remain so, as its citizens, their memories of war and revolution fading into history, demand the comforts and the franchises those régimes denied them? Europeans are perhaps more conscious than are Americans of the Russians as a people with a historic and developing culture and a political destiny entwined with their own: a people offering threats but also opportunities. Nobody is more conscious of this than the Germans, for whom the Russians have been in turn partners and victims, allies and adversaries, and for whom Europe stops neither at the Vistula nor at the Elbe.

Because Europeans have had their own experiences of expansion and contraction, of economic modernization and the social transformation that goes with it, we are therefore less inclined to believe in geopolitical or ideological absolutes. In the European perspective, it seems likely that the Soviet Union will ultimately change as all other modernized societies have changed, and its relations with the rest of the world will be affected by such change. It is true that all fundamental developments must come from internal evolution to which external pressures are secondary. But external factors are not irrelevant. Negatively, external pressures changed the nature of Charles XII's Sweden, Napoleonic France and Hitler's Germany by military defeat, and perhaps contained the ambitions of Stalin's Russia. Positively, external pressures from the West, economic and cultural, have transformed and are transforming the structures of societies throughout the world. For better or worse, we are involved in the unfolding destiny of the Soviet Union. So what would we wish that destiny to be?

Four 'models' present themselves for consideration, though we can be sure that reality will be more complex than any of them.

Model A (for Apocalyptic) is of a disintegrating Soviet Union, unable to hold together under the popular and nationalist pressures resulting from the revolution of rising expectations and the slackening grip of the Party. In the East Islamic fundamentalism will create independent republics. In the West dissident nationalism will spread from Eastern Europe northward to the Baltic and East to the Ukraine. European Russia will once more be reduced, as it was in 1919, to the dimensions of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy. For some in the West this is a dream-ticket. Certainly for the Russians it is a historic nightmare: there are those still alive who remember the days of the counter-revolutionary armies of Denikin and Kolchak – and remember also that France, Britain and the United States were arming and financing those forces. One of the charges levelled against Gorbachev by his adversaries is that *perestroika* is leading precisely in that direction.

It is an illusion, however, to suppose that under such conditions the Soviet Union would become helpless, introverted, and cease to present a 'threat'. Sooner or later a group would emerge in Moscow prepared to deal with the situation as ruthlessly as did Lenin, Stalin, or any of their historic predecessors. The process of 'restoring order' in Eastern Europe would recreate all the old tensions in the West. Further, even if the United States was not exploiting the situation up to the hilt, everyone would assume that it was doing so; and unfortunately the record of the White House in failing to control its covert agencies would make this a quite reasonable assumption. It is difficult to conceive of any circumstances in which the Soviet leadership might initiate a nuclear war, but the threatened disintegration of their society, assisted by Western propaganda and pressures, presents an alarmingly plausible scenario. Superficially attractive as such a model may appear in some quarters, it is one that we would do well to avoid.

Model B (for Benign) is the preferred alternative of the doves. It is of a Soviet Union which feels itself neither under external pressure nor under any obligation to export a creed of revolutionary socialism which it has itself long-since abandoned as counter-productive. It has co-operated in arms reductions and transferred massive resources to the civilian sector. It has scaled down its troops in Eastern Europe to defensive cadres and is managing political diversity in that region with reasonable skill. It has established a *modus vivendi* which has made possible a concordat between the two Germanies and a dismantling of the Wall. In international relations it is co-operative over such issues as the Middle East and Southern Africa. It is a staunch supporter of the United Nations, though it protects its interests as strongly as any other great power. It has, in short, rejoined the comity of nations and is playing the part which optimists hoped for it in 1945.

Improbable as such a development may seem, it appears a great deal less improbable today than it did, say ten, let alone forty years ago. It is the dream-ticket of most Europeans and many Americans, and is certainly the declaratory objective of the West. But even this model has its problems. It involves accepting a continuing, even if relaxed, Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe, and a régime which falls far short of West-

ern standards in human rights. And what, in such a case, happens to the Alliance? With a Soviet Union genuinely friendly and co-operative, would there be any further need for it? Would not the presence of American forces in Europe be seen by the Europeans themselves as unnecessary and provocative, creating further obstacles to a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe? Would not the Americans prefer to deal directly with their friendly neighbourhood super-power without allowing European security issues to complicate their relationship – thus fulfilling one European nightmare; and would not the West Germans drift away from their western allies into a Soviet-dominated Central European orbit – thus fulfilling another? And would not so open, friendly and co-operative a Soviet Union build up a position of influence in the Third World (as it has indeed in India) far transcending that of the United States? Would not Gorbachev, in short, have achieved by peaceful means all the objectives which his predecessors failed to secure by bluster and force? And, having achieved them, would he or his successors remain benign?

Model C (for Continuing Confrontation) is the *status quo* plus: a Soviet Union still economically weak but slowly strengthening itself, still keeping up its end in a crippling arms race which it dared not lose, still maintaining its menacing forces in Eastern Europe; still trying to embarrass the West by exploiting the forces of revolutionary socialism in the Third World, and still feeding its own people with a diet of mendacious propaganda. This is the situation from which Gorbachev is apparently seeking to escape, but he may find it impossible. And how seriously does the West want him to? Does not the *status quo* have significant advantages over the uncertainties of Model B? The existence of 'the threat' holds the Alliance together; without it, there would be many people out of a job. The Americans with their longer purse can always keep the Soviets in a state of strategic inferiority or compel them to distort their economy still further in the effort to keep up. Ideologically self-isolated, the Soviets are not serious contenders for world power.

There are of course disadvantages. The burden of the arms competition weighs even on the wealthy West. The Americans are understandably impatient with the reluctance of its European partners to increase their share of the defence burden. The Germans are finding it harder demographically, and the British economically, even to continue their contributions at a steady level. Continuing confrontation carries with it the ever-present risk of nuclear war. Public opinion is restive, though not unmanageable. But why not settle for the ills we have, rather than fly to others that we know not of, and which we may not be nearly so skilful at managing?

What troubles many people in the West, however, is not so much the uncertainties of Model B, as the possible development of Model D for Disaster, or Domination: an option no-one in the West would favour, but many fear. This is a triumphalist Soviet Union which, however grave its internal problems, has achieved so great a measure of escalation dominance in nuclear weapons and superiority in conventional forces

that it can blackmail Western Europe into submission and force the United States into a subordinate place in the international system. This model is no doubt still the dream-ticket of a faction in Moscow, and it is Washington's nightmare. I say 'Washington's' advisedly. There is in Europe a far greater degree of scepticism as to whether even the most brutal Soviet régime, given the ramshackle nature of its society, the waning influence of its ideology and the increasing diversity of the global system, would be any better able forcibly to impose its will on Western Europe or anywhere else than can the United States in Central America. But however implausible such a scenario may appear, it is not totally impossible, as the inhabitants of East Europe know very well; and even if present developments within the Soviet Union make it appear decreasingly likely, it would be unwise to lose sight of the possibility altogether. The problem is how far we should allow our fears of it to dominate our defence and arms-control policies and determine the degree of risk we are prepared to take, and it is over this that major disagreements are likely to arise in the West. Governments and their advisers are likely to prefer the familiar dangers and disadvantages of Model C, not so much because of the uncertainties of Model B but because of their fear that what might ultimately develop is Model D.

Our response to 'the Gorbachev challenge' must thus be determined by our preference as between these goals. We can deliberately bring pressure to bear upon the Soviet Union so as to exploit its weaknesses and encourage its disintegration; the preferred policy of certain Right Wing elements in the United States. We can do everything possible to normalise relations so as to facilitate drastic arms reductions, the relaxation of tensions in Central Europe, and the reintegration of Russia as a co-operative member of the international community; this is the 'Gorbachev challenge' which the Left Wing, and many centrists, both in Europe and in the United States, would wish to accept. Or we can, from fear of Model D, remain within the known parameters, take no risks, continue to maintain and improve our existing level of defences (including strategic defences), work cautiously at the margins for incremental confidence-building measures of arms control, and in general proceed on the assumption that no fundamental changes are occurring in the Soviet Union, none can be expected, and even if they did they would make no difference.

Given the conflicting pressures upon NATO governments, from the Right in America and from the Liberal-Left in Europe (particularly Germany) that is what the Alliance is likely to do. It may not be easy. Gorbachev's technique is now clear. It is to ask us to state our demands, and then simply to meet them. We demanded that the Soviet Union should leave Afghanistan. He has done so. We demanded that he should scrap the SS-20s and their smaller adjuncts. He did it. We demanded that such scrapping should be verified by intrusive on-site inspection. He agreed. We demanded that troop-reductions in Europe should be asymmetrical. He has agreed to that as well. We demanded that the offensive deployment and training of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe should be

abandoned for an overtly defensive posture. He has made his military re-examine their doctrine. What can one do with such a man?

To make matters worse, Gorbachev probably means all that he says. In the first place his knowledge of the world, which is clearly far greater than that of his predecessors, enables him to see that the West does not present a military threat to his country, and that the traditional Soviet belief that it does so is out of date. There is no question of an American President launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike, or of NATO forces following the road to Moscow taken by Napoleon and Hitler. He knows that major risks can be taken with Soviet security without risking Apocalypse – which is indeed far more likely to result from economic than military collapse. In the second place, the substantial run-down of Soviet armed forces is exactly what his economy requires. And in the third place, the promise, and even more the performance of sweeping arms reductions will do far more to confuse and divide the West and enhance Soviet prestige in the Third World than the continual striving for nuclear superiority which is crippling his country and with which he could do nothing even were he to achieve it. As in Aesop's fable the genial sun of arms reductions, even unilateral Soviet arms reductions, may strip the West of its cohesion and purpose far more effectively than the cold blasts of nuclear weaponry.

At its lowest, therefore, this is a very clever tactic indeed. Consciously or unconsciously Gorbachev is imitating the policy which Trotsky adopted in negotiating with the Germans in 1918 at Brest Litovsk, which involved dismantling Russian defences and daring the Germans to advance in the expectation that revolutionary peace propaganda in their rear would prevent them from doing so. Trotsky failed. He got his timing wrong; but only by a matter of months. But NATO is not Imperial Germany. General Galvin is not General Ludendorff; and public opinion in Europe is in a much stronger position to bring pressure on its governments than were the peace movements in Germany in the First World War. Military experts know that troop reductions would have to be on a scale of at least three to one to redress asymmetries in the conventional balance, but Gorbachev is still in a position to make us offers on a scale we can hardly refuse and take initiatives on a scale to which we would have to respond. To fail to do so would create enormous domestic difficulties for the governments of Germany, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and Belgium. Things would not be easy even in the United States, where an inherent tendency to suppose that technology can always take the place of manpower enables public opinion to press for troop reductions without abandoning its apprehensions about Model D. An offer to withdraw ten Soviet divisions from Eastern Europe in return for that of, say, three US and two European from West Germany; or the dismantling of five armoured divisions against a lesser NATO equivalent; or a policed and inspected 'nuclear-free zone' from the Vistula to the Rhine; offers on this scale, followed up by continuous public

pressure, would create military and political problems for the Alliance of a kind that can be readily appreciated.

Why therefore does Gorbachev not do it? Two possible reasons come to mind. The first is that he is simply too busy. *Glasnost* and *perestroika* are presenting him with domestic problems of a scale and urgency which must take priority over arms-control questions. Having declared in principle his willingness to negotiate on our terms – asymmetrical reductions, defensive deployment and mutual inspection – he is prepared to wait, like a chess-player, who has placed his opponent at a disadvantage, to sit and let us ponder our next move. A purely negative reaction would be unfavourably received by European and even much American opinion. A positive one he may well accept and ask for more. And if our proposals contain terms which we expect him to find unacceptable, he has shown himself to have a remarkable capacity to digest such 'hookers'. He will make his move when he is ready for it: meanwhile he has more important things to do.

The second reason will bring more comfort to the Western advocates of Option C – continuing confrontation. There are many Soviet leaders, both military and civil, who also prefer the *status quo*, and Gorbachev has not yet overcome them. In the same way as Western leaders will be reluctant to move to Option B for fear that they will find themselves stuck with Option D (and perhaps a few in their heart of hearts still hanker after Option A), so Soviet leaders will be reluctant to move to Option B for fear they will get stuck with Option A (and perhaps some have not abandoned all hope of Option D). Will not the West, they fear, exploit any withdrawal from Eastern Europe, both militarily and politically? Even if the present generation of Western statesmen appear unthreatening, what about their successors? Is it wise to return, effectively, to the frontiers of June 1941? Will such a move not release a turbulence in Eastern Europe which could rapidly spread elsewhere – as indeed *glasnost* has done already? And given the American drive to maintain nuclear superiority, especially their aggressive pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative, is this really the moment to cease to hold Western Europe hostage for American good behaviour? Gorbachev may feel that he can safely take risks, but he has to convince a large number of his colleagues. In the long run they may wear him down.

Those who wish to maintain the *status quo* in Europe thus have no cause to despair. Gorbachev may have sympathisers in the West who share his own preference for Option B, but those in the Soviet Union who prefer to remain, however uncomfortably, with Option C, with all its familiar advantages and drawbacks, are likely to be yet more influential, and will wish to negotiate, not for a breakthrough, but for a stalemate.

Which brings us back to the question I posed at the beginning of this paper. What does the Alliance want? If it really wants Option B, in spite of the risks and uncertainties involved, it will see Gorbachev's initiatives not as challenge but opportunity, and will match or

outmatch him in offers of arms reductions. It would appreciate Gorbachev's domestic problems and align itself with him against his more conservative adversaries, offering arms reductions as sweeping as his own. But the risks involved in such a course would be so deeply divisive within the Alliance that only an act of outstanding statesmanship on the part of the Allied political leaders – statesmanship of the kind that created the Alliance forty years ago – would make it possible to adopt it. The courage and vision required, indeed, would have to be on an even greater scale than that of 1949: fear is a much more effective catalyst than hope. And it must be admitted that such qualities are, among Allied political leaders at present, in somewhat short supply.

In the absence of such strong and controversial leadership from above, the Alliance will have to settle for Option C. With all its drawbacks it provides a credible framework for security; the risks involved in pursuing it are less than those attached to the bolder course; and above all it divides the Alliance least. With our objective thus clarified, our strategy becomes clear and we can shape our tactics accordingly. We must conduct a skilful delaying action in the certain knowledge that we have powerful allies in the enemy camp. We must block Gorbachev's radical proposals, or counter them with demands for radical troop cuts and redeployments of Soviet armed forces which, however attractive to Gorbachev himself, will be quite unacceptable to his military leadership and their political allies. Together with them, sooner or later, we can wear the man down and frustrate his disturbing designs: after that it may be another generation before a Soviet leader emerges with the energy to try again. All that is required is patience and the negotiating skills at which the Alliance is now so adept.

Few political leaders, however, would be prepared to accept the limited objectives implied in such a programme as being truly adequate for the Alliance, and even fewer would be prepared frankly to inform their publics that that is what they intend to do. Option B, a benign relationship with the Soviet Union, is our declared objective, whatever difficulties we may confront in pursuing it. A policy of confrontation may remain inevitable in the short run, but many Europeans will find it unacceptable for the long. Immobilism, however skilfully pursued, will eventually impose an intolerable strain on our relationships. Unless we can look beyond immediate necessities to ultimate objectives and adjust our policies accordingly, the prospects before the Alliance in the twenty-first century will be bleak. The Gorbachev challenge calls for critical self-examination as well as a convincing response.

Towards a new international community

YASUHIRO NAKASONE

What is the 'spirit of our times?'

From time immemorial different nations and groups of people, living in various parts of the world, have created their own life-styles and spiritual culture. As interchange between different regions became more frequent, nations and groups influenced each other, and common ways of thinking of a given period came to be shared by different peoples over broader areas, creating what can be called 'the spirit of the times'. Over the past millennium there have been various 'spirits of the times'. In Europe, for example, dominant spiritual trends have characterized respective ages, such as the respect for the individual in the Greek civilization, puritanism during the Reformation, humanism during the Renaissance, and rationalism during the Industrial Revolution.

What then is the spirit of our time? It is the scientific and technological revolution which started with the Industrial Revolution and continued through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Science and technology, which developed mainly in the modern Western nations, not only brought material benefits to mankind but also, because it extended to the entire world, became a common world language. It established objective yardsticks and methods of perception on a global basis. With this perspective, it became possible for the first time in thousands of years of human history to appreciate the spiritual cultures of different nations, races and groups without prejudice. This is indeed a great achievement.

Scientific and technological progress will undoubtedly continue to be fundamental to improving the well-being of mankind. However, as the end of the twentieth century approaches, it has become clear that science and technology alone cannot guarantee the happiness of man. The most typical example is the unleashing of nuclear energy. It gave mankind a new source of energy, but it also created the threat of nuclear war – the most serious issue of this century – putting man's own survival at risk.

Biotechnology, too, having made remarkable progress in recent years, holds great promise of improvements in medicine and in the supply of food to people around the world. On the other hand, human dignity could also be threatened if the technology of rearranging genetic codes is misused. One

This article is drawn from a 21 July 1988 address delivered by former Prime Minister Nakasone at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The original speech was printed by IMEMO.

could say that, externally and internally, mankind is threatened by nuclei: the atom and the gene.

The time has therefore come to enhance the spirit of the times, which has had as its supreme driving force the development of science and technology, to lift it to a yet higher level and to establish new spiritual guidelines that will prepare mankind for the ushering in of a new era.

What, then, should be the spirit of the coming age? There is a clue in the limitation inherent in science and technology. No matter how sophisticated science and technology may become, it is always the human being who reflects on and perceives such intellectual achievements. Now, more than ever, mankind must raise the human mind to its rightful pre-eminence above all else.

At the least, two things can be said. First, science and technology need to be put in their appropriate places as a *part* of human civilization, so that they do not overmaster mankind entirely. Second, just as science and technology have been based on universal values and concepts, so, in the area of spiritual civilization, we must promote understanding between different cultures and reach out to embrace a common basis for appreciating different values.

When international and domestic communities are undergoing rapid changes, individuals, companies and nations can no longer maintain their existence unless they remove the barriers which separate them and fully appreciate each other's existence. An era is approaching in which 'harmony and solidarity', derived from the lofty aspirations of the human spirit, will have become mankind's most urgent need. Such harmony and solidarity are the essence of the Oriental thought on which the Japanese culture is based.

One of the important pillars of this Oriental thought is Buddhism. Two thousand years ago Buddha taught that 'Mountains, rivers, plants and trees all attain Buddhahood'. This philosophy means that nature and man are of fundamentally the same root, both possessing divine characteristics, and thus should co-exist and co-prosper. The essence of Confucianism, which forms another pillar of Oriental thinking, is to maintain social order and peace by emphasizing filial piety, the importance of proprieties, love of work, service to and harmony within a community.

On the basis of such Oriental thinking, the Japanese hope to realize their ideals – respect for human dignity, respect for human rights, 'all nations living in harmony', and eternal peace. Following these basic guidelines, Japan is a nation committed to peace, abiding by the three non-nuclear principles, and devoted to self-defence, rejecting the path to becoming a military power. And it is seeking to make contributions appropriate to its national standing in the various regions of the world, including Asia and the Pacific.

Not only Japan but also Asian newly-industrialized economies have shown strong economic growth in recent years. This also has to do with deeply-rooted Confucian and Buddhist traditions in East Asia. Democracy and liberalism have blended with them to create an excellent balance between order and dynamism making possible tremendous growth.

Perspectives on East–West relations

Looking back over the past forty years or so, the East–West relationship has gone through cycles of confrontation and co-operation. It is a history in which the two sides have appeared and performed jointly on the same stage, but it has also been characterized by confrontation between the Stalinism and expansionism of the East and the containment policy of the West. It is a history of intertwined dynamics, one of tension, the other of relaxation. The trend towards heightened tension has been reflected in such incidents as the drawing down of the Iron Curtain at the end of World War II, the Korean War, the Berlin blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the trend towards easing tension has expressed itself in the 'thaw', the partial nuclear test ban, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Helsinki Accord and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

From the Japanese point of view, it is a situation where Stalinism, which destroyed mutual trust and caused a stand-off between the East and the West after World War II, has come to be criticized even within the Soviet Union itself. Equally, rigid thinking in the West deriving from the containment policy is becoming a thing of the past. There is now a growing trend towards sweeping away the residue of these policies and constructing a new East–West relationship.

It is from this perspective that the so-called 'New Thinking' adopted in recent Soviet diplomacy and the resulting positive steps, such as the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, are to be appreciated. It is to be hoped that other such actions will follow shortly. It should be stressed, however, that over and above the awareness of the threat of nuclear weapons, the acknowledgment that excessive nuclear arsenals were at the level of overkill, and the recognition that military expenditure was taxing national economies, there was another factor that was a key to the INF Agreement. This was the historic fact that the INF deployment in Europe to counter the SS-20 missile brought about the global 'double-zero' option.

The sort of progress needed in East–West relations is not just movement towards a mood of detente, but rather progress that is supported by concrete realities. It is all the more imperative, therefore, that the US and the USSR should exert further efforts to conclude the Strategic Arms Reductions treaty and that other nations should strengthen their support for these efforts. Moreover, talks should be promoted to broaden the arena to the whole of Europe, by way of implementing the agreement of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to start negotiations on conventional weapons. Information, people-to-people and economic exchanges between the West and the Soviet-bloc countries should be accelerated on the basis of respect for human rights and on a voluntary basis.

In this connection, *perestroika* and *glasnost* are of great importance. These restructuring steps undoubtedly have the basic objective of revitalizing the Soviet Union as a strong socialist state. And one should not har-

bour the illusion that adversarial relationships between the socialist regimes and liberal democracies will be resolved easily. The historic competition will continue. The critical difference between the two systems is that, while advocacy of socialist doctrines is allowed in liberal democracies, socialist regimes reject free and democratic ideas. Socialist parties have their rightful role in the free democratic system, whereas political parties adhering to liberal democratic ideas are basically prohibited in the socialist system. Furthermore, in a liberal democratic political system, democratization is not only a means to an end but also, and more importantly, a value to be pursued for its own sake.

This gives all the more reason for evaluating positively the present Soviet reforms, including *glasnost*, democratization and greater respect for human rights, and for saluting the courage and wisdom of its proponent, General Secretary, and now President, Gorbachev. The extent to which the so-called socialist pluralism will allow for the individual's ideas and beliefs, or allow freedom of assembly and association based on such beliefs will be followed with interest. The issues deliberated at the last Communist Party Conference, such as the separation of powers between the Party and the Soviet, or the direction of the leadership of the Party, are also worthy of close study. How these internal reforms will be reflected in Soviet foreign policies, especially in the areas of arms reduction, regional conflicts and bilateral issues should be examined. It is to be hoped that these reforms will evolve in a manner to match the spirit of the twenty-first century.

In looking at the future course of East–West relations, there seem to be three alternatives:

The first would be the continuation of the *status quo*.

The second would be a significant improvement in the relationship already attained, through a further deepening and broadening of the fruits borne by the negotiations and dialogues that have been achieved so far.

The third would be to abandon both Stalinism and the containment policy completely and establish global reconciliation and true normalization of East–West relations based on new principles and value systems.

The most likely of the three is the second course. Nonetheless, creating the momentum for the third alternative should always be borne in mind, for this is the course that would stabilize East–West relations for decades to come, and this is the road towards establishing co-operation and mutual dependence in political, economic and cultural spheres.

However difficult it may be, both sides must work to better relations between East and West through dialogue and negotiations; they must seek to solve world issues harmoniously rather than resorting to arms; they must stress the improvement of economies and living standards rather than military capabilities, and build a relationship allowing for unfettered exchanges and 'solidarity'. Through these efforts, we can make progress towards the spirit of the twenty-first century.

Asian strategic concerns

In the context of world development, centring around relations between East and West, what vista opens before Asia?

Asia consists of a number of countries and regions which differ in their political and economic systems, cultures, languages and historical backgrounds. And the relations between these countries are complex. Asia differs geopolitically from Europe; Europe is like an oil-painting, with colours painted all over the canvas, while Asia is like an Oriental brush painting, where much of the surface is left blank. In Europe the physical symmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact thoroughly covers both sides of the continent, but in Asia nothing of this sort exists. One may say that in Asia there is plenty of room for 'imagination' and 'creative thinking'. This characteristic should be fully taken into account.

Addressing Asia, President Gorbachev made various proposals in his Vladivostok speech, including a Helsinki-type Asia/Pacific Conference. Unfortunately, his proposals have not received a favourable response from the countries in the region. Frankly speaking, this is due to the absence of the conditions which could foster trust – a prerequisite for considering such proposals.

Concrete steps to resolve the various problems and issues which are at the root of political differences in this region are the first priority. Primarily, the Northern Territories issue between Japan and the Soviet Union should be resolved. Second, the continuing tension between North and South Korea should be eased. Third, a political solution to the Cambodian conflict should be reached.

It is Japan's hope that the Soviet Union will apply the flexibility engendered by its 'New Thinking' in its policy towards the Asian region, and that such flexibility will be demonstrated in its actions.

Japan and the Soviet Union

Lastly, the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union needs to be examined.

Japan attaches great importance to its relations with its important neighbour, and hopes that bilateral ties will develop on the basis of the philosophy of 'all nations living in harmony'. The Soviet Union appears to subscribe to the same notion. Indeed, relations between the two countries are developing in such practical fields as trade, commerce, fisheries, science and technology and culture. However, despite its great potential for further development, the Japanese–Soviet relationship has not yet realized its full potential. This is unfortunate not only for these two countries, but also for the world as a whole.

The major reason for this situation is the fact that a peace treaty, which should form the fundamental basis for mutual trust, has not yet been concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union. Without establishing a stable political basis between the two nations by resolving the Northern Territories issue and concluding a peace treaty, which constitute the fundamentals for the correct relationship between the two countries, it is quite difficult to be hopeful of substantial development of the Japanese–Soviet

relationship and the fuller utilization of its potential. This is the reason why the Japanese government has continuously and consistently been urging the Soviet government to respond seriously to the Northern Territories issue.

The Soviet government should make the first move by taking the initiative to alter its long-standing intransigence and showing a willingness to be forthcoming over the solution of this issue. Only then can the two countries talk of the ways to improve and develop their relationship.

With this in mind, it is important to widen and intensify the political dialogue between the two governments. Meetings between foreign ministers, as well as summit meetings, should be held more frequently and alternately in each country. If the still-pending visit by President Gorbachev to Japan is realized, it would certainly make an important contribution to the strengthening of the political dialogue. The Japanese–Soviet relationship will, I hope, be promoted in a balanced manner through efforts by both countries.

Towards a more co-operative world

The twenty-first century is just around the corner, and mankind should strive to make the coming age a glorious page in human history. The barriers of international borders, long at the root of war between nations, have been considerably lowered in recent times. The operations of multinational corporations are transcending national boundaries. Nuclear weapons, while effective as deterrents to other nuclear weapons, have now been proved to be useless against nations without them. Progress in the field of science and technology, such as development of micro-electronics, biotechnology and new materials, is opening infinite possibilities in space and in the oceans. Rapid progress in information media is making this earth truly integrated.

Against this background, new forms of nationalism, different from previous manifestations, are emerging in various parts of the world. Awareness and needs of nations for economy and welfare have changed, and individuality and human rights have become the focus of greater attention. Old regimes, old ideas and ideologies, old norms cannot cope with this emerging situation. We should lose no time in building a new international community befitting this new era.

Now is the time for the countries of the world in their respective regions to endeavour, not by words but by deeds, to find reasonable and constructive solutions to outstanding problems and to build better and more durable relationships appropriate to the coming century. At all levels, but particularly between senior politicians, Japan and the Soviet Union should engage in serious exchanges of views in order to identify the problems, to find ways towards solutions and to foster a promising future. There is a Russian proverb, 'Everything in its time'. The time, I am convinced, is now.

West Germany faces nuclear modernization

RONALD D. ASMUS

When discussing the future of theatre nuclear forces in West Germany, one must start by noting that the FRG is in the middle of a major debate on foreign and security policy, in which the question of nuclear modernization is a central issue. This debate centres on the need to define a new *Gesamtkonzept*, or comprehensive policy approach, to guide the country's foreign and security policy into the 1990s. The call for a new *Gesamtkonzept* was initially voiced by those West German conservatives concerned about the strategic ramifications of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement, but it has since spread across the political spectrum. The now widespread perception that a new approach is needed reflects changes in the domestic and strategic environment in which West German foreign and security policy must be formulated and implemented – changes that are increasingly seen as having eroded the foundations upon which security policy has hitherto been based.

The first change is in domestic opinion. The peace movement and the battle over Euromissile deployment of the early 1980s may now be history, but they have left the previous security consensus shattered, above all on the issue of nuclear strategy. The feeling that a review of security policy is needed has been fuelled by a second factor: the proclaimed 'New Thinking' in the foreign policy of the USSR under General Secretary, and now President, Mikhail Gorbachev and the consequent changing perceptions of the Soviet threat. Third, the continuing American debate about the direction of US foreign policy, its real or imagined shift towards the Pacific-rim countries, and fashionable theories of imperial decline have raised concern over the future course of American policy and the US commitment to European defence, thus reinforcing perceptions that the FRG must clarify its security policy needs.

Finally, the question of nuclear weapons on West German soil has become entwined with broader questions about the FRG's future role in Europe, its ties with the United States, and its relations with the East. Forty years after the FRG's foundation, a young generation of West Germans is critically re-examining whether the alignments that determined policy in the past can or should be adapted to suit its interests better in a changing East–West environment. The fact that members of both the

Ronald D. Asmus is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA. The views and conclusions expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research.

Left and the Right in the FRG are increasingly raising the banner of 'German interests' is an indication of a growing domestic feeling that the country's needs are more and more coming to differ from those of NATO and the West in general, and that it is no longer axiomatic that existing Western policies and institutions adequately serve specific German requirements.

The question of nuclear modernization occupies a crucial role in the debate for two reasons. First, for all that Bonn has publicly played down the significance of nuclear modernization, insisting that decisions on the matter can only be taken after a clarification of NATO's overall arms-control strategy, this is not just one more issue to be dealt with in a review of existing policy. NATO's nuclear strategy constitutes the political and military back-bone of the Alliance. It is a foundation that must be clearly defined and set firmly in place before one proceeds to construct a more comprehensive strategy for dealing with the East. Second, in domestic terms the question of NATO's future nuclear posture in Western Europe is the most politically sensitive factor in the process of determining West German security policy. It is in this area that the longer-term political impact of the INF debate shows most clearly, in a significant fall in public and elite support for nuclear weapons. This, in turn, is driving West German demands for force structure revisions that have important implications for NATO policy.

At first glance, an uneasy calm would seem to have fallen over the West German political landscape in the wake of the INF Treaty, signed at the December 1987 Washington summit, with all major political parties backing a budding US–Soviet detente and calling for further progress in arms-control talks. But a look below the surface reveals serious fault lines within the country's political elite over the future of nuclear weapons on German soil. The way in which the issue of nuclear modernization is dealt with (or not dealt with) will not only set an important precedent for the future management of the domestic security debate in the FRG, it will simultaneously have an important influence on the overall direction in which West German security thinking is likely to evolve at a time when East–West relations are in considerable flux.

The fall-out from INF

It is now almost five years since NATO began to implement its dual-track decision, and one year since the 'double-zero' concept emerged as the basis for the INF Treaty. Memories of the peace movement, mass demonstrations and the Soviet campaign to prevent Euromissile deployment have faded, but the divisive arguments of the early 1980s still cast a shadow over current debates on European security. This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the FRG, where the peace movement was the largest, and where the Euromissile conflict led to the collapse of a security consensus that had been a hallmark of West German politics since the early 1960s.

The current nuclear modernization debate can only be comprehended against this changed political backdrop. It is of course far harder to pinpoint where and how post-INF West Germany is different, and what ramifications this has for the debate on nuclear modernization. One should start by noting what has not changed. The peace debate did not alter the overwhelmingly positive public attitudes towards NATO, the US military presence or the *Bundeswehr*. Popular commitment to the main institutional pillars of Western defence remains solid and intact, and the INF Treaty gained overwhelming public support across the political spectrum in the FRG. Indeed, the decline of confidence in US leadership and policy shown in public opinion polls of the early 1980s has been partially reversed, as East–West relations have improved and US–Soviet arms-control negotiations have produced tangible results.[1]

Nevertheless, there are two areas where important changes have taken place. First, the days are past when formulating security policy was the domain of a small group of experts firmly integrated into a broader NATO community. The proliferation of alternative security think tanks and so-called 'counter experts' in West Germany, together with a more attentive public, guarantees that security policy issues will continue to be surrounded by public debate and controversy. The legitimacy and societal acceptability of existing security policy has been increasingly questioned. There is a widespread sense in the FRG that future security policy must be better calibrated so that, in the words of Lord Carrington, it remains acceptable to both the protectors and those being protected.

Second, the security elite in the FRG remains divided and polarized. While one can certainly document continuing strong public support for NATO, there is nevertheless a growing estrangement from the content of the Alliance's actual policies. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area where there has been a shift in public and elite attitudes (and one that has shown no signs of reversal): that of nuclear weapons. Insofar as one can justifiably talk of a collapse of the security consensus in the FRG, this is where it has occurred. A wide and disparate set of factors has led to this: loose talk in the early 1980s on the possibility of limited nuclear war in Europe; President Ronald Reagan's initial justification of the Strategic Defense Initiative as an alternative to nuclear deterrence; Chernobyl; the Reykjavik summit; Gorbachev's call for a nuclear-free world; and recent scandals in the West German civilian nuclear industry. The result has been a rise in anti-nuclear sentiment and a steady decline in public support for everything from first-use to the concept of nuclear deterrence in principle.

Matters have been further complicated by the strains in US–West German ties that the past decade has brought. In the early 1980s, it was the West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) that found itself opposed to a Reagan Administration whose policies it perceived – rightly or wrongly – as aggressive, unpredictable and contrary to vital to German interests. A sense of political frustration and impotence merged with the rising anti-nuclear sentiment to produce a political backlash that took on

a national and anti-nuclear tone.[2] This is one factor underlying the revised role that Social Democrats envisage for nuclear weapons, and the emphasis they place on 'European self-assertion' in their blueprints for a 'second *Ostpolitik*', stressing greater autonomy from the US and the search for alternatives to nuclear deterrence in the guise of 'common security' and 'structurally non-offensive capabilities'.

In the wake of Reykjavik and the 'double-zero' solution for INF, a similar process occurred on the German Right. Faced with changes in US arms-control policy that it perceived as precipitous and contrary to its view of German interests (above all on the second zero option and the way in which the Kohl government was pressured to agree to abandon the *Pershing* 1A), the German Right criticized the wisdom of American leadership and raised the banner of European (and especially Franco-German) co-operation to slow down what it saw as a hasty move towards accommodation with Moscow.[3] Leading West German conservatives feared that the 'double-zero' agreement had produced a situation where the remaining nuclear systems on West German soil were decoupling, where the FRG remained vulnerable to massive Soviet superiority in short-range systems, and where any future modernization of nuclear weapons on German soil would be politically more difficult in the wake of INF. The emotional and critical response evoked, particularly among West German conservatives, by the report *Discriminate Deterrence* (commissioned by the Office of the US Secretary of Defense), can only be explained in the context of diminished faith in US leadership, precisely because it confirmed the suspicion that trends in American strategic thinking and arms-control policy were undermining the concept of risk-sharing within the Alliance. The debate about West German 'singularization' underlined the pressures to cut back on nuclear weapons that had been generated on both the Left and the Right.[4]

Finally, these trends have only been exacerbated by Gorbachev's foreign-policy initiatives and the changing perceptions of the Soviet threat. Public opinion polls in the FRG have documented a consistent fall in threat perceptions since the mid-1980s, coinciding with the new Soviet leader's arms-control initiatives. Combined with growing anti-nuclear sentiment, this has produced high rates of public support for rejecting nuclear modernization and supporting calls for all nuclear weapons to be removed.[5]

These trends have only strengthened convictions that the *status quo*, in terms of nuclear systems stationed in the FRG, is neither desirable nor tenable; that pressures for further reductions are likely to increase rather than decrease; and that Bonn must act to control this process and steer it in a direction that better corresponds to German military and political interests.

A new package deal?

It is against this backdrop that Bonn must deal with the issue of nuclear modernization. The dilemma it faces is both military and political. In military terms, what should be done to maintain the credibility of extended deterrence after the INF Treaty? But superimposed on this is the broader political question: what needs to be done to maintain or re-establish the political acceptability of nuclear deterrence in West German society?

Public debate on nuclear modernization in the FRG has so far focused largely on the future of short-range systems (SRINF) with ranges below 500 km. More specifically, it has revolved around the implementation of the 1983 Montebello agreement and, above all, the question of a successor to the *Lance* land-based missile. Bonn's call for the clarification of a *Gesamtkonzept* was undoubtedly motivated by the fear of stirring yet another emotional debate, such as accompanied the deployment of *Pershing* II and cruise missiles in the early 1980s. It represented an attempt by Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition government to buy time in order to deal with the confusion within its own ranks and establish its own priorities for future arms-control talks. This has, in turn, been interpreted as foot-dragging by several of Bonn's NATO allies and has elicited quite a bit of lively discussion, as witnessed during the *Wehrkunde* conference in Munich in early 1988. The issue was papered over during Kohl's subsequent Washington visit, and during the NATO Brussels summit in March.

After recovering somewhat from its confusion in the immediate aftermath of the INF Treaty, the Bonn coalition has managed to regroup, and in past months there have been growing signs of an attempt to come up with a new package deal on nuclear modernization and arms control that would address the country's political and military concerns. A growing number of officials have called for a new package deal to cut the Gordian knot of nuclear modernization. Centred on the notion of a minimal political deterrent, it would involve significant reductions in SRINF, above all nuclear artillery, but this would be coupled with a 'restructuring' of the remaining systems to extend their range significantly, thereby enhancing their political acceptability.

A rather remarkable consensus has formed on the need for major SRINF and nuclear artillery reductions. On the Left, the SPD has long favoured such reductions in the context of the creation of a nuclear-free corridor, and, after the INF Treaty, Social Democrats called for a third zero option to cover nuclear systems with ranges below 500 km. Though firmly rejecting these SPD positions, leading Christian Democrats, too, have called for significant reductions in short-range systems while maintaining 'lower but equal ceilings'.

This was, of course, the message behind the so-called 'singularization' debate. A number of Western officials, most notably US Ambassador Richard Burt, have termed the notion of singularization a 'myth' – pointing out that other NATO countries are exposed to a similar threat from Soviet forces.[6] In response, West German officials such as Volker Rühe, deputy chairman of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), have maintained that the FRG is 'singularized' not only by its exposure to a massive

superiority in Soviet short-range nuclear systems, but also by the potential domestic political consequences of the remaining Western nuclear systems on West German soil. By lending credibility to the claim that the US wants to wage nuclear war in Europe, they argue, it will ultimately generate increased pressure for a third zero option and the eventual denuclearization of Europe.[7]

Rühe has also suggested that it would be desirable to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in West Germany to a level of some 2–2,500, including a 'drastic' reduction of some 50–80% in nuclear artillery.[8] Similar sentiments have been expressed by Alfred Dregger, head of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group. Referring to the arguments in *Discriminate Deterrence*, he claimed that Germany, also, could not be expected to base its security on a policy which, if implemented, implied self-annihilation.

Unlike the SPD, however, which sees such reductions as a shift away from nuclear deterrence towards what it calls 'common security', Christian Democrats argue that such cuts are needed in order to maintain public acceptance of nuclear deterrence. Moreover, CDU leaders have presented such reductions as part of a package deal, the other part of which involves what West German officials have politely called 'reforming' or 'restructuring' the remaining NATO nuclear forces in Western Europe. 'This phrase', according to Rühe, 'means that we will keep our strategy both acceptable and effective with fewer weapons but with a more convincing structure'. Such weapons, he remarked on another occasion, 'will be significantly fewer but politically more credible'. A similar position was embraced by Manfred Wörner shortly before he stepped down as West German Defence Minister:

> It is a question of restructuring our nuclear potential in conjunction with the *Gesamtkonzept*. . . . It is not a question of compensation for the land-based or cruise missiles currently being withdrawn, and even some form of trying to get around [the provisions of] the INF Treaty. . . . The German interest is leaning towards a further reduction of shorter-range systems, above all battlefield weapons, in favour of those weapons which can carry the risk of a potential attacker back to his own territory.[9]

The question that clearly needs an answer is what such a restructuring would entail. The short-range systems most likely to be affected would be a land-based follow-on to *Lance* and an air-to-surface missile. Both should ideally have a range as close to the 500-km limit as possible in order to meet German political concerns on singularity. Equally interesting, however, are references to systems capable of carrying 'the risk of a potential attacker back to his own territory'. The candidates for systems capable of reaching Soviet territory are limited. In view of West German concern about decoupling, the systems would presumably have to be American, and, with the INF Treaty having banned land-based intermediate-range missiles, NATO is left with the option of either air- or sea-launched systems. Assuming that the START negotiations do not produce a ban on cruise missiles, then air- or sea-launched cruise missiles, or some mix of the two, would be the most promising candidates on paper.

Most official West German commentary has so far steered clear of going into the details of such a 'restructuring'. Even Rühe, who has made the most detailed public proposal for a West German position on nuclear modernization, avoids this touchy question, maintaining that this is a decision for NATO, not Bonn. Other leading CDU politicians have been less coy. Speaking in Washington, Dregger publicly demanded: 'We want to know whether and with which air- and sea-based systems the United States is prepared to maintain intermediate-range deterrence'. Wörner commented in June 1987, when the contours of the INF agreement were becoming discernible on the diplomatic horizon:

> The deterrent effect of tactical nuclear weapons is all the greater if they can penetrate deep into the Warsaw Pact. This means that Flexible Response requires tactical nuclear weapons capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union. If the double-zero option is concluded, and we give up those nuclear delivery systems that are particularly effective, we face the question of how to maintain the effectiveness of our strategy. By replenishing our stocks with nuclear weapons with a range below 500 kilometres? No. Through air-based and sea-based tactical nuclear weapons with an extended range? Yes.[10]

Unanswered questions

Whether such a package proposal materializes as an official West German position will depend upon how several as yet unanswered questions are addressed. The obvious attraction of such a package is that it promises simultaneously to relieve Bonn's political and military concerns. Modernization, it is argued, can be made politically palatable by linking it to a significant reduction in the overall number of nuclear weapons on West German soil; moreover, the resulting changes in the structure of nuclear systems and the shift away from concentration on short-range systems to a better balance of short- and medium-range systems would defuse the dangers of 'singularization' and enhance extended deterrence. On the other hand, the obvious danger is that the reduction part of this package would be immediately accepted, while the modernization component became entangled in a domestic political quagmire, leading to a repeat of the dual-track decision debate of the early 1980s. A scenario of reduction without modernization would be widely seen as a further step down the slippery slope of denuclearization.

The question to be addressed, therefore, is whether sufficient support can be marshalled for the type of nuclear modernization package deal sketched out above. A closer look at attitudes on nuclear modernization reveals three different camps. The fault lines dividing them are attributable to three factors. The first is divergent attitudes on the role of nuclear weapons in Western deterrence strategy. Second, attitudes towards nuclear modernization are also linked to differing assessments

of the Soviet threat and of the likelihood of the USSR under Gorbachev making the types of concessions in arms-control negotiations that would ease the West's security dilemmas. Finally, varying opinions on nuclear modernization are also closely intertwined with different visions of the future evolution of East–West relations in Europe, the respective roles of the United States and the Soviet Union, and Bonn's own role in Central European politics, above all its ties with the GDR.

THE CDU/CSU

The first of the three groups is firmly rooted in the traditional NATO security establishment. In political terms, it is centred on the CDU/CSU and the Ministry of Defence; it also enjoys the support of a number of key defence intellectuals. It remains committed to NATO's strategy of Flexible Response, and is convinced of the need for nuclear modernization in order to maintain the credibility of extended deterrence. It favours a package deal involving a mix of cuts in battlefield nuclear weapons, combined with a modernization of the remaining systems with ranges below 500 km that would simultaneously extend their range and result in a structure of nuclear weapons on German soil that would be better balanced, militarily robust and politically sustainable. Supporters of this view include politicians such as Rühe and Dregger, as well as the new Defence Minister, Rupert Scholz.

Although this group has been reduced to a minority by the early 1980s collapse of the security consensus in the FRG, it is still powerful and influential, and has provided the basis for NATO policy for much of the post-war period. It is motivated not only by a commitment to nuclear deterrence, but also harbours a healthy scepticism about the proclaimed Soviet 'New Thinking' and longer-term Soviet ambitions towards Western Europe, and is concerned that the USSR will try to exploit existing anti-nuclear sentiment in West Germany to push for the denuclearization of Europe. While acknowledging that NATO's nuclear requirements could change in the future, depending upon the outcome of conventional arms-control talks, this group nonetheless feels that NATO must first get its own house in order, and that the Alliance cannot afford to allow its own decision-making to become the hostage of domestic politics and the uncertain outcome of future arms-control negotiations.

Reservations about longer-term Soviet ambitions also make this group a firm advocate of a strong American security presence in Europe.[11] While it is a driving force behind increased security co-operation in Western Europe, above all Franco-German, the group clearly sees such co-operation as a complement to the US security umbrella, and not a substitute for it, and firmly opposes any American devolution from the Alliance. In short, it wants nuclear modernization not only to maintain the credibility of extended deterrence, but as a form of political reassurance for the Federal Republic from the United States at a time of renewed super-power detente.

THE FDP

A second group is centred around West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher of the Free Democratic Party (FDP). Many of Genscher's public comments on nuclear modernization have been tantalizingly vague, and this, coupled with his commitment to detente and his public enthusiasm for Gorbachev's internal and external reforms, has led several commentators to conclude that he opposes modernization in all but name. On the other hand, there is little doubt that Genscher remains committed in principle to the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. In nearly all his major foreign-policy statements he stresses that there is no alternative to a strategy of deterrence based on an adequate mix of conventional and nuclear weapons, and he avoids the criticism of nuclear deterrence that has become so fashionable on the German Left. However, he always adds that deterrence alone is insufficient to maintain peace and security in Europe, and that the existing net of military deterrence must be complemented by confidence-building measures and expanded East–West co-operation.[12]

What this means for nuclear modernization remains to be seen. Genscher has come out against a third zero option for nuclear systems below 500 km, but he has also made it clear that he sees no need for an immediate decision, and that such decisions should not be made under time pressure.[13] Not only is he reluctant to subject his country to another agonizing debate about nuclear modernization, especially when the ruling Bonn coalition, and above all his own party, are reaping the political harvest of the INF Treaty and an improving East–West climate, but he also clearly wants to avoid steps that might undermine future arms-control prospects and an improving bilateral relationship between Bonn and Moscow. In contrast to West German conservatives – who fear that Moscow will exploit existing anti-nuclear sentiment in the country to push for denuclearization of the FRG and the eventual exclusion of the United States from Europe – Genscher has publicly played down these dangers, and has even claimed that Gorbachev's idea of a common European house is similar to the goal of a new European peace system advocated by NATO.[14]

Finally, Genscher's attitude towards nuclear modernization can only be understood in the context of his own longer-term vision of the future of East–West relations in Europe, and Bonn's role in the process. The evolution of his views incorporates many of the shifts that have taken place in West German foreign-policy thinking over the last decade. The staunch Atlanticist of the mid-1970s has come to espouse the notion of detente as a special German national necessity and responsibility. His increasing embrace of Franco-German co-operation reflects a conviction that the existing West European dependence upon the US is politically unhealthy, and that Europe must have a greater say in its own security.

While he is certainly committed to NATO, Genscher's longer-term goal is clearly a reformed Western Alliance with a strengthened European pillar and a reduced American presence. His enthusiasm for Gorbachev

must also be seen in this context. It reflects his belief that Gorbachev's reforms, if successful, might bring about an historic opportunity to initiate a transition to a system of European security based on a reformed Soviet Union, a militarily and politically restructured Warsaw Pact, and a more equal and balanced American–West European security relationship. It is also a vision in which the Federal Republic, due to its political influence and economic strength, would play a dominant role in managing Central European politics and promoting detente between the two blocs.

One can argue whether such a vision is plausible, or even desirable, but Genscher has proved to be the consummate domestic politician and currently enjoys the privilege of being the most popular politician in West Germany. Unlike an American secretary of state, who serves at the wish of the president, Genscher is an independent force in West German politics, and he has been remarkably skilled in setting the overall foreign-policy tone of the coalition – the complaints of some conservative Christian Democrats notwithstanding. It follows that, without the support of Genscher and his party, any modernization, no matter how limited, is simply not feasible in domestic political terms.

THE SPD

The last of the three camps is the West German Social Democratic Party. Social Democratic security policy thinking has clearly moved to the Left, a shift that is the result of generational changes and the lessons that leading Social Democrats themselves have drawn from their dealings with East and West in the 1970s and 1980s.[15] Moreover, past intra-party strife over security policy, so visible at the Nuremberg party congress in 1986, has since been largely overcome, to the extent that security policy played almost no role in the debates at the party's recent congress in Münster in September 1988.

In many ways, the SPD has laid out the clearest and most coherent *Gesamtkonzept*. It is a mixture of disengagement and denuclearization which, while clearly backing continuing NATO membership, calls for radical changes in the nuclear and conventional structures of the Alliance. The resolution on security policy passed in Münster, for example, rejected both the modernization of *Lance* and any measures designed to compensate for systems currently being removed under the INF Treaty.[16] In the longer run, the SPD advocates removing all nuclear weapons from German soil and reducing the Western nuclear deterrent to sea-based systems coupled to the US strategic deterrent. This is to be linked with a shift to a non-offensive conventional defence, already called for at Nuremberg.[17]

Such visions are, of course, long-term, and it would be wrong to assume that the SPD policy positions are set in concrete. The current party leader, Hans-Jochen Vogel, has made a determined effort to steer the party back towards centrist waters (above all on economic issues), and in past months leading foreign-policy figures, such as Egon Bahr and Horst Ehmke, have emphasized their agreement on arms-control policy not only with Genscher, but with leading conservatives in the Bonn coalition calling for SRINF reductions. But one should not overestimate the durability of such signs of consensus. While inching itself back towards the mainstream of political credibility, the SPD nonetheless sees this mainstream as continuing to move leftwards in its favour, above all on the nuclear issue.[18]

The SPD's stance on nuclear modernization, too, can only be fully understood in the context of its longer-term vision of Europe. Social Democrats see Gorbachev's reforms in the USSR as confirmation of precisely the type of reform Communism their own *Ostpolitik* was always designed to help foster. If Gorbachev succeeds in implementing his agenda, they are convinced that this will lead to a restructuring of the Warsaw Pact in military terms along with a transformation of Soviet–East European political relations, with a corresponding diminution of Soviet influence and control. This, in turn, would open the way for a restructuring of relations between the two halves of Europe, and also for the self-assertion and emancipation from the United States that the Social Democrats advocate. The result would be the type of European peace order that has been at the core of Social Democratic foreign-policy thinking for the last two decades, and in which both German states would be in the forefront of detente and the fostering of expanded East–West co-operation.

Needless to say, there is little room for nuclear modernization in such a vision. Indeed, many Social Democrats are inclined to propose that the West should make unilateral concessions on nuclear weapons and other matters, so as to assist Gorbachev's attempts to reform Soviet foreign policy. American calls for modernization are often seen not only as militarily unnecessary and politically counter-productive, but as attempts to maintain US political domination in the Alliance via nuclear weapons. The level of Social Democratic opposition to any package deal entailing nuclear modernization is likely to vary, depending upon the weapons involved and whether reductions in battlefield weapons are included, but it is currently hard to envisage Social Democratic support for nuclear modernization regardless of the packaging.

Prospects

In the final analysis, the West German position on nuclear modernization will depend upon the type of Alliance forged between the groups described above. Two main alternatives exist. The first would entail a compromise between the first two groups, the Christian and Free Democrats, within the existing Bonn coalition. This would be based on a general commitment to maintaining the credibility of existing NATO nuclear strategy, but would leave open such important details as the content and timing of any future modernization package until after the West German election and until future prospects for East–West arms control, above all in the conventional realm, have become clear. It would

keep West German attitudes on modernization and nuclear deterrence within the confines of the existing NATO consensus.

In the longer run, however, one must also contemplate the possibility of a second coalition forming between Genscher and the SPD with a very different platform, and under the rubric of a second *Ostpolitik*. Unlike the *Ostpolitik* pursued by the socialist-liberal coalition in the early 1970s, this would be focused on changing Western security policy. It would be based on a radically different interpretation of deterrence, in which American nuclear weapons on German soil would be reduced to a minimum. Bereft of any war-fighting capability, they would serve a solely symbolic function, a form of insurance against Soviet aggression. This shift would be complemented by remoulding existing conventional defence structures to fit the type of alternative non-offensive conventional defence strategies advocated by the German Left. As a form of political reassurance, both these moves would be buttressed by a significant expansion of East–West co-operation, led by the FRG.

For the foreseeable future, this second possibility is likely to remain in the realm of visionary Social Democratic thinking. Despite continuing squabbles within the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, and despite Chancellor Kohl's low standing in public opinion polls, current speculation about a possible break-up of the Bonn coalition would seem premature. Not only does the West German economy remain strong, but differences between Free and Social Democrats on economic policy are vast. Even in the foreign-policy realm, where Social Democrats have been stressing their agreement with Genscher, a closer look reveals significant differences, above all on nuclear deterrence. Barring unforeseen disaster, the current Bonn coalition is likely to be re-elected in 1990.

Notwithstanding the complaints of some West German conservatives about Genscher, Kohl is committed to working with him to forge a workable compromise within the coalition on the nuclear issue. The Chancellor has so far adopted a position that in many ways straddles the divergent views in his own government. In contrast to figures such as Dregger or Rühe, he has been a firm public advocate of the INF Treaty and has taken a more optimistic stance on current East–West trends and the opportunities they provide for West German foreign policy. He has expressed sympathy for the 'singularization' argument and has in general terms endorsed the call to reduce the overall number of nuclear weapons, while modernizing and extending the range of the remaining systems. Although committing himself in principle to nuclear modernization, in order to maintain the credibility of nuclear deterrence, Kohl has also made it clear that, like Genscher, he sees no immediate need to take a decision.[9] With the 1990 federal election looming, he is likely to choose with care the time and place to do battle over nuclear modernization.

Perhaps the one thing that can be predicted with some certainty is that nuclear modernization will become a major and contentious political issue in West German politics and, by extension, an important issue for NATO and the United States. The debate over NATO nuclear modernization may well be one of the first major European security issues to face the next US Administration. If Washington is to steer this debate in a constructive direction, however, two things are needed. One is a better understanding of and sensitivity to the changed domestic political context in which any West German government must operate. The merits of the INF Treaty notwithstanding, it has helped to create a climate in which any form of nuclear modernization in the FRG would be politically difficult. And a close look at the spectrum of foreign and security policy views in the FRG rapidly reveals that one political figure will inevitably be of central importance in any modernization decision: Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Criticism of 'Genscherism' may be fashionable in some Western capitals, but it is short-sighted and politically counterproductive. Genscher stands at the fulcrum of West German politics, and he is currently setting the direction and the tone of the foreign and security policy debate. Any future American initiatives must take this into account.

Second, a future American Administration must remain sensitive to the context in which the future of nuclear weapons in West Germany will be decided – a context shaped in large part by the United States itself through its words and actions. Two steps are necessary to set the scene against which the nuclear modernization issue can eventually be dealt with. First, the United States must clarify its own nuclear policy for an age of renewed East–West detente and arms-control negotiations. Rising anti-nuclear sentiment will not be stemmed by skirting around the issue. For example, NATO must explain more clearly why it opposes Soviet calls for denuclearization, and why some level of nuclear weapons will still be necessary even if arms-control negotiations lead to an improved conventional balance. Second, nuclear modernization initiatives are only possible in an overall arms-control context. A future US Administration can establish its credentials in this realm by pushing ahead with a START treaty and by tabling serious conventional arms-control proposals, thereby eliminating the Soviet public-relations edge that the lack of any Western answer to past Soviet initiatives has created.

Finally, the US must assert leadership within the Alliance and end the drift that has crept into Alliance management. The United States cannot expect a non-nuclear and divided country such as the FRG to take a public lead in formulating NATO nuclear policy. No West German chancellor can afford to be seen as taking steps that hinder the US–Soviet arms-control process. If the US insists that Bonn should publicly call for nuclear modernization, it is likely to be met with a deafening silence. Instead, Washington itself must demonstrate a willingness to assume leadership in shaping future Alliance nuclear strategy, above all *vis-à-vis* a Bonn government that faces strong domestic pressures and feels victimized by past American policy actions.

Walking the fine line between the necessities of modernization and arms-control and striking the proper balance between military and political requirements is no easy task. In view of the time constraints, and

the uncertainties attending any effort to mobilize a significant intra-Alliance attempt to come to grips with these issues, there will inevitably be pressures within NATO to postpone a difficult decision on nuclear modernization. But there is no guarantee that the issue will be easier to grapple with several years hence. Nuclear modernization could very well become more, rather than less, contentious as the election approaches. Even so, the United States must realize what is at stake and what the consequences of its actions (or lack of them) will be. No-one is eager to provoke another polarizing domestic clash in West Germany over nuclear weapons, like that of the early 1980s. To provoke a nuclear modernization debate in the FRG and to lose would be a disaster for the Alliance. On the other hand, a policy of non-action also involves risks. Pressures for drastic cuts in nuclear artillery are already mounting rapidly in West Germany. If the modernization of short-range land-based systems were to prove politically impossible, NATO might face a scenario in which nuclear deterrence in the FRG was further eroded and based increasingly on dual-capable air- and sea-based systems. NATO's nuclear posture in the FRG would increasingly become a hostage to West German domestic political constraints and Soviet arms-control policy, and the longer-term ability of the United States to station any new nuclear forces in the FRG could perhaps be called into question.

Finally, the issue of the future of nuclear weapons on West German soil is tied up with questions about the future US commitment to European defence, Gorbachev, and Bonn's own role in an increasingly fluid phase in East–West affairs. Any US initiative must therefore simultaneously address such concerns. NATO is currently undergoing a transition – one that is being driven both by Gorbachev and by internal changes within the Alliance, above all by the changing political context in the FRG. Transition offers both opportunities and dangers, and the final balance depends in no small part upon US leadership. A constructive American role, however, presupposes that the US itself has a vision of which way it wants to steer this transition, and of the reasons why, and also that it can convey this message in an effective fashion.

Notes

[1] In 1987, for example, the level of trust in President Reagan among West Germans rose from 45% to 60%. Hans Rattinger, 'The INF Agreement and Public Opinion in West Germany', paper delivered at the conference on Canadian and German Perspectives on East–West Arms Control, Toronto, 10–12 March 1988.

[2] For example, in 1981 Egon Bahr introduced the notion of 'nuclear class differences', claiming that Bonn was discriminated against because its nuclear destiny was in the hands of a country over which it had little or no control.

[3] 'Whether one can guarantee one's own security, or whether one depends upon others on such an important existential issue, is crucial to the dignity and self-confidence of any society. This became clear in 1983, above all on the Left, in connection with the debate over the deployment of new intermediate-range missiles. Perhaps here [i.e. on the Right], attitudes towards the United States have also started to change in the meantime, because one now thinks that the Americans want to disarm. . . . Take Reagan's 1983 speech on SDI, declaring deterrence to be morally reprehensible. That had . . . an effect in Europe and in the CDU/CSU. In addition, we have the increasing tendency in the USA to want to withdraw troops from Europe and the Federal Republic. The new Soviet proposals in foreign and arms-control policy also play a role. These proposals are aimed primarily at the nuclear sphere and at the American presence in Europe.' Karl Lamers, disarmament spokesman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, interviewed in *Tageszeitung*, 10 November 1987.

[4] According to Volker Rühe, one of the main proponents of the 'singularization' thesis, 'It is no longer possible to ignore the political fact that deterrence is being criticized in the FRG not only by the Left but by the Right and by people who have traditionally been in favour of the strategy of nuclear deterrence, and because of the structures that will be left in place by the INF Treaty.' *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 21 January 1988.

[5] In early 1988, for example, polls showed some 68% of West Germans rejecting nuclear modernization, and an even higher 79% calling for the removal of all nuclear weapons from West German soil. When asked whether West Germany without nuclear weapons would be any more vulnerable to Soviet pressure, a clear majority of 57% said No. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, 'When the Feeling of Threat Dwindles: Defence Policy Faced with the Growing Problem of Acceptability', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 July 1988.

[6] See Burt's article in *Der Spiegel*, 22 February 1988.

[7] According to Rühe, 'One should not underestimate the political consequences which the remaining potential in Western Europe could have. . . . The formula "the shorter the range, the more German the effect" does not only apply to the remaining short-range Soviet systems. . . . It is much more a question of the potential political consequences which NATO's remaining nuclear weapons could have for the FRG. This is a nuclear posture that – if its current structure and scope remain unchanged – would include land-based systems that would, if used, only destroy German territory – German territory in the German Democratic Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany.' Volker Rühe, 'Perspektiven zur Friedenssicherung in Europa', *Europa Archiv*, no. 23, 1987, p. 678.

[8] See Rühe's comments in *Die Welt*, 15 March 1988, and his interview in *Die Zeit*, 15 February 1988.

[9] Speech reprinted in *Stichworte zur Sicherheitspolitik*, no. 4, 1988.

[10] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 June 1987.

[11] NATO's new General Secretary Manfred Wörner reflected such sentiments in response to a question whether Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev still harboured the ambition of dividing Western Europe from the United States. 'Certainly! I don't have even the slightest doubt, even if one over there [i.e. in the Soviet Union] has since realized that it is a touchy subject and one must change tactics. Of course there are people who will tell you in private conversation that the Americans must stay. But take the notion of a common European house. It is of course very suggestive for the Europeans. We, the Soviets, they say, are Europeans – although the largest portion of the Soviet Union by far is Asian. We will build this house together. And there is no space for the Americans. And, I tell you, I will remain sceptical about this notion; as long as Europe is still divided I will not talk about a common house. This we can only do when this house has become a real house where one can go from one room to another without climbing over a wall. And even then I would say that we need the other super-power to balance the Soviets.' Wörner interview on Südwest TV, Channel 3, 24 June 1988.

[12] See Genscher's speech entitled 'New Approaches to East–West Security Co-operation', delivered at the meeting of the Institute for East–West Security Studies in Potsdam on 11 June 1988 (author's private copy).

[13] See Genscher's interview in *Welt am Sonntag*, 21 August 1988. A recently published article by a former Genscher aide in the Foreign Office also backed the 'singularization' arguments of Rühe and

others, and supported a mixture of short-range reductions coupled with the introduction of sea- and air-based intermediate-range systems. See also Wolfgang Ischinger, 'Jeneseits der Abschreckung? Nuklearwaffen, Rüstungskontrolle und die Zukunft Europas', *Europa Archiv*, no. 12, pp. 339–48.

[14] In an interview on Austrian television following his Moscow visit in late July 1988, Genscher, when asked whether he shared the conservative view that the USSR wanted to push the United States out of Europe, replied: 'First of all, in 1967 we in the Western Alliance called for the establishment of a European peace system – this is basically the same as what the General Secretary means by the *common European house, only put* differently. One must not delude oneself with regard to one question: the Russians are serious – and they have repeatedly stressed this – when they say that they do not intend to separate Europe from the United States and Canada. This is also not in the interests of the Soviet Union. In many talks I made it very clear that we are pursuing our policy of co-operation with the East – our pioneering role in this *policy* – as a *member of the Western* Alliance and the European Community, and as a trustworthy partner of our friends.' Vienna television service, 31 July 1988.

[15] See Ronald D. Asmus, 'The Second Ostpolitik of the SPD', *Aussenpolitik*, no. 1, 1987, pp. 40–55.

[16] See the resolution on security policy passed in Münster (author's private copy).

[17] The most detailed description of non-offensive conventional defence can be found in Andreas von Bülow, Helmut Funk and Albrecht von Müller, *Sicherheit für Europa* (Koblenz: Bernard and Graefe Verlag, 1988).

[18] In an interview in *Die Welt* on 5 March 1988, Vogel defended his party's position on a third zero option. 'Why should our security be reduced when the Russians always eliminate a multiple of what we remove. . . . Even the Kohl government has in the meantime demanded that the nuclear systems be *reduced significantly. Again we have the* same picture. Social Democrats propose something which immediately produces indignation and resistance. . . . Then, at intervals that are getting shorter and shorter, portions of the Union adopt elements of our positions and are in turn fought by their own colleagues for precisely this reason. And finally we see the realization of our proposal with the claim that it was always an original Union position.'

[19] See Kohl's comments on modernization following the NATO Brussels summit in *Bulletin*, no. 34, 7 March 1988; and his subsequent interview in the *Stuttgarter Zeitung*, 12 August 1988.

SPD security policy

MATTHEW A. WEILLER

The West German Social Democratic Party (SPD) has returned from political oblivion to become West Germany's most popular party.[1] In late 1986 and early 1987, it appeared as if ideological policies, erratic leadership, and a decaying party structure would relegate the SPD to many years in the opposition. However, the past two years have brought changes which have enhanced the party's fortunes. Policies have been reassessed, party leadership has changed hands, and an atrophying party structure has been reinvigorated. Further enhancing the SPD's position *has been the infighting and unpopularity of the governing conservative*-liberal Christian Democratic Union (CDU)/Christian Social Union (CSU)-Free Democratic Party (FDP) coalition.

Social Democratic security policy has yet to be significantly affected by the reassessment process. This is viewed positively by many party members and voters who support the SPD's pacifistic security policy line, and negatively by moderates both within the party and the electorate at large, as well as by other Western Alliance countries. To this latter group, the security policy of the SPD is often regarded as unrealistic, dangerous *and capable of undermining* NATO.

As the December 1990 federal election approaches, SPD electoral gains and the formation of a Social Democratic-liberal (SPD-FDP) coalition are growing possibilities. What effect might such a coalition have on West German security policy? And what would the implications be for NATO and the East–West strategic equation?

The SPD shifts to the Left

An examination of SPD security policy since 1979 shows a clear inclination *to pursue a left-leaning policy. This leftwards shift* commenced following former SPD Chancellor Helmut Schmidt's dual-track decision in 1979, a move which alienated the party's Left and which helped fuel the rise of the Green Party and the peace movement. The shift was first indicated by the writings of individual members, and later made part of the platforms adopted at party congresses in Cologne in 1982 and Essen in 1984.[2]

The decisive break with the security policy of the Schmidt era, and the event which set the tone for the 1987 elections and beyond was the adoption of the Nuremberg party congress *platform in August 1986*.[3] The Nuremberg document has been reinforced and expanded upon by suc-

Matthew A. Weiller researched and wrote this article while he was a West German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) fellow working with the SPD in the *Bundestag* and a research intern at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

cessive documents, including the April 1988 security policy position paper of the SPD parliamentary group and the August 1988 Münster party congress platform.[4] Among the stated goals of SPD security policy outlined by these documents are:

- *Increased arms control:* With the eventual goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons and curtailing the existence of all forms of weaponry, a commitment to arms control should include: extensive use of fora such as the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; Conference on Disarmament in Europe, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (or Atlantic-to-Urals); strict interpretation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; opposition to the Strategic Defense Initiative, nuclear testing, anti-satellite development, chemical and biological weapons, and any new stationing or modernization of nuclear weaponry, including any substitute systems for intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- *Structural inability to attack:* This concept, most often associated with SPD parliamentarian Andreas von Bülow,[5] calls for the restructuring of military units, equipment and strategy, so that they are strictly defensive in nature. Specific steps towards achieving a structural inability to attack include: increased emphasis on reserve forces and 'home guard' defensive ground units;[6] reductions in offensive systems, including battle tanks and other armoured vehicles, combat aircraft and helicopters, surface-to-surface missiles and other missiles with corresponding ranges; and rejection of strategic concepts such as AirLand Battle, AirLand Battle 2000, 'deep strike' and Follow-On-Forces Attack.[7]
- *Weapon-free zones:* As an intermediate step towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons, the SPD advocates nuclear weapon-free zones in Central Europe. These zones, inspired by the Palme Commission Report of 1983,[8] have been the focus of SPD negotiations with the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED).
- *A 'New Concept' (Gesamtkonzept) for NATO:* According to party doctrine, the NATO strategy of Flexible Response should be replaced as it is out-dated and does not correspond with the party's stated goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and because the party believes that defence based on nuclear weapons has lost public support.
- *'Common Security' (Gemeinsame Sicherheit):* This broad concept, related to similar SPD concepts dating back to the late 1940s,[9] would be the hoped-for culmination of SPD security policy; a Europe free of aggression and alliances, where there is recognition that '. . . peace can only be secured with and not against the political opponent'.[10] Common security is also the key to the strong emphasis placed by the SPD upon European self-determination.
- *Other SPD positions:* These include opposition to women in the *Bundeswehr*; conversion (from military to civilian production) and curtailment of the arms industry, and opposition to low-level military flights in the Federal Republic and – after the disaster at Ramstein on 28 August – to air shows.

Signs of moderation

While SPD security policy has demonstrated a continuing left-leaning orientation, political events increasingly suggest that a shift towards moderation may now be taking place. This shift, quite full-blown in domestic policy and slowly growing in security policy, commenced with the federal and state elections of 1987. In the January 1987 federal election, the SPD paired a moderate candidate for the chancellorship, Johannes Rau, with the positions of the Nuremberg party platform. The result was a mixed message which left voters unimpressed, and more eager to cast their votes for the Greens on the Left and the FDP on the Right.

The 1987 federal election highlighted the SPD's political dilemma, but it did not conclusively determine whether electability could be best achieved with the Greens or with the FDP. This determination came in April 1987, after the governing SPD-Green coalition in Hesse was defeated in the state election, forcing the SPD into the opposition there for the first time. This painfully symbolic election loss, the ill-feeling it caused between the two parties, and the chaotic in-fighting of the Greens during the latter half of 1987, convinced the SPD that their electoral future lay with the FDP.

Another indication of the move towards political moderation in SPD policy was the selection of Hans-Jochen Vogel as party chairman in June 1987, replacing Willy Brandt. As party leader, Brandt, a political idealist, focused on foreign and security policy issues, and was favourably inclined towards left-wing security policy formulation. Vogel was chosen over Oskar Lafontaine, Brandt's heir-apparent and Vice-Chairman of the party, and a past advocate of West German withdrawal from the military arm of NATO.

Vogel, who ushered in a change of both style and substance, is a traditional Social Democrat, strongest in the area of domestic policy and known as a skilled political technocrat. He was originally considered by many to have been a transitional figure, to be replaced after a few years by someone younger, such as Lafontaine. Yet he has proved to be a powerful leader with staying power. While some in the SPD complain that he is a relentless taskmaster and uninspiring leader, he has brought much needed organizational order and consistency to the party.

Under Vogel, the SPD has edged towards the political centre. Thus far, the focus has been on economic policy, the area of greatest difference with the FDP. Most notable in this respect has been the effort led by Lafontaine to challenge the party's loyalty to trade union-oriented economic policy in favour of a greater emphasis on market-oriented ideas. Lafontaine's willingness to emphasize political moderation is considered part of his bid to enhance his chances of becoming federal chancellor. It remains to be seen whether he will actively support a more moderate SPD security policy, although he has noticeably curtailed his anti-NATO

rhetoric.[11] Vogel has thus far remained strictly neutral in the intra-party security policy debate. In his security policy pronouncements, he has done no more than reiterate the goals outlined at Nuremberg.[12] His political style, however, would seem to signal an eventual shift towards moderation in order to bolster SPD electoral chances.

Security policy factions in the *Bundestag*

While there are numerous participants in the SPD security policy debate, there are relatively few SPD security policy makers in the *Bundestag*. Fewer still are those with expertise in defence policy; in a party with mixed feelings about the military, many security policy makers bill themselves 'arms-control experts'. The result is often a preoccupation with arms control itself rather than with the crucial interrelationship between arms control and strategic policy.

The SPD security policy makers in the *Bundestag* can be divided into three broad groups: the Centre-Right, primarily those who associate themselves with an intra-party grouping called the *Seeheimer Kreis* (Seeheimer Circle); the Left, many of whom can be linked with the *Frankfurter Kreis* (Frankfurter Circle); and a broad Centre-Left which draws its ideas from both of the former two groups.[13]

The names associated with the Centre-Right include many survivors of the Schmidt era as well as younger Social Democrats uneasy with the party's post-Schmidt security policy shift. Within the party, the *Seeheimer Kreis* uses stronger language for its support of defence in general and NATO in particular, and qualifies its support for the activities of the peace movement.[14] Above all, the *Seeheimer Kreis* makes clear its goal of enhancing the electability of the SPD.[15]

The *Frankfurter Kreis* (a looser intra-party grouping than the *Seeheimer Kreis*) supports a pacifist line towards security policy which is truer to the party's ideological roots, and which takes a strict interpretation of the Nuremberg party platform. This includes vigorous opposition to nuclear weapons, regarding the current Alliance structure as an interim necessity, and vigorously supporting an activist peace movement.[16]

The most influential group of SPD security policy makers are those on the Centre-Left. This group generally supports the ideas of the Nuremberg platform in principle, while favouring a more moderate line in practice. Those who can be classified under this Centre-Left heading include most of the major SPD security policy personalities, including Egon Bahr,[17] Horst Ehmke[18] and Karsten Voigt.[19]

The parliamentarians of this latter grouping are likely to continue to determine the course of SPD security policy. Bahr, with lengthy security policy experience, most notably as Willy Brandt's expert in this field, is the SPD's undisputed elder statesman in security policy formulation. Ehmke, Chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Committee on Foreign and Security Policy, co-ordinates the day-to-day business of SPD security policy making in the *Bundestag*. Karsten Voigt, SPD Foreign Policy Spokesman and emerging heir-apparent to both Bahr and Ehmke, is politically

astute, communicates well with all party factions, and has already established an international reputation as a security policy expert.

Security policy and domestic politics

Flirtation by the SPD with a 'Red-Green' *Bundestag* coalition ceased after the defeat of the SPD-Green coalition in Hesse in April 1987. Yet, even before this date, differences in respective security policies had effectively ruled out a workable coalition. Regarding such a coalition, Karsten Voigt stated that the SPD would be ready to discuss the issue 'only after the Greens are ready to relinquish their principled "no" to any militarily-based security policy, their rejection of arms-control negotiations, their fixation with a strategy of unilateral disarmament, and their demand for a withdrawal from NATO'.[20]

In 1986, Petra Kelly, a leader of the Greens in the *Bundestag*, indicated her steadfast opposition to any sort of coalition with the SPD, stating that the three traditional parties, including the SPD, were part of an 'all-party' coalition representing the Establishment, while the Greens were an 'anti-party' party.[21] In a pamphlet entitled *SPD Security Policy: A Halfway Peace*, the Greens forwarded a 12-point comparison of Green and SPD security policy,[22] concluding that 'the SPD has no transferable peace policy (*Friedenspolitik*) to offer [the Greens]'.[23]

Since mid-1987, the SPD has been openly courting the FDP, its coalition partner during the Brandt and Schmidt years, as a future coalition partner. Numerous Social Democrats have publicly praised the foreign and security policies of the FDP, particularly its steadfastness and perseverance over the INF issue.[24] The SPD and FDP are in agreement on many major aspects of security policy, including seeking a greater political role for smaller Alliance partners; support for a new strategic concept for NATO; and support for a German veto over the use of nuclear weapons on German soil.[25] In addition, the FDP's enthusiasm for reform in the Soviet Union closely matches that of the SPD.

Enhancing the attractiveness of an SPD-FDP coalition is the increasing tension between the FDP and the CDU/CSU. Differences have surfaced in numerous policy areas, most noticeably foreign and security policy. In an apparent attempt to counter FDP Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher's influence in these two areas, Chancellor Kohl appointed the combatitive Rupert Scholz as defence minister to replace newly appointed NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner. Scholz has expressed his mistrust of the Soviet Union's 'very effective public policy', and has scoffed at Genscher's claim that the USSR is interested in 'real progress in arms control'.[26]

Much of the SPD's enthusiasm for the FDP in general and for its security and foreign policy in particular is centred around the person of Genscher. The 'Genscherist' line is very popular within the SPD, and Genscher is on good terms with many Social Democrats, most notably Lafontaine. The SPD's relationship with the FDP is, however, overly dependent upon the strength of Genscher within his own party. Were he

to fall out of favour with his FDP colleagues, the Social Democrats would find it difficult to find another liberal around whom they could rally their coalition-building hopes.

More problematic, however, is the vast gulf dividing the SPD and the FDP over economic policy. While Genscher is praised as the force behind potential security policy consensus with the SPD, former finance minister Otto Graf Lamsdorff is vilified as the FDP politician behind the SPD-FDP coalition break-up of 1982, and as the most adamant opponent of any current coalition discussion. While the SPD has taken steps to make its economic policies more market-oriented, and Lamsdorff has recognized these efforts, there are still obstacles to overcome before agreement over economic policy could be achieved.

In reacting against the Greens and moving towards political moderation, some Social Democrats have even flirted with the idea of a CDU/CSU-SPD 'Grand Coalition' similar to the governing coalition of 1966–1969.[27] This idea, until recently unfathomable, has become ponderable as some conservatives, in particular Alfred Dregger, have abandoned more conservative security policy positions in favour of a more moderate line.[28] However, the differences between the SPD and the CDU/CSU are still much greater than those between the FDP and the SPD, and a 'Grand Coalition' remains highly unlikely. Yet the fact that there has even been talk of such a coalition gives the FDP added incentive to court the SPD, as the 1966–69 'Grand Coalition' was the only government from which the FDP – West Germany's perennial junior coalition partner – was excluded.

How do the voters feel about the parties and potential coalition shifts? In June 1988, 74% of FDP voters held a negative opinion of the governing CDU/CSU-FDP coalition.[29] Yet while they disapprove of the current government, an August 1988 poll showed that only 19% of FDP voters indicated a preference for an SPD-FDP coalition. This seems to suggest that FDP voters, in spite of their dissatisfaction with the conservatives, are still waiting for more moderate policies from the SPD.[30]

While FDP voters remain unconvinced, SPD voters are overwhelmingly keen on coalition-building with either of the parties to their Right. Forty-seven percent would prefer a coalition with the FDP, and 21% would like to see an SPD-CDU/CSU 'Grand Coalition'. Only 28% of SPD voters want a coalition with the Greens.[31]

A May 1988 public opinion poll showed that most West Germans favour a moderate security policy. A mere five percent supported a German withdrawal from NATO (even less than the seven percent who indicated that they would vote for the Greens), and 69% indicated support for maintaining West Germany's current status within NATO. Sixty-one percent believed the total elimination of nuclear weapons to be an unrealistic goal. An overwhelming majority (82%) thought that there was little danger of war in Europe.[32]

These polls give a clear indication that the key to electoral and governing success is a politically moderate course. In spite of the fear of

nuclear weapons and high hopes for East–West *rapprochement*, the West Germans are not in favour of any radical change in the current European security arrangement.

SPD-SED security policy co-operation

One aspect of SPD security policy which worries its critics is the party's relationship with the ruling East German Socialist Unity Party. During a meeting in East Berlin in September 1985, Willy Brandt and SED General Secretary Erich Honecker agreed to create an SPD-SED working group to examine the possibility of creating a nuclear weapon-free zone in Europe in the spirit of the Palme Commission Report.[33] After six meetings, the working group issued a joint document outlining a proposed 150-km wide, 300-km long nuclear-free zone which would encompass parts of the two Germanies and Czechoslovakia.[34]

The SPD-SED working group has continued its dialogue concerning a nuclear weapon-free zone and other security policy issues. In addition, the SPD was an enthusiastic participant in the June 1988 East German-sponsored international conference on nuclear weapon-free zones. Of the close working relationship between the two parties, Egon Bahr has stated, 'We [the SPD and the SED] speak openly about every subject'.[35]

At least two factors, however, threaten to dampen SPD enthusiasm for the intra-German party relationship. The first is the undemocratic nature of the East German government. The crackdown on dissent since January 1987 has confronted the SPD with a contradiction between its commitment to security policy goals and human rights ideals. The second is the 'Gorbachev Factor', for, while the SPD strongly supports Gorbachev's reform policies, the SED is most reluctant to embrace them. Here again, the SPD is confronted with contradictory political goals.

Thus far, the SPD has side-stepped these policy contradictions. Yet continued silence may become increasingly difficult. While Egon Bahr was addressing the June 1988 East Berlin conference on the nuclear weapon-free zone, East German security police across town were roughing up a crowd of East Berliners and West German television crews. These contrasting events – shown the same day on the West German television news – are embarrassing for the SPD, and perhaps politically damaging.

The SPD-SED relationship may encounter difficulties, but it is sure to continue. The SPD, the party which originated *Ostpolitik*, is not going to abandon or drastically curtail a relationship for which it was initially responsible. The continuation of the German-German relationship has become a political requirement for all West German parties, whereas until the early 1980s it had been the exclusive domain of the SPD. The current SPD-SED relationship provides a way in which to retain a degree of exclusivity on this issue, but as its primary function is as a forum for extra-governmental German-German dialogue, it is unlikely to change security policy in any major way.

The SPD and Franco-German defence co-operation

While praised in principle as promoting European political integration and strengthening the 'European Pillar', Franco-German defence co-operation has been fraught with problems for the SPD. These have included the role of nuclear weapons in French security policy, France's contribution to European conventional defence, scepticism over arms control, and the nationalistic nature of French security policy.

The strongly pro-nuclear aspect of French security policy starkly contrasts with the negative view of nuclear weapons held by West Germans in general and the SPD in particular. In France, nuclear weapons are symbols of national pride and security independence, whereas in the Federal Republic, particularly among the ranks of the SPD, nuclear weapons carry negative connotations of dependence and potential wartime devastation.

The French reluctance to increase its contribution towards European conventional defence is also a sticking point for the SPD. Horst Ehmke recently lamented that France 'concentrates its defence outlays on the build-up of the *Force de Frappe* and neglects its conventional forces'.[36] This neglect of conventional forces is often interpreted as French unwillingness to commit to the forward defence of West Germany.

French scepticism of the arms-control process often appears to contrast with SPD enthusiasm, as was demonstrated by former French Defence Minister André Giraud's statement at the February 1988 *Wehrkunde* Conference in Munich; 'The day it comes to general disarmament, nuclear weapons should be the last to go, and it is from Europe that they should go last'.[37] In a statement seemingly directed at the SPD, Giraud said that, 'After the INF agreement it is . . . our duty to warn [Europe's] public opinion against premature and exaggerated optimism and to emphasize that a credible defence effort, far from jeopardizing a lasting improvement of East–West relations, is, on the contrary, one of its preconditions'.[38] President Mitterrand's recent indications that France will be more flexible in the Conventional Stability Talks were aimed in part at addressing SPD anxieties.

The SPD is also concerned about the possible unconstitutionality of a common Franco-German brigade. As pointed out by SPD parliamentarian Hermann Scheer, Article 24 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic allows the transfer of command control only to multi-national organizations, such as NATO, and not to any other individual nation. Under this statute, a joint brigade with a French commander could be unconstitutional.[39]

While French security policy is essentially nationalist in nature, SPD security policy is supra-national, based on the concept of European-wide common security. Concerns have been expressed within the SPD that Franco-German defence co-operation would be a strictly bilateral affair, undermining European unity and hinting at the type of alliance structure which propelled Europe into World War I.

Additional reasons for SPD scepticism of Franco-German defence co-operation are the close relationship between conservative Helmut Kohl and socialist François Mitterrand, and a feeling that the French socialists have somehow betrayed the pacifist policy goals of the socialist movement. In recent months, SPD policy-makers from the Left, Centre-Left and Centre-Right have emphasized the problems and contradictions inherent for the SPD in Franco-German defence co-operation, and, unlike in the SPD-SED relationship, seem willing to confront these issues rather than avoid them. However, criticism of the French and the Franco-German defence relationship is not likely to go so far as to endanger Western European unity and co-operation.

The 'Gorbachev Factor'

No aspect of current SPD security policy is more striking than the tremendous enthusiasm generated by Soviet General Secretary, and now President, Mikhail Gorbachev, his reform policies, and his arms-control and arms-reduction proposals. Although it remains to be seen whether Gorbachev will have any real effect on Soviet military policy, the SPD seems prepared to take him at his word. Consequently, hopes have been raised within the SPD that arms control will become a continuing process, resulting in the creation of the longed-for bloc-free common security regime in Europe.

Gorbachev's most prominent SPD supporter is Egon Bahr. In a book published in early 1988,[40] Bahr describes Gorbachev as a genuine reformer and a believer in the SPD policy of common security in Europe. In contrast, Bahr chastises the West – meaning the Kohl Government, the UK, France and, above all, the US – for not embracing Gorbachev's peace initiatives. 'What Gorbachev is offering', according to Bahr, 'is the liberation of the world from the possibility of a Soviet military threat. What more more does the West want?'[41] Summing up his support for Gorbachev, Bahr writes, 'The vital interests of Europe allow for no other answer to Gorbachev than a yea in favour of new ideas and a yea in favour of common security. For he describes not his goal, but our goal.'[42]

The views expressed by Bahr have been echoed by numerous Social Democrats. Speaking in the *Bundestag* in response to a sceptical assessment of change in the Soviet Union delivered by Defence Minister Scholz, SPD parliamentarian Gernot Erler stated,

> What, then, must happen to prevent [Scholz] from repeating . . . the same eternal warning against the same eternal enemy . . . and instead say: People, let's take advantage of the opportunity of the moment and carefully test all offers from Moscow and lay our own proposals on the table, for the situation was never before so ideal for more peace and less weapons.[43]

The USSR actively supports SPD enthusiasm through the use of aggressive public diplomacy at all levels. Larger-scale efforts include: the barrage of Soviet arms-control and arms-reduction proposals; Gorbachev's bestselling book *Perestroika*, in which he praises the socialist and Social Democratic parties of Western Europe;[44] and high-visibility visits by both Willy Brandt and Hans-Jochen Vogel during

which each received a lengthy personal audience with Gorbachev. Efforts on a smaller scale include actively courting individual SPD parliamentarians as well as other SPD opinion-makers. Soviet courting of the European Left is not new; what is new, however, is a polished public diplomacy effort backed up by a relatively young, vigorous and dynamic leader.

The SPD and the United States

The relationship between the United States and the SPD has never been an easy one. From the founding of the Federal Republic in 1949 until 1969, the conservative-controlled governments of Adenauer, Ehrhard and Kiesinger closely allied themselves with the United States, which was praised as a role-model for the fledgling republic. The SPD, with its Marxist origins, its post-war support for a neutral, reunified Germany, and its early opposition to NATO and the *Bundeswehr*, often appeared not to fit in the conservatives' – and the United States' – post-war Western Europe.

The first SPD government in 1969 coincided with the political turmoil of the student movement, Vietnam, the civil rights movement, and later, Watergate and the first of the oil crises. Simultaneously, the vilification of the East gave way to detente and *Ostpolitik*, the latter largely due to the efforts of the SPD-led Brandt government. The post-war images of the 1950s and 1960s yielded to increasing openness towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and to rising scepticism about the United States and NATO, particularly among the Left. Even during the pro-NATO Schmidt era (and, in part, as a result of Schmidt's dislike of President Carter), this trend continued.

During the early 1980s, the relationship between the United States and the SPD became one of mutual suspicion and mistrust, to an extent because of contradictory security policy developments. While the Reagan Administration took a hard-line position towards the Soviet Union, the SPD was rapidly distancing itself from Schmidt-era security policy in favour of a more pacifistic and less nuclear approach. The SPD expressed its opposition to many aspects of US security policy, including SDI and the accompanying Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty reinterpretation; nuclear testing; military action in Central America, Grenada and Libya; and the revival of limited nuclear war scenarios. On the other hand, American policy-makers and academics have been critical of SPD security concepts such as 'common security' and 'structural inability to attack', suggesting that they would undermine Western defence.[45]

Since the Reykjavik summit, and especially since the INF agreement, the relationship has improved somewhat. Yet there are still any number of major differences between the SPD and the US, most notably on the issues of the modernization of short-range nuclear forces and 'triple zero'. Differences between the SPD and the US were highlighted by the release of the *Discriminate Deterrence* report in January 1988. The SPD took issue with much of the report, including its support of the use of an

'extreme threat' in regional conflicts; limited nuclear warfare capacity; and its sceptical attitude towards arms control and a chemical weapons ban. 'The European reaction to this report', according to the SPD, 'could cause exactly what it is trying to hinder: namely self-assertion, de-integration, bilateral structures, and sweeping nuclear arms control'.[46]

Another stumbling block in the US-SPD relationship is the increasing American consternation with Western Europe. The most visible manifestation of this is the disagreement over 'burden-sharing', which, especially in light of the Ramstein air show disaster, could harm both US-German and US-SPD relations. The American desire to reduce its financial and physical commitments in Europe is a sore point for all German parties, and the SPD has stated that, 'The financial situation [of the Federal Republic] does not permit an increase in the defense budget'.[47] Further, 'a rigid adherence to a peacetime strength of 495,000 men [in the *Bundeswehr*] is rejected by the SPD parliamentary group'.[48] The US is asking for larger financial contributions, but the West Germans increasingly feel they are paying their share in terms of physical risks and lack of sovereignty due to the large foreign troop presence.

The US-SPD relationship, however, is likely to show some gradual improvement during the next American administration. The post-Reykjavik arms-control and arms-reduction process – and the resulting improvement in US–Soviet relations – now seem firmly entrenched. The SPD is likely to moderate its security policy somewhat as the 1990 federal election draws closer, and, despite the host of differences that remain, the SPD is not wholly critical of the US and the West. Many SPD *Bundestag* members – often in spite of rhetoric to the contrary – are keen on maintaining and improving the German-American relationship. Fully seventy-six SPD parliamentarians in the *Bundestag* (more than one-third of the total SPD members in the *Bundestag*) are members of the SPD Parliamentary Subcommittee on the United States. This group deals with American issues in a positive and constructive manner, and serves as a powerful counter to any negative views of the US expressed within the SPD.

Conclusions

On paper, the security policy of the SPD represents a radical shift away from NATO. In practice, an SPD-led government would probably be more moderate than current SPD documentation indicates. One reason for this is moderate party leadership under the firm guidance of Hans-Jochen Vogel. Another reason is the smouldering intra-party security policy debate which, once it reaches a more public level, should move the SPD away from many left-leaning security policy positions. A third reason is that security policy moderation will be necessary to attract and maintain FDP support. Fourth, and given popular support for NATO membership, it is highly unlikely that the SPD would alter West Germany's position in NATO. In short, there is likely to be flexibility and moderation in the SPD

security policy position – factors which most Social Democrats know are the keys to electability and governability.

An SPD in power would probably restrict its most radical moves to the political and public diplomacy realms. This could entail a foreign and security policy reminiscent of the Brandt era; and bold political strides towards East–West *rapprochement* without abandoning the current Alliance structure. The SPD would probably seek to implement some degree of 'structural inability to attack', as well as aggressively pursuing chemical, nuclear and conventional arms control. Yet it would not undertake these moves unilaterally or to any extreme degree. There would be no change in the federal government's support for membership in NATO, and there would probably be some acceptance of nuclear weapons on German soil, at least until some sort of minimal deterrence structure could be agreed upon.

Change comes slowly in the Federal Republic. It took the SPD twenty years to install an SPD-led government in Bonn, and thirteen years before the conservatives were able to return to power. Konrad Adenauer's conservatives won the 1957 federal election with the slogan 'No experiments', which adequately expresses the West German aversion to extremism of any kind. The turmoil of twentieth-century German history weighs heavily on the German psyche. When pushed from the Right or the Left, the West Germans tend to rush towards the political centre. The SPD would not ignore this basic political reality in its security policy should it come to power in 1990.

Notes

[1] 'Bei einer Wahl, käme es zum Wechsel', *Der Spiegel*, no. 35, 1988. In an August 1988 poll, West Germans were asked, 'Which party would you vote for if next Sunday were the federal election?' The results were as follows: SPD = 43%, CDU/CSU = 40%, FDP = 9%, and Greens = 7%.

[2] For a discussion of the ideological shift at the documentation level, see: Franz Borkenhagen, 'Aspekte der sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Aus der Blickpunkt der SPD', *Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift*, no. 2, 1987, pp. 138–9; and Stephen F. Szabo, 'The German Social Democrats and Defense After the 1987 Elections', *SAIS Review*, Summer/Fall 1987, pp. 52–4.

[3] For the complete text of the Nuremberg party platform, see, 'Unser Weg zur Abrüstung und Frieden', *Politik*, no. 8, September 1986.

[4] SPD Parliamentary Group, Bonn, *Positionspapier zur Streitkräfte-, Personal-, Rüstungs- und Finanzplannung der Bundeswehr*, 28 April 1988. (Also obtainable in English: *Position Paper on the Bundeswehr Force-, Personnel-, Armament-, and Finance Planning*). 'Parteitag der SPD in Münster, 30.8.–2.9.1988', Service der SPD für Presse, Funk, TV.

[5] See Andreas von Bülow, 'Das neue von Bülow Papier', *Vorwärts*, 31 October 1987.

[6] *Ibid.* 'heimatnah bemannten Sperrverbaenden'.

[7] Peter Glotz, 'Mehr Sicherheit durch FoFa?', *Europäische Wehrkunde*, April 1987, pp. 197–8.

[8] See *Common Security: A Program for Disarmament, Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues* (London: Pan Books, 1983).

[9] Thomas Enders, *Die SPD und die äussere Sicherheit* (St Augustine, West Germany: The Konrad Adenauer Foundation, December 1987), p. 279.

[10] 'Position Paper of the SPD Parliamentary Group', *op. cit.* in note 4, p. 4.

[11] In a speech at the National Defense University in Washington DC on 23 September 1987, Lafontaine stated that the European role in NATO was regional and not global, and coyly outlined France's role in NATO without making any direct reference to West Germany. Service der SPD für Presse, Funk, TV, p. 4.

[12] For an example, see: Hans-Jochen Vogel, 'Sicherheit als *gemeinsame* Aufgabe', speech delivered at the 25th annual *Wehrkunde* Conference in Munich, 6 February 1988, Service der SPD für Presse, Funk, TV.

[13] The *Seeheimer Kreis* and the *Frankfurter Kreis* take their names from the cities in which they were first convened, Seeheim and Frankfurt respectively. Both were founded in the 1970s.

[14] 'Ein Seeheimer Beitrag zur sozialdemokratischen Programmdiskussion', paper presented at the Hotel Seminaris, Bad Honnef, West Germany, 11 December 1987, pp. 9–11. Most of the foreign and security policy ideas of this paper were penned by Florian Gerster, a first-term SPD parliamentarian and a member of the *Bundestag* Defence Committee, and Dietrich Stobbe, Chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Subcommittee on the United States.

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 2. 'Zentrales Anliegen der Seeheimer ist die Erhaltung – oder Wiedergewinnung – der Mehrheitsfähigkeit der SPD'.

[16] For the Left's views on security policy, as outlined by the *Frankfurter Kreis*, see: 'Entwurf eines Antrages zur Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik des Frankfurter Kreises', March 1988. Chief contributors to the *Frankfurter Kreis* in the area of security policy include Gernot Erler, first-term parliamentarian and *Bundestag* Defence Committee Member; Katrin Fuchs, Defence Committee member and vice-chair of the SPD Parliamentary Committee on Foreign and Security Policy; and Hermann Scheer, chairman of the SPD Parliamentary Committee on Arms Reduction and Arms Control.

[17] Although Bahr is often regarded by SPD detractors as the mastermind of the SPD's security policy Left, press accounts of his security policy pronouncements are greatly varied, showing a tendency to temper idealism with reality. While speaking to members of the *Bundeswehr* leadership in January 1988, Bahr stated that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was 'not realisable' ('nicht realisierbar') ('Bahr: Kein totaler Atomwaffen-Abbau', *Neue Ruhr Zeitung*, 16 January 1988).

[18] Horst Ehmke clearly expressed his support for a minimal nuclear deterrent during a May 1988 trip to Peking (see: 'Verminderung der Atomwaffen bis zur Minimalabschreckung', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 24 May 1988).

[19] Karsten Voigt has written that 'Contrary to what overly worried critics fear and too-optimistic factions of the peace movement hope, a further "zero solution" *will in no way mean the* denuclearization of Europe'. 'Von der Nuklearen zur konventionellen Abrüstung in Europa – Kriterien konventioneller Stabilität und Möglichkeiten der Rüstungskontrolle', *Europa Archiv*, no. 14, 1987, p. 409.

[20] Karsten Voigt, 'Die Grünen nach Hannover oder Warum es zwischen ihnen und der SPD keine Koalition geben kann', *Sicherheit und Frieden (S+F)*, vol. 4, 1986, p. 222.

[21] Gerhard Braunthal, 'Koalition zwischen Sozialdemokraten und Grünen: Perspektiven einer neuen Allianz', *Beiträge zur Konfliktforschung*, no. 3, 1986, p. 9.

[22] *SPD Sicherheitspolitik: Ein halber Frieden*, Die Grünen im Bundestag, Bonn, 1986. pp. 78–80.

[23] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[24] 'SPD sieht sich mit der FDP in der Abrüstungsfrage einig', *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 17 August 1987.

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New challenges for Swedish security policy


JOSEPH KRUZEL

An unobtrusive sign in the Swedish Army Museum reminds the visitor that Sweden was not always the peaceful nation it is today. From 1521 to 1814, it proclaims, Sweden fought a total of 48 wars. During those three centuries the country was more often at war than at peace.[1] The sign serves as a pointed reminder that Sweden was at one time a great power quite willing to defend its empire with a formidable military establishment. Gustavus Adolphus, whose achievements are prominently displayed in the Army Museum, was one of the great military innovators of all time, revolutionizing infantry tactics and establishing the first national standing conscript army in Europe.

Sweden is a country of paradoxes. The most vocal elements of its population seem more interested in North–South than East–West issues, more concerned with Vietnam, Afghanistan and Nicaragua than with activities in their own territorial waters. Its dominant political party is unenthusiastic about defence spending, but vehemently protective of military conscription. Sweden prides itself on maintaining a sophisticated arms industry, but Swedes are distinctly uneasy about the sale of arms to other countries, a practice that is essential to the survival of domestic arms production. Sweden has no standing army, but within three days it can mobilize 10% of the population for military service. It is a country that spends more on defence than any other neutral, but it stood virtually alone among European states in not raising defence spending during the 1970s and 1980s.

Swedes are proud of saying that their country has never been invaded, a singular achievement among European states over the past 200 years, and Sweden's successful neutrality through two world wars, when conflict raged all around its borders, makes its security policy *prima facie* an historical success. There is an understandable reluctance to tamper with such an impressive record, but the conditions on which Swedish defence policy were based during the 1950s and 1960s have changed significantly in recent years. The challenge for Sweden is to adjust to new geostrategic realities as it heads into a new century.

Joseph Kruzel is Associate Professor of Political Science and Acting Director of the Mershon Center at Ohio State University. He spent the summer of 1987 as Visiting Fellow of the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.
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The Nordic countries

Three problems are at the top of Sweden's security agenda. The first is how to react to the changing wartime threat brought about by the increasing strategic importance of the High North (northern Scandinavia, the Kola Peninsula and surrounding seas). The second is how to respond to the peacetime threat of continued underwater incursions by foreign vessels into Swedish territorial waters. A third problem is the enduring one of how to maintain adequate spending on military forces when demographic pressures, public opinion and the growing cost of the welfare state are likely to restrict the funds available for defence.

Neutrality and national defence

Sweden's 'armed neutrality' is long-standing and self-imposed. It is not guaranteed by international convention, like Switzerland's or Austria's, nor is it conditioned by any agreement of co-operation with a powerful neighbour, as is the case for Finland. Strictly speaking, Sweden is not even a neutral state; its posture is *alliansfrihet* – literally, 'freedom from alliances' – a stance aimed at preserving the ability to be neutral in wartime. Swedes are quick to stress that this inclination to neutrality applies only to security policy, not to ideology, culture or economic life. Politically and socially, Sweden is well established as a Western democracy.

In official Swedish policy, neutrality is not an end in itself, but rather the most likely means of maintaining the country's independence. In theory at least, neutrality is only one option among many, not an intrinsic good. In practice, however, only a few Swedish security specialists still talk about neutrality as a way to keep options open in a crisis. Many politicians and most citizens now regard neutrality as something sacrosanct: fixed in all situations and never to be questioned.

Everyone agrees that if any outside power attacks Sweden, the country would no longer be bound by any dictates of neutrality. But few are willing to admit that in the future it may be difficult to determine when the country is under attack. Would repeated overflights of Swedish territory constitute an attack? Would an economic embargo? In the grey area of contemporary international security, with no clear dividing line between war and peace, the plight of a nation desiring to be neutral is complicated and dangerous. Tolerating 'minor' transgressions may allow a state to hold on to neutrality, but at the risk of being seen by others as having compromised its position. By focusing on the threat of military conflict, neutrality might itself become neutralized by non-military factors.[2] Short of unambiguous attack, however, Sweden is extremely unlikely to give up a policy that has such broad popular appeal and has served its interests so well for so long.

The evolution of Swedish defence

The 1950s saw the evolution of a Nordic 'balance', with Norway and Denmark joining NATO, and Finland developing a special relationship with the Soviet Union. Sweden came to see itself as the pivot of this balance, a perception that prevails to the present time. There are no explicit links between Sweden and the other Nordic countries on defence policy. Peacetime defence co-operation, even at the level of staff talks, would be inconsistent with neutrality. But there are frequent and lengthy meetings of all Nordic defence ministers, and it would be surprising if these conversations did not entail frank and serious discussion of mutual security interests. Certainly, the Nordic countries themselves understand the interrelatedness of their security postures, and, even without formal consultations, each state is careful not to take actions that would upset the defence calculations of its neighbours.

Central to Sweden's defence strategy is the concept of 'marginality', the idea that in a war the country would be only a marginally important strategic goal, and that any adversary contemplating an attack on Sweden would therefore devote only a marginal part of its military strength to such an endeavour. On the surface, this seems a plausible

assessment. There are no natural or manufactured resources unique to Sweden, and no great material advantage to be had from possession of Swedish territory. Since any state attacking Sweden would be involved in a conflict with its opposing military alliance, there would be a far greater claim on its military resources than the invasion and occupation of relatively unimportant Sweden.

Today, the hypothesis of marginality is so important a premise in Swedish defence planning that it is rarely discussed and debated in public. In private, however, many defence analysts are dubious about Sweden's marginality. An isolated 'bolt-from-the-blue' attack on Sweden may not be a serious possibility, but one military bloc or the other could see Sweden as a strategic prize justifying the use of significant military resources.[3] Control of Sweden, and its use as a military base of operations, could be so attractive as to make it a high and immediate priority in the event of a European war. Pushing such a scenario too far, however, would undermine the Swedish defence posture and its critical reliance on mobilization, which depends on days of worsening political crisis to provide essential strategic warning.

Contemporary threat perceptions

Three plausible scenarios for attack on Sweden are: (i) a Soviet violation of Swedish ground or airspace en route to seizing and occupying the NATO airfields in northern Norway; (ii) a Soviet amphibious landing on the Baltic coast and a march across the country en route to securing the southern tip of Norway; and (iii) the 'air scenario', in which one military bloc or the other would grab Swedish air bases for use in waging the battle of the Atlantic.

A Soviet invasion of northern Norway might be attempted by land, sea or air. If an attack were to come over the difficult terrain of Lappland, then Finnish as well as Swedish territory would be involved. This would provide strategic warning for Sweden and a hostile terrain through which an invading army would have to advance before encountering Swedish troops.

There is considerable debate among Swedish defence experts about how seriously to treat the threat of a Soviet attack across northern Sweden. While the USSR has significantly increased its air and naval forces based in the Kola region, there has been no commensurate increase in ground forces. The Soviet Union could reinforce its units, but new troops would be unfamiliar with the terrain and unlikely to be equipped to fight in such difficult conditions. The act of bringing in additional forces would also provide warning time for Swedish mobilization. In any case, the road network in northern Sweden is not conducive to an east–west transit, making the prospect of such an attack a logistical nightmare for Soviet planners. For this scenario, the 'marginality thesis' may still hold.

Another issue of concern to Swedish analysts is the strategic value of southern Norway. Command of this region would give the occupier air bases which could be used to launch attacks on targets on the continent

or in the Norwegian Sea, as well to control access to, and egress from, the Baltic. If the Warsaw Pact sought to occupy southern Norway it would first need to make an amphibious landing and march across southern Sweden. This is not a scenario that NATO planners believe to be likely, but the low probability derives in part from the fact that a strong Swedish defence would impede a Warsaw Pact transit, thus giving Norway valuable strategic warning. Under the most optimistic forecast, Swedish military forces could effectively block an invasion or inflict such serious attrition that Norway would be able to cope with the forces that survived the transit.

The third scenario sees Sweden's primary strategic utility in its airfields and the unimpeded use of its airspace.[4] In any East–West war of more than a few days' duration the North Atlantic would be a critical theatre of operations. NATO would be forced to rely on the shipment of personnel and equipment from the United States to Europe and, without such successful resupply, would almost certainly lose the war. The most important line in this battle of the Atlantic connects Greenland, Iceland and the United Kingdom – the so-called GIUK gap – where maintenance of air superiority would be crucial to the outcome of the war. Here the Swedish airfields come into play. Possession of Swedish bases would give either side a considerably improved ability to operate in and around the GIUK gap. Operating out of air bases on Swedish soil could double the fighting capacity of attack aircraft involved in the battle of the Atlantic.[5] Swedish bases would also improve the occupying power's ability to give fighter protection to other military activities, such as anti-submarine warfare, airborne warning and control, and bomber operations.

For NATO forces, Sweden's air bases would provide an important additional attraction. Their use would be an immeasurable aid in waging the battle against Warsaw Pact forces in Central Europe and in launching air strikes against the Soviet homeland. Even if the air bases themselves were not occupied, control of Swedish airspace would greatly facilitate NATO air operations. For precisely these reasons, the Soviet Union would be interested in pre-emption, to deny its adversaries the use of Swedish airspace and base facilities.

The special problem of submarine incursions

For most of the post-war era there have been reports of unidentified foreign submarines, some very likely armed with nuclear weapons, intruding deep into Swedish territorial waters. Such incidents became more frequent and more brazen after 1980.[6]

In 1981, a *Whiskey*-class Soviet submarine ran aground near the Karlskrona naval base, one of Sweden's most important naval facilities. Even more serious was a September 1982 incident at Hårsfjärden, close to a major naval base near Stockholm. Numerous other incidents have occurred since that time. Although the '*Whiskey* on the rocks' and the Hårsfjärden intruder were the only two vessels specifically identified as

to national origin, the others are generally assumed to have been Soviet as well.

These recurring intrusions into Swedish territorial waters prompted official protests by the Swedish government, as well as considerable naval effort to bring the submarines to the surface, though without damaging them.[7] Predictably, the Kremlin responded to Swedish diplomatic protests by *emphasizing* that the real threat to good Soviet–Swedish relations was not posed by the activity itself, for which Moscow in any case was not responsible, but by unseemly Swedish accusations and protests. For a few years the submarine affair was a matter of considerable discussion and debate within all sectors of Swedish society. It continues to be a major issue of discussion within the small group of professional Swedish security analysts, and it seems to have touched off a wave of tough-mindedness within the community. Scholars not previously known for their hawkish writings have taken a central role in examining the submarine incursions, and have adopted a new and more realistic *tone towards security* issues.[8] Among the general public there seems to be a more equivocal attitude. On the one hand, Swedish public opinion has turned sharply against Moscow. A poll of nine West European countries taken in the summer of 1987 showed that the Swedes were more negative about the Soviet Union than any other population in the survey.[9] On the other hand, there seems to be a growing sense of resignation and fatalism about the submarine incursions, and the entire issue has become the subject of jokes as much as of serious public discussion.

Sweden's inability or unwillingness to stop the submarine incursions has raised serious questions about the depth and strength of the Swedish *commitment* to armed neutrality. As the USSR continues to mount underwater incursions, many fear that the sense of public outrage in Sweden will continue to fade and will give way to the notion that successful neutrality must learn to adjust to geopolitical reality, that the interests of a neighbouring super-power must be taken into account in peacetime as in war. The renewed Swedish interest in the diplomatic history of World War II, a time when Swedish diplomatic acumen counted for more than military capability, suggests a growing national apprehension that such conditions may await Sweden in the future.

With its activist and moralist foreign policy, Sweden continues to be watched closely by the rest of the world as it attempts to deal with its submarine problem. By the mid-1980s, the Swedish Navy had been instructed by the government to 'take whatever action necessary' to force any intruding submarine to the surface and bring it to port. Although this was an encouragingly explicit amendment to the more equivocal orders hinted at in the 1983 *Report of the Submarine Commission*, there were so many restrictions attached to the directive that frustrated Swedish officers believed the order was issued more for public consumption than for military effect. There is still no specific order to try to destroy one of the intruders.

How Sweden deals with this continuing assault on its territorial integrity is vital to the credibility of its armed neutrality. Swedish security analysts talk incessantly about perceptions and credibility, and these factors are precisely the issues at stake with the submarine incursions. To much of the outside world the submarine threat *is* the defence news about Sweden, and what may seem to the Swedish government to be a preference for quiet diplomacy rather than rash military action may appear to others as hypocrisy and pretence. For much of the outside world, how Sweden deals with the problem of underwater incursions will be regarded as a litmus test of the country's determination to meet the obligations of armed neutrality.

Military responses and force posture

Swedish military defence can be conceived as three concentric rings, each with a different type of preparation for defence against military attack.[10] The first and outermost ring is *power projection*: the ability to hit attacking forces before they have actually penetrated Swedish land, airspace or territorial waters. Second is *perimeter* defence of the nation at the border, designed to impose a high entrance cost on a potential attacker. The third ring is *territorial* defence, sometimes called defence in depth or defence with staying power. Territorial defence is resistance by military and other means even after an attacker has breached national borders.

In the Swedish military, projection forces basically take the form of high-performance tactical strike aircraft.[11] Projection forces may be the most effective deterrent to military attack, and having such forces gives Sweden an ability to influence regional events as well as some military basis for acting as the central figure in the maintenance of Nordic military stability. *Projection forces are the weapons that count on the world* scene. On the other hand, they are also very expensive, and they can be seen by other states as provocative, offensive weapons. For a country so manifestly non-aggressive as Sweden, they may also be very difficult forces to use effectively, which is to say in a first strike. In *Red Storm Rising*, Tom Clancy's best-selling novel about war in Europe, NATO uses evidence of Soviet-directed sabotage as justification for the decision to launch a pre-emptive air attack against Warsaw Pact targets. It is unthinkable that Sweden would ever act in similar fashion and use its power projection forces pre-emptively. And, unless there is a credible threat that such forces would be used early in a conflict, they lose much of their utility as a deterrent.

Perimeter defence forces are less expensive and less threatening, but by themselves they cannot prevent an enemy from massing forces outside Swedish territory and mounting an invasion from a protected sanctuary.

Territorial defence is the least expensive type of defence because it does not require complex equipment or lengthy training. It relies on the notion of a 'people's army' equipped with inexpensive weapons but capable of extracting a high cost of occupation, and thereby serving as a powerful deterrent to a potential invader.[12] At the same time, there are

serious questions about the war-fighting capability and deterrent value of such forces. Many advocates of territorial defence have been inspired by the examples of guerrilla warfare in Yugoslavia and Vietnam, but the relevance of such experience to a country like Sweden remains in doubt. No-one knows how effectively and enthusiastically a citizen army could be expected to hold out after the country had been invaded and occupied.

The three layers of Swedish defence are intended to be mutually reinforcing, but in reality the connection between the various rings is not so direct and supportive. There is a continuing debate in Sweden about the priority which each level should receive. Not surprisingly, each of the military services supports the layer of defence that promises to give it the greatest role in national defence and the largest share of the military budget.

The Air Force is unabashedly in favour of power projection. The Navy, forced to abandon its power projection role in the 1960s, now emphasizes perimeter defence, preferably with reliance on anti-invasion ships. The Army favours both perimeter defence and territorial defence. In fact, cynics suggest that, while the Army publicly promotes the popular concept of territorial defence, it remains institutionally committed to a perimeter defence based on tanks and armoured personnel carriers.

Sweden's military defence is based on a system of mobilization. While virtually the entire Air Force and many naval units operate on permanent alert, the Army in peacetime consists of a few units undergoing basic training or refresher exercises. This reliance on mobilizable militia and reserve forces is common to the European neutrals, and poses a special problem for them: the system is vitally dependent on adequate warning time for mobilization. Sweden recognizes this, and has designed a mobilization system that disperses equipment and units around the country and maintains redundant channels of communication. There is a broad national consensus in Sweden in support of a 'people's army'. The principle of universal male conscription has widespread support throughout the country, and very few politicians even question the notion. Among other social and political virtues, conscription is thought to ensure civilian control over the military.

The cornerstone of the Air Force inventory is the JA-37 *Viggen* multi-purpose fighter, with about 300 in the active inventory. The aging *Viggen* will be replaced in the 1990s by the new *Gripen* multi-purpose fighter. The quality of the Swedish Air Force, both in terms of personnel and equipment, is high, but the number of aircraft has declined significantly as the per-unit cost of modern fighters has rocketed. This decline has taken place over the past two decades, a period during which the number of foreign aircraft that can reach Swedish territory has increased more than tenfold.

Since the end of World War II, the Swedish Navy has been a service in search of a mission. Growing out of its experience during the war, the Navy in the early post-war years concentrated on the mission of preventing a seaborne invasion and keeping open to the Western powers the

sea-lines of communication (SLOC), along which essential supplies and assistance would have to pass. In the 1950s, as the conviction grew that surface combatants – cruisers and destroyers – would be extremely vulnerable in a future war, the Navy's fortunes began to wane. The 1958 defence decision began a fundamental restructuring of the Navy, moving towards the concept of a 'light fleet' composed of smaller craft with improved fire-power. The primary mission of maintaining the SLOC was dropped, and the Navy was directed to concentrate on the anti-invasion mission. By 1982, Sweden had decommissioned the last of its destroyers and significantly reduced the number of operational submarines. The net effect was a drastic reduction in anti-submarine warfare capability, which was not regarded as a significant loss at the time, since the protection of convoys along the SLOC was no longer regarded as an important mission. The contemporary mission of the Navy is to stop a seaborne invasion. Operating with the Air Force, the Navy will harass troop ships and force escort ships to protect mine-clearing efforts.

Interservice rivalry over roles and missions, particularly between the 'blue' services (Air Force and Navy) and the Army, is certain to grow in the constrained fiscal environment of the future. The most serious force structure problem for Sweden concerns the fate of the Army and the future of universal conscription. One glaring deficiency in the country's current defence posture is its critical reliance on strategic warning. Defence is now vitally dependent upon receiving at least three days of warning time for mobilization. The problem is compounded by the fact that the decision to mobilize may be a difficult step for political leaders, who will not want to be seen as moving towards war. Despite this structural problem, the idea of a standing army is unlikely to make much headway in Sweden, where the concept of conscription and a citizen army is almost universally accepted. Any improvement in the Army's peacetime preparedness will have to be made within the general context of conscription.

During the 1970s and 1980s, when major changes were made in the force structure of the Air Force and Navy, the Army remained about the same size. It did so by scrimping on hardware. Some Army units, particularly the Norrland brigades, are well equipped and trained, but others have serious deficiencies in fire-power, mobility and protective measures, and are poorly trained to boot. A large Army, even one composed of militia forces, is costly, and increasingly will squeeze out resources needed for other missions and other branches of service.

In the late 1970s, Sweden devoted about 3% of its GNP to defence, about the same as the average European NATO member, and significantly higher than that of the other European neutrals. The 1980s saw a slow and steady decline in defence spending that was finally arrested, but not reversed, with the parliamentary defence decision of 1987 which approved a small increase in spending for the next five-year period.

Another legacy of Sweden's experience in World War II is the total defence concept, the notion that all elements of society should be pre-

pared for war, and that resistance should continue through all phases of a war. Total defence includes, in addition to military efforts, economic, civil and psychological defence. It means making adjustments in all peacetime activities to ensure that society can continue to operate during war and support the military defence effort.

Economic defence means the country's ability to survive as an autarky with a cohesive and supportive population. It requires the ability to sustain the domestic population, to maintain access to international commerce if possible, and to feed and clothe the population without recourse to foreign trade. It means the ability to survive an economic blockade. This is an increasingly difficult problem in an age of interdependence, and Sweden has struggled to reconcile the requirements of total defence with the need to be an active participant in the world economy.

The domestic arms industry

Maintaining a successful arms industry has been good for Swedish economic growth, as well as for the country's policy of neutrality. Domestic arms production has allowed Sweden to reduce dependence on foreign sources of weapons, and to avoid the potential danger of having to rely on outside suppliers during times of war or crisis. This independence added great credibility to neutrality. In the 1980s, Sweden supplied about 70% of its defence requirements through domestic sources. The increasing cost of modern weapons has created a more difficult environment for Swedish arms producers, and has forced Sweden, along with other arms producing countries, to make increased use of two avenues for reducing costs: co-production and other co-operative multinational ventures, and the sale abroad of domestically produced weaponry.

The Swedish arms industry faces serious potential problems in exploring each of these two avenues. As a small country, Sweden had always been forced to include foreign technology in its advanced weapon systems. This requirement posed a potential conflict with the posture of neutrality, but in practice Sweden managed to work out co-operative arrangements with the United States and many European members of NATO. Every Swedish jet aircraft has used foreign engines, avionics and weapons systems produced under licence or purchased abroad. The fighter version of the JA-37 *Viggen* contained 20% foreign components, two-thirds of which were American.[13]

This arrangement allowed Sweden to have the best of both worlds. It could be non-aligned, and yet secure access to 'state-of-the-art' military technology as though it were an *ex officio* member of the Western Alliance. Sweden does pay an indirect price for striking such a bargain. The government has informally assured the United States that it will observe and enforce all US restrictions on the transfer of technology to third countries. Such acquiescence makes Sweden an implicit agent of the US technology transfer policy, and could be seen as compromising its own neutrality policy.

The second problem is selling arms abroad. Using foreign technology through co-production or licensing agreements obliges the user to give the originating country a veto over potential foreign sales – a veto which the United States exercised when Sweden attempted to sell the *Viggen* fighter to India in the 1970s.[14] Another part of the arms-export problem is self-imposed. Swedish law prohibits the export of arms to countries at war or located in 'zones of conflict', a broad category that has generally been understood to include the entire Middle East. The traditional Swedish policy on arms exports can be summed up as prohibiting the sale of weapons to any country that might conceivably be tempted to use them. Such restrictions have tempted Swedish companies such as Bofors to circumvent them by dealing with middlemen in third countries in order to sell arms to nations on the government blacklist. In other cases, the Swedish government has determined that companies have paid millions of dollars in 'commissions' in order to secure large arms contracts.[15]

The arms scandals of the late 1980s began a serious debate within Sweden, forcing many people to rethink their attitude towards foreign arms sales and the indirect relationship between such sales and the successful maintenance of armed neutrality. For Sweden to remain neutral, it must have an indigenous arms industry capable of producing its own weapons. To maintain its arms industry, it must sell arms abroad – or impose an additional burden on Swedish taxpayers already chafing under the world's heaviest tax burden.

How much is enough?

In the 1950s and early 1960s, Sweden spent about 5% of its GNP on defence. In the era of detente the figure began dropping to around 3%. During the 1970s and 1980s, when the external threat to Sweden – its strategic value to possible aggressors – increased, investment in defence declined. In most years defence spending rose slightly in absolute terms, but the increase did not keep pace with inflation, rising manpower costs and the greater cost of high-technology weapons systems. Even with a militia system, a high percentage of Swedish defence expenditure is devoted to personnel (over 70%), thus making military spending particularly susceptible to adverse economic conditions.

With the rising unit cost of new military equipment and the continuing commitment to conscription, Swedish defence faced a budget squeeze perhaps more serious than that of many other Western nations. In the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden deferred the acquisition of new equipment, reducing the quantities it purchased, but manpower continued to absorb most of the savings. Like other states, Sweden in the late 1980s is facing a 'force–strategy mismatch'. The country faces a difficult choice between providing greater resources to perform the assigned missions, or reducing the missions to match the available resources. In Sweden as elsewhere, political authorities have been reluctant to make such painful choices, preferring the 'middle way' of muddling through.

While the government's 1987 defence plan arrested the decades-long decline in Swedish defence spending, it did little to redress the decline in defence capabilities that had occurred over the previous twenty years. When Sweden devoted 5% of its GNP to defence, it could manage to maintain a wartime organization of 29 Army brigades, one of the most impressive Air Forces in Europe, and a Navy with noteworthy anti-submarine and anti-invasion capabilities. The continuing budget squeeze will force increasingly hard decisions about force posture. Almost certainly, the Army will have to be restructured and reduced in total size, perhaps by moving to a 'two-tier' system of well-trained and well-equipped first-line militia forces backed by a less capable and less ready support force.

Sweden is a successful advanced industrialized country with one of the world's highest standards of living. In the late 1980s, its economy was hailed as one of Europe's industrial powerhouses,[16] but even optimistic projections of growth in GNP seemed unlikely to keep pace with social spending. The costs of administering the welfare state have increased dramatically, with public sector expenditure rising from 44% of gross domestic product in 1970 to approximately 70% in the mid-1980s – the largest share in any Western nation.[17] The Swedish government recently has come under growing pressure for tax reductions, based on the pragmatic grounds that high taxation is driving out profitable industries. At the same time, there is a high level of national consensus on maintaining the welfare state; state services are popular and have a powerful political constituency. For the future, this presents a disturbing combination of demographic and political trends that has a security implication: an aging population that will require increased social and medical services, powerful interest groups in a society committed to preserving such services, and declining revenue from taxation. Defence spending will have a hard time holding its own.

Another aspect of Swedish domestic life that exerts a dispiriting influence on defence policy is the tendency to treat military service as just another job, subject to all the rights and privileges accorded to workers in any other job in the welfare state. This is not a problem unique to Sweden, but its effects seem more apparent here than elsewhere. The Swedish military is one of the few in the world that is entirely unionized.

This may not be surprising in a society in which almost everyone belongs to a union, but it does present special problems for the performance of military missions. One defence analyst joked that the real problem in catching intruding submarines was not so much a question of technology or political will as of labour laws. At the end of eight hours, Swedish anti-submarine helicopter pilots in hot pursuit of a submarine would call off the hunt and quit for the day. In the summer of 1987 there were repeated sightings of suspected submarines in the far northern Baltic near the Boden military base, but these reports could not be verified because the local anti-submarine force was on vacation. In past years, entire air bases have been closed down for summer holidays, thus

diminishing, if not fatally compromising, air defence readiness. If war does come to Sweden, perhaps it will not come during the summer holidays, and perhaps troops who fight so enthusiastically in peacetime for workers' rights will set aside personal inconvenience and fight with equal fervour for their country. If not, Swedish national security could be seriously jeopardized.

Strategic direction: central questions

The flowering of detente made more of an impression in Sweden than anywhere else in the world. There was a widespread national impression, encouraged by the government, of a fundamental change in the nature of international relations, of being at the dawn in world politics of a new era of increased co-operation and diminished conflict. High levels of defence spending would not only be wasteful in this new era; they would be counter-productive. Sweden would show the way. The Social Democratic Party, in particular, touted this vision, which confirmed and vindicated its foreign-policy line.

The second half of the 1980s has not been kind to Sweden's self-image. A series of national scandals raised questions about the Swedes' vaunted sense of propriety and superiority: the unsolved assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme, and the whiff of association with the revelation that Swedish arms merchants had for years been selling weapons to 'forbidden' countries; the collapse of Fermenta, the large Swedish high-tech corporation; the resignation under pressure of national ombudsman Per-Erik Nilsson; the escape of convicted spy Stig Bergling – all this contributed to a loss of national self-confidence. But something positive may emerge from this series of collective embarrassments. A new realism about Sweden and its external environment may allow Swedes to re-examine issues that were formerly considered too sacrosanct for public debate. There has always been an elliptical quality to security discussions in Sweden, a preference for discussing strategic affairs in terms of morality rather than *realpolitik*. The time is long overdue for a vigorous and open public debate about the basic dictates of Swedish defence policy.

Sweden still gives high priority to improving the international climate, but by the late 1980s there was a reluctant consensus that the grand vision of detente had not been realized. There were some promising signs of an improvement in US–Soviet relations, but Sweden's security environment seemed more dangerous than it had in earlier times. The parliamentary decision of 1987 mandated a modest increase in defence appropriations over the next five years, but even with additional funding Swedish security policy faces difficult challenges in the years ahead.

Sweden faces three important defence questions, and the answers to these questions will determine the nation's overall strategic direction as it enters the next century. The first question is what sort of military establishment Sweden wants – a high-tech, extrovert force favouring the Air Force and Navy at the expense of ground forces, or a low-tech, intro-

vert force emphasizing the Army at the expense of the 'blue' forces. Swedish politicians have fudged the answer to this question for the past twenty years, but continued unwillingness to make a fundamental strategic choice means that the Swedish military risks doing none of its tasks very well, of entering the twenty-first century with mediocrity the best that can be expected of ground, sea and air forces.

The second question is what military response, if any, to make to the incursions that continue to abuse and denigrate the country's territorial sovereignty. Sweden faces a growing gap between the external threat and its own defence preparations. This problem is not unique, but it poses special difficulties in the case of a neutral country with a long and proud tradition of peace. 'We have had 170 years with no war, a high standard of living, a quiet country with a welfare state. That tends to make you much less suspicious than you should be', said Anders Björck, a conservative member of Parliament.[18] He might have added that two centuries of peace puts an even greater burden on the credibility of defence, since there is no reputation for wartime prowess on which to build. Credibility is everything for a neutral state, and it must establish that credibility by its own efforts. There is no turning to allies for support.

The third question is how much Sweden is willing to spend on its national defence. The answer over the past two decades has seemed to be less and less each year, regardless of changes in the perception of threats. It will be no easier in the future to come up with the money to pay for defence when demographic pressures, public opinion and the cost of social services are exerting strong contrary pressures on the national purse. A continued decline in effective defence spending will inevitably raise doubts in both East and West about the tenacity of Sweden's commitment to defend itself by military means. The declaratory policy is in place, but the material support for that policy is lacking.

This is a difficult set of challenges, but meeting them is crucial to the continued success of Sweden's armed neutrality in the twenty-first century.

Notes

[1] Sweden was at war for 154 years and at peace for 139 years. The sign goes on to detail the particular adversaries and conflicts. The breakdown by country: Denmark–Norway, 12 wars lasting a total of 50 war-years; England, two wars (10 war-years); France, two wars (9 war-years); Holland, two wars (9 war-years); Austria–Hungary, four wars (28 war-years); Poland, seven wars (66 war-years); Russia, nine wars (64 war-years); German states, ten wars (75 war-years).

[2] Wolfgang Danspeckgruber, 'Armed Neutrality: Its Application and Future', in S. Flanagan and F. Hampson (eds), *Securing Europe's Future* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 273.

[3] In a rare display of official candour, this possibility was explicitly noted by the 1984 Defence Commission: 'By virtue of her geographical position in the north European area, Sweden could be involved in the operational planning of both blocs in an early stage of a conflict. Sweden's territory might attract the attention of either side as a possible short-cut for air operations, as a transit area, and as a base primarily for air combat forces and forward-based surveillance.' *Sweden's Security Policy Entering the 1990s*, Commission Report (Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, SOU, 1985), p. 57*f*.

[4] For a further elaboration of this 'air scenario', see Gunnar Jervas, *Sweden Between the Power Blocs: A New Strategic Position?* (Stockholm: The Swedish Institute, 1986), and Jervas, 'Sweden in a Less Benign Environment', in Bengt Sundelius (ed.), *The Neutral Democracies and the New Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1987).

[5] Jervas, *Sweden Between the Power Blocs* (*op. cit.* in note 4), p. 17.

[6] The official report of the Submarine Defence Commission has been published in English as *Countering the Submarine Threat* (Stockholm: Ministry of Defence, 1983). The best unofficial work in Swedish is Wilhelm Agrell, *Bakom Ubåtskrisen – Militär verksamhet, krigsplanläggning och diplomati i Östersjöområdet* (Stockholm: Liber, 1986). For English-language sources, see Gordon McCormick, *Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Internal Waters* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1988), a highly critical report that generated considerable controversy in Sweden even before its publication; Milton Leitenberg, *Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Internal Waters, 1980–1985*, (New York: Praeger/CSIS Washington Papers, 1987); Wilhelm Agrell, 'Soviet Baltic Strategy and the Swedish Submarine Crisis', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. XVIII, 1983, and, by the same author, 'Behind the Submarine Crisis: Evolution of the Swedish Defence Doctrine and Soviet War Planning', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. XXI, 1986, pp. 197–217. See also Ingmar Oldberg, 'Peace Propaganda and Submarines: Soviet Policy towards Sweden and Northern Europe', *Annals of the American Academy*, vol. 481, September 1985, pp. 51–60.

[7] The precise rules of engagement under which the Swedish Navy operated have never been made clear. The Report of the Submarine Defence Commission acknowledges that 'rumours circulated in the mass media to the effect that certain bans on the use of fire in force during the Härsfjärden operation were attributable to a decision by the government and/or Defence Command to let the submarine or submarines escape, out of consideration for Sweden's relations with the foreign power responsible' (*Countering the Submarine Threat, ibid.*, pp. 56–7). The debate was renewed in 1987 when Brigadier (Retd) Lars Hansson accused former Vice-Admiral Bror Stefensson, former Chief of the Defence Staff, of having issued a fire ban at the crucial moment of the hunt and of having declared that no blood of a Russian seaman should be shed.

[8] Wilhelm Agrell, Kjell Goldman and Nordal Åkerman may be offered as examples.

[9] 'Västeuropa litar på Gorbatjovs fredsvilja', *Dagens Nyheter*, 7 June 1987, p. 6.

[10] In an article that attracted great interest within Sweden, Steven Canby drew a slightly different distinction, dividing Swedish defence capability into 'extrovert' and 'introvert' forces. See 'Swedish Defence', *Survival*, May/June 1981, pp. 116–23.

[11] One might also include submarines and surface ships armed with long-range anti-ship missiles as projection forces.

[12] The most notable proponent of territorial defence is the former Army commander-in-chief Gen. Nils Sköld.

[13] Ingemar Dörfer, 'Nordic Security Today: Sweden', *Cooperation and Conflict*, vol. XVII, 1982, p. 276.

[14] The *Viggen* engine was produced under licence from the United States.

[15] Kenneth R. Timmerman, 'Arms Trade Scandal Shatters Image of Clean Dealings', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 June 1987. See also 'Arms and Iran: the Secret Deals', *The Times*, 17 June 1987.

[16] 'How Sweden Became Europe's Industrial Powerhouse', *Business Week*, 4 August 1986.

[17] *The Economist*, 'Sweden, Time for a Call', 6 October 1984, p. 17.

[18] 'No Longer Untarnished, Swedes Find', William Tuohy, *Los Angeles Times*, 11 November 1987, p. 1.

Verification of conventional arms reductions

MICHAEL KREPON

Western political leaders and arms-control specialists have articulated several key objectives in the prospective Conventional Stability Talks (CST): reducing the level of military equipment capable of offensive operations and the economic burdens associated with it; establishing a secure and stable conventional balance at lower levels; and decreasing the likelihood of a surprise attack through such reductions and through additional measures that increase the transparency of military operations, particularly those related to rapid mobilization. The most critical verification tasks associated with these objectives relate to monitoring compliance with agreed reductions and generating fairly unambiguous indications and warning of aggressive military preparations, both at the front and in rear echelon areas.

In theory, the chosen verification regime should be broad enough to cover key areas of concern, but not so broad as to provide collateral intelligence windfalls; intrusive enough to provide ample confidence in assessing compliance, but not so intrusive as to compromise highly sensitive military or industrial activities; and complex enough to foreclose important avenues of circumvention, but not so complex as to generate repeated false alarms or other unintended complications. Needless to say, no verification regime can meet all of these requirements in practice. Difficult trade-offs are unavoidable.

In other words, the question 'how much is enough?' applies to standards of verification as well as to outlays for national defence. Debates over this subject will no doubt be as heated for conventional arms reductions as for nuclear negotiations. When all is said and done, a familiar standard is likely to be established for the Conventional Stability Talks, at least for the US: the chosen verification regime must be able to detect militarily significant violations in time to take proportionate or appropriate responses. Verification measures cannot ensure effective responses, but they can make them more likely by generating multiple warning signs that are difficult for political leaders to misconstrue.

A verification regime cannot be conceived in a vacuum; it must be directly tied to negotiating and policy objectives, taking into account the political sensitivities of important domestic constituencies as well as

Michael Krepon is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-editor of *Verification and Compliance: A Problem-Solving Approach* (London: Macmillan, 1988). This article expands upon a paper presented in June 1988 at The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, US Department of State.

allied concerns. This task is difficult enough for bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union; it is far more onerous for the CST negotiations which involve 23 sovereign states, diverse military organizations and doctrines, and many thousands of weapons of various types. (For example, the number of Soviet T-80 tanks is by itself approximately equal to the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles permitted under the proposed strategic arms reduction agreement.) To further complicate matters, the CST negotiations will unfold at a time when military doctrines underpinning NATO and the Warsaw Pact are unusually fluid and when alliance cohesion is diluted.

With so many variables to consider – including the advent of a new administration in Washington – the development of detailed verification proposals will undoubtedly take time. Rather than lay out a hypothetical verification regime for various CST negotiating options, this article will suggest a variety of tools that could be used to monitor conventional arms reductions and to provide indications and warning of offensive military preparations.

The list of tools provided below includes both 'structural' and 'operational' elements, even though separate negotiations on arms reductions and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBM) are to be undertaken 'within the CSCE [Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe] framework'. Some operational approaches usefully complement verification measures for arms reductions, so negotiators might wish to include them in a CST agreement.[1] Some of these tools will be an integral part of any CST agreement that is negotiated; others will have quite specific applications. Verification approaches may be complementary or substitutive. Some of the trade-offs associated with these choices are described below.

National technical means

The foundation for any verification regime will remain intelligence collection methods under national control. Parties to a CST agreement will have significant disparities in such 'national technical means' (NTM) of intelligence collection, with the United States and the Soviet Union possessing far more sophisticated and extensive monitoring devices than other signatories. According to the US Department of State, NTM include 'photographic reconnaissance satellites, aircraft-based systems [such as radars and optical systems], as well as sea- and ground-based systems such as radars and antennas for collecting telemetry'.[2] These technical devices provide for an extremely broad field of view over Warsaw Pact military activities. While these sensors may not be in continuous operation or position to observe military forces associated with a CST agreement, they still provide a rich composite picture over a long period of time. Troubling developments that suggest mobilization for a surprise attack generate many tell-tale signs that can be picked up by NTM, which is why intelligence experts worry far less about the absence of indications or warning of attack preparations than about failures to

recognize them amid the wealth of data gathered, and the willingness of political leaders to take appropriate responses.[3]

NTM under independent control also provide a basis for verifying compliance with agreed CSBM between states. In the September 1986 Stockholm Document, participants agreed to accept prior notifications of certain military activities, routine observation when agreed thresholds are exceeded, and mandatory inspections when compliance is in doubt. Indications of unannounced military activities detected by NTM can serve as the basis for mandatory challenge inspections.

While the United States has depended on photoreconnaissance satellites for almost thirty years, no other Western state has direct access to high resolution imagery from space. This will change when France launches its *Helios* satellite in 1993.[4] Eastern bloc countries are similarly dependent upon the Soviet Union for imagery gathered from space. Disparities in NTM make intelligence-sharing one method of maintaining alliance cohesion, but disparities can also become a source of friction when allies believe that intelligence is not being properly shared or interpreted. NTM is also of limited utility in public diplomacy efforts since the actual products of space-based intelligence collection devices remain hidden from view in order to protect sources and methods. One possible means of bridging disparities in NTM capabilities and publicizing concerns over compliance would be to utilize commercial or multilateral observation satellites, as discussed below.

Ground observers

Important information about the ground forces arrayed against each other in Central Europe is also gathered by military attachés, who have the assignment of finding out as much as possible about another country's military affairs without disturbing normal diplomatic relations. American defence attachés have the responsibility of advising the ambassador about military and politico-military matters, representing the Department of Defense and the US military services, administering military assistance programmes and foreign military sales, and observing and reporting on military-related information.[5] Members of Military Liaison Missions (MLM) have more freedom to monitor military developments in East and West Germany, but at greater personal risk. Bilateral agreements between Soviet and US, French and British military officers established these MLM in 1947, 'permitting complete freedom of travel wherever and whenever it will be desired over territory and roads . . . except places of disposition of military units, without escort or supervision'.[6]

Routine observation on the ground by foreign military officials can contribute to a stable European environment by increasing the transparency of military activities and by picking up indications of unusual military preparations. The value of military attachés has been demonstrated many times in the past, as was evident when they filled the vacuum which resulted from the disbanding of the large Inter-allied Control Commissions created by the Peace of Versailles. Subsequent reporting of German non-compliance was not appreciably affected.[7] In recent years, the skills developed by military attachés and members of the MLM are being utilized to conduct inspections under the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty and the Conference on Disarmament in Europe [CDE] Accord. An important consideration in any CST agreement is how the rights and obligations accorded to ground observers may affect the continued existence of MLM.

Data exchanges

Data exchanges are the *sine qua non* for both arms reductions and CSBM in the future. Given the stress Soviet officials now place on *glasnost*, the Kremlin will be hard-pressed to withhold disaggregated data in CST, including information on the structure of their ground and air forces that they declined to divulge in the Stockholm negotiations. The INF Treaty provides important precedents for the exchange of information covering infrastructure as well as deployed forces. Facilities associated with the production, assembly, flight-testing, deployment, storage and elimination of treaty-limited items were identified by both sides, and site diagrams were exchanged. These precedents can be broadened in the CST context to include information exchanges on the structure of Soviet ground forces. Critics of the treaty eliminating intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles argued that the data on missile inventories provided by the Soviet Union were unverifiable and suspect, since they did not conform to worst case estimates by the Defense Intelligence Agency of Soviet plans to reload and refire mobile launchers. The Reagan Administration conceded that, 'for the most part', Soviet data were 'near the estimates of our Intelligence Community, allowing for the range of our uncertainties'.[8] Despite these concerns, criticism of Soviet data had little political effect, since the obligation to eliminate missile infrastructure, and the relative ease of monitoring training exercises and operational flight tests of prohibited missiles, vitiated the military utility of hidden inventories.

Concerns over the validity of data exchanged will undoubtedly be far greater in the CST negotiations since these safeguards will not be present and since data on troop strength in the mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) talks were such a contentious point. The Kremlin has attempted to capture the high ground on the data issue even prior to the CST negotiations by offering to exchange information on categories of opposing forces. This approach has temporarily succeeded in placing NATO on the defensive, while masking lingering difficulties in Moscow over the release of disaggregated data on Soviet force structure. Diplomatic gamesmanship along these lines is not conducive to resolving potentially serious disputes over data. Eventually, the Kremlin will be prepared to release detailed information on its own troop levels and structure. At that point, the super-powers would do well to emulate their practice in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and in the

chemical weapons negotiations of exchanging information after appropriate consultation and as the talks proceed. The exchange of questionable data, either before the negotiations begin or in a Memorandum of Understanding just prior to a ratification debate, can have the most damaging consequences.

On-site inspections

The INF Treaty's scope has necessitated the creation of a US On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) to carry out the intrusive verification measures established by the agreement, and to escort Soviet inspectors. The OSIA's initial year operating budget is estimated to be $US 89 million, including the support of 150 full-time personnel and perhaps an equal number of inspectors on temporary assignment from other agencies. Additional experience in intrusive verification has been gained by occasional observation and inspection of Warsaw Pact military exercises under the Stockholm Accord. A CST agreement will undoubtedly draw on the intrusive verification provisions of both the INF and CDE agreements, necessitating a further expansion of the American OSIA which may be replicated on a smaller scale in other countries.

Several types of inspections formalized in the INF Treaty can have direct applicability to a CST agreement:

– Base-line, close-out and elimination inspections help verify initial data, the cessation of treaty-related activities, and the destruction of items covered by the agreement. All can be essential components of a CST agreement. Base-line inspections can confirm data exchanges, and close-out inspections can confirm the removal of units or specific types of forces from the zone or zones of limitation. If a CST agreement mandates the dismantling or destruction of certain types of military equipment, elimination inspections to confirm the proper implementation of agreed procedures would be required.

– Short-notice inspections at declared facilities can be quite useful to monitor continued compliance with agreed reductions. Under the INF Treaty, signatories have the right to be taken to declared missile operating bases and missile support facilities within nine hours of specifying the site to be inspected. Similarly, the right to short-notice inspections at garrisons and headquarters can increase confidence that obligations governing troop, unit, or equipment limitations are being met. For example, if a CST accord provided for secured storage and restricted military areas for tanks, as Jonathan Dean has suggested, short-notice inspections can be one method of confirming these arrangements.[9]

The INF Treaty's short-notice inspections have been criticized because of their limited utility, since cheating is most likely to be carried out at suspect sites rather than at declared facilities. While short-notice inspections at declared sites are certainly no guarantee against cheating, they increase the opportunity and financial costs of non-compliance, while raising practical difficulties and operational constraints for military commanders. Tagging schemes for treaty-limited items such as

tanks and armoured personnel carriers can complement short-notice inspections and make cheating more difficult at declared locations, but tagging schemes can also unduly complicate agreed limitations and may not be necessary if data exchanges and short-notice inspection rights are sufficiently comprehensive. (See section on tagging, below.)

– For the first time, the INF Treaty establishes continuous perimeter/portal monitoring (PPM) around a single production-related facility in each country. PPM arrangements take advantage of existing security perimeters around sensitive areas which are supplemented by sensors and inspectors at entry/exit points. PPM arrangements may not be useful for a CST agreement unless it results in limitations on tank or other military production. While PPM could be used as an alternative or complementary measure to short-notice inspections at secured storage areas, it may not be worth the added expense.

In addition to on-site inspection measures drawn from the INF Treaty, a CST agreement could also borrow from inspection concepts considered in the MBFR, CDE and START negotiations:

– Permanent inspection posts at critical entry/exit points could be a useful tool in monitoring treaty-limited items or troop rotations within agreed zones. These inspection points, long-considered in the MBFR negotiations, could be combined with prohibitions against alternative ground transportation routes for treaty-limited items within agreed zones. Data exchanges, accounting methods and monitoring procedures for equipment delivered by aircraft would also be required. Permanent inspection posts could also be established within garrisons and/or at headquarters units. The benefits of such a permanent presence must be weighed against the potential impacts on MLM activities.

– Observations and inspections of military exercises within agreed zones could be drawn from the CDE experience. The Stockholm Document permits observation by all participating states at notifiable military activities exceeding 17,000 troops or, in the case of amphibious landing or parachute assault by airborne forces, 5,000 troops. Each state may send no more than two observers. In addition, participating states are obliged to accept up to three inspections per year (but no more than one from the same state) if their compliance with the accord's CSBM is in doubt. Inspection teams consisting of up to four individuals are to be permitted entry within 36 hours of their request. Inspections are to conclude within 48 hours.

These provisions for short-notice inspections and routine observation of military activities can be broadened in many ways, either in a CST agreement, a follow-up to the Stockholm Document, or both. For example, inspections could be lengthened, and inspection teams made larger; lower thresholds could be set. Observers and inspectors could also have access to improved aerial reconnaissance, and the task of monitoring CST reductions could be simplified by readily observable tagging schemes for treaty-limited items. Both of these concepts are elaborated below.

– Challenge inspections at suspect sites are currently under active consideration in the START negotiations. Under this concept, inspectors would be granted broad powers to investigate suspicious activities at almost any time and any place. This tool could be applied to a CST agreement in several ways. If, for example, the agreement banned bridge-crossing and/or mine-clearing equipment within agreed areas, challenge inspections at suspect sites could be used to confirm this, thereby contributing as a deterrent to cheating. (CDE procedures currently allow the host country to declare permanent or temporary military installations to be 'sensitive points', and thus off-limits to foreign inspectors.) Challenges could also be used in search of tanks or other treaty-limited items in excess of permitted numbers or without proper tags.

Whatever benefits may be gained from challenge inspections at suspect sites must be weighed against their multiple risks, including the risk of compromising sensitive military and industrial secrets. These hazards can be circumscribed by restricting the number of challenges and by permitting a limited right of refusal, but these safeguards can vitiate the utility and deterrent effect of suspect site inspections. Calculations of the benefits and risks of challenge inspections at suspect sites might well be quite different among parties to the CST, generating contentious debates and complicating alliance relations.[10] These calculations should acknowledge that perhaps one out of every ten short-notice inspections in a CST agreement would be a challenge at a suspect site, yet well over ten percent of the complications from implementing such an accord is likely to be generated by such inspections.

Unattended sensors

Ivan Oelrich and Victor Utgoff have proposed that unattended sensors such as seismic acoustic sensors, riverine sonars and optical or infra-red cameras, be used to provide clear indications and warning of offensive military preparations in Central Europe. Specifically, they propose the placement of such sensors around garrisons and in a barrier roughly along the East German-Polish border, continuing south through Czechoslovakia to the Austrian border.[11] Another use of unattended sensors in Central Europe – monitoring military preparations around the Fulda Gap – has been proposed by David Barton.[12] As the INF Treaty demonstrates, sensors play an integral role in monitoring production-related activities, albeit in conjunction with NTM and on-site inspections.

The second Sinai troop disengagement agreement signed in September 1975 between Israel and Egypt demonstrated the utility of unattended sensors when combined with aerial observation, NTM and periodic on-site inspections. Under this agreement, the United States agreed to operate an early-warning system for both parties, employing seismic, acoustic, infra-red, magnetic, pressure and electromagnetic sensors. Remotely-controlled television cameras were also utilized. With the implementation of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, this monitoring component came to an end.[13]

The utility of unattended sensors for a CST agreement depends in large part on their practicality, cost and availability. Clear indications and warning of offensive military preparations in Central Europe should be evident without them. Thus, whatever additional costs are imposed by fields of unattended sensors must be weighed against their marginal utility. Extensive sensor networks could actually provide obfuscating data and politically corrosive false alarms. There may also be political problems associated with verification schemes that suggest a reaffirmation of the division of Europe into military blocs, although the proposals offered by Oelrich and Utgoff are not particularly intrusive. Narrower applications, such as monitoring secured storage or restricted areas for tracked vehicles, may be more practical, if a CST agreement were to embrace these concepts. In this way, unattended sensors could supplement periodic inspections and help save on manpower costs.

Tagging

The idea of tagging – placing an identifiable signature on treaty-limited items – is under active consideration in the START negotiations. Tags can be passive or active. Those currently under consideration include 'glitter' paint, bar codes comparable to those found on items in some supermarkets, and fibre optic seals.[14] As with other monitoring devices, tags cannot ensure that cheating will not occur; they can, however, make violations more difficult, costly and obvious. Effective tagging schemes force the nation intent on cheating to create a covert infrastructure, with all of the attendant financial and opportunity costs. Whatever tag is used must be non-replicable, non-removable and extraordinarily tamper-resistant if not tamper-proof. Co-operative measures such as tagging can be particularly effective when they are compatible with NTM as well as inspections on the ground.

Tagging schemes for tanks might be especially useful if a CST agreement calls for reductions to a specific level, but not by units. The turret of each tank within the zone of limitation could be 'painted', and its picture taken showing its number and unit. Copies of these photographs could be kept in manifests held by the parties to the agreement and/or at central depositories. These manifests could be updated periodically as tanks leave or enter the zone of limitation at agreed points. No tank should be located within the zone of reduction without a proper tag, which can be observed during short-notice inspections of various kinds. During such inspections, pictures taken of tanks in the field could subsequently be checked against the signatures found in the manifest. A cheater might be able to succeed during the time of an inspection by using false tags, but multiple discrepancies from the register should become obvious upon subsequent examination of the inspectors' photographs and tank signatures. Tagging could be less useful if a CST accord requires the reduction of tanks by entire units. Nevertheless, the incremental growth of tanks in other units would continue to be a concern that could be addressed through tagging.

The synergistic effects of tagging schemes must be weighed against their potential complications. Tagging schemes will undoubtedly add new layers of complexity to CST verification and in general, the more complex the verification regime, the harder it will be to manage effectively. Tagging also lends credence to the argument that a formal bureaucracy and consultative mechanism is needed to oversee the process of implementation, an idea that was resisted strenuously in the CDE negotiations. Tagging might also be considered excessively intrusive and complicated since the primary concern will be tanks and other treaty-limited items poised outside the zone, not those within it. Nevertheless, tagging schemes appear to be technically feasible and relatively inexpensive.

Aerial reconnaissance

Almost three decades after it was proposed as a confidence-building measure in the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, the United States and the Soviet Union finally agreed to aerial reconnaissance procedures in the Stockholm Document. Unlike NTM under the exclusive control of the owner, aerial reconnaissance platforms used to monitor compliance with the CDE agreement constitute a co-operative venture between the host country and the inspecting party, with the former retaining control of the aircraft. In the Sinai agreements and the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, a third party – the United States – performed these services for both signatories.

Other variations might be possible under a CST agreement, particularly if it provides for zones of various kinds within which military equipment is either prohibited or permitted, but in limited numbers. In the latter case, tagging schemes that are compatible with visual observation from reconnaissance aircraft might have utility, as these monitoring techniques lend themselves to the public presentation of evidence suggesting non-compliance.

Aircraft can be dedicated to monitoring compliance with a CST agreement or provided by host countries. Peter Lyddon and Malcolm Lingwood have proposed the use of aircraft such as the airborne warning and control system (AWACS) for this purpose.[15] Far less expensive and sophisticated aircraft than AWACS or its Soviet counterpart, *Mainstay*, can be used to fly over or alongside sensitive areas. While aircraft dedicated to monitoring compliance with a CST agreement would increase the cost of implementing the accord, this expense may be worthwhile as a visible symbol of co-operative multilateral verification. The overall utility of aerial reconnaissance would depend on the other components of the verification regime chosen for CST, as well as on the number of flights permitted and the modalities associated with them.

Commercial or multilateral observation satellites

Commercial observation satellites might have value as a supplementary CST monitoring tool because their images can be distributed freely and

because they can soften somewhat existing disparities in space-based intelligence collection devices. For commercial systems to play such a role, however, they must offer much improved resolution, and important questions of access and product distribution must be resolved.[16]

There are no technical reasons why commercial observation satellites with resolution capabilities of three metres or better cannot be in operation by the mid-1990s, and whatever resolution is available can be substantially improved by widely available computer processing technology. Public access to high resolution imagery therefore depends heavily on whether commercial vendors, supported by national governments, see a market for this product.

Other alternatives exist to provide multilateral satellite observation for a CST agreement, although each may be more difficult to realize than the launch of higher resolution commercial systems. The Soviet Union or the United States could make available older models of their remote sensing platforms, or modify them for the purpose of monitoring a CST agreement. New satellite owners like the French-Italian-Spanish consortium behind *Helios* could agree to help monitor a CST agreement, as could the Canadians, Swedes or other nations now contemplating satellite launches. New consortia like the six nation, five continent group could also take this initiative, whether or not discussions in the United Nations about the establishment of an international verification agency bear fruit. Multilateral verification efforts using satellites are extraordinarily complicated to implement, however, in addition to their considerable expense.

As with improved commercial observation satellites, space-based multilateral monitoring devices could play only a limited role in any CST agreement. Very few high resolution platforms are likely to exist, and those that are in orbit may not be well-positioned or appropriately-equipped to take pictures when they are needed, especially if radar satellites are not launched to provide imagery at night and during periods of heavy cloud cover. Preferential treatment would be required when other customers are already standing in line for images during certain passes, and quicker turnarounds between the time that pictures are taken and received would be essential. Even then, difficult questions must be addressed as to how and when these images would be disseminated, enhanced, interpreted and utilized in compliance diplomacy.

Clearly, multilateral observation satellites can easily complicate verification, but third party access to high quality images from space will be a fact of life with improved commercial systems in the future. Nations that are without highly sophisticated NTM will be free to use these satellites for CST-related purposes; the relevant question for policy-makers is whether or not formally to use images from commercial systems as one of many monitoring tools available to all parties to the agreement.

One such use would be to provide a wide field of view during military exercises, complementing information gathered by aerial reconnaissance and observers on the ground. Raw data generated by commercial

imaging systems could be made available to all parties to the agreement at the same time for photo-enhancement and interpretation, ameliorating somewhat the disparities in NTM that could become an irritant between treaty signatories. This approach may be deemed unfair, since some states have better analytic capabilities than others, but it has several advantages: all parties to the agreement would retain a necessary degree of independence from faulty photo-interpretation, the impetus for creating a new large verification bureaucracy could be dampened, and at least one of several fertile grounds for the politicization of compliance judgments could be avoided.

More problematic would be the use of commercial satellites for indications and warning signs of offensive military preparations in the European context. Moderately high quality images could be useful in combating 'the big lie', that is, in demonstrating that significant offensive military preparations were under way, despite protestations to the contrary. But this information is likely to be in the public domain in any event. Commercial imaging systems can also play a role in public diplomacy associated with such a crisis by making this information more graphic. The public release of imagery, however, can be a two-edged sword: it can place added stress on the coerced party or it can focus pressure on the state with hostile intent. The release of space-based imagery can also shorten the time available for crisis decision-making, to the detriment of all concerned. Whether or not a CST agreement formally incorporates the use of commercial satellites as a monitoring tool, these uncertain impacts are unavoidable, since there is likely to be strong media interest in any crisis that erupts in Central Europe.

Conclusion

Many elements of a verification regime will be available to help monitor compliance with a conventional arms-reduction accord, drawing from experience gained in the INF and CDE arenas. The lessons learned in implementing these agreements can help make for a stronger verification package in CST, and new concepts may be borrowed from current negotiations in START and other multilateral talks. National technical means of verification will continue to be the foundation upon which co-operative arrangements will be built, especially data exchanges and many different forms of short-notice inspections. The permanent presence of liaison officers at designated entry/exit points and at garrisons and headquarters units can become an important element of the agreed verification regime. Aerial reconnaissance flights, unattended sensors and tagging techniques can have many direct applications as well. Even commercial observation satellites might be able to play a limited, but useful role. Clearly, difficulties in verification, while considerable, need not preclude a CST agreement.

Notes

[1] For more on the choices between structural and operational measures, see Richard E. Darilek, 'The future of conventional arms control in Europe', *Survival*, vol. XXIX, no.1, January/February 1987, pp. 17–19.

[2] US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace* (Washington DC: June 1983), p. 65. For a review of technical methods, see Kosta Tsipis, David W. Hafemeister and Penny Janeway (eds), *Arms Control Verification: The Technologies That Make It Possible* (Washington DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1986).

[3] See Richard K. Betts, *Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning* (Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1982).

[4] *Defense Daily*, vol. 151, no. 36, p. 282, 20 April 1987.

[5] For an historical review of military attachés, see Alfred Vagts, *The Military Attache* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1967). For current missions, see Richard J. Latham, 'The Military Attache: In Search of the Right Stuff', paper presented to the Conference on Intelligence: Policy and Process, USAF Academy, 7 June 1984, p. 5.

[6] Paragraph 10, 'Agreement on Military Liaison Missions Accredited to the Soviet and United States Commanders in Chief of the Zones of Occupation in Germany', 5 April 1947, in *Documents on Germany 1944–1985*, Department of State Publication 9446, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1986.

[7] Richard Dean Burns and Donald Urquidi, *Disarmament in Perspective: An Analysis of Selected Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements between the World Wars, 1919–1939*, Contract No. ACDA/RS-5, Prepared for the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, July 1968, vol. I, p. 193.

[8] *The INF Treaty*, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 100th Congress, Second Session (Washington DC: USGPO, 1988), Part 5, p. 465.

[9] See, 'The NATO–Warsaw Pact Confrontation in the Twenty-First Century: Rough Model for an Optimal Force Posture', Paper for the American Committee for US–Soviet Relations, 18 May 1988.

[10] For a more complete treatment of challenge inspections at suspect sites, see Sidney N. Graybeal and Michael Krepon, 'The Limitations of On-Site Inspections', *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 43, no. 10, December 1987, pp. 22–7.

[11] 'Cooperatively Placed Unmanned Sensors to Reduce the Risk of Surprise Attack in Central Europe', in Barry M. Blechman (ed.), *Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, forthcoming).

[12] 'The Sinai Peacekeeping Experience: A Verification Paradigm for Europe', *SIPRI Yearbook 1985* (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 541–64.

[13] For detailed descriptions and assessments of the Sinai monitoring effort, see Brian S. Mandell, 'The Sinai Experience: Lessons in Multimethod Arms Control Verification and Risk Management', *Arms Control Verification Studies*, no. 3 (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, September 1987); and Barton, *op. cit.* in note 12.

[14] For an elaboration of these ideas and the concepts behind tagging, see C. A. Appleby, 'A Utility Assessment of Passive Tagging for Strategic Ballistic Missile Systems', Pacific-Sierra Research Corporation, Contract DEAC – 0187DP50060, Arlington, VA, February 1988; and Steve Fetter and Thomas Garwin, 'Using Tags to Monitor Numerical Limits in Arms Control Agreements', in Blechman, *op. cit.* in note 11.

[15] See 'Verification for Conventional Arms Control', *The Council for Arms Control Bulletin*, no. 38, June 1988.

[16] The findings of a Carnegie Endowment study of the potential positive and negative national security implications of commercial observation satellites will be released in January 1989.

Documentation

Peace seems to be breaking out all over. This section includes documentation on efforts to bring peace to three troubled areas of the world: the Persian Gulf, South-west Africa and New Caledonia.

THE IRAN–IRAQ CEASEFIRE

Printed below is the text of a letter to United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, from President Khamenei of Iran explaining Tehran's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598, which demands a ceasefire in the Gulf War. The text of UN Resolution 598 is also included.

Letter from President Khamenei of Iran to UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar

Source: Published by *The Times*, 19 July 1988

Excellency,

Please accept my warm greetings with best wishes for your Excellency's success in efforts to establish peace and justice.

As you are well aware, the fire of the war which was started by the Iraqi regime on 22 September, 1980 through an aggression against the territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran has now gained unprecedented dimensions, bringing other countries into the war and even engulfing innocent civilians.

The killings of 290 innocent human beings, caused by the shooting down of an Airbus aircraft of the Islamic Republic of Iran by one of the American warships in the Persian Gulf, is a clear manifestation of this contention.

Under these circumstances, Your Excellency's efforts for the implementation of Resolution 598 is of particular importance.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always provided you with its assistance and support to achieve this objective.

In this context, we have decided to officially declare that the Islamic Republic of Iran – because of the importance it attaches to saving the lives of human beings and the establishment of justice and regional and international peace and security – accepts Security Council Resolution 598.

We hope that the official declaration of this position by the Islamic Republic of Iran would assist you in continuing your efforts, which have always received our support and appreciation.

Text of UN Resolution 598 on the Gulf War, adopted 20 July 1987

The Security Council,

- reaffirming its Resolution 582 (1986),
- deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a ceasefire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human life and material destruction,
- deploring the initiation and continuation of the conflict,
- deploring also the bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
- deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may take place,
- determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq,
- convinced that a comprehensive, just, honourable and durable settlement should be achieved between Iran and Iraq,
- recalling the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and, in particular, the obligation of all member states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,
- determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq,
- acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations:

(1) Demands that, as a first step towards a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate ceasefire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay;

(2) Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the ceasefire and withdrawal and further requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements in consultation with the parties and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council;

(3) Urges that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August, 1949;

(4) Calls upon Iran and Iraq to co-operate with the Secretary-General in implementing this resolution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honourable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues, in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations;

(5) Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict, and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;

(6) Requests the Secretary-General to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;

(7) Recognizes the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and the need for reconstruction efforts, with appropriate international assistance, once the conflict is ended and, in this regard, requests the Secretary-General to assign a team of experts to study the question of reconstruction and to report to the Security Council;

(8) Further requests the Secretary-General to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other states of the region, measures to enhance the security and stability of the region;

(9) Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of this resolution;

(10) Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance.

SOUTH-WESTERN AFRICA PEACE PRINCIPLES

Following is the text of the agreement initialed by delegations from Angola/Cuba and South Africa in New York City on 13 July 1988. This statement was approved by their respective governments and released publicly by mutual agreement on 20 July 1988.
Source: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington DC, 20 July 1988

The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa have reached agreement on a set of essential principles to establish the basis for peace in the southwestern region of Africa. They recognize that each of these principles is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement.

(A) Implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations. The parties shall agree upon and recommend to the Secretary-General of the United Nations a date for the commencement of implementation of UNSCR 435/78.

(B) The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and of the Republic of South Africa shall, in conformity with the dispositions of Resolution 435/78 of the Security Council of the United Nations, cooperate with the Secretary-General with a view towards ensuring the independence of Namibia through free and fair elections, abstaining from any action that could prevent the execution of said Resolution.

(C) Redeployment towards the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of the People's Republic of Angola on the basis of an agreement between the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba and the decision of both states to solicit the on-site verification of that withdrawal by the Security Council of the United Nations.

(D) Respect for the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of states and for territorial integrity and inviolability of borders.

(E) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.

(F) Abstention from the threat and utilization of force against the territorial integrity and independence of states.

(G) The acceptance of the responsibility of states not to allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence against other states.

(H) Reaffirmation of the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to self-determination, independence, and equality of rights.

(I) Verification and monitoring of compliance with the obligations resulting from the agreements that may be established.

(J) Commitment to comply in good faith with the obligations undertaken in the agreements that may be established and to resolve the differences via negotiations.

(K) Recognition of the role of the Permanent Members of the Security Council of the United Nations as guarantors for the implementation of agreements that may be established.

(L) The right of each state to peace, development, and social progress.

(M) African and international cooperation for the settlement of the problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa.

(N) Recognition of the mediating role of the Government of the United States of America.

AGREEMENT ON THE FUTURE OF NEW CALEDONIA

The Agreement on the Future of New Caledonia was signed in Paris on 16 June 1988. Excerpts of the text and of Appendix II are printed below.
Source: Ambassade de France à Londres, Service de Presse et d'Information, 16 June 1988 (excerpts)

. . . the clash of these two opposing beliefs has led until recently to a situation bordering on civil war.

Today the two parties have acknowledged the imperative necessity of contributing towards the establishment of civil peace, in order to create the conditions enabling the populations freely to choose, with confidence in their future, how to take their destiny in hand.

This is why they have agreed to administrative authority over the Territory being resumed by the State for the next twelve months.

The Prime Minister will therefore present a proposal to this effect to the Council of Ministers on 29 June 1988.

The delegations have also undertaken to present to their respective authorities and ask them to agree to the Prime Minister's proposals regarding the future evolution of New Caledonia. . . .

APPENDIX II

(1) The administration and development of the Federal Territory of New Caledonia are organized into three provinces: Loyauté Islands, South, North. Each Province freely administers itself through an Assembly elected for six years by proportional representation and its own Executive.

(2) Their common affairs are run by a Territorial Congress, composed of the three Provincial Assemblies meeting together. The number of members comprising each Assembly is determined in proportion to its population. The Executive of the Congress is entrusted to the State representative, who heads the Territorial administration.

Territorial powers

(3) The powers are divided between the State and the Territorial authorities on the following bases:

(a) The State wields power in the following areas: external relations; control of immigration and foreign nationals; external communications (navigation); management of the maritime economic zone; currency; Trésor; foreign trade; defence; law and order; nationality; ordinary-law registration of births, marriages and deaths; justice; State civil service; civil law; criminal law; trade law; governing principles of labour law; verification of the legality of communal administration; administrative and financial supervision of local authorities and their public establishments; secondary and higher education; audio-visual communication; sovereignty and ownership of the public maritime and air estates.

(b) The Territory retains the coordinating powers and the matters that cannot be transferred to the Provinces: taxation and Territorial budget; equipment and

infrastructures for the Territory as a whole (Territorial hospital and road network, waterworks serving the whole Territory); adaptation of national elementary school programmes.

(c) Each Province exercises the powers that do not lie with either the State, the Territory or the communes, in particular: Provincial budget; Provincial development blueprint and related infrastructures; economic development; training; teaching of vernacular languages; promotion of local cultures; health and social policy; support to the communes for elementary education; youth, sport and leisure; cultural activities; land reform and land planning.

(d) The communes hold the powers vested in them under the Code of Communal Administration.

(e) Consultative organs: the Provincial Customary Consultative Council is made up of the major Chiefs of the Province's customary areas. It is consulted by the Provincial Council on draft or proposed resolutions concerning special civil law and land law issues. It may be consulted on any other matters on the initiative of the President of the Province, who, also on his own initiative, can refer to the Provincial Council any question or proposal concerning the special civil law statute or the Melanesian land reserves statute.

Distribution of funding

(4) To meet both the specific requirements of each Province and the objectives covered by the rebalancing policy, three-year contracts (1990, 1991, 1992) will be concluded between the State and the Provinces during the third quarter of 1989. They will be extended by contracts to be implemented over five years (1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997), which will be drafted and signed in 1992.

During the phase of direct administration and until the end of 1989, the investment and running expenditure of the State and Territorial authorities will be provided for according to the terms and procedures currently in force.

The State will have the possibility of increasing its grants to provide for operations bound up with the measures to be decided on for New Caledonia.

State investment financing in the Territory will be distributed as follows: three quarters for the Northern and Island Provinces and one quarter for the Southern Province, on the basis of the 1988 budget.

Territorial budget funding for running expenditure will be allocated as follows: one fifth for the Territory, two fifths for the Northern and Island Provinces, two fifths for the Southern Province.

(5) Training: in order to rebalance the share-out of responsibilities, a major programme to train Melanesians in particular for senior positions will be launched as soon as possible.

To this end, a study will be undertaken on the High Commissioner's initiative to determine objectives, with a view to the new training programme getting under way in 1989. It should concern about 400 senior and middle-ranking executives, most of whom will be trained in colleges in metropolitan France over the next ten years.

Training for clerical staffs, which is less demanding, will be provided locally with the existing resources increased as necessary.

(6) A self-determination poll will be organized in New Caledonia in 1998.

Safeguards

All these provisions will be set out in a referendum bill. At the beginning of the autumn session the Government will propose to the President of the Republic its submission to the French people.

The New Caledonian electors called upon to vote on that referendum, together with their descendants on attaining their majority, make up the populations concerned by the Territory's future. Therefore, they alone will be authorized to take part until 1998 in the polls which will determine that future: elections to the Provincial Councils and self-determination poll.

The referendum bill will also provide for State compensation for exactions and, restored calm permitting, for amnesty measures relating to offences committed in the course of the recent disturbances, with the exception of serious crimes involving bloodshed.

Book reviews

The Origins of Flexible Response: NATO's Debate over Strategy in the 1960s
By Jane E. Stromseth. London: Macmillan Press, 1988. 274 pp. £35.00.

The acrimonious debate that marked NATO's deliberations over the 'double-zero' agreement in the spring of 1987 convinced many of the need to develop a comprehensive concept to integrate NATO strategy, force planning and arms-control policy. The North Atlantic Council embraced this notion in its June 1987 meeting at Reykjavik, and the NATO staff is presently engaged in developing what the Germans refer to as a *Gesamtkonzept*.

The basis of any comprehensive concept must be a clear view of the strategic requirements of the Atlantic Alliance, and the role of military force in meeting these requirements. NATO often proclaims its faith in 'a strategy of deterrence based upon an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces'. Yet, clarity in conceptual terms demands that the relation between conventional and nuclear forces be clearly spelled out.

In order to arrive at such a comprehensive view, one would do well to go back and re-examine NATO's previous efforts to define the role of nuclear and conventional forces in a strategy of deterrence. A good start would be the 1960s, which were witness to NATO's longest and most acrimonious debate about strategy. Jane Stromseth has eased this task considerably by providing an account of the era that tells the entire story in a way that will leave few asking for more.

In *The Origins of Flexible Response*, Stromseth provides an admirably written and thoroughly researched account of NATO's first and only comprehensive strategic debate. While Stromseth starts with an analysis of how and why NATO came to depend on nuclear weapons in the 1950s, it is in the chapters that follow that the reader will find much new to digest. She describes President John F. Kennedy's rejection of massive retaliation as the basis of US and NATO strategy at a time when the United States was becoming increasingly vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack or retaliation. He favoured multiple conventional and nuclear options, and insisted that the US retain central and civilian control over nuclear weapons at all times. The ever-present fear of nuclear proliferation ensured that the Kennedy Administration approached the presumed and actual nuclear ambitions of its allies with great distrust.

Most importantly, Stromseth points to the Berlin crisis in the first year of the Kennedy Administration as a crucial turning point in the history of US strategy. It was the contingency planning for that crisis that convinced the Administration of the need to deploy robust conventional forces to guard against deterrence ever failing. In rightly emphasizing the importance of Berlin, Stromseth provides a useful and much-needed reminder that it, much more than the Cuban Missile Crisis of the following year, was crucial to the development of the strategy pursued by Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara. If scholars had spent only half as much time studying the Berlin crisis as they have on the Cuban Missile Crisis, understanding of US policy would have been so much clearer.

Next, Stromseth reviews McNamara's efforts to persuade allies abroad and military sceptics at home of the correctness of his approach. McNamara did so

first by outlining his basic views on strategy in a major speech in Athens in 1962. At that time, he told his NATO colleagues that nuclear strategy should have the same objective as conventional strategy, that central control over nuclear means was indispensable to an integrated military strategy, and that conventional forces needed to be the first and most important means of defence should deterrence fail. He also sought to convince the NATO Allies that independent nuclear forces undermined the central control objectives of NATO strategy, and that NATO was not nor need it be hopelessly outnumbered by the Warsaw Pact.

Stromseth's description of McNamara's efforts to persuade other US officials of his ideas is the best and most original part of the book. Using the declassified 'Presidential Decision Memoranda' (PDM) on theatre nuclear forces and NATO strategy, Stromseth recounts McNamara's constant questioning of basic assumptions about nuclear weapons and NATO strategy. These PDM show how McNamara's ideas evolved while he headed the Pentagon, and Stromseth does all a great service by illuminating this important sequence of events.

Despite McNamara's best efforts, however, he failed to persuade. In part this was due to the mixed signals that emanated from Washington. These included: the persistent differences within the Department of Defense itself and within Washington more generally; a lack of information on nuclear matters so that the Allies were never clearly aware of the basis of Washington's thinking; the sorry story of the Multilateral Force, the history of which is one contradiction on top of another; and the erratic changes in US troop and nuclear deployment levels. The latter are particularly revealing, for while the US insisted on raising conventional force levels and de-emphasizing nuclear deployments, the opposite actually happened: US troops in Europe declined from a peak of 417,000 in 1962 to 300,000 in 1969, and nuclear weapon deployments rose from 2,500 in 1960 to a post-war high of 7,200 in 1967.

Next, Stromseth describes the Allied contributions to this episode in three chapters devoted to recounting the positions of the wavering West Germans, the antagonistic French, and the more supportive British. It took the emergence of the Grand Coalition in West Germany to clarify Bonn's policy, the departure of France from the integrated military command to pacify de Gaulle, and a Labour government to pull Britain away from its obsession with the special relationship which had only worked to the detriment of smoothing transatlantic relations.

Stromseth concludes that resistance to the conventional defence improvements for which McNamara and Kennedy strove ultimately proved too great. She offers six sources of resistance: the persistence of differing conceptions of deterrence; European objections to the implied nuclear-conventional division of labour; continued pessimism about the state of the East–West conventional balance; political and economic resistance to the required increases in defence budgets; the momentum of continuing programmes, particularly in the nuclear area; and the diplomatic style and internal divisions that marked Washington's diplomacy.

In her concluding chapter, Stromseth shows that all these obstacles persist today. For Flexible Response ever to have a more precise meaning than 'an appropriate mix of adequate and effective nuclear and conventional forces', some or all of these obstacles must therefore be overcome. Given their persistence over time, however, it is unlikely that this will ever happen. In particular, the divergent conceptions of deterrence are bound to persist, if only because the differences are due to geopolitical factors which cannot be changed. Indeed, the

story that Stromseth so lucidly tells is a useful reminder that attempts within the Alliance to persuade the Allies to clarify the ambiguity of NATO strategy are bound to fail in the future as miserably as they failed in the past.

IVO H. DAALDER
Senior Research Fellow, IISS

Democracy and Deterrence. The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy
By Philip Bobbitt. Macmillan Press, 1988. 350 pp. £9.95 (paperback)

Its somewhat misleading title notwithstanding, *Democracy and Deterrence* addresses two fundamental issues of great political import and theoretical interest. The first is the relationship between central and extended deterrence, and the second is how to maintain stability in both areas.

As regards the first, analytical theme, Bobbitt contends that the evolution of American strategic policy can best be understood as a series of doctrinal innovations designed to cope with crises in extended deterrence which, in turn, were caused by developments in central vulnerability, i.e., the Soviet nuclear threat to the US. This approach has its virtues, but Bobbitt tends to overrate them. Doubtless, a major determinant of American strategic policy has been the objective of keeping its nuclear commitment to NATO Europe credible in the eyes of friend and foe alike. Yet other factors such as maintaining central deterrence in the face of an evolving Soviet strategic arsenal, changes in technology, interservice rivalries, domestic politics, and arms-control policy were also involved in shaping US strategic doctrine. At one point, Bobbitt acknowledges the importance of these influences, but he does not use them as an analytical corrective to test his hypothesis.

In turning to an analysis of various therapeutic measures, the author sets out by exposing the sore point of extended deterrence: reassuring an ally is more difficult than deterring the opponent. Bobbitt carefully dissects the structural origin of this problem: what the US needs to say and do to keep its nuclear pledge on behalf of NATO Europe tolerable to itself may confirm recurrent European doubts about the reliability of the American nuclear protector. Recalling the INF deployment controversy, he is also right in pointing out that major sections of the European public have recently become highly sceptical regarding the concept and policy of nuclear (extended) deterrence.

Bobbitt then addresses the question of how to deal with the tolerability–reassurance conflict under conditions of strategic (US–Soviet) nuclear parity without abolishing extended deterrence which, he fears, could entail an unstable situation of nuclear multipolarity. This informed analysis provokes two objections. First, the author's description of the *status quo* is inconsistent: on the same page he asserts a 'collapse of US extended deterrence in the Euro-Japanese theatres (the Northern tier)', and 'the deep erosion of extended deterrence' (p. 193), and elsewhere he speaks of 'the impending collapse of extended deterrence' (p. 151) or its 'decline' (p. 236).

Second, Bobbitt's doctrinal approach leads him to concentrate on examining various military and arms-control remedies for the 'collapse/erosion' of extended deterrence. His discussion shows that none of the 'alternatives' represents a solution to the problem. Not surprisingly so, since its structural nature implies that the problem can only be managed. Doctrinal innovations and military hardware are political instruments of limited utility in this regard. Bobbitt does not deny this, but possible political remedies could have been explored in greater depth. As it is, his conclusion that the American extended deterrent can be maintained through an unexplained conjunction of the various alternatives discussed in his book and 'by investments in the understanding and knowledge of our people' (p. 285) must seem perplexing to the reader.

Except for a brief appendix about the Reykjavik summit meeting, *Democracy and Deterrence* unfortunately deals only with military and political developments until the mid-1980s. Without holding the author solely responsible for this shortcoming, it would certainly have been interesting to get his opinion on the implications of Gorbachev's foreign policy *perestroika*, or of the INF Treaty on the US nuclear commitment to Western Europe.

Perhaps Bobbitt would refine or revise his argument in light of these developments. In any event, however, there is an urgent need to improve the formal presentation of the book. Random tests revealed an intolerable number of quotations, references and assertions without proper attribution, as well as quotations with no further information than the author's name (e.g., pp. 278, 283). Bobbitt's substantive discussion of extended deterrence does not deserve such sloppiness.

ECKHARD LÜBKEMEIER
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Bonn

Moral Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence
By Gregory S. Kavka. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. 243 pp. £8.95 (£25 hardback).

Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction
By Ian Clark. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988. 154 pp. £17.50.

These two short books exemplify the welcome recent awakening of philosophical interest in the ethics of deterrence: an area curiously neglected by most philosophers for much of the nuclear era.

Kavka's book is a collection of ten essays, much of the material for which has previously appeared in philosophical journals, but which the publishers – rightly – deem now to deserve a wider audience. He offers a well-argued utilitarian defence of 'minimum deterrence' (a posture that – alarmingly for Europeans – would exclude extended deterrence) as a temporary necessity pending the eventual achievement of multilateral disarmament. Such deterrence, according to Kavka, is justifiable since the other currently available alternatives which he carefully explores (unilateral disarmament, world government, strategic defence and nuclear coercion) are either not feasible or carry greater risks. Either minimum deterrence or unilateral nuclear disarmament could lead to potentially disastrous outcomes (the former all-out nuclear war, the latter world domination, including nuclear use, by the remaining nuclear super-power), but Kavka believes the likelihood of disaster arising from unilateral nuclear disarmament is much higher. Minimum deterrence is, therefore, preferable following the 'Disas-

ter Avoidance Principle': under such conditions of uncertainty; 'it is rational to select the alternative that minimizes the probability of disaster occurrence' (p. 67). Whether such a simplifying decision-making principle adequately captures the nature of moral reasoning is open to doubt. But it is surely right to insist that in framing security policy there should be a two-fold objective: to prevent war and nuclear use, while securing political liberty. And the West is not prepared to trade off one for the other: it wishes to be neither dead nor red.

The key paradox that is reflected in the work's title arises from the co-location of three plausible assumptions: first, that it would be impermissible to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for aggression; second, that it is permissible to intend so to retaliate since this is the only reliable way to prevent such aggression; third, that if it is impermissible to do something under certain conditions, it is impermissible to intend this (the 'Wrongful Intentions Principle'). Although – as Kavka notes – the US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter managed to subscribe to all three propositions without noting their inconsistency, most commentators recognize that one has to be given up. The usual course is to reject either the first or second, concluding either that deterrence is impermissible since any use of nuclear weapons would be; or that since some uses might be permissible, a deterrent posture based solely on such uses could be permissible. Kavka, by contrast, takes the unusual step of rejecting the Wrongful Intentions Principle, arguing that, although this is normally valid, it does not apply to deterrent intentions where the beneficent effects of having the intention outweigh any difficulties associated with what is intended.

Kavka rightly stresses the importance in the moral reckoning of the beneficent effects of having the deterrent intention: critics of deterrence who argue as if a system designed to avoid nuclear use were morally synonymous with such use are mistaken. But whether the Wrongful Intentions Principle can be so readily dispensed with is less clear. What one intends to do one must – as a matter of logic – regard as in some senses 'doable'. But can an agent who wishes to act morally, regard as doable what he acknowledges as morally impermissible? Surely not. Kavka notes such difficulties, but suggests the agent has a duty to lower his moral standards. But he is then required to intend to do what he regards as morally impermissible, and the same objections would appear to apply to this secondary intention.

Some of the details of Kavka's argument are thus open to criticism. But the book, as a whole, is a well-balanced, philosophically rich and subtle contribution to an important area of ethical study.

Deterrence is only one of the many topics addressed in Clark's wide-ranging philosophical introduction to warfare. Clark contends that the concept and practice of war are intimately related, and that the practices deemed appropriate will depend on one's understanding of the nature of the enterprise. This is evidenced by his survey of the just war tradition that seeks to constrain the practice of war from general moral considerations; and of the doctrine of limited war, the constraints on the practice of which – *à la Clausewitz* – derive from the political nature of the undertaking. After considering some of the more practical rules of warfare, Clark turns to issues raised by deterrence, including the interesting question of how the acknowledged restraints on warfare apply to a system designed to prevent its occurrence.

Clark provides an admirably clear and comprehensive guide to 'the multiplicity of complex issues' (p. 4) that attend warfare. But in part because of the

very wide sweep of his canvas, his treatment is at times frustrating: important issues are raised, only to be discarded as the book moves rapidly on to the next topic. Thus, the nature of the undoubtedly intimate relation between the practice and concept of war is not fully explored. Are the rules of war tightly defined in practice in the way the rules of chess are of that game? Or is the connection looser, like the relation between the rules of etiquette and the practice of eating? Clark also does less than justice to the just war tradition: a doctrine of far greater philosophical subtlety and vitality than that of the limited war, which ultimately provides very little constraint given – as Clark recognizes – the potentially open-ended nature of political goals. Clark criticizes the just war principle of non-combatant immunity on the grounds that a cypher clerk, engaged in cracking enemy codes at Bletchley, even though he does not bear arms, may do more harm to the enemy than a soldier (p. 92). This criticism has, however, long been anticipated by those just war authors who found the basis of the immunity accorded to innocent non-combatants on the original meaning of *innocent*, i.e. not harming. On that basis the cypher clerk loses his immunity. Finally, Clark's contention that the 'constraints of just warfare were not thought to apply to intercultural conflicts' (pp. 47–8) would have surprised the sixteenth-century just war writer Franciscus de Victoria, whose seminal treatise *de Indis* was designed to persuade the Spanish authorities that such constraints – derived from natural law and human reason – applied to all men, including the indigenous inhabitants of the newly-discovered Americas, with whom the conquistadors were then embattled.

DAVID FISHER
Brussels

Making and Marketing Arms. The French Experience and its Implications for the International System

By Edward A. Kolodziej. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987. 518 pp. No price given.

Apart from the two super-powers, France is the country which has given the highest priority to the creation and maintenance of a national armaments industry. As the world's third largest exporter of arms during the past quarter of a century, it has supplied weapons and military technology to over one hundred countries. The proportion of its arms production which is made for overseas sales is, moreover, far higher than that of the United States or the Soviet Union. 'The military-industrial complex is alive and well in France', Edward Kolodziej tells us. Anyone who has watched the proud presentation of the newest arms during recent Bastille day parades would be inclined to agree, even if they masked the actual decline in the state of health of the arms industry.

France's role as the pre-eminent arms exporter is the first reason that makes this book important. The second is its breadth and depth. This is the most comprehensive case study to date of the national experience of a single country in selling arms. As such, this work makes a major contribution towards understanding the interplay of foreign policy, domestic politics, economic incentives and technological factors in the manufacture and sale of conventional arms.

Why has France placed such a strong emphasis on its armaments industry? The reason is rooted in the French belief in the absolute necessity of having an

independent foreign and defence policy. With the wide acceptance of this premise, an autonomous arms manufacturing capability providing a full panoply of weapons became the required underpinning of an independent national security strategy. This self-reliance in conventional arms is, in effect, the twin of the other aim of possessing a national nuclear deterrent. But since the domestic need for conventional arms is insufficient to justify an arms industry of 300,000 workers, there is a tremendous pressure to export, resulting in a policy of *ventes d'armes tous azimuts*.

As an international relations scholar, Kolodziej properly places his analysis in the context of France's global aspirations. The more original and interesting chapters, however, deal with the politics and organization of the French arms industry. Here the reader is given a wealth of accumulated information on the major aerospace and electronic manufacturers such as Dassault, Aerospatiale, Matra and Thompson, with their quasi-private, quasi-state status. In addition, much new light is thrown upon the complex decision-making process within the government, especially at the key Délégation Générale pour l'Armement.

The author's queries lead him to conclude that the 'arms oligarchy', the alliance of engineers, general staffs of the armed services, and weapons-making industrialists, controls the flow of information and perpetuates a favourable image of its activities and interests. Accordingly, lack of public disclosure insulates the arms industry from public scrutiny and political oversight.

Economic incentives have been a critical element in the growth of the arms industry in France, more so than in the US or the USSR. Without the ability to use export orders to lower unit costs of weapons for France's own armed forces, the national industry could not have been maintained. Nor would the design teams and technologists have sufficient work to justify their retention.

Too little attention is given in this book, however, to the over-dependency on exports which has resulted. Approximately 70% of French arms production has been for overseas customers in recent years. Two-thirds of Dassault's sales of *Mirage* aircraft, for example, went abroad in 1986.

Indeed, the large French arms industry is presently moving towards a crisis, the result, ironically, of its past successes. The reasons are manifold. The market for arms in the oil-exporting nations of the Middle East, the largest customers in the past, is shrinking due to a combination of reduced oil revenues and saturation of the region with weapons. What demand exists is increasingly filled less expensively by the emerging third-world arms producers, such as Brazil and China. French arms sales have steadily declined since the record year of 1984. The end of the Iran–Iraq War would notably accelerate the downturn, as these nations have been large customers in the 1980s. Competition is growing from other Europeans; witness the recent $30 billion British sale to Saudi Arabia and the joint, four-nation development of the European Fighter Aircraft with which the French *Rafale* will have to compete. Even some American arms are looking more attractive to the Europeans because of their lower costs and technological advance.

Kolodziej's otherwise excellent book, therefore, may reveal far more about the past than what lies ahead.

ANDREW J. PIERRE
Paris

Soviet Policy towards South Africa
By Kurt M. Campbell. London: Macmillan Press, 1986. £27.50.

This book is based upon research undertaken in four countries and upon extensive documentary sources. Dr Campbell was exceptionally fortunate in gaining access to the papers of the South African Department of External Affairs in the Pretoria Archives which are normally closed. His secondary sources are also extensive, and his bibliography does indeed constitute 'a useful guide to material on Soviet-South African relations' (p. 7).

Campbell believes that writers in the Soviet field have failed to recognize the significance of its historical dimension, and he sets out to remedy this. There is, however, nothing especially original in his contention that a degree of continuity exists between Russian and Soviet foreign policy. His chapter on the period prior to the Bolshevik Revolution covers some familiar ground, such as Russian support for the Boers in the second Anglo-Boer War, together with some fascinating material which he uncovered in the *Krasnyi Arkhiv* regarding Russian support for an abortive scheme for a Boer-fomented 'native' rebellion against the British in 1904.

Campbell has relied largely on published sources for his coverage of Soviet support for black resistance movements in the post-1917 period. This is an illuminating chapter which clearly demonstrates (on p. 24) that 'the USSR's support of political resistance . . . and indeed the vagaries of Soviet foreign policy have on several occasions served to impede rather than to promote the national liberation struggle'. One worrying defect is his tendency, common in Britain and the US, to use 'multiracial' and 'non-racial' interchangeably. There is a particularly confusing example on p. 32. This may not matter in more fortunate lands, but the distinction in South Africa is an important one. 'Multiracialism' implies that racial differences are to be recognized and accommodated in the political system, not necessarily on a basis of equality – the National Party claims that its current policies are 'multiracial'. 'Non-racialism' insists that differences must be played down and preferably ignored if there is ever to be justice in South Africa.

Campbell's treatment of official relations between the USSR and South Africa (1942–56) is admirably well documented, mainly from new archive material. There are, however, some problems with his presentation. For example, in explaining why the USSR was more interested in relations with the 'white regime' than in the liberation struggle, Campbell might have considered Stalin's later foreign policy in more general terms. Soviet support for revolutionary movements was frequently ambivalent at this time, as a glance at the relationship between Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party in the period up to October 1949 will demonstrate. The Soviet Union's championship of the anti-apartheid lobby at the United Nations is well known, but Campbell makes the useful observation, appropriately documented, that 'there is little evidence of an increase in Black African support' for the USSR as a result (p. 91).

The longest chapter concerns the minerals 'nexus', and in his attempts to uncover the 'Byzantine commercial relationship' (p. 113) between the two countries, Campbell interviewed people in mining circles in South Africa, London and the USSR. He has substantiated the long-standing rumours about the diamond cartel, but has had to content himself with some less firm conclusions about gold and platinum. He here takes up the argument about the 'strategy of denial', whereby the USSR is alleged to be plotting to cut off the West's access to

those strategic minerals of which South Africa and the USSR have a near-monopoly, by establishing a puppet government in Pretoria which would do Moscow's bidding. Common sense suggests, as does Campbell, that whatever kind of government rules in South Africa in the future, it will not refuse to export its minerals. In fact, the more socially responsible the government, the more it will need to increase foreign-exchange earnings in order to fund its programmes.

The book's survey of Soviet 'active measures' rightly suggests that Soviet espionage 'has little relevance to the powerful social and political forces in South African society which will ultimately determine South Africa's future' (p. 129). Campbell thus disposes of the 'total onslaught' theory, adding that this espionage is designed mainly to provide Moscow with information on matters such as the South African nuclear programme. He notes in passing Soviet attempts to discredit the United States in third-world eyes by providing 'evidence' of US-South African co-operation on certain sinister projects. The US State Department's recent (August 1987) publication entitled *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda*, shows that these attempts are continuing.

Campbell discusses Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean in the wider context of Soviet relations in southern Africa. He denies that there is a 'Brezhnev Doctrine for Africa', although he notes in his postscript that Moscow's determination to shore up the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* does not appear materially to have wavered, despite the recent escalation of conflict. As for the Cape Sea Route, Campbell neatly dismisses it as an 'apocalyptic scenario' (p. 150), since a Soviet attempt to close it to Western shipping would be strategically unwise, and would lead to unacceptably expensive consequences.

Campbell's conclusions summarize the views set out in the body of his book. They cause him to suggest that Soviet policy in southern Africa will be 'reactive', 'cautious' and 'opportunistic', and also that the region is at present not a high priority for Moscow although it might become more important. It is his view that the USSR is concerned to establish its right as a super-power with interests in the region and in any settlements which may be canvassed there.

However, while Campbell effectively debunks the various myths which surround Soviet policies towards South Africa, he is hardly a trail-blazer. Most of his views have been put forward for years by American Sovietologists such as Robert Legvold. The chief merit of Campbell's book is that it presents this school of thought in a concise and readable form, adding the fruits of his own considerable research and knowledge. While it is likely that it is intended largely for US policy-makers, South Africans and others would benefit from reading this book.

SARA PIENAAR
Department of History, University of South Africa, Pretoria

A European Non-Proliferation Policy: Prospects and Problems
Edited by Harald Müller. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 416 pp. No price given.

This is a very valuable and well-balanced book, but with a somewhat misleading title, because it does not deal very much with issues or perspectives that are particularly European. The break between title and contents may indeed signal what has happened, since the last year of the Carter Administration, to what was

once a loud 'debate' between Western Europe and the United States on the global nuclear proliferation problem. As amply demonstrated in the book's two chapters by the editor himself, there may no longer be much of a gap between what sensible Europeans and sensible Americans would see as the trade-offs on this issue.

Bertrand Goldschmidt and Julien Goens contribute two chapters on the evolution of European-American interactions on the general horizontal nuclear proliferation problem, but even the chapter by Goldschmidt does not suggest that deep transatlantic disagreement remains. The general analysis of the book is indeed what seems to have emerged in the US as well (at least within the Republican Administration), that no single move will preclude the further spread of such weapons, but that a long array of prudential steps is indeed necessary – that other considerations are important, including the pursuit of economic development and cheap energy, but that heading off the spread of nuclear weapons is something *very* important.

The rest of the book consists of chapters *by* Europeans rather than *about* Europeans. That is, they offer a series of well-researched case studies of potential 'nth' countries, in chapters which offer even the specialist a most helpful update. The book is neither alarmist nor complacent regarding the possibilities of nuclear proliferation. More of the news is good than bad, but most problems are far from permanently solved.

In each of these chapters on previously or currently worrisome cases, ranging from India to Libya to Argentina, an effort is still made to outline some specifically Western European influence that might play a role in one direction or another. However, while it was obviously part of what held together the study group producing the book, this is not the most plausible aspect of the volume, for the greater part of it deals instead with the domestic factors leaning one way or the other, or the interactions with possibly hostile neighbours, or the inputs controlled more by the US and the USSR, the super-powers.

The chapters are slightly uneven in style. The chapter on Iran by Akbar Etemad, the director of the Iranian nuclear programme in the days of the Shah, offers almost entirely first-hand information, with few footnotes (as does Goldschmidt's chapter), while most of the other chapters are written more by outsiders who have to mix interviews with a search of the literature. But the chapters are uniformly high in the quality of their contents. Perhaps as a gesture to its ostensible focus on European influence, there are no chapters on Taiwan or South Korea (which presumably are more exclusively the responsibility of the United States?), but the book otherwise offers a very valuable tour of the front, with the chapter by Maurizio Cremasco on Libya being especially valuable for breaking new ground. The chapter on Pakistan by Dieter Braun might have gone into more extensive detail on how the Pakistanis managed to extract so much information and unwitting assistance from Urenco (which would have amounted to a still more specifically 'European' aspect here, of course), but this story has already been told elsewhere.

This collection makes it almost difficult to remember the years when Americans and Europeans were declaring such substantially different approaches to the spread of dual-purpose nuclear technology. Whatever its origins, the book, by the time of its publication, offers reassuring evidence that the posturing of the early debate is over. Perhaps Reagan and his Administration deserve some credit

for this, for pretending to be relatively uninterested in the problem, thus smoking out the Europeans, and others around the world, who had known all along that the risks of nuclear proliferation were serious, but who could previously count on the super-powers to take the lead on this burden. But, as the book nicely demonstrates, a larger part of the credit goes simply to the reflective and analytical powers of a group of European academics who, in a free and unfettered atmosphere, can produce analyses that are just as clear-headed on proliferation as on any other international security theme.

GEORGE H. QUESTER
University of Maryland

España en la Política de Seguridad Occidental 1939–1986
By Antonio Marquina Barrio. Madrid: Colección Ediciones Ejército, 1986. 1,022 pp. No price given.

This work gives a blow-by-blow account of the process by which Spain emerged from the diplomatic isolation imposed by the United Nations in 1946 on Franco as a collaborator with the Axis to its acceptance in 1981 as a member of NATO.

The strategic importance of Spain was evident to both Hitler and the Allies in the World War II. If Spain had entered the war on the German side, the implications for the Allied war effort would have been serious. Ideological affinity apart, Franco's alignment with Germany was dictated by his hope to be on the winning side at any post-war settlement; when it was clear that the Allies would be the victors, Franco attempted to change horses without success. Churchill rejected Franco's proposal in October 1944 for a joint alliance against the USSR. The author argues that Franco came to the conclusion that Churchill and the British were the prisoners of a masonic conspiracy, and that the road to favour and, after the war, the end of diplomatic isolation, must come through the United States. Hence the otherwise inexplicable grant of landing rights for US civil aircraft in 1945.

Though, as Potsdam and American support of the UN anti-Franco resolution were to prove this perception was false at the time, it was through the US that Franco emerged, with the Bases Agreement of 1953, in his own words as the 'sentinel of the West'. The bulk of this long book is devoted to the negotiation of the agreement (pp. 125–574), and its subsequent development (pp. 574–891). The acceptance of Spain as part of the defence of the West was the result of the Pentagon's conviction that the logistical advantages of the Iberian Peninsula were overwhelming, and of the pressure of sympathetic elements in Congress carefully cultivated, as this book shows, by Lequerica as manager of a Spanish lobby. The State Department was aware of the complete rejection by Britain and France of any deal with an unreconstructed 'fascist' which, in addition, might imply that US military planners were prepared to withdraw to a defence based on the Pyrenees. By 1948, the State Department had given in to domestic pressures and supported the normalization of relations with Spain; this imposed severe strains on the relationship with those who were to become America's partners in NATO. The US Chiefs of Staff were consistent advocates of Spain's inclusion in NATO, and in this they were strongly supported by Portugal; a detailed discussion

of Portuguese policies is a feature of this book. No arguments about the inconsistency of including authoritarian regimes such as Portugal itself and Turkey could weaken the resistance of the democratic powers to the inclusion of Spain, nor could exhortations to liberalize his regime in order to make it acceptable to the European members of NATO make any impression on Franco. Thus, until the dictator's death, the connection of Spain with the defence planning of the West remained for the most part 'indirect', i.e., through the US.

Nevertheless, as this book makes clear, the bilateral relationship with the US was not always cordial. Each time that the agreement came up for renewal, there were bouts of brinkmanship: meetings broke up; both sides threatened withdrawal. Spain wanted more money and better arms, and above all a treaty ratified by the Senate which would put Spain on a par with America's other allies; in return for exposing itself to nuclear retaliation, the US should guarantee Spanish territory against an attack from Morocco, a constant obsession. On its side, the US complained of Spanish greed and military inefficiency.

Of particular interest is the account of the 1962 negotiations. Alarmed at the supply of US arms to Morocco, Spanish negotiators sought to convince their American counterparts of the 'threat from the south', which the US rejected as a Spanish invention that would involve the US in the defence of Spain's African territories. Since there was no possibility that Congress would increase aid, the Spanish team in Washington demanded political counterparts, i.e. American pressure for Spain's entry into the EEC and NATO.

With Spain a fully functioning democracy after the elections of June 1977, the political objections to Spanish membership of NATO disappeared. Though Prime Minister Suarez pursued an ambiguous policy, his successor forced Spain's entry through the Cortes against the bitter opposition of the Socialist party which fought the 1982 election on an anti-NATO programme, only to change its mind after victory. From this embarrassing situation the new government extricated itself by the risky operation of a referendum. Its terms committed the government to membership of NATO on conditions: no military integration, and the reduction of US forces in Spain, above all those stationed at Torrejón – a proposal which the US, after a long debate, accepted. Spain therefore still remains an 'odd man out' in NATO, on terms which its political opponents consider absurd.

The strength of this book lies in its analysis of the relationship between military planning and political considerations, in its exhaustive use of archival material, in its emphasis on the roles of Portugal and Morocco. Its weakness is its heavy, abstract tone; light relief – Serrano's injections to steady his nerves when negotiating with Ribbentrop, Franco's insistence on talking about the Galician crops when Castiella wished to discuss relations with the US – is rare.

SIR RAYMOND CARR

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Danopoulos, Constantine P., *Military Disengagement from Politics*. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul of America Ltd, 1988. 283 pp. £30.00 (B)

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AFRICA

Aluko, Olajide, *Nigerian Foreign Policy Under the Second Republic (1979–1983)*. Bordeaux: Centre d'Etude d'Afrique Noire, 1988. 42 pp. No price given (P)

Grundy, Kenneth W., *The Militarization of South African Politics*. London: I. B. Tauris, 1986. 133 pp. £16.50 (B)

Harbeson, John W., *The Military in African Politics*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. 197 pp. £25.95 (B)

ARMS AND ARMS CONTROL

Powaski, Ronald E., *March to Armageddon: The United States and the Nuclear Arms Race, 1939 to the Present*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987. 300 pp. £18.50 (B)

Sakitt, Mark, *Submarine Warfare in the Arctic: Option or Illusion?* Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, 1988. 93 pp. No price given (P)

Sheehan, Michael, *Arms Control: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988. 188 pp. £9.95 (B)

Teller, Edward, *Better a Shield than a Sword: Perspectives on Defense and Technology*. New York: Free Press, 1987. 257 pp. £14.95 (B)

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Barnhart, Michael A., *Japan Prepares for Total War: The Search for Economic Security, 1919–1941*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987. 290 pp. $US 29.95 (B)

Cline, Ray S. *et al.*, *Asia in Soviet Global Strategy*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1987. 193 pp. $US 18.95 (B)

Farr, Grant M. and Merriam, John G., *Afghan Resistance: The Politics of Survival*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press Inc., 1987. 235 pp. $US 27.00 (B)

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Lewis, Julian, *Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence, 1942–47*. London: The Sherwood Press Ltd, 1988. 475 pp. £30.00 (B)

Walendowski, Edmund, *Combat Motivation of the Polish Forces*. London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1988. 154 pp. £29.00 (B)

LATIN AMERICA

Corkill, David and Cubitt, David, *Ecuador: Fragile Democracy*. London: Latin America Bureau, 1987. 115 pp. £3.95 (B)

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USA

Kruzel, Joseph, *American Defense Annual 1988–89*. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books and Columbus, OH: The Mershon Center, 1988. 323 pp. No price given (B)

Record, Jeffrey, *Beyond Military Reform: American Defense Dilemmas*. McLean, VA: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988. 186 pp. £9.95 (B)

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Hansen, James H., *Correlation of Forces: Four Decades of Soviet Military Development*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1987. 236 pp. £28.50 (B)

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Mr. Yasuhiro Nakasone
c/o Mr. Ichiro Fujisaki
Counsellor
Embassy of Japan
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Dear Sir,

The November/December edition of our journal, Survival, containing your article "Towards a new international community" has recently been published.

I would like to thank you for allowing us to publish this piece, and for your co-operation during the production process. As a small token of our appreciation, I enclose a cheque for £100 along with a copy of Survival. Six further copies will be sent to you shortly.

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outmatch him in offers of arms reductions. I would appreciate Gorbachev's domestic problems and align itself with him against his more conservative adversaries, offering arms reductions as sweeping as his own. But the risks involved in such a course would be so deeply divisive within the Alliance that only an act of outstanding statesmanship on the part of the Allied political leaders – statesmanship of the kind that created the Alliance forty years ago – would make it possible to adopt it. The courage and vision required, indeed, would have to be on an even greater scale than that of 1949: fear is a much more effective catalyst than hope. And it must be admitted that such qualities are, among Allied political leaders at present, in somewhat short supply.

In the absence of such strong and controversial leadership from above, the Alliance will have to settle for Option C. With all its drawbacks it provides a credible framework for security; the risks involved in pursuing it are less than those attached to the bolder course; and above all it divides the Alliance least. With our objective thus clarified, our strategy becomes clear and we can shape our tactics accordingly. We must conduct a skilful delaying action in the certain knowledge that we have powerful allies in the enemy camp. We must block Gorbachev's radical proposals, or counter them with demands for radical troop cuts and redeployments of Soviet armed forces which, however attractive to Gorbachev himself, will be quite unacceptable to his military leadership and their political allies. Together with them, sooner or later, we can wear the man down and frustrate his disturbing designs: after that it may be another generation before a Soviet leader emerges with the energy to try again. All that is required is patience and the negotiating skills at which the Alliance is now so adept.

Few political leaders, however, would be prepared to accept the limited objectives implied in such a programme as being truly adequate for the Alliance, and even fewer would be prepared frankly to inform their publics that that is what they intend to do. Option B, a benign relationship with the Soviet Union, is our declared objective, whatever difficulties we may confront in pursuing it. A policy of confrontation may remain inevitable in the short run, but many Europeans will find it unacceptable for the long. Immobilism, however skilfully pursued, will eventually impose an intolerable strain on our relationships. Unless we can look beyond immediate necessities to ultimate objectives and adjust our policies accordingly, the prospects before the Alliance in the twenty-first century will be bleak. The Gorbachev challenge calls for critical self-examination as well as a convincing response.

Towards a new international community

YASUHIRO NAKASONE

What is the 'spirit of our times?'

From time immemorial different nations and groups of people, living in various parts of the world, have created their own life-styles and spiritual culture. As interchange between different regions became more frequent, nations and groups influenced each other, and common ways of thinking of a given period came to be shared by different peoples over broader areas, creating what can be called 'the spirit of the times'. Over the past millennium there have been various 'spirits of the times'. In Europe, for example, dominant spiritual trends have characterized respective ages, such as the respect for the individual in the Greek civilization, puritanism during the Reformation, humanism during the Renaissance, and rationalism during the Industrial Revolution.

What then is the spirit of our time? It is the scientific and technological revolution which started with the Industrial Revolution and continued through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Science and technology, which developed mainly in the modern Western nations, not only brought material benefits to mankind but also, because it extended to the entire world, became a common world language. It established objective yardsticks and methods of perception on a global basis. With this perspective, it became possible for the first time in thousands of years of human history to appreciate the spiritual cultures of different nations, races and groups without prejudice. This is indeed a great achievement.

Scientific and technological progress will undoubtedly continue to be fundamental to improving the well-being of mankind. However, as the end of the twentieth century approaches, it has become clear that science and technology alone cannot guarantee the happiness of man. The most typical example is the unleashing of nuclear energy. It gave mankind a new source of energy, but it also created the threat of nuclear war – the most serious issue of this century – putting man's own survival at risk.

Biotechnology, too, having made remarkable progress in recent years, holds great promise of improvements in medicine and in the supply of food to people around the world. On the other hand, human dignity could also be threatened if the technology of rearranging genetic codes is misused. One

This article is drawn from a 21 July 1988 address delivered by former Prime Minister Nakasone at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The original speech was printed by IMEMO.

could say that, externally and internally, mankind is threatened by nuclei: the atom and the gene.

The time has therefore come to enhance the spirit of the times, which has had as its supreme driving force the development of science and technology, to lift it to a yet higher level and to establish new spiritual guidelines that will prepare mankind for the ushering in of a new era.

What, then, should be the spirit of the coming age? There is a clue in the limitation inherent in science and technology. No matter how sophisticated science and technology may become, it is always the human being who reflects on and perceives such intellectual achievements. Now, more than ever, mankind must raise the human mind to its rightful pre-eminence above all else.

At the least, two things can be said. First, science and technology need to be put in their appropriate places as a *part* of human civilization, so that they do not overmaster mankind entirely. Second, just as science and technology have been based on universal values and concepts, so, in the area of spiritual civilization, we must promote understanding between different cultures and reach out to embrace a common basis for appreciating different values.

When international and domestic communities are undergoing rapid changes, individuals, companies and nations can no longer maintain their existence unless they remove the barriers which separate them and fully appreciate each other's existence. An era is approaching in which 'harmony and solidarity', derived from the lofty aspirations of the human spirit, will have become mankind's most urgent need. Such harmony and solidarity are the essence of the Oriental thought on which the Japanese culture is based.

One of the important pillars of this Oriental thought is Buddhism. Two thousand years ago Buddha taught that 'Mountains, rivers, plants and trees all attain Buddhahood'. This philosophy means that nature and man are of fundamentally the same root, both possessing divine characteristics, and thus should co-exist and co-prosper. The essence of Confucianism, which forms another pillar of Oriental thinking, is to maintain social order and peace by emphasizing filial piety, the importance of proprieties, love of work, service to and harmony within a community.

On the basis of such Oriental thinking, the Japanese hope to realize their ideals – respect for human dignity, respect for human rights, 'all nations living in harmony', and eternal peace. Following these basic guidelines, Japan is a nation committed to peace, abiding by the three non-nuclear principles, and devoted to self-defence, rejecting the path to becoming a military power. And it is seeking to make contributions appropriate to its national standing in the various regions of the world, including Asia and the Pacific.

Not only Japan but also Asian newly-industrialized economies have shown strong economic growth in recent years. This also has to do with deeply-rooted Confucian and Buddhist traditions in East Asia. Democracy and liberalism have blended with them to create an excellent balance between order and dynamism making possible tremendous growth.

Perspectives on East–West relations

Looking back over the past forty years or so, the East–West relationship has gone through cycles of confrontation and co-operation. It is a history in which the two sides have appeared and performed jointly on the same stage, but it has also been characterized by confrontation between the Stalinism and expansionism of the East and the containment policy of the West. It is a history of intertwined dynamics, one of tension, the other of relaxation. The trend towards heightened tension has been reflected in such incidents as the drawing down of the Iron Curtain at the end of World War II, the Korean War, the Berlin blockade, the Cuban Missile Crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan. On the other hand, the trend towards easing tension has expressed itself in the 'thaw', the partial nuclear test ban, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Helsinki Accord and the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

From the Japanese point of view, it is a situation where Stalinism, which destroyed mutual trust and caused a stand-off between the East and the West after World War II, has come to be criticized even within the Soviet Union itself. Equally, rigid thinking in the West deriving from the containment policy is becoming a thing of the past. There is now a growing trend towards sweeping away the residue of these policies and constructing a new East–West relationship.

It is from this perspective that the so-called 'New Thinking' adopted in recent Soviet diplomacy and the resulting positive steps, such as the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, are to be appreciated. It is to be hoped that other such actions will follow shortly. It should be stressed, however, that over and above the awareness of the threat of nuclear weapons, the acknowledgment that excessive nuclear arsenals were at the level of overkill, and the recognition that military expenditure was taxing national economics, there was another factor that was a key to the INF Agreement. This was the historic fact that the INF deployment in Europe to counter the SS-20 missile brought about the global 'double-zero' option.

The sort of progress needed in East–West relations is not just movement towards a mood of detente, but rather progress that is supported by concrete realities. It is all the more imperative, therefore, that the US and the USSR should exert further efforts to conclude the Strategic Arms Reductions treaty and that other nations should strengthen their support for these efforts. Moreover, talks should be promoted to broaden the arena to the whole of Europe, by way of implementing the agreement of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to start negotiations on conventional weapons. Information, people-to-people and economic exchanges between the West and the Soviet-bloc countries should be accelerated on the basis of respect for human rights and on a voluntary basis.

In this connection, *perestroika* and *glasnost* are of great importance. These restructuring steps undoubtedly have the basic objective of revitalizing the Soviet Union as a strong socialist state. And one should not har-

bour the illusion that adversarial relationships between socialist regimes and liberal democracies will be resolved easily. The historic competition will continue. The critical difference between the two systems is that, while advocacy of socialist doctrines is allowed in liberal democracies, socialist regimes reject free and democratic ideas. Socialist parties have their rightful role in the free democratic system, whereas political parties adhering to liberal democratic ideas are basically prohibited in the socialist system. Furthermore, in a liberal democratic political system, democratization is not only a means to an end but also, and more importantly, a value to be pursued for its own sake.

This gives all the more reason for evaluating positively the present Soviet reforms, including *glasnost*, democratization and greater respect for human rights, and for saluting the courage and wisdom of its proponent, General Secretary, and now President, Gorbachev. The extent to which the so-called socialist pluralism will allow for the individual's ideas and beliefs, or allow freedom of assembly and association based on such beliefs will be followed with interest. The issues deliberated at the last Communist Party Conference, such as the separation of powers between the Party and the Soviet, or the direction of the leadership of the Party, are also worthy of close study. How these internal reforms will be reflected in Soviet foreign policies, especially in the areas of arms reduction, regional conflicts and bilateral issues should be examined. It is to be hoped that these reforms will evolve in a manner to match the spirit of the twenty-first century.

In looking at the future course of East–West relations, there seem to be three alternatives:

The first would be the continuation of the *status quo*.

The second would be a significant improvement in the relationship already attained, through a further deepening and broadening of the fruits borne by the negotiations and dialogues that have been achieved so far.

The third would be to abandon both Stalinism and the containment policy completely and establish global reconciliation and true normalization of East–West relations based on new principles and value systems.

The most likely of the three is the second course. Nonetheless, creating the momentum for the third alternative should always be borne in mind, for this is the course that would stabilize East–West relations for decades to come, and this is the road towards establishing co-operation and mutual dependence in political, economic and cultural spheres.

However difficult it may be, both sides must work to better relations between East and West through dialogue and negotiations; they must seek to solve world issues harmoniously rather than resorting to arms; they must stress the improvement of economics and living standards rather than military capabilities, and build a relationship allowing for unfettered exchanges and 'solidarity'. Through these efforts, we can make progress towards the spirit of the twenty-first century.

Asia's strategic concerns

In the context of world development, centring around relations between East and West, what vista opens before Asia?

Asia consists of a number of countries and regions which differ in their political and economic systems, cultures, languages and historical backgrounds. And the relations between these countries are complex. Asia differs geopolitically from Europe; Europe is like an oil-painting, with colours painted all over the canvas, while Asia is like an Oriental brush painting, where much of the surface is left blank. In Europe the physical symmetry between NATO and the Warsaw Pact thoroughly covers both sides of the continent, but in Asia nothing of this sort exists. One may say that in Asia there is plenty of room for 'imagination' and 'creative thinking'. This characteristic should be fully taken into account.

Addressing Asia, President Gorbachev made various proposals in his Vladivostok speech, including a Helsinki-type Asia/Pacific Conference. Unfortunately, his proposals have not received a favourable response from the countries in the region. Frankly speaking, this is due to the absence of the conditions which could foster trust – a prerequisite for considering such proposals.

Concrete steps to resolve the various problems and issues which are at the root of political differences in this region are the first priority. Primarily, the Northern Territories issue between Japan and the Soviet Union should be resolved. Second, the continuing tension between North and South Korea should be eased. Third, a political solution to the Cambodian conflict should be reached.

It is Japan's hope that the Soviet Union will apply the flexibility engendered by its 'New Thinking' in its policy towards the Asian region, and that such flexibility will be demonstrated in its actions.

Japan and the Soviet Union

Lastly, the relationship between Japan and the Soviet Union needs to be examined.

Japan attaches great importance to its relations with its important neighbour, and hopes that bilateral ties will develop on the basis of the philosophy of 'all nations living in harmony'. The Soviet Union appears to subscribe to the same notion. Indeed, relations between the two countries are developing in such practical fields as trade, commerce, fisheries, science and technology and culture. However, despite its great potential for further development, the Japanese–Soviet relationship has not yet realized its full potential. This is unfortunate not only for these two countries, but also for the world as a whole.

The major reason for this situation is the fact that a peace treaty, which should form the fundamental basis for mutual trust, has not yet been concluded between Japan and the Soviet Union. Without establishing a stable political basis between the two nations by resolving the Northern Territories issue and concluding a peace treaty, which constitute the fundamentals for the correct relationship between the two countries, it is quite difficult to be hopeful of substantial development of the Japanese–Soviet

relationship and the fuller utilization of its pot[illegible]ial. Th[illegible]s the reason why the Japanese government has continuously and consistently been urging the Soviet government to respond seriously to the Northern Territories issue.

The Soviet government should make the first move by taking the initiative to alter its long-standing intransigence and showing a willingness to be forthcoming over the solution of this issue. Only then can the two countries talk of the ways to improve and develop their relationship.

With this in mind, it is important to widen and intensify the political dialogue between the two governments. Meetings between foreign ministers, as well as summit meetings, should be held more frequently and alternately in each country. If the still-pending visit by President Gorbachev to Japan is realized, it would certainly make an important contribution to the strengthening of the political dialogue. The Japanese–Soviet relationship will, I hope, be promoted in a balanced manner through efforts by both countries.

Towards a more co-operative world

The twenty-first century is just around the corner, and mankind should strive to make the coming age a glorious page in human history. The barriers of international borders, long at the root of war between nations, have been considerably lowered in recent times. The operations of multinational corporations are transcending national boundaries. Nuclear weapons, while effective as deterrents to other nuclear weapons, have now been proved to be useless against nations without them. Progress in the field of science and technology, such as development of micro-electronics, biotechnology and new materials, is opening infinite possibilities in space and in the oceans. Rapid progress in information media is making this earth truly integrated.

Against this background, new forms of nationalism, different from previous manifestations, are emerging in various parts of the world. Awareness and needs of nations for economy and welfare have changed, and individuality and human rights have become the focus of greater attention. Old regimes, old ideas and ideologies, old norms cannot cope with this emerging situation. We should lose no time in building a new international community befitting this new era.

Now is the time for the countries of the world in their respective regions to endeavour, not by words but by deeds, to find reasonable and constructive solutions to outstanding problems and to build better and more durable relationships appropriate to the coming century. At all levels, but particularly between senior politicians, Japan and the Soviet Union should engage in serious exchanges of views in order to identify the problems, to find ways towards solutions and to foster a promising future. There is a Russian proverb, 'Everything in its time'. The time, I am convinced, is now.

West Germany faces nuclear modernization

RONALD D. ASMUS

When discussing the future of theatre nuclear forces in West Germany, one must start by noting that the FRG is in the middle of a major debate on foreign and security policy, in which the question of nuclear modernization is a central issue. This debate centres on the need to define a new *Gesamtkonzept*, or comprehensive policy approach, to guide the country's foreign and security policy into the 1990s. The call for a new *Gesamtkonzept* was initially voiced by those West German conservatives concerned about the strategic ramifications of the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement, but it has since spread across the political spectrum. The now widespread perception that a new approach is needed reflects changes in the domestic and strategic environment in which West German foreign and security policy must be formulated and implemented – changes that are increasingly seen as having eroded the foundations upon which security policy has hitherto been based.

The first change is in domestic opinion. The peace movement and the battle over Euromissile deployment of the early 1980s may now be history, but they have left the previous security consensus shattered, above all on the issue of nuclear strategy. The feeling that a review of security policy is needed has been fuelled by a second factor: the proclaimed 'New Thinking' in the foreign policy of the USSR under General Secretary, and now President, Mikhail Gorbachev and the consequent changing perceptions of the Soviet threat. Third, the continuing American debate about the direction of US foreign policy, its real or imagined shift towards the Pacific-rim countries, and fashionable theories of imperial decline have raised concern over the future course of American policy and the US commitment to European defence, thus reinforcing perceptions that the FRG must clarify its security policy needs.

Finally, the question of nuclear weapons on West German soil has become entwined with broader questions about the FRG's future role in Europe, its ties with the United States, and its relations with the East. Forty years after the FRG's foundation, a young generation of West Germans is critically re-examining whether the alignments that determined policy in the past can or should be adapted to suit its interests better in a changing East–West environment. The fact that members of both the

Ronald D. Asmus is an analyst at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, CA. The views and conclusions expressed are those of the author and should not be interpreted as representing those of the RAND Corporation or any of the agencies sponsoring its research.

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中曽根前総理の訪ソ（講演の雑誌掲載）

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ОЦЕНКИ, СУЖДЕНИЯ

Недавно посетивший нашу страну депутат японского парламента, бывший премьер-министр Японии (27.XI.1982—6.XI.1987) Ясухиро Накасонэ выступил в ИМЭМО АН СССР с лекцией, содержащей широкий подход к современному миру, ближайшему будущему цивилизации в XXI веке. Не со всеми изложенными взглядами и постановками вопросов можно согласиться. На точке зрения оратора относительно послевоенных реальностей, истории международных отношений и ряда происходящих сегодня процессов сказываются его политические пристрастия, есть в ней и некоторые крайности. Однако оценки, высказанные человеком, продолжающим оказывать заметное влияние на формирование внешней политики одной из крупнейших мировых экономических держав, представляют несомненный интерес для исследователей-международников.

Публикуемый ниже текст выступления Я. Накасонэ помогает углубить представление о внешнеполитическом курсе и аргументах правящих кругов Японии.

ЗАЛОЖИТЬ ОСНОВЫ НОВОГО МЕЖДУНАРОДНОГО СООБЩЕСТВА

Я. НАКАСОНЭ

Сегодня, когда я посещаю вашу страну, минуло свыше 70 лет после Октябрьской революции. На пороге XXI века повсюду в мире происходят глубокие перемены, охватившие человечество. Одна из целей моего визита — непосредственно ощутить и лучше понять, как развивается советское общество в условиях этих перемен, какие проблемы вы решаете, как оцениваете перспективы.

Важные задачи связаны с претворением в жизнь перестройки, в ней ваш народ видит свое будущее. Мне хотелось бы глубже узнать сущность происходящих реформ, почувствовать отношение к ним советских людей.

Я рад представившейся возможности выступить в ИМЭМО АН СССР перед советскими учеными. Наши взгляды не во всем совпадают. Разрешите обрисовать, как мы представляем себе ближайшее будущее международных отношений на новом этапе их развития.

Люди в разных частях света с незапамятных времен создавали свой собственный образ жизни, духовную культуру. Но по мере того, как между ними возникали и развивались взаимосвязи, нации и группы людей постепенно находили сходные точки зрения в оценке окружающей их действительности. Так родились общие идеи, ставшие характерными для той или иной эпохи. В Европе, например, это уважение к личности, присущее древнегреческой цивилизации, пуританство в эпоху Реформации, гуманизм эпохи Возрождения, рационализм в период промышленной революции.

Духом нашего сегодняшнего времени я бы назвал научно-техническую революцию, восходящую своими истоками к временам промышленной революции и бурно развивающуюся с XIX века по XX век.

Наука и техника, получившие развитие в Европе и Америке Нового времени, не только принесли человечеству материальные блага, но и по мере распространения на весь мир стали универсальным средством сближения. Повсюду использовались общие критерии и методы познания явлений природы и общества, стало возможным без предубеждений изучать культуру и достижения других стран, народов и отдельных групп людей. Этим был сделан большой шаг вперед.

У нас нет ни малейшего сомнения в том, что научно-технический прогресс будет и впредь оставаться фундаментом повышения благосостояния человечества. Однако сегодня, на пороге нового века, становится очевидным, что силами лишь науки и техники невозможно обеспечить счастье людей. Возьмем, к примеру, использование ядерной энергии. Расщепив ядро атома, ученые дали миру новый уникальный источник энергии, но одновременно с этим возникла и самая страшная опасность наших дней — опасность

ядерной войны, ставящей под угрозу само существование человечества.

В последнее время быстрыми темпами развивается и другое направление знаний — биотехнология. Люди всего мира возлагают на нее особые надежды в качестве эффективного источника медикаментов и продовольствия. Но развитие биотехнологии, генной инженерии может пойти и в опасном направлении, затронув достоинство человека, его существование как биологического вида. В этом смысле мы подвергаемся опасности со стороны двух ядер: снаружи — от ядра атома, изнутри — от ядра клетки.

В условиях прогресса знаний, ставшего духом нашего времени, возникает необходимость определить идею, которой будет подчинено развитие цивилизации в будущем. Здесь, на мой взгляд, необходимо разрешить противоречие, заложенное в нынешнем научно-техническом прогрессе, когда многие его достижения противостоят человеку. На каком бы передовом уровне ни находилась техника, наблюдает и познает все явления в конечном счете сам человек. Мы должны воздать должное человеческому разуму.

Мне хотелось бы подчеркнуть два момента. Во-первых, наука и техника не должны подавлять человеческую культуру, частью которой они являются. Во-вторых, поскольку развитие науки и техники базируется на общих идеях и ценностях, нам необходимо выработать аналогичные общие идеи, достичь взаимопонимания и в гуманитарной сфере. Современная цивилизация должна приблизиться к подлинному взаимопониманию, опершись на общечеловеческий фундамент ценностных категорий.

Историки и философы говорят о том, что в переходный период наблюдается сосуществование двух противоборствующих тенденций, одна из которых определяла предыдущее развитие, а другая — станет преобладать в будущем. Мне кажется, что новая тенденция наших дней заключается в следующем: отдельные личности, предприятия и целые страны не смогут в будущем существовать без устранения барьеров, их разделяющих, без должной оценки партнеров.

В этих условиях — как в международном сообществе в целом, так и в отдельных его составляющих — происходят значительные изменения. Наступает новая эпоха, при которой гармония и солидарность станут высшими проявлениями человеческого духа.

Хотелось бы особо отметить, что гармония и солидарность считаются основополагающими началами в мировоззрении Востока, на их базе развивается и японская национальная культура.

Одна из мировоззренческих основ восточной философии — буддизм. Две тысячи лет назад Будда изрек: «горы, реки, травы, деревья — все это бытие, в котором таится мой дух». Идея здесь заключается в том, что и природа, и человечество имеют общие корни. Проникнутые единым божественным духом, они должны сосуществовать и процветать вместе. Сущность конфуцианства, другой основы восточной философии, — в сохранении социального порядка и мира посредством почитания старших, вежливости, трудолюбия, гармонии и служения каждого всеобщему благу.

Следуя этим традициям восточной мысли, японцы стараются реализовать свои идеалы — добиться уважения человеческого достоинства, прав личности, установления гармонии в международных отношениях, достижения прочного мира. Япония — миролюбивая страна, соблюдающая три ядерных принципа. Обладая силой, носящей сугубо оборонительный характер, мы не встали на путь превращения в военную державу. Наша страна стремится внести вклад, соответствующий ее потенциалу, в развитие международных отношений, прежде всего в Азиатско-тихоокеанском регионе.

В последние годы успешное динамичное развитие стало характерным не только для Японии, но и для так называемых азиатских «новых индустриальных экономик». Это явление в немалой степени опирается на глубоко укоренившиеся в Восточной Азии принципы конфуцианства и буддизма. Идеи демократии и либерализма, слившись с традиционными принципами, удивительным образом сбалансировали стремление к порядку, с одной стороны, и энергичный поиск нового — с другой.

Теперь посмотрим на послевоенную историю отношений между Востоком и Западом со сменявшими друг друга переходами от конфронтации к взаимодействию. За прошедшие 40 с лишним лет обе соперничавшие стороны играли на мировой арене разные роли. Это история конфронтации между сталинизмом и экспансионизмом Востока и противостоящей им жесткой политикой сдерживания, проводимой Западом. В то же время, говоря о периодах напряженности, нельзя не видеть и сменявших их периодов разрядки. Был не только спуск «железного занавеса», война в Корее, блокада Берлина, карибский кризис и вторжение в Афганистан. Было и заключение Договора о запрещении испытаний ядерного оружия в атмосфере, в космическом пространстве и под водой, Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия, Договора об Антарктике, соглашений между США и СССР об ограничении стратегических вооружений, а также хельсинкские договоренности и заключение Договора о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности.

Нужно отметить, что сталинизм, который, по нашему мнению, стал причиной исчезновения взаимного доверия после Второй мировой войны, образования безвыходного положения в отношениях между Востоком и Западом, сегодня подвергается критике и в Советском Союзе. С другой стороны, сам жесткий подход

Запада, его политика сдерживания в нынешних исторических условиях уже явно устарели. Как мне представляется, создается почва для полного искоренения конфронтационных подходов, для налаживания принципиально новых отношений между Востоком и Западом.

Именно с этих позиций я оцениваю новое мышление, которым стала руководствоваться советская дипломатия, а также новые практические шаги СССР, такие, как заключение Договора о ликвидации ракет средней и меньшей дальности, решение о выводе войск из Афганистана. Надеюсь, что отмеченные положительные тенденции наберут дальнейшие темпы в будущем.

В то же время ключом к упомянутому Договору стало не только обоюдное осознание опасности ядерного оружия, пересмотр отношения к целесообразности иметь чрезмерный его уровень, способный уничтожить противника многократно, а также в немалой степени тяжелое бремя гонки вооружений для народного хозяйства. Историческим фактом является и то, что «глобальному двойному нулевому варианту» предшествовало размещение в Европе ракет средней дальности в противовес советским ракетам СС-20.

Нужно развивать отношения, подкрепленные практическими шагами, а не просто поддаваться настроению разрядки. Безусловно, важным здесь следует считать скорейшее завершение переговоров между США и СССР о стратегических наступательных вооружениях, которые должны поддержать и все другие государства. Географические рамки переговоров нужно распространить на весь европейский континент, где для полного осуществления хельсинкских соглашений необходимо начать сокращение и обычных вооружений.

Надеюсь, что взаимный обмен в сфере информации, контакты между людьми и экономические связи между Советским Союзом, странами Восточной Европы и странами Запада получат дальнейшее развитие на основе добровольности и уважения к правам человека. В этом контексте весьма важное значение мы придаем гласности и перестройке, осуществляемой сейчас в Советском Союзе.

Понятно, что конечная цель этих реформ — повышение мощи Советского социалистического государства. И мне не кажется, что противоборство между социалистическим строем и строем нашей свободной демократии уйдет в прошлое. Историческое соревнование будет продолжаться. Существенная разница между двумя режимами сводится к тому, что в системе нашей демократии не исключаются социалистические убеждения, подтверждением чему является наличие социалистических партий, а в социалистической системе убеждения демократии нашего типа и создание на этой основе политических партий исключены. Под термином «демократизация» мы подразумеваем не только средство для достижения целей, но и важнейшую цель саму по себе.

Именно поэтому я высоко оцениваю нынешние реформы, проводимые в Советском Союзе, прежде всего гласность, демократизацию и более полное уважение прав человека. Нельзя не отдать должное в этой связи дальновидности и смелости Генерального секретаря М. С. Горбачева.

С большим вниманием мы наблюдаем за развитием в рамках социалистического плюрализма идей о праве на собственную точку зрения, о свободе собраний и митингов, объединения в организации. Важны и другие проблемы, рассмотренные на прошедшей недавно Всесоюзной партийной конференции, включая вопрос о разделении функций между партийными и советскими органами, о руководящей роли партии в советском обществе. В фокусе нашего внимания и то, каким образом реформа внутри страны будет отражаться на вашей внешней политике, в частности на сокращении вооружений и на подходах к региональным и двусторонним проблемам. И в этой связи я надеюсь на то, что реформа будет идти в общем русле перемен XXI века.

При оценке перспектив развития отношений между Востоком и Западом просматриваются следующие три варианта. Первый — сохранение нынешней ситуации, статус-кво. Второй — развитие уже достигнутых успехов в переговорах, дальнейшее расширение и углубление диалога. Третий — окончательная ликвидация сталинизма и политики сдерживания, полная и на глобальном уровне нормализация отношений между двумя системами, которые основываются на новых принципах и ценностях. Наверное, самый реальный вариант — второй. Но необходимо уже сейчас закладывать прочный фундамент и под третий из названных вариантов. Ведь именно он стабилизирует международные отношения в долгосрочной перспективе, открывает дорогу к установлению сотрудничества и взаимозависимости в политической, экономической и культурной сферах.

Несмотря на имеющиеся трудности, мы должны работать в направлении дальнейшего развития отношений между Востоком и Западом на пути диалога и открытого обсуждения проблем, должны искать гармоничное решение мировых проблем без применения силы, должны придавать большее значение повышению экономической мощи и уровня жизни, чем наращиванию вооружений, устанавливать отношения исходя из стремления к свободным международным связям и солидарности. Уверен в том, что именно в этом направлении мы продвинемся вперед в формировании духа нового времени, характерного для XXI века.

Какое место занимает Азия, в которой расположена и Япония, в контексте рассмотренных выше проблем международных отношений? Общеизвестно, что в

Азии находятся страны и субрегионы с различным политическим строем, экономическими системами, с многообразием культурных, языковых, исторических особенностей. Сложившиеся в этой части земного шара межгосударственные отношения представляются не только сложными, но и во многом отличными от геополитической ситуации в Европе.

Как-то я сказал одному всемирно известному политологу следующее: Европу можно уподобить картине маслом, полотно которой покрыто красками, но Азия — это восточный «сумие», рисунок тушью, значительная часть поверхности которого еще не окрашена. Европу характеризует четкая поляризация сил, распространяющаяся на весь регион, которую определяют НАТО и Варшавский Договор. В Азии ничего подобного нет, а то, что здесь есть, дает большие возможности и для игры воображения, и для конструктивного мышления. Эту особенность положения в Азии нужно учитывать.

Обращаясь к Азии, Генеральный секретарь ЦК КПСС М. С. Горбачев выдвинул в известной владивостокской речи различные предложения, в том числе и о созыве, по типу хельсинкской, Азиатско-тихоокеанской конференции. К сожалению, это не нашло широкой поддержки среди стран региона. Откровенно говоря, такая ситуация сложилась потому, что в настоящее время еще не созданы условия для взаимного доверия, которые могли бы послужить предпосылкой для рассмотрения выдвинутых предложений.

В сегодняшней реальности приоритетной задачей следует считать ликвидацию тех нерешенных проблем, которые служат причиной политической напряженности в регионе. Прежде всего, и это касается Японии и СССР, должен быть решен вопрос северных территорий. Во-вторых, должна быть смягчена остающаяся напряженной обстановка на Корейском полуострове. В-третьих, необходимо добиться политического урегулирования кампучийского вопроса. Китай также продолжает выдвигать три препятствия для полной нормализации отношений с СССР. В этих условиях, как отметил президент США Рейган, недоверие существует не из-за достигнутого уровня вооружений, сам этот уровень порожден существующим недоверием.

Я глубоко надеюсь, что Советский Союз гибко применит новое мышление в своей политике в азиатском регионе и продемонстрирует его практическими шагами.

В заключение хотелось бы еще раз коснуться советско-японских отношений. Япония придает большое значение связям с СССР, важным соседом нашей страны. Исходя из принципа «всем странам жить в гармонии», мы желаем дальнейшего развития двусторонних контактов. Уверен в том, что и у Советского Союза такой же подход.

Отношения между нашими странами продвинулись в таких областях практического взаимодействия, как торгово-экономический и научно-технический обмен, рыболовство, культурные связи. Но, откровенно говоря, несмотря на большой потенциал советско-японских отношений, на сегодняшний день он реализуется далеко не полностью. И это неблагоприятно влияет не только на двусторонние связи, но и на общую ситуацию в мире.

Отсутствие мирного договора, который заложил бы основу взаимного доверия, служит самой главной причиной такого положения. Без решения вопроса северных территорий и заключения мирного договора, то есть без установления стабильной политической основы отношений, довольно трудно надеяться на значительное расширение советско-японских связей и более полное использование их потенциала. Именно поэтому правительство нашей страны в течение долгих лет призывало советскую сторону проявить серьезный подход к данному вопросу. Я считаю, что первый шаг, пересмотрев свою прежнюю упорную позицию, должна сделать советская сторона, ей следует проявить готовность идти навстречу решению данного вопроса. Только в этих условиях две страны могут вести переговоры о дальнейшем улучшении и развитии отношений. С этой же целью необходимо углубить и активизировать политический диалог между правительствами обеих стран, почаще и поочередно проводить встречи на уровне министров иностранных дел и на высшем уровне. В укрепление политического диалога между нашими странами большой вклад внес бы остающийся на повестке дня визит в Японию Генерального секретаря ЦК КПСС М. С. Горбачева. От всей души надеюсь, что обоюдными усилиями сторон советско-японские отношения получат сбалансированное развитие.

Мы вступаем в XXI век. Нужно сосредоточить усилия на том, чтобы в истории человечества была открыта новая светлая эра. Высокие преграды государственных границ, долгое время служившие поводом для войн, становятся ниже. За их рамки уже вышла деятельность транснациональных компаний. Ядерное оружие еще сдерживает применение такого же, ядерного, оружия, но становится бесполезным в отношениях со странами, его не имеющими. Микроэлектроника, биотехнология, освоение новых материалов и другие направления научно-технического прогресса открывают безграничные возможности для использования в интересах человечества космоса и Мирового океана. Быстрый прогресс средств связи также делает нашу планету единой.

В то же время новые формы национального сознания, отличные от прошлых, возникают в разных ее частях. Меняются потребности народов, на перед-

ний план выступают экономический рост и благосостояние, индивидуальность личности и человеческие права. Старые способы правления, старые воззрения и идеологические догмы, старые нормы поведения становятся бездейственными в новой ситуации. Возникает необходимость создания нового международного сообщества, соответствующего новой эре.

Сейчас пришло время всем странам мира во всех его регионах найти не на словах, а на деле рациональное и конструктивное решение остающихся проблем и создать новую систему взаимоотношений, приемлемую для нового столетия. В свою очередь, Япония и Советский Союз на всех уровнях, прежде всего на уровне руководящих политических деятелей, должны провести серьезный обмен мнениями для выяснения существа стоящих перед ними проблем и поиска их решений в будущем.

Русская пословица гласит: «Всему свое время». Так не настало ли наше время сейчас?

НАША СПРАВКА

Ясухиро Накасонэ родился в 1918 г. в г. Такасаки, префектура Гумма. Окончив юридический факультет Токийского университета, работал в министерстве внутренних дел, затем служил в японских ВМС. После второй мировой войны был инспектором полицейского управления Токио. С 1947 г. в общей сложности 16 раз избирался в палату представителей парламента Японии. Занимал министерские посты: в 1959—1960 гг.— начальник управления по науке и технике, в 1967—1968 гг.— министр транспорта, в 1970—1971 гг.— начальник управления национальной обороны, в 1972—1974 гг.— министр внешней торговли и промышленности и в 1980—1982 гг.— государственный министр, начальник управления административного контроля Японии. В 1974—1976 гг.— генеральный секретарь правящей либерально-демократической партии (ЛДП). С ноября 1982 г. по ноябрь 1987 г.— председатель ЛДП и премьер-министр Японии. С лета нынешнего года возглавляет созданный по его инициативе Международный институт глобальных проблем мира — новую исследовательскую организацию, консультирующую правительство по вопросам международных отношений и мировой экономики.

十時ヘルシンキ受付往電案

p-2

秘
無期限

※総第 096310号002公館宛 GM3124-02

※昭和 63年 22時 10月 4分 3日 42秒受付

暗・略

電信案

電信課長

大臣
秘書官
政務次官
事務次官
外務審議官
外務審議官
官房長

主管 欧亜局長
参事官
ソヴィエト連邦課長
首席事務官

※発電係 1

起案 昭和63年10月3日

起案者 内田 電話番号 2621

協議先

(※印欄内は電信課記入)

FAX

在 英 大使 総領事 あて 外務大臣 発

件名 中曽根前総理の訪ソ(講演の英誌掲載)

主管・文書記号	※電番	大至急 / 普通 / 至急(優先処理)	パターン・コード
在ソ	第2280号	至急(優先処理)	

転電 転送 在ソ連 転報

※転電番号 第2740号

大使・総領事あて

大至急 / 至急(優先処理)

(八〇字)

貴電第3328号及び在ソ連発大臣宛第3989号に関し、

本件については、冒頭ソ連発来電のとおり本講演テキストの英誌掲載につき IMEMO独

※

09631089 優先 YEI 等002 F電

GB-1 外務省 回覧番号 1094

(注意) 1枚目は、機械で処理しますので、折り曲げない様願います。

(昭和六二・一〇・六改正)

(三八〇字)

生異存ない旨述べていることもあり、冒頭貴電別上AX信の通り掲載して差し支えなく、右IIS S側に回答あり下さい。(なお、本件英訳掲載については IMEMO側のうまくは基本的に必要ないと思うところ、(右念の為)
ソ連に転電した。

(3)

16/09:30 [redacted] 5904 02/11 P01 R154651

注意 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の内容に関する照会は検閲班（内線２１７１、２１７４）。
3. その他本電の取扱い等に関する照会は調整班（内線３１６９）に連絡ありたい。

ファイル用

電信写 [redacted] [redacted] 11－015

大臣	政務次官	事務次官
外務審議官	外務審議官	儀典長
大使	外務審議官	査察使
博多代表	研修所長	
総務審議官	総合外交政策局長	対人地雷担当大使
厚生審議官	情報調査局長	在外邦人保護審議官
外報	審議官	内閣外政審議官
領事移住部長	文化交流部長	審議官
	参事官	旅券審議官
北米局長	中東アフリカ局	審議官
	北東アジア課	参事官
中南米局長	欧州局	審議官
欧州局長	参事官	西欧第一課
		東欧課
近東アフリカ局長	審議官	アジア大洋州局
		参事官
経済局長	次長	総合外交政策局
	審議官	経済協力局
	参事官	経済課
	経済安全保障室	
	参事官	審議官
経済協力局長	審議官	政府開発援助
	参事官	調査計画課
条約局長	審議官	条約課
国連局長	審議官	経済人権課
	参事官	軍縮課
科学審議官	科学原子力課	
情報調査局長	審議官	情報分析第一課
	参事官	企画室

総番号 R154651 主管 欧ソ

月 14日 [redacted] 英国発

63年 9月 15日 [redacted] 本省着

外務大臣殿 千葉大使

ナカソネ前総理の訪ソ（講演の英し掲載）.

第3328号 至急 [redacted]

（以下FAX送信LD4144－01）

(三八〇字)

電電公社専用 16×20号に関し、

IISS より、Survival 誌掲載用に手を入れた

原稿を送付致しましたところ、右 MEMO 案(別FAX(注))の

ご解釈線をみた場合には、右原稿とさせ頂

きたきや、念の為同電頂いたい。

(3)

16/09:17 [redacted] 5886 02/11 P01 R154491

注意 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の内容に関する照会は検閲班（内線2171、2174）
3. その他本電の取扱い等に関する照会は調整班（内線3639）に連絡ありたい。

取扱注意

ファイル用

電信写

[redacted]

11－014

大政事外外儀官 務務 典房 次次 臣官官審審長長
大外審 儀 察 代 使研審 表
総総対文会厚情オ 括 審察人國在儀警史
外報官 審報内 際外 文長 審一二
領移長 参一二旅査移
審地中東 二 参北東西 一
北米長 審一二保
中南長 審一二
欧長 参西ソ洋 一 西東 二
近ア 審一二アア 一二
経長 次総経途博 二 経漁国 一 参経エ国 安ネ二
参海 審準
経協長 審政国開無 参調技有理
条長 審条協規
国長 審政経人 参軍社
科審 科原
情調長 審情析調 審企安

総番号 R154491　主管

月 14日 [redacted]　ソ連発　欧ソ

63年 9月 15日　本省着

外務大臣殿　武藤大使

ナカソネ前総理の訪ソ（講演の英し掲載）

第3989号（取扱注意）至急 [redacted]

（以下FAX送信MW1599－01）

取扱注意

(三八〇字)

貴電四九合第一六四二八号に関し、

本日当館伊藤(裕)より木村チェンマイEM

の書記に対し、また本日山村よりチェクロフ

「世界経済と国際関係」誌副編集長に対し、本件

を参考情報として伝達しおいた。

なお、「木」書記は「問題ないと思う」旨、また

「チェ」副編集長は「論説の当誌への掲載が「Su

rvival」誌への掲載を妨げるものではない」

旨述べた。

英国に転電した。

(3)

ファイル用

注意 1. 本電の取扱いは慎重を期せられたい。
2. 本電の内容に関する照会は検閲班（内線２１７１、２１７４）。
3. その他本電の取扱い等に関する照会は調整班（内線３１６９）に連絡ありたい。

電信写

[redacted] [redacted] 11－015

大臣官房	政務次官
大臣官房	事務次官
大臣官房	外務審議官
使節	大使
研修	代表
審議官	博
総括審議官	総合外交政策局
総括審議官	総合安全保障
総括審議官	人権人道
総括審議官	在外邦人保護
外務報道官	内閣審議官
外務報道官	文化交流
外務報道官	審議官
領事移住部長	参事官
領事移住部長	旅券課長
領事移住部長	審議官
領事移住部長	地球規模課題
領事移住部長	中東アフリカ
領事移住部長	参事官
領事移住部長	北東アジア
領事移住部長	西欧
北米局長	審議官
北米局長	二国間
北米局長	保障
中南米局長	審議官
中南米局長	二国間
欧州局長	参事官
欧州局長	西欧
欧州局長	大洋州
欧州局長	東欧
欧州局長	二国間
欧州局長	審議官
欧州局長	二国間
欧州局長	アイルランド
欧州局長	アイスランド
欧州局長	二国間
経済局長	次長
経済局長	総括
経済局長	途上国
経済局長	博
経済局長	経済連携
経済局長	二国間
経済局長	参事官
経済局長	経済安全保障
経済局長	エネルギー
経済局長	二国間
	参事官
	海洋
	審議官
経済協力局長	審議官
経済協力局長	政策課長
経済協力局長	開発協力
経済協力局長	無償資金協力
経済協力局長	参事官
経済協力局長	調査計画課長
経済協力局長	技術協力
経済協力局長	有償資金協力
条約局長	審議官
条約局長	条約課長
条約局長	協定課長
国際法局長	審議官
国際法局長	政治経済人権
国際法局長	参事官
国際法局長	軍縮不拡散・科学
国際法局長	社会国際法
科学審議官	科学原子力
情報調査局長	審議官
情報調査局長	情報分析課長
情報調査局長	企画調整室長
情報調査局長	安全保障

総番号 R166456

主管

月 1日 [redacted] 英国発 欧ソ

63年 10月 2日 [redacted] 本省着

外務大臣殿 千葉大使

ナカソネ前総理の訪ソ（講演の英し掲載）

第3655号 [redacted]

（以下FAX送信LD4551－01）

(三六〇字)

在電第3328号に関し、

1155側より、サプライヤル線の停切れ見、っている旨っていることもありそ差自線往毛別FAX信のままで差もなまや否やを確認願い、ん、、当中し越しているところ、何分の儀回示促、、ない。

(3)