

Handwritten mark or signature at the top of the page.

Handwritten characters, possibly "飲理" (Shinri).

Handwritten character, possibly "子" (Ko).

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Handwritten characters "サシヨ" (Sashio).

Handwritten characters "サル" (Saruru).

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
SECRET

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The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his Government that, in particular, an armed attack against the Republic of Korea and against the Taiwan area, if it occurred, would seriously affect the security of Japan. On the basis of this recognition, the Prime Minister stated that, in the event of such armed attacks, it would be the policy of the GOJ to give prompt and favorable consideration, in accordance with the principle of prior consultation, to the use by US armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan in fulfillment of US treaty obligations.

SECRET



(August 20, 1969)

SECRET

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

Agreement was reached between President Nixon and myself that, upon reversion, the Security Treaty and its related arrangements should apply to Okinawa without any additional arrangement.

I explained to the President that the reversion of Okinawa in the manner I have just stated would not affect effective discharge of the international obligations assumed by the United States for the defense of countries in the Far East, including Japan. It would be only natural that a question should arise in this connection on the application of the prior consultation system on the use by U.S. forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations.

That action by U.S. forces under the Security Treaty must be in conformity with the U.N. Charter is clear from the provisions of Article I of the Treaty. This limitation therefore is applicable to the use by U.S. forces of facilities and areas in Japan for the security of the Far East, including Japan, under the terms of Article VI of the Treaty. The purport of the Exchange of Notes concerning the implementation of Article VI of the Security Treaty is to reserve the right of our final judgment on U.S. action involving Japan's vital national interest, or the country's own security, such as the

use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations, by making such action subject to prior consultation with our Government even though the action is to be in conformity with the U.N. Charter. The Security Treaty, however, is based on the common objective of Japan and the United States to maintain the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan. Since the prior consultation system should be properly maintained in accordance with this common objective, the system as such would not hinder U.S. forces from effectively contributing to the security of the area, including Japan.

Our primary objective in maintaining firmly the Security Treaty is, needless to say, to ensure the security of our own country. ~~Yet,~~ As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The tranquility of the Taiwan Strait, a problem relating to the area surrounding our country, is also a matter of great and immediate concern to us from the point of view of Japan's security. *It is essential to maintain peace and security in the Taiwan area.* ~~A situation in which the United States and Communist China directly engaged in warfare over Taiwan must be avoided at all costs for the sake of peace and security in the Far East.~~ On the other hand, it is also a fact that the United States has *in the event of an armed attack against the Taiwan area,* treaty commitments to the Republic of China. *However,* I do not today foresee a situation requiring these commitments to be invoked, and it is clear, too, that the United States Government *seeks to maintain peace and security with respect to the Taiwan area,* is giving its mind to the furtherance of talks with the Chinese ~~Communists.~~ Our Government's policy is to keep a close watch on the situation and deal with it as our national interest requires.

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(August 20, 1959)

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
Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The tranquility of the Taiwan Strait, ~~as an immediate~~ problem relating to the area surrounding our country, is also a matter of great concern to us from the point of view of ^{and immediate}

Japan's security. A situation in which the United States and Communist China directly engaged in warfare over Taiwan must be avoided at all costs for the sake of peace and security in the Far East. On the other hand, it is also a fact that the United States has treaty commitments to the Republic of China. However, I do not today foresee a situation requiring these commitments to be invoked, and it is clear, too, that the United States Government is giving its mind to the furtherance of talks with the Chinese Communists. Our Government's policy is to keep a close watch on the situation and deal with it as our national interest requires.



部内作字用

日

8.22 米陸軍省

August 21, 1969

SECRET

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

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peace and security

The tranquility of the Taiwan area, a problem relating to the area surrounding our country, is also a matter of great and immediate concern to us from the point of view of Japan's security. ^{It} ~~is essential to maintain peace and~~

~~security in the Taiwan area.~~ The United States has treaty

commitments to the Republic of China in the event of an armed attack against the Taiwan area. ^{Such an armed attack against the Taiwan area} However, I do not

^{and} today foresee a situation requiring these commitments to be invoked, and it is clear, too, that the United States

Government seeks to maintain peace and security with respect to the Taiwan area. Our Government's policy is to keep a

close watch on the situation and deal with it as our national interest requires.

would be dangerous to the peace and security of Japan, (the F.C. activity through)

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極 秘
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10 部の内 2 号

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(August 23, 1969)

(Treaties Bureau)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East, including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should be situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be involved against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East, including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires.

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極 秘
10 部の内
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(August 25, 1969)


Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

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In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

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I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires.



SECRET

(August 27, 1969)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.


In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan.

I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires.

on the basis of the foregoing considerations,

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(September 1, 1950)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister


As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide promptly its position on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

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I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan, though, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today. The policy of our Government is to continue to keep a close watch on the situation in the Taiwan area and to deal with it as our national interest requires on the basis of the foregoing considerations.

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The following remarks will be made on Vietnam in the Prime Minister's Statement:-

Although it is a hypothetical question related to the future, the U.S. Government is concerned with possible effects the reversion of Okinawa might have on the U.S. military efforts in Vietnam in case the war in Vietnam would unfortunately be prolonged. I, therefore, believe that, should hostilities have not been concluded by the time reversion is scheduled to take place, our Government should hold consultations with the U.S. Government on how to achieve necessary adjustments between the U.S. military efforts and the reversion, in a manner consistent with the mutual long-term interest of the two countries.

SECRET

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Korea

(Prime Minister's Statement)

Therefore, should an occasion arise for the U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

S E C R E T

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Taiwan

A. (Communique)

2. by honoring its defense treaty obligations in the area. *The Prime Minister agreed that the U.S. should be in a position to discharge effectively its international obligations for the defense of countries in the Far East including Japan.* (c.f. U.S. proposals of September 11, 1969).

B. (Prime Minister's Statement)

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. Should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan. Therefore, in view of our national interest, we should deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the U.S. of its defense obligations. However, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today.

S E C R E T

(Washington, September 12, 1969)

Viet-Nam

1. (Prime Minister's Statement)

Although it is a hypothetical question related to the future, it is my belief that, should hostilities unfortunately not have been concluded by the time reversion of Okinawa, is scheduled to take place, U.S. military activities relating to the conflict should not be [REDACTED] affected by reversion, as the two Governments would consult fully on the implications of a prolongation of the war.

2. (President's Statement)

Even in the unfortunate event of a prolongation of the conflict in Vietnam, the reversion of Okinawa agreed upon between our two countries with the necessary legislative support would not be affected, since there are fully adequate provisions for consultation between the two Governments on the implications of such a prolongation of the war.


3. (Communique)

The Prime Minister and the President expressed the hope that the war in Viet-Nam will be concluded before the return of administrative rights in Okinawa as mentioned in 5 below.

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(The Prime Minister also made clear the basic recognition of his Government that, in particular, an armed attack against the Republic of Korea, if it occurred, would seriously affect the security of Japan. The Prime Minister further stated that such recognition would form the basis on which the Government of Japan would determine its position vis-à-vis prior consultation under the exchange of notes concerning the implementation of Article 6 of the Security Treaty on the use by United States armed forces of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations from Japan to meet the armed attack against the Republic of Korea.)



SECRET

(September 17, 1969)

Draft Statement by the Prime Minister

As I have always stated in the past, the security of Japan in the world in which we live today cannot be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East. Thus, the security of countries in the Far East cannot but be a matter of serious concern for Japan's security. Herein lies the significance of Article VI of the Security Treaty. And it would be in accord with our national interest to determine our response to prior consultation in the light of the need to maintain the security of the Far East including Japan.

In particular, if an armed attack against the Republic of Korea were to occur, the security of Japan would be seriously affected. Therefore, should an occasion arise for U.S. forces in such an eventuality to use facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to meet the armed attack, the policy of the Japanese Government towards prior consultation would be to decide its position positively and promptly on the basis of the foregoing recognition.

The maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area is also an important factor for the security of Japan. I believe in this regard that the determination of the United


States to uphold her treaty commitments to the Republic of China should be fully appreciated. However, should a situation ever occur in which these treaty commitments would actually have to be invoked against an armed attack from outside, it would be a threat to the peace and security of the Far East including Japan. Therefore, in view of our national interest, we would deal with the situation on the basis of the foregoing recognition, in connection with the fulfillment by the U.S. of its defense obligations. However, I am glad to say, such a situation cannot be foreseen today.

昭和四年八月二一日
外務省アメリカ局長

徳義発言集

昭和四年八月二一日
外務省アメリカ局長

現実の國際社会に於いて、わが國の安全は、極東における國際の
平和と安全なくしては十分に維持することはできない、ということ
は我が國に透り透りしているところであり、従つて、極東の諸國の安
全は、わが國の安全のため、われわれの重大な關心事項であります。
ここに安保條約第六條の意味があるのも、また華南協約について
ても、日本を含む極東の安全に参与するといふ見地に立つて諸國を
決めることがわが國の國益に合致する所以であります。
特に韓國に対する武力攻撃が発生するようになるとは、これ
はわが國の安全に重大な影響を及ぼすものであります。従つて、万



一韓国に対して武力攻撃が発生し、これに対処するため、米軍が日本国内の施設区域を戦闘作戦行動の発進基地として使用しなければならぬよりな事態が生じた場合は、事前協議に対して、前記の見地に立つて迅速に態度を決定するというのが政府の方針であります。

わが國の安全という見地から、当面わが國周辺の問題として、台湾地域の静ひつということもわれわれの大きな関心事であります。

台湾地域の平和と安全の維持は不可欠であります。米國としては台湾地域に対する武力攻撃があつた場合には、中韓民國に対し乗機上の義務を負つております。今日私はこのよりの義務が奨励されるよりの事態を予測してはおりませんし、また米國政府としても、台湾地域について平和と安全を維持しようとしてゐることも明らかであります。

もまた。政府としては、専断を強調しつつわが國益に用いて対処して行く方針であります。

部内別冊 甲 △

極 秘
無 期 限
10 部の内 又 号

総理 発言案

昭和四四・八・二三（条約局）

現実の国際社会において、わが国の安全は、極東における国際の平和と安全なくしては十分に維持することはできない、ということ、は私が常に述べているところであり、また、したがって、極東の諸国の安全は、わが国の安全のため、われわれの重大な関心事であります。ここに安保条約第六条の意味があるのであり、また事前協議に ついても、日本を含む極東の安全の確保の必要という見地に立つて 諾否を決めることがわが国の国益に合致するゆえんであります。特に韓国に対する武力攻撃が発生するようないことがあれば、これはわが国の安全に重大な影響を及ぼすものであります。したがって、

万一韓国に対して武力攻撃が発生し、これに対処するため、米軍が日本国内の施設区域を戦闘作戦行動の発進基地として使用しなければならぬよりな事態が生じた場合は、事前協議に対して、前記の認識に立つて迅速に態度を決定するというのが政府の方針であります。

台湾地域における平和と安全の維持も、わが国の安全にとって重要な要素であります。私は、この点で、米国の中華民国に対する条約上の義務遂行の決意を十分に評価しなくてはならないと考えます。もつとも万一、外部からの武力攻撃に対して現実はこの義務が発動されなくてはならない事態が生ずれば、それは、わが国を含む極東

の平和と安全を脅かすことになりましよすが、幸いにして、現在のところ、このよゝな事態が生ずるとは予測されません。政府としては、引き続き台湾地域の情勢を注視しつつ、わが国益に即して対処していく方針であります。

極 秘
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10 号

總理發言案


昭和四四・八・二五

現実の國際社会において、わが國の安全は、極東における國際の平和と安全なくしては十分に維持することはできない、ということ
は私が常に述べているところでもあります。したがつて、極東の難國
の安全は、わが國の安全のため、われわれの重大な関心事でありま
す。ここに安保条約第六条の意味があるのであり、また事前協議に
ついても、日本を含む極東の安全の確保の必要という見地に立つて
断言を決めることがわが國の利益に合致するゆえんであります。
特に難國に対する武力攻撃が発生するようなことがあれば、これ

はわが國の安全に重大な影響を及ぼすものであります。したがつて、
万一韓國に対して武力攻撃が発生し、これに対処するため、米軍が
日本國內の施設区域を職團作戦行動の発進基地として使用しなけれ
ばならないような事態が生じた場合は、事前協議に対して、前記の
懸念に立つて迅速に態度を決定するというのが政府の方針でありま
す。

台湾地域における平和と安全の維持も、わが國の安全にとつて重
要な要素であります。私は、この点で、米國の中韓民國に対する条
約上の義務遂行の決意を十分に評価しなくてはならないと考えます。
もつとも、万一外侮からの武力攻撃に対して現実にこの義務が發動
されなくてはならない事態が生ずれば、それは、わが國を含む領東

の平和と安全を脅かすことになりましようが、幸いにして、現在のところ、このような事態が生ずるとは予測されません。政府としては、引き続き台湾地域の情勢を注視しつつ、わが利益に即してこれに対処していく方針であります。



昭和四年・八・二五

（總理發言案—ヴィエトナム）

ヴィエトナムにおける事態も、極東における平和と安全に關係のある現下の重要な問題の一つであります。政府としては、従来より、南ヴィエトナム人民の自由と独立を擁護せんとする米國の基本政策を支持し、また、在日施設・区域をこのための米國の軍事行動上必要な支援のために使用せしめるべき安保条約上の義務を誠実に履行してきた次第であります。今後とも、平和的解決の達成せられるまでは、この日本政府の立場は変更さるべきでなく、また、変更するなんらの意圖も有しません。幸いにして、和平の話し合いは其の緒につき、遅々としてながら継続されております。私は、この話し合い

が一日も早く成功をみ、ヴェトナム戦争が沖繩返還前に終結に至ることを衷心念願するものであります。私は、今回ニクソン大統領より正当なる平和的解決達成のための米國及び吾國の真摯な努力につき十分の聰明を得てまいりました。よつて、他の関係当事者にしてこれに対応する誠意を示すにおいては、沖繩返還時に現在の態様の米國の軍事行動がヴェトナムについて依然継続さるべき必要はなく、したがつて、今回ニクソン大統領との間に合意をみた沖繩の返還はヴェトナム戦争に関連する米國の軍事行動に影響を及ぼすことではないというのが私の確信であります。

64.5.26

(注)

右に關連し、必要に應じ、なんらかの形式により日本國政府の次の立場を表明することを考慮する。

「總理大臣は、特に韓国に対する武力攻撃の發生は日本國の安全に重大な影響を及ぼすものであるとの日本國政府の基本的認識を明らかにし、韓国に対して生じた武力攻撃に対処するため合衆國軍隊が日本國內の施設・区域を戦闘作戦行動の発進基地として使用することについての安保条約第六條の実施に關する交換公文に定める事前協議に対して日本國政府が執るべき態度は、かかる基本的認識に立つて決定されるものである旨を明らかにした。」