

ペーラールツ、ヴァン、ブロックランド

ダブリユー、ド、ボーフォール

アルテ

エルネスト、デ、ヴァスコネロス

三九四

(印)

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第二編 西比利亞及東支鐵道ニ關スル問題

第一章 西比利亞ニ關スル問題

(一) 幣原全權陳述

一月二十三日極東委員會第二十四回會議
西比利亞

支那ニ關スル諸般ノ問題ハ大體ニ於テ米國提案ノ議題ノ順序ニ從ヒ極東問題總委員會ニ於テ討議ヲ重スルコト二十有數回ニ及ヒ概ネ其ノ審議ヲ了シタルヲ以テ大正十一年一月二十三日同總委員會第二十四回會議ニ於テ支那關係約定問題ヲ議了セル後「ヒューズ」議長ハ茲ニ右議題ノ順序ヲ追ヒ西比利亞問題ノ討議ニ入ルヘキ旨宣シタリ

玆ニ於テ幣原全權ハ西比利亞問題ニ關スル討議ニ入ルニ先チ本問題ニ對スル帝國ノ立場ヲ明ニスルヲ要ストシテ左ノ如キ陳述書ヲ朗讀セリ同陳述ヲ以テ同日ノ會議ヲ散會シ次同ニ於テ本問題ヲ讀議スルコトトナレリ

The military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken in common accord and in co-operation with the United States in 1918. It was primarily intended to render assistance to the Czechoslovak troops who in their homeward journey cross Siberia from European Russia, found themselves in grave and pressing danger at the hands of hostile forces under German command. The Japanese and American expeditionary forces together with other allied troops fought their way from Vladivostok far into the region of the Amur and the Trans-Baikal Provinces to protect the railway lines which afforded the sole means of transportation of the Czechoslovak troops from the interior of Siberia to the port of Vladivostok. Difficulties which the Allied forces had to encounter in their operations in the severe cold winter of Siberia were immense.

In January, 1920, the United States decided to terminate its military undertaking in Siberia, and ordered the withdrawal of its forces. For some time thereafter, Japanese troops continued alone to carry out the duty of guarding several points along the Trans-Siberian Railways in fulfillment of Inter-Allied arrangements, and of affording facilities to the returning Czecho-Slovaks.

The last column of Czecho-Slovak troops safely embarked from Vladivostock in September, 1920. Ever since then, Japan has been looking forward to an early moment for the withdrawal of her troops from Siberia. The maintenance of such troops in a foreign land is for her a costly and thankless undertaking, and she will be only too happy to be relieved of such responsibility. In fact, the evacuation of the Trans-Baikal and the Amur Provinces was already completed in 1920. The only region which now remains to be evacuated is a southern portion of the Maritime Province around Vladivostock and Nikol'sk.

It will be appreciated that for Japan the question of the withdrawal of troops from Siberia is not quite as simple as it was for other Allied Powers. In the first place, there is a considerable number of Japanese residents who had lawfully and under guarantees of treaty established themselves in Siberia long before the Bolshevik eruption, and were there entirely welcomed. In 1917, prior to the Joint American-Japanese military enterprise, the number of such residents was already no less than 9717. In the actual situation prevailing there, those Japanese residents can hardly be expected to look for the protection of their lives and property to any other authorities than Japanese troops. Whatever districts those troops have evacuated in the past have fallen into disorder, and practically Japanese residents have had precipitately to withdraw, to

seek for their personal safety. In so withdrawing, they have been obliged to leave behind large portions of their property, abandoned and unprotected, and their homes and places of business have been destroyed. While the hardship and losses thus caused the Japanese in the Trans-Baikal and the Amur provinces, have been serious enough, more extensive damages are likely to follow from the evacuation of Vladivostock in which a larger number of Japanese have always been resident and a greater amount of Japanese capital invested.

There is another difficulty by which Japan is faced in proceeding to the recall of her troops from the Maritime Province. Due to geographical propinquity, the general situation in the districts around Vladivostock and Nikol'sk is bound to affect the security of Korean frontier. In particular, it is known that these districts have long been the base of Korean conspiracies against Japan. Those hostile Koreans, joining hands with lawless elements in Russia, attempted in 1920 to invade Korea through the Chinese territory of Chientao. They set fire to the Japanese Consulate at Hunchun, and committed indiscriminate acts of murder and pillage. At the present time, they are under the effective control of Japanese troops stationed in the Maritime Province, but they will no doubt renew the attempt to penetrate into Korea at the first favorable opportunity that may present itself.

Having regard to those considerations, the Japanese Government have felt bound to exercise precaution in carrying out the contemplated evacuation of the Maritime Province. Should they take hasty action without adequate provision for the future they would be delinquent in their duty of affording protection to a large number of their nationals resident in the districts in question and of maintaining order and security in Korea.

It should be made clear that no part of the Maritime Province is under Japan's military occupation.

Japanese troops are still stationed in the southern portion of that Province, but they have not set up any civil or military administration to displace local authorities. Their activity is confined to measures of self-protection against the menace to their own safety and to the safety of their country and nationals. They are not in occupation of those districts any more than American or other Allied troops could be said to have been in occupation of the places in which they were formerly stationed.

The Japanese Government are anxious to see an orderly and stable authority speedily re-established in the Far East possessions of Russia. It was in this spirit that they manifested a keen interest in the patriotic but ill-fated struggle of Admiral Kolchak. They have shown readiness to lend their good offices for promoting the reconciliation of various political groups in Eastern Siberia. But they have carefully refrained from supporting one faction against another. It will be recalled, for instance, that they withheld all assistance from General Rozanov against the revolutionary movements which led to his overthrow in January, 1920. They maintained an attitude of strict neutrality, and refused to interfere in those movements, which it would have been quite easy for them to suppress, if they had so desired.

In relation to this policy of non-intervention, it may be useful to refer briefly to the past relations between the Japanese authorities and Ataman Semenov, which seem to have been a source of popular misgiving and speculation. It will be remembered that the growing approachment between the Germans and the Bolshevik Government in Russia in the early part of 1918 naturally gave rise to apprehensions in the Allied countries that a considerable quantity of munitions supplied by those countries and stored in Vladivostok might be removed by the Bolsheviks to European Russia, for the use of the Germans. Ataman Semenov was then in Siberia and

was organizing a movement to check such Bolshevik activities and to preserve order and stability in that region. It was in this situation that Japan, as well as some of the Allies, began to give support to the Cossack Chief. After a few months, such support by the other Powers was discontinued. But the Japanese were reluctant to abandon their friend, whose efforts in the Allied cause they had originally encouraged; and they maintained for some time their connection with Ataman Semenov. They had however no intention whatever of interfering in the domestic affairs of Russia, and when it was found that the assistance rendered to the Ataman was likely to complicate the internal situation in Siberia, they terminated all relations with him and no support of any kind has since been extended to him by the Japanese authorities.

The Japanese Government are now seriously considering plans which would justify them in carrying out their decision of the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province, with reasonable precaution for the security of Japanese residents and of the Korean frontier regions. It is for this purpose that negotiations were opened some time ago at Dairen between the Japanese representatives and the agents of the Chita Government.

Those negotiations at Dairen are in no way intended to secure for Japan any right or advantage of an exclusive nature. They have been solely actuated by a desire to adjust some of the more pressing questions with which Japan is confronted in relation to Siberia. They have essentially in view the conclusion of provisional commercial arrangements, the removal of the existing menace to the security of Japan and to the lives and property of Japanese residents in Eastern Siberia, the provision of guarantees for the freedom of lawful undertakings in that region and the prohibition of Bolshevik propaganda over the Siberian border. Should

adequate provisions be arranged on the line indicated, the Japanese Government will at once proceed to the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from the Maritime Province.

The occupation of certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin is wholly different, both in nature and in origin, from the stationing of troops in the Maritime Province. History affords few instances similar to the incident of 1920 at Nikolaievsk, where more than seven hundred Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese Consul and his family and his official staff were cruelly tortured and massacred. No nation worthy of respect will possibly remain forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Nor was it possible for the Japanese Government to disregard to just popular indignation aroused in Japan by the incident. Under the actual condition of things, Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom she can communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction.

Nothing is further from the thought of the Japanese Government than to take advantage of the present helpless conditions of Russia for prosecuting selfish designs. Japan recalls with deep gratitude and appreciation the brilliant role which Russia played in the interest of civilization during the earlier stage of the Great War. The Japanese people have shown and will continue to show every sympathetic interest in the efforts of patriotic Russian aspiring to the unity and rehabilitation of their country. The military occupation of the Russian Province of Sakhalin is only a temporary measure, and will naturally come to an end as soon as a satisfactory settlement of the question shall have been arranged with an orderly Russian Government.

In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation is authorized to declare that it is the fixed and settled policy of Japan to respect the territorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every part of the Russian possessions.

(右譯文)

一九一八年ニ於ケル日本ノ西比利亞出兵ハ元來米國政府ト協議セルモノニシテ「チエツクスロヴァク」軍力歐露ヨリ西比利亞ヲ經テ本國ニ歸還スルニ當リ甚シク獨軍ノ脅威ヲ感シ居ルニ鑑ミ先ツ之ヲ援助スルノ目的ヲ有セルモノナリ日米兩軍ハ他ノ聯合軍ト共ニ「チ」軍ヲ西比利亞内地ヨリ浦港ヘ輸送スル唯一ノ交通機關タル鐵道線路ヲ保護スルタメ浦港ヨリ出テテ遠ク黒龍ニ及ヒ「バイカル」以北ノ地域ニ奮闘シ其ノ西比利亞ノ冬季嚴寒ニ遭遇セル聯合軍ノ困難ハ正ニ筆舌ニ絶スルモノアリ

一九二〇年一月米國政府ハ西比利亞ニ於ケル軍事行動ヲ止ムルニ決シ之カ撤兵ヲ命セリ暫クアリテ日本軍ハ獨リ「チエツクスロヴァク」軍ノ歸還ニ便宜ヲ與フルノ聯合國間協定ヲ履行スル爲西比利亞橫斷鐵道沿線ニ於ケル數箇所ヲ警護スルノ任ヲ續行セリ一九二〇年九月「チエツクスロヴァク」軍ノ最後ノ部隊ハ安全ニ浦潮斯德ヲ出港スル事ヲ得タリ爾來日本政府ハ西比利亞撤兵ノ時期ノ速ニ到來セムコトヲ期待ス蓋シ多數ノ軍隊ヲ國外ニ駐屯スルハ管ニ巨額ノ費用ヲ要スルノミナラス寔ニ有難カラサル措置ナレハナリ日本ニシテ此責任ヲ免ルルヲ得ムカ其ノ最モ悅ブ所ナリ實際「バイカル」以北及黒龍江地域ノ撤兵ハ已ニ一九二〇年ニ於テ完了シ今尙撤兵ヲ爲ササルハ只浦潮斯德及「ニコリスク」附近ナル沿海州ノ南部ノ一地方ニ過キササルナリ

西比利亞撤兵問題ハ日本ニ取リテハ他ノ聯合國ノ場合ノ如クシカク簡單ナルモノニ非サルコトヲ諒トセラルヘク第一西比利亞ニ於テハ多數ノ日本人ノ在住スルアリ皆正當ニ或ハ條約其ノ他ノ約定ニ遵ヒ過激派勃發以前ニ長ク此地ニ移植シ且

ツ彼地ニ於テ歡迎セラレ居ルモノナリ

日本ノ西比利亞共同出兵以前ノ統計ヲ見ルニ即チ一九一七年ニ於ケル日本人ノ西比利亞在住者ハ已ニ九千七百十七名ニ達シ當時ノ實情タル此等ノ日本住民ハ其ノ生命財産ノ保護ヲ日本軍隊以外ニ向ヒテ期待スルヲ得サリシナリ過去ニ於ケル日本軍ノ撤退セル所ハ再ヒ紊亂ニ陥リタルヲ以テ事實上日本ノ住民ハ擧ケテ其ノ一身上ノ安全ヲ求メムカ爲ニ居ヲ遷スノ已ムナキニ至レリ其ノ退去ニ當リ彼等ハ多額ノ財産ヲ遺棄シ住居及營業所ハ破壊ニ委セサル可ラサルノ情況ナリ斯ノ如ク「バイカル」以北及黑龍諸州ニ於ケル日本人ノ蒙レル困苦ト損害トハ莫大ナルモノアルニ拘ハラス更ニ多數ノ日本人ト其ノ多額ノ資本トヲ投セル浦潮斯德ヨリ撤兵セハ其ノ結果トシテ更ニ莫大ノ損害ヲ生スヘキハ頗ル明ナリトス

日本カソノ軍隊ヲ沿海州ヨリ撤退セントスルニ當リ尙他ノ難問アリ地理的接近ノ故ヲ以テ浦潮及尼港ノ周圍ニ於ケル地方ノ一般形勢ノ如何ハ朝鮮國境ノ安固カ脅カサレサル能ハサルモノアリ殊ニ該地方ハ從來不逞鮮人ノ我カ國ニ對シ陰謀ヲ行フ策源地タリシハ周知ノ事實ナリ

此等不逞鮮人ハ露國ニ於ケル無賴ノ徒ト提携シテ關東州ヲ通過シ朝鮮ニ侵入センコトヲ企テタリ彼等ハ珥春日本領事館ニ放火シ殺人掠奪ノ暴行ヲ敢テセリ目下之等不逞鮮人ニ對シテハ沿海州駐在ノ日本軍隊ノ抑制其ノ效ヲ奏シツツアレトモ苟モ機會ノ生スアラシカ彼等カ捲土重來朝鮮内地ニ侵入ヲ企ツルヤ疑ナシ

日本政府ハ此等ノ事情ヲ商量スルカ故ニ沿海州ノ撤兵ノ豫定計畫ヲ實行スルニ於テ慎重ナル注意ヲ加フルノ必要ナルヲ看取セリ若シ將來ニ對スル適當ノ準備ナク輕舉スルコトアラシカ日本政府ハ該地方在住ノ我住民ノ大多數ノ保護並朝鮮ノ秩序及安寧ノ維持上其ノ義務ヲ全ウセサル誹ヲ免ルルコト能ハサルヘシ今ヤ沿海州ノ何レノ部分モ日本ノ兵力の占領ニ屬スルモノニ非サルヲ牢記スヘシ日本軍ハ今尙該州南部ニ駐在スト雖決シテ該地方官憲ヲ排除シ内政上又ハ軍事上ノ行政權ヲ行フコトナシ彼等ノ活動ハ自身並本國及國民ノ脅威ニ對スル自衛ノ範圍ヲ出ツルコトナシ目下日本ノ軍隊ノ此等地方ニ於ケルハ米國及其ノ他聯合國軍隊カ當時駐屯セシ地方ニ於ケルトノ異ナルヲ見ス日本政府ハ極東露領ニ於

テ整然確固タル政權ノ速ニ再建セラレムコトヲ翹望シテ已マサルモノアリ「コルチャツク」將軍ノ愛國的ナルモ不運ニ終レル奮闘ニ對シテ多クノ興味ヲ有シタリシモ全クコノ精神ニ基キシニ外ナラス日本政府ハ東部西比利亞ニ於ケル種々ノ政治的團體ノ和解ヲ促進セムカ爲ニ常ニ周旋ノ勞ヲ吝ムコトナカリシモ決シテ或ル一派ニ偏シテ援助ヲ與フルノ舉ニ出テタルコトナシ例ヘハ管テ革命的運動ニ對抗シタル「ロザノフ」將軍ニ對シテ一切ノ援助ヲ拒ミ同將軍ハ遂ニ一九二〇年一月失脚シ了レルニ徴スルモ明ナリ日本ハ終始嚴正中立ノ態度ヲ保持シ意ノ儘ニ容易ニ抑壓シ得ヘカリシ運動ニ對シテモ何等干涉セシコトナシ

此ノ非干涉ノ政策ニ關シテハ當時世人ノ危懼ト懸念ノ原因タルノ觀ヲ呈シタル日本官憲ト「アタマン、セミヨノフ」トノ關係ヲ略述スルノ要アラム一九一八年ノ初頭ニ際シ獨逸ト露國過激派政府トカ漸ク接近シ始メタルノ一事實ハ當時聯合國ノ供給ニ係リ浦潮ニ貯藏セル多量ノ軍需品カ獨逸ニ使用セシムルタメニ過激派ニ依リ歐露ニ移サルルニ至ルヘキ懸念ヲ聯合國ニ於テ抱クニ至レルコトハ吾人ノ記憶スル所ナリ當時西比利亞ニ在リシ「アタマン、セミヨノフ」ハ西比利亞ノ秩序ト安定ヲ維持スルタメニ斯ル過激派ノ活動ヲ阻止スル運動ヲ畫策中ナリシナリ日本カ他ノ聯合國ト同シク「セミヨノフ」ヲ援助セル當時ノ事情正ニ斯ノ如シ

越エテ數月他ノ聯合國ノ援助ハ中止セラレタリト雖日本官憲ハ此ノ聯合與國カ元來支持獎勵シテ自己ノ爲ニ盡サシメタル友ヲ棄ツルニ忍ヒスシテ尙姑ラク「アタマン、セミヨノフ」ヲ支援シ其ノ關係ヲ繼續セリ然レトモ日本ハ斷シテ露國ノ内政ニ干涉スルノ意思ヲ有セス從テ斯ル援助ヲ供與スルノ却テ西比利亞ノ國內の局面ヲ紛糾スルノ虞アルコトヲ發見スルヤ日本官憲ハ直チニ「セミヨノフ」トノ一切ノ關係ヲ絶チ爾後何等ノ援助ヲモ之ニ提供シタルコトナシ

日本政府ハ在留日本人ノ安全ト朝鮮國境地方ニ於ケル保安ニ對スル相當保障ヲ得テ沿海州地方ヨリ全部撤兵セムトスル既定方針ヲ實行セムカタメニ適當ナル手段ヲ目下慎重ニ考慮シ居レリ政府カ先般來「チタ」政府代表トノ交渉ヲ大連ニ於テ開始シ居ルモ實ニ右ノ目的ヲ達成セムカタメニ外ナラス蓋シ右交渉ハ日本カ何等排他的性質ヲ有スル利權ヲ獲得セム

カタメニ非サルハ固ヨリ唯對西北利亞關係ニ於テ日本カ遭遇シ居ル若干ノ緊要問題ヲ解決セムトスルノ希望ニ基クモノ
ニ外ナラサルナリ

帝國カ特ニ希圖スル所ハ暫定の通商取極ノ締結日本國家ノ安固ト東部西北利亞在留ノ日本臣民ノ生命財産ニ對スル脅威
ノ排除同地方ニ於ケル適法企業ニ對スル自由ノ保障竝西北利亞國境ニ於ケル過激派宣傳ノ禁止ノ諸點ニ存ス右諸問題ニ
關シ適當ナル協定ノ成立ヲ見ルニ至ラムカ日本政府ハ即時ニ沿海州地方ヨリノ撤兵ヲ完了スルノ途ニ出ツヘシ

露領「サハレン」州ノ或地點ノ占領ハ沿海州駐兵ト全然其ノ性質及起源ヲ異ニセリ一九二〇年尼港ニ於テ七百餘名ノ我同
胞カ老若男女ノ別無ク非道殘忍ニ虐殺セラレ正當ニ承認セラレタル帝國領事及其ノ家族竝領事館員モ亦難ニ殉シタルハ
實ニ史上其ノ例稀ナル大慘事ニシテ如何ナル國民ト雖到底是ヲ看過スルノ屈辱ニ堪エ難キハ當然ニシテ日本政府モ本件
ニ關スル國民ノ正當ナル憤怒ヲ坐視スルコト能ハサリシナリ

事態斯ノ如シ日本政府ハ他日露國ニ責任アル政府ノ樹立セラレ同事件ニ關シ満足ナル解決ヲ得ルニ至ル迄此殘虐ナル行
爲ノ行ハレタル露領「サハレン」州ノ或地點ヲ復仇手段トシテ占領スルノ外亦他ノ處置ニ出ツル事能ハサリシナリ

日本政府カ露國ノ無援ナル現況ニ乘シテ利己の野心ヲ遂行セントノ意志ヲ有スルカ如キハ帝國ノ夢想タモ爲ササル所日
本ハ大戰勃發ノ當初文明國民ノ爲露國ノ演シタル光輝アル役割ヲ多トシ今猶之ヲ追想シテ感謝ノ念禁セサルモノアリ日
本國民ハ愛國心ニ富メル露國民カ故國ノ統一再興ノ爲ニ努力盡瘁セルニ對シテハ常ニ多大ノ同情ヲ有セリ將來モ亦然リ
露國「サハレン」州ノ軍事的占領ハ素ヨリ臨時ノ處置ニシテ秩序アル露國政府トノ間ニ右問題ニ關シ満足ナル解決ヲ見ル
ト同時ニ自然ニ終了スヘキモノナリ

最後ニ日本全權ハ露國領土ノ保全ヲ尊重シ其ノ内政ニ對スル非干涉主義竝露國領土内ニ於ケル各國民ノ商工業上ノ機會
均等主義ヲ遵守スルハ日本政府ノ一定不變ノ政策タルコトヲ宣言ス

(一)「ヒューズ」氏陳述

四月二十
五日
委員會
「ヒューズ」氏陳述

翌一月二十四日極東問題總委員會第二十五回會議ニ於テ「ヒューズ」氏ハ前回幣原全權所述ニ關シテ次ノ陳述ヲ爲セリ

The American Delegation has heard the statement by Baron Shidehara and has taken note of the as-
surances given on behalf of the Japanese Government with respect to the withdrawal of Japanese troops from
the Maritime Province of Siberia and from the Province of Sakhalin. The American Delegation has also noted
the assurance of Japan by her authorized spokesman that it is her fixed and settled policy to respect the ter-
ritorial integrity of Russia, and to observe the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of that
country, as well as the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in every
part of the Russian possessions.

These assurances are taken to mean that Japan does not seek, through her military operation in Siberia,
to impair the rights of the Russian people in any respect, or to obtain any unfair commercial advantages, or to
absorb for her own use the Siberian fisheries, or to set up an exclusive exploitation either of the resources of
Sakhalin or of the Maritime Province.

As Baron Shidehara pointed out, the military expedition of Japan to Siberia was originally undertaken
in common accord and in cooperation with the United States. It will be recalled that public assurances were
given at the outset by both Governments of a firm intention to respect the territorial integrity of Russia and
to abstain from all interference in Russian internal politics. In view of the reference by Baron Shidehara to
the participation of the American Government in the expedition of 1918, I should like to place upon our records,

for transmission to the Conference, the purposes which were then clearly stated by both Governments.

The American Government set forth its aims and policies publicly in July, 1918. The purposes of the expedition were said to be, first, to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces; second, to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance; and, third, to guard the military stores at Vladivostok.

The American Government opposed the idea of military intervention, but regarded military action as admissible at the time solely for the purpose of helping the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen, and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defence in which the Russians themselves might be willing to accept assistance. It was stated that the American Government proposed to ask all associated in this course of action to unite in assuring the people of Russia in the most public and solemn manner that none of the Governments uniting in action either in Siberia or in northern Russia contemplated any interference of any kind with the political sovereignty of Russia, any intervention in her internal affairs, or any impairment of her territorial integrity either now or thereafter, but that each of the Associated Powers had the single object of affording such aid as should be acceptable, and only such aid as should be acceptable, to the Russian people in their endeavor to regain control of their own affairs, their own territory, and their own destiny.

What I have just stated is found in the public statement of the American Government at that time.

The Japanese Government, with the same purpose, set forth its position in a statement published by the Japanese Government on August 2, 1918, in which it was said:

The Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desires of the American Government, and also to act in harmony with the Allies in this expedition, have decided to proceed at once to dispatch suitable forces for the proposed mission. A certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course the Japanese Government remains unshaken in their constant desire to promote relations of enduring friendship with Russia and the Russian people, and reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that, upon the realization of the projects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military.

The United States of America withdraw its troops from Siberia in the spring of 1920, because it considered that the original purposes of the expedition had either been accomplished or would no longer be subserved by continued military activity in Siberia. The American Government then ceased to be a party to the expedition, but it remained a close observer of events in eastern Siberia, and has had an extended diplomatic correspondence upon this subject with the Government of Japan.

It must be frankly avowed that this correspondence has not always disclosed an identity of views between the two Governments. The United States has not been unmindful of the direct exposure of Japan to Bolshevism in Siberia, and the special problems which the conditions existing there have created for the Japanese Government; but it has been strongly disposed to the belief that the public assurances, given by the two Governments at the inception of the joint expedition, nevertheless required the complete withdrawal of Japanese troops from

all Russian territory—if not immediately after the departure of the Czecho-Slovak troops, then within a reasonable time.

As to the occupation of Sakhalin, in reprisal for the massacre of the Japanese at Nikolaievsk, the United States was not unimpressed by the serious character of that catastrophe; but, having in mind the conditions accepted by both Governments at the outset of the joint expedition, of which the Nikolaievsk massacre must be considered an incident, it has regretted that Japan should deem necessary the occupation of Russian territory as a means of assuring a suitable adjustment with a future Russian Government.

The general position of the American Government was set forth in a communication to Japan of May 31, 1921. In that communication appears the following statement:

The Government of the United States would be untrue to the spirit of cooperation which led it, in the summer of 1918, upon an understanding with the Government of Japan to dispatch troops to Siberia, if it neglected to point out that, in its view, continued occupation of the strategic centers in Eastern Siberia—involving the indefinite possession of the port of Vladivostok, the stationing of troops at Habarovsk, Nikolaievsk, De Castries, Mago, Sophiesk, and other important points; the seizure of the Russian portion of Sakhalin, and the establishment of a civil administration, which inevitably lends itself to misconception and antagonism—tends rather to increase than to allay the unrest and disorder in that regions.

‘The military occupation’—I am still reading from the note of May 31, 1921—‘The military occupation in reprisal for the Nikolaievsk affairs is not fundamentally a question of the validity of procedure under the recognized rules of international law.’

The note goes on to say that ‘the issue presented is that of the scrupulous fulfillment of the assurances given to the Russian people, understanding between the Government of the United States and of Japan. These assurances were intended by the Government of the United States to convey to the people which were a matter of frank exchanges and of apparently complete understanding between the Government of the United States and of Japan. These assurances were intended by the Government of the United States to convey to the people of Russia a promise on the part of the two Governments not to use the joint expedition, or any incidents which might arise out of it, as an occasion to occupy territory, even temporarily, or to assume any military or administrative control over the people of Siberia.’

Further, in the same note, the American Government stated its position as follows:

‘In view of its conviction that the course followed by the Government of Japan brings into question the very definite understanding concluded at the time troops were sent to Siberia, the Government of the United States must in candor explain its position and say to the Japanese Government that the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims or titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it can not acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.

‘The Government of Japan will appreciate that, in expressing its views, the Government of the United States has no desire to impute to the Government of Japan motives or purposes other than those which have heretofore been so frankly avowed. The purpose of this Government is to inform the Japanese Government of its own conviction that, in the present time of disorder in Russia, it is more than ever the duty of those

who look forward to the tranquilization of the Russian people, and a restoration of normal conditions among them, to avoid all action which might keep alive their antagonism and distrust toward outside political agencies. Now, especially, it is incumbent upon the friends of Russia to hold aloof from the domestic contentions of the Russian people, to be scrupulous to avoid inflicting what might appear to them a vicarious penalty for sporadic acts of lawlessness, and above all to abstain from even the temporary and conditional impairment by any foreign power of the territorial status which, for them as for other peoples, is a matter of deep and sensitive national feeling transcending perhaps even the issues at stake among themselves.'

To that American note the Japanese Government replied in July, 1921, setting forth in substance what Baron Shidehara has now stated to this committee, pointing out the conditions under which Japan had taken the action to which reference was made, and giving the assurances, which have here been reiterated, with respect to its intention and policy.

While the discussion of these matters has been attended with the friendliest feeling, it has naturally been the constant and earnest hope of the American Government—and of Japan as well, I am sure—that this occasion for divergence of views between the two Governments might be removed with the least possible delay. It has been with a feeling of special gratification, therefore, that the American delegation has listened to the assurances given by their Japanese colleague, and it is with the greatest friendliness that they reiterate the hope that Japan will find it possible to carry out within the near future her expressed intention of terminating finally the Siberian expedition and of restoring Sakhalin to the Russian people.

My suggestion would be, if it is not desired otherwise by the delegates, that the statement made on be-

half of the Japanese Government by Baron Shidehara, and the one that I have made setting forth the position of the American Government, which is as stated in its communication of May 31, 1921, which I have read, should be communicated to the Conference for the purpose of being spread upon its records.

(右譯文)

米國全權ハ日本軍ノ沿海州及薩哈噠州撤退ニ關シ日本政府ノ爲メニ與ヘラレタル保障竝露國ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ其ノ内政ニ對スル非干渉主義竝露國ノ全領域ニ於ル各國民ノ商工業上ノ機會均等主義ヲ尊重スルハ日本ノ確定政策ナル旨ノ保障ヲ諒承セリ

右保證ハ日本カ西比利亞ニ於ル其ノ軍事行動ニ依リ何等露國人民ノ權利ヲ侵害シ或ハ不公平ナル商工業上ノ利益ヲ獲得シ或ハ自己ノ爲ニ西比利亞ノ漁業ヲ壟斷シ或ハ沿海州及薩哈噠州ニ於ル資源ノ排他的開發ヲ爲サンコトヲ企圖スルモノニ非サルヲ意味スルモノト解セラル

幣原男ノ指摘セラレタル加ク日本ノ西比利亞出兵ハ元來合衆國トノ合意協調ニヨリ行ハレタルモノニシテ茲ニ想起スルハ當初兩國政府カ露國ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ露國ノ内政ニ對スル一切ノ干渉ヲ避ケントノ強固ナル決心ヲ有スル旨公然保障シタルコトナリ

幣原男カ一九一八年ノ出兵ニ米國政府ノ參加セルコトヲ一言セラレタルニ顧ミ予ハ當時日米兩國政府カ明白ニ聲明シタル出兵目的ヲ記錄ニ留メ之ヲ會議ニ傳達センコトヲ欲スルモノナリ

米國政府ハ一九一八年七月其ノ目的ト政策トヲ聲明セリ右ニヨレハ出兵ノ目的ハ第一「チエツク、スロヴアツク」軍ノ兵力集結ヲ援助シ第二露國人ノ自治又ハ自衛ノ努力ニ對シ其ノ受諾スヘキ援助ヲ與ヘ第三浦潮ニ貯藏セラレタル軍需品ヲ護衛スルニアリ米國政府ハ軍事の干渉ノ思想ニ反對ナリシモ當時專ラ「チエツク、スロヴアツク」軍カ其ノ兵力ヲ集結シ其ノ同胞トノ協力ヲ達成スルコトヲ援助シ且ツ露國人ノ自治又ハ自衛ノ努力ニ對シ其ノ受諾スヘキ援助ヲ與フルノ目的

ニ出タル軍事の行動ハ之ヲ許容スヘキモノト思惟シタリ

尙右聲明ニヨレハ米國政府ハ軍事行動參加諸國カ西比利亞ニ於テモ北露ニ於テモ現在及將來ヲ通シ何等露國民ノ主權ヲ侵犯シ其ノ内政ニ干渉シ又は其ノ領土ノ保全ヲ侵害スルノ意圖ヲ有セス其ノ目的トスル所ハ單ニ露國民カ其ノ内政ヲ統制シ其ノ領土ヲ恢復シ其ノ國運ヲ挽回セント努力スルニ當リ其ノ受諾ス可キ援助ヲ供與スルニ在ルコトヲ極メテ公然且ツ嚴肅ニ露國民ニ對シ共同ニ保障セムコトヲ此等諸國ニ提唱セリ

以上ハ當時ニ於ル米國政府ノ宣言ニ記載セララル所ナルカ日本政府モ亦同一目的ヲ以テ一九一八年八月二日ノ宣言ニ依リ其ノ地位ヲ明ニシタリ同宣言中ニ曰ク

『日本帝國政府ハ合衆國政府ノ提議ニ應ジテ其ノ友好ニ酬ヒ且ツ聯合列強ニ對シ步武ヲ齊クシテ履信ノ實ヲ舉グル爲特ニ帝國ノ地位ニ顧ミテ速ニ軍旅ヲ整備シ先之ヲ浦潮ニ派遣シ更ニ緩急ニ應ジ西比利亞沿道ノ秩序ヲ維持スルノ目的ヲ以テ臨時軍隊ヲ増遣シテ該方面ニ出動セシムルニ決定セリ

彼上ノ措置ヲ採ルニ當リ帝國政府ハ一意露國及露國民民ト恒久ノ友好關係ヲ更新センコトヲ希圖スルヲ以テ常ニ同國ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ併セテ其ノ國內政策ニ干渉セサルノ既定主義ヲ聲明スルト共ニ所期ノ目的ヲ達成スルニ於テハ政治的又ハ軍事のニ其ノ主權ヲ侵害スルコトナク速ニ撤兵スヘキコトヲ茲ニ宣言ス』

米國ハ一九二〇年春西比利亞ヨリ撤兵シタルカ是出兵當初ノ目的ハ既ニ達成セラレ若クハ此上西比利亞ニ於テ軍事行動ヲ繼續スルモ何等右目的の達成ニ資スル處ナシト思惟シタルニ由ル爾後米國政府ハ出兵ニ參加セサルコトナリシモ東部西比利亞ノ事態ニ對シテハ周密ナル觀察ヲ怠ラス此ノ問題ニ關シ日本政府ト長文ノ外交文書ヲ往復セリ該文書ハ必スシモ常ニ兩國政府ノ意見ノ一致ヲ示セルモノニ非サルコトヲ卒直ニ言明セサル可ラス米國ハ日本カ西比利亞ノ過激主義ニ直接暴露セラレタル事情ト西比利亞ニ於ケル情勢カ日本政府ニ取リ特殊ノ問題ヲ生シタルコトヲ承知セサルニ非ス然レトモ共同出兵ノ當初日米兩國政府カ公然與ヘタル保障ニ鑑ミ「チエツク、スロヴアツク」軍隊出發後直ニ實行セサル迄モ

相當ノ期間ニ露國領土ヨリ日本軍隊ヲ全部撤退セシムルノ必要アルコトハ米國ノ固ク信シタル所ナリ

尼港日本人虐殺事件ノ復仇トシテ薩哈噠占領ニ關シテハ米國ハ右變災ノ性質重大ナルヲ感セサリシニ非サルモ尼港事件ハ共同出兵中ノ一偶發事件ト思惟スヘキモノニシテ共同出兵ノ當初日米兩國政府ノ承認セル條件ニ鑑ミレハ日本カ未來ノ露國政府ト適當ナル解決ヲ遂クルノ保證手段トシテ露國領土ヲ占領スルヲ必要ト認メタルコトヲ遺憾トシタルモノナリ米國政府ノ一般の地位ニ付テハ一九二一年五月三十一日ノ對日通牒ニ於テ之ヲ述ヘタリ

該通牒中ニ曰ク

『若シ合衆國政府ニシテ其ノ見解ニ依レハ東部西比利亞ニ於ケル戰略的要地占領ノ繼續(浦潮港ノ無期領有、哈府、尼港、「デカストリ」「マゴ」「ソフィスク」其ノ他ノ要地ニ於ケル軍隊ノ駐屯露領樺太ノ占領及必然誤解及敵愾心ヲ惹起スヘキ民政ノ施行ヲ含ム)ハ該地方ニ於ケル不安混亂ヲ緩和セスシテ却テ之ヲ増大セシムル傾向アルコトヲ指摘セサルニ於テハ一九一八年ノ夏日本政府トノ了解ノ下ニ西比利亞ニ出兵スルニ至リタル協調ノ精神ニ忠實ナラサルモノト云フヘシ尼港事件ニ對スル復仇トシテノ軍事占領ハ元來國際法ノ通則上正當ナル措置ナリヤ否ヤノ問題ニ非ス又一九二〇年八月十三日附日本大使館覺書中ニ示サレタルカ如キ露國行政區劃變更ノ問題ニモ非ス合衆國政府ノ承知スル所ニ依レハ尼港ノ場合ニ於テハ右變更ハ露國行政官ノ便宜ノ爲一時的の措置トシテ採用セラレタルモノナリ

要スルニ現下ノ問題ハ日米兩國政府間ニ於テ坦懷ナル意見ノ交換及安全ノ觀アル了解ニ基キ露國民ニ對シ與ヘタル保證ヲ嚴密ニ遂行スヘキヤ否ヤニアリ右保證ヲ與フルニ當リ合衆國政府ノ趣旨トセシ所ハ兩國政府ニ於テ共同出兵又ハ之ニ起因シテ生スヘキ如何ナル事變ヲモ取テ以テ之ヲ口實トシ假令一時的ト雖モ領土ヲ占領シ或ハ西比利亞人民ニ對シ何等軍事の又行政の支配ヲ行フコトナカルヘキヲ露西亞國民ニ約スルニアリタリ

合衆國政府ハ日本政府ノ執リ來レル政策ハ西比利亞派兵當時成立セル明確ナル了解ヲ疑問タラシムルモノナリト確信スルカ故ニ卒直ニ其ノ立場ヲ説明シ合衆國政府ハ現在ニ於テモ現下ノ占領又ハ支配ニ基ク如何ナル權原ノ要求ヲモ有

效ト認ムル能ハサルコト竝ニ苟クモ現存條約上ノ權利或ハ露國ノ政治的又ハ領土的主權ヲ侵害スルカ如キ日本政府ノ行動ハ一切之ヲ認容シ能ハサルモノナルコトヲ日本政府ニ通告セサルヘカラス

如斯合衆國政府ハ其ノ所見ヲ述フルニ當リ日本政府ノ精神及目的ハ其ノ從來屢々卒直ニ公言シタル所ト異ナルモノアリト爲スカ如キ意思ハ毫モ之ヲ有セサルモノナルコトハ日本政府ノ諒トセラルル所ナルヘシ合衆國政府ノ趣旨ハ現下露國混亂ノ時機ニ際シ露國民ヲシテ他國政治的機關ニ對シ敵愾心ト不信念トヲ起サシムル如キ一切ノ行動ヲ避クルコトハ露國民ノ平和狀態ノ恢復ヲ冀念スル者ノ義務ナルコトヲ確信スル次第ヲ日本政府ニ通告スルニ在リ惟フニ露國民ノ内爭ニ關與セス又露國民ニトリ偶發的不法行為ニ對スル犠牲責罰トモ見ルヘキ行為ヲ極力回避シ殊ニ他國民ニ於ケルト等シク露國民ニトリテハ急ヲ告クル内部ノ問題ヲ超越シテ過敏ナル國民的感情ニ深甚ナル影響ヲ與フヘキ領土的地位ニ對スル外國ノ一時的乃至條件付侵害ヲ避クルコトハ特ニ此機ニ於テ露國友邦ノ責務ナリト謂フヘシ

右米國ノ覺書ニ對シ日本政府ハ一九二一年七月回答ヲ爲シ大體幣原男カ本委員會ニ於テ陳述セラレタル所ト同様ノ趣旨ヲ述ヘ日本政府力前掲ノ行動ヲ執ルニ至リ事情ヲ指摘シ且ツ同政府ノ意圖竝政策ニ關シ既ニ其ノ反覆聲明シタル保障ヲ與ヘタリ

此等諸問題ノ論議ハ極メテ友誼的感情ヲ以テ行ハレタルカ右兩國政府ノ見解ノ相違ヲ出來得ル限り速ニ除去センコトハ素ヨリ米國政府ノ常ニ切望スル所ニシテ日本政府亦等シク之ヲ希望スヘキヲ信スサレハ米國全權ハ特ニ満足ノ感ヲ以テ日本全權ノ與ヘタル保障ヲ聽取シタル次第ニシテ日本カ其ノ聲明セル西比利亞撤兵薩哈噠遠附ノ意思ヲ近キ將來ニ於テ實行シ得ルニ至ランコトヲ重ネテ希望スルモ亦最深厚ナル友誼的精神ニ出ツルモノニ外ナラス

予ノ茲ニ提議セント欲スル所ハ他全權ニシテ異見ナクハ幣原男カ日本政府ノ爲メニ爲セル陳述及合衆國政府ノ態度(予カ朗讀セル一九二一年五月三十一日ノ通牒所載ノ通り)ニ關スル陳述ヲ會議ノ記錄ニ留メムカ爲メ之ヲ本會議ニ報告スルコトニ在リ

(三) 日米佛三全權陳述議事錄登載

「ヒーズ」氏ハ右陳述後左ノ如キ決議案ヲ提出シテ審議ヲ求メタリ

Resolved, that the statements by the Japanese and American Delegations in respect to the presence of foreign troops in Siberia be reported to the Conference at its next plenary session to be spread upon its records.

(右譯文)

西伯利ニ於ケル外國軍ノ駐屯ニ關シテ爲サレタル日本及合衆國兩全權ノ陳述ヲ議事錄ニ留ムル爲次回總會議ニ報告スヘキコトヲ決議ス

右ニ對シ討議ヲ求メタルニ何等ノ意見ナカリシヲ以テ引續キ採決ニ問ヘル處米英兩國ハ直チニ贊同シ佛國全權「サロー」氏モ左記ノ如キ陳述ヲ爲シテ贊意ヲ表セリ

『予ハ本決議案ニ對シ全幅ノ同意ヲ表セムトス予ハ佛國カ露國最古ノ盟邦タルコトヲ回想シコノ關係ヨリ先刻特殊満足ノ情ヲ以テ本總委員會ニ於ケル日米兩全權ノ意見交換ヲ聽取セリ西比利亞ニ對スル日本政府ノ意圖成ルヘク速カニ露國ヨリ撤兵スヘシトノ希望竝露國內政不干涉及其ノ領土保全尊重ノ確乎タル同政府ノ意圖ニ關スル幣原全權ノ聲明ニ對シテハ佛國政府モ同一ノ感情ヲ以テ之ヲ聽クヘシト信ス佛國ハ從來其ノ忠實ナル友邦タリシ日本ニ對シ滿腔ノ信頼ヲ置キ同國ノ與ヘタル保障ノ實施セラルヘキコトヲ確信ス佛國ハ又右ノ保障ヲ更ニ一層ノ喜悅ヲ以テ受クルモノナリ何トナレハ斯クノ如キハ千九百十八年ニ於テ佛國政府ヲシテ米國國務長官ノ述ヘラレタルト全然同一ノ條件ヲ以テ西比利亞出兵ヲ斷行セシムルニ至レル政策ニ全ク合致スルモノナレハナリコノ點ニ關シ予ハ茲ニ再ヒ佛國モ亦其ノ盟邦ト共ニ露國ノ領土保全ヲ尊重シ其ノ內政ニ干渉セサルノ意圖ヲ有スルコトヲ最モ明白ニ言明セント欲ス

佛國ハ露國ノ友誼ヲ忘レス之ニ對シテ常ニ信頼ヲ置ケリ佛國ハ他ノ同盟諸邦ニ對スルト同シク露國民ニ對シテ感謝ノ情

日米兩陳
述議事錄
登載ニ關
スル決議
案

「サロー」
氏陳述

ヲ抱クモノナリ露國ハ最初ヨリ佛國ノ友邦ニシテ其ノ政府ハ其ノ裏切ラルルニ至ル最後迄佛國ニ對スル友誼ヲ守リ來レリ佛國モ之ニ對シ他日正規ノ政府ノ樹立ニ依リ大露國再現ノ機必ス到ルハキヲ確信シテ變ハルコトナシ佛國全權ハ如上ノ感情ヲ以テ本決議ニ對シ全幅ノ贊意ヲ表スルモノナリ」云々

決議成立
二月六日
第六回總
會議
三陳述載

次テ伊、日、蘭葡諸國全權何レモ異議ナクシテ右決議案ノ通過ヲ見タルカ越ヘテ二月四日第六回總會議ニ於テ前記幣原「ヒューズ」及「サロー」三全權ノ陳述ヲ議事録ニ留ムルコトニ對シ各國全權ハ何レモ正式ノ承認ヲ與フルニ至レリ前記「サロー」氏ノ陳述全文ヲ掲クレハ次ノ如シ

I give my full and unreserved adherence to this Resolution. In giving this unreserved adherence, I like to remember that France was the oldest ally, perhaps, of Russia, and in this respect it is with a particular feeling of gratification that I will state that I have listened with great pleasure to the exchange of views that had just taken place before the Committee between the Representatives of the United States and Japan. The French Government would hear with the same feelings the formal assurance given by Baron Shidehara of the intention of the Japanese Government concerning Siberia; of Japan's desire to withdraw her troops from Russia as soon as possible; of its firm intention not to interfere in the domestic affairs of Russia; and of its firm purpose to respect the integrity of Russia.

France has full trust in Japan, who have always proved a loyal and trustworthy friend. It is quite certain that this assurance will be carried out. France accept this with all the more pleasure because it is exactly the program which the French Government has adopted in 1918 and which led them to interfere in Siberia under the same conditions as those set forth so exactly by the Secretary of State of the United States. At this point I can not fail to restate quite clearly France's intention, like that of her allies, to respect the

integrity of Russia, and to have the integrity of Russia respected, and not to interfere in her internal policy.

France remains faithful to the friendship of Russia, which she can not forget. She entertains feelings of gratitude to the Russian people, as she does to her other allies. Russia has been her friend of the first hour, and she is loyal; she stuck to her word until the Russian Government was betrayed in the way with which those present are familiar. France also remains faithful to the hope that the day would come when through the channel of a normal and regular government great Russia would be able to go ahead and fulfill her destiny. Then it would be good for her to find unimpaired the patrimony that had been kept for her by the honesty and loyalty of her allies. It is with this feeling that the French delegation with great pleasure concurs in the adoption of the present Resolution.

(四) 西比利亞問題ニ關スル輿論

西比利亞問題ニ關シテハ從來日米兩國政府間ニ屢々意見ノ交換アリ就中帝國ノ駐兵ニ就キ兩國見解ノ相違稍機微ニ涉リタルモノアリタルニ加ヘ本會議開會前後附錄別記ノ如ク「チタ」側ノ宣傳猖獗ヲ極メタル結果本問題ノ上議ハ渺ラサル興味ヲ以テ迎ヘラレタルモノノ如クナリシ處前記幣原全權陳述ヲ見ルヤ

一月二十四日ノ諸新聞ハ其ノ重要欄ニ右陳述ノ要點ヲ掲ケ尙二十三日午後「ヒューズ」氏カ新聞記者會見ノ際幣原全權ノ陳述ノ末段一節ニ論及シ米國政府ハ昨年日本政府トノ間ニ本問題ニ關シ意見ヲ交換シタルコトアリタルカ日本全權今回ノ陳述ハ一層明確且ツ具體的ニ日本政府ノ方針ヲ表示シタルモノニシテ歡迎スヘキモノナリト述ヘタル由ヲ記シ更ニ幣原全權ノ陳述ハ日本議會ニ於ル内田外務大臣ノ演說ノ趣旨ニ合致シ之ヲ是認シ得ヘキモノナリトノ見解ニ大體一致セリ

然ルニ同二十四日極東總委員會ニ於テ「ヒューズ」氏ヨリ西比利亞問題ニ關スル米國側ノ立場ヲ明カニシタル外何等論議ヲ

見スシテ本問題ヲ打切りタル結果二十五日ノ諸新聞ニ反動ヲ來シ華盛頓會議ニ於テ本問題ヲ解決シ得サリシ結果日本カ果シテ將來撤兵ヲ實行ス可キヤ否ヤニ付疑念ヲ挾ムノ聲一般ニ高マレリ主ナル新聞ノ社説大要次ノ如シ

紐育「トリビューン」

日本撤兵ノ誓約ハ齊多政府ノ承認延テ「ボルシエビスト」ノ太平洋岸ニ勢力ヲ及ホスコトヲ意味ス日本カ西比利亞ノ一部ヲ占領スルハ好マサル處ナルモ右ハ侵略主義ニ出テタルニ非ス必ス適當ノ機會ニ撤兵スヘシ

華盛頓「ボスト」

日本カ撤兵期ヲ言明セサリシコトハ聯合諸國ヲシテ失望セシム可シ日本ノ撤兵ハ之ヲ信スルモ兩國間ノ見解ノ相違ハ不安ノ念ヲ起サシム日本全權ノ用ヒタル言葉ハ用意周到ナルモ兩國見解ノ相違ハ將來解決ヲ要スル一問題ナリ

「バブリックレヂャー」

日本ノ言明ハ嚴肅且ツ明確ナル誓約ト認ム只何時西比利亞ヲ撤退スヘキヤハ判斷スル能ハス

「バルチモニア、サン」

西比利亞ニ對スル日本ノ立場ハ不正當ナリ從而誤解ヲ招ク次第ナリ將來何時ニテモ反古ト爲シ得ヘキ口約束ヲナスヨリモ卒直無留保ノ聲明ヲ爲ス事日本ノ信用ヲ高ムル所以ナリ

紐育「ウオールド」

誤レル日本ノ對西比利亞政策ハ西比利亞ニ於ル強固ナル政府ノ成立ヲ妨ケ又西比利亞住民ノ反感ヲ招クニ至レリ日本ニシテ自ラ撤兵ヲ困難ナラシメサルニ於テハ撤兵ノ好時期ハ得ラルヘシ

紐育「タイムス」

日本今回ノ陳述ハ四十年前英國カ埃及撤兵ニ關シテ爲シタルモノニ酷似ス而モ英國ハ未タ撤兵セサルニ非スヤ日本軍カ滿洲方面ヲ支配シ樺太ノ北半ヲ占領スルノ事態ニ顧ミレハ何人モ九ヶ國條約中支那及西比利亞ノ運命及通商ニ關シ

積極的規定ヲ設クルノ必要ナルヲ爭ハサルヘシ

「バブリック、レヂャー」(二十六日)

世界ノ輿論ハ日本ヲシテ今回ノ誓約ヲ爲サシメタルモ西比利亞ヨリ日本ヲ追出シ得ルノ力ナカリキ「ヒューズ」氏ノ遺口ハ經世家的ナラサリシモ少ナクモ辯護士的ナリ將來必要ノ場合ニハ必ス日本ノ陳述ヲ利用スヘシ今回ノ誓約ハ無視シ得ヘキ程曖昧ナル問題ニ非サルヲ以テ今回ハ愈之ヲ實行スルカ又ハ右誓約ヲ反古トスルカヲ決セサルヘカラス

附 錄

在華府齊多政府代表者ノ反日宣傳

華府會議議題ニ關スル米國提案中ニ西比利亞問題ヲ包含スルコトノ發表セラルルヤ齊多極東共和國政府ハ之カ討議ヲ利用シ對日本關係ニ於テ自己ニ有利ナル形勢ヲ誘導セムトスルノ氣色ヲ示シタルカ會議開會ニ近ツクヤ同政府カ密カニ其ノ代表者ヲ華府ニ送リタル由ノ報導アリ次イテ在華府齊多側代表者ト稱スルモノ同地新聞ヲ利用シテ盛ニ反日の宣傳ヲ開始シ西比利亞問題ニ對スル列國ノ注意ト同情ヲ喚起スルニ努メ屢々虛構捏造ノ文書ヲ發表シテ帝國ニ對スル反感ヲ誘出スルニ力ヲ盡シタルカ右等宣傳文書ハ列國ノ認ムル所ナラサリシノミナラス反ツテ齊多側ノ不信ヲ招キ其ノ誠意ヲ疑ハシムルノ結果ヲ來シタルニ止マレリ今前記反日宣傳ノ主ナル事例ヲ掲クレハ次ノ如シ

第一 所謂日佛密約交換文書ノ發表

所謂日佛
密約ニ關
スル日佛
交換文書

大正十年十一月七日紐育「ヘラルド」紙ハ莫斯科特電トシテ極東ニ於ケル日本ノ脅威ニ關スル「ラヂツク」及「ステイツクロフ」兩氏ノ談話ヲ掲ケ更ニ勞農露國外相「チチエリン」氏カ「ヘラルド」ニ供與セル文書ハ日佛間陰謀ノ證左ナリトシ大體左ノ通ノ覺書ナルモノヲ發表セリ

一、九月二日佛國外務省發日本外務省宛覺書

華府會議ノ目的未タ不明ナル今日吾人ノ地位ヲ明言スル事難シト雖モ極東ニ於テ日毎ニ其ノ勢力ヲ増シ行ク米國ニ對峙スル日本ト「ソビエツト」露國ニ地位ヲ占メントセル米國ノ努力ヲ挫キタル佛國ト相提携スルハ賢明ナル策ト謂フヘク佛國ハ華府ニ於テ惹起セラルヘキ一切ノ問題ニ關シ日本ノ支援ヲ期待シ得ヘキヲ信スルト同時ニ日本カ其ノ保護ノ下ニ極東獨立共和國建設ノ計畫ヲ實現セントスルニ對シテハ佛國政府ハ充分ノ支持ヲ與フヘシ日本軍ノ西比利亞撤退

ハ過激政府カ遠カラス沒落セントスル情況ニ顧ミ尙早且ツ危險ナリ日本ハ兩國ノ利益ヲ實現シ得ヘキ新露國ノ復活ニ參與スヘク右計畫ノ實現ニ對シ日本カ難題ヲ持出ス事無カラシムト共ニ佛國政府ハ欣然日本ノ利益ヲ擁護スヘキヲ言明ス

二、九月七日日本政府回答

帝國政府
反駁

日本政府ハ佛國政府ノ見解ト全然一致スルヲ喜ヒ佛國政府ノ好意ヲ感謝ス日本ハ如何ナル場合ニモ其ノ西比利亞政策ヲ變更スル能ハス新極東共和國ノ建設ハ我對外政策ノ一ナリ過激政府倒壊ノ曉帝國政府ハ露國復活ニ助力ヲ惜マサルヘシ日佛共同利害ノ關スル限リ帝國政府ハ佛國ヲ支持スヘシ云々

於是帝國政府ハ在米幣原大使ヲシテ其誣罔ノ甚シキモノナル所以ヲ明ニスル爲メ適當措置方取計ハシムルト同時ニ在大連松島政務部長ヲシテ在同地齊多政府代表者「ベトロフ」氏ニ對シ本件ノ如キ何等根據ナキ事實ヲ虛構シテ關係國ニ對シテ極メテ有害ナル宣傳ヲ爲スハ不都合ノ甚シキモノニシテ此種ノ不誠實ナル行動ハ常ニ彼我ノ接觸ヲ阻害スルコト少ナカラサルヲ以テ充分ノ注意ヲ要スル旨ヲ說示セシメタリ

日佛交換
文書等再
發表

然ルニ翌大正十一年一月二日ニ至リ米國各新聞ハ齊多政府代表者ノ發表セル所謂日佛密約及關係公文ナルモノヲ掲ケタルカ其ノ大要次ノ如シ

(一) 千九百二十年十二月佛國外務省發在東京佛國大使宛電報

「ラツセル」少佐訓令ヲ奉シテ東京ヘ向ハムトス貴官ハ至急日本政府ニ例ノ計畫ヲ通告シテ同政府ノ之ニ對スル態度ヲ報告スヘシ露國代表者「Tirbach」例ノ organization ヲ指圖セムカ爲ニ上海ニ向ハムトス英國領事ヨリハ日本政府トノ交渉カ満足ナル結果ヲ齎ス迄「Tirbach」ヲ援助スヘキ旨ノ回答ヲ得タリ日本ハ尙「セメノフ」ト密接ナル關係ヲ有ストノコトナルカ若シ事實ナラハ同人ヘモ我カ計畫ノ一端ヲ通シ置クヘシ

(二) 千九百二十一年一月六日日本軍事委員發東京外務省宛電報

「ウランゲル」撤退ニ關シ佛國側ト満足ナル協定成立セリ佛國カ我西比利亞問題ニ關シ日本ヲ支持スルニ於テハ日本ハ佛國ノ提案ヲ承諾シ得ヘシ

(三) 千九百二十一年一月日本代表者ト佛國軍事委員トカバ里會議ニ於テ起草セル議定書

佛國政府ハ依然「ウランゲル」軍ト約定ヲ有シ且ツ露西亞問題ニ至大ノ關係ヲ有スルカ故ニ日本政府ノ代表ニ依リテ爲サレタル提議ニ對シ日本政府ニ感謝ス佛國政府ハ日本ノ利益特ニ西比利亞問題ニ關シテ之ヲ支持スヘキモ日本ノ西比利亞占領ノ計畫ハ聯合國全體ノ問題ナルヲ以テ佛國單獨ニ之ヲ承認スルヲ得ス

佛國政府ノ最モ考慮ニ入レタキハ現下形勢發展ノ爲メニ佛米間ノ關係ヲ毀損セラレサルニアリ故ニ佛國政府ハ次ノ條件ヲ以テ其ノ第二案即チ西比利亞ノ一時占領ノ提議ニ賛成ス

(イ) 永久占領又ハ併合ノ觀念ヲ拋棄スルコト

(ロ) 日本ハ過激派及ヒ社會革命黨ニ反對スル黨派ヲ援助スルコト

(ハ) 日本ハ「ウランゲル」軍ヲ西比利亞ニ輸送シ且ツ軍備品及必需品ヲ供給スルコト日本官憲ハ「コルチャツク」ノ前副官 Tihach ヲ庇護セムコトヲ希望ス

(ニ) 日本カ右計畫ヲ承認スル場合ハ佛國ハ日本カ西比利亞ニ於ケル行動ノ自由ヲ享有シ且ツ「セメノフ」ノ指揮下ニ在ル「ウランゲル」軍ヲシテ過激派ノ占領セル地方ヲ恢復セシメントスル計畫ヲ承認スヘシ右過激派占領地方ノ恢復セラレタル場合ハ其ノ保護ノ下ニ露國政府ヲ樹立スヘク佛國ハ英國政府ニ對シテ之ニ關シ必要ナル通告ヲナスヘシ

(ホ) 利權ニ關シテハ佛國ノ利益ヲ日本ノ次ニ置クコト

(四) 千九百二十一年一月東京秘密會議ノ決議

日本政府ハ佛國ノ提案ハ妥當ニシテ承認シ得ヘキモノト思考スルモ尙全般ニ互リテ審議スルノ必要アルヲ以テ之カ爲委員ヲ任命セリ日本側ハ既ニ Tihach ト接觸ヲ保チ萬事彼等ヲ援助ス去レト日本ハ西比利亞ノ爲ニ從來以上ノ犠牲ヲ

拂フコトヲ得ス日本ハ過激派思想ノ浸潤セル「チタ」政府ノ保護ヲ認諾シ能ハサルヲ以テ Tihach ノ計畫カ成功スルニ於テハ極東共和國ヲ其ノ保護國トナスヘシ

(五) 千九百二十一年三月日佛露代表者間ニ締結セル條約

日本政府ハ露西亞代表者カ日本ノ提議ヲ承認スル場合ハ次ノ條件ノ下ニ露國人ニ對シ左記ノ援助ヲ與フヘシ

(イ) 西比利亞カ過激派兵力ヨリ解放セララル場合ハ日本ハ西比利亞ニ於テ完全ナル優越權ヲ有スルコト

(ロ) 日本ハ露國政府ヲ監督スルコト

(ハ) 露國官憲ハ日本ノ監督ノ下ニ立ツコト

(ニ) 露國ノ軍隊及警察ハ日本ノ監督ノ下ニ立ツコト

(ホ) 一切ノ利權ハ日本人ニ屬ス他國ニ對スル利權ノ允許及其ノ條件ハ日本ノ承認ヲ要ス

(ヘ) 東支鐵道ハ露國ニ回收シテ其ノ經營ハ日本ノ監督ノ下ニ置キ且ツ日本ハ全線ノ買収ニ對シテ優先權ヲ有スルコト

(ト) 日本ハ軍事上必要アル箇所ニ駐兵スルノ權利ヲ有スルコト

前記ノ各項ニシテ承認セララル場合ハ日本政府ハ左ノ援助ヲ與フヘシ

(A) 「ウランゲル」軍ノ極東輸送軍需品及必需品ノ供給

(B) 軍事行動開始後ハ軍費及軍用材料ヲ供給スルコト

(C) 反過激派軍團ニ對スル聲援

(D) 過激派勢力掃蕩後ハ新團體及新政府ノ爲必要ナル輸送ニ關シ一切ノ援助ヲ與フルコト

(六) 千九百二十一年九月二日佛國外務省發在東京佛國大使館電報及

(七) 同年九月七日在東京佛國代表者ニ手交セル日本外務省ノ書翰(前記大正十年十一月七日紐育「ヘラルド」所載秘密

文書ト同様ニ付省略ス)

帝國全權
否認

右ノ如キ宣傳文書ノ發表ハ將ニ西比利亞問題カ會議ニ上程セラレントスル一方浦鹽政權ノ勢力擴張シ「ハバロフスク」占領ノ報傳ハリ齊多政府ノ威信漸ク衰ヘントスル際ニ於ケル同政府代表者ノ掉尾ノ活動ニシテ新年初頭紙面ノ閑散ナルヲ利用セルモノナルヘク紐育「ウオールド」ヲ除ク一般新聞ハ別段之ニ重キヲ置カス大體ニ於テ真面目ナル方面ノ信憑ヲ得サリシ模様ナルモ該文書ニ對シテハ直ニ填原全權ヨリ右ハ全然事實無根ナル旨ヲ強ク言明シ置キタルカ佛國全權ニ於テモ二日ノ新聞紙ニ於テ極力否認セリ

尙一月三日ノ新聞記者會見ニ於テ加藤全權ハ「予ハ過去七年内閣ニ在リシモ本件ニ關シテ何等聞ク所ナク該文書ハ絕對ニ虛偽ナル」旨ヲ説明セリ

他方帝國政府ハ松島政務部長ヲシテ此種虛說流布ハ畢竟同政府カ信ヲ天下ニ喪フ所以ナルノミナラス速カニ代表者ニ訓令シテ爾今此種ノ宣傳ヲ禁止スルニス非ンハ同政府ノ誠意ニ對シテモ疑ヲ播マサルヲ得サルヘク大連會議ノ進捗ニモ多大ノ障礙ヲ招致スルコトナルヘキ旨覺書ヲ以テ嚴重ニ「ベトロフ」氏ニ申入レシメタル處「ベトロフ」氏ハ我方使者島田副領事ニ對シ「詳細ハ調査ノ上確答スヘキモ斯カル文書ノ發表ハ齊多側代表者ノ爲セル所ニ非スシテ巴里方面ヨリ華府ニ赴キタル露國人一派ト米國ノ或ル團體トカ相通シテ爲セル所爲ナリト思考ス曩ニ日本側ヨリ申出アリタル日佛文書交換問題（前顯十一月七日發表ノモノ）ニ付テモ當時直ニ「チチエリン」氏ニ打電シ置キタルニ同人ヨリ斯ル覺エナシ詳細郵報アレトノ返信ニ接シタルヲ以テ先頃ニ郵報シ目下其ノ回答ヲ待チ居ル次第ナリ尙齊多政府閣員中ニモ親米派タル溫和社會黨ハ大連會議開催ニ反對ナルカ故ニ大連會議今日ノ進捗ノ模様ニ鑑ミ外部ヨリ破壞運動ノ行ハルハ敢テ不思議トスルニ足ラス」ト答ヘリ

越エテ一月二十七日「ベトロフ」氏ハ島田副領事ニ對シ齊多政府ヨリノ回電ニ依レハ同政府ハ在華府齊多代表ニ對シ此種文書公表ノ權限ヲ賦與シタルコトナキ旨ヲ語り同副領事ノ其ノ旨公表セラレテハ如何トノ提言ニ對シ同氏ハ在華府「エズイコーフ」氏ト米國新聞トノ關係如何ニナリ居ルヤ承知スルノ必要アリテ問合中ナリト答ヘタルニ止マレリ

第二 所謂日露密約文書ノ發表

日本軍
「セメノフ」援助
密約

一月三日加藤全權ハ新聞記者會見ニ當リ一記者カ齊多政府代表者ノ發表ト稱スル日本陸軍代表露國「セメノフ」政權代表間ニ成立シタル協定ナルモノヲ讀上ケタルニ對シ同全權ハ帝國陸軍代表者ニハ決シテ斯ル協定締結ノ權能ヲ賦與セラレ非サルヲ以テ斯ル事ノアリ得ヘキ筈ナシト答ヘタルニ四日ノ諸新聞ハ右加藤全權ノ陳述ト共ニ更ニ所謂日露密約ナルモノヲ發表セリ

右ニ依レハ該密約ハ千九百二十一年六月六日ヲ以テ露國側「グロデコウオ」兵團司令官「サヴエリエフ」中將及同參謀長少將日本側第十一師團司令部附外交代表者ト稱スル有本大尉及樋口中尉間ニ締結セラレタルモノニシテ規定ノ内容大體左記ノ如シ

- (一) 「サヴエリエフ」中將ハ在「グロデコウオ」第一分隊在「ハバロフスク」第二分隊在浦潮第三分隊及烏蘇里哥薩克ヲ指揮シテ極東共和國革命軍ニ對シ攻撃ヲ開始ス右開始ノ時機ハ日本軍ト協定ス男爵「ウンゲルン」、ステルブルグ」中將ノ軍ハ「ムインフーヤ」「セレンガ」「ベトロフスキー」「ザヴオード」地方ニ於ケル赤軍背部ノ掃蕩ニ任ス
- (二) 露軍カ「イマン」「ハバロフスク」方面ニ迂回前進シタル時ハ日本軍ハ其ノ後方ヲ假ニ占領シ援助ヲ與フルコト
- (三) 沿海州全部回復ノ上ハ日本軍ハ前項ノ占領地帶ヨリ「ニコリスク」「ウスリスキー」及浦潮迄撤兵シ千九百二十年二月二十九日ノ日露條約所定ノ通三十露里以外ニ出サルコト

(四) 前記攻撃開始ト同時ニ日本軍ハ露軍ニ對シ五十萬圓ニ相當スル物資ノ援助ヲ爲シ且ツ左ノ武器ヲ引渡スコト

銃三千二百挺右彈藥三十五萬個

機關銃二十四右彈藥二十四箱

野砲六山砲二右彈藥七十五箱

(五) 日本軍ハ露軍ニ必要ノ糧食及輸送機關ヲ供給ス
 (六) 「ハバロフスク」占領ト同時ニ日本軍司令部ハ「アタマン、セメノフ」中將ノ橫濱正金銀行預金引出方及右ヲ露軍ニ引渡方ヲ日本政府ニ稟請スルコト

(七) 日本司令部ハ露軍ノ海上輸送ヲ援助スルコト

(八) 「イマン」占領ト同時ニ日本軍司令部ハ日本漁船ヲ保護スル爲メ Vladimir Teinklin Nernovo 及 Imperatorsky 諸灣ニ軍隊ヲ上陸セシムルコト

(九) 秩序ノ確立ニ至ル迄ハ日本軍ハ浦潮市及要塞守備並ニ烏蘇里及東支鐵道ノ管理ニ任ス

(十) 「ハバロフスク」占領後人民議會召集ニ至ル迄極東地方ノ全權ハ「セメノフ」中將管理シ之ヲ行使ス

(十一) 沿海州薩哈噠州勘察加州「アムール」州後貝加爾州ノ掃蕩ヲ終ヘ極東共和國倒壊シタル後ハ地方人民議會ヲ召集スルコト

(十二) 右政府確立シタル時ハ日本ハ前記薩哈噠及勘察加州ニ於テ狩獵漁業及森林特許ニ關シ優先權ヲ獲得シ沿海黑龍兩州ニ於テ最高權ヲ享有スルコト

帝國全權
辯駁

右ニ對シ加藤全權ハ一月四日ノ記者會見ニ於テ大要次ノ如ク辯駁說示シ置キタル處翌五日ノ諸新聞ハ何レモ之ヲ目立チタル欄ニ掲載セリ

『千九百十八年聯合諸國西比利亞出兵當時獨塊俘虜ノ指揮下ニ在ル過激派ノ東漸ヲ防止スル爲メニハ先ヅ露國軍ヲシテ之ニ當ラシムルヲ適當ト認メタル處日本政府ハ他ニ適當ナル者ヲ發見シ得ザリシヲ以テ「セメノフ」將軍ニ物質的援助ヲ與ヘテ之ニ當ラシムルコトニ決セリ右日本ノ決意ハ何等野心ヲ抱藏スルモノニ非ズシテ當時聯合諸國殊ニ英佛兩國モ亦同様ノ政策ヲ採リタリ然ルニ其ノ後獨塊ノ勢力西比利亞ヨリ掃蕩セラレ西比利亞ノ政情變轉ニ對スル「セメノフ」「コルチャツク」其ノ他社會革命黨諸團體ノ政爭トナルニ及ヒ日本軍ハ「セメノフ」援助ヲ打切り全然中立ノ態度ヲ取リ現ニ同

將軍「ザバイカル」撤退ノ際ニモ何等援助ヲ與ヘズ其ノ後今日ニ至ル迄毫モ同將軍ヲ援助シタルコト無シ』

日本軍
「セメノフ」援助
密約ノニ

然ルニ其ノ後ニ於テモ齊多側ノ宣傳ハ依然熄マズ更ニ「セメノフ」派ニ對スル日本ノ軍事的援助ニ關スル祕密文書ナルモノ五通ヲ發表セルカ紐育「タイムス」紙ノ掲ケタル所ニヨレハ其ノ大要次ノ如シ

第一號文書ハ浦潮憲兵隊司令官五味大佐ト「ソフイー、アレクセーフスキー」「ファジエフスキー」「ボルタフスキー」「ジャンチャゴウ」「モノフ」トノ間ニ千九百二十年七月十五日「グロデコーウオ」ニ於テ締結セラレタル「グロデコーウオ」停車場及附近ノ占領ニ關スル取極ニシテ末段ニ於テ日本軍ハ東部北部及西北部ヲ占領シ第六十一第二第五十六第二十一第六十三第五十七高地ヲ監視シ且ツ警備ニ任スト規定セリ

第二號文書ハ浦潮憲兵隊五味大佐ヨリ立花將軍ニ宛テタル千九百二十一年六月二十三日附機密第七百五十六號報告書ニシテ左ノ如シ

六月一日共同九ニ於テ「セメノフ」頭領ト會見セル際「セメノフ」ハ左ノ通り述ヘタリ

一、余ハ極東ヨリ共產黨ヲ驅逐スルニ關シ貴下ハ援助ヲ與ヘラレルコトト信ス余ハ將來西比利亞ニ大露國ヲ建設スル考ナリ

二、余ハ「メルクローフ」政府ヨリ金貨三十萬留ヲ得ヘキヲ以テ此金ヲ以テ浦潮ニ於テ兵ヲ擧クル積ナリ

三、昨日「ザバイカル」及「アムール」州ヨリ到着シタル代表者カ「メルクローフ」政府顛覆ヲ希望シ居レルコトヲ熟知ス

四、人民議會參加ノ爲「ザバイカル」及「アムール」諸州ヨリ來着シタル代表者ノ大部分ハ非社會黨ナリ余ハ彼等ト協力ス但シ浦潮地方ハ共產黨社會民主黨及社會革命黨ヲ選出スヘシ彼等ハ多數黨ナルカ故ニ人民議會成立後ハ政權ハ彼等ノ掌中ニ入ルヘシ齊多政府ハ「メルクローフ」政府ヲ顛覆センコトヲ欲シ後者ハ之ニ對抗スルノ用意ヲナシ居レルモ十分ノ兵力ナシ余ハ地方民カ「メルクローフ」政府ヲ承認セス從テ同政府ハ赤軍ヲ擊退スル能ハサルヘキコトヲ知ル

第三號文書ハ千九百二十一年六月二十九日附ヲ以テ「セメノフ」事件ニ關シ浦潮憲兵司令部ヨリ沿海州日本憲兵隊長ニ與

ヘタル祕密命令ニシテ大要左ノ如シ

六月二十八日午後八時軍司令部ニ於テ會議ノ結果左ノ通り決定ス

一、昨年三月事變中押收シタル兵器ハ旅順條約ニ基キ之ヲ「セメノフ」ニ還附ス

二、日本政府ハ「セミヨール」ニ對シ五百萬留ヲ贈與ス

三、日本軍々司令部ハ「セメノフ」ト協議ノ上「カツペリ」「セメノフ」間ノ協調ヲ謀ルコト

四、右ニ關シテハ「メルクロフ」トモ協議ヲナスコト

五、「セメノフ」ニ對シ兵員武器彈藥及食糧ヲ送ルコトヲ要ス

六、浦潮及「ニコリス」ウスリースク」地方ニ在リテ日本司令部ヲ承認セサル「カツペリ」殘軍ノ武裝ヲ解除スルコトヲ要ス

七、日本軍ハ「セメノフ」ヲ極東軍總司令官トスルコト

第四號文書ハ千九百二十一年六月二十二日附ヲ以テ「セメノフ」ノ浦潮上陸ニ關シ日本憲兵部浦潮憲兵分隊「ヤマ」大佐支隊「オリモト」憲兵分隊長ニ與ヘラレタル訓令ニシテ左ノ如シ

一、旅順祕密協約ニ基キ軍司令部ハ「セメノフ」ノ浦潮上陸ヲ掩護スヘシ

二、「セメノフ」上陸後「セメノフ」ト「カツペリ」側トノ間ニ衝突ヲ生シタル時ハ日本軍ハ双方ノ武裝解除ヲ行フヘシ

三、「セメノフ」ハ浦潮ニ滯留シ得ヘク極東總司令官タルコトヲ宣言シ動員令ヲ下スヘキニ依リ日本軍ハ人民ノ態度ヲ

監視スヘシ

「セメノフ」ハ「メルクロフ」ニ對シ數ヶ條ヨリ成ル要求ヲ提出シ「メルクロフ」ハ之ヲ一個人ノ要求ト看做シ居ル處

斯ノ如キ態度ハ面白カラサルニ付兩者ノ誤解ヲ避ク爲メ左ノ通り決定セリ

甲、「カツペリ」「セメノフ」間ノ衝突ヲ妨ク爲メ五味大佐ヲシテ「セメノフ」ト會見セシメ「セメノフ」ヲ「グロデコウオ」

ニ赴カシムルコト

乙、「セメノフ」ノ「グロデコウオ」滯留中ハ日本軍ニ於テ私カニ之ヲ援助スルコト

丙、「メルクロフ」政府ニ於テ「セメノフ」ヲ逮捕シタル時ハ日本軍ハ之ニ抗議ヲ爲シ之ヲ釋放ヲ要求スルコト「セメノフ」ノ不在中「カツペリ」軍ト「セメノフ」軍トノ間ニ衝突起リタル時ハ日本軍ハ双方ノ武裝解除ヲ行フヘシ

第五號文書ハ千九百二十一年九月二十六日東京陸軍大臣ヨリ浦潮軍司令部ニ宛テタル無線電信命令ニシテ左ノ如シ

兵變ノ場合ニハ嚴正中立ヲ守ルヘシ必要ノ場合ハ兵力ヲ以テ臨時政府ノ地位ヲ擁護スヘシ極東共和國ニ於テ「ニコリス」

スクウスリス」及浦潮ヲ占領セントスル場合ニハ外交手段ニ依リ之ヲ妨害スヘシ外交手段ニ依リ其ノ目的ヲ達スル

能ハサル場合ニハ兵力ヲ用フヘシ本件ニ關シテハ露國政府トノ公ノ關係ヲ要セス(同氏ハ茲ニ所謂臨時政府トハ「メル

クロフ」政府ノ事ナリト註セリ)

一月七日
帝國政府
聲明

以上ノ如ク齊多側ハ西比利亞ニ於ケル我カ軍隊ノ行動ニ關シ屢々中傷的宣傳ヲ試ミタル處斯クノ如キハ勿論虛構捏造ニ係ルモノニシテ公正ナル人士ノ一顧ヲモ得サルヘキ所ナルモ其ノ萬一ノ效果ヲ慮レル結果帝國政府ハ一月七日外務當局ノ談トシテ左ノ如キ公表ヲ爲シ以テ本件ニ關スル帝國政府ノ態度ヲ中外ニ闡明スル所アリタリ

『帝國ハ自衛上已ムヲ得ス極東西比利亞ニ駐兵スルモノナルヲ以テ露國人ノ政爭ニ對シテハ嚴正中立ノ態度ヲ維持シ同地方ノ政情安定シテ速ニ撤兵シ得ルニ至ランコトヲ希望スルモノナルコトハ帝國政府ノ屢々宣明スル所ナリ

然ルニ一部露西亞人ハ自己ノ黨派ニ不利ナル事態ノ發生スル毎ニ帝國ノ態度ヲ中傷非難シ甚シキニ至テハ全然虛構ノ事實ヲ捏造シテ宣傳ヲ行フモノアルハ殆ト彼等ノ心事ヲ解スルニ苦シマサルヲ得サル所ナリ

客年五月浦潮ニ政變起リ齊多政府ノ勢力同地方ヨリ一掃セラルルヤ一時日本軍ノ白黨援助ヲ宣傳シ其ノ後大連會議開催「ツエトリ」ノ浦潮密行、日本軍ノ「メルクロフ」政權ニ對スル武器供給拒絕等ノ事實ハ日本軍ノ赤黨援助ノ宣傳ヲ出シタルモ此等宣傳ハ何レモ事實ニ反シ日本軍ハ終始不偏不黨ノ態度ヲ嚴守セリ五月政變ノ際ノ如キ日本軍ノ公正ナル態

度ハ當時浦潮ニ在リシ齊多政府代表者ノ文書ヲ以テ承認セル所ナリ

最近沿海州ニ於ケル白色軍ノ成功ヲ見ルヤ再ヒ日本軍ノ白黨援助ノ宣傳行ハレ齊多國民議會ハ世界各國政府ニ對スル檄文ヲ決議シ外相「ヤンソン」亦議會ニ於テ公然日本ノ態度ヲ中傷シタル趣ナルカ右ハ何レモ依例邪推乃至虛構ノ說ヲ吹聴シ何等爲ニセントスルモノニ外ナラサルモノナルコトハ既往ニ於ケル帝國政府及軍隊ノ態度ニ徴シ何等疑義アルヘキコトナシ左ニ右檄文記載事項中主要ナル事實相違ノ點二三ヲ例示セン

日本軍ハ尼港ヲ破壊シ黑龍江水道ヲ閉塞シタリト云フモ右ハ明白ナル虛說ニシテ其ノ實過激派軍ハ歷史上稀ナル殘虐手段ヲ以テ尼港ニ於ケル帝國臣民全部ヲ虐殺シ我救援ノ到着前尼市ニ火ヲ放チテ之ヲ全滅セシメ黑龍江水道ニ石船ヲ沈メテ水道ヲ閉塞シ奧地ニ逃走シタルモノニシテ其ノ後日本軍同地ニ到着スルヤ直ニ生存露人ノ救済水道ノ開通等ニ從事シタルモノナリ

日本軍ハ白軍ニ武器ヲ供給シ内亂ヲ助長シ依テ以テ駐兵ノ口實ヲ得ントスルカ如キハ寧ロ滑稽ニ屬ス蓋シ帝國ハ露國民カ一日モ速ニ内爭ヲ止メ極東露領ノ政情安定シテ撤兵シ得ルニ至ランコトヲ希望スル外他意ナク日本軍ハ浦潮領事團ノ要望ヲ容レ公安維持上絕對ニ必要ナル最少限度ノ武器ヲ從來許容セラレ居ル一定數ノ民警用トシテ地方自治機關ニ交附シタルニ過キスシテ白軍ニ武器ヲ供給シタルコト絕對ニ無シ右ハ「メルクロフ」政權カ日本ヨリ武器供給ヲ受ケ得サル爲メ日本ヲ非難スル事實ニ徴スルモ明カナルヘシ最近白色軍ノ活動ハ日本軍トハ全然關係ナク彼等ハ地方農民ノ後援ト赤軍ヨリ分捕シタル武器トニヨリテ其勢力ヲ増大シツアリト云フ

日本ハ大連會議ニ於テ駐兵ノ承認ヲ求メ且ツ韃靼海峽沿岸ノ割讓ヲ求ムル等極東露領ヲ其ノ手中ニ收ムルカ如キ要求ヲ爲シタリト云フハ事實ヲ誣フルコト最甚シキモノナリ大連會議ノ主要目的ハ極東露領ニ於ケル帝國臣民ノ生命財產並交通ノ危險及帝國ニ對スル脅威ノ除去通商産業ノ自由等ニ關シ保障ヲ得以テ沿海州ヨリ撤兵ヲ實行セントセルモノニシテ何等他意アルニ非ス

最近又華盛頓ニ於ケル極東共和國代表者ハ日佛兩國カ「ウランゲル」セメノフ」一派ヲ援助シ西比利亞ヲ以テ恰モ日本ノ保護國ト爲スカ如キ密約ヲ締結シタリトノ說ヲ流布シ右密約及關係公文書ナルモノヲ發表シタルカ右ハ惡意ヲ以テ捏造セラレタル全然虛偽ノ文書ニシテ日本政府及其ノ官吏ハ佛國政府又ハ其ノ他何人トノ間ニモ此ノ如キ交渉ヲ爲シタル事絕對ニ無シ右偽造文書ノ一部ハ客年十一月勞農政府側ヨリ發表セラレタルヲ以テ當時帝國政府ハ在大連「チタ」政府代表者ヲ經テ強硬ナル抗議ヲ提起シタルカ今又同政府代表者カ此ノ如キ虛構ノ事實ヲ流布シテ各國民間ニ不信不和ノ種子ヲ播カントスルハ最モ惡辣ナル國際的罪惡ニシテ世界ノ輿論ハ斷シテ之ヲ假借セサルヘキヲ信ス」

第三 日本軍ノ米國將校暗殺陰謀等ニ關スル文書ノ發表

一月六日ノ「オークランド、トリビュン」紙ハ「東京政府ノ西比利亞ニ於ケル米國官吏暗殺ノ陰謀發見」云々トノ見出ヲ附シ同紙特派員「フレデリック、マツコーミツク」ナル者ノ通信ヲ掲載セル處一月九日ノ「紐育タイムズ」及「シカゴ、トリビュン」ハ何レモ之ヲ轉載セリ

其ノ大要次ノ如シ

「余ハ西比利亞ニ於ケル政治的陰謀ノ調査中蒐集シタル文書及通信ヲ携テ浦潮ヨリ滿洲ヘ逃ケ出シ一月一日夜滿洲トノ國境ニ到着シタル時浦潮出發以來余ヲ追踵シタル立花司令官ヨリ派遣セラレタル四百餘名ノ者ノ攻撃ヲ受ケ携帶書類及金錢全部ヲ掠奪セラレタリ更ニ右兇漢ハ余及同伴者カ停車場ニ入ラントスル際モ余等ヲ拉シ去ラントセシカ守備支那兵ノ應援ニ依リ漸ク事無キヲ得タリ

日本政府ハ滿洲及西比利亞ヨリ米國政府ノ最後ノ殘留員ヲ驅逐シ仍テ北部西比利亞ノ富源地獲得ニ對スル大障礙物ヲ除去シタリ最後ノ殘留員トハ「スチブンス」ヲ議長トスル聯合國技術部委員會ノ委員米國技師及鐵道從業員ナリ日本ノ密偵カ活動ヲ始メタルハ「スチブンス」カ浦潮ヲ去リタル十月十三日ニシテ其ノ活動ノ目標トナリタルハ「クラーク」少佐ナリ

茲ニ同封スル東京浦潮間及「メルクローフ」政府中ノ帝政派ト日本人間ニ交換セラレタル書類ノ原書及寫眞ニ依リ右密偵ノ活動ヲ窺知シ得ヘシ日本カ直接浦潮政府ノ首相「メルクローフ」及内務省民警局長「ボゴスロフスキー」ト交渉シ十月十九日以降四日間ニ互ル四通ノ公信ニ於テ「メルクローフ」政府ニ對シ益々壓迫ヲ加ヘ其ノ企圖ヲ遂行セントセリ日本軍ハ「クラーク」少佐カ其ノ直屬長官「ジョンソン」大佐ト打合セテ了シ特別列車ニ乗シテ哈爾濱ヲ發シ浦潮ヘノ途次ナル旨ノ情報ヲ得タルカ浦潮政府ハ十二月十二日附ヲ以テ日本軍ノ企圖ヲ實行スルコトニ同意シ之カ實行ノ爲「ボゴスロフスキー」ハ出發シ他ニ警官二十名ヲ從ヘ日本兵ヲ乗セタル二ツノ特別列車ト共ニ浦潮ヲ出發シ「ニコリスク」ト滿洲國境トノ間ニ於テ止マリ待チ居タリ是レ「クラーク」少佐カ滿洲「ムーリッ」停車場ニ二日間逗留シタルカ爲メナリ尙右關係文書ノ主ナルモノ左ノ如シ

第一號 一九二一年九月十六日附淺野大佐發「メロクローフ」宛(内務大臣ヨリ參考トシテ「ボゴスロフスキー」大佐及「グイーイワノフ」ニ與ヘタルモノ)

「クラーク」少佐ハ「ニコリスク」「ウスリースク」及「ハルビン」ニ向テ出發ス同少佐ハ露國共產黨代表者「オンリン」及「グリゴリエフ」ト會見ノ筈「クラーク」少佐ヲ監視スレハ興味アル結果ヲ得ヘシ日本軍司令部ハ「ボゴロフスキー」大佐及「ボクラコフ」大佐ニ對シ發令セラレムコトヲ望ム

第二號 一九二一年十月十九日附淺野大佐發「メルクローフ」宛(内務大臣ヨリ「イワノフ」ニ對シ參考トシテ與ヘタルモノ)
「クラーク」少佐ト共產黨トノ關係及同少佐ト「シャトフ」及「コシヨウニコフ」トノ友誼關係ハ吾人ノ久シク確認スル所ナルコトヲ回答ス

第三號 一九一八年十月二十二日附ヲ以テ「ボゴスロフスキー」及「ボグラコフ」兩大佐ヨリ内閣議長及内務大臣ニ提出シタルモノ

午前十時島本大尉來應「クラーク」少佐事件ニ關スル日本軍鐵道部ノ情報ヲ齎セリ委細親シク後報ス

帝國政府
反敵再公表

第四號 一九二一年十月二十一日附沖山少佐發公信「メロクローフ」ヨリ執行命令トシテ「イワノフ」ニ與ヘタルモノ)

「クラーク」少佐ハ「ハルビン」ニ於テ極東共和國代表者「オズリン」ヨリ露國共產黨用通信暗號及地方政黨首領ニ宛テタル書翰數通ヲ受領セリ淺野大佐ハ「クラーク」少佐ノ列車檢閲ノ必要ヲ提議シタル處日本軍司令部ニ於テハ右檢閲ニ依リ重大ナル材料ヲ得ヘシト信シ居レリ因テ「ボクラコフ」ニ右傳達セラレムコトヲ望ム

右通信員ト齊多政府側トノ關係明白ナラスト雖察スル所同政府ノ旨ヲ更ケ此種排日宣傳ノ舉ニ出テタルモノナルヘシ於是帝國政府ハ更ニ「マツコーミツク」氏ノ通信ノ虛構ヲ辯明スルト同時ニ所謂日露密約ナルモノノ全然無根ノ虛報タルノ事實ヲ指摘シ以テ西比利亞ニ於ケル帝國政府ノ施設ノ公正妥當ナル所以ヲ内外ニ闡明センカ爲メ左ノ通公表シタリ

帝國ノ西比利亞政策ニ關スル各種ノ中傷的宣傳ニ對シテハ曩ニ其ノ妄ヲ辯シタルカ其ノ後或種露國人其ノ他ノ者ニシテ下記ノ如ク或ハ「セメノフ」援助ニ關スル日露密約及祕密文書或ハ日本軍憲ノ一米國通信員及米國鐵道専門家ニ對スル陰謀等無稽ノ報道ヲ外國新聞ニ發表セルモノアルニ付爲念嚴密調査ヲ遂ケタル處何レモ全然事實無根ノ虛報ニシテ其ノ所謂證據文書ナルモノハ虛構ノ事實ヲ羅列セル捏造文書ニ外ナラサルコト明瞭トナレリ彼等ハ斯ノ如キ虛說ヲ流布スルコトニ依リテ自ラ世界ニ向テ自己ノ不信不義ヲ曝露スル以外何等得ル處ナカルヘシ

一、曩ニ在華府齊多側代表者ノ發表セル所ニ依レハ所謂日露密約ナルモノハ一九二一年六月八日露國「グロデコウオ」兵團司令官ナル者ト日本軍憲トノ間ニ締結セラレタルモノニシテ日本軍カ「セメノフ」一派ヲ援助シ以テ極東共和國軍隊ヲ掃蕩シタル後日本ハ極東露領ニ於テ優先的利權ヲ獲得シ特ニ沿海黑龍兩州ニ於テハ最高權ヲ享有スヘシトノ趣旨ヲ有スト稱セラルル處右ハ驚クヘキ虛報ニシテ密約締結者ト稱セラルル「アリモト」大尉及「ヒグチ」中尉ナル者ハ西比利亞日本駐屯軍中ニ存在セス日本ハ一九一八年歐洲大戰中「セメノフ」カ西比利亞ニ於テ獨逸軍人ノ支配下ニアル過激派軍ニ對スル唯一有力ノ防護者タリ際際聯合與國ト共ニ彼ニ援助ヲ與ヘタルコトアルモ其ノ後獨逸ノ勢力一掃セラレ且ツ「セメノフ」ト其ノ反對黨ノ政爭起ルニ及ヒ全然援助ヲ中止シ中立ノ態度ヲ取り來レリ而シテ一九二

一年五月下旬「セメノフ」カ日本軍憲再三ノ忠告ヲ容レス旅順ヨリ浦潮ニ向ハントスルヤ同軍憲ハ彼ニ對シ何等援助又ハ保護ヲ與フルコト能ハサルコトヲ通告シ六月上旬其ノ浦潮ニ入港スルヤ同地日本軍憲ハ更ニ彼ニ對シ絶對ニ援助ヲ與ヘサルコトヲ最モ明白ニ通告スルト共ニ部下日本軍隊ニ對シテモ右ニ關シ嚴格ナル訓令ヲ與ヘタリ即チ所謂密約成立シタリト稱セラルル六月八日前後ニ於テ日本軍ハ「セメノフ」ニ對スル絶對不援助ノ態度ヲ徹底セシムヘク有ユル手段ヲ執リツツアリシナリ

二、在華府齊多政府代表ノ發表セル「セメノフ」援助ニ關スル祕密文書五通ナルモノモ亦全部虚偽ノ内容ヲ有スル捏造文書ニ外ナラス其ノ内容ノ杜撰ニシテ事實ニ反スルコト前記日本軍ノ「セメノフ」ニ對スル不援助ノ態度竝ニ該文書ノ署名者ト稱セラルル浦潮日本憲兵隊「ゴミ」大佐「ヤマ」大佐「モリモト」分隊長ナル者ハ同憲兵隊中ニ存在セサル事實ハ右文書ノ虚偽ナルコトヲ證スルニ足ルヘシ

三、米國其ノ他ノ新聞ニ掲載セラレタル「フレデリック・マツコーミツク」氏通信ニ依レハ（イ）立花司令官ハ多數ノ兇漢ヲ使喚シテ「マツコーミツク」氏ヲ襲撃セシメ（ロ）日本政府ハ滿洲及西比利亞ヨリ米國鐵道委員技師及從業員ヲ驅逐シ尙（ハ）日本軍ハ「メルクロフ」政權ヲ壓迫シ米國鐵道委員「クラーク」少佐ヲ暗殺セント企テ同少佐ノ身體検査ヲ行ハシメタリトアル處右ハ全然事實ニ反スル虚報ニシテ多分右通信者ハ惡意ノ宣傳者ニ誤マラレタルモノナルヘシ（イ）ニ付テハ日本軍憲カ兇漢ヲ使喚シタル事實全然ナキノミナラス却テ日本軍憲ハ外國新聞記者ニ對シ出來得ル方便宜ヲ供シツツアリ

（ロ）ニ付テハ米國政府カ一九二〇年二月自發的ニ突然西比利亞ヨリ其ノ全軍隊ト共ニ大多數ノ鐵道技術家及從業員等ヲ引揚ケタルハ天下周知ノ事實ニシテ此等米國人ノ進退ニ付テハ日本政府ハ何等ノ關係ナシ

（ハ）客年十月「メルクロフ」政權カ「クラーク」少佐ヲ列車内ニ抑留シ米國領事立會ノ上臨檢シタル事實アルモ右ハ「メ」政權對「クラーク」少佐嫌疑事件ニ係ルモノナル由ニテ日本軍ハ本件ト何等ノ關係ヲ有セス偶々日本軍用客車カ「クラーク」少佐ノ乗用車ニ連結アリシヨリ誤解ヲ招クニ至リシヤモ計ラレサルモ各列車ニ日本軍用客車ヲ連結スルハ通常ノコトニシテ何等疑問トスルニ足ラス尙本件ニ關シ日本軍憲ト「メルクロフ」政權トノ間ニ往復セラレタリト稱セラルル文書ナルモノハ全然捏造ニシテ該文書ノ發信者ト稱セラルル「アサノ」大佐「オキアマ」少佐ナルモノハ我浦潮派遣軍中ニ無ク又東京參謀總長「オキアマ」將軍ナルモノモ存生セス教育總監ニ秋山將軍アルモ同將軍ハ職務上立花將軍ト文書ヲ往復スル地位ニアラス尙右文書ニ記載セル電信「コード」モ日本軍ノ全然知ラサル所ナリ