

in Asia, our experience of Asia, the sufferings of countries that were our responsibility, the gallant and finally successful part played by our arms against Japan—all these meant that the terms of the coming peace were in our minds from the moment the war ended. We played our part in war. We had our contribution to make to peace.

The present treaty is not, however, the handiwork of the United States and Britain alone—very far from it. In the first place our contribution to the treaty has itself been influenced and determined, through constant discussion, with the Commonwealth as a whole. About that I will say more in a moment. Next, a great number of the other countries at war with Japan have expressed comments on the treaty and these have now been incorporated in the document before us. The present treaty is in fact a composite document, contributed from many different sources, in which practically all the powers concerned (including the sponsors) sacrificed points of importance to themselves in the interests of general agreement.

付録 31 9月5日のヤンガー英代表の演説（英文）

In the disasters which followed on Japan's entry into the war, the peoples of our Far Eastern territories suffered heavy losses. There was serious damage to their economies and living standards. In defending them, we, together with the Commonwealth and the Colonies, suffered grievous casualties. The resources and manpower of the Commonwealth, and particularly of its members in the Pacific and in Asia, were a notable and resolute contribution to the final defeat of Japan.

It was appropriate therefore that, though the greater part of the occupation forces in Japan was composed of United States troops, a representative Commonwealth Division, commanded by an Australian general, should have gone to Japan for occupation duties shortly after the surrender.

At the Moscow Conference in December 1945 it was decided to establish the Far Eastern Commission to lay down the broad policies which were to govern the occupation of Japan, and it was considered proper that members of the Commonwealth who had committed troops or whose territory had been occupied by Japanese forces should all be represented on that body. The Commonwealth countries thus carried their close wartime association with their Allies into the 6-year period which followed the end of hostilities.

By the middle of 1947 it appeared that the occupation regime in Japan was well on the way to accomplishing the tasks which had been laid upon

it by the Potsdam Proclamation and the policy decisions made by the Far Eastern Commission. It was not surprising therefore that the United States Government and the Governments of all members of the British Commonwealth who had been in such continuous and close touch over Japanese affairs should almost simultaneously have begun to consider what steps should be taken to bring about a peace treaty with Japan. On 11th July 1947 the United States Government proposed that the 11 countries then represented on the Far Eastern Commission should agree to the summoning of a preliminary peace conference. The Government of Australia had in the meantime invited the other Commonwealth Governments to a meeting at Canberra in August of that year to consider the same subject.

At that meeting in 1947 members of the Commonwealth were unanimous that a peace treaty with Japan should be concluded as soon as possible. They agreed with the proposal already made by the Government of the United States that at the peace conference there should be no right of veto by the Four Great Powers, but that the states principally concerned in the war against Japan should have an equal voice in the drafting of the peace treaty.

Unfortunately, progress could not be made on the United States proposals because the Governments of the Soviet Union and China objected, not to the principle of an early peace treaty—and I think I can fairly say that all the countries principally concerned were agreed on this—but to the procedure to be followed. In its notes of July 1947 and November 1947 to the United States and Chinese Governments, the Government of the Soviet Union expressed the view that the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan should be entrusted to the Council of Foreign Ministers. As I have already indicated, this view was unacceptable to us.

At the end of 1947, therefore, it looked as though a peace treaty with Japan would have to be delayed. But the Governments of the Commonwealth still thought that the sooner Japan became fully responsible for the conduct of her own affairs, the easier and quicker would be the return to normal conditions in Asia and the Pacific. At the Commonwealth Foreign Ministers' Conference at Colombo in January 1950, the Ministers considered that a treaty was overdue and that every effort should be made to get negotiations moving. As a first step, a working party of Commonwealth officials was set up to study the problem. Then, in September 1950, the United States Government proposed to begin informal discussions with states members of the Far Eastern Commission, and this was followed by the communiqué of the London Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in

January 1951 which again stressed the urgent need for the early conclusion of a Japanese peace treaty.

While the many delays had been disappointing, the preparatory work done during this time was most valuable. We were able to give proper study to the difficulties facing us. We faced them in the knowledge that the countries with interest in the peace treaty would not be of the same mind upon many of the subjects with which the treaty would deal. We held throughout to the view that the treaty should be concluded soon—as soon as possible. We appreciated the success of the Occupation in guiding Japan into the ways of peace and toward the adoption of a liberal and democratic way of life once she was free and sovereign. But we believed that the time had come for her to exercise the responsibilities of this democratic life herself.

Because we thought it urgent to conclude peace, we agreed wholeheartedly with the procedure adopted for preparing the treaty. We thought that the diplomatic channel afforded the quickest and best method of finding out the views of the countries at war with Japan. As I have already explained, we could not accept the view that the treaty should be prepared by the Council of Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom, United States, Soviet Union, and China. The argument that it should be so prepared rested on a misinterpretation of the Potsdam Agreement. But apart from this we did not want to be held up indefinitely by a veto, and finally we felt most strongly that this procedure would not have been fair to many countries which had long, close, and bitter experience of the war against Japan. We welcomed the procedure adopted, since it provided for a wide basis of consultation among the powers at war with Japan and it saved the Japanese peace treaty from the indefinite postponement which has baffled all our efforts to reach a settlement over Austria.

Next, I should like to say that we in the British Commonwealth have believed right from the earliest days, even when the memories of Japanese aggression were still fresh in our minds, that the peace settlement with Japan should be a liberal and generous one. We agree cordially with what Mr. Dulles has said about this, and are convinced that Japan should be given the best possible chance of resuming an honorable place among the free nations of the world.

This is not to say that we in the Commonwealth have forgotten the acts of cruelty and violence with which Japan's aggression was accompanied. The people of Malaya and Hong Kong have not forgotten their direct experience of Japanese occupation—its degradation and beastliness. But all of us—and India has been at one with us in this—have agreed that in the

peace settlement it is our moral duty to rise above considerations of hatred and revenge; that it is our duty not to dwell on the past, but to turn our eyes toward the future.

Let me here say a word about India, whose representatives we are very sorry not to see with us in San Francisco today. India, like Pakistan, played a conspicuous and distinguished part in the defeat of Japan. India was with us in the Commonwealth consultations of which I have just spoken. India agreed with us throughout on the principle of a liberal and early peace, and was indeed one of the strongest advocates of this policy. It is, therefore, a matter of great regret to us that the Indian Government have not felt it possible to participate in the treaty because of sincere concern about certain of its terms. We believe, for reasons which I shall develop shortly, that these anxieties on the part of the Indian Government are unfounded.

The other great absentee from our Conference today is China. Ever since 1937 the Chinese people played a brave and determined part in resisting Japanese aggression. No country has a better claim, on grounds of long and bitter experience of Japanese violence, to take part in the peace treaty. Unfortunately, however, it is a situation of fact that the Governments at war with Japan are not agreed among themselves as to what government would possess the lawful and practical authority to commit the whole Chinese nation to permanent engagements. The participation of China in the peace settlement would thus have entailed waiting until general agreement on this question was reached among the other powers. This delay would have been inconsistent with our general agreement on the need for an urgent peace treaty.

We have, therefore, regretfully decided that there is no alternative but to conclude the present multilateral peace treaty without any signature on behalf of China. At the same time, the treaty safeguards the interests of the Chinese people by provisions designed to ensure that major benefits will accrue to China notwithstanding the absence of any signature or ratification of the treaty on China's behalf. The treaty thus provides that, when it comes into force, all Japan's special rights and interests in China will automatically be renounced, and that China will have the right to deal on its own account with Japanese property in China.

This procedure will not imply any alteration in the various positions regarding China taken up by the Governments signatory to the present treaty. The United Kingdom Government, as is well known, have recognized the Central People's Government as the legitimate Government of China,

and still maintain this view. Japan's future attitude toward China will necessarily be for determination by Japan herself in the exercise of the sovereign and independent status contemplated by the treaty. The treaty has been framed so as not to prejudice that important principle.

This solution is the outcome of long and anxious consultation among governments. The United Kingdom Government endorse it as being the only possible solution in the difficult circumstances obtaining.

The treaty also provides for Japan to renounce its sovereignty over Formosa and the Pescadores Islands. The treaty itself does not determine the future of these islands. The future of Formosa was referred to in the Cairo Declaration but that Declaration also contained provisions in respect to Korea, together with the basic principles of non-aggression and no territorial ambitions. Until China shows by her action that she accepts those provisions and principles, it will be difficult to reach a final settlement of the problem of Formosa. In due course a solution must be found, in accord with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. In the meantime, however, it would be wrong to postpone making peace with Japan. We therefore came to the conclusion that the proper treatment of Formosa in the context of the Japanese peace treaty was for the treaty to provide only for renunciation of Japanese sovereignty.

You will not expect me now to dwell in detail on all the territorial provisions of the treaty. They are based on the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, which provided that Japanese sovereignty should be confined to the four main islands and such other islands as the powers which signed that Declaration might subsequently determine. As regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the treaty does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude; that is to say that those islands nearest to Japan itself are to remain not only under Japanese sovereignty, but under Japanese administration as well. This is in marked contrast with the provision for the complete renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, the other principal group which approaches close to the main islands of Japan, and which is now occupied by the Soviet Union. We have agreed to the renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, but we think that this comparison should be borne in mind by those who criticize the provisions relating to the more southerly of the Ryukyus, and to the Bonin Islands.

The treaty contains no restrictions upon Japanese rearmament. Experience in regard to such restrictions in previous treaties has shown

that in the course of time they have become a dead letter. Indeed, not only have they failed to achieve the desired result, but they have provided a breeding ground for the germs of nationalism in its most dangerous form.

Moreover, Japan's dependence on imported raw materials must in the foreseeable future make it impossible in practice for her to rearm to the point of threatening the peace.

On the contrary, the problem today is not Japan's disarmament, but her defense. Today she has no arms of any description and no armed forces apart from the police. She is, therefore, in no position to resist aggression should aggression be contemplated against her.

In the present treaty Japan accepts the obligations set forth in article 2 of the Charter of the United Nations. At the same time the Allied Powers recognize that Japan possesses the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense referred to in article 51 of the Charter.

It is at present proposed that the security of Japan should be ensured by her voluntary conclusion of a defense pact with the United States, whereby forces will be maintained in and around Japan for the defense of Japanese territory. Such a pact of course in no way indicates an intention on the part of the United States to build up the armed forces of Japan to a point where she could again become a danger to her neighbors. The British Government are entirely satisfied that no such intention exists, and that the aim of the arrangement between Japan and the United States is to ensure that Japan herself cannot become a victim of aggression. It would have been reasonable to hope that we might have left the possibility of aggression against Japan out of account, but the aggression in fact committed by North Korea last year, and the moral and material support given to the aggressors, compel us to consider the defense of Japan as a matter of practical importance.

The provisions of the draft treaty, in accordance with the intentions of the wartime agreements between the major Allies, remove Japan from the special position which she had acquired in Asia and in the Pacific. Later provisions of this instrument follow logically from the basic intention of the wartime agreements in taking away from Japan the position of political influence in Europe and in Africa which she gained as one of the major Allies of the First World War.

In the course of these 11 months of negotiation, however, we have never lost sight of the fact that, if Japan were to return to the society of free nations without the power and influence which her former empire and world position had gained for her, it was imperative that she must be free to trade.

We considered that Japan must be able to maintain a sound economy and to provide a reasonable standard of living for her growing population. In consequence the United Kingdom was in full agreement with all countries which took part in the Pacific war that the peace treaty should not contain restrictions upon Japanese industry or commerce. It has been suggested that we, remembering the very severe and damaging Japanese competition which our industries had to face before the war, wished to take advantage of the peace treaty to safeguard our own position. This is untrue, and no such restrictions have been imposed. It is true that much concern has been expressed in Britain about the risk to our own economy from a revival of Japanese competition. This anxiety has been widespread and sincerely felt, but we recognized that the imposition of economic restrictions in the treaty would have been inappropriate.

The preamble to the draft treaty, its commercial articles and the first declaration attached to it combine to place Japan as a free country once more in a position to regulate her trading relations with other states on a basis of equality. We trust that this will come about the more readily as a result of Japan's expressed intention to observe internationally accepted fair trade practices and to be a party to a number of the more important international instruments and conventions which help to govern world trade.

The reparation provisions of the draft treaty also give effect to the principle of viability. During the 6-year occupation Japan has been a financial liability and her essential imports of food and raw materials have cost the United States Government more than two thousand million dollars in that time. The draft treaty, therefore, while stating the principle that Japan should, in equity, be required to make due reparation for the damage and suffering which she caused by embarking on an aggressive war, recognizes that if she is to continue to develop as a healthy and peace-loving state, adequate reparation cannot be made.

This was a difficult decision for governments to take. As I have already said, British territories in Asia in common with the territories of many other powers received damage much of which has not yet been made good. It might have been easier to require Japan to pay compensation, hoping that something would have been forthcoming. But we concluded that this would have been a short-sighted policy and would certainly have laid the foundation of a lasting resentment between ourselves and Japan.

We have, however, agreed that Japan should make such reparation as, on a realistic estimate, we believe she can afford. In the first place, Japan will, if required, render to any of the Allied Powers whose territory she

overran, assistance in repairing the damage done by Japanese occupation. The draft treaty provides for the resumption by Allied nationals of their property and all their property rights in Japan. If these have been destroyed or cannot be returned, the Japanese Government has undertaken to pay compensation. Finally, the draft treaty gives each of the Allies the right to seize all Japanese assets within its territory (subject to certain customary exceptions) and expresses Japan's desire to make recompense, out of the proceeds of Japanese assets in neutral and the suffering ex-enemy countries, for the suffering endured by prisoners of war who fell into her hands.

Apart from the provisions which embody major decisions of policy, there are a number of others whose aim is to replace upon a firm basis the trade and financial relations of the parties to the treaty. Examples which I might give are the provisions dealing with Japan's overseas indebtedness, Allied industrial property and copyrights, and suits between Allied nationals and Japanese nationals which were pending at the outbreak of war.

A war completely disrupts international trade and commerce, and it is in our view right that a peace settlement should attempt to lay down general rules to govern their resumption. It was for this reason that the United Kingdom has sponsored the protocol which has been circulated as one of the peace treaty documents. Its first three sections follow the precedent of annex 16 to the peace treaty with Italy and provide on similar lines rules to govern contracts, periods of prescription and negotiable instruments as between Japan and those states at war with her which may decide to sign it. Parts D and E of the Protocol provide procedure for the settlement by Japanese and Allied insurance companies of all matters outstanding in connection with insurance contracts affected by war. We hope that the Protocol, by obviating the necessity for lengthy and expensive litigation, will materially help to restore that basis of confidence and willingness to meet obligations which is so important to the smooth conduct of international trade.

Britain has a special tradition of interest in the affairs of Japan and of sympathy with the Japanese people. This tradition has unfortunately been broken by the events of the last 20 years. Nevertheless our belief is that the present solemn occasion, with its conscious decision by the Allied Powers here assembled to reject the pressure of prejudice and put our faith upon the development of reason and amity will provide the opportunity for our renewing those former ties of interest and sympathy with Japan.

We should none of us underestimate the problems which will have to be faced and solved by Japan when she resumes the exercise of her sovereign

independence on the coming into force of the present treaty. Nevertheless she has powerful advantages on her side. She has the great qualities of her people, who will now be free to devote them entirely to constructive tasks. Gone is the militarist faction which misruled Japan for so many years and manipulated her ancient institutions to suit their own ambitions. She has succeeded in preserving the monarchical structure which is so peculiarly suited to the character of her people; it has emerged from the years of defeat and occupation strengthened by its adaptation to democratic forms. Under the guidance of the occupation she has been able to resume her contacts with the liberal and progressive ideas of the free world.

Mr. President, it is our hope that from the peace settlement a genuinely democratic Japan will emerge. We realize that there can be no guarantee that this will be so. The peace treaty is to that extent necessarily an act of faith but one which we believe to be justified. Whatever may happen, the Allied Powers will have done their utmost to achieve the desired end. In the treaty before us they will have given Japan one of the most generous peace settlements ever imposed upon a defeated enemy, to help her on the return journey to what we regard as her rightful place among the free and peaceful nations of the world. Our best wishes go with her.

付録 32 9月5日のグロムイコ・ソ連代表の演説（英文）

The Delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—A. A. Gromyko (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs): Mr. Chairman, Honorable Delegates, the Soviet Delegation considers it necessary at the very outset to stress the importance of the question of the Peace Treaty with Japan. The importance of this question can be seen from the fact that many of the countries represented at the present Conference were objects of Japanese aggression, not to speak of the Chinese People's Republic, the people of which during a long period of time had to struggle single-handed against the Japanese aggressor who invaded its territory.

In 1931 the Japanese Army invaded Manchuria. After a 6-years occupation of Manchuria, which was converted by Japan into a military base for a further expansion of aggression on the Asiatic continent, militarist Japan in 1937 invaded Central China and occupied vitally important centers of China. The Chinese people in the struggle against the Japanese aggressor have suffered severe losses both in human lives and in material values.

Fighting for its independence in this struggle against Japanese aggres-

sion, having taken upon itself the main brunt of the struggle against this aggression, the Chinese people have afforded an invaluable contribution to the cause of struggle against Japanese militarists and have expedited the final victory of freedom-loving peoples.

It is a well-known fact that 13 years ago militarist Japan invaded the Soviet Union in the Vladivostok region at Lake Hasan. Having received an appropriate repulse the Japanese militarists, however, did not abandon their aggressive plans in regard to the Soviet Union. In 1939 the aggressive forces of Japan repeated their attack in another place, in the region of the Mongolian People's Republic, at Halhingol, in order to break through onto Soviet territory.

In spite of the fact that this time as well they were duly repelled by the armed forces of the Soviet Union, the Japanese militarists nevertheless, as is known, did not abandon their aggressive plans in respect of the Soviet Union, did not conceal the fact that they had set as their aim the seizure of the Soviet Far East.

A number of other states in Asia and the Far East, including India, Burma, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have suffered from Japanese aggression.

Finally, the peoples of the United States also know what Japanese aggression means, since the attack on the American Pacific naval base, Pearl Harbor, is still fresh in their memories. This attack on the United States widened the scope of Japanese aggression. After this attack the Japanese militarists invaded a number of other countries in Asia and the Far East. The war as expanded enveloped all Asia. In the course of nearly 15 years one after the other of the countries of Asia and the Far East were subjected to attacks by Japanese militarists. It was necessary to exert united efforts of the Powers in order to save the independence of the countries which were attacked by the Japanese aggressor and to create conditions for the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East. Many countries of Asia and the Far East have suffered great losses while fighting for their national independence against the Japanese militarists.

All this goes to show that it is high time to make use of the conditions created as a result of the defeat of the Japanese aggressor and to establish peace in the Far East. Guided by this fact the Soviet Union has already repeatedly proposed to undertake practical steps providing for the solution of this task. In the course of recent years it proposed to accelerate the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. It goes without saying that the Soviet Union has always proceeded and is proceeding from the fact that peace

should be democratic conforming to the interests of the peoples and not profitable only for certain circles of insatiable imperialists. Peace has to be such as actually to satisfy the legitimate claims of the peace-loving states and first and foremost of those which were the object of Japanese aggression, such as not to allow the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state.

Hence, we should consider a peace treaty and a peace settlement with Japan of such a nature that it would not permit Japanese militarism to raise its head again and would provide for peace and security for all countries of Asia and the Far East.

In this are interested not only countries which have suffered from Japanese aggression but the Japanese people themselves who are paying for the crimes committed by Japanese militarists who have dragged them into an aggressive war against other nations and peoples. The national interests of the Japanese people require that there should exist peaceful relations between Japan and other nations and first and foremost with its neighboring countries.

The Soviet Delegation considers it necessary to point out the importance of the question of the peace treaty with Japan because not all of the participants of the present Conference display a desire to prevent the use of a situation wherein the Japanese militarists could again lead Japan along the path of aggression. Moreover, the American-British draft of a peace treaty with Japan submitted to the Conference goes to show that the authors of this draft are more anxious to clear the path for the rebirth of Japanese militarism and to push Japan again along the path aggression and military adventure.

First and foremost this can be said about the United States whose policy in regard to Japan has yielded sufficient evidence to show that the Government of the United States has its own special plans in regard to Japan, plans which have nothing in common with the interests of a real peace settlement with Japan, with the interests of maintaining and strengthening peace in the Far East.

In considering the question of the peace treaty with Japan there first of all arises the question, what are the principles which should serve as bases for this treaty; how provide for the prevention of Japan being again converted into an aggressive state; how provide that the fate of Japan should not again fall into the hands of militarists who are already raising their heads in Japan unabashedly declaring openly their plans for revenge?

This task can be successfully resolved if the participants of the Conference will proceed from the principles which found their expression in well

known international agreements pertaining to Japan and the implementation of which would provide for the prevention of the rebirth of Japanese militarism. This concerns first of all such agreements as the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the Yalta Agreement of 1945, under which the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union undertook specific obligations both as regards the completion of the war with Japan and the peace settlement with Japan and the transformation of it into a peace-loving democratic state.

This concerns also such agreements as the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, under which the United Nations undertook obligations not to conclude a separate peace with enemy states including Japan, and the decisions of the Far Eastern Commission having as its members the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, China, France, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India and the Philippines on the basic post-surrender policy for Japan, adopted after the end of the war with Japan.

It is known that the Potsdam Declaration of 1945 and the resolutions of the Far Eastern Commission on the basic post-surrender policy for Japan adopted in accordance with this Declaration provide for the eradication of Japanese militarism and prevention of conditions which would permit the rebirth of militarism in Japan. The decision of the Far Eastern Commission "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" of June 19, 1947, imposes on Japan, for example, rigid restrictions in respect of its armed forces.

The Potsdam Declaration points out the necessity of eliminating the power and influence "of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest". It also shows the necessity of taking measures to prevent Japan from re-arming and following the path of conquests.

Agreements of the Powers in regard to Japan provide for the elimination of Japanese militarism and the transformation of Japan into a peace-loving state capable of maintaining normal relations with other nations and peoples, including its neighboring states which have most suffered from Japanese aggression. Those who actually desire not to permit the repetition of Japanese aggression and provide for peaceful relations between Japan and other states cannot but support this aim.

Thus, the task of demilitarization of Japan is one of the principal tasks which should be resolved by the peace treaty with Japan. This, first of all, means that the peace treaty with Japan should include provisions restricting the strength of its armed forces—land, naval, and air. It is known that the Japanese militarists preparing for aggression against other states have

created numerous armed forces, land, naval and air. On the eve of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor the strength of the Japanese Army amounted to 3,200,000 men. By the time of Japan's capitulation in August 1945, the strength of the Japanese Army amounted to approximately 6,000,000 men. The so-called Kwantung army, which was a select Japanese army located on the territory of Manchuria occupied by Japanese militarists, amounted to nearly a million men.

It goes without saying that all these unduly inflated armed forces of Japan were maintained at the cost of plundering the working population. Japanese militarists, following the example set by their partner in aggression, Hitlerite Germany, having set as their aim the reduction to slavery of entire nations and peoples, did not care much about the vital interests of the Japanese people, and tightened still further the taxed pressure on the Japanese peasant and worker in order to squeeze out more money to prepare for war and then to conduct war.

While preparing and concluding the peace treaty with Japan there has to be resolved the task of guarantees against the rebirth of Japanese militarism, of guarantees which would exclude the possibility of a repetition of Japanese aggression.

It goes without saying that after the conclusion of the peace treaty all occupation troops should be withdrawn from Japan, and her territory should not be used for the maintenance of foreign military bases. The absence in the peace treaty of a specific and clear indication to that effect contradicts the very aim of a peace settlement with Japan which should lead to the re-establishment of her sovereignty and also contradicts the interests of the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

The above-mentioned agreements of the Powers provide for the transformation of Japan into a democratic state. In the Potsdam Declaration it is directly stated that "the Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people". It is also said there that there shall be established "freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights". In the decisions of the Far Eastern Commission on the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan" it is stated that "The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights, particularly the freedoms of religion, assembly and association, speech and the press. They shall be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations."

Such is the second vital task set by the Powers during the time of war with Japan—the task of the democratization of Japan. The purpose for

setting this task is quite clear. Militarist Japan was ruled by a reactionary clique. The entire political and social life was under the control of this clique and the big Japanese trusts—Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and others which supported it. Hence follows the task of the demilitarization of Japan. The prevention of the rebirth of Japanese militarism is closely interlinked with the task of the democratization of the political and social life of the country, with the task of establishing in Japan a democratic order under which the fate of the country will not depend on the arbitrariness of a group of reactionary militarists.

This means that the peace treaty with Japan must have clauses providing for the implementation of the principles expressed in the Potsdam Declaration and in other decisions of the Powers, regarding the necessity for the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, regarding the democratization of Japan.

Of great importance in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan are the questions pertaining to the development of Japanese economy. It is known that in the past this economy served the purposes of militarist circles. Its development was directed in such a way as to prepare Japanese industry and agriculture for the satisfaction of war needs. A characteristic feature of Japanese economy both before and during the war was its militarization which was detrimental to the vital needs of the Japanese people. The basic resources of industry and agriculture were used for the production of armaments and strategic material and not for the needs of the civil population.

This means that the peace treaty with Japan should have clauses providing for both restrictions of armed forces of Japan and the prevention of militarization of its economy. At the same time, the Peace Treaty must not place obstacles in the path of the development of peaceful Japanese economy. This principle has already been formulated in the Potsdam Declaration signed by the United States, Great Britain, China, and the U.S.S.R.

Proceeding from this principle of the Potsdam Declaration, the Soviet Government in September 1948, introduced in the Far Eastern Commission a proposal to the effect that not only would there be a prohibition on the reestablishment and creation of Japanese war industry and the establishment of an appropriate control over this prohibition, but also there would be no restriction on the reestablishment and development of peaceful industry designed to satisfy the needs of the Japanese population as well as the development of Japan's trade with other countries according to the needs

of the peaceful economy of Japan.

In its remarks of May 7, 1951, on the draft peace treaty previously circulated by the U.S. Government the Soviet Government, proceeding from the above principle, insisted that no restrictions should be imposed on Japan as regards the development of its peaceful economy and that all restrictions should be removed in respect of Japan's trade with other states. Is it necessary to dwell at length on the fact that providing for an unlimited development of the peaceful economy of Japan and the development of its foreign trade corresponds not only to the interests of the maintenance of peace in the Far East and establishment of good-neighbor relations between Japan and other states, particularly those neighboring with it, but also corresponds to the interests of the Japanese people? Such a development of Japan's economy would for the first time open before the Japanese people an opportunity for an improvement of its welfare.

To object to the inclusion of such clauses in the peace treaty with Japan can only occur to those who try to strangle Japanese economy and to make it depend on the interests of foreign monopolies. To object to the inclusion of such clauses in the peace treaty can only occur to those who strive as well to direct the development of Japanese economy in the future not to the satisfaction of peaceful requirements of the Japanese people not to strengthening of normal economic relations of Japan with other states, but to the militarization of Japan, for the adaptation of its economy to the plans for a new war in the Far East which are cherished by certain great powers.

A healthy, peaceful economy of Japan would easily permit the satisfaction of the legitimate claims of a number of states which have suffered from Japanese occupation and afford compensation for the damage caused by the Japanese aggressor. It would be much easier for Japan to do this than to pay for the damage by using directly the labor of the Japanese population as is provided for by the American-British draft. It is not difficult to understand what has prompted the proposal contained in the draft. It has been prompted by the desire to make use of the cheap labor of the Japanese worker and peasant without any regard to the fact that this slavery-like form of redeeming the damage would divert a considerable part of its productive forces. It is profitable not for the countries which are legitimately claiming the redemption by Japan of damages inflicted on them and which have a surplus of manpower, but is profitable to certain great powers which want to benefit at the expense of cheap labor of the Japanese.

The peace treaty with Japan should, naturally, resolve a number of territorial questions connected with the peace settlement with Japan. It is known that in this respect as well the United States, Great Britain, China

and the Soviet Union undertook specific obligations. These obligations are outlined in the Cairo Declaration, in the Potsdam Declaration, and in the Yalta Agreement.

These agreements recognize the absolutely indisputable rights of China, now the Chinese People's Republic, to territories severed from it. It is an indisputable fact that original Chinese territories which were severed from it, such as Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores, the Paracel Islands and other Chinese territories, should be returned to the Chinese People's Republic.

The rights of the Soviet Union to the southern part of the Sakhalin Island and all the islands adjacent to it, as well as to the Kurile Island, which are at present under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union, are equally indisputable.

Thus, while resolving the territorial questions in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan, there should not be any lack of clarity if we are to proceed from the indisputable rights of states to territories which Japan got hold of by the force of arms.

Such are the main principles which, in accordance with already existing international agreements, should form the basis of a peace treaty with Japan and the implementation of which would mean the establishment of a durable peace in the Far East.

There arises a question as to what extent the American-British draft of a peace treaty with Japan corresponds to the principles which have been outlined in appropriate agreements of the Allied Powers in respect of Japan and, consequently, as to what extent it meets the interests of maintaining peace in the Far East.

In connection with this it is first of all quite appropriate to ask whether this draft contains any guarantees against the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state. It is regretted that it does not contain any guarantees in this respect. That it does not contain any guarantees against rebirth of Japanese militarism can be seen from the fact that it does not provide for any restrictions on the number of the armed forces of Japan. At the same time it is well known that the peace treaties concluded after the Second World War with other states, for example, the peace treaty with Italy, contain clear and specific provisions restricting the strength of the armed forces of those states. Japan, however, in this respect is being placed into a privileged position as compared to other states in spite of the fact that there are no reasons for doing so.

Thus, the American-British draft is in gross contradiction with the principles on the basis of which can be built a real peace treaty with Japan

capable of establishing peace in the Far East and of giving guarantees that Japanese aggression shall not be repeated.

This draft is also contradictory to the decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, which, as early as in 1947 in the above-mentioned document on the "Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," set out to "complete the task of physical and spiritual demilitarization of Japan by measures including total disarmament, economic reform designed to deprive Japan of power to make war, elimination of militarist influences and stern justice to war criminals and requiring a period of strict control". This decision was adopted by all states members of the Far Eastern Commission: Australia, Canada, China, France, India, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the U.S.S.R., Great Britain, and the U.S.A.

The authors of the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan try to minimize the importance of this fact, making references to the effect that allegedly the decision of the Far Eastern Commission is valid only for the period preceding the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan. However, it is not difficult to show the complete inadequacy of such attempts. It is sufficient to point out that this decision directly outlines measures which should "deprive Japan of power to make war". This fact goes to show quite clearly that the decision of the Far Eastern Commission covers the entire postwar period as well.

The American-British draft peace treaty with Japan follows the path of the existing practice of the American occupation authorities in Japan in the reestablishment of all kinds of militarist organizations, in the construction and expansion of military, naval, and air bases in Japan, in the reestablishment of the land, naval, and air forces and in the expansion and modernization of former Japanese military arsenals. Japanese industry is being converted more and more to produce armaments and strategic war material. The material and manpower resources of Japan are being widely used by the United States in its military intervention in Korea, illegally conducted under the flag of the United Nations.

All these measures implemented in Japan by the Government of the U.S.A., as well as the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan which is now under consideration, show that the Government of the United States ignores the obligations undertaken together with other states to prevent the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state. The Government of the United States is gambling on the reestablishment of Japanese militarism, to which those states which are really interested in securing a true peace in the Far East cannot but object in a most resolute way.

Thus, the American-British draft does not contain any guarantees whatsoever against the rebirth of Japanese militarism, guarantees providing for the security of those countries which have suffered from aggression on the part of militarist Japan, in spite of the fact that this should be one of the principal tasks in connection with the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan.

The American-British draft provides for the participation of Japan in military blocs created under the aegis of the United States whose purpose has nothing in common with the interests of maintaining peace in the Far East. It is well known what purpose is being pursued by the inclusion in the draft peace treaty of a clause providing for the conclusion by Japan of military agreements with other states. The Government of the United States attempts to make the Peace Treaty itself prejudice the question of the conclusion of a military agreement between the United States and to make of Japan an American military base at the time of the conclusion of a peace treaty.

The Government of the United States is substituting for the task of preventing the rebirth of Japanese militarism and ensuring the future security of countries that have suffered from Japanese aggression that of concluding a military agreement with Japan. It is not difficult to understand that the conclusion of such an agreement will still further push Japan along the path of the reestablishment of militarism, will still further encourage the activities of militaristic circles in Japan, who, disregarding the national interests of the Japanese people, are prepared to start new military adventures against the neighboring states.

The American-British draft peace treaty imposes on Japan an obligation to join a military grouping directed against the countries near Japan and first and foremost against the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic. This can be seen from the fact that in the military agreement provided for by the American-British draft peace treaty the participation of such countries as the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union is being excluded.

The real nature of this requirement, the purpose of which is to tie Japan hand and foot at the present time by obligations regarding its participation in a military grouping headed by the U.S.A., cannot be concealed by any false phrases regarding the right of Japan for "individual and collective self-defense", since there exists no threat for Japan on the part of the states neighboring with it. In these circumstances any references to the necessity for Japan to join any military blocs allegedly for

the purpose of self-defense are groundless. Any references to the necessity for Japan to enter into military agreements and alliances with other states under the pretext that this is allegedly being prompted by the interests of self-defense of Japan are the more ridiculous since, as is known, Japan has not been subjected for centuries to any attack from any side.

Such references are obviously being made in order to mislead public opinion as regards the real aims which the authors of the American-British draft link up with the driving of Japan into their aggressive military blocs since these aims have nothing in common with the maintenance of peace in the Far East.

The driving of Japan into military blocs provided for by the American-British draft peace treaty cannot but cause anxiety on the part of states which are really interested in safeguarding and maintenance of peace in the Far East.

In connection with this it is also necessary to dwell on the question of the withdrawal of the occupation forces from the territory of Japan and of the prevention of the creation of foreign military bases on Japanese territory.

As is known, in the peace treaties concluded after the Second World War, including the Peace Treaty with Italy, it is specifically stated that the occupation shall be terminated as soon as possible, and, in any case, not later than within 90 days from the date of the coming into force of the peace treaty. The American-British draft (article 6) formally contains such a provision. However, the same article speaks of the possibility of retaining armed forces on Japanese territory "under or in consequence of any bilateral or multilateral agreements which have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied Powers, on the one hand, and Japan on the other."

It is clear that this reservation makes of the provision for the withdrawal of occupation forces within 90 days an empty phrase which conveys nothing and which is used clearly for the purpose of misleading naive people regarding the real sense of this article of the draft. Its real meaning, however, is that already agreements are being imposed upon Japan under which it undertakes in advance to yield its territory for the establishment of American military, naval and air bases in accordance with the aggressive plans of the United States in the Far East.

Who is not aware of the fact that during a prolonged period of time the Government of the United States and the present Japanese Government have been negotiating the retention of American occupation forces on the territory of Japan and of American military bases in Japan even after the conclu-

sion of a peace treaty with it? Who is not aware of the fact that in the course of these negotiations the Government of Japan is being subjected to flagrant pressure on the part of the United States who actually controls the political and economic life of the country?

As regards the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan in the part pertaining to territorial questions, the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. considers it necessary to state that this draft grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory: Taiwan, the Pescadores, the Paracel and other islands severed from it by the Japanese militarists. The draft contains only a reference to the renunciation by Japan of its rights to these territories but intentionally omits any mention of the further fate of these territories. In reality, however, Taiwan and the said islands have been captured by the United States of America and the United States wants to legalize these aggressive actions in the draft peace treaty under discussion. Meanwhile the fate of these territories should be absolutely clear—they must be returned to the Chinese people, the master of their land.

Similarly, by attempting to violate grossly the sovereign rights of the Soviet Union regarding Southern Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it, as well as the Kurile Islands already under the sovereignty of the Soviet Union, the draft also confines itself to a mere mention of the renunciation by Japan of rights, title and claims to these territories and makes no mention of the historic appurtenance of these territories and the indisputable obligation on the part of Japan to recognize the sovereignty of the Soviet Union over these parts of the territory of the U.S.S.R. We do not speak of the fact that by introducing such proposals on territorial questions the United States and Great Britain, who at an appropriate time signed the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations, as well as the Yalta Agreement, have taken the path of flagrant violation of obligations undertaken by them under these international agreements.

The American-British draft provides for the exclusion of the Islands of Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, Marcus and Daito from the sovereignty of Japan and their transfer under the administration of the United States of America under the pretext of including them in the trusteeship system of the United Nations. However, it is well known that such a severance of the said islands from Japan is not provided for by the above-mentioned agreements of the powers, or by the decision of the Security Council which alone has the right to take decisions regarding trusteeship over territory of strategic importance. This means that the requirement

contained in the American-British draft is arbitrary and illegal.

It is vain to look in the American-British draft peace treaty for any provisions pertaining to the democratization of Japan. In this respect as well the draft does not satisfy the requirements which should be met by a peace treaty with Japan. And this in spite of the fact that the Potsdam Declaration expressly states that it is necessary to democratize Japan. The decisions of the Far Eastern Commission, as we have already pointed out, speak of the necessity of encouraging the Japanese people to form "democratic and representative organizations," and to respect fundamental human rights. As regards the present situation in Japan in this respect, it can be seen from the fact that during the entire period of occupation repressions against Japanese trade-unions, against democratic parties and outstanding democratic leaders of Japan, against progressive organs of the Japanese press have been carried out with the approval and direct encouragement on the part of the American occupation authorities.

This draft likewise does not contain any mention of the inadmissibility to create in Japan various types of militarist and Fascist organizations and other similar organizations the danger of the rebirth of which is the more real since many of them are already openly functioning. And this in spite of the fact that the decision of the Far Eastern Commission expressly states that "All organizations inspired by the spirit of militarism and aggression shall be rigidly suppressed." All this makes us think seriously what the authors of the American-British draft peace treaty are up to, what path they are forcing Japan to take. After a careful analysis of the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan it becomes quite clear that this draft is intended not only for the rebirth of Japanese militarism—which makes real the danger of a repetition of Japanese aggression—but it is also intended to place again at the steering wheel of the country militarists and reactionaries who have already brought Japan to a national catastrophe.

Finally, those provisions of the American-British draft which are devoted to economic questions merit serious attention. As regards the economic question, the principal attention is devoted to the safeguarding of economic privileges obtained by certain states in Japan and first of all by the United States of America after the war and during the occupation of Japan.

The draft contains detailed clauses providing for the maintenance by foreign monopolies of a commanding position in Japanese economy. This concerns Japanese industry, Japanese shipping, Japan's foreign trade and guaranteeing various rights and claim of foreign firms and juridical persons against Japan. At the same time the draft treaty does not contain anything

that would secure for Japan an un-hampered development of its peaceful industries, its foreign trade, the development of its navigation and commercial shipbuilding. And this cannot be considered as accidental. It is no secret as to who is interested in getting the Japanese industry into an iron grip and to flood Japanese markets with foreign manufactured goods.

We shall in vain look in this draft for any mention of the fact that Japan shall receive, on equal terms with other states, access to raw material sources in spite of the fact that this has been expressly provided for by the Potsdam Declaration. The draft does not contain such a provision. It is absent because it is unprofitable for the United States and Great Britain which are attempting to get hold of all principal world raw material sources.

Thus, the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan submitted to the Conference cannot, in any measure, serve the purpose of a peace settlement with Japan or give any guarantees against the recurrence of Japanese aggression in the future.

The American-British draft peace treaty does not and cannot satisfy any state that in deed and not in word stands for the establishment of a durable peace and the elimination of a threat of a new war. Such a draft cannot satisfy especially the countries of Asia and the Far East whose peoples have suffered most from the consequences of Japanese aggression and cannot permit a revival of Japanese militarism that is bearing a permanent threat to the peaceful existence of its neighbor countries in the Far East. It is for this reason that the American-British draft peace treaty met with opposition on the part of a number of countries: the Chinese People's Republic, India, Burma, and others.

In its statement of August 15, the Central People's Government of the Chinese People's Republic justly evaluated the American-British draft peace treaty stating that "in reality this treaty is a treaty for the preparation of a new war and not a genuine peace treaty" and that it "constitutes a threat to the peoples of Asia, violates peace and security throughout the world and is prejudicial to the interests of the Japanese people".

It is also a well-known fact that the Government of India condemned the American-British draft peace treaty stating that it cannot be a party to this treaty in view of the fact that "the settlement provided for by it cannot be anything else but the source of discontent among the Japanese people and shall sow the seeds of future dissension and of a possible conflict in the Far East".

To sum up, the following conclusions regarding the American-British draft peace treaty can be drawn:

1. The draft does not contain any guarantees against the reestablishment of Japanese militarism, the transformation of Japan into an aggressive state. The draft does not contain any guarantees ensuring the security of countries which have suffered from aggression on the part of militarist Japan. The draft creates conditions for the reestablishment of Japanese militarism, creates a danger of a new Japanese aggression.

2. The draft treaty actually does not provide for the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces. On the contrary, it ensures the presence of foreign armed forces on the territory of Japan and the maintenance of foreign military bases in Japan even after the signing of a peace treaty. Under the pretext of self-defense of Japan the draft provides for the participation of Japan in an aggressive military alliance with the United States.

3. The draft treaty not only fails to provide for obligations that Japan should not join any coalitions directed against any of the states which participated in the war against militarist Japan, but on the contrary is clearing the path for Japan's participation in aggressive blocs in the Far East created under the aegis of the United States.

4. The draft treaty does not contain any provisions on the democratization of Japan, on the ensurance of democratic rights to the Japanese people, which creates a direct threat to a rebirth in Japan of the prewar Fascist order.

5. The draft treaty is flagrantly violating the legitimate rights of the Chinese people to the integral part of China—Taiwan (Formosa), the Pescadores and Paracel Islands and other territories severed from China as a result of Japanese aggression.

6. The draft treaty is in contradiction to the obligations undertaken by the United States and Great Britain under the Yalta Agreement regarding the return of Sakhalin and the transfer of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union.

7. The numerous economic clauses are designed to ensure for foreign, in the first place American, monopolies the privileges which they have obtained during the period of occupation, Japanese economy is being placed in a slavery-like dependence from these foreign monopolies.

8. The draft actually ignores the legitimate claims of state that have suffered from Japanese occupation regarding the redemption by Japan for the damage that they have suffered. At the same time, providing for the redemption of losses direct by the labor of the Japanese population it imposes on Japan a slavery-like form of reparations.

9. The American-British draft is not a treaty of peace but a treaty for

the preparation of a new war in the Far East.

It is not difficult to understand how to explain the fact that the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan not only contains no guarantees against the re-establishment of Japanese militarism but, on the contrary, creates conditions for the rebirth of Japan as an aggressive state. This can be explained by the fact that the plans of the authors of the American-British draft as regards Japan have nothing in common with the task to prevent the re-establishment of Japanese militarism, to ensure peace and security for states that have suffered most from Japanese aggression. However, those states that have suffered most from Japanese aggression and therefore are most interested in not permitting it to recur were prevented from participating in the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. And this in spite of the fact that the procedure for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan was provided for by the Potsdam Agreement which established the Council of Foreign Ministers of five Powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S., China, Great Britain, and France, and by the well-known United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, ensuring that no separate peace treaties be concluded with states that were at war with the Allied and Associated Powers. In the Potsdam Declaration it was expressly stated that the Council of Foreign Ministers was being created first and foremost for "preparatory work on a peaceful settlement" and that while drawing up appropriate peace treaties "the Council shall be composed of members representing those States that have signed the terms of capitulation dictated to the enemy state concerned".

Thus, there is no lack of clarity on the question regarding the procedure for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. Those who not in words but in deeds observe the obligations undertaken in accordance with international agreements must strictly follow the procedure for the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan provided for by these agreements. There cannot be any justification for the fact that the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain have taken into their hands the preparation of a peace treaty and are now forcing other states to conclude a separate peace with Japan prepared by these Governments.

It is appropriate to recall that it was this procedure that had been followed at the time when the peace treaties with Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland were being prepared. As one can see, experience also confirms the just demand of the Soviet Union and of the Chinese People's Republic the Government of which has repeatedly outlined its point of view to this effect, regarding the necessity to adhere strictly to the procedure for

the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan under which the Council of Foreign Ministers is charged with the preparation of the peace treaty.

In the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan there should participate all other countries that were in a state of war with Japan, as was the case when peace treaties with other countries were concluded. The Soviet Government has submitted an appropriate proposal in this respect as early as its note of December 30, 1947, to the Chinese Government and its note of January 4, 1948, to the Government of Great Britain.

The Government of the United States, which has usurped the right of the initiative of the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan, contrary to the obligations it has undertaken, resolutely objects to the preparation of the peace treaty by the Council of Foreign Ministers. In support of such a position an argument is put forward that allegedly such a procedure will hold up the preparation of the peace treaty. However, the groundlessness of such an assertion is obvious, which is testified to by the fact that such a task has been carried out by the Council of Foreign Ministers in other cases since it was possible to conclude peace treaties with the five above-mentioned countries as far back as four years ago.

The Governments of the United States and Great Britain which have jointly submitted the draft peace treaty have chosen another path, having illegally, from the very outset, banned both the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic from any participation in the preparation of the Peace Treaty, without the participation of which there can be no question of accomplishing a peace settlement with Japan. The Soviet Government has already drawn the attention of the Government of the United States to this fact in its remarks of May 7 on the American draft peace treaty and also in its note of June 10, 1951. The Chinese nation which was forced to conduct a prolonged and severe war against militarist Japan that invaded its territory has suffered particularly heavy losses in this struggle. Therefore, the Government of the Chinese People's Republic as the sole legitimate representative to express the will of the Chinese people cannot be banned from the preparation of a peace treaty with Japan. The Soviet Government fully shares in this question the point of view expressed in appropriate statements of the Government of the Chinese People's Republic, in particular in its statement of May 22 and in that of August 15, 1951, and insists on a full participation of the Chinese People's Republic in the preparation and discussion of the peace treaty with Japan. Those states which, following in

the wake of the United States and Great Britain, are prepared to sign the peace treaty without the participation of the Chinese People's Republic, India, and Burma which are particularly interested in a peace settlement with Japan, take upon themselves a heavy responsibility for the aftermath of such an unjust and illegal act.

What is the situation that the present Conference in San Francisco has to face?

The Governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain have put before the Conference the fact that China has not taken and is not taking part in the preparation and discussion of a peace treaty with Japan. It is clear that in these circumstances no real peace settlement in the Far East will be achieved. Is it possible for peoples which can openly and freely express their feeling of justice and their longing for peace among the nations to reconcile themselves to this position?

India, as well as Burma, has refused to participate in the San Francisco Conference, stating that the American-British draft is unacceptable. It means that not only China, but also India, the principal states of Asia, are banned from the participation in the preparation and discussion of the draft peace treaty with Japan which is being imposed on the participants of the present Conference by the United States of America and Great Britain. Is it not true that such actions discredit the authors of this draft and does it not mean that such a policy is a policy of bankruptcy?

The Soviet Union has not refused to take part in the San Francisco Conference. The reason for this is that it is necessary to voice publicly the truth about the American-British draft and to oppose it with demands for such a peace treaty with Japan that shall in fact meet the interests of a peace settlement in the Far East and serve to strengthen a universal peace.

Whereas, the American-British draft peace treaty with Japan does not answer the requirements necessary for a peace treaty with Japan, the Soviet Delegation proposes the following amendments to be made in the draft of a peace treaty submitted by the Governments of the U.S.A. and Great Britain to the Conference for its consideration.

The Vice President of the Conference—P.; C. Spender: Order, order. Do I understand that the representative is proposing to move certain amendments to the draft treaty?

The Delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—A. A. Gromyko: I am making a declaration, and I am defending my position. I have the right to speak and I ask, Mr. President, to continue.

The Vice President of the Conference—P. C. Spender: Continue.

The Delegate of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—A. A. Gromyko:

1. *To Article 2.*

a) To include, instead of paragraphs “b” and “f”, a paragraph reading as follows: “Japan recognizes full sovereignty of the Chinese People’s Republic over Manchuria, the Island of Taiwan (Formosa) with all the islands adjacent to it, the Penhuletao Islands (the Pescadores), the Tunshatsuntao Islands (the Pratas Islands), as well as over the Islands of Sishatsuntao and Chunshatsuntao (the Paracel Islands, the group of Amphitrites, the shoal of Maxfield) and Nanshatsuntao Islands including the Spratly, and renounces all right, title and claim to the territories named herein”.

b) Paragraph “c” is to be amended to read as follows: “Japan recognizes full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over southern part of the Sakhalin Island, with all the islands adjacent to that part, and over the Kurile Islands and renounces all right, title, and claim to these territories”.

2. *To Article 3.*

Article 3 to be amended to read as follows: “The sovereignty of Japan will extend to the territory consisting of the Islands of Honshu, Kushu, Sikoku, Hokkaido, as well as the Islands of Ryukyu, Bonin, Rosario, Volcano, Parece Vela, Marcus, Tsushima and other islands which formed part of Japan prior to December 7, 1941, except those territories and islands which are named in Article 2”.

3. *To Article 6.*

Paragraph “a” to be amended to read as follows: “All armed forces of the Allied and Associated Powers shall be withdrawn from Japan, as soon as possible and, in any case, not later than 90 days since the date of the coming into force of the present treaty, and after that no Allied or Associated Power or any other foreign power shall have its troops or military bases on the territory of Japan”.

4. *To Article 14.*

Paragraph “a” and subparagraph 1 of the same paragraph to be replaced by the following text: “Japan undertakes to compensate the damage caused by military operations against the Allied or Associated Powers, as well as by the occupation of the territories of certain Allied and Associated Powers. The amount and the sources of payment of the reparations to be paid by Japan shall be considered at a conference of the states concerned

with the express participation of the nations which were subjected to Japanese occupation, namely, the Chinese People’s Republic, Indonesia, the Philippines, Burma, with Japan being invited to that conference”.

5. *To Article 23.*

To insert, instead of paragraphs “a” and “b”, a paragraph reading as follows: “The present treaty shall be ratified by the states which sign it, including Japan, and will come into force for all the states, which will then ratify it, when the instruments of ratification have been deposited by Japan and by a majority of the following states, including the United States of America, the Soviet Union, the Chinese People’s Republic, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; namely, Australia, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, France, India, Indonesia, the Netherlands, the Mongolian People’s Republic, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Chinese People’s Republic and the United States of America. It shall come into force for each state which subsequently ratifies it, on the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification”.

6. *A new article (in Chapter IV).*

“Japan undertakes to remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people, to take all measures necessary to secure to all persons under Japanese jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publication, of religious worship, of political opinion, and of public meetings”.

7. *A new article (in Chapter IV).*

“Japan undertakes not to permit the resurgence on Japanese territory of Fascist and militarist organizations, whether political, military or semi-military, whose purpose it is to deprive the people of their democratic rights”.

8. *A new article (in Chapter III).*

“Japan undertakes not to enter into any coalitions or military alliances directed against any Power which participated with its armed forces in the war against Japan”.

9. *A new article (in Chapter III).*

“Japanese land, air, and naval armaments shall be closely restricted to meeting exclusively the tasks of self-defense. In accordance with the foregoing, Japan is authorized to have armed forces, including the frontier guards and gendarmerie, of not more than:

a) A land army, including anti-aircraft artillery, with a total strength of 150,000 personnel;

b) A navy with a personnel strength of 25,000 and a total tonnage of 75,000 tons;

c) An air force, including naval air arm, of 200 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft and of 150 transport, air-sea rescue, training, and liaison aircraft including reserves aircraft, with a total personnel strength of 20,000. Japan shall not possess or acquire any aircraft designed primarily as bombers with internal bomb-carrying facilities.

d) The total number of medium and heavy tanks in the Japanese armed forces shall not exceed 200.

e) The strength of the armed forces shall in each case include combat, service, and overhead personnel".

10. A new article (in Chapter III).

"Japan is prohibited to conduct in any form military training of the population on the scale exceeding the requirements of the armed forces which Japan is permitted to maintain under article...of the present treaty laying down the size of the armed forces of Japan".

11. A new article (in Chapter III).

"Japan shall not possess, construct, or experiment with: (1) any atomic weapon and other means of mass destruction of human life, including bacteriological and chemical weapons; (II) any self-propelled or guided missiles or apparatus connected with their discharge (other than torpedoes and torpedo launching gear comprising the normal armament of naval vessels permitted by the present treaty); (III) any guns with a range of over 30 kilometers; (IV) sea mines or torpedoes of non contact types actuated by influence mechanisms; (V) any torpedoes capable of being manned.

12. A new article (in Chapter IV).

"No restrictions shall be imposed on Japan in developing her peaceful industries or in developing her trade with other States or in obtaining access to raw materials in accordance with the requirements of the peaceful economy of Japan. Similarly, no restrictions shall be imposed on Japan in developing her commercial shipping or in the construction of merchant vessels".

13. A new article (in Chapter III).

"1. The Straits of La Perouse (Soya) and Nemuro, along the entire Japanese coast, as well as the straits of Tsugaru and Tsushima shall be demilitarized. These straits shall always be open for the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

2. The Straits named in paragraph 1 of this article shall be open for the passage of only such warships as belong to the Powers adjacent to the Sea of Japan".

付録 33 9月7日の吉田総理の受諾演説(英文)

The Delegate of Japan—Shigeru Yoshida (Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs): The peace treaty before the Conference contains no punitive or retaliatory clauses; nor does it impose upon Japan any permanent restrictions or disabilities. It will restore the Japanese people to full sovereignty, equality, and freedom, and reinstate us as a free and equal member in the community of nations. It is not a treaty of vengeance, but an instrument of reconciliation. The Japanese Delegation gladly accepts this fair and generous treaty.

On the other hand, during these past few days in this very conference hall criticisms and complaints have been voiced by some delegations against this treaty. It is impossible that anyone can be completely satisfied with a multilateral peace settlement of this kind. Even we Japanese, who are happy to accept the treaty, find in it certain points which cause us pain and anxiety.

I speak of this with diffidence, bearing in mind the treaty's fairness and magnanimity unparalleled in history and the position of Japan. But I would be remiss in my obligation to my own people if I failed to call your attention to these points.

In the first place, there is the matter of territorial disposition. As regards the Ryukyu archipelago and the Bonins which may be placed under United Nations trusteeship, I welcome in the name of the Japanese nation the statements by the American and British Delegates on the residual sovereignty of Japan over the islands south of the 29th degree, north latitude. I cannot but hope that the administration of these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the reestablishment of world security—especially the security of Asia.

With respect to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin, I cannot yield to the claim of the Soviet Delegate that Japan had grabbed them by aggression. At the time of the opening of Japan, her ownership of two islands of Etoroff and Kunashiri of the South Kuriles was not questioned at all by the Czarist government. But the North Kuriles north of Urruppu and the southern half of Sakhalin were areas open to both Japanese and Russian settlers. On May 7, 1875 the Japanese and Russian Governments effected through peaceful negotiations an arrangement under which South Sakhalin was made Russian territory, and the North Kuriles were in exchange made Japanese territory.

But really, under the name of "exchange" Japan simply ceded South

Sakhalin to Russia in order to settle the territorial dispute. It was under the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 concluded through the intermediary of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States that South Sakhalin became also Japanese territory.

Both Sakhalin and the North and South Kuriles were taken unilaterally by Russia as of September 20, 1945, shortly after Japan's surrender. Even the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, constituting part of Hokkaido, one of Japan's four main islands, are still being occupied by Soviet forces simply because they happened to be garrisoned by Japanese troops at the time when the war ended.

The second point is economic. Japan has lost 45 percent of her entire territory together with its resources. Her population of almost 84 million has to be confined within the remaining areas, which are war-devastated, with their important cities bombed and burnt. The peace treaty will deprive Japan of her vast overseas assets. Moreover, article 14 empowers Allied Nations, which have suffered no damage from the war, to seize Japanese private property in their countries. There is fear as to whether Japan, reduced to such a predicament, could ever manage to pay reparations to certain designated Allied Powers without shifting the burden upon the other Allied Powers. However, we have undertaken the obligations of the treaty in this respect, and we mean to carry them out. I solicit the understanding and support of the governments concerned *vis-à-vis* Japan's efforts toward a satisfactory solution of this problem in the face of huge difficulties.

With her war-shattered economy salvaged through American aid, Japan is making progress on the road of recovery. We are determined that our nation shall cease to be a burden on other countries but shall contribute positively to world prosperity, while observing fully the fair trade practices in international commerce. For this purpose domestic laws have already been promulgated. By perfecting this legislative machinery and by participating in the various international agreements we intend to contribute to the wholesome development of world trade. The present treaty opens the door to the realization of such aspirations of Japan in the field of international economy. But the same door may be closed by the Allied Nations at any time. This may be an inherent feature of such a peace treaty. I only hope that the door will be kept open by all countries as widely as possible.

Since my speech was prepared I have heard the three questions put to me this morning by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Indonesia. The questions seek to resolve doubts such as have been expressed by some others.

The answer to these questions is "Yes" since that means in our opinion a fair interpretation of articles 14 and 9 of the treaty. I hope that this answer will resolve any doubts of others as to Japan's good intentions under the treaty.

Thirdly, there is the question of repatriation. The conclusion of this peace treaty arouses afresh the anxiety of the Japanese people regarding the fate of the more than 340 thousand of their compatriots, who have failed to return. In the name of humanity I would like to appeal to all Allied Powers for continued assistance and cooperation toward speeding the repatriation of these hapless Japanese nationals through the instrumentality of the United Nations, or by any other means. We are thankful that a provision relating to repatriation has been inserted in the treaty at the final stage of drafting.

In spite of the existence of these causes for anxiety, or rather because of it, Japan is all the more anxious to conclude the peace treaty. For we expect that Japan as a sovereign and equal power would gain wider opportunities for eliminating anxiety, as well as for dissipating the dissatisfactions, apprehensions, and misgivings on the part of other powers.

I hope the peace treaty will be signed by as many as possible of the countries represented at this Conference. Japan is determined to establish with them relations of mutual trust and understanding and to work together for the advancement of the cause of world democracy and world freedom.

It is with keen regret that the Japanese Delegation notes the absence of India and Burma. As an Asiatic nation Japan is specially desirous to cultivate relations of closest friendship and cooperation with other Asiatic nations with whom we share common problems, common spiritual and cultural heritages, and common aspirations and ideals. We hope Japan may become a good member of the world community by being first a good member of the immediate neighborhood by contributing her full share toward its prosperity and progress.

As regards China, I confine my remarks to two points. The first point is that like others, we regret that disunity prevents China from being here. The second is that the role of China trade in Japanese economy, important as it is, has often been exaggerated, as proven by our experience of the past 6 years.

Unfortunately, the sinister forces of totalitarian oppression and tyranny operate still throughout the globe. These forces are sweeping over half the Asiatic continent, sowing seeds of dissension, spreading unrest and confusion, and breaking out into open aggression here and there—indeed,

at the very door of Japan. Being unarmed as we are, we must, in order to ward off the danger of war, seek help from a country that can and will help us. That is why we shall conclude a security pact with the United States under which American troops will be retained in Japan temporarily until the danger is past, or international peace and security will have been assured under the United Nations auspices or a collective security arrangement. Japan was exposed once to the menace of Czarist imperialism from the north which threatened the Kuriles and Hokkaido. Today it is the Communist menace that threatens her from the same direction. When the Allied troops are withdrawn from our country with the conclusion of peace, producing a state of vacuum in the country, it is clear as day that this tide of aggression will beat down upon our shores. It is imperative for the sake of our very existence that we take an adequate security measure.

This should not raise the bugbear of Japanese peril. Japan, beaten and battered, dispossessed of her overseas possessions and resources, is absolutely incapable of equipping herself for modern warfare to such an extent as to make her a military menace to her neighbors. For that she has not the materials; she has not the means; she has not the will.

President Truman at the opening ceremony of this Conference spoke of the sweeping political and social reforms of the spiritual regeneration, as well as the material rehabilitation of Japan, which the country has realized during the past six postwar years of Allied occupation under the wise direction and benevolent guidance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and his successor, General Ridgway. Japan of today is no longer the Japan of yesterday. We will not fail your expectations of us as a new nation dedicated to peace, democracy, and freedom.

Almost a century has passed since Japan first entered the world community by concluding a treaty of amity with the United States of America in 1854. Meanwhile there have been two world wars bringing astounding changes on the map of the Far East. Present at this Conference are the delegates representing a number of new states—most of which are members of the United Nations, born here in San Francisco 6 years ago. They are united with many other states in the East and the West in the one purpose to advance the cause of world democracy and freedom and to promote world peace and prosperity through unreserved cooperation under the Charter of the United Nations.

I am glad to believe that the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty today marks one good fruit of their noble endeavors in that direction. It

is my sincere hope that Japan will soon be permitted to join that glorious world organization of yours. For it is in the very language of the Charter itself that there is to be found the essence of the ideals and the determination of the new Japan.

Nowhere more than in Japan itself can there be found today a greater determination to play a full part in saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war."

We have listened here to the delegates who have recalled the terrible human suffering, and the great material destruction of the late war in the Pacific. It is with feelings of sorrow that we recall the part played in that catastrophic human experience by the old Japan.

I speak of the *old* Japan, because out of the ashes of the old Japan there has risen a new Japan.

My people have been among those who suffered greatly from the destruction and devastation of the recent war. Purged by that suffering of all untoward ambition, of all desire for the path of military conquest, my people burn now with a passionate desire to live at peace with their neighbors in the Far East, and in the entire world, and to rebuild their society so that it will in ever greater fullness yield a better life for all.

Japan has opened a new chapter in its history.

We see in the future a new era among nations, an era of peace and harmony as described in the opening words of the Charter of the United Nations.

We seek to take our place among the nations who are dedicated to peace, to justice, to progress and freedom, and we pledge ourselves that Japan shall play its full part in striving toward these ends.

We pray that henceforth not only Japan but all mankind may know the blessings of harmony and progress.

付録 34 9月6日(推定)の小畑くん起草の受諾演説案

—現地で小畑くん起草のもの—

SPEECH OF PRIME MINISTER SEIGERU YOSHIDA, CHIEF DELEGATE OF JAPAN (draft)

Japan gladly accepts the peace treaty, as it stands. In saying this I express the sentiment of a preponderant majority of the Japanese people.

The treaty contains no punitive or retaliatory clauses. Nor does it im-

pose upon our nation permanent restrictions or disabilities. It will restore us to full sovereignty and equality and freedom and reinstate Japan in the community of nations as a free, and equal member. It is not a treaty of vengeance but an instrument of "reconciliation," as was once described by Mr. Dulles. And as such, the treaty is accepted by our nation.

On the other hand, during these past few days in this very conference hall criticisms and complaints have been voiced by some delegations against this treaty. I am sorry but not surprised. It is impossible that anyone can be completely satisfied with a multilateral peace settlement of this kind. Even we Japanese, who are happy to accept the treaty, find in it certain points which cause us pain and anxiety.

I speak of this with diffidence, bearing in mind the magnanimity of the treaty and the position of Japan. But I would be remiss in my obligation to my own people if I failed to call your attention to these points.

In the first place, there is the matter of territorial disposition. Under the treaty Japan is to lose various overseas possessions, constituting 45% of her entire territory. These areas have been either always Japanese territory, or acquired since the Meiji Restoration through cession, annexation or exchange. Their acquisition in each case was effected by treaty according to the then prevailing legitimate procedure, and as such recognized by all countries. None of them was "grabbed" or "stolen." Nor did Japan enslave any people anywhere. This point must be made clear for the sake of history.

The attachment of a people to their ancestral homeland is a universal sentiment that transcends all material considerations or calculations. The territory to be detached from Japan includes the South Kuriles—our home territory—Japan's title to which has never been questioned by any country in the past. Even the islands of Habomai and Shikotan, constituting a part of Hokkaido, are held under military occupation.

We are apprehensive of the future of Amami Oshima and other islands of the Nansei Archipelago, which are to be detached from Japan. At this very moment their inhabitants are lifting their voices in prayer for union with the homeland.

The second point is economic. Japan has lost 45 percent of her entire territory together with its resources. Her population of almost 84 million has to be crammed into the remaining areas, which are war-devastated, with their important cities bombed and burnt. The peace treaty will deprive Japan of her vast overseas assets; it empowers Allied nations, which have suffered no damage from the war, to seize Japanese private

property in their countries. It is feared if Japan, reduced to such a predicament, could ever manage to pay reparations to certain designated Allied Powers without shifting the burden upon the other Allied Powers.

Thirdly, there is the question of repatriation.

The conclusion of this peace treaty arouses afresh the anxiety of the Japanese people regarding the fate of the more than 340 thousand of their compatriots, who have failed to return. In the name of humanity I would like to appeal to all Allied Powers for continued assistance and cooperation toward speeding the repatriation of these hapless Japanese nationals through the instrumentality of the United Nations, or by any other means. We are thankful that a provision relating to repatriation has been inserted in the treaty at the final stage of drafting.

In spite of the existence of these causes for grievance and anxiety, or rather because of it, Japan is all the more anxious to conclude the peace treaty. For we expect that Japan as a sovereign and equal Power would gain wider opportunities for eliminating such causes, as well as for dissipating the dissatisfactions of other Powers and effecting amicable adjustments of the issues pending between us and those Powers.

I hope the peace treaty will be signed by as many as possible of the countries represented at this conference. Japan is determined to establish with them relations of mutual trust and understanding and to work together for the advancement of this cause of world democracy and world freedom.

It is with keen regret that the Japanese delegation notes the absence of India and Burma. As an Asiatic nation Japan is specially desirous to cultivate relations of closest friendship and cooperation with other Asiatic nations with whom we share common problems, common spiritual and cultural heritages, and common aspirations and ideals. We hope Japan may become a good member of the world community by being first a good member of the immediate neighborhood by contributing her full share toward its prosperity and progress.

Unfortunately, the sinister forces of totalitarian oppression and tyranny operate still throughout the globe. These forces are sweeping over half the Asiatic continent, sowing seeds of dissension, spreading unrest and confusion, and breaking out into open aggression here and there—indeed, at the very door of Japan. Being unarmed as we are, we must seek protection from a country that can give us protection. That is why we are concluding a security pact with the United States under which American troops will be retained in Japan temporarily until the danger has past, or

we are prepared to defend ourselves.

This should not raise the bugbear of Japanese peril. Japan, beaten and battered, dispossessed of her overseas possessions and resources, is absolutely incapable to equip herself for modern warfare to such an extent as to make her a military menace to her neighbours. For that she has not the materials; she has not the means; she has not the will.

I do not ask you to take me at my word. I invite you to take a good look at us and find out for yourselves. President Truman at the opening ceremony of this Conference spoke of the sweeping political and social reforms of the spiritual regeneration, as well as the material rehabilitation of Japan, which the country has realized during the past six postwar years of Allied occupation and under the wise direction and benevolent guidance of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur, and his successor, General Ridgway. Japan of today is no longer Japan of yesterday.

The peace treaty generously omits a surveillance clause. But I ask the Allies—I ask the world—to keep a close watch on us. I want you all to watch and see how we go about discharging our obligations under the present treaty and fulfilling our pledge to abide by the principles of the United Nations Charter and to uphold that lofty Declaration of Human Rights. Japan will not betray your trust. We will not fail your expectations of us as a new nation dedicated to peace, democracy, and freedom.

付録 35 9月6日作成の総理受諾演説案

総理受諾演説案—第4案—

(注) 1951. 9. 6現地で作成

1945年8月15日にポツダム宣言を受諾して戦争を終結してしまい6箇年、日本国民は、今日あるを鶴首して待つたのであります。

ここに提示された平和条約は、通例平和条約にみる如き報復のため懲罰を課する条項をふくまず、わが国民に恒久的な制限を課することはありません。この平和条約は、日本に完全な主権と平等と自由とを回復し、日本を自由且つ平等の一員として国際社会へ迎えるものであります。この平和条約は、復讐の条約ではなく、かつてダレス氏の述べられたように「和解」の文書であります。日本全権はこのような平和条約を欣然受諾致す次第であります。

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過去数日にわたつてこの会議の席上若干の代表団は、この条約に対して批判と苦情を表明されたのであります。私としましては、誠に残念であるとは思いますが、必ずしも予期しなかつたことではありません。この種の多数国間における平和解決にあつては、すべての人々を完全に満足させることは、不可能なのであります。この平和条約を欣然受諾するわれわれ日本人すらも、若干の点について苦悩と憂慮を感じることを否定できないのであります。

私は、この条約の公正と日本のおかれている地位を十分識りつつも、あえてこのことを述べる次第であります。これらの点について各位の注意を喚起することは、同胞に対する私の責務であります。

まず第1に、領土の処分の問題であります。

奄美大島、琉球諸島、小笠原群島その他平和条約第3条によつて国際連合の信託統治制度の下におかるべき北緯29度以南の諸島の主権に関するアメリカ合衆国全権及び英国全権の意向を、私は、すべての同胞とともに、多大の喜びをもつて諒承しました。私は、ここにすべての日本国民とともに、世界とくにアジアの平和と安定が速かに確立され、よつてこれらの諸島が1日も早く日本国の行政の下に戻ることを期待するものであります。

千島列島及び南樺太についてソ連全権は、これら地域は日本が侵略によつて奪取したものだと言明されたのであります。各国全権の御参考までに、この点について少しく説明いたします。日本開国の当時、千島南部の2島すなわち択捉、^{エトナフ} ^{クナッリ} 国後両島が日本領であることについては帝政ロシアもなんら異議を挿まなかつたのであります。ただ得撫^{ウルツフ}以北の北千島諸島と南樺太は、当時いわば日露両国人の混住の地でありましたので、1875年5月7日日露両国政府は平和的な外交交渉を通じて南樺太は露領とし、その代償として北千島諸島は日本領とすることに話合をつけたのであります。その後南樺太は1905年9月5日アメリカ合衆国ルーズヴェルト大統領の仲介によつて結ばれたポーツマス平和条約で日本領となつたのであります。

千島列島及び南樺太は、日本降伏直後の1945年9月20日付をもつて一方的にソ連領に編入されております。また、日本の本土たる北海道の一部を構成する色丹島及び歯舞諸島も同じく今日にいたるまでソ連軍に占領されたままであります。

私は、各国全権がかかる問題の存在に留意されることを希望するものであります。

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その2は、経済に関する問題であります。

日本は、全領土の45パーセントをその資源とともに喪失します。8千4百万に及ぶ日本の人口は、残りの地域に押し込まれました。しかも、その地域は、戦争のために荒廃し、主要都市は焼失しました。この平和条約は、莫大な在外資産を日本から取り去ります。戦争のために何の損害も受けなかった国までもが、日本人の個人財産を接収する権利を与えられます。このような苦境におかれる日本が、他の連合国に負担を生ぜしめないで特定の連合国に賠償を支払うことができるかどうか、甚だ疑わしいのであります。

しかし日本は、条約の義務を受諾した以上は、誠意を以て、これが履行方法を見出すため、交渉をなすつもりであります。私は、日本の困難な条件と、それにもかかわらず、問題の円満な解決のためになさんとする努力に対して、関係諸国が理解と支持を与えられることを要請したのであります。

平和は、繁栄を伴うものであります。しかし、繁栄なくしては、平和はありえないのであります。日本国民は、民生の安定があつて始めて社会は安定し、社会の安定があつて始めて国際の平和は確固たりうるものであることを戦争によつて体験したのであります。戦争によつて根底から破壊された日本経済は、合衆国の温い援助を得て救われ、回復の途に進むことができました。日本は、やがては、世界経済に対する負担たることをやめ、進んで世界経済の繁栄に寄与する覚悟であります。

この平和条約は、国際経済の面において、このような日本国民の念願を実現しうべき途を開いてはおります。しかし、この途は、連合国側で一方的に閉ざしうることにもなっています。これは、平和条約の本質上、やむをえないことかも知れませぬが、われわれ日本国民としては、すべての連合国が、現実、この途を最大限に開かれるよう希望してやまないものであります。

その3は、未引揚者の問題であります。

この平和条約の締結は、34万に達する未引揚日本人の運命について、日本国民の憂慮を新にするものであります。私は、すべての連合国が国際連合を介し、または他の方法によつて、これら哀れな日本人の速かなる帰還を実現するために、あらゆる援助と協力を与えられるよう、人道のために、お願いいたしますのであります。

引揚に関する規定が、起草の最終段階において、平和条約に挿入されたことは、日本

国民のひとつしく感謝するところであります。

上述のような憂慮すべき事があるにもかかわらず、否、その故にこそ、日本は、いよいよもつて、この平和条約を締結することを希望しているのであります。けだし、日本国民は、日本が平等な主権国家として上述のような事由を除去し、諸国の不満を解消し、且つ、これらの国との懸案を友好的に調整するため、現在よりも大なる機会をもつことを期待しうるからであります。

私は、この会議に代表されている諸国がなるべく多く平和条約に署名されることを希望してやみません。日本は、これらの国々と相互に信頼と理解ある関係を樹立し、且つ、相共に世界のデモクラシーと世界の自由を前進させる覚悟をもつものであります。

日本代表団は、インドとビルマが会議に連なつていないことを知り、甚だ残念に思います。アジアに国をなすものとして、日本は、他のアジア諸国と緊密な友好と協力の関係を開きたいと熱望するものであります。それらの国々と日本は、伝統、文化、思想、ならびに、理想を共にしているのであります。われわれ日本国民は、まず善隣の良き一員となり、その繁栄と発展のために十分に貢献し、もつて、日本が国際社会の良き一員となることを期待するものであります。

しかるに、不幸にして、全体主義的の圧迫と専制を伴う陰險な勢力が、今なお、全世界に跳りようしております。その勢力は、すでにアジア大陸の過半をなめ尽し、不満の種を播き散らし、不安と混乱を広め、且つ、ここかしこで公然たる侵略に打つて出つてあります。事実、それはまさに日本の間近に迫っております。ところが、われわれ日本国民は、何らの武装をももっておりません。そこで、日本国民としては、保護を与えてくれる国の保護を求めるほかはないのであります。これこそ、われわれが合衆国との間に安全保障条約を締結する理由であります。その条約によつて、日本を襲いつつある危険が去るまで、あるいは日本区域における国際の平和と安全とが国際連合の措置若しくはその他の集団安全保障制度によつて確保される日があるまで、米国軍は当然日本に留まることになるであります。

日本は、かつて、北方から迫るロシア専制主義に脅かされた経験をもっております。当時千島列島と「えぞ」は、直接その侵略の危険にさらされたのであります。今日、わが国は、またもや同じ方向から専制主義の脅威にさらされているのであります。平和条約が成立して占領が終了すると同時に、日本に力の真空状態が生じる場合に、必ずや迫

つてくる脅威に対し安全保障の措置をとることは、民主日本の生存のために当然必要な措置であります。日本を全体主義の脅威から守ることは、アジアに平和と安定をもたらすための基礎条件であるばかりでなく、新しい戦争の危険を阻止して国際連合の理想を実現するために必要欠くべからざるものであります。日本国民は、ここに、平和愛好諸国と提携して、国際の平和と安定に貢献すべきことを、重ねて誓うものであります。

日本が前述の安全保障の措置をとることは、日本の侵略の恐怖を惹き起こすべきいわれはありません。敗戦に打ちひしがれ、海外領土と資源を取り上げられる日本には、隣国に対して軍事的な脅威となる程の近代的な軍備をする力は、全然ないのであります。資材もなく、資力もないのみならず、その意思也没有ありません。

私のいうことを言葉だけで信用して頂きたいと申すではありません。われわれを看まもって各位自ら検討を願いたいのであります。この会議の開会式の席上トルーマン大統領も、日本が過去6箇年にわたる連合国の占領下に遂行した精神的再生のための徹底的な政治的及び社会的の改革、ならびに、物質的復興について語られました。すなわち、今日の日本は、もはや、昨日の日本ではないのであります。

この平和条約は、寛大にも、日本を監視する規定をふくんでおりません。しかし、私は、連合国に、否全世界に、われわれを看まもられることを求めたいのであります。私は、われわれがこの条約によつて課せられた日本の義務を履行するか、そして、国際連合憲章の諸原則を遵奉し、高邁なる世界人権宣言に従うべしとの日本国民の誓をいかに実現するかを見守って頂くことを各位に望みたいのであります。日本は、決して各位の信頼を裏切らないつもりであります。新しい国民として平和、デモクラシー、自由に貢献すべしとの各位の期待を決してゆるがせにしない覚悟であります。

私は、最後に、過去を追懐し、将来を展望したい。日本は、1854年アメリカ合衆国との和親条約によつて開国、国際社会に導入されました。その後1世紀を経て、その間2回にわたる世界戦争があつて、極東の様相は一変しました。数多の新しいアジア諸国の代表が連合国の一員として、ここに列席しておられます。今や、洋の東西を問わず地上には、ひとしく世界の平和と繁栄を招致することにおいて目標を一つにした諸国家が存在しています。すなわち、これらの諸国は、すべて、このサン・フランシスコで、6年前に誕生した国際連合憲章の下に相互依存して平和と繁栄を相ともに享受しようと努力しています。私は、国民とともに、対日平和条約の成立が、この努力の結実の一つ

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であることを信じ、且つ、あらゆる困難が除去されて日本もその輝しい国際連合の一員として、諸国によつて迎えられる日の1日も速かならんことを祈つてやみません。

付録 36 9月3日総理・スミス上院議員会談録

9月3日午後2時半

桑港 マーク・ホプキンスにおいて

スミス議員(全権代理)は、シーボルト大使に同伴されて総理をホテルに來訪した。

同議員は、キャスル元大使の手紙をもつてきていて、同大使からの伝言を総理に伝えるところがあり、しばらくキャスル元大使の追懷談があつた。

スミス議員は、米国では今回の対日平和条約によつて強い民主日本が独立を回復して米国の友邦となることをひとしく歓迎しておる。民主、共和の両政党を通じて、この平和条約を支持する点において一致している。日米親善関係の確立のために、自分はよこんで、日本をお助けする気持がある。米国において懸念されているところは、独立回復後の日本が、その経済的必要から中共大陸と単独講和を結びはしまいかという点である。昨年日本その他極東地域を訪問し日本の実情も心得ているつもりである。日米親善は必要で又可能であると信ずるというような話があつた。

総理は全く同感であり日本国民も日米友好関係の増進に熱意をもっている。日本と中国の経済関係は想像されるほど大きなものでなく満州を除けば中国本土と日本の貿易は日本の全貿易の六パーセント位しかならなかつた。今日の中国は日本が貿易を発展させようとしても中共の方でうけつけまい。中共は中共のタムスで取付しようというにきまつている。日本が中共と単独講和しようとしても中共がうけつけないであらうと日本と中共とが一緒になりはしまいかとの先方の懸念の無用なことを説明された。

日本においては今度の平和条約は社会党や共産党を除き、絶対多数によつて支持されている。共産党の勢力は選挙ごとに退歩しつつある。国内勢力としては恐るるに足らぬと断言する。ただ国外における情勢による影響は別問題である。

自分は、今度の旅行で米国の対日感情のいかによくなっているかに驚いた。前回1938年米国にきた時とくらべて隔世の感がある。45年11月マ元師に日本の経済使節

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をワシントンに送りたいと話したところ、マ元帥はワシントンの対日空気は悪くて使節の安全が保障できぬ。今にこの感情は好転するであろう。それからにしていではないかと言われたが正にそのとおりになったのはよろこばしいと語られた。

スミス議員は全米の対日感情はよろしい。昨日日本から立派な議員団の訪問をうけ、われわれは大いに歓迎したと語り米国は衷心から日本が強くなつて民主陣營の友邦であることを希望する。日本に賠償義務を負わせようとは、決して思わぬ。強い日本が早く実現することを望むと言つた。

総理は、条約の批准を日本はいそぐがよからうか、あるいは、米国の批准があつてからにした方がよいであろうか、貴見を参考までに伺いたいといわれたに対し、スミス議員は、米国では批准に国難はなく、なるべく早く批准されるよう努める。しかし、日本としては、米国の批准とは無関係に、早くなされたがいいと思うと答えた。

最後に、総理からマ元帥の近況を問い、スミス議員は1月前にあつたが、元帥は健康である。今ニューヨークにおられるが、会議中に当地にこられるかとも思うと述べていた。

傍にいた者の印象は、極めて、友好的な、日本の再興のためにはいくらかでも援助しましょう。ただ中共と手をくまれることだけではないでしょうね というものの如くであつた。

付録 37 9月3日総理・ヤンガー英代表会談録

9月3日午後3時半

桑港 マーク・ホブスキンスにおいて

総理から、公正にして寛大な平和条約を日本に与えるために英国政府が払われた努力に対し謝意を表し、日本国民の絶対多数が同条約を支持しおる旨を述べられたるに対し、ヤンガー国務相から前述の言葉を直接総理の口からきくことをはなはだ欣幸とする旨を答えた。後は、儀礼的の談話に終始した。同相は、学生時代西園寺公一氏と同窓であつたとのことでその話などがでた。

付録 38 9月4日総理・スバルジョ・インドネシア代表会談録

昭和26年9月4日(火) 午前10時30分

松井秘書官記

吉田総理大臣よりまず「対日平和条約は日本国民の支持するところでありなるべく多数の国家の参加が望ましくインドネシアがこれに調印することを希望するが賠償問題について難点があるやに聞いている。日本政府としては平和条約第14条の義務を忠実に履行すべく直ちに交渉開始の用意を有するものである。本日貴大臣を往訪した目的も右の趣旨を御伝え致し度いためである」と述べたところ、スバルジョ外相は吉田総理大臣の来訪を謝し「御説の通り本国においては賠償問題がやかましく言われており、何とか国民の要望を満足させなければならない。この点に大いに腐心している次第である」と述べた。

吉田総理大臣は「貴国のクレームをできるだけ満足させたいと考えているが日本の経済復興は未だ完成せず、そこに困難がある。しかし日本政府としては直ちに又どこにおいても交渉開始の用意がある」と答えた。これに対しスバルジョ外相は「貴大臣はいつサン・フランシスコを出発するか」とたづねたので吉田総理大臣は「調印後なるべく早く帰りたいと考えている」と答えた。スバルジョ外相は「自分としては双務協定締結のためサン・フランシスコにおいて直ちに会談を開始し度い。できうれば原則だけでも決めたいと思う」と述べたので、吉田総理大臣は直ちに会談開始の用意ある旨を繰り返えされた。

続いてスバルジョ外相は「平和会議の席上において行うステートメントにできうれば本日吉田総理大臣のなされたステートメントを引用致し度いが、日本政府の適当な係官を派して案文について協議致し度い旨を申出でたので吉田総理大臣は西村条約局長を指名し午後3時に出頭せしめることとした。

インドネシア側はアリー駐米大使を指名した。

(備考) この会見はきわめて友好裡に行われインドネシア側も14条についてある程度の満足が得られれば条約に調印するであろうとの印象を得た。

付録 39 9月4日総理・ロムロ比代表会談録
 (編注9)
 付・5日受領した比側作成の会談録(英文)

昭和26年9月4日(火)午前11時
 松井秘書官記

吉田総理大臣よりまず「今次戦争中においてフィリピンに対して与えた被害はまことに遺憾であり、日本政府としてはできるだけフィリピンのクレームを満足させたいと考えている。ただ日本経済は連合国の援助によつてようやく復興の途上にあるがなお前途は長く賠償問題は容易ではない。しかし日本としては条約第14条の義務は忠実にこれを履行する用意がある。」と述べたところ、ロムロ外相は「実はフィリピンにおいては賠償問題は非常にやかましい問題となつている、国民も今次条約の賠償条項はきわめて不満足である。反対党は遂に平和条約の全権団に全権を送ることを拒否するに至つた。昨日の入電によればマニラ市において『条約反対』『米英のかいらいとなるな』『国民的名誉と自尊心をすみやかに回復すべし』等のポスターを立ててパレードが行われた旨の情報が入つている。自分はこの平和条約は調印すべしとの議論をしているが自分の立場の困難なことは御推察に難くないであろう。正直に申し上げれば、自分は戦争中、マックアーサー元帥とともにパターン、コレギドールを経て米国に逃れた。マニラの私宅は焼失し、家族は苦難の道を歩んだ、その自分が国民の意思に反してこの条約を支持せんとしているのである。自分の立場は解してくれるであろう。貴大臣も日本国民の声を代表しておられるであろう。私もフィリピン国民の声を代表せざるを得ない。そこでおたずね致し度いのはいつワシントンに出発せられるか。ワシントンに出発される前に米国を交えず直接に会見し、賠償支払の意思ある旨の確約を得たい。」と述べた。吉田総理大臣は「自分は条約調印後、直ちに日本に帰りたい。しかし条約第14条に基く会談は直ちに、又どこ場所においても開始する用意がある。東京でも良い。貴国においても良い。」と答えた。

続いてロムロ外相は「ダレス特使との会談も全部賠償の問題についてであつた。マックアーサー元帥も日本人は賠償を支払う意思がある。日比間に必ず満足の行くような双務協定ができることを信ずる旨の発言があつた。どうか日本政府の誠意を示し直ちに会談を開始するようにしてほしい。」と述べた。

(備考) この会談はインドネシアの場合に比しロムロ代表の発言きわめてアグレッシブであり賠償に対する関心の度合の強烈さを痛感した。しかし条約の調印をする意思は明瞭にしていたことは特筆するに値しよう。

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付録 40 9月4日総理・ジェエワルデーネ・セイロン代表会談録

昭和26日9月4日(火)午後4時
 松井秘書官記

本会議は全く儀礼的なものであり吉田総理大臣は麻生夫人を同伴し、先方又夫人、駐米大使、書記官2名を列席せしめ茶菓の饗応があつた。

会談内容は仏教に関する話合、セーロン島は2600年前から独立国であつたのが19世紀に一時英国の植民地となり最近再び独立を回復した等の話合があつた。

付録 41 9月4日総理・ザフラ・ハーン・パキスタン代表会談録

昭和26年9月4日(火)午後5時30分
 松井秘書官記

吉田総理大臣より先ず「本条約は日本国民の圧倒的支持を得ておるものであり自分としては貴国政府を含む多数国政府の調印を見ることを希望する旨の陳述がありこれに対しハーン代表は長々と左のような説明をなした。

「パキスタンにおいては御承知の通り目下キャンミール問題というきわめて厄介な問題があるので端的にいつて対日平和条約調印には自分としては出てこない積りであつた。しかしながら今回の条約は過去において全くその例を見ざる戦勝国が戦敗国に対して苛酷な条件を課するという条約でなく、平等と尊厳と満足(equality, dignity, contentment)という諸原則に立脚した条約であり全く新しい試みといわなければならない。私はこういう条約の重要性和パキスタン首相の強い要請により遂にサンフランシスコにくる決心をいたし昨夜当地に着いた次第である。

この条約に反対を表明している国の内、ソ連の態度は了解することができる。人世観や世界観の異なるソ連が反対するのは当然である。中国の反対も良くわかる。中共はソ連と同じ陣営にあり反対するのは当然である。国民政府は条約から除外せられ台湾の帰属も不明であるので反対するのは当然である。しかし印度の不参加は理解し難い。中共政府を参加せしめなかつたからソ連と隣接している地理的關係上ソ連に同調したと見るべきであろうが、沖縄、小笠原の信託統治に反対しながら千島の問題に触れていない

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のは片手落と非難せられても抗弁の余地はあるまいと思う。しかし講和条約に参加しない国も同じような線に沿った条約を日本と単独に結ぶ方法もある。自分としては平和条約問題で日本に援助を与えうるものがあればその労を惜しむものではない。できるだけことはいたしたいと思っている。すでにパキスタンには日本政府在外事務所があり日本とパキスタンとの間には貿易協定が締結せられている。

本日も貴大臣の訪問を受けることなく当方より訪問いたしたきところ、御来訪をいただきまことに光栄に存じておる次第である。」

（備考） 雰囲気はきわめて友好的であつた多少説教めいた感はあつた。

付録 42 9月8日総理・モリソン英代表会談録

昭和26年9月8日（土）12時30分

松井秘書官記

先ず吉田総理大臣より平和条約の調印を見たのは米英両国政府の好意と不断の努力によるものとして深く感謝の意を表せられたのに対し、モリソン外相は「貴大臣の口から親しく日本政府の見解を聞くを得たのは誠に幸である」と答え、吉田総理大臣は更に「本朝調印に先立ちモリソン全権が日本人を信頼し日本人の人格及び勤勉性を信じ、日本国民の平和的、進歩的社會責任を完全に果すことを確信して平和条約を締結するとの言はわれわれの反省を促すものであると信ずる旨を述べたのに対しモリソン外相は長々と左のような趣旨を述べた。

「自分は過去における日英親善関係を回顧し充分日本人を信頼しているが第二次大戦による傷は未だ完全には癒えず英国人の中には今なお日本人に対し猜疑の念を禁じ得ないものがある。この気持ちを氷解させるためには日本人としても良く考え占領中に実施された各種の民主的改革を今後共良く実践して行く必要がある。英国においても多くの社会的改革が行われた。労働者の声を無視して政策の決定は行われない。英国においては政府とT、U、Cが緊密な関係にあり常に労働階級の声を聞いている。もちろん経営者側の声も聞いて判断を下している。時には繁雑に堪えないこともあるが結果は良いと思う。もちろん英国の重要産業の国有化は必ずしも常に成功であるとは言えない。国有化

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の結果成績の落ちた所もあつた。しかしそれは国有化のみに罪を着せるのは誤りであつて時期の問題、客観状勢の影響等のあることも否定できない。日本における民主化の諸措置についても色々批判はあろうが良く国民各位の利害を考慮して採るべきものは採り、民主化の実を図られたい」

モリソン外相は続いて「今度の平和条約においては戦前において英国人の蒙つた損害の補償の問題が明らかでないところ、日本政府は7月13日の閣議決定によつて本問題についての補償を認めているが英国としてはその確認を得たいと述べた。吉田総理大臣はこれに対し、「閣議決定の線に沿つて実行するからわれわれを信用ありたい」と答えた。

モリソン外相は更に「今後の両国関係は相互の信頼に基礎を置くべきものであり過般締結せられたボンド地域との支払協定のごときにおいても日本としてはボンド貨の蓄積のみ行われドル貨の不足を生じないように、英国側と常に緊密な連絡を執り、互に協力することによつて相互信頼を図るようになすべきである。今後通商協定、貿易協定、文化協定等が結ばれるであろうが右のような精神で行うべきであると思う」と述べた。吉田総理大臣も右に賛意を表したところモリソン外相は近くデニング新大使が赴任するので同大使と早速各種の話を開始されたいと述べた。

最後にモリソン外相は吉田総理大臣の質問に対し中共問題についての英国側の見解を述べ意見交換の後には吉田総理大臣は辞去した。

（会見時間およそ30分）

付録 43 9月4日賠償問題に関するシーボルト大使西村（藤崎）会談録

26.9.4 藤崎

9月4日午後、西村条約局長（藤崎随員）は、パレス・ホテルのアメリカ代表団事務所シーボルト大使を往訪した。（たまたま、松井秘書官が同大使に、昨日の総理とフィリピン全権、インドネシア全権と話された内容を連絡にきていた。）

シ大使は、総理とフィリピン、インドネシア側との話の内容を伝えた上、「先方に話をされる場合には、賠償の具体的な問題に立ち入る必要はない。いつ話をはじめるか、というようなことについて、一般的に話をするに止められた方がよいと思う」といつた。

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9月4日午後（シーボルト大使と会談の後）、西村条約局長（藤崎随行）は、パレス・ホテルのインドネシア代表部を往訪、スジヨノ大使その他と会談した。

ス大使は、「吉田総理は、われわれの賠償要求にミースすることを約された。しかし、それだけでは国民を納得させることができないので、公文の交換を行い、又、その内容を会議における演説の中で引用し、会議の議事録に止めたい」といつた。

また、他の代表は、「賠償の方法、額について協力することのみならず、紛争の場合に第3国のアービトレーションにかけることも公文の中でうたいたい。これは、みな、インドネシアのホーム・コンサンプションのためである」といった。

当方から、「総理には会議における貴方の発言をコンファームする用意はあると思うが、その前に公文の交換を行うことを考えてはおられないと思う。内容については、われわれは、ここで協定の主題たるべき事項について具体的に論議するべく用意してきている。専門の者がいない。アービトレイションは、両国間の紛争を予見することになる。われわれは、ここで考えられるいるステップは両国間の友好関係のため広い政治的観点に立つものであつて、そこまでいうことは、根本の趣旨にそぐわないし、日本国民にもよい印象を与えないと思う。また、平和条約第22条でカバーされていることであると思う」と述べた。

結局、

- (1) まずインドネシア代表が会議における演説で、賠償の方法及び額を規定する協定のための交渉にすみやかに入る用意があることを総理が述べられた旨を述べる（クォートの仕方については、当方に事前に連絡されたいといったところ、これを了承。さらに、先方は、この話はアメリカ側から出たことだから、アメリカを通じてやりたいといったので、当方これを了承）。
- (2) 次に、インドネシアの方から、日本側に対し、右の発言を確認されたい旨及び紛争が起つた場合には、平和条約第22条によるべきことを確認されたい旨の公文を出し、
- (3) 日本側がこれを確認する回答を出す
- ということに打合わせた。

9月5日夜、西村条約局長（藤崎随行）は、パレス・ホテルのインドネシア代表団事務所にハニファ博士（全権代理、保健省高官）及びザイン氏（全権代理、外務省経済部長）を往訪した。

先方の要望の趣旨は、次のとおりである。

「平和条約第9条には、日本が漁業協定の締結のための交渉に応ずるべき旨の規定があるが、それだけではアシュアランスにならない。われわれは、内閣から、賠償と漁業の二点についてアシュアランスをえるように訓令を受けている。この二点について内閣が満足しうることができなければ、条約に署名してはならないことになっている。ところで、漁業についてのわれわれの関心事は、日本の業者が進出して来て、インドネシアの業者を圧倒し、国民の食糧資源をおびやかすはしないかということである。日本を閉めださそうというのではない。日本に反感をいだき、あるいは戦敗国視するが故では決してない。」

これに対して、当方から次の趣旨を述べた。

「漁業についても、平和条約の規定は、忠実に実行する。双方が友好的な気持ちで話合えば、そう解決の困難であるとも思わない。ただ、すぐここで具体的な話をする用意はできていないし、またわれわれとしては、他の連合国との関係もあり、そうすることを好まない。しかし、原則の点については、貴方とはアングルを異にする。公海における一切の活動は、原則として自由であるべきである。それでは、特定の漁業について資源がデブリートされ、人類一般の福祉に反するという事実が科学的に確立された場合には、関係国間の合意により合理的な規制の方法を講ずるということであるべきであると思う。また、われわれとしては、インドネシアに日本の漁業に関する技術を提供して積極的に協力する用意がある」

右の趣旨による一応の案として別添の書き物を示した。

これに対しては、先方は という趣旨をもつとはつきり出した。
いといったが、当方は、その趣旨は という言葉で十分出ていると述べた。

結局どうするかということについての結論は出なかつたが、先方は本日の話合いで相当満足した様子であつた。

付録 46 賠償問題（第14条(a)）に関する総理・インドネシア代表間往復
文書

INDONESIAN DELEGATION TO THE
JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE

San Francisco
September 5, 1951

Excellency:

With reference to the meeting between the Heads of the Indonesian and Japanese delegations in the Palace Hotel at San Francisco on September 4, 1951, followed by further discussions of representatives of said delegations on the same date, I have the honour to state that the following is the understanding of the Indonesian Delegation in regard to the results of the above-mentioned meetings:

1. Japan is prepared to pay reparations to Indonesia for damage suffered by Indonesia during the second world war in accordance with the provisions stipulated in article 14 of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
2. Those reparations will be specified and the amount thereof fixed in a bilateral treaty between Indonesia and Japan, which will be concluded as soon as possible after the signing of the Peace Treaty.
3. Disputes which might arise between Indonesia and Japan concerning the interpretation or execution of the reparations treaty to be concluded, which cannot be settled by diplomatic means, shall be settled in accordance with the provisions in article 22 of the Japanese Peace Treaty.

The Indonesian delegation would be grateful if the Japanese Delegation would confirm the above through the intermediary of the Delegation of the United States of America.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

His Excellency
Shigeru Yoshida,
Prime Minister and concurrently,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Chairman of the Japanese Delegation
to the Japanese Peace Conference,
San Francisco.

Ahmad Subardjo
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and
Chairman of the Indonesian,
Delegation to the Japanese
Peace Conference.

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September 6, 1951

Excellency:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note dated September 5, 1951, asking confirmation by my delegation of the following understanding in connection with our meeting in the Palace Hotel at San Francisco on September 5, 1951.

1. Japan is prepared to pay reparations to Indonesia for damage suffered by Indonesia during the second world war in accordance with the provisions stipulated in article 14 of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
2. Those reparations will be specified and the amount thereof fixed in a bilateral treaty between Indonesia and Japan, which will be concluded as soon as possible after the signing of the Peace Treaty.
3. Disputes which might arise between Indonesia and Japan concerning the interpretation or execution of the reparations treaty to be concluded, which cannot be settled by diplomatic means, shall be settled in accordance with the provisions in article 22 of the Japanese Treaty.

I have the honor to confirm hereby the above-stated understanding.

Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister and
concurrently
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and
Chief Delegate to the Japanese
Peace Conference.

His Excellency
Ahmad Subardjo,
Minister of Foreign Affairs,
and
Chairman of the Indonesian,
Delegation to the Japanese,
Peace Conference.

付録 47 漁業問題（第9条）に関する総理・インドネシア代表間往復文書

INDONESIAN DELEGATION TO THE
JAPANESE PEACE CONFERENCE

San Francisco
September 6, 1951

Excellency:

With reference to the conversation held by representatives of the Indonesian and Japanese Delegations on Wednesday night September 5,

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1951, in the Palace Hotel at San Francisco on the subject of fishing and fisheries on the high seas, I have the honour to state that the following is the understanding of the Indonesian Delegation in regard to the results of that conversation.

It was understood that in accordance with article 9 of the Japanese Peace Treaty the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas between and surrounding the Indonesian islands would be settled in a friendly and brotherly way between the Indonesian and Japanese nations and would be the subject of a Treaty between Indonesia and Japan, to be concluded as soon as possible after the signing of the Peace Treaty.

It was further understood that said Treaty would be based on the principle that in the interest of both nations fishing activities on the above-mentioned seas should be regulated and limited in order to preserve the amount of fish in those seas and to safeguard the seafood supply of the Indonesian people.

This letter is forwarded to you through the intermediary of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Japanese Peace Conference.

The Indonesian Delegation would be grateful if the Japanese Delegation would confirm the above in the same way.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Ahmad Subardjo
Minister of Foreign Affairs
and
Chairman of the Indonesian
Delegation to the Japanese
Peace Conference

His Excellency,
Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister and Concurrently
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Chairman of the Japanese Delegation
to the Japanese Peace Conference
San Francisco.

September 6, 1951

Excellency,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note dated September 6, 1951, stating the understanding of the Indonesian Delegation in regard to the results of the conversation held by representatives of the Indonesian and the Japanese Delegations on September 5, 1951, as follows:

It was understood that in accordance with article 9 of the Japanese Peace Treaty the regulation or limitation of fishing and the conservation and development of fisheries on the high seas between and surrounding the Indonesian islands would be settled in a friendly and brotherly way between the Indonesian and Japanese nations and would be the subject of a Treaty between Indonesia and Japan, to be concluded as soon as possible after the signing of the Peace Treaty.

It was further understood that said Treaty would be based on the principle that in the interest of both nations fishing activities on the above-mentioned seas should be regulated and limited in order to preserve the amount of fish in those seas and to safeguard the seafood supply of the Indonesian people.

I have the honor to confirm hereby the understanding of the Indonesian Delegation, it being understood, however, that the internationally recognized freedom of high seas should always be respected and that no waiver of international rights of the Japanese Government is implied hereby.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Shigeru Yoshida
Prime Minister and Concurrently
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Chief Delegate to the Japanese
Peace Treaty Conference.

His Excellency Ahmad Subardjo,
Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Chairman of the Indonesian Delegation,
To the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference.

付録 48 9月5日賠償問題に関するフィリピン代表部との会談録

一付、先方作成の会談録一

賠償問題に関しフィリピン代表部と会談の件

26. 9. 5 藤 崎

9月5日午後（午後の会議と夜の会議の間に）、西村条約局長（藤崎随行）は、セント・フランシス・ホテルのフィリピン代表団を往訪した。

先方の出席者

マカバガル氏（代表、下院議員）

シンコ教授（代表）

ロベズ公使（代表代理、国連代表）

マダムバ氏（代表代理、外務省政治経済局長）

キンテロ氏（代表代理、外務省法務局長）

当方から、総理の命により、ロムロ代表と総理との間の話合いの線で事務当局としてなしうるものがあれば、できるだけのことをしたいと述べた。先方から具体案を求められたので、当方としては、

- (1) 日本政府としては、賠償問題に関するフィリピンの国民感情はわかること
- (2) 日本政府としては、平和条約第14条により賠償を支払うべき義務を受諾したので、その義務を、誠実に良心的に果すべきこと
- (3) 日本政府は、できるだけフィリピン側の要求をみたすべき協定のための双方にとり満足すべき方式を見出す目的をもつてすみやかに交渉を開始する用意があること。との趣旨を書面をもつてコンファームすることは可能であろうと述べた。

先方は、それだけでは満足できない趣で、いろいろの問題を提起したが、その主なものを挙げれば、次のとおり。

- (1) 総理は、いつでも交渉を始める用意があるといわれたが、それならば、もつと具体的な腹案があるはずである。一体どれ位の賠償を支払うことができると思うか。

これに対して、当方から、「われわれは、今直ちにサン・フランシスコで、そういう具体的な話をする用意をしてきていない。東京に帰ってからでも具体的な話をするためには、事務当局として相当研究しなければならない。事は、日本の

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経済全般に関する問題である。アメリカの経済援助に関する債務、連合国財産の補償等連合国側に対する他の債務との関係もある。

- (2) 加工方式による賠償の場合、一切の費用は、日本政府が負担するか。賠償という以上、当然そうあるべきであると思うが、確認をえたい。ダレス氏は、今日の演説でノン・プロフィット・ベイスンという表現を使われたかも知れないが（注、実際は、サーヴィンズ・フリーリー・ギヴンといっている）、以前行つた放送演説では、フリー・オブ・コストといわれたこともある。

この点については、今日のダレス氏の演説には異存ないという外、当方の意見を述べることを差控えた。

- (3) サービスという言葉は、非常に広い意味に解されうる。条文上は、原料はフィリピンから供給すべきことになっているが、原料が日本にあるものである場合、従つて、その輸入のため外貨を使う必要のない場合においては、日本の原料を使つてその製品をフィリピンに送ることもありうると思うか。フィリピン国民は、レバレイション・イン・カインドを強く要望している。

この点についても、当方は明確な答をすることを避けた。

- (4) 賠償の額について、日比間で争いが解決されない場合、公平な第三者の裁定を求めることにすることについての所見いかん。それは、一般の国際慣行として行われているところであると思うが。

当方としては、まず彼我両国の間で誠意をもつて了解に達するように努めようではないか、第三者による調停はそれではどうしてもうまく行かない場合の話である、といつたが、先方は、それではフィリピン国民を満足させることはできないと述べた。

先方は、上述の(4)点をノートしていたが、具体的にどのようなステップをとるかという点には触れなかつた。また、前日の総理とロムロ代表との会談内容に関するエイド・メモアールをくれたが、これについても、別にコンファメーションをえたいともいわなかつた（9月6日マダムバ氏、キンテロ氏、ロベズ公使等から午餐に招待されたが、その際マダムバ氏は、このコンファメーションをえたいといつた）。

先方は、フィリピン国民は平和条約の第14条の規定に満足していない。従つて、ロムロ代表等が、この条約に署名することは、内政的に非常に困難におちいるおそれがある

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る。しかし、アメリカ側からの話もあるので、できれば署名したいが、それには、フィリピン国民の納得の行くようなことを日本側でもらわなくてはならないという趣旨のことを繰返して述べた。

会談の当初は、ステイフな態度であつたが、いろいろ話合っているうちにやわらいできて、辞去する際には、お互いの気持ちを理解する上に非常に役立ったといつていた。

付、先方作成の会談録
比側作成の会談録

AIDE-MEMOIRE

At 11:01 a.m., September 4, 1951, Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida of Japan, accompanied by his private secretary, Mr. Akira Matsui, was ushered into the suite of General Carlos P. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, at the Hotel St. Francis. As they shook hands, the following conversation ensued:

Prime Minister
YOSHIDA: Good morning, Your Excellency.

Secretary
ROMULO: Good morning, Mr. Prime Minister, I want you to know that yours is the first Japanese hand I have shaken since the war.

YOSHIDA: I have come to pay my respects to Your Excellency and to express the regret of my Government and people for the damage done in the Philippines by the Japanese Army....

ROMULO:and the suffering caused the Filipino people. I have nothing much to say. I prefer to listen.

At this point, the conversation was interrupted for about ten minutes as newspaper reporters, press and radio correspondents, photographers and movie cameramen entered the room. At the request of the radio correspondents, Secretary Romulo and Prime Minister Yoshida spoke briefly before the microphones as follows:

ROMULO: I have received Prime Minister Yoshida today not in the spirit of letting bygones be bygones but in the spirit that bygones must not be repeated.

YOSHIDA: I have come to pay my respects and to express the regrets of the Japanese people and Government for the damage and

suffering inflicted on the Philippines by the Japanese Army.

After the newspaper reporters, correspondents and photographers left, the conversation was resumed.

ROMULO: In connection with the proposed peace treaty with Japan, you must be aware that reparations is of prime concern to the Philippines. The Filipino people are united in demanding the payment of adequate reparations from Japan and I am here to fight for their interests.

YOSHIDA: I wish to assure you, Your Excellency, that the Japanese people and Government are ready to do all that is humanly possible to meet your claims.

ROMULO: You are aware, of course, that there are limitations in the proposed treaty regarding reparations with which the Filipino people do not and cannot agree. I hope, therefore, that in the course of the bilateral arrangements on reparations between the Philippines and Japan, it will be possible to make these provisions conform more closely to the wishes of the Filipino people.

YOSHIDA: I have no doubt but that this will be done. You can name the place and the time and our negotiators will be there.

ROMULO: There are certain other matters which we have to discuss, such as the barter agreements between our countries and guarantees against the resurgence of Japanese militarism.

YOSHIDA: I want you to know, Your Excellency, that I have always opposed militarism in my country. I was imprisoned by the militarists because of my stand. I also wish to assure you that the Japanese people have been chastened as a result of our tragic experience under militarism.

ROMULO: Mr. Prime Minister, you and I are here to obey the bidding of our peoples. It is important for me to be able to tell my people, as you have just said, that the Japanese people and Government will do all that humanly possible to meet our claims.

YOSHIDA: You can give them that assurance, Your Excellency. By the way, are you signing the peace treaty?

ROMULO: We will follow closely the course of the Conference. We are here to defend the interests of the Filipino people.

YOSHIDA: Are you signing the treaty?

ROMULO: We will decide that later.

YOSHIDA: When Mr. Dulles went to Japan, he asked the Japanese Government to do the best it can to meet the Philippine demands, and we promised to do so. Have you seen General MacArthur lately?

ROMULO: Yes, I saw him five days ago in New York at his suite in the Waldorf-Astoria. He expressed deep concern over the question of reparations and said that he hoped the Philippines and Japan would come to a suitable agreement. He promised to help. When you go to New York, I am sure that he will take up this matter with you. How long are you staying in San Francisco?

YOSHIDA: I cannot stay very long because I am needed in Japan, but I would be ready to have further conversations with you after the Conference is over.

ROMULO: I would prefer that these conversations take place before the signing of the treaty.

YOSHIDA: I am at your disposal, Your Excellency, and I would be ready to meet you at any time. I am staying at the Scott House here in San Francisco, and if there is any information that you need, your secretary may get in touch with me at any time.

Before leaving, Your Excellency, I wish to express to you my deep regret for what you personally suffered during the war.

ROMULO: I appreciate the sentiment, coming as it does from you, Mr. Prime Minister, for as I have said, you are the first Japanese I have talked with since the war.

YOSHIDA: I wish to thank you for this audience.

At 11:05 a.m., September 5, 1951, Mr. Kumao Nishimura, Director of the Bureau of Treaties, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and Secretary-General of the Japanese Delegation, telephoned the office of the Philippine Delegation at the Hotel St. Francis, asking if it would be possible for him to confer with someone in the Philippine Delegation that day concerning the matters which had been discussed between General Romulo and Prime Minister Yoshida.

General Romulo decided to designate Congressman Diosdado Macapagal, Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, Minister Salvador P. Lopez, Counselor Lucas V. Madamba, and Counselor Eduardo Quintero to meet Mr. Nishimura at the office of the Philippine Delegation at 6:00 p.m. that day.

付録 49 9月6日キンテロ代表代理から受領した質問書

QUESTIONS PROPOUNDED BY THE PHILIPPINE DELEGATION TO THE JAPANESE DELEGATION REGARDING REPARATIONS

1. Is the Japanese Government in a position to indicate provisional estimate of the amount of reparations it can pay to the Philippines?
2. If the question of Japanese capacity to pay should arise in the course of the bilateral negotiations between Japan and the Philippines, will Japan agree to the creation of an impartial commission to investigate Japan's capacity to pay?
3. In interpreting Article 14 (a) 1, does the Japanese Government agree that the clause "services of the Japanese people in production" would include the manufacture free of cost of consumer as well as capital goods out of raw materials supplied by the Philippines as well as out of raw materials available in Japan, the use of which would not impose a foreign exchange burden on Japan?
4. Does the Japanese Government interpret the word "services" to include, for example, the use of Japanese bottoms for the shipment of Philippine raw materials for processing in Japan and the shipment of the finished goods back to the Philippines without cost?
5. Does the Japanese Government agree that Philippine raw materials sent to Japan for processing and the finished goods shall enter, remain or leave Japan free of customs duties, storage fees and other charges on exports and imports?

付録 50 9月3日パラス・ホテルでダレス特使起草のオランダ代表書簡案

My dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Some question has arisen as to the interpretation of the reference in Article 4(b) to "claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals" which the Allied Powers agree to waive. The question is whether this Article a) obligates each Allied Government to confiscate the private claims of its nationals so that after the Treaty comes into force these claims will be non-existent or b) involves a waiver by the Allied Powers of the legal right of the government and their nationals to prosecute their claims.

The distinction is important because certain governments are prevented by constitutional provisions from confiscating private property of their nation-

als and might even lay themselves open to liability if they sought to do so. Also, there are certain types of private claims by Allied nationals which we would assume the Japanese Government might want to deal with in its own way as a matter of good conscience or of enlightened expediency.

It is our view that the second interpretation above put is the correct interpretation of Article 14(b).

I would appreciate your confirmation of our interpretation in this respect.

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency

Shigeru Yoshida,

Prime Minister of Japan.

付録 51 9月4日シーボルト大使から連絡されたオランダ代表のステートメント案

Suggested Statement by the Foreign Minister of the Government
of the Netherlands

Some question has arisen as to the interpretation of the reference in Article 14 (b) to "claims of the Allied Powers and their nationals" which the Allied Powers agree to waive. It is my Government's view that Article 14 (b) as a matter of correct interpretation does not involve the expropriation by the Allied governments of the private claims of Allied nationals so that after the Treaty comes into force these claims will be non-existent.

The question is important because some governments, including my own, are under certain limitations of constitutional and other governing laws as to confiscating or expropriating private property of their nationals. Also, there are certain types of private claims by Allied nationals which we would assume the Japanese Government might want voluntarily to deal with in its own way as a matter of good conscience or of enlightened expediency.

付録 52 9月5日シーボルト大使に手交したわが回答案

Japanese Delegation is willing to confirm the interpretation of Article 14 (b) of the Government of the Netherlands that it does not involve the expropriation by the Allied governments of the private claims of Allied

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nationals so that after the Treaty comes into force these claims will be non-existent. Japanese Delegation wants to add, in its confirmation note, that the same interpretation shall be applicable to Article 19 (a) and (b) which stipulate the waiver by Japan of certain claims of Japanese nationals against Allied governments and their nationals.

So far as it concerns the second paragraph of the statement of the Government of the Netherlands, Japanese Government is prepared to take note of it.

付録 53 9月5日夜11時シーボルト大使より受領した日本代表の回答案
(ダレス特使起草)

In view of the constitutional legal limitations referred to by the Government of the Netherlands, the Government of Japan does not consider that the Government of the Netherlands by signing the Treaty has itself expropriated the private claims of its nationals so that, as a consequence thereof, after the Treaty comes into force these claims would be non-existent.

However, the Japanese Government points out that, under the Treaty, Allied nationals will not be able to obtain satisfaction regarding such claims, although, as the Netherlands Government suggests, there are certain types of private claims by Allied nationals which the Japanese Government might wish voluntarily to deal with.

付録 54 9月7日のオランダ代表の来簡

San Francisco, September 7, 1951.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I beg to draw the attention of Your Excellency to the paragraph in the address to President and Delegates of the Peace Conference I made yesterday, reading as follows:

"Some question has arisen as to the interpretation of the reference in article 14 (b) to "claims of Allied Powers and their nationals" which the Allied Powers agree to waive.

It is my Government's view that article 14 (b) as a matter of correct interpretation does not involve the expropriation by each Allied Government of the private claims of its nationals so that after the

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