

第二章 英米豫備交渉及帝國在外使臣ノ關係國側トノ折衝

第一節 英米豫備交渉ノ開始

第一項 勞働黨内閣ノ成立ト「ドーズ」新駐英米國大使ノ任命

「フリーヴァー」大統領ニ於テ既述ノ如ク軍備縮少ノ促進ヲ強調シ其ノ抱懷スル理想ヲ具體化スヘキ機會ヲ待望シツツアリシ折柄英國ニ於テハ五月二十日總選舉行ハレ其ノ結果豫テヨリ軍縮ノ達成ト國際關係殊ニ英米關係ノ改善ヲ力説シ來リタル（註）勞働黨大勝ヲ博シテ第一黨トナリ六月五日同黨首領「マクドナルド」ハ新内閣組織ノ大命ヲ拜シ越テ八日第二次勞働黨内閣ヲ組織スルニ至レリ

（註）勞働黨ハ千九百二十八年七月「勞働黨ト國民」(Labour and the nation)ナル小冊子ヲ發表シテ内外ニ互ル其ノ政策ヲ開示シ之ニ依リテ總選舉ニ臨ミタリ

其ノ「世界平和ノ六支柱」ト稱スル原則ノ頭初ニ軍縮問題ニ關スル左ノ二原則ヲ掲ケタリ

一、國際條約ニ依リテ國策ノ手段トシテノ戰爭ヲ拋棄シ國際聯盟ヲ通シテ國際協定ヲ商議スヘキコト

二、軍備ヲ國際的ニ協定シテ警察目的ニ必要ナル最少限度ニ縮少スヘキコト

尙總選舉ニ當リ軍備縮少宣言委員會ノ宣言（右委員會ハ二月末友人協會平和委員會ノ決議ニ基キ組織セラレタルモノニシテ該宣言ニハ「セシル」卿「バルファア」卿等各方面ノ有力者署名セリ）發表セラレタルニ對シ三大政黨ハ聲明書ヲ發シテ各其ノ態度ヲ明ニセルカ其ノ際勞働黨首領「マクドナルド」ハ「満足ナル軍備縮少條約締結ノ爲不戰條約ハ勿論直チニ其ノ基礎トシテ利用セラレサルヘカラス海洋自由ノ原則ノ問題ハ不戰條約調印及海軍力ノ發達ニ鑑ミ全然新シキ事態ニ入レルモノト思考ス英米間ニ完全ナル協定ヲ成立セシム

ルコトハ今ヤ可能ニシテ且直チニ協定セラレサルヘカラサルコトト信ス」ト述ヘ軍縮促進ノ必要ヲ力説セリ

「マクドナルド」新首相ハ組閣ノ日「ラヂオ」ヲ通シテ國民ノ勞働黨ニ對スル信任ヲ謝シ特ニ英米關係ノ改善ニ重キヲ置クコト及軍縮問題ヲ徹底的ニ進捗セシムル意圖ヲ有スルコトヲ明ニセリ（註）

（註）聲明原文左ノ如シ

In view, however, of the overshadowing importance of the problem of disarmament and the need for friendly discussion and agreement between the United States and other Powers and ourselves, I hope to be able to pay a short visit to Geneva at the opening of the next meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations. I shall also watch the American situation, because I feel it to be of such importance that no misunderstandings should exist between our two countries.

之ヨリ先米國ニ於テハ「フリーヴァー」大統領ハ前副大統領「チャールズ・ジョー・ドーズ」ヲ新ニ駐英大使ニ任命シタルカ偶々勞働黨ノ組閣トナルヤ同大使ハ海軍問題ニ關シ親シク大統領ト協議ヲ重ネタル上六月初旬「フシントン」ヲ出發シ赴任ノ途ニ就キタリ此ノ間ノ消息及情勢ノ前途ニ關シ六月十三日在英松平大使ハ左ノ如キ觀測及意見ヲ申報シ來レリ

「フリーヴァー」大統領カ「ドーズ」ノ如キ聲望アリ且其ノ性格ヨリ見テ外交生活ニ入ルヲ好ムヘシトモ思ハレサル人ヲ駐英大使トシテ立タシムルニ至リタルハ海軍問題ニ依リ生シタル面白カラサル英米關係ヲ徹底的ニ改善セントスル意圖ニ基クモノト思ハルル處右ノ空氣ハ英國側ニ於テモ一般ニ歡迎セラレ殊ニ「ギブスン」ノ聲明以來海軍問題解決ノ好機會到來セル如ク感シ居ル様子ニテ偶々勞働黨ノ組閣トナルヤ首相ハ既報ノ如ク英米關係ノ改善ニ重キヲ置クコトヲ聲明シ軍縮問題モ徹底的ニ進捗セシムル意圖ヲ明ニシタル以來當地新聞ハ首相自ラ米國ヲ訪問シ「フリーヴァー」大統領ト親シク軍縮問題ヲ議セントスル意思アル旨報シ居ル位ニテ「ドーズ」ノ着任後（六月十三日ノ豫定）早晚或ル形ニ於テ豫備的談合開始セラルルモノト思考ス尤モ新聞員ハ首相相相ヲ始メ事務引繼後間モナク休暇ヲ取り旅行中ニテ外相ノ如キモ漸ク來週ニ至リ

始メテ外交團ヲ接見スル如キ有様ニモアリ從テ如何ナル時機ニ於テ話ヲ始メルヤ又果シテ首相カ米國ヲ訪問スルヤ否ヤ等ハ何レ新外相ト「ドーズ」ト會見後ニアラサレハ決定セサルヘク又交渉開始セラレテモ結局ハ專門的話トナルヘキモノナルニ付容易ニ解決スヘシト思ハレサルモ「フーヴァー」ノ性質、労働黨ノ主義ヨリ見テ可ナリ徹底的ニ問題ヲ取扱フモノト思ハル然ラハ我方ニ於テモ本問題ニ付各種ノ情勢ニ應シ何時ニテモ我方ノ意見ヲ述ヘ得ル様準備アルコト肝要ナルヘシ右ハ既ニ御準備整ヒ居ルモノト存セラルルモ爲念申進ス尙英米ノ商議ニ付テハ本使ニ於テモ充分當局ト聯絡ヲ取ルヘキ處我方ノ主張及希望ノ要點ハ機會アル毎ニ早目ニ英米側ニ諒解セシメ置クコト緊要ナルカト存ス

第二項 米國ノ對軍縮方針ニ關スル「スチムスン」國務長官出淵大使會談

六月十一日駐米出淵大使ハ「スチムスン」國務長官ニ面會シ軍縮問題ニ關シ意見ヲ交換シタルカ其ノ際同大使ヨリ「軍縮問題ニ關スル米國政府ノ方針ハ是迄「キヤッスル」次官補トノ接觸ニ依リ大體承知セルカ本日ハ長官ヨリ直接腹藏ナキ御意見ヲ承リタシ」ト述ヘタル處長官ハ「フーヴァー」大統領ハ本問題ニ付テハ頗ル熱心ニテ先般聯盟軍縮準備委員會ノ際ニモ「ギブスン」ヲシテ特ニ提議セシムル所アリタルモ當時恰モ英國總選舉ヲ控ヘ討議意ノ如ク進行ヲ見ル事能ハサリシカ右選舉モ終了シ労働黨内閣ノ成立ヲ見ルニ至リタル處同内閣ハ少クモ保守黨内閣ヨリモ軍縮問題ヲ相談スルニハ好都合ト考ヘラレ又最近ノ英國輿論ヲ觀察スルニ之亦概シテ軍縮ニ賛成シ居ルカ如シ（長官ハ此ノ時最近ノ新聞紙ノ傳フル所ニ依レハ「マクドナルド」首相自ラ渡米セムトスル由ナルカ右ニ付テハ未タ何等公報ニ接セサルモ若シ實現セハ米國ハ固ヨリ之ヲ歡迎スル次第ナリト附言セリ）從テ此ノ機會ニ軍縮問題ノ進行ヲ計ル事得策トハ考フルモ如何ナル方法ニ依ルヲ適當トスルヤニ付テハ今以テ何等成案ナシ米國政府トシテハ本問題ニ最モ關係深キ日英兩國トハ常ニ密接ナル接觸ヲ持續シ腹藏ナク意見ヲ交換シ度シト思ヒ居ルニ付若シ日本政府ヨリ何等カノ名案ヲ示サルニ於テハ喜ンテ之ニ考慮ヲ加フヘシ」ト述ヘタリ

依テ出淵大使ヨリ「本國政府ニ於テハ先般「ギブスン」ヨリ所謂米國案ナルモノノ大要ヲ示サレタル關係モアリ無論研究

シ居ル事トハ思ハルモ實ハ「ジョーンズ」提督歸國ノ上ニテ「フォーミュラ」ヲ作成シ之ヲ提示スヘシトノ事ナリシ故折角之ヲ待チ居ル譯ナリ」ト述ヘタル處長官ハ「「ジョーンズ」カ「フォーミュラ」ノ作成ヲ急キ居ル事ハ事實ナルモ自分トシテハ米國案ナルモノヲ正式ニ關係國ニ提示シ之カ爲萬一ニモ同案ヲ強制セントスルモノナルカ如キ誤解ヲ生セン事ヲ恐レ居リ從テ米國案ヲ提示スル事ヲ氣兼ねシ居ル次第ナリ」ト語レリ

出淵大使ハ更ニ「日本ハ軍縮案ニ付固ヨリ熱心ナル贊成者ノ一ニテ今後凡ユル機會ニ於テ其ノ目的達成ノ爲協力ヲ辭セサルモ本問題ヲ議スルニハ何等カノ基礎案ヲ有スル事進行上便利ナルヘク「フォーミュラ」完成次第形式ノ如何ヲ問ハス成ル可ク速ニ示サレンコトヲ希望ス」ト述ヘタル處長官ハ稍躊躇シタル後「適當ノ時期ニ於テ米國案等ト云フ大袈裟ナル名稱ヲ附セス御參考迄ニ内示スル事ハ出來得ヘシ」ト答ヘタルニ付出淵大使ハ右機會ヲ利用シ「貴國ニ於テハ聯盟軍縮準備委員會ニテ更ニ本件討議ヲ續ケントノ積リナリヤ」ト質シタルニ長官ハ「自分ノ見ル所ニテハ準備委員會ハ海軍軍縮ニ關シテハ既ニ爲シ得ヘキ總テヲ爲シタルモノト認メラレ此ノ上同委員會ニテ研究セシムルモ結局要領ヲ得ルニ至ラサルヘシ軍縮問題ハ之ヲ專門家ノ手ニ委セハ到底解決ノ見込ナカルヘク結局ニ於テ夫々其ノ專門家ノ意見ヲ徵シ之ヲ基礎トシ政治的ニ何等カノ歸着點ヲ發見スル以外ニハ方法ナキ様思考ス」ト述ヘ「自分ハ今日ヨリ約一週間程休暇ヲ得テ「ニューヨーク」ニ赴キ歸華次第本問題ニ關シ大統領ト相談ノ上大體ノ方針ヲ決定スル等ナリ」ト語リタリ依テ出淵大使ハ「然ラハ長官カ大統領ト相談セラレタル後重ネテ御話ヲ承ルヘシ」トテ本會談ヲ打切りタリ

尙右會見ノ機會ニ於テ出淵大使ハ長官ニ對シ「日本ノ國論ハ補助艦問題ニ對シ五―五―三ノ比率適用ニ付反對アルハ御承知ノコトト存スルカ本日ハ比率問題ニ付論議セムトスル次第ニハ非サルモ補助艦ハ諸般ノ關係上主力艦ト趣ヲ異ニスル點篤ト考慮ニ入ラレタシ」ト述ヘタル處長官ハ「先般貴國立寄ノ際田中男爵ト腹藏ナク話合ヒタルコトモアリ日本側ノ意嚮ハ充分承知シ居レリ」ト語リタリ

第三項 英米豫備交渉ノ開始及我方トノ聯絡

「ドーズ」大使ハ六月十四日着任シ翌十五日信任狀捧呈ヲ了スルヤ組閣後「スコットランド」ノ郷里ニテ休養中ナリシ「マクドナルド」首相ト十六日「フォレス」ニ於テ會見シ海軍問題ニ關スル英米豫備交渉ヲ開始シタリ右會見ニ關シ首相ハ同日左記要旨ノ「コムミュニケ」ヲ發表セリ（註一）

『我等ハ米英間海軍問題ノ現狀ニ關シ非公式一般的且最モ満足ナル會談ヲ爲セリ「ドーズ」大使ハ火曜日「ビルグリムズ、クラブ」晚餐會ニ於テ本問題ニ言及スヘキコトヲ提言セルカ余モ亦略同時ニ「ロッシーマウス」ノ演説ニ於テ之ニ言及スヘシ本會談ハ海軍問題商議ノ端緒トシテ爲サレタルモノニシテ之ニ對シ他ノ海軍國ノ協力カ期待セラルル事ヲ茲ニ明瞭ニセシコトヲ欲ス』

十六日「マクドナルド」首相ト會談ヲ行ヒタル「ドーズ」大使ハ即夜歸倫ノ途ニ就キ十七日早朝我松平大使ニ至急會見ヲ申込ミタルカ兩大使ノ會談要領左ノ如シ

一、「ドーズ」大使ハ『自分來任ニ就テハ海軍問題ニ付大統領及國務長官ト熟議シタル結果「ジュネーヴ」會議カ失敗シタルハ何等委員各個人ノ罪ニ非スシテ要スル會議ノ方法ヲ誤リタル爲ナリ之ヲ成功セシムルニハ商議ノ方法ヲ變セサルヘカラストノ事ニ意見一致シ豫テ約束トナリ居ル火曜日（十八日）ノ「ロンドン」「ビルグリムズ、クラブ」晚餐會ニ於テ右ニ關スル意見ヲ演説スルコトニ決シ其ノ草稿モ三人ニテ練リタル次第ナルカ右演説草稿ヲ「マクドナルド」首相及貴大使ノ内覽ニ供シ何等修正又ハ附加スルヲ適當トセラルル點アリヤニ付御相談スルコトヲ適當ト認メ其必要上急遽信任狀ヲ捧呈シタル上昨日「マクドナルド」首相ヲ往訪シ又今朝ハ十一時ニ「ヘンダスン」外相ヲ往訪ノ事ニナリ居ルカソレ以前ニ斯ク取急キ貴大使ヲ來訪セル次第ニテ「マクドナルド」首相トノ長會談ニ於テハ何等交渉ニ入リタル次第ニ非ス其内容ハ今貴大使トノ會談ノ趣旨ト同シモノナリ』トテ演説ノ草稿ヲ松平大使ニ讀ミ聞カセ『右演説ノ趣旨ニ付テハ「マクドナルド」首相ハ同感ナル趣ニテ唯専門家ニ關スル言及ノ個所ニ自ラ數行筆ヲ加ヘ其ノ調子ヲ緩和シタリ』ト述ヘタリ

二、右ニ對シ松平大使ハ『貴大使カ英國側ニ對スル同様斯ク率直ニ相談セラレタルハ本使ノ甚タ欣幸トスル所ニシテ日本政府ニ於テモ多トスル所ナルヘシ』ト謝意ヲ表シタル後『右演説ノ内容ニ付テハ固ヨリ何等云フヘキ事ナシ』ト述ヘ尙『自分ハ今回大統領カ貴大使ノ如キ聲望家ヲ當國ニ送ラレタルハ英米間ノ問題ヲ此ノ際一掃セントスル大統領ノ決心ヲ語ルモノト解釋シ居タル次第ニテ英米關係ノ改善ハ日本政府ニ於テ望マシト思考スルハ勿論ナルモ率直ニ云ヘハ從來軍縮ノ爲英米兩國ト密接ナル關係ニ於テ協力シ來レル日本カ勢ヒ英米商議ノ圈外ニ置カルル事態ノ生セン事ヲ憂ヘ其事ハ「チェンバレン」前外相ニ對シテモ申入レ置キタル次第ナルカ（註二）今大統領及貴大使ノ態度ヲ承知シ安心シタリ今後其密接ナル聯絡ヲ希望ス』ト述ヘタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ『軍縮問題ノ解決ハ是非共日英米三國ノ協力ニ俟タサルヘカラス且此三國サハ協力セハ佛伊ハ多少騒クトモ結局之ニ追從シ來ルヘク自分來英ニ付テハ英國側ト同様日本側ト密接ニ聯絡ヲ執リ日本トノ協力ヲ計ルヘキ旨大統領ヨリ特ニ旨ヲ受ケタル次第ナルニ付今後其腹藏ナク貴大使ト意見ノ交換ヲ爲スヘシ』ト云ヒ尙國務長官ヨリノ來信ヲ松平大使ニ内示シタルカ右書信ニ依レハ海軍力比較ノ米國案ハ未タ完成セス完成次第送付スヘシトアリ「ドーズ」大使ハ『右送付越シ次第英國當局及貴大使ヘ手交スヘク之ニ付關係國ニ於テ各自國案ト比較研究ノ上意見ノ交換ヲ爲ス事然ルヘシ』ト述ヘ更ニ松平大使ヨリ『右意見交換ノ方法トシテ最近會議ニテモ開ク意嚮ナリヤ』ト尋ネタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ『右方法ニ付テハ未タ何等考ヘ居ラス其事ニ付テモ追テ協議シタシ』ト述ヘタリ

尙同日「ヘンダスン」外相新任ノ摺換ノ爲各國大公使ヲ各別ニ接見シタル際松平大使ヨリ外相ノ就任ヲ祝シタル後同盟ニ由來スル日英從來ノ密接ナル關係ニ言及シ今後其兩國ノ一層ノ親密ト協力トヲ希望シ當面ノ問題中支那問題ニ關シ日英米協調ノ望マシキコトヲ説キ海軍問題ニ關スル英米商議ノ成功ヲ希望スル次第竝ニ軍縮ニ付英米ト密接ニ協力シ來レル日本ノ立場ヲ述ヘ同大使ノ非公式ニ聞キタル所ニ依レハ米國側ニ於テハ右商議ニ付テハ日本側ト腹藏ナク充分聯絡ヲ取ル趣ナルニ付テハ英國側ニ於テモ同様聯絡ヲ取ラレンコトヲ希望スト述ヘタル處外相ハ一々首肯シ海軍問題ニ關スル商議ニ於テ

各國ノ協力ヲ希望スル次第ハ「ドーズ」大使トノ會談後ノ首相「コムミュニケ」ノ通ナリト述ヘタリ
(註一)

COMMUNIQUE.

We have had a conversation regarding the present position of the question of naval disarmament as between the United States and Great Britain. It has been informal and general and most satisfactory. His Excellency proposes to refer to this subjects at the Pilgrims' Dinner on Tuesday night, and I shall do the same almost at the same time at Lissiemouth. This is intended to be the beginning of the negotiations. We both wish to make it clear that the other Naval Powers are expected to cooperate in these negotiations, upon the successful consummation of which the peace of the whole world must depend.

(註二) 第二章第三節第五項(註二) 參照

第四項「ドーズ」大使ノ「ビルグリムズ、クラブ」ニ於ケル演説及

「マクドナルド」首相ノ「ロッシーマウス」ニ於ケル演説

斯クシテ「ドーズ」大使ハ六月十八日「ビルグリムズ、クラブ」晚餐會ニ於テ大要左ノ如キ演説ヲ爲シタリ(註一)

『ケロング、バクト』ノ批准ハ世界平和ノ國際討議ニ大變化ヲ及ホセリ目下第一ノ必要ハ世界平和ノ愛好者カ協力ニ依ルニ非サレハ其目的ヲ達シ得サルコトヲ深ク自覺シテ目的ニ進ムニアリ主要海軍國ハ速カニ海軍縮協定ニ達スルコトヲ急務トス

米國議會ハ二億五千萬弗以上ニ達スル海軍計畫ヲ可決シ軍縮協定成立セサレハ大統領ハ之ヲ實行スル外ナキ次第ナルカ米國豫算局長ノ豫算ニ依レハ大統領ノ軍縮政策ヲ採用セラレサル場合新艦建造費ノミニテ十一億七千八十万弗ニ達ス其ノ實行ノ場合他國モ之ニ從ハサルヘカラス十五年間ニ世界ノ不生産ノ費用負擔カ如何ニ大ナルヤハ之ヲ推察シ得ヘシ余ハ茲ニ云ハントスルハ軍縮商議將來ノ方法ノ變更ニ關スルモノニシテ軍縮達成ノ方法ニ付テハ人情ニ考量ヲ置カサル

ヘカラス對獨賠償問題ハ先ツ經濟專門家ヲシテ審議セシメ後ニ別ニ政治家カ審議スルコトニ依リ始メテ成功シタリ蓋シ政治家カ政治ト經濟問題トヲ調節シタルカ爲ナリ海軍專門家ハ海軍力比較ノ原則ヲ決定スルニ適スルモ之ヲ適用シテ軍縮ヲ實現スルニ適セス蓋シ彼等ハ人情上必然自國海軍ノ優勢ヲ希望スレハナリ然ルニ政治家ハ專門家ノ意見ニ聽クト共ニ世界平和ノ爲ニ策ヲ立ツルヲ義務トス故ニ各國ハ個々ニ專門家ヲシテ比較ノ尺度ヲ決定セシメ之ヲ實際ニ使用シ妥協點ヲ發見シ條約ノ成案ヲ得ルコトハ政治家ヨリ成ル委員ノ任務トスヘキナリ「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ失敗ハ委員ニ政治家ト專門家トヲ交ヘタル組織ノ缺陷ニ基因ス英米人ノ多數カ「ジュネーヴ」ニ於テ過失ヲ爲セリトノ自覺ニ於テ一致シ居ルハ喜フヘキ事實ナリ』

同日「マクドナルド」首相モ豫テノ打合せノ如ク「ロッシーマウス」ニ於テ演説シ先ニ「フォレス」ニ於テ發表シタル「コムミュニケ」ノ趣旨ヲ敷衍シ英米限リニテ問題ヲ決定シ之ヲ他國ニ押シ付ケントスルモノニアラスシテ他國トノ協調ニ重キヲ置クコトヲ力説セリ(註二)

右「ドーズ」大使及「マクドナルド」首相ノ演説ニ關スル各國新聞論調左ノ如シ

一、英 國

「ロンドン」各新聞ハ十九日孰レモ好意ヲ以テ之ヲ迎ヘ今次英米ノ會談ハ決シテ英米ノ同盟或ハ英米間ニ協調ヲ爲シテ其ノ決意ヲ他國ニ強ヒントスルカ如キコトヲ意味スルモノニ非サルコトヲ述ヘ「ドーズ」大使ノ提案ニ關シテハ米國現政府ノ「ビズネスライク」ノ政策ノ表明ニシテ停滯セル軍縮問題ニ一新機軸ヲ出スモノトシテ其ノ成功ヲ期待スト謂フニ一致シ居リタリ其中「タイムズ」ハ「ドーズ」氏ノ提案ハ「ドーズ」案ニ依リタル經驗ニ出ツルモノニシテ「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ失敗ハ明カニ政治家ト專門家トヲ混用スルコトノ非ナルヲ示スモノナリ勿論海軍縮ハ總テノ大海軍國ノ協調ニ依リ成立スヘキモノナルモ今日最大ノ困難ハ英米二國間協調不成立ニ存スルヨリ見テ此ノ兩國カ不戰條約ノ結果ヲ證明スヘキ最大ノ理由ト最容易ナル方法トヲ有スト論シ「テレグラフ」ハ「ドーズ」氏ノ提案ハ米政府ノ見解ヲ他國ニ

強制セムトスルモノニ非サルコトハ勿論ニシテ只軍縮ノ目的達成ノ最良ノ方法ヲ示シタルモノナリ同氏ノ提案ハ常識ニ最適合セルモノトシテ英國民ハ一般ニ之ヲ首肯スヘク他ノ國モ同様ナルヘシ英米二國ノミニ依リ事ヲ爲サントスルモノニ非サルコトハ「マクドナルド」首相ノ演説ニ依リテモ明カナルカ如ク二國ハ他國カ喜ンテ協調シ得ルカ如キ途ヲ準備セント努メ居ルニ過キスト述ヘ「ボースト」ハ「ドーズ」氏ノ演説ヲ以テ人道ト正義ノ精神ニ合スルモノト賞讃シ首相及「ドーズ」氏ノ演説ハ明カニ英米間ノ友誼ノ發露タルニ疑ナシト論シ「ガーディアン」ハ今ヤ新内閣ノ下ニ外交ハ舊態ヲ脱スヘキ時ニ入レリ首相ハ軍縮商議ヲ尋常外交商議ニ非ストノ信念ヲ國民ニ與フルニ於テ最善ヲ盡セリト論シ「ヘラルド」ハ今ヤ英米兩國間ニハ優劣ヲ競フノ疑念ハ殆ント重要性ヲ失ヒ友誼ト平和ノ確立トヲ求ムル進取的希望出現スルニ至レリト論セリ

尙二十日「テレグラフ」ハ外交記者ノ通信トシテ「ドーズ」大使ノ演説ハ熱誠ニシテ聴ク人ヲ動カシタルカ如キモ一般殊ニ外交官及議會方面ニ或ル程度ノ失望ヲ與ヘタルコトハ事實ナリ之ハ決シテ大使自身ノ罪ニ非サルモ大使力着英後急遽首相ヲ「フォレス」ニ往訪スル等ノ熱心ヲ示シ首相ハ其ノ往訪ヲ少シ買被リ一般モ兩氏ノ會見ニ於テ有形ノ合意カ成立セシナラント期待シタル丈ケ演説其ノモノカ拍子拔ケトナリシ形ニナレリ若シ同大使カ首相ヲ往訪セス直ニ右演説ヲ爲シタリシナランニハ其ノ與ヘタル印象ハ一層深キモノニアリシナラン又首相ハ英米間友情ノ排他的ナラサルコトヲ餘リニ強調シタル爲英米親善ヲ以テ英外交ノ第一義ト考ヘ居ル者ノ希望ト熱心トヲ挫カシムルノ結果トナレリ云々ノ記事ヲ掲ケ更ニ二十一日各新聞ハ「ドーズ」大使英首相ノ演説カ海外ニ與ヘタル印象ヲ報シ佛伊ニ於テハ非常ナル興味ヲ以テ其ノ發展ヲ注目シ居リ獨逸ニ於テハ海軍軍縮ニ始マリ引續キ陸軍軍縮ニ及ハンコトヲ希望シ居レル旨ヲ述ヘ日本ノ態度ニ關シテハ「タイムズ」ハ相當目立チタル場所ニ「コオベレーション、バイ、ジャパン」ナル標題ノ下ニ日本政府ハ海軍軍縮ニ關スル公正ニシテ實際のナル計畫ニハ何時ニテモ參加スルノ用意アル旨ヲ報シ又「テレグラフ」ハ同紙外交記者ノ記事トシテ今ヤ海軍軍縮ヲ實現スヘキ絶好ノ雰囲気ニアル理ナレハ此ノ機會ヲ失フヘカラスト論シタリ

二、米 國

二十日米國各新聞ハ一齊ニ「ドーズ」大使カ海軍軍縮問題ハ政治家カ專門家研究ノ結果ヲ徵シタル上解決ノ術ニ當ルヘキモノナリト述ヘタル點ヲ熱心ニ支持シ現在ノ場合本問題解決ノ氣運ヲ作ル事最必要ニシテ「ドーズ」大使及「マクドナルド」首相ノ演説ハ新見地ヨリセハ極メテ重要ナリトスルニ一致シ「ドーズ」大使ノ演説ノ結果直チニ全世界ニ軍縮カ行ハルルカ如キ奇蹟ハ望マレス大使ノ任務ハ地味ナルモ極メテ重大ニシテ米國政府ノ真意ヲ徹底セシメ以テ英米間ニハ戰爭ナシトノ考ノ下ニ軍縮問題ノ解決ニ着手シ他ノ海軍國モ之ニ參加セシムヘシトスルニ在リト爲シ「ニューヨーク、ウオールド」ハ專門家ヲシテ基礎案ニ關スル研究ノミニ携ラシムル事ハ結構ナルカ先ツ政治家間ニ基本的問題即チ「パリテ」ニ關スル協定ヲ作成セシムル事最良ナリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘ「シカゴ、トリビューン」ハ「ドーズ」大使ノ演説カ從來英米兩國間ニ存在セル蟠リヲ一掃シタルヲ慶賀シ海軍問題ニ關シ英米兩國カ諒解ヲ遂ケ世界ノ恒久平和及協調ニ盡力スヘキコトヲ希望シ米國ノ輿論モ一致シテ之カ目的達成ヲ支援スヘキ旨ヲ論シ更ニ「ドーズ」大使カ專門家ヲ不當ニ重要視スルノ不可ナル所以ヲ述ヘタル點ニ言及シ右意見モ然ルコト乍ラ「ワシントン」會議ニ於ケルカ如ク專門家ヲ不當ニ輕視スルモ亦宜シカラスト附言シ「シカゴ、デイリー、ニューズ」ハ今回ノ演説ハ文明諸國ノ等シク多大ナル興味ヲ以テ待望シ居タルモノナリトシ大使ノ率直ナル演説カ英國朝野ニ好感ヲ以テ迎ヘラレタルヲ慶フト共ニ英米海軍ノ均勢ハ蓋シ將來ノ軍縮會議ノ成功ニ缺クヘカラスト原則ナリト述ヘタリ

三、佛 國

「マクドナルド」首相ノ演説ニ關シテハ「タン」ハ英國首相ノ演説ニ依リ英米兩國ニ於テ他ノ關係國ヲ排除スルノ意圖無キコト明カトナレリト述ヘ「エコ、ド、バリ」ハ同演説中米國大使トノ會談ニ關スル部分ヲ指摘シ右ハ要スルニ先ツ英米間ニ妥協ヲ定メ然ル後他ノ關係國トノ商議ニ入ラントノ意味ヲ包含スルモノナリト論斷シ又「ドーズ」大使ノ演説ニ關シテハ各紙共同大使カ英米兩國海軍ノ平等ノ原則ヲ高調シ右實現不可能ノ場合ニハ米國ハ其麾下大ナル造艦計畫ヲ實行ス

ルノ外ナキ旨ヲ仄カセル點ヲ指摘シ軍縮會議ニ於ケル海軍専門家ノ權限ニ關スル大使ノ提案ニ付「タン」ハ各國國防上ノ立場孰レモ相違シ居ルニ顧ミ所謂戰闘力測定ノ標準決定ニ就テモ種々困難アルヘキモ兎ニ角本件提案ハ新ナル實際的方法ヲ示スモノナリト評シ「デバ」ハ各國海軍専門家ノ技術的豫備會議ヲ開催スル事然ルヘシト論シ「エコー、ド、バリ」ハ米國ハ結局大型艦ニ付英國ヨリモ優越ナル地位ヲ要求スル代リ小型艦ニ就テハ英國ニ讓步シ從來ノ主張ヲ緩和スルニ至ルヘシトノ觀測ヲ揭ケタリ

(註1)

THE FULL TEXT OF THE SPEECH OF AMBASSADOR CHARLES G. DAWES,
DELIVERED AT THE LONDON PILGRIMS DINNER ON JUNE 18, 1929.

We are in a period when mankind, emerged from its greatest cataclysm—the World War—is lifting its eyes from the darkness of the past toward the sunlight of international peace and tranquility. It is the era of effort for world construction—moral and material.

The ratification of the Kellogg Peace Treaty, which is the agreed upon expression of a world intention, has one of its first effects in a pronounced change in the form of the international discussion of the world's peace. The closing of the discussion upon the form of the expression of the principle, and the inception of the discussion of the practical methods by which to make it effective, prove the existence of the general determination to make the treaty not a mere gesture, but the foundation of an era of "Peace on earth and good will toward men."

The matter of first importance at the present time is that the friends of the world's peace move unitedly toward that objective with a clear understanding among themselves that any effort which is not a united effort is liable to be in effective and tending toward disintegration. To avoid confusion and delay endangering their common objective, they now should not only unitedly consider what steps should be taken toward it, but the order in which those steps are to be taken.

The question of an early agreement on naval reduction by the nations is of outstanding importance

at the present time, and it would seem to be the next step to be taken toward world peace. As to any other controverted questions between any nations or between Great Britain and the United States, their future peaceful settlement, either way, will not be endangered by the cessation of an enormously expensive naval competition in progress during their discussion.

Congress has already by law committed the United States to an immediate naval programme involving over \$250,000,000, giving, however, to the President the power to suspend it in the event of an international agreement for the limitation of naval armament.

On May 31 last the Secretary of State of the United States said: "I have in my possession a memorandum from the Director of the Budget showing the cost of the programme recommended by the Navy Department in case the policy of naval reduction which the President advocates is not adopted. That memorandum shows that the authorized and contemplated naval programme for the construction of new ships alone amounts to \$1,170,800,000. When it is borne in mind that the foregoing figures involve the construction programme of only one nation, and that if it proceeds other nations will be impelled to follow suit, the burden of unproductive expenditure which will be imposed upon the economic world during the next 15 years can be to a certain extent realized."

My address to-night concerns itself with suggestions as to a change in the method of future negotiations for naval disarmament. Agreement upon a method of negotiation must concern, from the very beginning, all interested naval Powers and should have not a partial, but a world, sanction. While in the course of the discussion I may refer to the principle of equality of naval power as between Great Britain and the United States, it is only because the outcome of previous conferences shows that this is the agreed policy of both Governments. My theme is what method of procedure had best be adopted to translate a policy of naval reduction into a fixed agreement between the nations—a step so important to the peace of the world and to the happiness hereafter of mankind.

Edmund Burke, in his "Observations on a Late State of the Nation," once made a profound remark about politics which he could have made with equal truth of law, of governmental systems, and of dealings

with international relations of all kinds, including methods of negotiation for reparation settlements or reduction in naval armament, "Politics," said he, "ought to be adjusted not to human reasonings but to human nature, of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part."

The long time which elapsed after the ending of the Great War before a proper method of negotiation for reparation settlements was evolved was because the first method was adjusted to human reasoning and not to human nature. That method was to have the recommended settlement prepared by the continuing and concurrent work of economic experts and statesmen combined.

Since the reparation settlement involved, in each one of the nations interested, both an economic and a political problem, it was reasonable to suppose that it would be best determined by the joint effort of statesmen and of economists working together. This futile effort continued so long before its abandonment that all Europe was brought to the brink of economic and political chaos. And then only, in the latter part of 1925, did the Reparations Commission as an experiment decide upon the separate formation of the First Committee of Experts. This expedient, viewed at that time as almost hopeless by most economists and entirely so by most politicians—then designated by one great member of the Reparations Commission as the "prescription of a pill for an earthquake"—proved successful.

The formation of that Committee was not a triumph of intellect—it was the triumph of despair. It was adopted because nothing else had worked. Its success was due to its unconscious but proper adjustment to the law of human nature. What happened thereafter demonstrated that by accident the world had discovered that the proper method of settling an international problem, involving a separate economic and political problem in each country, was to use independent experts whose suggestions were their interpretation of the correct and fundamental economic principles involved in the situation, their formula then to be handed over to the statesmen, who, reinforced by general public confidence in the impartiality of expert opinion, could better bring the respective public sentiments into acceptance of the necessary working compromise between political expediency and economic principles.

In committees formerly composed of collaborating statesmen and economists, the economists had always

stood rigidly for conclusions endangering the statesmen and the acceptance of the Plan, and the statesmen for conclusions which would nullify the economists and endanger the success of the Plan. Under such circumstances the arrival at a constructive compromise was well-nigh impossible. The method was not adjusted to the law of human nature.

Economic and technical problems are one thing—governmental and political problems another. The rigid attitude and determined expressions of international economic and technical specialists as to the inviolability and sacredness of technical principle is perhaps praiseworthy, but we must remember that these expressions are often incident to a doubtful embodiment of them in a personal interpretation of their applicability to international political situations, of which the experts are not always competent diagnosticians.

One who is inclined to believe that economists and technicians, claiming to be guided in their intellectual voyages by the stars and compasses and high lighthouses of fixed principles, never compromise, as do the alleged unworthy politicians, is lacking in experience in international economic negotiations. For six years after the War the unhappy Reparations Commission, besides its other misfortunes, was surrounded by an army of economic experts representing the different nations interested in the problem. These experts delivered innumerable written ultimatums as to the correct economic principles which underlay their divergent recommendations which filled vast untouched libraries and now moulder in their unfulfilled dust. The disagreements of these experts with each other, each swearing devotion to infallible principle, was as complete and overwhelming as those which characterized the deliberations of the supposedly less worthy, entirely confused, but fully as determined politicians and statesmen.

I remember during the last two weeks of deliberation on the part of the First Committee of Experts appointed by the Reparation Commission that, as the inside expert Committee was labouring with the formulation of its conclusions, almost all of them more or less the result of a compromise, they faced a snow-storm of protesting papers filled with the voluminous but disagreeing economic advice of outside experts removed from the field of negotiation.

What I have said has a most direct bearing upon the question of the method of conducting the great

negotiation for naval disarmament soon justify to occupy the attention of the world. The question is how best to adjust the methods of negotiation to accord with the laws of human nature so that a successful outcome, so vital to the welfare of the world, may not be unnecessarily endangered.

International naval reduction is a task the successful accomplishment of which requires the cooperative employment of two distinctly unrelated talents—that of naval technical experts and of statesmen.

Important as is a preliminary expert examination of economists to report to the statesmen on an international problem involving both an economic and political phase, it is even more important where naval technicians and statesmen confront a problem involving both a technical and political phase. But here we must keep in mind the law of human nature. In the case of a preliminary use of economic experts, their prime objective is a formula which will recognize the dominance of economic law, and the success of the statesmen in reaching the second objective of accommodating the expert formula to the political conditions in the respective countries is something as much desired by the economic experts as by the statesmen themselves. That later achievement only will crown with success the preliminary expert effort. This attitude has recently been twice demonstrated. So anxious was the first Economic Committee of Experts, Reparations Commission in 1924, that their report should be the basis of a successful settlement that they were engaged continually during their work in adjusting the form of their statement to expected political repugnance.

It was their constant endeavour to frame their conclusions in such language as would make them easily understood and be as inoffensive from a political standpoint as was possible. This effort to adjust economic necessity to political expediency led them to many collateral individual conferences for advice from European statesmen during their work. As a result, when the report of the First Committee of Experts was delivered to the statesmen of the London Conference, the latter found it unnecessary to change the Plan, but only to supplement it by collateral international agreements relating to it, making it politically acceptable to all the nations concerned. And thus it was with the world-important report of the Second Committee of Experts just completed. It was their intense desire to have a constructive outcome of their work, as much as because the work itself was a diplomatic as well as an expert employment, that led them

to consult constantly with the leading European statesmen during their epoch-making labours. This desire on the part of these Economic Committees accorded with the law of human nature. But in the case of technical experts, working for a formula for naval equality, the law of human nature runs contrary to such an attitude. It would be vastly more difficult, other things being equal, for a mixed commission of navy technicians and statesmen to agree on a plan for naval disarmament than for a mixed commission of economists and statesmen to agree upon a reparations settlement, practically impossible as history has shown the latter to be.

A naval expert is qualified to define accurately the principles which should determine abstract naval equality, but the law of human nature decrees that his opinion is relatively not as safe in a programme which he formulates as a practical interpretation of those principles applied to a partial destruction of his own navy. The proper pride of a naval officer's life is his navy. His whole professional career impels him to think of a navy only in terms of victory. He not only instinctively feels, but he is rightly taught to feel, that he must strike not for equal navies, but for a superior navy. It is difficult for him to forget that with a superior navy, victory is probable, with an equal navy doubtful, with an inferior navy almost hopeless. Other things being equal, I fear no naval officer ever inherently favours equality.

The naval officer has his duty to perform to his State, and it is primarily to secure it against attack. He therefore trusts to his ships and his armament. It is the duty of the statesmen to remove from his State the danger of attack. Upon the latter primarily lies the duty of peace-making, and in these negotiations he must hold the initiative. He is the one to build up the new order and to start the new policy, guided as he goes by the advice of those competent and patriotic naval experts who serve him. What differences there are in their respective duties can be coordinated into a policy of statesmanship, and that alone is what I have in mind in what I now say.

I have no knowledge of the qualifications and record of any naval officers heretofore engaged in these negotiations, or acquaintance with them. I am concerned only that the methods under which this work is to be done, whoever may do it, shall be adjusted to the laws of human nature.

At the beginning of the work the contribution of the naval experts to the problem should be a definition of abstract equality. It is certainly possible for naval experts to arrive at a definition for evaluation of fighting strength of ships. Thus, for instance, one might find a yardstick with which to determine the military value of individual ships. These ships might differ in displacement, size of guns, age, speed, and other characteristics, and yet such an agreed properly weighted value might be given to each of these differing characteristics as to make it possible to compare, for example, the cruiser fleets of two navies, and establish a parity between them. If naval experts rise to the proper sense of their responsibility, the use by statesmen of their yardstick will not be one which will invite peril from those extreme pacifists and extreme militarists who form the "lunatic fringe."

But, again, in connexion with the method of preparing the naval yardstick, let us consider the law of human nature. Should a Commission composed of the representatives of each Navy concerned meet to reach agreement upon this yardstick, they would be asked to agree upon something the use of which will reduce in number the idols of their hearts—the ships of their navies. I am casting no reflection here upon naval officers when speaking of the law of human nature which subconsciously influences the actions of all mankind; learned or ignorant, good or bad, rich or poor, skilled or unskilled, great or humble, old or young, of every race and nationality of the world.

I have already spoken of the fallibility and lack of agreement of expert and economic opinion as exemplified by the experience of the Reparations negotiations. I will say, frankly, that from a commission of naval experts of the respective nations meeting together and called to evolve a final definition of the naval yardstick, I personally should expect a failure to agree.

It would seem that, to adjust to human nature the method of arriving at naval reduction, each Government might separately obtain from their respective naval experts their definition of the yardstick and then the inevitable compromise between those differing definitions, which will be expressed in the final fixation of the technical yardstick, should be made by a committee of statesmen of the nations, reinforced from the beginning by those separate expressions of abstract technical naval opinion and able again to seek further

naval advice, if necessary, before the final fixation.

These statesmen should further be the ones to draw up for the world the terms of the final agreement upon naval reduction, which should be couched in those simple terms understandable to the ordinary man in the street, which, while the pet aversion of the casuist, are the highest expression of true statesmanship. That final agreement, covering the quantitative dispositions, will go to the nations for approval or rejection.

If this should be the outcome, let those entrusted with the last draft of the conclusions of the last Conference be men born with the faculty of clear and concise statement, for that document must appeal to the composite will of the peoples of the nations, and in order to make the proper appeal it must be read generally and understood.

There, again, we remember the operations of the law of human nature, and will hope that in these men the temptation to show erudition be subordinated to writing that which, while properly covering the cause, may be understood by the audience. A clear statement of the cause, understandable by all, should mean success.

And here let me anticipate the possible comments of those whom we have always with us on both sides of the ocean—the social purveyors of the trivial in international discussion who talk so continually about good relations and do so little to forward them.

In all I have said to-night I intend nothing in derogation of the absolute necessity for the consideration and presentation of the naval side of this question by its ablest experts the world over, and, on the other hand, nothing in derogation or the absolute necessity of bringing to the political side of it the highest qualities of statesmanship which the world can provide. But to properly solve the problem we must adopt a method which brings the full weight of both of these classes of men to bear upon it, without their unnecessary collisions during the first formulating period when they are primarily concerned with two separate objectives.

Again, and also anticipating certain comment, let me say that while it is the fashion of these sensational days to attribute of both countries—while decorated by reason, is based under the providence of God

upon fundamental human instincts and a commingling of the blood.

In these circumstances, let us be hopeful for the cause of world peace and the progress of civilization; for in the joint hands of these same English-speaking peoples rests not only their secure guarantee, but as well the ark of the covenant of human freedom.

(註1)

CHIEF POINTS OF MR. MACDONALD'S SPEECH AT LOSSIEMOUTH

ON JUNE 18, 1929.

General Dawes and I found each other taking the same general view of world-peace.

We did not meet to threaten other nations, to dominate other peoples, nor indeed did we meet to form alliances and pacts. We have no intention of presenting to the other nations an accomplished fact which they can take or leave.

There are obstacles to be surmounted, differing interests to be reconciled, some historical inheritances to be soothed, and rivalries which are legitimate to be confined to their proper channels—such considerations, for instance, as those mentioned by Mr. Churchill the other day to be studied and adjusted.

第五項 「マクドナルド」首相訪米説ト其ノ真相

労働黨内閣成立直後「マクドナルド」首相カ既述ノ如ク特ニ英米關係ノ改善ニ重キヲ置クコトヲ聲明シ且海軍縮小問題ヲ徹底ノ促進セシムヘキ意圖ヲ有スルコトヲ明カニシテ以來英國諸新聞ハ首相自ラ米國ヲ訪問シ「フーヴァー」大統領ト親シク軍縮問題ヲ議セントスル意思アル旨ヲ報シ右報道ハ同國輿論ニ依リ好意的支持ヲ受ケタルカ一方米國ニ於テモ一般ニ歡迎的口調ヲ以テ迎ヘラレ六月十一日「ワシントン」通信ハ「ホワイト、ハウス」初メ米國官憲ニ於テハ「マクドナルド」首相ニシテ訪米ニ決スル場合米國側ニ於テ欣然之ヲ歡迎スヘキ旨ヲ述ヘタル外公報未到ノ故ヲ以テ何等意見ノ表示ヲ避ケ居ルモ政府側ハ十四日「ロンドン」着ノ筈ナル「ドーズ」新大使ヨリノ報告ヲ待チ居ル模様ナル旨ヲ報シタリ

六月十二日松平大使ハ「リンゼー」外務次官ニ面會シ右報道ノ真偽ヲ質シタル處同次官ハ「前内閣時代ニ「ボールドウィン」首相自ラ本年秋頃米國ヲ往訪シ軍縮問題ヲ商議シテハ如何トノ話アリタル事アリ軍縮ニ付テハ「マクドナルド」新首相ハ單ニ制限ニ止マラス縮少ヲ行ハサルヘカラストノ豫テノ意見ナルニ付將來右ノ如キ事ナシトハ斷定出來サルモ自分ハ新首相ノ意圖ヲ未タ承知スル處ナシ」ト答ヘタリ

其後六月十九日「シカゴ、デイリー、ニューズ」記者「エドワード、ベル」ナル者松平大使ヲ來訪シ「自分ハ「フーヴァー」大統領ト惡意ノ間ナルカ大統領ハ英米ノ關係ノ面白カラサルコトヲ心配シ之カ徹底ノ改善ヲ希望シ居リ其ノ極メテ非公式ノ指示ヲ受ケ三ヶ月程前ヨリ英國ニ來リ居ル次第ナル」旨ヲ述ヘ英米交渉ニ關スル我方ノ意見ヲ尋ネタルコトアリシカ其際松平大使ヨリ「マクドナルド」首相訪米ノ風説ニ關シ質問シタル處「ベル」ハ「前内閣時代ニ「ボールドウィン」首相ハ米國往訪ノ意ヲ有シ居リタルカ唯大統領ヨリ招待狀ヲ出スコトハ或ハ呼付クル形トナリ極メテ機微ニシテ萬一拒絶セラルルコトアリテハ面白カラサルニ付要ハ先ツ以テ首相ニ充分其意アルコトヲ確ムル必要アリト考ヘ居タル次第ナルカ現首相カ其意ヲ有スルコトハ判明シタルモ其ノ訪問ハ時期ノ問題ニシテ未タ確定シタルモノニ非ス」ト答ヘタリ

「ベル」トノ會見後松平大使ハ「ドーズ」大使ヲ往訪シ本件ニ關スル同大使ノ所見ヲ尋ネタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ極秘トシテ「先般來「エドワード、ベル」ナル新聞記者渡英シ居リ頻リニ「ボールドウィン」首相ノ米國行ヲ勸誘シ其後新首相ノ米國行ヲ慫慂シ居タル様子ナリシカ自分カ過日「ワシントン」ニ赴キタル際同人ヨリ大統領ニ對シ英國首相ニ渡米ノ招待ヲ發センコトヲ勸告シ來リ居リ大統領ヨリ自分ノ意見ヲ求メラレタルカ自分ハ是程ノ愚策ナカルヘシト即答シ「マクドナルド」首相自身渡米ヲ希望スルニ於テハ之ヲ受クル方法ヲ考ヘサルヘカラサルモ目下ノ狀態ニ於テ英國首相及「カナダ」首相カ來米スルコトハ徒ニ世間ノ疑惑ヲ招クノミニシテ益ナシトノ意見ヲ述ヘ置キタルカ今回「マクドナルド」首相トノ會見ニ於テモ此ノ話出テタルニ付目下ノ狀態ニ於テ渡米セラルルハ面白カラス之カ實行ハ軍縮問題解決ノ後ヲ可トスヘキ旨意見ヲ述ヘ置キタリ」ト述ヘ「マクドナルド」首相訪米説ノ出所及「ドーズ」大使トノ會見後本件ニ對スル首相ノ口調カ變リ

タル理由ヲ明カニシタリ「ドーズ」大使トノ右會談ハ同時ニ大統領ニ於テハ主トシテ同大使ヲ海軍問題ノ解決ニ當ラシムルモノニアラサルカトノ印象ヲ與ヘタリ

第二節 英米内交渉我方參加方ニ關スル提議

第一項 「ドーズ」大使ノ日英米三國交渉案及我方ヨリノ主動的提案總論

六月二十一日米國國務省ハ駐白大使「ギブスン」ヲ來週倫敦ニ派シ「ドーズ」大使ト軍縮問題ニ付協議シ特ニ聯盟軍縮準備委員會ニ於ケル同問題ノ現狀ヲ報告セシムルコトトセル旨發表セルカ六月二十三日「ドーズ」大使ヨリ「ギブスン」明夕「ロンドン」到着軍縮問題ニ關シ次ニ執ルヘキ手續ヲ協議スヘク二十五日ニハ更ニ「マクドナルド」首相ト會見ノ約アルニ付其以前ニ協議シタキコトアリ」ト申越シタルヲ以テ松平大使ハ二十四日「ドーズ」大使ト會見シタル處同大使ハ「スチムスン」國務長官ヨリ「ギブスン」ヲ派遣スヘキニ付篤ト協議ノ上軍縮問題ニ付執ルヘキ手段ヲ申出アリ度キ旨申越セル書翰ヲ示シ「尙自分ノ考トシテハ海軍作製ノ表ノ來ルヲ待タス此ノ際「マクドナルド」首相ト大體ノ事ニ關シ話ヲ進メタキ處英米ノミニテ話ヲ開始スルヨリ貴大使モ列席セラレ如何ナル方法ヲ執ルヤニ付寧ロ日本側ヨリ發案セラルルコト都合好シト思考ス例ヘハ假リニ自分ヨリ何等カ案ヲ出セハ或ハ國ヲ賣ルモノナリトノ批難ヲ起ス虞モアリ英國側ニ於テモ亦同様ノ不便アルニ付寧ロ日本ヨリ「イニシアチブ」ヲ執リ「サジェスト」セラルコト然ルヘキカト思考ス然ラハ日本ノ「プレスティジ」ノ上ヨリ見ルモ都合ナルヘキカト思考セラル」ト述ヘ同時ニ國務長官ニ發シタル電報ヲ讀ミ聞カセタルカ其ノ要旨ハ英米交渉ニ松平大使ヲ參加セシムルコト然ルヘキ旨記載シアリタリ依テ松平大使ハ其好意ヲ深謝シ「右ハ頗ル重大ノ義ニシテ實ハ先般御話ノ筋ハ一々報告シ居ルモ政府ヨリ何等本使ノ心得トナルヘキコトヲ申來ラサルニ付右ノ御話ニ對シテハ自分一己トシテ何等回答致シ難キニ付早速本省ニ請訓スヘシ」ト述ヘタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ「右ハ全ク自分丈ノ思付ニ付何レ「マクドナルド」首相トモ相談ノ上更メテ協議スヘシ」ト述ヘタリ尙松平大使ハ「日本ノ「サジェス

ト」スヘキ方法トハ如何ナルコトヲ意味セラルルヤ」ト問ヒタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ「自分モ何等思付ハナシ先ツ「ギブスン」カ來英シタル上種々話ヲ聞キ然ル上「ギブスン」ト共ニ貴大使ヲ訪ヒ先ツ下相談ヲ致スヘシ「マクドナルド」首相ニハ明二十五日「ギブスン」ヲ伴ハスシテ會見ノ積リナリ「ギブスン」ハ自分ノ必要ト認ムル丈「ロンドン」ニ置ク積リナリ佛伊トノ關係ニ付テハ餘程注意ヲ拂ハサルヘカラサルモ最初ヨリ共ニ入レテ話ヲスルトキハ徒ニ議論ヲ生シ面白カラスト考フ假ニ協議カ日英米三國間ニ成立セリトセハ佛伊ノ參加ハ望マシキモ若シ面倒ノ存スル場合ニハ三國限ニテ條約ヲ成立セシムルモ可ナリト思フ」ト言ヒ尙松平大使ハ本日ノ新聞ニハ「ニューヨーク」通信ニ日、英、米、佛、伊ノ海軍專門家會議今秋「ジュネーヴ」ニ於テ開催セラルヘシトノ情報ヲ掲ケ居ルモ右ハ根據アリヤト尋ネタル處「ドーズ」大使ハ「馬鹿氣タル妄説ナリ」トテ一笑ニ附シタリ

尙「ドーズ」大使ハ右會談ノ際海洋自由問題ニ付過日「ロッシーマウス」ニ於テ「マクドナルド」首相トノ間ニ作成シタル覺書ヲ示シタルカ其ノ要旨ハ海洋自由問題ヲ軍縮問題ト同時ニ議論スルコトハ混雜ト遲延ト來スヘキニ付海洋自由問題ノ討議ハ後廻シトシ先ツ重要ナル軍縮問題ヲ提議スヘシト云フニアリタリ

第二項 右ニ對スル松平大使所見及請訓

上述ノ如キ「ドーズ」大使申出ニ對シ松平大使ハ左ノ通其ノ所見ヲ具申シ右ニ對スル帝國政府ノ訓令ヲ求メタリ

「ドーズ」大使ノ態度ハ最初ヨリ極メテ率直ニシテ日本ニ對シテ特ニ好意ヲ示シ居ルコトハ累次ノ電報ニ依リ御承知アルヘキ通ナルカ右申出ハ果シテ米國政府ニ於テ同意シ來ルヘキヤ又「マクドナルド」首相ニ於テ承知スヘキヤ本使ニ於テ疑ヒ居ルモ假ニ双方共同意シ改メテ本使ニ參加ヲ求メタル場合ニ如何ニ處スヘキヤ御回訓煩ハシ度右ニ關シ左ニ心付ノ點御考慮ニ入レタシ

一、「ドーズ」ノ考ニテハ會議ノ形式ニ依ラス唯「マクドナルド」首相ト「ドーズ」ハ是迄「ヘンダスン」外相ヲ出シ抜キ居ル形トナリ居リ稍々機微ノ點アルヲ以テ矢張り外相モ相談中ニ入ルルコトトナルヘシト云ヘリ」同大使「ギブスン」