

ル願望ノ表明ニシテ從テ其ノ價值ハ條文ノ法律の解釋ニ存セス寧ロ條約ノ精神の道德的及政治的意義ニ存スルモノナリトハ「クログ」國務長官初メ米國朝野ノ屢々力説セル所ナリ而シテ米國ニ於ケル不戰ノ觀念ノ確立ハ惹イテ「フーヴァー」新大統領ノ所謂「制限」ヨリ「縮少」ノ觀念ノ樹立即チ新軍縮政策ノ宣明トナリ更ニ「ロンドン」海軍會議ニ於ケル軍縮交渉ノ出發點トナルニ至レリ

第五節 米國政府ノ新軍縮政策

第一項 第六回聯盟軍縮準備委員會ニ於ケル「ギブスン」聲明

千九百二十九年（昭和四年）三月四日米國ニ於テ「フーヴァー」大統領就任スルヤ豫テヨリ軍縮達成ノ熱心ナル主唱者タリシ新大統領ハ其ノ就任ノ演說ニ於テ不戰條約ヲ締結セル以上大ナル軍備制限ニ到達スルノ途ヲ開拓スヘク吾人ハ世界ニ向テ真摯ニ之ヲ提議スルモノナリト述ヘ（註一）前節所述ノ如ク米國政府ニ於テハ不戰條約ノ精神ヲ擴充シテ軍縮問題解決方ニ對シ何等カノ具體的措置ニ出ツルニアラスヤトノ印象ヲ與ヘタリ

（註一）

The recent treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy sets an advanced standard in our conception of the relations of nations. Its acceptance should pave the way to greater limitation of armament, the offer of which we sincerely extend to the world.

果シテ米國政府ハ同年四月二十二日第六回聯盟軍縮準備委員會席上同國代表「ギブスン」ヲシテ軍縮問題殊ニ海軍問題ニ關シ左記要旨ノ一般の聲明ヲ爲サシメタリ（註二）

一、軍縮條約案第一讀會ニ於テハ各國代表自説ヲ主張スルコト當然ナルヘキモ第二讀會ニ入テハ各國ハ夫々自國ノ爲シ得ヘキ最大ノ讓歩ヲ示スヘク然ラスンハ單一ノ條約案ニ達スルコト不可能ナルヘシ

二、陸軍問題ハ寧ロ之ヲ他ノ主要關係國ノ論議ニ讓リ米國代表トシテハ實際上協定ノ成立ヲ容易ナラシムヘキ一切ノ讓歩

ヲ爲スニ吝ナラス

三、海軍問題ニ關シテハ

（イ） 米國政府ハ海軍軍縮ノ最簡單、公平且實際の方法ハ艦種別制限ニアリト從來ノ見解ヲ保持スルモ他國ニ於テ之カ受諾ヲ難シトスルモノアルニ鑑ミ各種ノ妥協案ヲ發見スルニ努メタリ就中佛國代表カ第一讀會ノ際提出セル妥協案ニ其後非公式ノ會談ニ於テ提議セラレタル如ク主力艦及大型航空母艦以外各艦種別間ニ一定百分比ノ融通ヲ認ムルノ修正ヲ加ヘタル案ハ之ヲ討議ノ基礎トシテ受諾シ得ルノ用意アリ

（ロ） 米國政府ハ自國案又ハ佛國案其他ノ案ノ一般の受諾ヲ容易ナラシムヘキ補足的方法就中海軍力ノ比較測定ニ當リ排水量以外ノ要素モ參酌スルノ方法ヲ考慮セントス即チ各艦種ニ含マルル個艦ハ能力上著シク相違セル特性ヲ有スルモノナルニ依リ各艦種ニ對スル相對的噸數ヲ衡量スルニ當リ前記個艦ノ能力ヲ左右スヘキ艦齡、單艦排水量、砲口徑等ノ要素ヲ考慮ニ入レントスルニ在リ而シテ米國政府ハ此等比較標準ニ關シテハ既ニ充分ナル研究ヲ遂ケタリ從テ米國代表ハ本委員會ニ於テ何時ニテモ本問題討議ノ用意アリ

（ハ） 以上ハ軍縮ノ方法ニ關スル第二義の問題ニシテ要ハ軍縮ノ實際的遂行ニアリ而シテ不戰條約ノ締結ニ依リ軍縮事業ハ會テ見サル絶好ノ機會ニ遭遇セル今日吾人ハ軍備制限ト云フカ如キ消極的態度ヲ捨テ積極的ニ軍備ノ大減縮ニ向テ邁進セサルヘカラス米國政府ハ既ニ三國會議ノ際ニモ各國ノ保有スヘキ一定ノ噸數ヲ提議スルト共ニ會議參加國ニ關シ現存條約ノ相對的現狀ヲ維持スヘキ更ニ低キ噸數ヲモ受諾スルノ用意アル旨ヲ宣言シタルカ今尙右態度ニ變更ナシ（ニ）軍縮ハ例外ナク一切ノ艦船ニ及ボササルヘカラス此點ハ英佛妥協案ニ關スル米國政府ノ對英回答中ニモ明カニシ置キタル所ナリ

（ホ） 右米國政府ノ對軍縮態度ハ各國海軍力ノ需要ヲ以テ相對的ナリトスルノ信念ニ基クモノニシテ今ヤ「ワシントン」條約締約國ヲ脅カスヘキ海軍力ノ他ニ存スルモノ無ク又締約國相互ニ於テモ巨大ナル現存海軍力ヲ維持スヘキ何等ノ

必要ナキニ當リ此ノ友好的關係ヲ基礎トスル常識的軍縮協定ノ成立セサル理由毫モナシ

上掲ノ如ク米國新政府ノ軍縮ニ對スル新政策ノ要點ハ陸軍ニ關シテハ從來ノ主張ヲ固執セスシテ妥協的態度ニ出テ單ニ制限ニ止マラスシテ重要ナル縮少ヲ爲スト同時ニ海軍國間ニ一定ノ比率ヲ保持セムトスルニアルコト並ニ海軍問題ニ關シテハ總テ軍縮備準委員會ヲ通シテ事ヲ爲サムトスル意嚮ヲ示シタルコト等米國從來ノ態度ニ照シテ注目ニ價スルモノアリタリ

(註11)

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON (United States of America)—Mr. President, before making the declaration which I desire to make on behalf of my Government, I should like to take this opportunity to pay a tribute to the very important and helpful statement made by Lord Cushendun at our sixth meeting. It is encouraging and refreshing to hear a statement in this generous spirit, and I hope I may be able to contribute in like manner to the successful conclusion of our labours.

I have sought your permission to make a general statement of the views of my Government in regard to the question of disarmament, and have felt warranted in doing so at this stage of the proceedings because, while we have not entered upon a second reading of the draft Convention, we are bringing up for reconsideration various questions which have been previously discussed. It is felt, therefore, that, in view of certain changed conditions, it may facilitate the approach to these questions if I am permitted to take this occasion for stating my Government's views as to the means best calculated to promote an early agreement.

During the first reading of the draft Convention, it was the duty of each one of us to put forward the views of his Government on the various problems before the Commission, to urge them upon his colleagues and endeavour to persuade them that those views should be adopted. It was only in this way that we were able to throw full light upon the complicated questions the solution of which we seek. When we come to the second reading, however, a renewal of the old discussions is no longer in order. Our first duty

is for each one of us examine all phases of the problem before us with a view to discovering what measures of concession can be offered by each delegation. Agreement upon a single text can be achieved only by a maximum of such concession.

For the purposes of my presentation this morning, the disarmament problem may be divided into two parts, land and naval armaments. As regards land armaments, the American delegation will be able, when we reach this question in our discussion, to defer to the countries primarily interested in land armaments with such measure of concession as I trust will materially facilitate agreement between them.

My country's defence is primarily a naval problem. The American Government has found no reason for modifying its view that the simplest, fairest and most practical method is that of limitation by tonnage by categories—a method which has been given practical and satisfactory application in the Washington Treaty. While it is realised that this does not constitute an exact and scientific gauge of strategic strength, we have nevertheless found that it constitutes a method which has the advantage of simplicity and of affording to each Power the freedom to utilise its tonnage within the limitation of each category according to its special needs.

The American delegation has urged this view throughout the first reading, but, in view of the inacceptability to some other delegations of our unmodified thesis, my Government has sought, in the various methods presented, some solution which might offer the possibility of compromise and general acceptance. It will be remembered that, during the third session of the Preparatory Commission, the French delegation brought forward a method which was an attempt to combine its original total tonnage proposals with the method of tonnage by categories. Under this method, a total tonnage was assigned to each nation and this total divided among categories of ships by specified tonnages. If I am not mistaken, certain modifications were suggested, in informal discussions, so as to provide that the tonnage allocated to any given category might be increased by a certain percentage to be agreed upon, such increase to be transferred from any other category or categories not already fixed by existing treaty.

In the hope of facilitating general agreement as to naval armaments, my Government is disposed

to accept the French proposal as a basis of discussion. It is, of course, the understanding of my Government that this involves an agreement upon the method alone and not upon any quantitative tonnages or the actual percentages to be transferred from one category to another. All quantitative proposals of any kind should properly be reserved for discussion by a Final Conference.

My Government is disposed to give full and friendly consideration to any supplementary methods of limitation which may be calculated to make our proposals, the French thesis, or any other, acceptable to other Powers, and, if such a course appears desirable, my Government will be prepared to give consideration to a method of estimating equivalent naval values which takes account of other factors than displacement tonnage alone. In order to arrive at a basis of comparison in the case of categories in which there are marked variations as to unit characteristics, it might be desirable, in arriving at a formula for estimating equivalent tonnage, to consider certain factors which produce these variations, such as age, unit displacement and calibre of guns. My Government has given careful consideration to various methods of comparison and the American delegation will be in a position to discuss the subject whenever it comes before the Commission.

In alluding briefly to these possible methods, I desire to lay special emphasis on the fact that, for us, the essential thing is the achievement of substantial results. Methods are of secondary importance.

I feel that we are able to deal to best advantage with the specific questions on our agenda only if we bear clearly in mind the recent important changes in world conditions.

Since our last meeting, the nations of the world have bound themselves by solemn undertaking to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. We believe (and we hope that our belief is shared by the other nations) that this agreement affirming humanity's will to peace will advance the cause of disarmament by removing doubts and fears which in the past have constituted our principal obstacle. It has recently been my privilege to discuss the general problem of disarmament at considerable length with President Hoover, who has always been an ardent advocate of peace and good understanding. I am in a position to realise, perhaps as well as anyone, how earnestly he feels that the Pact for the Renunciation of War opens to us an unprecedented opportunity for advancing the cause of disarmament, an opportunity which admits

of no postponement.

Any approach to the disarmament problem on purely technical grounds is bound to be inconclusive. The technical justification of armaments is based upon the experience of past wars and upon the anticipation of future wars. So long as the approach to the problem is based upon old fears and old suspicions, there is little hope of disarmament. The lessons of the old strategies must be unlearned. If we are honest, if our solemn promise in the Pact means anything, there is no justification for the continuation of a war-taxed peace. Great armaments are the relic of another age, but they will remain a necessary relic until the present deadlock is broken and that can be accomplished only by the decision of the Powers possessing the greatest armaments to initiate measures of reduction.

In the opening statement at the Three-Power Naval Conference in 1927, I took occasion, in suggesting certain tonnage levels as a basis of discussion, to say that the United States is prepared to agree to a plan for limitation at still lower levels which maintain the relative status of existing treaties with respect to the Powers represented at that Conference. This is still the attitude of my Government, and I am authorised to state that, on this basis, we are willing to agree to any reduction, however drastic, of naval tonnage which leaves no type of war-vessel unrestricted.

A large part of the suggestions for limitation hitherto made seem to have been of such a nature as to sanction existing armaments or even to set higher levels, with tacit encouragement to increase existing establishments. This is only a timid expedient, and an agreement on the basis of existing world armaments (or at higher levels) can never be justified before enlightened public opinion as a positive achievement. At best, it is purely negative. Fundamentally, our purpose should be to release large numbers of men from military service to productive effort, and, secondly, to reduce the heavy burden of taxation. So long as the nations are burdened with increasing taxation for the maintenance of armaments, it is idle to pretend that the world is really advancing toward the goal of disarmament. In recent years, the word "limitation" has come to be used chiefly in describing agreements at existing levels or still higher levels, and is generally looked upon as having nothing to do with actual reduction. It is useless to attempt to correct this

impression by explaining that limitation may be at any level, lower or higher than those existing. As a practical matter, it would seem to be best to accept the general public understanding of these terms. Let us therefore take the bold course and begin by scrapping the term "limitation" in order to concentrate upon a general reduction of armaments.

My Government believes that there can be no complete and effective limitation of armament unless all classes of war-vessels, including cruisers, destroyers and submarines, are limited. It could not agree to any method which would result in leaving any class of combatant vessels unrestricted. In its reply, under date of September 28th, 1928, to communications from the British and French Governments concerning an understanding reached between them as to a basis of naval limitation, my Government pointed out that this understanding applied to only one type of cruiser and one type of submarine and would leave totally unlimited a large class of effective fighting units. This note also called attention to the American position at the Geneva Naval Conference and the fact that a proposal for general reduction was then urged by the American delegation.

The willingness of my Government, I may even say its eagerness, to go to low levels is based upon the fundamental belief that naval needs are relative, namely, that what we may require for our defence depends chiefly upon the size of the navies maintained by others. Aside from the si natories of the Washington Treaty, there is no conceivable combination of naval power which could threaten the safety of any of the principal naval Powers. There is therefore no need to maintain large naval armaments as against the rest of the world. As between the principal naval Powers, what justification can there be for the Powers which lead in the respective classes of naval vessels to sanction further building programmes in those classes? In the case of the United States, we have already expressed our willingness to agree on a basis that would mean a substantial reduction of our present destroyer and submarine forces. In the case of cruisers, it is only possession by others of greatly superior strength in this class that has led to the adoption of the present building programme.

My Government cannot find any justification for the building and maintenance of large naval

establishments, save on the ground that no Power can reduce except as a result of general reduction. Let us ask ourselves honestly what these establishments are for. As regards the relations of the maritime Powers among themselves, there is no need for them. Even if the danger of war is admitted, it could be guarded against just as well by the maintenance of relative strength at low levels as at higher levels. The principal naval Powers have nothing to fear from the naval strength of the countries non-signatory to the Washington Treaty. There is no conceivable combination of naval strength among the non-signatory Powers which need give concern. As an example, the cruiser strength of all the non-signatory countries in the world does not attain to one-half of the cruiser tonnage of the greatest single fleet.

The people of every country are crying out against the burdens of taxation and demanding the suppression of unnecessary expenditure. My Government is convinced that expenditure for disproportionate naval establishments is indefensible in that it can be avoided by a sensible agreement among the naval Powers. And we must recognise that the people who pay taxes are bound to feel well-founded resentment against any policy which commits them to needless taxation through failure to reach rational agreements.

My Government believes firmly in its idea that naval needs are relative and that radical general reduction is possible only on the theory of relative needs. I trust that these views may commend themselves to other Governments and that it may be possible to agree upon such reductions. If, however, it is impossible to agree on this thesis, it is obvious that there will remain only the thesis of absolute naval needs. This would mean that all thought of reduction is abandoned, that each country retains a free hand in building, with an inevitable tendency toward competition. Surely we can hardly envisage such a sequel to our solemn undertaking to keep the peace?

My Government has always felt that we need no exact balance of ships and guns which can be based only upon the idea of conflict—what is really wanted is a commonsense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means. My Government has never believed that an effective approach to the problem of disarmament could be made by methods of reduction of armaments alone. It feels that genuine disarmament will follow only from a change of attitude toward the use

of force in the settlement of international disputes. It is for that reason that I venture to make this appeal that the countries here represented examine the whole problem afresh in the hope that they will find in general world conditions, and in the solemn obligation they have taken among themselves, a reassurance as to their security, and that they will find in this the confidence to enable them to dispense with the armaments which hitherto have seemed so essential.

第二項 「ギブスン」聲明ニ關スル各國新聞論調

一、米國論調

四月二十三日ノ主ナル新聞ハ「ギブスン」聲明ノ全文ヲ掲クルト共ニ論評ヲ加ヘ右聲明ハ軍縮問題ノ將來ニ希望ヲ齎スモノニテ不戰條約ハ軍縮促進ノ機會ヲ開ケリトノ點ニ賛意ヲ表スルニ一致シ「ファイデルフィア、レフチャー」ハ大統領カ近キ將來軍縮會議開催ヲ希望シ居レルハ明トナレリトシ「ギブスン」ノ聲明ハ米國側ニ於テ妥協ノ意アルヲ示シ居レカ右見地ノ變更ハ軍縮促進ニ多大ノ貢獻ヲ爲スモノナリト述ヘ「ニューヨーク、タイムズ」ハ本聲明ハ要スルニ軍縮協定ハ各國ノ相對的必要ヲ基礎トスヘキコトヲ明ニセリト爲シ「ニューヨーク、タイムズ」ハ軍縮ヲ技術的見地ヨリ取扱フノ誤ヲ繰返スコカラスト論セリ

尙國務長官ハ新聞記者會見ニ際シ米國ハ不戰條約カ各國民ニ及ホセル影響ヲ利用シ軍縮ノ達成ヲ期セントスルモノニテ米國ノ立場ハ三國會議以來變更無ク各艦種ニ渉ル縮少ヲ歡迎スルモノナルカ比率問題ヲ根本トスル本聲明ノ案ニヨル戰闘力ニ關スル「フォーミュラ」ハ軍縮委員會ニ於テ之ヲ作成スルヲ得ヘシトノ趣意ヲ述ヘタル趣報道セラレタリ

更ニ二十四日ヨリ二十五日ニ亙リ各新聞ハ英國外相カ「ギブスン」ノ聲明ニ賛意ヲ表シ居ルコト、伊國側ニテハ佛國ト同比率ヲ要求シ居レルコト及日本當局ハ五、五、三ノ比率ニハ満足シ居ラサルコト等本件聲明ニ對スル各方面ノ反響ヲ詳細報道スルト共ニ下院海軍委員長「ブリッテン」カ「ギブスン」ノ聲明中海軍勢力算定ニ當リ商船及根據地ヲ度外視セルハ不可ナリト非難セル聲明ヲ發シタルコト及議員中海軍論者ハ五、五、三ノ比率ニ依ラサル條約ハ上院ノ贊同ヲ得

サルヘシト語レルコト等米國內ニ於ケル反響ヲモ報道シ更ニ官邊ノ意向トシテ米國政府ハ少クトモ目下ノ處軍縮會議ノ開催ニ就テハ何等考慮シ居ラス只「ジュネーヴ」ニテ將來ノ協定ノ基礎ヲ發見シタキ意向ヲ有スルニ過キス大統領モ二十三日ノ定例會見ニ於テ新聞記者ニ對シ右同様ノ趣旨ヲ語レリ等ノ記事ヲ掲ケタリ

二、英國論調

二十三日ノ英國各新聞ハ「ギブスン」ノ聲明ハ行詰レル軍縮ノ討議ニ新シキ「スタート」ヲ與フルモノナリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタル後米國カ總噸數ノミヲ軍縮ノ標準トスルコトニ満足セス千九百二十七年ノ佛國ノ提案ノ趣旨ヲ新ニ採用シテモ可ナリトノ意向ヲ示セルコト等ニ關シ歡迎的批評ヲ加ヘ「タイムズ」ハ軍縮ハ技術的見地ヨリシテハ成立難カルヘク之カ討議ハ「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ時ノ狀況ニ遡ルコトナク不戰條約ヨリ新ニ出發シ「リミテーション」ヲ目的トセス之ヲ協議ニ依リ達シ得ヘキ最低限度ニ「レデュクス」スルコトヲ目的トセサルヘカラスト論シ「ボースト」ハ米國ハ大型巡洋艦ノミヲ欲スルモノナルカ故ニ自然右以外ニ於ケル制限ニ贊同スル理ナレトモ世界的ナル海上交通ヲ有スル英國ハ米國ト同様ナルコト能ハス兩國ノ必要乃至海軍政策ノ相違スノ如クナル以上軍縮ニ關シ共通ノ標準ヲ發見スルコトハ至難ナルカ兎ニ角技術的制限ハ效力薄シト述ヘ「テレグラフ」ハ「ギブスン」ノ聲明ノ仄カス如ク米國ハ軍縮問題ヲ以テ海上警戒ノ爲ニスル列國協調ノ問題ト認メントスルモノトセハ本問題ノ歴史ニ一ノ新ナル且注目スヘキ一節ヲ加フルモノニシテ英國輿論ハ大イニ之ヲ歡迎スルト共ニ海軍協定ノ基礎トシテ大統領ノ代表者ノ述ヘタル處ヲ具體化センコトヲ希望スルモノナリト附言セリ尙「ガーディアン」ハ軍縮ハ「ジュネーヴ」ニテハ行詰リノ狀況ニアリ聯盟ハ元々之ヲ解決シ得ヘキニアラスシテ右ハ實際ニ英米兩國ノ問題ナリ陸軍軍縮問題モサルコト乍ラ海軍軍縮ノ問題ハ特ニ英米間ノ政治的平和ノ基礎ヲ爲スモノナルカ故ニ速ニ行詰リヲ打開スルヲ要ストノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタリ

尙二十四日下院ニ於テ勞働黨及自由黨議員ノ質問ニ答ヘ「チェンバレン」外相ハ英國政府ハ「ギブスン」ノ聲明シタル米國ノ要望ニ全然同感ナリ英國ハ米國ト同様海軍制限ニ止マラス其ノ縮少ヲ希望ス總テノ軍艦ヲ縮少スヘシトハ英國ノ提

唱シ來レル所ニシテ英米意見ノ相違ハ此ノ大原則又ハ英米ノ相對的勢力ニ存セス軍艦分類ノ範疇ニノミ存ス而シテ政府ハ米國提議ノ新標準ニ注目シ且兩國ノ異レル事情ニ適合スルヲ得シメン爲ニ考慮セラレタル彈力性ヲ特ニ重要視スルモノナリ英國ハ米國ノ協調の精神ヲ多トシ同精神ヲ以テ完全ナル協定ニ達セン熱望ノ下ニ米國案ヲ考慮スヘシトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘタル趣報道セラレタルカ二十五日諸新聞ハ右外相ノ答辯ヲ稱揚スル意味ノ論說ヲ掲ケ「タイムズ」ハ米國ノ新提案ニ依リ直ニ軍縮カ實現スルカ如ク考フルハ誤ニシテ又軍縮ニハ技術的考慮ヨリモ政治的考慮必要ナリト附言シ「テレグラフ」ハ外相ノ米國提議無留保歡迎ハ英國ノ總テノ政黨及階級ノ感情ヲ表現セルモノナリト論シ更ニ「ガーディアン」ハ軍縮ニハ英米戰爭ナシトノ確信ヲ要シ之カ爲ニハ海上法規ノ改正必要ナルヘシト論シタリ

三、佛國論調

佛國諸新聞ハ一般ニ「ギブスン」聲明ノ趣旨ニ賛意ヲ表シ二十四日「タン」、「デバ」等ハ同聲明カ「ボール、ボンクル」案ノ趣旨ヲ認メ且一時行詰リノ感アリタル聯盟ノ軍縮事業ニ活路ヲ與フルニ至リタルコトヲ慶賀シタリ但シ二十五日「エコ、ド、バリ」ハ「ギブスン」ノ聲明ハ實質上英佛海軍協定ニ關スル米國政府ノ對佛回答ト同一ニシテ英米兩海軍ノ相反スル要求及佛伊兩國ノ相異ナル立場ヨリ生スル困難ニ對シ何等ノ解決ヲ與ヘ居ラスト述ヘタル上右ニモ拘ラス本件聲明カ多大ノ反響ヲ見ルニ至レルハ英國ノ總選舉ニ當リ選舉民ニ對シ英米間ニ何等妥協成立セルカノ如ク見セ掛ケントノ魂膽ニ基クモノナリト結論シタリ尙二十七日「エクセルシオール」ハ「ジュネーヴ」特電トシテ米國代表部ヨリ得タル情報ニ依レハ米國ハ將來自國商船隊カ異常ナル發展ヲ爲スヘキ場合ヲ考慮シ商船隊ニ關スル三國會議當時ノ主張ヲ固守セサル意向ナル旨並ニ今後比率問題決定ノ一標準トシテ艦齡増加ニ伴フ戰鬪力ノ年度削減退率ニ關スル詳細ナル表ヲ作成スルコトトナルヘシト論シタリ

四、伊國論調

伊國諸新聞ハ「ギブスン」聲明ニ關シ可成リ詳細ニ之カ報道ヲ爲シタルモ伊國ノ立場ヨリ本問題ノ内容ニ付論評ヲ試ム

ルモノ殆ントナシ

第三項 「ギブスン」聲明ニ對スル各國ノ態度表明

「ギブスン」ノ聲明後將來ノ海軍問題取扱方ニ關シ聯盟幹部及主要海軍國代表者間ニ意見ノ交換行ハレタルカ種々討議ノ結果結局第六回ノ委員會ニ於テハ海軍問題ハ一切之ヲ討議セス先ツ米國ノ各國海軍比較案(註)ナルモノヲ研究シタル上關係國ニ於テ各自單獨ニ米國ト豫備の交渉ヲ行フコトニ落着シタリ右將來ノ豫備交渉ニ關シ帝國代表ハ英米間ノ直接交渉ニ依リ我國ノ利益侵害セララルニ至ルコトナキ様英米代表ニ對シ英米間ニ於クル商議進行ノ模様ハ時ヲ遷サス出來得ルタケ詳細ニ之ヲ日本側ニ通告シ緊密ナル連絡ヲ保持スル様充分ナル了解ヲ取付ケ加之英國代表ニ對シテハ「英米會商ニ前後シテ日米交渉ヲ試ムルコトアルヘキ」件ニ付又米國代表ニ對シテハ「米國提案ノ各國海軍比較案研究ノ後之カ追加的説明ヲ求メ且米國政府ト意見交換ノ必要ヲ認ムル場合日本政府ヨリ海軍専門家ヲ「ワシントン」ニ派遣スルコトアルヘキ」件ニ付何レモ満足ナル了解ヲ得置キタリ

(註) 米國ノ各國海軍比較案ハ當初委員會ニ於テ之ヲ公表スル筈ナリシモ英國側ニ難色アリタルヲ以テ右ハ沙汰止ミトナリ結局「ワシントン」ニ於テ各國政府ノ申出ニ依リ何時ニテモ米國國務省ヨリ之ヲ交付スルコトトナリタリ

斯クテ五月六日各國代表ハ左記順序ノ下ニ夫々各自國ノ態度ヲ聲明シ本問題ニ關スル討議ヲ終ルコトナリタルカ其ノ要旨左ノ如シ

(一) 日本代表

(イ) 客月二十二日ノ米國代表ノ聲明ハ海軍軍縮問題ノ終局的解決ノ爲一新局面ヲ開キタルモノナルコト言フ俟タサルモ問題ノ複雜且重要ナルニ鑑ミ之カ討議ヲ開始スルニ先チ豫メ主要關係國間ニ於テ充分慎重ナル研究ヲ行フコト肝要ナルヘク之カ爲委員會ハ此等關係國ニ藉スニ多少ノ時日ヲ以テセラレ度シ右關係國ノ一タル日本ノ如キ遠隔ノ地ニ在ル

モノニ付テハ殊ニ其ノ必要ヲ加フル次第ナリ

- (ロ) 日本政府トシテ右研究終了次第何時ニテモ委員會ニ於ケル本件討議ニ參加スルノ用意アルハ勿論今一時延期ヲ求ムルモ海軍問題ノ急速解決方ニ關シテハ全力ヲ盡スノ決心アリ

(ハ) 「ギブスン」氏聲明ニ對スル帝國政府ノ態度ニ關シ政府ノ名ニ於テ左ノ通聲明ス

- (a) 米國提案ハ海軍縮小ノ如キ重大ナル事業ノ進捗ニ貢獻スル所大ナルヘク帝國政府ハ之ニ對シ敬意ヲ表セントス
(b) 帝國政府ハ公平且合理的ナル軍縮提案ニ對シテハ總テ最慎重ナル考量ヲ加フルト同時ニ軍縮事業ハ單ニ制限ニ止マラス實際的縮減ヲ計ルヘシトハ帝國政府從來ノ主張ナリ
(c) 尤モ海軍縮小ノ根底ヲ構成スル諸問題例ヘハ或艦種ニ關スル現存約定ノ基礎ヲ成ス問題ノ如キモノニ對シテハ帝國政府ノ意見ヲ開陳スルノ時期未タ到達セスト思考ス況ヤ米國新提案ハ海軍力測定ノ方法ノミニ關スルモノナルニ於テ一層然リトス

(二) 英國代表

- (イ) 海軍問題ヲ以テ軍縮事業ノ進捗ヲ妨ケツツアル唯一ノ障害ナリトスルノ誤ナルコトハ今次委員會ノ經過ニ徴スルモ明白ナルカ同問題カ依然トシテ最大ノ困難ノ一タルコトハ疑ナシ然ルニ過日「ギブスン」氏聲明ハ此ノ形勢ヲ正ニ好轉セシメタリト云フヘシ該聲明ハ確定的提案ヲ含マスト雖モ本問題ニ關シ協定ニ到達シ得ヘキ方法ヲ示セル一ノ「サジラシモン」トシテ大ニ歡迎スヘシ

- (ロ) 唯米國案審查ノ爲ニハ相當ノ時日ヲ要スルコト當然ナルヲ以テ本件ハ日本代表提議ノ通延期ノ外ナカルヘシ

(三) 次テ佛伊代表モ交々前記日英代表聲明ノ趣旨ニ賛成ノ意味ノ聲明ヲ爲セリ

(四) 米國代表

- (イ) 客月二十二日ノ聲明後他ノ政府ニ於テモ米國提案ト同一ノ方法ヲ研究中ナルコト明トナリ且又本日各國代表ヨリ米

國案考究ノ爲ニハ相當ノ日時ヲ必要トスル旨述ヘラレタリ

- (ロ) 技術上複雑ナル海軍問題ニ於テ或方法ニ關シ協定ニ到達センカ爲ニハ各國ニ於テ夫々獨立ノ研究ヲ遂ケ充分ナル準備ノ後會商スルヲ要スヘキニ付右諸國ニ對シ相當ノ時日ヲ與フルコト蓋シ當然ナルヘシ余ハ他ニ米國案ト類似ノ研究行ハレツツアルニ鑑ミ將又他國ノ獨立研究ノ自由ヲ束縛セザランカ爲今茲ニ何等詳細ナル提案ヲ爲スヲ避ケ單ニ他國政府ノ研究ノ基礎トシテ米國提案ノ概略ヲ再說スルニ止ムヘシ

- (ハ) 各單艦ノ軍事的價值從テ或艦種内ニ著シク能力ヲ異ニスル數種艦ノ存在スル場合ニ於テ此等各種艦ノ合計價值ヲ表示スヘキ比較標準 (Equivalent of value) (註) ノ決定ニ當リテハ簡單且明瞭ニシテ算出及諒解ニ容易ナル要素ノミヲ考量ニ入ルヘク第二次の要素ノ考量ニ依リ問題ヲ錯雜セシムヘカラス余ハ過日ノ聲明ニ於テ右種要素トシテ單艦排水量砲口徑及艦齡並速力其他ノ要素ヲ提示セリ (因ニ前同ノ聲明ニハ排水量、砲口徑、艦齡ノ三要素ヲ列記シタルニ止マリ)

(註) 米國専門家ノ談ニ依レハ比較要素ハ(イ)排水量 (ロ)砲口徑 (ハ)艦齡ヲ主トシ速力「シューワージネス」裝甲其他ハ之ヲ排水量要素ニ含マシメントスル案ナリト云フ

- (ニ) 軍縮達成ノ機運今日ヨリ盛ナルハナシ吾人ハ此ノ好機ヲ利用シ一日モ早く行動スルノ必要アルモ不用意ノ審議ニ依リテ此ノ重要且複雑ナル問題ノ健全且有效ナル處理及解決ヲ害スヘカラス

- (ホ) 依テ海軍條項ノ審議ハ關係國カ一般討議ニ入り得ヘキコトヲ議長ニ通告スル時期迄之ヲ延期スヘシトノ日英代表ノ提議ニ全然賛同ス

第四項 「フーヴァー」大統領及「スチムスン」國務長官ノ演說及聲明

五月三十日「メーモリアル、デー」ニ際シ「フーヴァー」大統領ハ「アーリントン」國立墓地ニ於テ不戰條約ノ理想實現ノ爲ニハ軍費ヲ防禦ノ爲ニノミ使用スルヲ要スト爲シ海軍軍備縮少ノ必要ヲ強調セル演說ヲ爲シタリ (註)

右演說中大統領ハ米國海軍ハ國防上最重要ナルコト、防禦用トシテノ海軍ハ相對的ナルコト及米國海軍ハ他國海軍ニ對シ「バリティ」維持ヲ主張スルモノナルコト等ノ主義ニ依リ海軍軍備縮少協定ヲ作成スヘキナリ然ルニ不戰條約署名後ニ至リテモ各主要國ハ海軍力充實ニ從事シ居レルカ國際間ノ恐怖及猜疑ノ念ヲ弱ムルニハ軍備縮少ニ依ルノ外ナク而シテ軍備縮少ト同時ニ國防ヲ完フスルニハ各國海軍力ノ比較及其ノ相對的勢力維持ノ爲合理的標準ヲ發見セサルヘカラス米國現政府ハ新ナル計畫ヲ以テ本重大問題ニ當ラントスルモノナルカ此ノ際軍備制限ヲ說クコトハ制限ナル觀念カ從來多少效果ヲ齎ラシタリトハ言ヘ結局軍備擴張ヲ招來シ易キヲ以テ之ヲ無益ト思考スルモノニシテ吾人ノ目的ハ「リミテイション、アップワード」ニアラスシテ現存ノモノヲ更ニ低キ限度ニ縮スルニアリト述ヘタリ

翌三十一日「ステュムスン」國務長官ハ前記大統領ノ演說ニ言及シ米國ノ海軍費ハ議會ノ協賛ヲ經タルモノ及計畫中ノモノヲ併セ約十一億七千萬弗餘ニ上ルヘキ處米國一國ノ費用既ニ斯ノ如ク巨額ナルニ付他國之ニ倣フトキハ今後十五年間ニ要スル經費ハ如何ニ多額ニ達スルカハ明カトナルヘシトノ聲明書ヲ發セリ(註二)

右ニ關シ米國新聞「ワシントン」通信中ニハ大統領ハ軍縮協定成立セハ海軍擴張法中ノ規程ニ依リ十五隻ノ巡洋艦ノ建造ハ變更スル覺悟ナルヘシト報スルモノアリ又「ニューヨーク、タイムズ」「ワシントン」通信ハ消息通ハ大統領ニ於テ關係諸國トノ間ニ別ニ軍縮ニ關スル協議ヲ行ハンコトヲ考ヘ居ルヤニ觀測スル者アリト傳ヘタリ

其後各新聞ハ其論說ニ於テ大統領ノ演說ハ不戰條約ノ當然ノ歸結トシテ海軍縮少ヲ爲スヘキコトヲ簡潔直截ニ明ニセルモノニテ「メモリアル、デー」ニ際シ右演說ヲ爲シタルハ最モ時期ヲ得タルモノナリトテ贊辭ヲ呈シ又「ワシントン、スター」ハ大統領ハ巡洋艦擴張計畫ノ外主力艦計畫ヲモ變更スルノ意ナルコト明ナリト論シ「フィラデルフィア、レッチャー」ハ大統領ノ意嚮ハ右代換計畫全部ヲ遂行スルノ必要ナキニ至ランコトヲ希望シ得ハ可ナリトノ程度ト見ルコト寧ろ事實ニ當レリトノ趣旨ヲ述ヘ「ニューヨーク、トリビューン」ハ米國ハ縮少ニ依リテ「バリティ」維持ヲ欲スルモ右實現セサル場合國防ノ爲ニハ國務長官聲明ノ經費ハ米國年收約九百億弗ニ比スレハ僅少ナル額ナリト論シタリ

(註1)

PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AT ARLINGTON ON MAY 30, 1929.

Fellow Countrymen: Over the years since the Civil War the Grand Army of the Republic have conducted this sacred ceremony in memorial of those who died in service of their country. The ranks of their living comrades have been steadily thinned with time. But other wars have reaped their harvest of sacrifice and these dead too lie buried here. Their living comrades now join in conduct of this memorial, that it may be carried forward when the noble men who today represent the last of the Grand Army shall have joined those already in the Great Beyond.

This sacred occasion has impelled our Presidents to express their aspirations in furtherance of peace. No more appropriate tribute can be paid to our heroic dead than to stand in the presence of their resting places and pledge renewed effort that these sacrifices shall not be claimed again.

Today, as never before in peace, now life-destroying instrumentalities and new systems of warfare are being added to those that even so recently spread death and desolation over the whole continent of Europe. Despite those lessons every government continues to increase and perfect its armament. And while this progress is being made in the development of the science of warfare, the serious question arises—are we making equal progress in devising ways and means to avoid those frightful fruits of men's failures that have blotted with blood so many chapters of the world's history?

There is a great hope, for since this day a year ago, a solemn declaration has been proposed by America to the world and has been signed by 40 nations.

It states that they "Solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another."

They "Agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

That is a declaration that springs from the aspirations and hearts of men and women throughout the world. It is a solemn covenant to which the great nations of the world have bound themselves.

But notwithstanding this noble assurance, preparedness for war still advances steadily in every land. As a result the pessimist calls this covenant a pious expression of foreign offices, a trick of statesmen on the hopes of humanity, for which we and other nations will be held responsible without reserve. With this view I cannot agree.

But, if this agreement is to fulfill its high purpose, we and other nations must accept its consequences; we must clothe faith and idealism with action. That action must march with the inexorable tread of common sense and realism to accomplishment.

If this declaration really represents the aspirations of peoples; if this covenant be genuine proof that the world has renounced war as an instrument of national policy, it means at once an abandonment of the aggressive use of arms by every signatory nation and becomes a sincere declaration that all armament hereafter shall be used only for defense. Consequently, if we are honest we must reconsider our own naval armament and the armaments of the world in the light of their defensive and not their aggressive use. Our Navy is the first, and in the world sense the only important, factor in our national preparedness. It is a powerful part of the arms of the world.

To make ready for defense is a primary obligation upon every statesman and adequate preparedness is an assurance against aggression. But, if we are to earnestly predicate our view upon renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, if we are to set standards that naval strength is purely for defense and not for aggression, then the strength in fighting ships required by nations is but relative to that of other powers. All nations assent to this—that defensive needs of navies are relative. Moreover, other nations concede our contention for parity. With these principles before us our problem is to secure agreement among nations that we shall march together toward reductions in naval equipment.

Despite the declarations of the Kellogg pact, every important country has since the signing of that agreement been engaged in strengthening its naval arm. We are still borne on the tide of competitive

building. Fear and suspicion disappear but slowly from the world. Democracies can only be led to undertake the burdens of increasing naval construction by continued appeal to fear, by constant envisaging of possible conflict, by stimulated imaginings of national dangers, by glorification of war. Fear and suspicion will never slacken unless we can halt competitive construction of arms. They will never disappear unless we can turn this tide toward actual reduction.

But to arrive at any agreement through which we can, marching in company with our brother nations, secure reduction of armament, we must find a rational yardstick with which to make reasonable comparisons of their naval units with ours and thus maintain an agreed relativity. So far the world has failed to find such a yardstick. To say that such a measure cannot be found is the counsel of despair, it is a challenge to the naval authorities of the world, it is condemnation of the world to the Sisyphean toil of competitive armaments.

The present Administration of the United States has undertaken to approach this vital problem with a new program. We feel that it is useless for us to talk of the limitation of arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to be an incitement to increase armament. The idea of limitation of arms has served a useful purpose. It made possible conferences in which the facts about national aspirations could be discussed frankly in an atmosphere of friendliness and conciliation. Likewise the facts of the technical problems involved, and the relative values of varying national needs, have been clarified by patient comparison of expert opinions.

But still the net result has been the building of more fighting ships. Therefore we believe the time has come when we must know whether the pact we have signed is real, whether we are condemned to further and more extensive programs of naval construction. Limitation upward is not now our goal, but actual reduction of existing commitments to lowered levels.

Such a program, if it be achieved, is fraught with endless blessings. The smaller the armed force of the world, the less will armed force be left in the minds of men as an instrument of national policy. The smaller the armed forces of the world, the less will be the number of men withdrawn from the creative and

productive labors. Thus we shall relieve the toilers of the deadening burden of unproductive expenditures, and above all, we shall deliver them from the greatest of human calamities—fear. We shall breathe an air cleared of poison, of destructive thought, and of potential war.

But the pact that we have signed by which we renounce war as an instrument of national policy, by which we agree to settle all conflicts, of whatever nature, by pacific means, implies more than the reduction of arms to a basis of simple defense. It implies that nations will conduct their daily intercourse in keeping with the spirit of that agreement. It implies that we shall endeavor to develop those instrumentalities of peaceful adjustment that will enable us to remove disputes from the field of emotion to the field of calm and judicial consideration.

It is fitting that we should give our minds to these subjects on this occasion; that we should give voice to these deepest aspirations of the American people, in this place. These dead whom we have gathered here today to honor, these valiant and unselfish souls who gave life itself in service of their ideals, evoke from us the most solemn mood of consecration. They died that peace should be established. Our obligation is to see it maintained. Nothing less than our resolve to give ourselves with equal courage to the ideal of our day will serve to manifest our gratitude for their sacrifices, our undying memory of their deeds, our emulation of their glorious example.

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SECRETARY STIMSON'S STATEMENT.

In connection with the President's speech at Arlington yesterday in which he advocated naval disarmament and stressed the imperative character of this problem, I wish to call attention to another aspect of the same question.

The President yesterday spoke about it with reference to its direct relation to the promotion of peace and to relieving the world from the threat of war. In addition to these considerations, we do not always realize the immense material burden which is imposed upon the nations of the world to-day by the cost of

the modern ships of war.

The cost is mounting with every fresh discovery in warfare. A modern capital ship costs between thirty-five and forty millions of dollars several times the cost of the battleship of a few years ago. Even a modern 10,000 ton cruiser costs more than double the original cost of the Library of Congress.

I have in my possession a memorandum from the Director of the Budget showing the cost of the program recommended by the Navy Department in case the policy of naval reduction which the President advocates is not adopted.

That memorandum shows that the authorized and contemplated naval program for the construction of new ships alone amounts to \$1,170,800,000. In addition to this enormous sum for construction there will also be required very large increases in the already large naval budget to cover the operating cost of these new ships.

When it is borne in mind that the foregoing figures involve the construction program of only one nation and that if it proceeds other nations will be impelled to follow suit, the burden of unproductive expenditure which will be imposed upon the economic world during the next fifteen years can be to a certain extent realized.