

軍備縮少トハ外國ノ軍備ヲ削減スルニ非シンハ自國ノミ軍備ヲ擴張セントスルニ外ナラス從テ今次ノ增艦計畫ハ「ジュネーヴ」三國會議及英佛海軍協定ノ失敗ヨリ來ル當然ノ結果ナリト論シ尙海洋自由ノ問題ニ關シテ米國カ歐洲大戰以前ハ熱心ニ海洋ノ自由ヲ主張シタリシニモ拘ラス參戰以後ハ全然之ト反對ノ態度ニ出テタル事例ヲ指摘シ本件ニ關スル新國際法規制定ノ成否ヲ疑問視シタリ

## 第二節 海軍制限方式ニ關スル英佛協定問題

### 第一項 英佛協定成立經過概要及協定内容

國際聯盟軍備縮少會議準備委員會ハ大正十五年以來陸海空三軍軍備ニ互ル軍備制限問題ヲ審議中ナリシカ海軍問題ニ關シ議岐レ一國海軍軍備ノ總噸數ヲ制限スルト同時ニ右總噸數内ニ於テ特定ノ艦種ニ付キ各艦種毎ニ噸數ヲ制限セムトスル所謂艦種別主義ト單ニ一國海軍軍備ノ總噸數ヲ制限スルニ止メ其ノ範圍内ニ於テハ噸數ノ使用ヲ全然當該國ノ自由ニ委スヘシトスル所謂總噸數主義ノ對立ヲ見タリ前者ハ日英米、後者ハ佛伊等ニ依リ支持セラレ双方共自說ヲ固持シテ下ラサリシカ爲準備委員會ノ議事遲々トシテ進捗セサルモノアリタリ

千九百二十七年三月開催ノ第三回準備委員會ニ於テハ局面打開ノ爲佛國側ヨリ所謂「ボール、ボンクール」妥協案(註)ノ提示アリタルモ當時「ジュネーヴ」三國會議直前ノコトニテモアリ英米兩國側ニ於テ即決ヲ肯セサリシカ爲本問題未決了ノ裡ニ委員會ハ休會スルコトナリタリ

其後同年九月開催ノ第八回聯盟總會ニ於テハ本問題ノ機微ナル性質上其ノ儘準備委員會ヲ開催スルモ會議決裂ノ虞アルカ故ニ關係國間ノ直接交渉ニ依リ之カ解決ヲ圖ルコトナリ其ノ結果英佛當局ヨリ夫々我方出先官憲ニ對シ我方意見ヲ求メ來レルコトアリシモ我方ハ本件ニ關シ終始公正ナル態度ヲ持スルノ見地ヨリ敢テ深入スルコトナク此ノ問題ニ處シ來リタリ越テ千九百二十八年(昭和三年)七月三十日英國外務大臣ハ議會ニ於テ軍備縮少問題ニ關シ英佛兩國政府間ニ私的の交

渉進行中ナリシ處最近具體的結果ヲ得タルニ因リ之ヲ關係國政府ノ考慮ニ付セントスルモノナリト披露シタリシカ翌三十一日佛國外務省聯盟事務局局長ハ補助艦制限方法ニ關スル左記英佛提案ヲ國際聯盟帝國事務局局長ニ提示シ次テ在本邦英國代理大使モ我方ニ對シ八月二日附ヲ以テ同趣旨ノ申入ヲ爲シ帝國政府ノ見解ヲ求メタリ

一、軍備縮少會議ノ決定スヘキ制限ハ四種ノ軍艦ニ關スルモノトス

(1) 主力艦即チ排水量一萬噸ヲ超ユル又ハ口徑八吋ヲ超ユル備砲ヲ有スル艦船

(2) 一萬噸ヲ超ユル航空母艦

(3) 一萬噸以下ノ水上艦船ニシテ口徑六吋ヲ超ヘ八吋ニ至ル備砲ヲ有スルモノ

(4) 大洋用潛水艦即六百噸ヲ超ユル潛水艦

二、「ワシントン」會議ハ(1)及(2)艦種艦船ノ制限ヲ規定セルヲ以テ軍備縮少會議ハ單ニ右制限ヲ同條約非署名國ニ擴張スル方法ヲ審議スヘシ

三、英國政府及佛國政府ハ左ノ如ク提案ス

(一) (3)及(4)艦種ニ關シ軍備縮少最終會議ハ一切ノ國ニ適用セラレ何レノ國モ右艦種毎ニ艦船ノ全部ニ付條約期間中超過スルコトヲ許容セラレサル最大限噸數ヲ定ムヘシ

(二) 右艦種制限ニ關スル最終會議ニ於テ各國ハ前項ノ制限内ニ於テ其ノ到達セントシ且條約期間中超過セサルコトヲ約スル噸數ヲ表示スヘシ

(註) 所謂「ボール、ボンクール」妥協案トハ之ヲ約言スレハ艦種ハ(1)主力艦 (2)航空母艦 (3)一萬噸以下ノ

水上補助艦 (4)潛水艦ノ四艦種ニ別チ各國ハ條約ニ依リテ許容セラレタル範圍内ニ於テハ聯盟事務局ニ對スル一ヶ年ノ豫告ヲ以テ艦種間ニ噸數ノ融通ヲ認ムヘシト云フニアリ

### 第二項 英佛提案ニ對スル日米伊ノ態度

## (イ) 日本

右英佛提案ニ對シ帝國政府ハ慎重考慮ヲ重ネタル結果本案ニ依リテ行詰リタル海軍問題ヲ解決シ得ルニ於テハ欣然本案ヲ討議ノ基礎トスルニ賛意ヲ表ストノ趣旨ヲ以テ同年九月七日附ヲ以テ在京英國代理大使宛左記要旨ノ回答ヲ爲シ同時ニ在「ジュネーヴ」國際聯盟帝國事務局長ヲ通シ同様ノ趣旨ヲ佛國側ニ通告シタリ

『公正ナル軍縮協定ノ成立ニ對シ眞摯ノ努力ヲ惜マサルハ帝國政府ノ終始一貫セル方針ナル處今般英佛兩國協定ニ係ル海軍軍備制限方式ハ從來各種提案ノ間ニ存在セル合理性ト實行可能性トノ杆格ヲ良ク調和シ得タルモノニシテ帝國政府ハ本協定ノ趣旨ニ賛意ヲ表ス

然レトモ各國ニ一律ニ適用スヘキ大型巡洋艦及潛水艦ノ最大限噸數ハ國民負擔ノ輕減ト國ノ安全ノ兩見地ヨリ事情ヲ異ニスル各國ヲ満足セシムルモノタラサルヘカラサルヲ以テ之カ協定ハ最モ慎重公正ナルヲ要スルモノト認ム』

## (ロ) 米 國

米國ハ當初ヨリ本協定ニ對シ難色ヲ示シ殊ニ同國諸新聞紙ハ協定内容ニ關シ種々指摩臆測ヲ爲シ或ハ右協定中英佛兩國海軍力ノ共同動作ヲ目的トスル條項存ストシ或ハ右協定ハ英佛同盟ノ先驅ヲ爲スヤノ疑アリトシ或ハ本協定ヲ以テ「ワシントン」條約所定ノ英米均勢ヲ事實上破壊セント企テ居ルモノナリトシ一般ニ英國側ニ對シ不滿ノ聲ヲ洩ラシ居リタルカ米國政府ニ於テモ慎重考慮ノ結果九月二十八日英佛兩國政府ニ對シ左記要旨ヲ回答シ本協定ニ反對ノ意ヲ表明シタリ(註一)

- (1) 米國政府ハ海軍制限ヲ一切ノ艦種ニ適用スヘシトスル見解ヲ持スルニ對シ英佛協定ハ其ノ能率高キコトアル六吋砲巡洋艦並ニ驅逐艦及六百噸以下ノ潛水艦ヲ除外セリ
- (2) 英佛協定ハ米國ノ特ニ必要トスル大型艦ニ對シテノミ制限ヲ加フルモノナリ
- (3) 六吋砲搭載ノ巡洋艦ト爲シ得ル商船ノ噸數多キ國ノ攻撃力ハ著シク増大スヘシ

- (4) 英佛協定ハ海軍競争ヲ廢除セス從テ國民負擔輕減ノ效果ヲ擧ゲス
- (5) 米國政府ハ英佛協定ヲ討議ノ基礎ト爲スニ異存ナキモ右ハ何等有益ナル目的ヲ達成セサルモノト思考ス
- (6) 然レトモ米國政府ハ「ジュネーヴ」會議ニ參加セサリシ國ヲ含ム一切ノ海軍國ニトリ満足ナル海軍制限ノ基礎發見ノ爲今後最善ノ努力ヲ致スヘク他國ニ於テモ米國ノ必要トスル所ニ對シ同情ヲ以テ考慮セラレンコトヲ望ム

## (ハ) 伊 國

伊國ハ千九百二十七年「ジュネーヴ」會議ノ招請ヲ受ケタル際ニ於テモ軍備制限ハ萬國のナルヲ要シ且其ノ特殊ノ地理的地位ニ鑑ミ其ノ海軍現有勢力カ既ニ國防上不充分ナリトノ理由ニ依リ右會議ニ不參加ヲ回答シタルカ英佛協定ニ對シテモ殆ント右ト同趣旨ニ依リ十月六日附ヲ以テ英佛兩國政府ニ回答ヲ爲セリ其ノ要旨左ノ如シ(註二)

- (1) 制限ハ陸、海及空ノ三軍ニ互ルヲ要シ僅ニ二三國ニ關スルカ如キ軍備ノ縮少ヲ考慮スル能ハス
- (2) 陸軍及海軍ニ付テハ歐洲大陸ノ他ノ何レノ國ト比較スルモ之ト劣勢ナラサル限り如何ナル程度迄モ軍備ノ縮少ヲ行フ用意アリ
- (3) 海軍軍備制限方式ニ關シテハ總噸數主義ヲ採ル代リニ英佛協定ニ依ルトキハ技術ノ進歩及形勢ノ變化ヨリ生スヘキ豫見シ能ハサル事態ニ備ヘンカ爲各國ハ最大ナル海軍計畫ヲ採用スルニ至ルヘシ
- (4) 伊國ハ海軍軍備縮少ニ最有效ナル一方法トシテ海軍軍備制限ニ關スル「ワシントン」條約調印國主力艦建造ヲ千九百三十六年以後ニ延期スヘキコトヲ提議ス

## (註一) 米國回答全文

The Government of the United States has received from His Majesty's Government a communication summarising the understanding reached between the British and the French Governments as to a basis of naval limitation, which agreement, it is stated, will be submitted to the next meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

The Government of the United States is willing to submit certain suggestions as to the basis of naval limitation as summarised in the British note. From the communication of His Majesty's Government it appears that:

"The limitations which the Disarmament Conference will have to determine will deal with four classes of men-of-war:

- (1) Capital ships, i.e., ships of over 10,000 tons or with guns of more than eight-inch calibre.
- (2) Aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons.
- (3) Surface vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre
- (4) Ocean going submarines over 600 tons."

As the Washington Treaty regulates the first two classes, that is, capital ships and aircraft carriers, the Preparatory Commission will have to consider only the last two categories so far as the signatories of that treaty are concerned.

From the foregoing summary of the agreement it appears that the only classes of naval vessels which it is proposed to limit under the Anglo-French draft agreement are cruisers of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre, and submarines of over 600 tons. The position of the Government of the United States has been and now is that any limitation of naval armament, to be effective, should apply to all classes of combatant vessels. The Anglo-French Agreement provides no limitation whatsoever on six-inch gun cruisers or destroyers, or submarines of 600 tons or less. It could not be claimed that the types of vessels thus left without limitation are not highly efficient fighting ships. No one would deny that modern cruisers armed with six-inch guns, or destroyers similarly armed, have a very high offensive value, especially to any nation possessing well distributed bases in various parts of the world. In fact, such cruisers constitute the largest number of fighting ships now existing in the world. The limitation of only such surface vessels as are restricted in Class 3 of the draft agreement, that is, cruisers of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre, would be the imposi-

tion of restrictions only on types peculiarly suited to the needs of the United States. The United States cannot accept as a distinct class surface combatant vessels of or below 10,000 tons armed with guns of more than six-inch and up to eight-inch calibre. It is further clearly apparent that limitation of this type only would add enormously to the comparative offensive power of a nation possessing a large merchant tonnage on which preparation may be made in times of peace for mounting six-inch guns.

At the Three-Power Conference at Geneva in 1927 the British Delegation proposed that cruisers be thus divided into two classes: those carrying eight-inch guns, and those carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre. They proposed, further, that eight-inch gun cruisers be limited to a small number or to a small total tonnage limitation, and that the smaller class of cruisers carrying six-inch guns or less be permitted a much larger total tonnage, or, what amounts to the same thing, to a very large number of cruisers of this class. The limitation proposed by the British Delegation on this smaller class of cruisers was so high that the American Delegation considered it in effect no limitation at all. This same proposal is now presented in a new and even more objectionable form which still limits large cruisers, which are suitable to American needs, but frankly places no limitation whatever on cruisers carrying guns of six inches or less in calibre. This proposal is obviously incompatible with the American position at the Three-Power Conference. It is even more unacceptable than the proposal put forward by the British Delegation at that Conference, not only because it puts the United States at a decided disadvantage, but also because it discards altogether the principle of limitation as applied to important combatant types of vessels.

Much of what has been said above as to vessels in Class 3 of the Anglo-French Agreement applies with equal or greater force to Class 4. The American Government can not accept as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons, leaving unlimited all submarines of 600 tons or under. Six-hundred-ton submarines are formidable combatant vessels. They carry the same torpedoes as are carried by larger submarines and of equal destructive force within the radius of their operation. They can also be armed with guns of five-inch calibre. The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nations of the world, abolish the submarines altogether. If, however, submarines must be continued as instruments of naval warfare, it is the

belief of the American Government that they should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number.

If there is to be further limitation upon the construction of war vessels so that competition in this regard between nations may be stopped, it is the belief of the United States that it should include all classes of combatant vessels, submarines as well as surface vessels.

The Government of the United States has earnestly and consistently advocated real reduction and limitation of naval armament. It has given its best efforts towards finding acceptable methods of attaining this most desirable end. It would be happy to continue such efforts, but it cannot consent to proposals which would leave the door wide open to unlimited building of certain types of ships of a highly efficient combatant value and would impose restrictions only on types peculiarly suitable to American needs.

The American Government seeks no special advantage on the sea, but clearly can not permit itself to be placed in a position of manifest disadvantage. The American Government feels, furthermore, that the terms of the Anglo-French Draft Agreement, in leaving unlimited so large a tonnage and so many types of vessels, would actually tend to defeat the primary objective of any disarmament conference for the reduction or the limitation of armament, in that it would not eliminate competition in naval armament and would not effect economy. For all these reasons the Government of the United States feels that no useful purpose would be served by accepting as a basis of discussion the Anglo-French proposal.

The American Government has no objection to any agreement between Great Britain and France which those countries think will be to their advantage and in the interest of limitation of armament, but naturally cannot consent that such an agreement should be applied to the United States.

In order to make quite clear that, in declining to adopt the Anglo-French Agreement as a basis for discussions of naval limitation, it seems appropriate briefly to review the attitude of the United States regarding the methods of limitation in order to show that the American Government has consistently favored a drastic proportional limitation. The success of the Washington Conference is known to all. It strictly limited all combatant ships and aircraft carriers of over 10,000 tons. In order to bring about such limitation the American Government made great sacrifices in the curtailment of plans of building and in the actual

destruction of ships already built. At the first session of the Preparatory Conference the American Government submitted proposals which were consistently adhered to at subsequent meetings:

- 1) That the total tonnage allowed in each class of combatant vessel be prescribed;
- 2) That the maximum tonnage of a unit and the maximum calibre of gun allowed for each class be prescribed;
- 3) That, so long as the total tonnage allowed to each class is not exceeded, the actual number of units may be left to the discretion of each power concerned.

Within this general plan the American proposal at the Geneva Conference was, for the United States and the British Empire, a total tonnage limitation in the cruiser class of from 250,000 to 300,000 tons, and for Japan, from 150,000 to 180,000. For the destroyer class, for the United States and the British Empire, from 200,000 to 250,000 and for Japan from 120,000 to 150,000 tons. For the submarine class, for the United States and the British Empire, 60,000, to 90,000 tons, and for Japan, 36,000 to 54,000 tons. It was further stated by the American Delegation that, if any Power represented felt justified in proposing still lower tonnage levels for auxiliary craft, the American Government would welcome such proposal.

The purpose of these proposals was that there might be no competition between the three Powers in the building of naval armament, that their respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should not be of the size and character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent, and, finally, that a wise economy dictates that further naval construction be kept to a minimum.

The Government of the United States remains willing to use its best efforts to obtain a basis of further naval limitation satisfactory to all the naval Powers, including those not represented at the Three-Power Conference at Geneva, and is willing to take into consideration in any conference the special needs of France, Italy or any other naval Power for the particular class of vessels deemed by them most suitable for their defence. This could be accomplished by permitting any of the Powers to vary the percentage of tonnage in classes within the total tonnage; a certain percentage to be agreed upon. If there was an increase in one class of vessels it should be deducted from the tonnage to be used in other classes. A proposal along these lines made by Great Britain and discussed by the American and British representatives would be sympathetically considered by the United States. It expects on the part of others, however, similar consideration

for its own needs. Unfortunately, the Anglo-French Agreement appears to fulfill none of the conditions which to the American Government seem vital. It leaves unlimited a very large class of effective fighting ships, and this very fact would inevitably lead to a renaissance of naval competition disastrous to national economy.

(註二) 伊國回答譯文

一、伊國政府ハ英國大使館カ軍縮會議準備委員會ニ上程スヘキ英佛海軍協定「テキスト」ヲ伊國政府ニ通告セル本年七月三十一日附第二八一號口上書ヲ引用スルノ光榮ヲ有ス其後同大使館ハ九月二十七日附第三五四號口上書ヲ以テ右協定ニ關シ英佛兩國間ニ交換セラレタル公文書類寫ヲ伊國政府ニ傳達シ英佛兩政府間ニハ右書類以外本件ニ關スル書類存在セサル旨ヲ附記セラレタリ右交換公文書中ニハ七月三十一日附口上書ニ記載セル協定條項以外ニ協定適用ニ對スル形式問題ヲ取扱ヒ居リ尙右形式問題ニ關スル提案採用ノ場合ニハ英國政府ハ「教育豫備兵」ニ關シ佛國政府ニ満足ヲ與フヘキコトヲ表明セラレ居レリ

二、伊國ニ通告セラレタル前記協定條項ニ依レハ軍縮會議ハ左記ノ如ク軍艦ヲ四種類ニ區分シ之ニ制限ヲ設定スヘキモノナリ

- (a) 主力艦即チ一萬噸以上ニシテ口徑二〇三「ミリメートル」以上ノ備砲ヲ有スル艦
- (b) 一萬噸以上ノ航空母艦
- (c) 一萬噸及ソレ以下ニシテ口徑一五二「ミリメートル」以上二〇三「ミリメートル」以下ノ備砲ヲ有スル艦
- (d) 大洋航行ニ堪ユル潛水艦即チ六百噸以上ノモノ

然ルニ「ワシントン」條約ハ既ニ(a)及(b)艦種ノ制限ヲ規定セルヲ以テ軍縮會議ハ右二種ニ關シテハ單ニ既定制限ヲ「ワシントン」條約調印國以外ノ諸國ニ擴大セシムヘキ方法ヲ考量スヘシ

其他ノ艦種即チ(c)及(d)ニ關シテハ軍縮會議ハ各國ニ對シ適用シ得ヘキ最大限ノ噸數ヲ定メ而シテ何國ト雖モ本協約有効期間中ハ各艦種ニ充テラレタル總噸數ヲ超ユルコトヲ得サルモノト爲スヘシ此ノ最大限ノ制限内ニ於テ各國ハ前記各艦種ニ對シ各自ノ所要噸數ヲ定メ協約有効期間中ハ之ヲ超過セサルコトヲ約束スル旨ヲ軍縮會議ニ申出ツヘシト爲セリ

三、英國政府ハ前記ノ如キ提案ニ對シ伊國ノ贊同ヲ求メ來リタルカ右同様ノ要求ハ日米兩政府ニモ亦爲サルタリ

伊國政府ハ本件諸問題ヲ研究ノ結果喜ンテ自己ノ所見ヲ開陳スヘシ

先ツ伊國政府ハ海軍問題ノミヲ分離シテ討議スルコトニ贊同スル能ハス以下述フル所ハ陸海空三軍問題ノ最モ廣ク且論理的考察ヲ前提トスルモノナリ

伊國政府ハ英佛提案中海軍ニ關スル提議及陸軍ノ教育豫備兵及動員ノ場合ニ關スル問題ノ間ニ生スル關係中ニ此意味ニ於ケル一ノ指示ヲ發見セリト信ス

伊國政府ハ又二三ノ國ニミ制限ヲ加フル如キ軍縮問題ヲ考量スル能ハス軍備及其ノ制限ハ絶對的ナルヘカラス他國トノ相對的ナルヲ要ス於茲モ亦伊國政府ハ少クモ主義ニ於テ「ワシントン」條約ノ條項ヲ未調印諸國ニ擴大セントスル英佛案文中ニ右伊國ノ主張ノ適用ヲ發見セリト信ス

四、陸、海、空軍軍縮ニ關シテハ伊國政府ハ既ニ他ノ場合ニ於テ爲セル聲明ヲ繰返ヘサントス即チ伊國政府ハ卒先シテ歐洲大陸ノ他ノ國ヨリ劣勢トナラサル限り如何ナル數字迄ニモ縮少ヲ爲スノ用意アリ伊國政府ハ軍縮會議ノ實現スヘキ聯盟規約第八條ノ主義即チ國防上ノ必要ニ副フ最少限度ノ軍縮ヲ齎ラサンカ爲ニハ右聲明以外何モノモ忠實ニシテ且完全ニ之カ適用ヲ示スコトヲ得スト思考ス

伊國政府ハ海軍問題ニ付該主義ノ適用ニ對シ最モ適當ナル方法ハ艦種別制限ヨリモ寧ロ總噸數制限主義ノ

採用ナリト信ス

總噸數主義ニ依レハ各國ノ各自ノ所見ニ從ヒ總噸數ヲ活用シ得ヘク大ナル伸縮性ト形態ノ適合性トヲ有スル結果各國ハ最低限ノ制限ヲ承認スルコトヲ得ヘク而シテ軍縮ノ實ヲ舉クルト共ニ經費ノ輕減ヲ爲スニ至ルヘシ

以上ハ總テノ國ニ適用セラルヘキ一般の見解ナリ次ニ所要目的ニ對シ一層大ナル重要性ヲ齎ラスヘキ左ノ見解ハ軍備ノ少ナキ國ニ直接關係アルモノナリ

艦種別主義ニ依レハ財力豐カナル國ハ財力乏シキ國ニ比シ各艦種共絶對優勢ヲ保持スルヲ得ヘシ然ルニ總噸數主義ニ依レハ各國ハ自己ノ國防上ノ必要ニ鑑ミ自己ニ適スルト認ムル艦種ヲ選ミ得ルカ爲軍備ノ少ナキ國ハ右艦種ノ選擇ト適合トヲ以テ他國ノ優勢ニ對シ何等カ補フコトヲ得ヘシ

伊國ノ特種情勢ニ鑑ミ伊國カ曾テ爲セル聲明ニ基キ左記ノ如キ自國ノ自然の狀況ヨリ國家防禦ノ必要ヲ考慮スルノ已ム無キニ至レリ

伊國ハ世界各地トノ交通ハ僅カニ三線ヲ有シ物資ノ供給ヲ受ケンカ爲ニハ必ス「スエズ」「ジブラルタル」及「ダルダネル」ノ三通路ヲ經由セサルヘカラス

伊國ハ長キ海岸線ヲ有シ其ノ海岸ニハ人口稠密ニシテ而カモ國家生活ノ中心ヲ爲ス多數ノ都市存在スル外僅カ海岸ヲ離レテ二大島及「ドデカネーヅ」アリテ共ニ本國ト緊密ノ關係アル交通路ニ依リ連結セラレ居レリ伊國ハ地中海ニ進出シ又ハ進出シ得ヘキ國家ニシテ特ニ其ノ地理的位置ニ幸ヒセラレ交通ノ幹線ヲ脅カシ又多數ノ各種艦艇ヲ所有シ或ハ大規模ノ海軍計畫ヲ遂行セントスル他國ニ對シ考量セサルヘカラス

五、右同様ノ考察ハ海軍建造計畫ノ事前通告ニ關スル今同ノ英佛提議ニ對シテモ亦有效ナリ英佛提議ノ如キ方法ヲ採用スレハ技術ノ進歩及形勢ノ變化ニ依リ各艦種ノ能率ニ及ホスヘキ豫見シ能ハサル事態ニ備ヘン

カ爲各國ハ必然的ニ最モ大ナル海軍計畫ヲ實行スルニ至ルヘシ

六、英佛案文中(a)及(b)項ハ主力艦及航空母艦ニ就テ「ワシントン」條約ノ條項ヲ未調印國ニ擴大スヘキコトヲ勸告セントスルモノナリ

多數ノ相違セル見解ヲ融和スルノ困難ナルニ顧ミ伊國政府ハ海軍軍縮ニ最モ有效ナル一方法トシテ「ワシントン」條約調印五大國ハ同條約ノ認ムル千九百三十一年乃至千九百三十六年ノ間ニ建造シ得ル主力艦ノ建造ヲ千九百三十六年以後ニ延期スルコトヲ約束スヘキヲ可ナリト信ス伊國政府ハ他ノ調印國ニ於テ一様ニ約束スル場合ニハ前記ノ約束ヲナスヘキ用意アリ

此種調印ノ採用ハ五大國ハ「ワシントン」條約ノ豫見スル千九百三十一年度ニ於ケル關係ヲ繼續スルモノニシテ五大海軍國ノ平和の精神ノ實際の證左ヲ世界ニ示スコトナルヘシ右ハ著シキ節約ヲ保障シ且英佛案ノ大ナル不安ノ一トスル所即チ大ナル攻撃力ヲ有スル軍艦ヲ特ニ制限セントスル趣旨ニモ満足ヲ與フヘキモノナリ

七、伊國政府ハ英國政府ニ對スル回答トシテ最モ友誼アリ且最モ誠實ナル協力的精神ヲ以テ敘上ノ見解ヲ提示スルノ光榮ヲ有ス

伊國政府ハ本件問題ノ主要ナルコト及何等カ問題ノ解決方法ヲ講スルノ必要ナルコトヲ充分ニ考慮シタリ伊國政府ハ此ノ希望ニ副フヘキ眞ノ解決ハ等シク各國ノ正當ナル要求ヲ調節シ各國自ラ進ンテ忠實ニ贊同スルカ如キモノタルヘシト思考ス

從來英佛同様歐洲ノ整頓及再建設ニ關スル重要ナル國際諸條約ニ參加セル伊國政府ハ軍縮問題ニ對シテモ亦右歐洲ノ強固ト再建設トヲ増大シ裨益シ得ル一ノ機關タルヘキ總テノ協力ト貢獻トヲ爲スヘキ決意アルコトヲ玆ニ重ネテ確言ス

「ローマ」 千九百二十八年十月六日（第六年）

### 第三項 英佛協定ノ後始末

上述ノ如ク英佛協定ハ米伊兩國ノ拒絶スル所トナリタルヲ以テ自然消滅ノ外ナキ運命ニアリタル處本協定ノ内容ハ之ヲ外部ニ發表セス只日、米、伊ノ關係國政府ニ内報スルニ止メタルヲ以テ其ノ内容ニ關シ種々ノ風説ヲ生シ殊ニ米國ニ於テハ不安疑惑ノ念最モ甚タシク（註）九月二十一日「ハースト」系諸新聞紙ニ一齊ニ發表セラレタル本協定ニ關スル佛國外務省ヨリ在外佛國外交使節ニ發送セル所謂極秘文書ナルモノノ摘發の記事ノ如キ米國政界及外交關係方面ニ異常ナル「センセーシヨン」ヲ惹起シ本協定カ極端ナル祕密外交ノ所産ナルコトヲ非難スル聲米國ハ勿論英國内ニ於テモ漸ク旺トナリタルヲ以テ英佛兩國政府ハ協議ノ末兩國間往復公文書ヲ公表スルコトナリタリ其後十一月六日英國上院ニ於テ本問題ニ關スル論議中一議員ヨリ英佛協定ハ死物トナリ事態ハ協定前ノ狀況ニ復シタルモノナリヤ將又當事國間ニ何等義務ノ殘存スル次第ナリヤトノ質問アリタル處ニ對シ「ソールズベリー」卿ハ同協定ハ全ク終焉ヲ告ケタルモノナリト答辯シタルコトアリ從テ七月二十日附公文ニ依レハ本協定カ關係國ニ依リテ受諾セラレサル場合ニ於テモ海軍制限實現ノ爲共同政策ヲ執ル爲相互ニ協調スルノ重要ナル義務アルコト依然タルヘシトノ了解存シ居タルニモ拘ラス其後英佛間ニ何等ノ話合モナク兩國共ニ此種協定ハ今後日、英、米、佛、伊ノ五國間ニ同時ニ協議スルニ非サレハ成功セストノ意見トナリタルモノノ如シ

（註）英佛協定カ米國ニ於テ極度ニ其ノ對英反感ヲ刺戟シ一度下火トナリ居タル海軍擴張熱ヲ煽リ遂ニ海軍建造法成立ノ主要ナル素因ノ一トナリシコトハ前節所述ノ通ナリ

## 第三節 「ジュネーヴ」會議後ニ於ケル英國政府ノ對海軍軍縮態度

### 第一項 英國政府ノ主力艦制限問題提議

「ジュネーヴ」會議後暫ク英國政府ハ海軍軍備制限問題ニ關シ其ノ態度ヲ表明スル所ナカリシカ其後情勢ノ變移ニ伴ヒ隨時其ノ態度ヲ表明スルニ至リタリ其ノ第一ハ千九百二十八年（昭和三年）三月第五回軍縮準備委員會ニ於ケル主力艦制限問題ニ關スル提議、第二ハ英佛海軍協定ノ妥結、第三ハ米國海軍建造法成立後ニ於ケル在米英國大使「ハワード」ノ聲明ナリ右ノ中第二ニ付テハ既ニ前節ニ於テ記述スルアリタルカ故ニ茲ニ第一及第三ニ付記述スヘシ

千九百二十八年二月米國ニ於テ海軍擴張問題ニ關スル論議最モ旺ナリシ折柄同月二十八日在本邦英國代理大使ハ出淵外務次官ヲ來訪シ同政府ニ於テハ第五回軍縮準備委員會ニ主力艦問題ヲ提起セントスル意向ナルカ米國大統領選舉切迫セルニ鑑ミ同政府ハ之ニ依リ「ワシントン」條約ヲ即時改訂スルカ如キ最終的決定ヲ期待セス只一般的軍備縮少ニ大ナル貢獻ヲ爲スモノトシテ概括的ノ提案ヲ爲サムトスルニ過キサル意向ナルコト及「ワシントン」條約締約國代表者カ「ジュネーヴ」ニ會合スル機會ヲ利用シ條約第二十一條第二項ニ依ル會議ヲ「ジュネーヴ」三國會議ニ於テ考慮セラレタル如ク繰上ケ開催スル期日ヲ確定セン爲協定シ且英國提案ノ要旨ニ付非公式意見ノ交換ヲ爲サンコトヲ希望スルニ付（右會議ハ千九百二十八年秋若ハ遅クトモ千九百二十九年春開催スヘシトノ英國政府ノ意向ナリ）日本政府ニ於テ在「ジュネーヴ」英國代表ヲ支援シ右目的ヲ達成セシムル様日本代表ニ訓令アリタキ旨ヲ記載セル「エイド、メモアール」ヲ手交シタリ然ルニ越テ三月二日同代理大使ハ右「エイド、メモアール」ヲ取消シ之ニ代フルニ公文ヲ以テ單ニ英國政府ハ來ルヘキ軍備縮少會議準備委員會ニ主力艦問題ヲ提起スルノ意向ナル旨通報シ來リタリ

英國政府カ最初突如トシテ前記ノ如キ提議ヲ爲シ乍ラ急遽之ヲ撤回シ單ニ右ノ如キ通告ニ止メタル真意及事情ニ付テハ其ノ真相ヲ把握スルコト頗ル困難ナルモ當時在米松平大使カ英國大使ヨリ聞ク所ニ依レハ本件ハ佛國政府宛公文カ漏洩シタル爲米國側ノ思惑ヲ顧慮シ之ヲ糊塗センカ爲ニナサレタルモノニアラスヤト思ハレ又英國政府ノ意向ハ「ジュネーヴ」ニ於ケル準備委員會ニ於テ主力艦噸數引下ケ及艦齡延長カ一般的軍備制限上重要ナル結果ヲ及ホスヘキコトヲ説明セントスル迄ニテ強テ之ニ關スル討議ヲ提起スル心算ニ非ス又「ジュネーヴ」三國會議ノ際三國全權ニ於テ「ワシントン」條約第