

第四章 帝国政府ノ華府条約廢止通告並ニ予備交渉ノ休止

第一節 帝国政府ノ華府条約廢止通告期ノ切迫ト交渉休止

(一) 予備会商休止ニ至ル事情

今次軍縮交渉ニ処スル帝国政府ノ根本方針ニ照シ昭和九年末迄ニ華府条約廢止通告ヲ行フヘキコトハ我方既定ノ方針ナリシカ我方ハ交渉ヲ成ルヘク友好的且効果的ニ行ハントノ見地ヨリ出来得レハ各關係国ト共同シテ右廢止通告ヲ行ハントヲ希望シ右ニ関シ我代表部ニ於テ英米側ト交渉シタルモ両国共之ニ同意セス他方仏伊ニ対シテハ十一月二十七日広田大臣ヨリ在京仏伊代表者ヲ通シ華府条約共同廢止通告方ニ関スル本國政府ノ意嚮ヲ確カメタル処仏國側ハ十二月一日伊國側ハ同日何レモ我方提議ニ応シ難キ旨回答越セリ

右情勢ニ鑑ミ政府ハ帝國独自ノ措置トシテ昭和九年末迄ニ華府条約廢止通告ヲ行フニ決シ十二月三日ノ閣議ニ於テ本件廢止通告方ノ件ヲ樞密院ニ御諮詢方奏請ノコトヲ決シタルカ本件ハ十二月十一日ニ樞密院審査委員會ヲ經テ同十九日同院本會議ニ於テ全会一致可決セラレ同二十一日御裁可ヲ經タリ

曩之帝國政府ノ華府条約廢止通告ノ期日漸ク近付クヤ「デーヴィス」ハ前頭十一月二十五、六日雜談ノ際(第三章第八節)松平大使ニ対シ日本ノ本件通告ハ英米ニ相当反動ヲ生スヘキニ依リ此ノ際暫ク會議ヲ延期スル方都合ヨキカト考フト述ヘ又「スタンドレー」ハ十二月三日會談ノ際山本代表ニ対シ英側ハ交渉進展ヲ計リ

ツツアルモ日本カ華府条約廢止通告ニ決シ居ル以上華府倫敦兩條約ヲ基礎トシテ會議ヲ進ムルモ効果ナカルヘク右通告ノアリタル上ハ米代表ハ新訓令ニ接セサル限り帰國スヘシト語リタルカ更ニ「デーヴィス」ハ十二月四日英米代表會談ノ席上日本ノ華府条約廢止通告ニ依リ自分來倫ノ理由消滅セルカ故ニ此ノ上滯留ノ必要ナシト極論シタル趣ニシテ十二月六日「サイモン」外相ハ松平大使ニ対シ情勢右ノ如クナルニ付テハ米側ヲ引留ムル為又日本側ニテハ戸ヲ鎖サントスルモノニ非ス誠意ヲ以テ解決方法ヲ発見セント希望シ居ルコトヲ説明シ得ル為ニモ本件廢止通告ハ年内(昭和九年内)成ルヘク遅ク行ハントヲ希望スル旨申出タリ然レ共帝國政府ニ於テハ前述ノ如ク本件廢止通告ニ関スル國內手續ヲ着々進行セシメツツアリタル処十二月十二日「クレーギー」ハ松平大使ニ対シ近々日本ヨリ華府条約ノ廢止ヲ通告セラルルニ於テハ英米側ニ相當衝動ヲ与フヘク而シテ米代表側ニ於テハ目下為ス所ナクシテ極メテ苛立チ居ル状態ナルニ付テハ此ノ際ハ一先ツ休會シ廢止通告後人心沈靜ヲ俟テ再ヒ繼續スルコト可然大体十二月二十日頃正式休會シ其後モ非公式會談ハ繼續スルコトトシテハ如何ト申出テ尚米代表ハ十二月二十九日歸米ノ途ニ就ク筈ナリ就テハ日本ノ廢止通告ハ三十日カ三十一日迄延期出来マシキヤト述ヘタリ

次テ十二月十八日我代表部ハ休會ノ前日十九日ニ日英米三國代表會議ヲ開催休會ニ関スル「コミュニケ」ヲ決定スルコトトナリタル趣ヲ以テ右「コミュニケ」原案ヲ電報越セリ

帝國政府ハ右休會ニハ同意スルノ外ナシト認メタルカ「コミュニケ」案ニハ交渉再開期日ニ付何等確定スル所ナカリシニ依リ遅クモ昭和十年三月迄ニ再開シ得ル様期日挿入方ニ関シ英米側ニ申入方我代表ニ訓令シ我

代表ハ十二月十八、九日、英米側ニ対シ右申入レヲナシタルモ両者共之ニ同意セス「コミュニケ」中ニハ交渉再開期日ニ関シ何等言及セサルコトトナレリ

(二)予備会商ノ休止

十二月十九日三国代表全部英国下院ニ会合シ「マクドナルド」首相ヨリ休会ノ際発セラルヘキ「コミュニケ」ノ要旨ヲ説明シ之ニ対スル各国代表ノ意見ヲ求メ松平代表及「デーヴィス」代表ヨリ異存ナキ旨申述べタリ、次テ右「コミュニケ」公表ノ手續ニ関シ英国ノ関スル限り二十日ノ朝刊ニ発表セシムルコトトスルモ日米ニ関シテハ之ヲ定メス十九日午後五時ニ英国ヨリ日米両国ニ通報スルコトニ打合セタリ

次ニ「マクドナルド」首相ハ英国ヲ代表シテ軍縮事業ハ実ニ重大事業ニシテ此ノ事業ノ完成如何ハ国際政局上革命ノ齎スヨリ以上ノ影響ヲ有スル次第ナルカ英国トシテハ相互ニ相手国ノ立場ニ付テモ充分ノ理解ヲ有スルコトニ努メ協力シテ世界平和ノ確立ニ力ヲ尽シ度キ旨竝ニ今回ノ休会ハ臨時ノ休会ニシテ休会中ト雖モ各国ト意見ノ交換ヲ行ヒ度希望ヲ有スル旨ヲ述ヘタルニ対シ松平代表ヨリ日本代表ハ今後モ引続キ各国代表ト協力シ本会議ノ基礎トナルヘキモノノ発見ニ努力シタキ旨及此ノ会合カ一日モ速ニ再開セラルルニ至ランコトヲ希望スル旨ヲ述ヘ「デーヴィス」ヨリモ三大海軍国協調ノ要ヲ説キ主催国ニ謝意ヲ表スルトコロアリ、会議ハ茲ニ休会セラレタリ

「コミュニケ」英文

The naval conversations, which were started last June, and, after a recess have been proceeding since October 23rd, are agreed by the representatives of all three Governments to have served a useful purpose. These conversations, which were initiated under the London Naval Treaty of 1930, became broadened in scope in the light of proposals and suggestions subsequently made. Every aspect of the naval problem has been discussed between the parties frankly, fully and amicably. It was never the purpose of these preliminary conversations to reach any hard and fast conclusion: the sole purpose was to prepare the ground for future negotiation and agreement. The French and Italian Governments, who were also signatories of the present naval treaties and were associated with the discussions in the summer, have been kept informed of all developments.

Although the three Governments represented in these conversations are in favour of a continuation of naval limitation with such reduction as can be agreed upon by all the Powers concerned, the principle and methods for achieving this in the future remain to be determined. Now that the respective views have been made known and fully discussed, the conversations have reached a stage when it is felt that there should be an adjournment in order that the delegates may resume personal contact with their

Governments and the resulting situation can be fully analysed and further considered. It has therefore been agreed to adjourn the conversations at this point.

The Governments concerned in the London conversations will keep in close touch with each other and with the other Governments which are parties to the London and Washington Naval Treaties. The adjournment will also give His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom an opportunity for further consultation with the Governments of the Dominions. It is hoped that, in view of the preparatory work accomplished during the conversations which have already taken place, the situation will so develop as to justify a subsequent meeting as soon as the opportune moment arrives. In that event the Government of the United Kingdom which initiated the present conversations, will take the appropriate steps.

予備交渉休止ニ関スル「コミュニケ」(昭和九年十二月二十日公表)

去ル六月開始セラレタル海軍交渉ハ一時休会ノ後十月二十三日以来続行セラレタルカ其ノ有益ナリシハ三国代表ノ等シク認ムル所ナリ一九三〇年「ロンドン」海軍条約ニ基キ開始セラレタル本交渉ハ爾後諸提議及「サジェスション」アリタルヲ以テ其ノ範圍ハ拡大セラレ、海軍問題ノ一切ノ方面ニ亘リ当事国間ニ卒直、充分且友誼的ニ討議セラレタリ本予備交渉ハ確固不動ノ結論ニ達センコトヲ目的トシタルコトナク将来ノ交渉及合意ノ為メニスル素地ヲ作ランコトヲ其ノ唯一ノ目的トシタルモノナリ、三国ト等シク現行海軍条約署名国

ニシテ今夏ノ討議ニ与カレル仏伊政府ハ一切ノ經過ニ関シ報道ヲ受ケ居レリ本交渉ニ参加セル三国政府ハ一切ノ關係国ニヨリテ縮少ヲ協定シ以テ引キ続キ海軍軍備制限ヲ行ハンコトニ賛シ居ルモ之ヲ将来実現スヘキ原則及方法ニ付テハ未タ決定ヲ見ス各關係国ノ見解ハ判明シ且充分ニ討議セラレタルニヨリ本交渉ハ代表者カ本国政府ト親シク打合セヲ行ヒ以テ交渉後ノ情勢ヲ充分ニ検討シ更ニ考慮ヲ加フル為休会スヘキ時機ニ達セリ因テ此ノ際交渉ヲ休止スルコトニ協定ナリタリ「ロンドン」交渉参加国政府ハ相互ニ且「ロンドン」及「ワシントン」兩条約ノ当事国政府ト密接ナル連絡ヲ保ツヘク又交渉休止ハ英国政府カ自治領政府ト更ニ協議ヲ行フノ機会ヲ与フヘシ既ニ行ハレタル交渉ニ於テ達成セラレタル準備工作ニ鑑ミ適當ナル時機到来セハ直チニ会商再開ヲ見ルカ如キ事態ノ發展センコトヲ希望ス其ノ場合ニ於テハ本交渉首唱者タル英国政府ハ適當ナル措置ヲトルヘシ

(三)交渉休止ニ関スル「マクドナルド」首相ノ議會ニ於ケル答弁

其後昭和十年一月二十三日「クレーギー」ハ加藤参事官ニ対シ英国下院ニ於テ海軍交渉特ニ日本ノ華府条約廃止通告ニ関シ質問アリタルニ対シ二十八日「マクドナルド」首相ヨリ

(一)予備交渉ニ於テハ各国ノ主張ニ関シ有益ナル意見ノ交換行ハレタルカ各国代表カ夫々本国政府ト親シク打合セヲ為スヘキ時期ニ達シタリト認メラレタルニ付十二月十九日一先ツ予備交渉ヲ休会スルコトナリタル次第ナルコト

(二)日本政府ハ十二月二十九日華府条約廃止ノ通告ヲ為シタルカ同条約カ過去ニ於テ建艦競争ヲ防止スル上ニ

於テ偉大ナル効果アリタルニ鑑ミ日本ノ処置ハ英國政府トシテハ甚タ遺憾トスル旨竝ニ

(三)日本ハ華府条約ハ廃止シタルモ關係各國ノ「プレスエイジ」及安全ノ見地ヨリ見テ公正妥当ナル新協定ニ到達スル様誠心誠意努力スベキ旨声明アリタルコト

ヲ答弁スヘキ旨申述ヘタルカ右(三)ハ帝國ノ主張ヲ十分闡明シ居ラサルモノト認メタルヲ以テ齋藤大使ヲシテ米國側ニ申入レシメタル通(後出第四章第二節(一))

帝國政府ハ今次軍縮交渉ニ対スル根本方針比率主義ヲ撤廃シ且攻撃的艦船ヲ全廢若クハ極減セントスルモノナルニ照シ華府条約ノ存続ヲ容認シ能ハサルニ依リ同条約ノ規定ニ遵ヒ廢止通告ヲ行ヒタル次第ナルモノ之ニ依リ進テ軍拡ヲ行ヒ又ハ國際平和ヲ害セントスルカ如キ意図ヲ藏セサリシハ勿論ニシテ今後モ引続キ關係諸國トノ友好的商議ヲ続行シ新協定ノ成立ニ努力シ以テ國際平和ノ増進ヲ期スルモノ

ナル趣旨ニ依ラシムルコトヲ適當ト認メタルヲ以テ此ノ趣ヲ英國政府ニ申入レシメタル結果英國政府ニ於テモ之ニ從ヒテ答弁スルコトトシタルカ二十八日下院ニ於テ「マクドナルド」首相ハ本件ニ關スル質問ニ對シ日本政府ノ華府条約ノ廢止ハ英國政府ノ最モ遺憾トスル処ナルモ幸日本政府ハ軍拡ヲ行ヒ又ハ國際平和ヲ害セントスル意図ヲ有セス今後モ引続キ關係諸國トノ友好的商議ヲ繼續シ華府条約ニ代ルヘキ公正妥当ニシテ且軍縮ノ精神ニ合致セル新協定ノ締結ニ努力シ以テ各國間ノ平和親交ヲ増進センコトヲ期ストノ保障ヲ与ヘタルハ英國政府ノ頗ル満足トスル所ナリト述ヘタリ

第二節 帝國政府ノ華府条約廢止通告

(一)華府条約廢止通告

帝國政府ハ既定ノ方針ニ遵ヒ且諸般ノ情勢ニ顧ミ昭和九年十二月二十九日ヲ以テ在米齋藤大使ヲシテ華府条約第二十三条ノ規定ニ從ヒ米國政府ニ對シ帝國政府ノ華府条約廢止ノ意思ヲ通告セシムルト共ニ

帝國政府ハ今次軍縮交渉ニ對スル其ノ根本方針比率主義ヲ撤廃シ且攻撃的艦船ヲ全廢若クハ極減セムトスルモノナルニ照シ華府条約ノ存続ヲ容認シ能ハサルニ依リ同条約ノ規定ニ遵ヒ廢止通告ヲ行フモノナルカ之ニ依リ進テ軍拡ヲ行ヒ又ハ國際平和ヲ害セムトスルカ如キ意図ヲ藏セサルハ勿論ニシテ今後モ引続キ關係諸國トノ友好的商議ヲ続行シ新協定ノ成立ニ努力シ以テ國際平和ノ増進ヲ期スルモノナル旨ヲ申入レシメタルカ尚同時ニ英仏伊各政府当局ニ對シテモ我在外使臣ヲシテ廢止通告文写ヲ示スト共ニ前頭ノ趣旨ヲ申入レシメタリ

Japanese Embassy, Washington,

December 29, 1934.

Sir,

I have the honour, under instruction from my Government, to communicate to you the following :

In accordance with Article XXIII of the Treaty concerning the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, the Government of Japan hereby give notice to the Government of the United States of America of their intention to terminate the said Treaty, which will accordingly cease to be in force after the 31st December, 1936.

Accept, Sir, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Signed) Hiroshi Saito

The Honourable Cordell Hull
Secretary of State
Washington.

以書翰啓上致候陳者本使ハ本国政府ノ訓令ニ依リ左ノ通閣下ニ通報スルノ光榮ヲ有シ候

日本国政府ハ千九百二十二年二月六日「ワシントン」ニ於テ署名セラレタル海軍軍備制限ニ関スル条約第二十三条ニ從ヒ茲ニ「アメリカ」合衆国政府ニ対シ右条約ヲ廃止スルノ意思ヲ通告ス依テ右条約ハ千九百

三十六年十二月三十一日後ハ効力ヲ有セサルモノトス

本使ハ茲ニ閣下ニ向テ重テ敬意ヲ表シ候

敬 具

千九百三十四年十二月二十九日

齋 藤 博

在「ワシントン」

國務長官 コーデル、ハル閣下

(二) 帝国ノ華府条約廃止通告ニ関スル仏国ノ対米通牒

昭和十年一月四日在京仏国大使ハ広田大臣ヲ来訪本国政府ノ訓令ニ基ツク趣ヲ以テ米国政府ヨリ帝国政府ノ華府条約廃止通告ノ件通報アリタルニ対スル仏国政府ノ対米復答ノ写ヲ交付シタルカ右ハ仏国政府カ華府条約ノ更新ニ同意シ得ヘカラサリシ事情ヲ拳ケタル後仏国政府ニ於テハ新軍縮協定ハ華府条約關係五国ニ限定セラルヘキモノニ非スト認メ居ル旨記載セルモノニシテ仏国大使ハ右末段ノ件ニ関シ我方ノ意向ヲ訊ネタルニ付広田大臣ハ我方ハ共通最大限ノ設定ヲ重視スルニ依リ先ツ以テ英米ト話合ヲ逐クルノ要アリ從テ両国ノ右諾否明カナラサルニ一般海軍国ヲモ参加セシムルコトノ適當ナリヤ否ヤハ疑問トスル旨答ヘタリ

第三節 日米代表ノ引揚ケ

(一) 米国代表ノ帰国

米国代表一行ハ十二月二十九日退英帰国ノ途ニ上リタルカ同日「デーヴィス」ハ暇乞ノ為松平代表ヲ訪問シ交渉カ友好的の雰囲気ニ休止セラレタルハ結構ナルカ華府条約廃止通告ノ結果輿論ニ悪影響ヲ及ボサルヤヲ気ニシタルヲ以テ松平代表ハ相互ニ輿論ニ対スル刺戟ヲ避クルコト必要ナル旨ヲ述ヘタリ尚「デーヴィス」ハ英国ノ御大典ノ関係モアリ六ヶ月位休会シ輿論ノ趨向ヲ見ルコト必要ナルヘシト述ヘタルニ付松平代表ハ各国共将来ノ造艦計画ヲ定ムル必要モアリ旁々成ルヘク速ニ交渉ヲ再開シ本會議モ速カニ終ルコト必要ト思考スル旨答ヘタリ

(二) 山本代表ノ引揚ケ

山本代表ハ随員一行ト共二月二十八日倫敦発西伯利亜經由帰朝ノ途ニ就ケリ

第四節 英国ノ所要最少限海軍力ニ関スル対日通牒

其後昭和十年一月十五日英国政府ハ駐英松平大使ニ対シ英国海軍ノ所要最少限兵力ニ関シ左ノ「ノート」ヲ手交セリ

Strictly Confidential.

NOTES ON THE MINIMUM BRITISH NAVAL STRENGTH

NECESSARY FOR SECURITY.

At the final meeting of the three Delegations on the 19th December, the Prime Minister urged the representatives of Japan and U.S.A. to realise that Great Britain was basing herself on essentials and asked them, therefore, not to assume that it was only a matter of pressure or time for the United Kingdom to change. The figures that have been communicated to the Japanese and the U.S.A. representatives are, in fact, not maxima up to which the United Kingdom desires to be able to build, but minima below which the British Empire cannot feel a sense of security.

2. As stated in the Japanese fundamental claim "To possess the measure of armament necessary for national safety is a right to which all nations are equally entitled and "due regard must be given to that right in order that the sense of national security of the various powers might not be impaired". The unique situation of the British Empire lies in the fact that it is not a single unit geographically concentrated in one area of the world but consists of a number of Dominions and Colonies scattered over the whole world. Consequently, the strength of the British Navy must be calculated so as to produce a sense of national security in all the Dominions and Colonies, each of which has a right to its own safety.

3. In estimating the naval needs of the British Empire, it is accordingly necessary to take into

account responsibilities in European waters and in the Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Oceans. This implies the possession of a fleet of sufficient strength to be able to dispose simultaneously in more than one area forces adequate to meet all reasonable defensive needs.

Capital Ships.

4. When the matter of capital ship strength was considered at Washington in 1922 and again in London in 1930, it was decided that 15 capital ships represented the minimum which would give to the British Empire the requisite defensive strength.

Since then Germany has not only built 4 battlecruisers of a special type but will undoubtedly insist on naval expansion qualitatively as well as quantitatively. Italy is already building 2 capital ships of 35,000 tons each ; France will wish to lay down ships of the same size and is understood, in addition, to wish to increase her capital ship strength beyond the limits imposed by the Washington Naval Treaty. If these tendencies continue and if there is no international agreement on naval limitation after 1936, the probabilities are that, far from any decrease in British capital ship strength being possible a further increase in numbers would be rendered necessary.

5. With less than 15 capital ships it would not be possible to provide reasonable security both in European waters and elsewhere. The tonnage figure in this category communicated to the Japanese

representatives, however, is dependent also on the qualitative limit to be arrived at for new capital ships. The British Government have, as is well known, proposed a limit of 25,000 tons with 12" guns, a reduction of 28 % on the existing limit. Could this limit be generally agreed upon, the tonnage in the capital ship category could ultimately be correspondingly reduced.

Aircraft Carriers.

6. The under-age tonnage of aircraft carriers that was communicated to the Japanese representatives was calculated on 5 units of the proposed maximum size of 22,000 tons each. This is the least number of units that could be accepted for the normal operations of the British Fleet. The Japanese representatives have proposed, however, that the future qualitative limit should be reduced to 20,000 tons. If there is a reasonable prospect of agreement in other categories, the British Government would be willing to consider this reduction with a corresponding reduction of the tonnage in the category.

7. Further, if it should prove possible to bring about the abolition of bombing, still greater reductions might be made in the aircraft carrier category.

Cruisers.

8. The British Government have already announced their hope of the ultimate abolition of the 8" gun cruiser. All such vessels, however, are comparatively modern, and it is highly improbable that foreign

powers would agree to scrap them before the end of 1942. France and Italy each have 7 of these vessels in service already, and Japan has 12, while America has 18 built and building. It is not possible, therefore, for the British Empire to reduce below the 15 ships already built.

9. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire agreed to the low total cruiser figure of 339,000 tons, which was calculated on a basis of 50 cruisers. Even if it were possible to make a further agreement on such a basis (and reasons why it is not are given below) the tonnage figure would have to be considerably larger than 339,000 tons. The British Empire cannot replace existing small wartime cruisers by ships that would be outclassed from the start by those of other navies. From this it follows that there must be an automatic increase, even without any increase in the number of ships, from a tonnage of 339,000 to about 410,000 tons. This figure is based on the general acceptance of a future qualitative limitation of 7,000 tons, and would be made up as follows: -

15 - 8" Gun Cruisers	146,800 tons
10 Large 6" Gun Cruisers	95,000 "
8 Leanders	57,000 "
4 Arethusas	20,800 "
<u>13 New ships at 7,000 tons</u>	<u>91,000 "</u>

410,600 "

10. In the London Naval Treaty the British Empire accepted a cruiser tonnage figure based upon the tonnage of 50 cruisers for the following reasons:

- (a) Under the international conditions existing at that time, the prospect for the next six years was more unclouded than it can be said to be today.
- (b) It was accepted subject to the Powers other than the three signatories to Part III of the London Naval Treaty agreeing to corresponding reductions. This has not occurred: on the contrary the naval forces in Europe have greatly increased.
- (c) In 1930 we were on the eve of a General Disarmament Conference from which much was hoped.
- (d) In the process of a steady reconstruction of the fleet after the war a halt had been called in cruiser building for some years, in the hope of inducing a corresponding halt in foreign building. Thus, the curve indicating the number of British under-age cruisers was at its lowest during the period of the treaty.

It is unfortunately the case that since the London Naval Treaty was concluded in 1930, a serious deterioration in the international and political outlook has occurred. Further, there are not present today any of the other conditions that rendered possible the acceptance in 1930 of a cruiser tonnage

based on 50 ships.

11. The British 6" gun cruiser under-age tonnage is governed by the intention of the British Government to arrive, by a programme of steady building of about 3 ships a year, at an ultimate total of (including 15 8" gun cruisers) 70 ships, of which 10 would be over-age. Due to the necessity for building large 6" gun cruisers, brought about by the building of such ships by the U.S.A. and Japan, the 243,800 tons of under-age tonnage at the end of 1942 (the figure given to the U.S.A. and Japanese representatives) would represent only 32 ships, making at that time with the 8" gun cruisers a total of 47 under-age cruisers in all. A balance of over-age ships must, therefore, be retained to provide security.

Destroyers.

12. The 150,000 tons of under-age destroyer tonnage is the same as that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and could only be reduced if submarines were abolished or drastically reduced in numbers. (If submarines were abolished, 100,000 tons of destroyers would be sufficient). As, however, an increase of submarine tonnage appears likely in certain European navies as well as in the Japanese Navy, it will be necessary to retain additional over-age destroyer tonnage.

Submarines.

13. The British Government desire to abolish all submarines. If this cannot be achieved, however, they neither desire nor intend to increase their tonnage beyond that agreed upon in the London Naval Treaty and would consider the additional destroyer tonnage required by an increase in the submarine tonnage of others as a provision in lieu of an increase in their own submarine tonnage.

January 15th, 1935.

安全ニ必要ナル最少限英国海軍力ニ関スル「ノート」

十二月十九日ノ最終三国代表會議ノ席上首相ハ日米両国代表ニ対シ英国ハ自主的所要量ヲ考慮セルモノナルヲ以テ、英国ニ圧迫ヲ加フレハ或ハ藉スニ時ヲ以テセハ英国ノ態度カ変スヘシトノ見解ヲ抱カレサル様要請セリ日米両国代表ニ通報サレタル数字ハ實際ニ於テ連合王国力右迄建造シ得ル様希望スル最高限ニハ非スシテ右以下ニテハ英帝国カ安全感ヲ有シ得ストスル最少限ナリ

一、日本ノ根本要求ニ述ヘラレタル如ク「国家ノ安全ニ必要ナル軍備形態ヲ保有スルノ權利ハ一切ノ国家カ同様ニ享有スヘキ權利ニシテ右權利ニ対シテハ各国ノ国防安全感力毀損サレサル様適當ナル注意カ払ハレサルヘカラス」英帝国ノ特殊ナル地位ハ英帝国カ地理的ニ世界ノ一地域ニ集中セラレタル一単位ニハ非スシテ全世界ニ散在セル多数ノ領土及植民地ヨリ成ル点ニ存ス從テ英国海軍ノ勢力ハ個々ノ領土及植民地カ

各ノ安全ノ權利ヲ有スル一切ノ領土及植民地ニ国防ノ安全感ヲ与フル様考慮セラレサルヘカラス

三、從テ英帝国ノ海軍所要量算定ニ當リテハ欧州ノ海洋、大西洋、印度洋及太平洋ニ於ケル責任ヲ考慮ニ入ルルコト必要ナリ右ハ数地域ニ於テ同時ニ一切ノ防禦的必要ニ適合スル適當ナル兵力ヲ処理シ得ル充分ナル勢力ヲ有スル艦隊ノ保有ヲ意味ス

主力艦

四、主力艦勢力ノ問題カ一九二二年華盛頓ニ於テ及一九三〇年倫敦ニ於テ議セラレタル時ニ於テ十五隻ノ主力艦ハ英帝国ニ必要ナル防禦力ヲ与フヘキ最小限ヲ示スモノト決定セラレタリ其後独逸ハ特殊艦型ノ戰艦巡洋艦四隻ヲ建造セルノミナラス將來量ノニモ質的ニモ海軍拡張ヲ主張スヘキヤ疑ナシ伊太利ハ既ニ三万五千噸ノ主力艦二隻ヲ建造中ナリ仏蘭西ハ同様ノ大キサノ艦船起工ヲ希望スヘク且華盛頓條約ニヨリ課セラレタル制限ヲ超エテ其主力艦ノ勢力ヲ増加センコトヲ希望スヘシ若シ右傾向ニシテ繼續シ且一九三六年後海軍制限ニ関スル何等ノ國際協定ナキ場合ニハ英國主力艦勢力ノ減少ハ問題トナラスシテ却テ其數ノ増加カ必要トセラルルニ至ルヘシ

五、十五隻ニ達セサル主力艦ヲ以テシテハ欧州ノ海洋其他ニ於テ適當ナル安全感ヲ供与スルコト不可能ナルヘシ日本代表ニ通報セラレタル右艦種ノ噸數ハ新主力艦ニ関シ到達セラルヘキ質的制限ヲモ条件トスルモノナリ英國政府ハ充分諒解セラレタル通り現存制限ニ對シ二割八分ノ縮減ニ相當セル二万五千噸十二吋砲ノ制限ヲ提案セリ右制限ニシテ一般の合意ニ達ストセハ主力艦々種ニ於ケル噸數ハ終ニハ同様ノ縮減ヲ見

ルヘシ

六、日本代表ニ通報セラレタル航空母艦ノ艦齡内ノ噸數ハ提案最大噸數二万二千噸ノ航空母艦五單位ヲ考慮セルモノナリ右ハ英艦隊ヲ普通ニ活動セシムル為受諾シ得ヘキ最少ノ單位ナリ然レトモ日本代表ハ將來ノ質的制限ハ二万噸ニ縮減サルヘキコトヲ提議セリ若シ他ノ艦種ニ於ケル合意カ可能ナル見込アルニ於テハ英國政府ハ右縮減、從ツテ航空母艦艦種ニ於ケル噸數ヲ右ニ対応シテ縮減スルコトニ付欣然考慮ヲ加フヘシ

七、更ニ進ンテ若シ爆撃全廢ヲ協定シ得ルニ於テハ航空母艦艦種ニ於テヨリ大ナル縮減ヲ為スコトヲ得ヘシ八、英國政府ハ既ニ八吋砲巡洋艦ヲ窮極ニ於テ廢止セントスル其ノ希望ヲ表明セリ然レトモ一切ノ右艦船ハ比較的現代的ノモノニシテ諸外國カ右艦船ヲ一九四二年前ニ廢棄スルカ如キハアリ得ヘカラサルヘシ仏蘭西及伊太利ハ各々既ニ就役中ノ右艦種七隻ヲ有シ日本ハ十二隻「アメリカ」ハ既成艦及建造中ノモノヲ併セ十八隻ヲ保有ス故ニ英帝国カ既ニ竣工セル十五隻未滿ニ其ノ隻數ヲ縮減スルコトハ不可能ナリ

九、倫敦海軍條約ニ於テ英帝国ハ巡洋艦五十隻ノ基礎ノ下ニ計量セラレタル巡洋艦總噸數三十三万九千噸ナル低キ數字ニ同意セリ仮令右ノ如キ基礎ノ下ニ現在新ニ協定スルコト可能ナリトスルモ（其ノ不可能ナルハ後述ノ通ナルモ）其總噸數ハ三十三万九千噸ヨリモ遙ニ大ナルモノタルヘシ英帝国ハ既存ノ小戰時巡洋艦ヲ他國海軍ノ有スル最初ヨリ艦型ノ大ナル艦船ヲ以テ代換スルコトヲ得ス從テ仮令其ノ艦船ノ數ヲ増加セストスルモ自動的ニ三十三万九千噸ヨリ約四十一万噸ニ増加ヲ見ルコトトナルヘシ右數字ハ將來七千噸

ノ質的制限ヲ一般ニ受諾セサルヘキコトヲ根拠トシ次ノ基礎ニヨル

八吋砲巡洋艦	十五隻	一四六、八〇〇噸
大型六吋砲巡洋艦	十隻	九五、〇〇〇〃
「リアンダー」級	八隻	五七、〇〇〇〃
「アレシユーズ」級	四隻	二〇、八〇〇〃
七千噸新建造艦	十三隻	九一、〇〇〇〃
合計	五十隻	四一〇、六〇〇〃

一〇、倫敦海軍条約ニ於テハ英帝国ハ次ノ理由ニヨリ巡洋艦五十隻ノ噸数ニ基ク巡洋艦ノ噸数ヲ受諾セリ

(イ)當時存在セル国際情勢ノ下ニ於テハ次ノ六年間ニ対スル見透シハ現今ヨリモヨリ明朗ナリキ

(ロ)右ハ倫敦条約第四編ノ三締約国以外ノ国家力之ニ対応セル縮減ヲ為スコトニ合意スヘキコトヲ条件トシテ受諾サレタルモノナリ然ルニ此ノ事ナク却テ欧州ノ海軍兵力ハ非常ニ増大セリ

(ハ)一九三〇年ニ於テハ吾人ハ多クヲ期待サレタル一般の軍縮會議ノ門出ニアリタリ

(ニ)戦後ニ於ケル艦隊ノ堅実ナル再建ノ過程ニ於テ数年ノ間巡洋艦建造ニ停止ヲ為シ外国ニ於ケル建造ニ於テ右ニ対応スル停止ヲ誘発センコトヲ希望セリ、斯テ英国ノ艦齡下巡洋艦ノ数ヲ示ス曲線ハ条約期間中

ニ於ケル最低下ニアリタリ

不幸ニモ一九三〇年倫敦海軍条約カ締結サレテ以来国際竝ニ政治的展望ニ於テ重大ナル減損起リシナリ

加之一九三〇年ニ於テ五十隻ヲ基礎トスル巡洋艦ノ噸数ノ受諾ヲ可能ナラシメタル条件ノ何レノ一モ今日ハ現存セス

一一、英国ノ六吋砲巡洋艦ノ艦齡下噸数ハ一年略々三隻ノ堅実ナル建造計画ニヨリ窮極ニ於テ七十隻（八吋砲巡洋艦十五隻ヲ含ム）ニ達セントスル英国政府ノ意図ニヨリ支配セラル但シ右ノ中十隻ハ艦齡超過艦ナルヘシ亜米利加合衆国及日本ノ大型六吋砲巡洋艦建造ニヨリテ此ノ種艦船ノ建造必要トナリタルニ鑑ミ一九四二年末ニ於ケル艦齡下噸数二十四万三千八百噸（亜米利加合衆国及日本代表ニ与ヘラレタル数字）ハ僅ニ三十二隻ヲ表示スルコトトナリ當時ニ於テ八吋砲巡洋艦ヲ併セ合計四十七隻ノ艦齡下巡洋艦トナルヘシ、故ニ安全感保持ノ為艦齡超過艦ノ差額カ保有セラレサル可カラス

駆逐艦

一二、艦齡下駆逐艦噸数十五万噸ハ倫敦海軍条約ニ於テ協定サレタルト同様ノモノニシテ潜水艦カ全廢サレ又ハ数ニ於テ大縮減ヲ見ル場合ニ於テノミ縮減サレ得ヘシ（潜水艦全廢ノ場合ニ於テハ駆逐艦十萬噸ヲ以テ足ルヘシ）然レトモ欧州ノ或ル国ノ海軍及日本海軍ニ於テ潜水艦噸数ヲ増加スルカ如キ形勢ニアルヲ以テ更ニ艦齡超過ノ駆逐艦噸数ヲ保有スルコト必要ナルヘシ

潜水艦

一三、英国政府ハ一切ノ潜水艦ヲ廢止センコトヲ希望ス、然レトモ若シ右ニシテ成就セラレサルニ於テハ英政府ハ倫敦海軍条約ニ於テ協定セラレタルトコロヲ超エテ其ノ噸数ヲ増加スルノ希望モ意図モ有セスシ

テ他国ノ潜水艦ノ噸数増加ニヨリ必要トセラルル駆逐艦ノ追加噸数ハ其ノ潜水艦ノ噸数ヲ増加セサル代償
ト見做スヘシ

一九三五年一月十五日

二 軍縮問題ニ関スル帝国代表及在外
使臣ノ新聞記者ニ為セル談話