

RECORDS
OF THE
CONFERENCE FOR THE
LIMITATION OF NAVAL
ARMAMENT

Held at Geneva from June 20th to August 4th, 1927.

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INVITATIONS TO THE POWERS.

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GREAT BRITAIN,
JAPAN, FRANCE AND ITALY
REGARDING THE FURTHER LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.
(February 10th to May 16th, 1927)

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 10TH, 1927.

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to my instructions, the American Ambassadors at London, Paris, Rome and Tokyo will to-day present to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan a Memorandum suggesting that they empower their delegates at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to negotiate and conclude at an early date an agreement further limiting naval armament, supplementing the Washington Treaty on that subject, and covering classes of vessels not covered by that Treaty. I transmit herewith for the information of the Congress a copy of this Memorandum.

I wish to inform the Congress of the considerations which have moved me to take this action.

The support of all measures looking to the preservation of the peace of the world has been long established as a fundamental policy of this Government. The American Government and people are convinced that competitive armaments constitute one of the most dangerous and contributing causes of international suspicion and discord and are calculated eventually to lead to war. A recognition of this fact and a desire as far as possible to remove this danger led the American Government in 1921 to call the Washington Conference.

At that time we were engaged in a great building programme which, upon its completion, would have given us first place on the sea. We felt then, however, and feel now, that the policy we then advocated — that of deliberate self-denial and limitation of naval armament by the great naval Powers — promised the attainment of at least one guarantee of peace, an end worthy of mutual adjustment and concession.

At the Washington Conference we found the other nations animated with the same desire as ourselves to remove naval competition from the list of possible causes of international discord. Unfortunately, however, it was not possible to reach agreements at Washington covering all classes of naval ships. The Washington Treaties provided a specific tonnage limitation upon capital ships and aircraft carriers with certain restrictions as to size and maximum calibre of guns for other vessels. Every nation has been at complete liberty to build a number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Only size and armament of cruisers were limited. The signatories of the Washington Treaty have fulfilled their obligations faithfully, and there can be no doubt that that Treaty constitutes an outstanding success in its operation.

It has been the hope of the American Government, constantly expressed by the Congress since the Washington Conference, that a favourable opportunity might present itself to complete the work begun here by the conclusion of further agreements covering cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The desirability of such an agreement has been apparent, since it was only to be expected that the spirit of competition, stifled as regards capital ships and aircraft carriers by the Washington Treaty, would sooner or later show itself with regard to the other vessels not limited under the Treaty. Actually, I do not believe that concentrating building of these classes of ships has begun; nevertheless far-reaching building programmes have been laid down by certain Powers, and there has appeared in our own country as well as abroad a sentiment urging naval construction on the ground that such construction is taking place elsewhere. In such sentiments lies the germ of renewed naval competition. I am sure that all Governments and all peoples would choose a system of naval limitation in preference to consciously reverting to concentrated building. Therefore, in the hope of bringing about an opportunity for discussion among the principal naval Powers to ascertain whether further limitation is practicable, I have suggested to them that negotiations on this subject should begin as soon as possible.

The moment seems particularly opportune to try to secure further limitation of armament in accordance with the expressed will of Congress. The earnest desire of the nations of the world to relieve themselves in as great a measure as possible of the burden of armaments as to avoid the dangers of competition has been shown by the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which met at Geneva last May and which is continuing its work with a view to preparing the agenda for a final general conference. For more than six months representatives of a score or more of nations have examined, from all points of view, the problem of reduction and limitation of armaments. In the discussions, it was brought out very clearly

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The American Government is most anxious that concrete results in the limitation of armament may be achieved. The discussions of the Preparatory Commission have emphasized the fact that a number of Governments consider that one of the chief present obstacles to the general reduction and limitation of armaments lies in the independence of land, sea, and air armaments, and in the consequent impossibility of reducing or limiting one of these categories without dealing simultaneously with the others. On the other hand, the discussions have demonstrated even more emphatically that, should all effort to bring about the reduction or limitation of armament be conditioned upon the acceptance by all the world of a comprehensive plan covering all classes and types of armament, there would be little, if any, prospect of actual progress toward arms limitation in the near future.

The above difficulties must be frankly recognised. The American Government believes that they can be overcome and that they must be overcome, since the consequences of a failure to overcome them and to make some definite, if only partial, agreement for the limitation of armament would constitute a setback to the cause of international peace too great to deserve serious contemplation as a possibility.

Admitting reluctantly that the existing political situations in certain parts of the world may render the problem of universal limitation incapable of immediate solution as a whole, the American Government believes that it is entirely practicable for the nations of the world to proceed at once to the isolation and separate solution of such problems as may appear susceptible of such treatment, meanwhile continuing to give sympathetic consideration and discussion to comprehensive proposals aimed at the simultaneous limitation of land, sea, and air armaments by a general agreement when such an agreement may be warranted by existing world conditions. The American Government believes that the adoption of such a course is the duty of the Governments represented on the Preparatory Commission, and that by so doing they will ensure the achievement by the Commission and by the general conference of concrete, even though perhaps only partial, results, thus facilitating progress toward the final solution of the general problem.

The American Government, as its representatives on the Preparatory Commission have repeatedly stated, feels that land and air armaments constitute essentially regional problems, to be solved primarily by regional agreements. The American Army and Air Force are at minimum strength. Agreement for land and air limitation in other regions of the world would not be dependent upon the reduction or limitation of American land and air forces. Therefore, the American Government does not feel that it can appropriately offer definite suggestions to other Powers in regard to the limitation of these categories of armament.

The problem of the limitation of naval armament, while not regional in character, can be dealt with as a practical matter by measures affecting the navies of a limited group of Powers. This has been clearly established by the success of the Washington Treaty limiting naval armament. The United States, as the initiator of the Washington Conference and as one of the principal naval Powers, has a direct interest in this question and, being both ready and willing to enter into an agreement further limiting naval armament, feels itself privileged to indicate a course of procedure which will, in its opinion, lead to such an agreement.

The discussions over a period of six months in Geneva have been most useful in the opportunity afforded for an exchange of views as to the general problem of naval limitation, and on the basis of these discussions it is felt that there is a possibility of reconciling many of the divergent views which have been expressed in such a manner as to meet the requirements of the naval Powers and enable them to decide upon acceptable measures of limitation.

In order to advance definitely toward a limitation agreement, the Government of the United States takes this method of addressing an enquiry to the Governments signatories of the Washington Treaty limiting naval armament as to whether they are disposed to empower their representatives at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission to initiate negotiations looking toward an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty.

The American Government is not unmindful of the fact that the Preparatory Commission is not specifically charged with the duty of concluding international agreements, and that its task is primarily that of preparing the agenda for a conference to be called at a later date. Nevertheless, being sincerely desirous of the success of the Preparatory Commission, the American Government makes this suggestion in the firm belief that the conclusion at Geneva, as soon as possible, among the Powers signatories of the Washington Treaty, of an agreement for further naval limitation, far from interfering with or detracting from the success of the Preparatory Commission's aims, would constitute a valuable contribution to the sum of achievement attributable to that Commission and would facilitate the task of the final conference in dealing with the particularly complex problems of land and air armament, perhaps capable of solution for the present only by regional limitation agreements.

It seems probable that under any circumstances the final conference will not be able to meet during this calendar year. The coming into effect of agreements reached by it might be delayed for a considerable period for a multitude of causes. Therefore the American Government believes that those Powers which may be able to arrive at an agreement for further naval limitation at an earlier date would not be justified in consciously postponing that agreement and thereby opening the way for a recrudescence of a spirit of competitive naval building—a development greatly to be deplored by all Governments and peoples.

The American Government feels that the general principles of the Washington Treaty offer a suitable basis for further discussion among its signatories.

Although hesitating at this time to put forward rigid proposals as regards the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the different Powers, the American Government, for its part, is disposed to accept, in regard to those classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty, an

that a number of nations felt that land, sea and air armaments were interdependent and that it would be difficult if not impossible to agree upon the limitation of one type of armament without simultaneously limiting the other types. The consequence to be feared is that a deadlock will be reached should even partial progress in the reduction of armaments be conditioned upon acceptance of some universal plan covering land, sea and air forces together. If the prospective deadlock cannot be broken, it is probable that little progress will be made for the time being. It appears to be the duty of this Government, which has always advocated limitation of armaments, to endeavour to suggest some available means by which concrete results may be achieved, even though such a result may be short of an ultimate ideal solution for the threefold problem of land, sea and air armament. Our delegates at Geneva have consistently expressed the view that, under conditions as they exist in the world to-day, the problems of land and air armaments are most susceptible of solution by regional agreements covering regions within which the land or air armaments of one country could constitute a potential threat to another country. Geographical continents have been suggested as regions appropriate for land and air limitation agreements.

The American land and air forces constitute a threat to no one. They are at a minimum strength; their reduction has been suggested by no one as a necessary condition precedent to arms limitation. This reduction of our land forces has been rendered possible by our favoured geographical position. I realise that the problems of armaments on land and in the air in Europe are beset with difficulties which in all great Powers we must recognise, and, although this Government will always be ready to lend its assistance in any appropriate way to efforts on the part of European or other Governments to arrive at regional agreements limiting land and air forces, it would hesitate to make specific proposals on this subject to European nations.

The problem of the limitation of naval armaments, while not regional in character or susceptible of regional treatment, has been successfully treated in part by an agreement among the five leading naval Powers and, in my opinion, can be definitely dealt with by further agreements among those Powers.

It will be a contribution to the success of the preliminary work now going on at Geneva should the great naval Powers themselves agree upon further definite limitation of naval armament.

It is my intention that the American representatives at Geneva should continue to discuss with the representatives of the other nations there the programme for a general limitation of armaments conference. If such a conference should be possible in the future on a basis generally acceptable, this Government would of course be highly gratified. Pending the formulation of the plan for such a general conference, however, I believe that we should make an immediate and sincere effort to solve the problem of naval limitation, the solution of which would do much to make the efforts towards more general limitation successful.

Memorandum.

The American Government has followed with close attention the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and, after the most careful deliberation, has concluded that it can helpfully make certain observations at this time, which, it hopes, may contribute materially to the success of that Commission — a success earnestly desired by the Government and people of the United States.

The conviction that the competitive augmentation of national armaments has been one of the principal causes of international suspicion and ill-will, leading to war, is firmly held by the American Government and people. Hence the American Government has neglected no opportunity to lend its sympathy and support to international efforts to reduce and limit armaments.

The success of the Washington Conference of 1921-22 demonstrated that other Powers were animated with a similar desire to do away with this dangerous source of international discord. The Washington Conference made a beginning, however, and it has been the continued hope of the American Government since 1922 that the task undertaken at Washington by the group of naval Powers could be resumed and completed.

For this reason, the American Government was happy to observe that the efforts looking towards the holding of a general international conference for the limitation of armament, which has been in progress for several years under the auspices of the League of Nations, had reached, in December 1925, a stage sufficiently advanced, in the opinion of the Council of the League of Nations, to warrant the establishment of the Preparatory Commission, to meet in 1926, to prepare the ground for an international conference at an early date. The American Government, pursuant to its policy of co-operation with all efforts calculated to bring about an actual limitation of armaments, accepted the invitation of the Council to be represented on the Preparatory Commission. The American representatives on that Commission have endeavoured to play a helpful part in its discussions, and they will continue to be guided by that policy.

The American Government believes that the discussions of the Commission have been most valuable in making clear the views of the various Governments as to the problems presented, and in demonstrating the complexity and diversity of the obstacles to be overcome in the preparation and conclusion of a general agreement for the limitation of all armament.

At the same time, these very complexities and difficulties, as brought out in the Preparatory Commission, have clearly pointed out that a final solution for the problem of armament may not be immediately practicable. Indeed, at the latest meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, several distinguished statesmen, leaders in the movement for the limitation of armament, sounded a note of warning against too great optimism of immediate success.

that, at the very moment when the Preparatory Commission is called upon to draw up its conclusions, the five most important maritime Powers should take over the question, in so far as it concerns them, and give it a definitive solution of such a nature as to prejudice the final decisions on the general naval problem?

Furthermore, the categories to which the new limitations should apply are those which are of greatest interest to the majority of the Powers. The limiting of the agreement to these few navies only could be explained if it applied only to battleships, for they are practically the only navies which have any battleships, but in the matter of light vessels the situation is different; all the navies in the world have an interest in being included in the deliberations on this important problem.

As for the French Government, which, in the question of the limitation of armaments, is concerned only from a defensive standpoint, as M. Briand declared to Mr. Hughes on December 18th, 1921, and which, in this regard, must look to the protection of its coasts and the safeguarding of its maritime communications, its delegates at Geneva have defended and obtained the acceptance by the technical committees of two general principles: that, on the one hand, the limitation of naval armaments cannot be undertaken without taking into consideration the manner in which the problems of the limitation of land and air armaments are proposed to be met; and that, on the other hand, from a naval standpoint particularly, the limitation of armaments cannot be realised without the allotment to each Power of a global tonnage which it shall be free to distribute according to its necessities.

The American proposal immediately sets these two principles aside, with the result that the French Government cannot accept this proposal without abandoning the position which it has taken before all the nations represented at Geneva. The French Government would thus be placed in public contradiction to its previous attitude.

Even so, is such a method as that proposed likely to obtain the result desired? The example of the Rome Conference in 1924 does not justify such a hope. That Conference did not even succeed in securing the adoption by the Powers which were not represented at Washington of the principles which were established there for battleships; still less did it succeed in bringing about the extension of those principles to other categories of vessels. The Powers in question would be no less mindful of their own interests should they again be asked to accept principles springing from decisions in the formulation of which they had no part.

This last-stated objection has no doubt been considered by the American Government; and if it saw fit to set this argument aside it was because it believes that without separating the problems of disarmament there can be no hope for any practical results in the near future. The French Government believes, on the contrary, that, in view of the progress thus far of the work with which the Preparatory Commission is charged, and provided that the nations represented bring a firm resolution to succeed like that which animates the Government of the Republic, that Commission can reach decisions at its next session which will permit the meeting of a general conference on disarmament with serious chances of success.

The French Government, having considered the various aspects of the American proposal, conscious of the duties which its membership in the League of Nations imposes, apprehensive of infringing upon the authority of the League, and convinced that no durable structure of peace can be erected without the general consent of all the Powers, called on equal terms to defend their rights and interests, believes that it is at Geneva, and by the Preparatory Commission itself, in which we have been so happy to see the delegates of the United States participate, that the American proposal can be most effectually examined.

NOTE FROM THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
FEBRUARY 19TH, 1927.

The Japanese Government have given careful consideration to the memorandum of the American Embassy at Tokyo, dated February 10th, defining the attitude of the United States on the general problem of disarmament and suggesting that the representatives of the five Powers signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty about to participate in the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva shall be empowered to negotiate and to conclude an agreement among those five Powers for the limitation of armament in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty.

2. The Japanese Government fully share with the American Government the views expressed in that memorandum on the desirability of an agreement calculated to complete the work of the Washington Conference for the prevention of competitive naval building. They cordially welcome the initiative taken by the American Government for the institution among the five Powers of negotiations looking to such desirable end. They will be happy to take part in those negotiations through their representatives invested with full powers to negotiate and to conclude an agreement on the subject.

3. In view, however, of the supreme importance of the problem to be discussed and determined, the Japanese Government find it essential that at least a part of the Japanese delegation shall be specially sent from Tokyo. Considering the length of time required for the necessary preparations as well for the journey from Tokyo to Geneva, it will obviously be impossible for the Japanese representatives to assist at the negotiations should that meeting be held simultaneously with or immediately after the forthcoming session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission scheduled to be opened on March 21st next. Accordingly, the Japanese Government desire that the meeting of the Powers signatories of the Washington Naval Treaty now suggested should take place on a date not earlier than June 1st.

extension of the 5-5-3 ratio as regards the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and to leave to discussion at Geneva the ratios of France and Italy, taking into full account their special conditions and requirements in regard to the types of vessels in question. Ratios for capital ships and aircraft carriers were established by that treaty which would not be affected in any way by an agreement covering other classes of ships.

The American representatives at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva will, of course, participate fully in the discussions looking to the preparation of an agenda for a final general conference for the limitation of armament. In addition, they will have full powers to negotiate definitely regarding measures for further naval limitation and, if they are able to reach agreement with the representatives of the other signatories of the Washington Treaty, to conclude a convention embodying such agreement, in tentative or final form, as may be found practicable.

The American Government earnestly hopes that the institution of such negotiations at Geneva may be agreeable to the Governments of the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, and that comprehensive limitation of all types of naval armament may be brought into effect among the principal naval Powers without delay.

NOTE FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT,
FEBRUARY 15TH, 1927.

[Unofficial translation.]

The American Government was so good as to send to the signatories of the Washington Naval Convention of 1922, and to the French Government as one of those signatories, a Memorandum in which, without relinquishing its interest in the general work for the reduction of armaments carried on for the last ten months by the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, it proposed the negotiation between the five Powers, at Geneva, of an agreement having in view the limitation in the future of naval armaments in the vessel categories not included in the Washington Treaty.

The French Government wishes, first of all, to express its deep appreciation of the lofty aim of the American note. The generous idealism which inspires it is in harmony with the views of the French Government. No Power could be more appreciative of the noble initiative of President Coolidge than France, who gives constant proof of her resolutely pacific will.

The French Government desires also to express its appreciation of the friendly consideration shown by the Federal Government in giving to its proposals an elasticity which permits them to take into account the special conditions and the individual requirements of the continental Powers. The American Government thus showed that it is fully acquainted with the very clear position taken by the French Government in the question of naval disarmament. It may not, therefore, be surprised to see French opinion concerned with the duties of France as a Member of the League of Nations and with her moral obligations toward all those Powers which are included among its Members.

The Government of the Republic, on its part, would have been happy to be able to give an unreserved adherence to these proposals, and the whole French people would have rejoiced to see the two countries once more associated in an enterprise so consistent with their common traditions. But a careful study of the American proposals has convinced the Government of the Republic that in their present form they run the risk of compromising the success of the work already undertaken with the active co-operation of the representatives of the American Government at Geneva.

Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations made the general limitation of armaments one of the primary duties of the League. It is true that the Powers to whom the United States is appealing to-day united their efforts in 1921 in an endeavour by themselves to bring about a limitation of naval armaments. The calling of the Conference of Washington was fully justified at the time when it took place, but the circumstances to-day are different. The League of Nations has begun its work: the conclusion of a Convention on the Traffic in Arms, the drafting of a Convention on the Private Manufacture of War Material, and finally the convening of a Preparatory Commission with a view to the assembling of a conference on the general limitation of armaments, a Commission to which all the countries of the world were invited and in which most of them are taking part, mark so many decisive steps toward the aim fixed by the Covenant. The American Government does not, indeed, propose to withdraw from the task undertaken the so efficient collaboration which its delegates have lent for nearly a year; it promises, on the contrary, to continue it. But its proposal has, nevertheless, the practical result of taking away from the Preparatory Commission an essential question on its programme; of setting up a special conference on the side in which only certain Powers may participate, and whose decisions, if they are not to be valueless, must be recognised as valid by Powers which will not have been allowed to take part in their discussion.

To decide on a change of method without consulting the League of Nations, and to seek a partial solution of the problem looking to the maintenance of the present situation rather than to determining the conditions which might best assure the security of all, and to confine this undertaking to certain Powers only, would both weaken the authority of the League of Nations, which is so essential to the peace of the world, and undermine the principle of the equality of States, which is at the very basis of the Geneva Convention, to which the French Government, for its part, remains firmly attached.

The principle of the equality of the Powers, great or small, is one of the recognised rules of the League of Nations. Technical committees have met; all the maritime Powers have taken part in their labours and have submitted the requirements for their defence. How could it be allowed

NOTE FROM THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FEBRUARY 28TH, 1927.

His Majesty's Government in Great Britain received with cordial sympathy the invitation of the Government of the United States of America to take part in a conversation at Geneva on the further limitation of naval armament.

The view of His Majesty's Government upon the special geographical position of the British Empire, the length of inter-Imperial communications and the necessity for the protection of its food supplies are well known and, together with the special conditions and requirements of the other countries invited to participate in the conversation, must be taken into account.

His Majesty's Government are nevertheless prepared to consider to what extent the principles adopted at Washington can be carried further either as regards the ratio in different classes of ships between the various Powers or in other important ways. They therefore accept the invitation of the Government of the United States of America and will do their best to further the success of the proposed conversation.

They would, however, observe that the relationship of such a conversation to the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva would require careful adjustment.

IDENTICAL NOTE OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT TO THE BRITISH AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS, MARCH 11TH, 1927.

EXCELLENCY: With reference to the memorandum handed by the American Ambassador to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (to the Imperial Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs), February 10th, 1927, regarding the possibility of the initiation of negotiations at Geneva concerning the limitation of naval armament between the representatives of the Powers signatories of the Washington Treaty of 1922, my Government is pleased to learn, as the result of informal conversations, that the British Government (that the Imperial Japanese Government) is willing to participate in negotiations with the United States and Japan (Great Britain).

The American Government regrets that France and Italy should have formally refused the President's invitation and shares the opinion of His Majesty's Government that their presence would be most welcome at such a conference. This Government sincerely hopes, therefore, that they may decide to be represented at least in some informal manner at the conversations contemplated.

These conversations, it now appears, could most advantageously and conveniently begin at Geneva on the first day of June, or soon thereafter.

JOSEPH C. GREW,
Acting Secretary of State.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT, MARCH 14TH, 1927.

With reference to the memorandum of the French Government of February 15th, 1927, in reply to that of the American Government of February 10th, enquiring whether the French Government was disposed to empower its representatives at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to enter into negotiations looking toward an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Treaty of Washington of 1922, the Government of the United States has noted with pleasure that the French Government is animated by the same spirit that prompted the President of the United States upon the occasion of his message to Congress, on the day in which the above-mentioned memorandum of the American Government was handed to the Governments of the Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty.

With regard to the fear expressed by the French Government that such negotiations would risk compromising the success of the work of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva, the Government of the United States is of the opinion that all appropriate measures taken by the large naval Powers cannot but contribute towards facilitating the task of the Commission.

In the last paragraph of the memorandum of the French Government, the view is set forth that it is at Geneva and by the Preparatory Commission itself that the proposal of the American Government can be effectually examined. The Government of the United States desires to emphasise the fact that it proposed the initiation at Geneva of negotiations by representatives of certain Powers at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Commission, and is therefore of the opinion that, far from undermining the authority of the League of Nations, such conversations as those proposed would be of great service to that body in an advance towards the solution of a difficult problem.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have now acceded to the proposal of the American Government, which has therefore decided to enter into conversations with these Powers and sincerely hopes that the French Government will see its way clear to be represented in some manner in these conversations in order that it may be fully cognisant of the course of negotiations and of the agreements which may be reached.

As the French Government already knows, the American Government has no preconceived ideas regarding any definite ratio for the limitation of French tonnage. It does not desire to open up questions already settled by treaty but wishes to point out that all other questions relative

4. The Japanese Government are further gratified to learn that it is not the intention of the American Government at this time to put forward rigid proposals on the ratios of naval strength to be maintained by the several Powers in the classes of vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. In order to ensure the success of the proposed negotiations, it seems highly important that, in the matter of these conditions of the limitation of armament, all parties to the negotiations should approach the subject with an open mind, being always guided by the spirit of mutual accommodation and helpfulness, consistently with the defensive requirements of each nation. The Japanese Government confidently hope that an adjustment will be reached in a manner fair and satisfactory to each of the participating Powers and conducive to the general peace and security of the world.

NOTE FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, FEBRUARY 21ST, 1927

[Unofficial translation.]

The Italian Government has submitted to serious examination the memorandum handed on February 10th by the Ambassador of the United States of America to the Prime Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The said memorandum explains the principles which have inspired the Washington Government in proposing that, before the contemplated international conference for the reduction and the limitation of armaments, negotiations be initiated between the five Powers signatory to the Treaty of Washington of 1922 for the purpose of studying the limitation of certain categories of naval armaments not covered by said treaty.

The Italian Government appreciates fully the high spirit which has guided the President of the United States of America in addressing his message to Congress on the same day in which the memorandum of the American Government was handed to the Government of the great Powers interested. The appreciation of the Italian Government has all the greater value since Italy has always associated herself with every international activity tending to establish upon a solid base the tranquillity and peace of the world.

That spirit which has guided Mr. Coolidge is, so to say, the heritage of the Italian Government and people.

Italy in fact has not only adhered to the Washington Conference but has concluded during the past five years more treaties of friendship and arbitration than those stipulated by any other European State. Her actual military expenses and, above all, her naval budget, in which there is appropriated three hundred million lire annually — equal to about thirteen millions of dollars — for new naval construction demonstrate clearly that the "far-reaching building programmes" alleged in the message certainly cannot refer to Italy.

The American Government proposes in its memorandum that the Italian Government empower its representative on the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to initiate negotiations at Geneva with a view to concluding agreements which, in anticipation of a global limitation of naval, land and air armaments, shall regulate naval armaments, by limiting the construction of those lesser vessels which were not contemplated in the accords of 1922.

As regards such a proposal, the Government of His Majesty must, above all, state that, in principle and so far as concerns the Continent of Europe, its point of view is that there exists an undeniable interdependence of every type of armament of every single Power and, furthermore, that it is not possible to adopt partial measures between only the five large naval Powers. The Italian Government thinks that the limitation of armaments, to be efficacious to the ends referred to by Mr. Coolidge, should be universal, and recalls in this connection that the example of Washington was not accepted by the minor naval Powers and that the Conference held at Rome in February 1924 for the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty to the Powers not signatory thereto was a failure.

Then, as concerns Italy more specifically, the Italian Government believes that it can invoke the same geographical reasons referred to in the message of President Coolidge. If the United States, by reason of their geographical position ("our favoured geographical position") have been able to reduce land armament to the minimum, Italy, by reason of its unfavourable geographical position, cannot expose itself without grave risks to a binding limitation of its maritime armaments, which are already insufficient to the needs of its defence.

Italy has, in fact, only three lines of communication with the rest of the world — three obligatory routes, through Suez, Gibraltar, and the Dardanelles — for provisioning itself.

Italy has an enormous coast development with populous cities and vital centres on the coast or a short distance from it, with two large islands, besides the Dodecanese, all of which are linked to the peninsula by lines of vital traffic.

Italy has four important colonies to protect, two of which are beyond the Suez Canal.

In fact, Italy must also consider the other nations which face on or can appear in the Mediterranean, particularly favoured by their geographical position amid essential lines of communication, and which have under construction many units of various types or are elaborating naval programmes of great strength.

For the reasons above stated, the Government of His Majesty feels confident that the Government of the United States will take into account the reason why Italy cannot, to its regret, accede to the proposal contained in the memorandum of February 10th.

remains firmly attached, or the exclusion from the discussion of an essential problem of the States without whose collaboration no result can be obtained, or the abandonment of the technical principles on which alone, as the French delegates have maintained during the preparatory discussions, it is possible to base a general limitation of armaments.

In spite of the assurances that the American Government is good enough to give as to the preoccupations which have inspired its initiative and as to the principles by which it intends to be guided, the Government of the Republic cannot see its way to modify its views towards the proposal which had been put before it. It persists in thinking that a positive participation of France in the proposed Conference between the United States, Great Britain and Japan cannot be considered.

Since the delivery of the American memorandum, a new element, and which imposes itself on us, has intervened: the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference has met at Geneva. From the beginning, the French delegation has affirmed its thesis and presented a draft convention based on the principle of global disarmament. A large part of the Commission has shown itself favorable to it and the debates which have ensued permit of thinking that it will be largely taken into consideration in the conclusions of the Commission.

Ever since then, the French Government is bound to great reserve as concerns the request of the American Government to be represented in other discussions whose promoters are inspired by entirely different principles. It is for us a question of honesty towards the League of Nations to do nothing which might allow, in the mind of the delegations which have favourably received our proposals, a doubt to arise as to the sincerity of our efforts.

The French Government, appreciative of the value that the American Government attaches to its being directly informed concerning the conversations engaged between the three Powers, preserves the greatest sympathy for the American efforts for disarmament and for peace. It would certainly have liked to be able to decide now as to the cordial invitation which has been sent it. It likes at least to think that the American Government will appreciate the reasons which make it a duty under the present circumstances to defer any decision as to the possibility of participating even by a simple observer in conversations on a limited subject touching on the question of disarmament.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,

MAY 16TH, 1927.

[Unofficial translation.]

The Royal Italian Government has the honour to reply to the memorandum from President Coolidge, received on March 14th last. The Royal Government is particularly glad to note that the United States Government fully appreciates the serious reasons for which the Royal Government has been compelled, to its great regret, to decline the invitation to take a direct part in the forthcoming Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament not contemplated by the Washington Agreement of 1922. In its note of March 14th, the United States Government, while realising Italy's attitude and the excellent reasons for it, is good enough to urge in the following terms that Italy should take an indirect part:

"The American Government sincerely hopes that the Italian Government will see its way clear to be represented in some manner at these conversations, in order that it may be fully cognizant of the course of negotiations and of the agreements which may be reached."

The Royal Government thanks the United States Government for its courtesy, which it highly appreciates, and desires to state that the Geneva negotiations will be followed with the closest attention by the Italian Government and by public opinion in Italy, even if an official "observer" is not appointed to attend the Conference.

The Royal Government, however, leaves open the possibility of appointing a naval expert or experts to follow the negotiations at first hand if their progress and probable issue should seem to make this desirable; and these experts may possibly at some point assume the definite status of "observers" of the Conference.

to limitation of naval armament are open and that in the projected conversations each Power would have the privilege of taking any position it thinks best for its own protection as a basis for negotiation.

The Government of the United States would be especially gratified by the presence of representatives of a nation holding the ideals set forth in the memorandum of the French Government, a nation which has, in the past, been associated with the United States in efforts to further the cause of world peace.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT,

MARCH 14TH, 1927.

With reference to the memorandum of the Italian Government of February 21st, 1927, in reply to that of the American Government of February 10th enquiring whether the Italian Government was disposed to empower its representatives at the forthcoming meeting at Geneva of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to enter into negotiations looking toward an agreement providing for limitation in the classes of naval vessels not covered by the Treaty of Washington of 1922, the Government of the United States has noted with pleasure that the Italian Government is animated by the same spirit that prompted the President of the United States upon the occasion of his message to Congress, on the day in which the above-mentioned memorandum of the American Government was handed to the Governments of the Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty.

With regard to the assertion of the Italian Government that there exists an interdependence of every type of armament, the American Government is nevertheless of the opinion that all appropriate measures taken by the large naval Powers in limitation of the naval branch of armament must greatly contribute in advancing the solution of the problem as a whole.

As for the statement in the memorandum of the Italian Government that, owing to geographical position and strategic considerations, Italy could not expose itself without grave risks to a binding limitation of its maritime armaments, it is feared that there may exist some misapprehension regarding the terms of the proposal of the President of the United States. The American Government has no preconceived ideas regarding any definite ratio for the limitation of Italian tonnage in the classes referred to, but regards this question as one to be determined during the proposed conversations. While the American Government does not desire to open up questions already settled by treaty, all other questions relative to limitation of naval armament are open, and each Power would have the privilege of taking any position it thought best for its own protection as a basis for negotiation. The American Government is also of the opinion that an agreement for partial limitation of armaments could expose no Power to danger from the navies of the Powers not included in such an understanding, since no agreement is contemplated which would not be subject to reconsideration of revision should the security of any party to it be menaced by the naval programme of a nation not included in the understanding.

The Governments of Great Britain and Japan have now acceded to the proposal of the American Government, which has therefore decided to enter into conversations with these Powers and sincerely hopes that the Italian Government will see its way clear to be represented in some manner at these conversations in order that it may be fully cognizant of the course of negotiations and of the agreements which may be reached. The Government of the United States would, moreover, be especially gratified by the presence of the representatives of a nation holding the high ideals set forth in the memorandum of the Italian Government, a nation which has, in the past, been associated with the United States in efforts to further the cause of world peace.

MEMORANDUM FROM THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR,

APRIL 2ND, 1927.

[Unofficial translation.]

By its memorandum of March 14th, 1927, the American Embassy was good enough to inform the French Government of the decision taken by its Government as a result of the adherence of Great Britain and Japan to the proposals contained in the American memorandum of February 10th last to engage in conversation with these Powers.

On this occasion, the American Government expresses the hope that the Government of the Republic "will see its way clear to be represented in some manner in these conversations in order that it may be fully cognizant of the course of the negotiations and of the agreements which may be reached". It is good enough at the same time to show the particular value that it would attach to the presence of French delegates.

The American Government specifies, on the other hand, that it has no preconceived idea as to the formula that it would be proper to consider in regard to a limitation of French naval tonnage and it presumes that, in the proposed conversations, each Power will have the privilege of adopting as a basis of negotiation the attitude that it judges the best for the defence of its interests.

The French Government pointed out on February 15th, in its reply to the first American note, the decisive reasons for which it could not participate in the Conference proposed by the American Government for a new limitation of naval armaments.

It cannot allow either the weakening of the authority of the League of Nations already invested with the problem of disarmament in which naval armaments cannot be separated from land and aerial armaments or injury to the principle of the equality of the Powers to which France

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA.

Delegates:

Rt. Hon. Sir J. COOK, G.C.M.G.
High Commissioner in London.

Captain H. J. FEAKES, R.A.N.
Dr. W. HENDERSON.

Major O. C. W. FUHRMAN, O.B.E.
Private Secretary to High Commissioner.

NEW ZEALAND.

Delegates:

The Hon. Sir James PARR, K.C.M.G.
High Commissioner in London.

Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe OF SCAPA,
O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.

Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL, C.B., C.M.G.

Mr. C. KNOWLES.
Private Secretary to High Commissioner.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA.

Delegates:

Mr. J. S. SMIT.
High Commissioner for the Union in London.

Mr. C. PIENAAR.

Trade Commissioner for the Union in Europe.

Miss HAUMANN.

Private Secretary to Mr. Smit.

Mr. J. F. Halkima KOHL.

Private Secretary to Mr. Pienaar.

IRISH FREE STATE.

Delegates:

Mr. K. O'HIGGINS.
Minister for External Affairs.

Mr. J. A. COSTELLO, K.C.
Attorney-General.

Mr. M. MACWHITE.
Irish Free State Representative in Geneva.

Mr. J. P. WALSH.
Secretary of the Department of External Affairs.

INDIA.

Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.

Japan.

Delegates:

Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO.
Governor-General of Korea.

Viscount Kikujiro ISHII.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to France.

Secretary-General:

Mr. Naotake SATO.
Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Japanese
Bureau to the League of Nations.

Foreign Office Section:

Mr. Sadao SABURI.
Director of the Bureau of Treaties and Conventions
in the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Secretariat:

Mr. Toshio SHIRATORI.
First Secretary of Embassy.

Mr. Masataka MATSUKUMA.
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Haruhiko NISHI.
Second Secretary of Embassy.

Mr. Kikuji YONEZAWA.
Second Secretary of Embassy.

Mr. Kyoshi YAMAGATA.
Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs.

Mr. Tamao SAKAMOTO.
Third Secretary of Embassy.

Mr. Tadao KUDO.
Attaché to Embassy.

Mr. Tsuneo HAYAMA.
Attaché to Embassy.

Naval Section:

Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI.

Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.

Captain Teikichi HORI.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA.

Captain Mineichi KOGA.

Mr. Shigeharu ENOMOTO.
Secretary of the Department of Navy.

Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI.

Commander Naokuni NOMURA.

Commander Ichiro SATO.

Surgeon-Commander Yoshiyuki HIKI.

Paymaster-Commander Hikosuke ARAKI.

Constructor-Commander Kikuo FUJIMOTO.

Engineer-Lieut.-Commander Hiromitsu YANA-
GIHARA.

Lieutenant-Commander Hidenori MARUYAMA.

Lieutenant Shigetoshi MIYAZAKI.

Press Section:

Mr. Sadao SABURI.

Mr. Tamao SAKAMOTO.

Advisory Section:

Military:

Major-General Gen SUGIYAMA.

Colonel Kyosuke KAWAMURA.

Financial:

Mr. Okinobu KAYA.
Secretary of the Department of Finance.

LIST OF DELEGATIONS.

United States of America.

Delegates:

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America at Brussels.

Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES, U.S.N.
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the General
Board, U.S. Navy.

Naval Advisers:

Rear-Admiral Andrew T. LONG, U.S.N.
General Board, U.S. Navy.

Rear-Admiral Frank H. SCHOFIELD, U.S.N.
Director of Plans Division, U.S. Navy.

Captain J. M. REEVES, U.S.N.
Commander of Aircraft Squadrons, Battle Fleet.

Captain Arthur J. HEPBURN, U.S.N.
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Captain Adolphus ANDREWS, U.S.N.

Captain W. W. SMYTH, U.S.N.

Lieut.-Commander Harold C. TRAIN, U.S.N.

Lieut.-Commander H. H. FROST, U.S.N.

Legal Adviser:

Mr. Allen W. DULLES.

State Department Adviser:

Mr. George A. GORDON.
First Secretary of Embassy.

Secretariat:

Mr. Frederic R. DOLBEARE.

Secretary of the American Delegation, Counsellor
of Legation.

Mr. S. Pinkney TUCK, Consul.

Mr. David W. KING.

Mr. Hector O'CONNOR.

Archivist:

Mr. David A. SALMON.
Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and Archives, Depart-
ment of State.

Great Britain, Dominions and India.

GREAT BRITAIN.

Delegates:

Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, M.P.
First Lord of the Admiralty.

Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD.
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff.

Rear-Admiral A. D. P. R. POUND, C.B.
Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (on illness of Sir
F. L. FIELD).

Captain W. A. EGERTON, C.M.G., R.N.

Lieut.-Colonel W. W. GODFREY, C.M.G., R.M.

Mr. Alexander FLINT, C.B.

Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH, C.B.
Liaison Officer.

Group-Captain W. F. MACNEECE, C.B.E.,
D.S.O., D.F.C.

Air Ministry. Liaison Officer.

Mr. W. C. HANKINSON, M.C.
Dominions Office. Liaison Officer.

Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL, C.M.G.
Secretary to the Delegation.

Captain H. R. MOORE, D.S.O., R.N.
Secretary to the Delegation.

Mr. W. L. BECKETT.
Legal Adviser.

Mr. G. F. STEWARD.
Press Officer.

Paymaster Captain F. L. HORSEY, O.B.E.,
D.S.C.

Private Secretary to Admiral Field.

Mr. T. FRY.
Private Secretary to First Lord.

Mr. E. C. HENTY, subsequently Mr. N. BUTLER.
Private Secretary to Viscount Cecil.

Mr. E. WILLIAMS
Accountant.

CANADA.

Delegates:

Hon. E. LAPOINTE, K.C., M.P.
Minister of Justice.

W. A. RIDDELL, M.A., Ph.D.
Dominion of Canada Advisory Officer accredited
to the League of Nations.

Commodore Walter HOSE.
Director of the Naval Service.

Mr. L. P. PICARD,
Private Secretary to the Minister of Justice.

PART I.

VERBATIM RECORDS OF THE PLENARY SESSIONS.

Chairman: The Hon. Hugh GIBSON.

FIRST PLENARY SESSION.

Geneva, Monday, June 20th, 1927.

Present:
United States of America: The Hon. Hugh GIBSON,
Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES,
Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG,
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD,
Mr. A. W. DULLES.

Great Britain, Dominions and India:
Great Britain: Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN,
Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD,
Vice-Admiral Sir F. FIELD.
Canada: Dr. W. A. RIDDELL.
Australia: Rt. Hon. Sir J. COOK.
New Zealand: Hon. Sir J. PARR,
Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe,
Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.
Union of South Africa: Mr. J. S. SMIT.
Irish Free State: Mr. M. MACWHITE.
India: Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.

Japan: Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO,
Viscount Kikujiro ISHII,
Mr. Sadao SABURI,
Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI,
Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.

Secretariat-General: The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON (Secretary-General),
Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL,
Mr. Naotake SATO,
Mr. Howard R. HUSTON.

French Mission d'Information: Comte CLAUZEL,
Capitaine de frégate DELEUZE,
M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.

Italian Unofficial Observers. Captain Don Fabrizio RUSPOLI,
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

Election of Chairman.

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON: Gentlemen, — Inasmuch as this Conference has met at the suggestion of the President of the United States, it is incumbent on me, as Chairman of the American delegation, to call the meeting to order for the purpose of organisation. Obviously the first step to be taken is the choice of a Chairman of the Conference, and I should welcome any suggestions that other delegations may be good enough to make.

The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: I have very great pleasure in moving that Mr. Gibson take the chair at this Conference. He has opened the meeting as representing the country which called the Conference, and I think it is most suitable that we should ask him to preside. I therefore beg to move that Mr. Gibson preside over the Conference.

— 16 —

Personal Staff to Admiral Viscount Saito: Mr. Takashi KOMATSU.
Mr. Tsurukichi MARUYAMA. Private Secretary.
Mr. Kizo FUJIWARA. Lieut.-Commander Kyosuke MIZUNO.
Private Secretary.

General Secretariat of the Conference.

Secretary-General: The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON.

<i>American Delegation.</i> The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON. Substitute: Mr. Frederic DOLBEARE. <i>British Delegation.</i> Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL. Substitute: Captain H. R. MOORE.	<i>Japanese Delegation.</i> Mr. Naotake SATO. Substitute: Mr. Toshio SHIRATORI. <i>League of Nations Secretariat.</i> Mr. Howard R. HUSTON.
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French Mission d'Information.

Comte CLAUZEL. Ministre plénipotentiaire, chef de Service français de la Société des Nations au Ministère des Affaires étrangères. Capitaine de frégate DELEUZE. Délégué naval adjoint à la Commission permanente consultative de la Société des Nations.	M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR. Secrétaire d'ambassade du Service français de la Société des Nations au Ministère des Affaires étrangères.
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Unofficial Observers.

Italy.

Captain Don Fabrizio RUSPOLI. General Staff R.I.N., Naval Delegate to Permanent Advisory Committee of the League of Nations.	Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA. General Staff R.I.N., Assistant Delegate to Perma- nent Advisory Committee of the League of Nations.
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Statement by the Hon. Hugh Gibson (Chairman).

The CHAIRMAN: It is my agreeable duty to convey to you the following message from the President of the United States:

"I am deeply gratified that the representatives of the British Empire and of Japan are meeting with the representatives of the United States to consider measures for the further limitation of naval armaments through the extension of the principles of the Washington Treaty. An agreement rendering impossible any form of naval competition between the three Powers will have a lasting influence in cementing the present relations of good understanding between the three countries and constitute a definite step in advance toward the common objective of a general limitation of armaments. Please assure the representatives of the British Empire and of Japan that I am only interpreting the overwhelming sentiment of the American people in stating that the United States will do its utmost to make such an agreement possible.

Calvin COOLIDGE."

Your Governments' response to the President's proposal and your presence here make it clear that you share the President's desire to extend the principles of the Washington Treaty and thereby avoid a recurrence of the evils of competitive naval building. Our work is thus beginning under favourable conditions, and we are fully justified in feeling that, with a common purpose, a common interest and mutual good will, we shall find a satisfactory solution to the problem which has been entrusted to us.

I am sure that I voice the feeling of all members of the Conference in expressing regret that all the Powers parties to the Washington Treaty have not felt that they could participate fully in our work. We have no doubt, however, that both France and Italy share our desire that naval building programmes should be limited, and I am confident that the result of our work here will be of a character to facilitate their future co-operation with us in a task which the Five Powers initiated and which, I trust, will be carried forward by the Five Powers as a common enterprise in the interest of peace. Pending the time that this may be possible, we are glad to welcome the representatives of France and of Italy who have been sent here to follow the work of the Conference.

In view of the work which has been initiated here by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, it is entirely fitting that the consideration of further naval limitation should take place in Geneva, and I desire to express the appreciation of my Government for the courtesy of the Swiss Confederation, whose hospitality we are enjoying, and our thanks to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the facilities so kindly placed at the disposal of the Conference.

Our deliberations here will have a far-reaching influence, as they will serve to determine not only the feasibility of further progress in naval limitation but will also have an important bearing upon the practicability of the endeavour to deal with the general problem of armaments. We must recognise that we are dealing with the least intricate phase of the problem of armaments. If we should fail to make definite progress, a serious blow would be dealt to efforts which are being made to limit land and air armaments. On the other hand, our success would materially aid the Preparatory Commission in its task of opening the way for the General Conference on the Limitation of Armaments.

Representing as we do the Powers which now lead in naval armaments, it is appropriate that we should assume the responsibility for initiating further naval limitation. If we were not prepared to limit, we could not expect others to do so. Fortunately, our task is made easier by the fact that we are here to complete a programme successfully initiated at Washington in 1921 and that we have as a basis for our work principles which have stood the test of five years of practical application.

Further, we can start with assured agreement on the following points:

1. That, in the interest of international understanding, there should be no competition between the three Powers in the building of naval armaments.
2. That our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security and should never be of a size or character to warrant the suspicion of aggressive intent.
3. That a wise economy in Government dictates that future naval construction should be kept to a minimum.
4. That the methods and principles of limitation set forth in the Washington Treaty are both practical and effective and should be extended to all categories of combatant vessels of the Three Powers.

The four points I have indicated should constitute a valuable basis of agreement from which we can approach the consideration of the special requirements of each of the Powers here represented. With your permission, it may be well for me to take this occasion to state briefly the general views of the American Government.

The proposals made by the American Government at the Washington Conference covered auxiliary vessels as well as capital ships. At that time, we might have been justified in insisting that, before we sacrificed capital ships, where we had assured preponderance, there should be a general limitation of all classes of vessels. It was the desire of the American Government that there should be such a general limitation on the ground that any failure to make the agreement comprehensive would leave one or more classes open to the continued evils of competitive building. Practical obstacles were encountered, however, in making such a comprehensive agreement and the American Government felt that to insist upon the adoption of its original proposals in regard to auxiliary vessels would jeopardise the success of the Conference and lead to the indefinite post-

Admiral Viscount SAITO: On behalf of the Japanese delegation, I heartily associate myself with the proposal of my British colleague.

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON: If there are no further suggestions, it only remains for me to say I am very highly honoured by the proposal of my name, and I shall consider it a privilege to serve as Chairman of the Conference. I should like to take this occasion of expressing my appreciation of the terms in which this proposal has been made.

Rules of Procedure.

The CHAIRMAN: You have before you the Rules of Procedure (Annex No. 1), which have already received the approval of the various delegations, and unless there are further proposals or objections we may consider them as adopted.

As there are no objections, we will consider that these Rules of Procedure are adopted for the guidance of the Conference.

Procedure.

The CHAIRMAN: By a preliminary agreement among the Powers represented here, the American delegation was asked to designate the Secretary-General of the Conference. The President has chosen the Hon. Hugh Wilson, American Minister to Switzerland, to serve in that capacity. He will be assisted by Mr. Frederic R. Dolbeare, Counsellor of Legation. The delegation of the British Empire has designated as its representative on the Secretariat-General Mr. R. H. Campbell, C.M.G., who will be assisted by Captain H. R. Moore, D.S.O., R.M., and the Japanese delegation has designated Mr. Naotake Sato, Minister Plenipotentiary, who will be assisted by Mr. Toshio Shiratori, First Secretary of Embassy. The Secretary-General of the League of Nations has very kindly placed at the disposal of the Conference the facilities of the Secretariat, and to facilitate and expedite the despatch of our business he has designated Mr. Howard Huston to serve on the Secretariat-General of the Conference as Administrative Secretary. I should like to take this opportunity of expressing our warm appreciation of the courtesy of Sir Eric Drummond in placing the facilities of the Secretariat at our disposal. I am sure this assistance will materially contribute to the effective handling of our problems.

Appointment of Credentials Committee.

The Rules of Procedure we have adopted provide for the appointment of a Committee on Credentials. I would therefore suggest that each delegation forward to the Secretary-General of the Conference the full powers with which it has been furnished in order that he may lay them before the Committee on Credentials. I further suggest that the chief delegate of each country designate a member of his delegation to serve on this Committee, and that his name be communicated to the Secretary-General (for Report, see Annex No. 2).

Appointment of Executive Committee.

In order to expedite the handling of business, I would suggest the appointment of an Executive Committee to prepare a programme for the labours of the Conference and of its Committees, and to make such recommendations to the Conference as it may consider desirable as to the creation of Committees and the disposal of the work of the Conference. I hesitate to offer any suggestions as to the composition of this Committee, but, if it is agreeable to the other delegations, I would suggest that the chief delegates meet at 11 a.m. to-morrow in Room D with the Secretary-General of the Conference to confer on this subject. With the creation of this Committee, I believe it will be unnecessary for us to make any further designations of Committees at this plenary session.

In conclusion, it is my very pleasant duty to express on behalf of the Conference our great satisfaction at the presence here of the representatives of France and Italy and to wish them a cordial welcome. It will be one of the first duties of the Secretary-General to confirm this message to them and to assure them of a welcome at the meetings of the Conference and of its Committees.

Message to President Coolidge.

Admiral Viscount SAITO: Mr. President and Gentlemen, — Now that the Conference has been duly organised, I consider it most fitting that, before entering on our work, we should send a few words of greeting to the President of the United States, at whose invitation the present Conference has been convened.

The message I propose we should send is as follows:

"Profoundly and cordially appreciating the humane and wise initiative of the President of the United States in convening the present Conference with a view to the further reduction of the burden and danger of naval armaments, the delegates assembled desire to tender to him this expression of their highest respect and of their strong hopes of a most satisfactory result."

The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: I should like to associate myself and those whom I represent in the message which Viscount Saito has so felicitously drawn up to President Coolidge.

The CHAIRMAN: If it is the desire of the Conference, the Secretary-General will be requested to transmit this message to the President of the United States. I should like to take this opportunity to assure Viscount Saito that the American delegation is particularly sensible of the friendliness which prompted him to suggest the sending of this message, and I should like also to thank Mr. Bridgeman for his support of it.

In order to obviate the scrapping of comparatively new vessels in one class and the simultaneous building of vessels in another, a wasteful method of procedure, the American proposals contemplate an adjustment over a period of years between the cruiser and destroyer classes.

If it should eventually be possible to reach a general agreement between all naval Powers to abolish submarines, the United States would not be unfavourable to its consideration. My Government realises, however, that such action, in order to be acceptable, must necessarily be universal.

The technical details of the foregoing proposals are being submitted to you in written form (see Annex No. 3).

We must not under-estimate the difficulties of the task we have before us, but I feel that we may approach it with optimism. The difficulties we may encounter will result primarily from the difference in the character of the technical naval problems with which our countries are faced.

Problems of this character we shall be able to take up and determine on their merits in a spirit of mutual accommodation, each having due regard for the needs of the others. We have none of us a right or interest to maintain a naval force which would constitute a threat to any one of us. We have every right to maintain a naval force sufficient for our legitimate requirements of national defence. The relations of the friendship which exist between our peoples make it unthinkable that we should any of us contemplate a naval programme which would be a just cause of apprehension to the others. We have only faithfully to translate into written agreement the feeling of cordial understanding between our countries and our peoples and thus make it impossible, in so far as this can humanly be done, that naval rivalry should ever disturb the relations between us.

Statement by the Rt. Hon. W. C. Bridgeman.

The Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: Mr. President and Gentlemen, — I count it a great privilege to take part in this Conference as one of the British delegates, and I desire first of all to thank, on behalf of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain, the President or the United States for sending out the invitation, the Swiss Confederation for their hospitality, and the League of Nations for their great kindness in accommodating us so comfortably at Geneva and all their help in arranging the meeting.

It was an invitation which we could readily accept. It so happened that, a few days before President Coolidge's invitation was sent, I had put before my Prime Minister certain proposals on which the Admiralty had been at work for some months, with a request that steps might be taken to ascertain whether a conference could be summoned for their consideration by the Powers which participated in the Washington Conference. Such steps became unnecessary on the receipt a few days later of the President's invitation and his intimation that the scope of the Conference would not merely be confined to the discussion of the ratio.

It is a matter of deep regret also to His Majesty's Government that France and Italy have not found themselves able to take a full part. But it is my earnest hope that any agreement which may be reached in this Conference will be of such a nature as to make it easier for them to consider adherence at no very distant date.

We are fortunate in meeting at a time when relations between the Three Powers represented here, and the other Powers invited, are of such a friendly character, and when we remember, as Mr. Gibson has reminded us, that each of us has loyally carried out the Agreement arrived at in Washington.

The great achievements of the Washington Conference of 1921 are not perhaps so generally realised as they deserve to be. Let me recall the situation as it existed before that Conference, little more than six years ago.

Already then, designs were in contemplation for huge battleships of 45,000 tons displacement armed with 18 or 20-inch guns, while the number of such vessels was only limited by the willingness and capacity of any nation to pay for their construction and maintenance. Each nation was watching another, and the danger of a recommencement of ruinous competition was imminent.

The Conference held at Washington put an end to this tendency — a great attainment in itself. But it did more. It proved the possibility of limiting by agreement the scale of armaments to be maintained.

We feel that the time is ripe for a further extension of this principle, and I am authorised to put before you proposals which will mark a further step in the progressive decrease of armaments and, while maintaining the respective security of our several nations at sea, will reduce the standard of naval armament.

I am quite convinced that we are all animated by a strong desire to reach agreement and a readiness to appreciate the special conditions which differentiate our respective positions. And I think our deliberations are more likely to reach a successful conclusion if each country adopts an attitude of complete frankness in stating what naval force they want and why they want it. I am assuming that none of the countries represented here to-day, and Mr. Gibson has assumed the same, require a navy for aggressive purposes, and that we have come together to consider what we require respectively for the defence of our existing interests, and are prepared with arguments in support of those requirements based purely on defensive considerations.

And so I will begin by an attempt to make clear what are the considerations which govern the position of Great Britain and the British Empire.

In doing so I shall not be revealing any secrets hitherto unknown. Indeed, I am more likely to be accused of repeating well-worn platitudes.

Nevertheless, I will, for the sake of clearing the ground for discussion, put the following facts before you, fully realising that for other countries other considerations deserve the special attention of the Conference.

ponement of any naval limitation. We therefore consented to restrict the field of agreement, and directed our efforts toward achieving limitation of capital ships and aircraft carriers. We recognise that all Powers parties to the Washington Treaty made substantial concessions in order to make possible a limitation of these classes of vessels, and the fact that our sacrifices in 1921 were numerically more considerable than those of other Powers is not to-day a cause of regret to us. The results achieved amply justified them.

I feel, however, that I should point out that our present naval situation as regards auxiliary vessels is due in large measure to our reluctance to embark upon an extensive building programme so long as there is any hope that an early agreement may be reached for the limitation of such vessels. It is well known that the President has recently exerted his influence to postpone construction by the United States in the hope that it may be possible at this time to reach an agreement which will obviate the need or inducement for further competitive building.

Our policy with respect to naval armaments is guided solely by the desire for adequate defence. We have no intention of maintaining a naval force which could be regarded as a threat to any Power. Neither have we any desire to initiate a competitive building programme in any class of vessel which might influence others to lay down more vessels than they would otherwise consider necessary.

Pursuant to this policy, the United States is prepared to accept a general programme providing for as low a total tonnage in each class of auxiliary vessels, on the basis of the Washington Treaty ratio, as will be acceptable to the other Powers here represented. The American delegation has come to the Conference with an estimate of what we consider equitable tonnage allocation in the various categories of vessels, but with no rigid quantitative proposals. We are prepared to discuss the question of tonnages fully and frankly in the light of our several legitimate needs. It is our desire to have a real limitation which would obviate the necessity for extensive building programmes in the future, and we feel that we should therefore keep in mind that the fixing of unduly high tonnages in the various classes of auxiliary vessels would not be calculated to achieve that result.

The American suggestions are based on the following considerations:

1. That the ratios and principles of the Washington Treaty be applied to cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
2. That any agreement concluded here by the Three Powers to limit the building of auxiliary vessels should be made co-terminous with the Washington Treaty and contain the same general provisions for extension or modification. It may be desirable to include an additional provision respecting revision in the event of an extensive building programme by a power not a party to any agreement we may conclude.
3. That, for the purpose of the future limitation of naval armaments, auxiliary vessels be divided into four categories, three of which — namely cruisers, destroyers and submarines: — shall be subject to limitation with a fourth category of negligible combatant value not subject to limitation as follows:
 - (a) Cruiser class, including surface naval combatant vessels between 3,000 tons and 10,000 tons.
 - (b) Destroyer class, including all surface naval combatant vessels between 600 and 3,000 tons, with a speed greater than 17 knots.
 - (c) Submarine class, including all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea.
 - (d) An unrestricted class, including other naval vessels of negligible combatant value, the definition of vessels falling in this class to be subject to technical agreement.

Before suggesting tonnage allocations in the various classes, I desire to state that we frankly recognise that naval requirements are relative, that building programmes on the part of one Power may well require corresponding programmes on the part of others, and that, if these limits were adjusted for one of the Three Powers, they should be so adjusted for all. The tonnage allocations suggested by the American delegation as a basis of discussion are the following:

<i>Cruiser Class</i>	<i>Total Tonnage Limitation</i>
For the United States.	250,000 to 300,000 tons
For the British Empire	250,000 to 300,000 tons
For Japan	150,000 to 180,000 tons
<i>Destroyer Class</i>	
For the United States.	200,000 to 250,000 tons
For the British Empire	200,000 to 250,000 tons
For Japan	120,000 to 150,000 tons
<i>Submarine Class</i>	
For the United States.	60,000 to 90,000 tons
For the British Empire	60,000 to 90,000 tons
For Japan	30,000 to 54,000 tons.

If any of the Powers represented here feel justified in proposing still lower tonnage levels for auxiliary craft, the American Government would welcome such proposals.

way as to jeopardise the security arising out of any agreement we may reach in regard to the more important types of vessels.

Finally, I wish to make it clear that, in making the above proposals for disarmament, I am speaking with the consent of my colleagues here who represent the Dominions, and that these proposals are put forward on behalf of all the Governments of His Britannic Majesty whose plenipotentiaries are here to-day.

I may perhaps add that my colleagues and I are, under the terms of our full powers, appointed respectively for the particular part of the British Empire named in the full power, but all of us are appointed representatives of His Majesty the King.

As regards the form of the Treaty which may result, as I hope, from the deliberations of this Conference, it is our desire, in accordance with the resolutions of the Imperial Conference which met last year and the statement made by Sir Austen Chamberlain at the March meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, that such Treaty should be made in the name of heads of States, the participation of the several parts of the British Empire being shown by appropriate geographical entries in the list of plenipotentiaries.

It seems hardly necessary for me to dwell at length on the advantages of the measures we bring forward.

In the earlier items, the extension of the life of vessels, and the reduction in their tonnage and armament in the future, will obviously reduce very considerably the cost of replacement for us all.

The limitation of the size in the various classes of warships will prevent a reversion to that competition which was exemplified in the continual increase in the size of battleships and which led from dreadnoughts to super-dreadnoughts, and opened an endless prospect of increased expenditure as each country attempted to equal or to excel the latest vessel designed by another Power. As I have already said, this competition in large vessels was brought to an end in 1921. It remains for us to try to put an end to it in respect of smaller vessels.

If increases in the size of even small vessels in any country once begin, they must have an effect not only on the vessels of that type in other countries but also on the size, armour and cost of the larger vessels which may be exposed to their attack.

The object, therefore, at which we aim is to secure economy in the replacement of ships as they become obsolete, and to eliminate the danger of rivalry in new vessels by stabilising their size and armament.

There is, however, one reservation which I must make in offering these suggestions for your consideration.

If agreement can be reached between the United States of America, Japan and ourselves, the British Empire must, by virtue of the position of Great Britain in relation to Europe, be liable to a danger which does not affect the other two countries. That is the danger that some other Power or Powers not signatories to this agreement might embark upon such an increase in their naval strength as would imperil our safety. The agreement would consequently, in order to safeguard our position, have to provide for a reconsideration of our strength if any other Power or Powers were known to be initiating an extensive shipbuilding programme. That, I think, is more or less in correspondence with the statement which Mr. Gibson made in his opening remarks. But this danger would undoubtedly be very much reduced if, as I most earnestly hope, it may be possible for European Powers to give their adherence to our agreement. Such adherence would perhaps also make it possible for us to go more fully into the consideration of numbers in other categories than it is at present.

It has been my endeavour so to frame our scheme as to make it easier and not harder for France and Italy to join us, as the success of our plans depends not so much on any hard and fast ratio as upon a straightforward declaration of the requirements of the countries who participate in it.

I have tried to put our case briefly, under the impression that the more we confine ourselves to facts and plain language, and the less we rely upon rhetoric, the better is the chance of our understanding and agreeing with one another.

I trust, however, that, if my statement has been somewhat blunt, I may give you the assurance that my countrymen and their representatives here feel very deeply the need for some further agreement and hope most fervently that what I have said may lead to a result which will be satisfactory to the Conference and to the world.

Statement by Viscount Saito:

Viscount SAITO: It is the traditional policy of the Japanese Government to give the heartiest support to all measures and endeavours which, in whatever form, aim at the promotion of the peace of the world and the welfare of mankind.

It was in keeping with that fundamental policy that they gladly participated in the Washington Conference of 1911-1922, which presented an epoch-making treaty to the world.

It was in that spirit also that they have from the outset freely and loyally co-operated in all the efforts and labours of the League of Nations directed to the object of general disarmament, especially in those made by the Preparatory Commission, which recently sat in this room.

True to that spirit again, the Japanese Government most promptly and whole-heartedly agreed to the American proposal to hold the present Conference. The people and Government of Japan sincerely desire that an arrangement, fair and satisfactory to all, may result from the Conference now inaugurated in such auspicious circumstances. The Japanese delegation firmly believe that there ought to be nothing to prevent that desired end from being attained if proper and sympathetic consideration be given to the peculiar conditions and requirements of the respective nations and if the interested States are determined upon frank and sincere co-operation and are guided by a spirit of accommodation.

First and foremost, there is the insular position of the mother-country, which I represent, and the fact that she is almost entirely dependent not only for raw material but also for her food supplies and her very existence upon free passage upon the seas. It is no exaggeration to say that, if the seas were closed to ships trading with our country, we should be faced with starvation within a few weeks.

My countrymen would never consent to take any risk of such a catastrophe. This obvious fact places us in a position totally different from that of any other country in the world, and makes discussion on naval disarmament, I think, more difficult for us than for any other Power.

The other important factors in our case are the immense lengths of the routes over which our trade is carried and the very large coastlines which bound the various parts of the Empire, and the necessity of providing reasonable protection for these extensive shores and long lines of communication against any aggression, however unlikely such a menace may appear at the moment to be.

In this second consideration, more closely than the first, the welfare of the outlying parts of the Empire is very deeply concerned. Our situation is very plain, but its very simplicity is a measure of its vital seriousness to us. At the same time, we feel that there are limitations in naval armament beyond those which have been accepted in the Washington Conference to which we could safely agree if the other Powers found themselves able to consent.

I have listened with very great interest to the statement made by the Chairman, and with a very large measure of agreement with the principles which underlay it, but I think he will agree with me, and I hope that Viscount Saito, too, will agree with me, that to-day it will perhaps be better to confine ourselves to our own aspect of the question and not to discuss the proposals which other countries have made. I think we shall be able to discuss them more fairly and more satisfactorily after we have had a little more time to think them over, and therefore, rather than discussing the proposals which he has made, I should like to lay before you the proposals which I am authorised to make on behalf of the British Government. I shall do it as briefly as I can and without entering into details, which can be left for examination and explanation later.

The main proposals which we have to make are:

- (1) The extension of the accepted life of the existing capital ships from 20 to 26 years, and a consequent waiver by the Three Powers of their full rights under the replacement tables agreed upon at Washington. Such an arrangement would naturally have to provide for some little elasticity on each side of that figure.
- (2) The fixing of the life of other vessels — first, that of 8-inch gun cruisers at 24 years; secondly, destroyers at 20 years; and, thirdly, submarines at 15 years.
- (3) The reduction in the size of any battleships to be built in the future from the present limit of 35,000 tons displacement to something under 30,000 tons.
- (4) Reduction in the size of guns in battleships from the present limit of 16 inches to 13.5 inches.
- (5) Limitation of the displacement of aircraft carriers to 25,000 tons instead of the present limit of 27,000 tons.
- (6) Reduction of guns on aircraft carriers from 8 inches to 6 inches.
- (7) Acceptance of the existing ratio 5 : 5 : 3 for cruisers of 10,000 tons displacement carrying 8-inch guns. The numbers of these large cruisers which each of the three countries require can be the subject of further discussion.
- (8) A limitation of 7,500 tons and 6-inch guns to be placed on all future cruisers after the number of 10,000-ton cruisers has been decided upon.
- (9) Limitation of displacement of destroyer leaders to 1,750 tons and destroyers to 1,400 tons.
- (10) Guns in destroyers to be limited to 5 inches.
- (11) With regard to submarines, we have not changed our mind since the Washington Conference, when our delegates expressed their willingness to agree to the discontinuation of the use of submarines in warfare, but we recognise that Powers which possess fewer of the larger vessels of war regard the possession of submarines as a valuable weapon of defence. At the same time, we feel that, if the proposals we have put forward for the limitation of battleships and other more powerful vessels of war should be accepted, it would not be unreasonable to suggest some limitation in the size, and perhaps also in the number of submarines.

We therefore propose that the tonnage of the larger type of submarine be limited to 1,600 and of the smaller type to 600 tons, and the armament of each to 5-inch guns. We also think it would be desirable to discuss the possibility of limiting the number of submarines according to our varying requirements; and it must be borne in mind that any limit placed on the number of submarines would make it easier to limit the number of destroyers, and if agreement were reached on these points with other Powers it might be possible also to consider the numbers of cruisers each of us should possess.

It will be noted that we have not made any definite proposals with regard to miscellaneous vessels such as mine-layers, small aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, mine-sweepers, fleet auxiliaries and purely local defence vessels. We have, however, prepared a comprehensive classification table (Annex No. 4) which includes all types of vessels with suggestions for the limitation of their tonnage and armament designed solely with a view to preventing their development in such a

SECOND PLENARY SESSION

Geneva, Thursday, July 14th, 1927.

Present :	
<i>United States of America :</i>	The Hon. Hugh GIBSON, Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES, Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG, Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD, Mr. A. W. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain, Dominions and India :</i>	
Great Britain :	Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD, Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Canada :	Hon. E. LAPOINTE, Dr. W. A. RIDDELL.
Australia :	Rt. Hon. Sir J. COOK.
New Zealand :	Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe, Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.
Union of South Africa :	Mr. J. S. SMIT.
Irish Free State :	Mr. M. MacWHITE.
India :	Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.
<i>Japan :</i>	Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO, Viscount Kikujiro ISHII, Mr. Sadao SABURI, Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI, Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
<i>Secretariat-General :</i>	The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON (Secretary-General), Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL, Mr. Naotake SATO, Mr. Howard R. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information :</i>	Comte CLAUZEL, Capitaine de frégate DELEUZE, M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian Unofficial Observers :</i>	Captain Don Fabrizio RUSPOLI, Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

Condolences with the Irish Free State and the Family of the late Mr. Kevin O'Higgins.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, — Before turning to the matters we have to consider to-day, it is my sad duty to recall to you that Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, one of the delegates of the Irish Free State, has fallen a victim of assassination. In voicing our horror of the deed and our deep sympathy with the Irish Free State in the loss of a foremost citizen, I know that I express the profound feelings of the Conference. If it meets with the approval of my colleagues of the British Empire and Japanese delegations, I would beg the Irish delegation to convey our message of sympathy to the Free State Government.

Viscount SAITO: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — I have the honour, and the melancholy privilege, of associating myself and the Japanese delegation with the eloquent and touching sentiments concerning our late colleague which have just been pronounced by the Chairman of the Conference. Perhaps Japan and Ireland have never been so directly associated before. They could not have a more moving occasion of sympathetic approach than in this tribute to the blood of a martyr in the cause of his country's welfare.

The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — Our delegation has already passed a vote of condolence with the Irish Free State and the family of Mr. O'Higgins, but we are very glad to be able to join with the whole of the delegations here present in a joint expression

In the admirable speeches to which we have just had the privilege of listening, both the American and British delegates have expressed their views on the question of auxiliary vessels. While declaring our readiness to accord the most careful and sympathetic consideration to any proposals that have been or will be made, we may be permitted to submit to the Conference an outline of our views in this matter.

The purposes for which auxiliary craft may be employed are manifold, and their utility and value to each respective country vary according to the special conditions of that country. It may be said, however, that the requirements of each nation in regard to auxiliary craft are reflected in what that nation possesses actually or in authorised programmes. For that reason, in any discussion concerning auxiliary vessels, adequate consideration must be given to the existing status of each nation in that particular respect.

The most important object of an agreement looking to the limitation of armaments lies in preventing the expansion of armaments without at the same time endangering the national security of any Power party to that agreement. Such radical departures from existing conditions, therefore, as may be calculated to shake the foundation on which the sense of security of a nation rests should be carefully avoided.

The Japanese delegation venture to submit here a practical plan of limitation which may be summarised as follows:

N. B. — Capital ships and aircraft carriers covered by the Washington Naval Treaty are not included in this proposal.

1. None of the conferring Powers shall, for such period of time as may be agreed upon, adopt new building programmes or acquire ships with the purpose of increasing its naval strength.

2. By the term "naval strength" used in Article 1 is meant the total tonnage comprised in the category of surface auxiliary craft and the total tonnage comprised in the category of submarines to be agreed upon on the basis: (a) of the tonnage of completed ships actually possessed by each Power which have not reached the replacement age specified in Article 4; and (b) of the designed tonnage of ships now in course of construction by that Power. In determining the naval strength to be allotted to each Power, (a) the designed tonnage of ships not yet laid down but which are embodied in authorised building programmes, and (b) the tonnage of ships which will pass the replacement age during the execution of such programmes shall also be taken into consideration.

3. The following ships are excluded from the application of the foregoing two Articles:

- (a) Ships not exceeding 700 tons in displacement.
- (b) Surface ships carrying no gun exceeding 3 inches in calibre or carrying not more than 4 guns exceeding 3 inches and not exceeding 6 inches in calibre with or without any number of guns not exceeding 3 inches in calibre, provided, however, that the speed thereof shall not exceed 20 knots.
- (c) Aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons.

4. Each Power may replace ships which shall have passed the ages hereunder specified or which shall have been lost, by the construction or acquisition of ships of the corresponding category within the limits of the naval strength prescribed under Article 2:

Surface auxiliary craft:	
above 3,000 tons	16 years
under 3,000 tons	12 years
Submarines	12 years.

Provided that, although the normal ages for the replacement of ships are those above specified, exceptions may be permitted in case the conditions at present prevailing call for any special adjustments to be made.

5. Any tonnage in excess of the naval strength prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1 and 2, as also any ships replaced by others under the provisions of Article 4, shall be disposed of according to provisions to be agreed upon.

6. Appropriate regulations shall be provided in respect of replacement construction in order to avoid sudden displacements of naval strength as between the conferring Powers and to equalise, as far as possible, the amount of annual construction undertaken by each.

The CHAIRMAN: The chief delegates for the purpose of organising the Executive Committee will meet to-morrow morning at eleven o'clock in Room D. The Committee on Credentials will meet at 3 o'clock in the afternoon. Members of the Secretariat will be designated by the Secretary-General. The Secretary-General will give due notice of the time of the next plenary session.

Are there any further questions this afternoon? If not, the meeting is adjourned.

The Conference adjourned at 4.10 p.m.

I think when we came here none of us quite appreciated the full difficulties of making a three-cornered agreement, when the needs of the three countries were so different. I was certainly bitterly disappointed when I observed that the British proposals were at first sight so coldly received.

We had thought that, if we each made a frank statement of our requirements and had a little discussion about them, we should find agreement much easier than if we proceeded to seek for some mathematical or logical formula under which the special needs of all three Powers could be met.

We have now been engaged in this Conference for over three weeks, and by trying to see each other's case, as the Chairman has said, certain provisional recommendations have been produced by the technical experts which are important as indicating a valuable measure of agreement on destroyers, submarines and the classification of non-combatant vessels. I believe if we did not reach an agreement on cruisers it would be well worth while to make an agreement on the other subjects.

But little substantial progress has been made on the subject of cruisers.

It is perhaps of happy augury that, on the subject of capital ships, which after our first meeting loomed more largely as a bone of contention than anything else, agreement has been reached to hold discussions which, though they may not go quite as far as we desired, will, I think, result in a substantial step forward in limitation in that category.

This concurrence only became possible after some mischievous allegations as to British desire for supremacy had been contradicted and brushed aside. May I express my appreciation of the willingness of the other countries to meet us in this and my earnest hope that the difficulties which beset the cruiser problem may also be dispelled by a clear statement of our attitude and of that of the other Powers, which this meeting affords.

President Coolidge, in his memorandum of February 10th, which accompanied his invitation to this Conference, referred to his Government's policy as being one of "co-operation with all efforts calculated to bring about an actual limitation of armament". We therefore entered with good hopes upon the task of presenting a scheme of limitation which we thought would produce far-reaching results in economy and mark distinct progress in establishing a lower standard of aggressive power.

When we drew up our programme for the further limitation of armaments — and I would remind the Conference that this programme had been carefully considered long before President Coolidge issued his invitation to us to attend this Conference, and had been presented by me to our Government in substantially its present form some days before that invitation was given — I say, when we drew up our programme, what was the situation which we felt had to be faced? Two things were uppermost in our minds. The first was the fact that, in 1931, if the Washington Treaty persisted, we should have to commence the building of capital ships of a size and cost which we had become convinced were unnecessary and incompatible with the true spirit of disarmament. On this I need not say anything further at this moment. The other and more pressing consideration was that we found ourselves, owing to having accepted at Washington a 10,000-ton limit for future cruiser construction, launched on a programme of these powerful and expensive vessels of which the end was not even in sight, so long as there was no limit to the number of these powerful ships which any country might maintain.

I need not here repeat our proposals in detail, but I may emphasise the point that one of the main features was the prevention of competition in offensive armament by laying down definite maxima for individual ships in each separate category both in tonnage and armament. These maximum figures were in no case higher than the figures now prevailing, and in many cases considerably lower. On April 5th, 1927, at the meeting of the Preparatory Commission, you, Sir, are reported as saying on this subject:

"We believe that the maximum size of each category should be prescribed, also the maximum calibre of gun, because we are convinced that we cannot go wrong if we deal with tangible and visible characteristics rather than complicate the problem by dealing with characteristics that are not openly visible to all the world that cares to see".

This is profoundly true. Total tonnage is like a pie. It may be a very good thing, but it all depends on what is inside it. What I mean is this: If total tonnage is arrived at by a process of addition and multiplication of ships of a known size and ascertained numbers, then it has an excellent effect, but if it is merely a total tonnage within which any country can build, without other people knowing, ships of varying sizes, then to me it is not such an acceptable proposition, and I take it from your view, which I have just quoted, that we are entirely at one on that subject. There is no other way of preventing competition in building except by agreement on maximum size in each type, and the mere fixation of total tonnage or ratios is perfectly useless unless it is accompanied by individual limits in every class. It must be remembered that the object of this Conference was to prepare the way in naval matters for a general agreement for disarmament by the League of Nations which would comprise other countries besides the three who are here represented to-day. Without such limits no country can know with what force it has to compete, because one country can use its tonnage in building large ships, which, if numerous, would have an aggressive character and so impose upon others the necessity of doing the same.

If our proposals were accepted, a definite reduction in the offensive power of every type of vessel would be established for the future. The initial cost of each capital ship would be reduced by a million pounds, of each cruiser by over half-a-million pounds, and many thousands would be saved annually in the cost of maintenance; and the same can be said in a lesser degree of smaller classes of ships.

of our views. We have lost a very valued colleague whose wisdom and character commanded the appreciation of all of us who had to work with him, and we are very grateful to the American and Japanese delegations for their kind feeling in associating themselves with our loss.

Mr. MACWHITE: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — On behalf of the Government of the Irish Free State, I wish to express my deep appreciation of the sympathy which the delegations to this Conference have manifested in the grievous loss that Ireland has sustained through the assassination of Mr. Kevin O'Higgins, one of her greatest statesmen as well as one of her most distinguished citizens. His untimely death has plunged a whole nation into mourning.

Although only thirty-five years of age, Mr. O'Higgins had been for four years Minister for Justice, and the work he accomplished in that department was really remarkable. It might indeed be said that he brought order out of chaos, and, as a result, justice is administered to-day without fear or favour throughout the length and breadth of the Free State. But this was not his only achievement. His imprint is on all the progressive and social legislation that has been enacted by Dail Eireann. He was a man of dauntless courage and unflinching determination, yet notwithstanding he had a heart of gold. He loved and was loved in return by little children, and his last act before leaving Geneva eight days ago was to purchase toys for his own children and those of his friends. He died as bravely as he lived.

A great pillar of the State has been ruthlessly struck down. A young and fruitful career has been brought to an untimely close. Nevertheless, he leaves behind him an enduring monument in the gratitude of a people who know and realise how stupendous were his labours in the cause of their social and political advancement.

The Irish delegation, to whom the loss of Mr. O'Higgins is a cause of profound personal grief, is all the more sensible of the sympathy to which you have given expression and shall not fail to convey your kindly message to the Government of the Irish Free State.

Report of the Work and Progress of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, — As Chairman of the Conference I desire to take the occasion of our second plenary meeting to give a brief report on the work and progress we have accomplished during the three weeks for which we have now been in session.

While I would not underestimate the seriousness of the problems which still remain to be settled, I am glad to be able to report that progress has been made. The Technical Committee, in its nine sessions, has been able to make provisional recommendations on important questions relating to destroyers, submarines, and definitions of types and classes, and characteristics of vessels of small combatant value which need not be subject to limitation. The Executive Committee, whose task is to direct the work of the Conference subject to decisions to be taken in plenary session, has devoted two meetings to the report of the Technical Committee, and is now engaged in considering the crucial question before the Conference, namely the form and manner of limiting the cruiser class. Meanwhile, our Credentials Committee has met and accepted the full powers of the various delegates and has submitted its report.

Delegates have been in daily consultation with a view to guiding the work of various informal groups which have been devoting particular attention to methods of limitation of auxiliary surface vessels. Informal meetings have also been held by the legal advisers of the various delegations with a view to framing articles which would form a part of any treaty for the further limitation of naval armament, whatever may be the decision of the Conference upon the tonnage limitation of the various categories.

We are now in a position to make rapid progress in the event of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for the limitation of the cruiser class. I feel sure I am expressing the views of my colleagues in stating that we shall continue the consideration of this question during the coming days in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and candour, and shall explore every possible method of finding a basis for mutual agreement.

It is the right and duty of any of the delegates to ask for a plenary meeting of the Conference at any time when he may feel that our work will be advanced by such a meeting. As Mr. Bridgeman has indicated his desire to make a statement to the plenary Conference, we have gladly acquiesced in his suggestion. I therefore take pleasure in calling on Mr. Bridgeman.

The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: I asked for this plenary meeting originally because it seemed to me that the atmosphere was being vitiated by gross misrepresentations of the British case in certain quarters, where ideas have been disseminated of serious ill-feeling amongst the various delegates, and an atmosphere of intolerance which make any chance of agreement more difficult. As to this, I will only say that it would be highly improbable that in a complicated matter such as that we have in hand, there would not be differences of opinion or that in a conference of frank and freedom-loving men these differences would not have been expressed in blunt and plain language. But we have never lost the respect for each others' opinions or the earnest desire to bring them into harmony. Still less can it be said that anything has occurred which imperils the good relations which prevailed and will prevail between the three nations here represented.

Some of the trouble has been caused, I fear, by parties whose desire and interest would lead them to rejoice in the failure of this Conference. Every little incident has been used to make mischief, fantastic figures have been mentioned and every atom of partial information has been dragged from its context in order to create friction and ill-will.

I do not think that the members of this Conference are influenced by this, however irritating it may be. But it is due to ourselves to say here in public that we see no reason whatever to despair of finding a solution, in the spirit of good-will in which we have always sought it.

different ships up to the time when the revision of the Washington Treaty had to take place. It would be the form of limitation most closely resembling the scheme adopted at Washington, and it comes near to our original notion that we could agree on each other's needs if they were frankly stated. I am very glad to think that the preliminary investigation of this plan has revealed a large measure of general consent. I hope that before our next session we shall have found in it the solution of this very difficult problem. We shall use our utmost endeavours to this end, and I am sure that the other delegations will do the same.

Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, — One of the difficulties surrounding a settlement of the cruiser question has been the demand of the British Empire delegation for a definite number of these vessels. I will ask the Conference to allow me to put the matter of numbers before the delegation in the light of my experience as a naval officer, and particularly as concerning my responsibilities during the Great War, first as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet and subsequently as Chief of the Naval Staff at the Admiralty.

Our insistence upon numbers is the result of a consideration of the number and length of the sea communications of the Empire which need protection and the great volume of trade along those communications. Much of this trade being foodstuffs, it is absolutely essential to the actual life of the people of Great Britain. A great proportion of the remainder is necessary for the economic welfare of the people of Great Britain and the outlying parts of the Empire.

The length of the principal lines of communication on which British vessels are to be found in large numbers is approximately 80,000 miles, and on April 1st, 1926 (a typical day), 9,500,000 tons of British ships, exceeding 3,000 tons in individual tonnage were actually on those lines or were within areas at the terminals of the lines and approaching various ports.

If we analyse these lines of communication and consider them in different areas, which might be looked upon respectively as spheres in which protecting vessels might be operating, we find that in the North Atlantic there were 3,000,000 tons of British shipping disposed along lines 13,000 miles in length; in the South Atlantic, 1,280,000 tons along lines 6,300 miles in length; in the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, 1,147,000 along lines 20,000 miles in length; in the Pacific, 642,000 tons along lines 26,000 miles in length; and in the Mediterranean 607,000 tons along lines 1,100 miles in length. The tonnage necessary to complete the total of 9½ million tons mostly represents ships approaching the terminals.

It is, of course, possible that, under certain conditions, shipping in one or more of these areas might be fairly safe from interruption by hostile vessels; but when the operations of the two German raiders *Wolf* and *See Adler* in the Pacific, the Indian Ocean and other seas, many thousands of miles distant from German ports, are considered, it will be realised that it may well be necessary to look upon the great majority of the Empire's lines of communication as open to attack.

Perhaps it may be argued that the number of cruisers which the British Empire desires to possess is too great, and doubts may be expressed by other nations as to the necessity for this number. As to this, it will be remembered that, in the Chairman's opening statement, he remarked that it was desired that the respective navies might be maintained at the lowest limit compatible with national security, and that the American delegation was prepared to discuss the question of tonnage fully and frankly in the light of our several legitimate needs. It is surely obvious — and the fact is recognised in the words which I have quoted — that each nation must judge for herself as to the measures necessary for her own safety; and, as has been pointed out very frequently, the British Empire, with its far-flung Dominions and the absolute dependence of the British people for food on sea communications, occupies a totally different position in this respect from any other nation in the world.

The requirements of the Empire to-day have been given as some 70 cruisers. This number is arrived at as follows. It is the generally accepted view that, in a fleet, five cruisers are required for every three capital ships. With the British fleet of 15 capital ships, the number of cruisers needed for fleet work is therefore 25, and 45 out of a total of 70 are therefore left for direct trade protection. Of this number, we must expect 12 to be refitting or fuelling at any given moment. With lines of communication eighty thousand miles in length this gives one cruiser for every 2,500 miles of communication. Naturally, cruisers are not dotted about the ocean singly in this way but are engaged in convoy work patrolling in groups or squadrons, or are held available in various strategic or focal centres; but the figures indicate that the British Empire delegation would find it very difficult to agree to a reduction in the number of cruisers, for which we are pressing, in view of our responsibilities to the mother-country and to the Dominions overseas.

If we examine this figure of 70 in the light of war experience, it will be found that it is certainly not excessive.

On the outbreak of the Great War we possessed 114 cruisers, and in spite of the fact that Germany had only two armoured cruisers, six light cruisers and four armed auxiliaries outside the North Sea, our losses in merchant ships due to the action of these German vessels exceeded 220,000 tons, and the allied losses 30,000 tons, before they were finally disposed of. It must be remembered, too, that of the above force Von Spee's squadron of two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers was in the Pacific when war broke out, and was therefore not favourably placed for operating against trade, nor, indeed, did it attempt to do so. The existence of this powerful squadron at large had, however, a great effect upon our cruiser dispositions up to the time of the battle of the Falkland Islands. The great majority of our early losses were due to the operations of the *Emden*, the *Karlsruhe* and three armed auxiliaries. Later in the war, three disguised German raiders accounted for 254,000 tons of British and 39,000 tons of allied shipping. If, under these conditions, 114 cruisers proved to be an inadequate number — and it must be remembered that our Japanese allies helped us very materially in this respect — can it be said that 70 is now excessive?

I very earnestly hope that we shall agree to the lowest maximum sizes in our scheme. I am speaking of the smaller ships at the moment. If not, the only agreement we can reach will be one which does not decrease but might actually increase the offensive strength which now prevails.

Now I come particularly to the case of cruisers. In your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, you said: "Our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security", and later on: "We are prepared to discuss the question of tonnages fully and frankly in the light of our legitimate needs". We were in cordial agreement with those sentiments, and we took them to mean that the legitimate needs of each country were to be stated by that country. We have long been at work considering what was compatible with our security. We have stated before, and we state again, that, as we have only a few weeks' food supply in Britain at any given moment, we depend for our very existence on free passage on the seas. We said before, and we repeat it, that, as the transport of our food and raw materials and of our inter-imperial trade also depends on safe passage over the oceans which separate the different parts of the Empire, we are, owing to their distance apart, more dependent than any other nation on uninterrupted communication by sea. I hope that Lord Jellicoe will corroborate the extent of our danger from the unique experience which he had in commanding our naval forces in the war. We have always been prepared to justify our requirements in naval strength before this Conference, and we have made very frank statements on this subject to the other delegations to this Conference. We have not attempted to lay down what are the requirements of other countries; but we have made it clear that numbers are of more importance to us than size.

In our original proposal we offered to agree to a ratio similar to the Washington ratio for capital ships being applied to cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, and we are prepared to refrain from laying down any new cruisers of this size until that ratio is reached, and to stop building any more of these large cruisers after that stage has been reached.

In smaller cruisers we have not disputed the claim of the United States of America to an equal number to ours or of Japan to such a number as are necessary for her defence; but we desire to limit their size, and their armament of 6-inch guns, so that they may be defensive and not offensive weapons. In reply to this, we are asked to accept a limit of total tonnage to which, as I have said, we have no intrinsic objection provided we know how other countries are going to use that tonnage. We were, however, alarmed when at one time a figure of 25 large 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns was suggested as a possible requirement for America, with a possibility of a further number of smaller cruisers with 8-inch guns. At the same time, we understood that we were to agree in advance to a total tonnage of 400,000 for cruisers. What would this mean for us? We are to agree to an arbitrary figure to represent the force necessary for our security without even knowing the character of the cruiser fleets of other nations.

We desire to fix the lowest possible tonnage compatible with security, but as numbers and not size are important for our purposes, the greater the number of large cruisers which other countries require the more difficult it is for us to reach a low total tonnage. It is not reasonable to ask us to fix any figure of total tonnage until we know how many large cruisers the other nations propose. These large cruisers with 8-inch guns represent an enormous superiority over the 6-inch gun cruisers in offensive strength — a superiority of at least 2½ to 1. The proposal therefore puts us in the position of accepting not parity but definite inferiority in offensive power, unless we abandon the number of cruisers we regard as essential for the protection of our imperial communications. No country can be expected to give up the right to live and to live in security.

What, again, does this proposal mean in the cause of disarmament? It admits the possibility of a huge increase in the offensive strength of the fleets of the world over the strength which exists to-day. It would be a strange outcome of a conference called for limitation.

It is not parity with America that is troubling us. We have not raised any objection to that. Nor are we troubled by the proportion to which Japan would be entitled. It is our own security with which we are concerned and our power in future to protect our sea communications against hostile raids of whose disastrous effects we had such bitter experience in the war.

If our scheme is adopted, we three great nations shall have set an example to the world in arresting increase in offensive strength of all ships of war and in making competition in shipbuilding impossible between the three countries represented here, and we shall have saved the taxpayers of all countries many millions of pounds in the future.

We are accused of an arrogant desire for superiority and of having refused parity to the United States. This statement has already been formally contradicted. The principle that "navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security" has been laid down by the Chairman and accepted gladly by us. We do not dispute the right of the United States to build cruisers in numbers sufficient to secure that object. We cannot surrender a similar right for ourselves. It is in our manifest interest to build no more than we must.

We have been grossly misrepresented in some quarters. But if the Conference will accept from me this plain statement of our case, I feel sure that they will agree that we have made a most strenuous effort to meet other countries in the cause of limitation. We have gone further than anyone in the plain statement of our needs and of our reasons for them. We are still ready to consider any other proposals which may be advanced and which promise a fair solution of the problem. If therefore no further progress is possible on the lines which we have proposed with regard to cruisers, and as we are all of us most desirous of reaching agreement, we will gladly consider other suggestions. A few days ago another idea was mooted that we should investigate the possibility of agreeing on a definite building programme which could be embodied in the Agreement of this Conference. It would be a maximum programme for each country and would be subject to the limitation of maximum individual tonnages. It would enable each of us and the world to see exactly what was the most that any of us could build and the characteristics of the

The second case is that of the *Emden* in a different part of the world, but at the same date. On the night of October 20th, the *Emden* was in the vicinity of Ceylon, and two British cruisers searching for her were on converging courses, which, had the *Emden* been able to maintain the speed she desired, would have brought them into direct contact at daylight. The *Emden* was, however, slightly delayed by her prizes being unable to keep up with her, the result being that, instead of running into our patrolling cruisers, she passed ten to twenty miles astern of them early in the morning, when the visibility was insufficient to allow of her being sighted.

There is yet one other point of importance in connection with trade protection and our war experience. During the Great War, Great Britain was very favourably placed geographically for preventing the exit of raiders from German ports, whether cruisers or disguised merchantmen. I have mentioned my difficulties as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet in that connection. But the fact remains that, with the single exception of a war with a Mediterranean Power, the difficulties of the British Navy in preventing the exit of raiders from the ports of any other nation would be multiplied a thousandfold. Indeed, by no conceivable means could such exit be prevented. The result must inevitably be that we should have to deal with raiders in far greater numbers than in the late war, and this fact alone makes it all the more imperative that the number of our cruisers should be adequate for the work that would fall upon them.

Once again I would reiterate that, if we found 114 cruisers insufficient during the Great War, are we not putting our requirements at the lowest possible figure when reducing this number to 70?

Viscount Kikujiro ISHII: Mr. President and Gentlemen, — The Conference has now reached the stage at which, the Technical Committee having in a general way concluded the work assigned to it and submitted a report to the Executive Committee (see Annex No. 7), the latter has examined that report and an exchange of views is being accomplished by the delegates of the three Powers. A plenary session called at this juncture affords a fit occasion for the various delegations to re-state their positions in the light of these recent developments. The Japanese delegation would therefore avail themselves of this opportunity of laying before the American and British delegates a candid and straightforward exposition of their standpoint, for I believe that, by being candid and straightforward, we shall best be able to avoid misunderstandings over questions such as those we have before us.

First, the question of capital ships and aircraft carriers raised by the British delegates was a matter which lay outside the scope of the instructions then in the hands of the Japanese delegation. But as there could be no doubt that the British proposal, if adopted, would bring about great benefit in the direction of relieving the taxpayer's burden, we did not hesitate to ask our Government for instructions on the matter. We are much gratified that our Government, persuaded that the reduction of the naval burden is one of the principal aims of the present Conference, has authorised its delegates to discuss the matter after an agreement shall have been reached on the main object of the present Conference — the limitation of auxiliary armament.

Secondly, the Japanese Government have always believed that the most effective and rational way of discussing the question of auxiliary craft is by dividing them into two categories, that is to say, surface ships and submarines. That is an idea which they have always entertained and which they quite recently advocated in the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference created by the Council of the League of Nations. At the present assembly, however, with a view to facilitating the progress of the discussions, we have agreed, without prejudice to our future attitude in this respect, to examine the matter of surface auxiliary vessels on the footing of their being further divided into two classes.

In the matter of cruiser class, the Japanese delegation have found themselves in disagreement with one or other of the American and British delegations, or with both of them, over such questions as replacement age, tonnage and others, but we are prepared in a spirit of co-operation to make every possible concession and to exert our utmost energy in order to arrive at a solution satisfactory to all.

In regard to the destroyer class, we have already arrived at a settlement with the American and British delegations by receding in some degree from our original position concerning maximum unit tonnage and the replacement age of destroyers and flotilla leaders.

As to submarines, the Japanese delegation thought it proper to propose that small vessels for purely local defence be here exempted from limitation. For a country like Japan consisting of innumerable islands and possessing numberless sounds and straits, the need for a great number of such vessels is quite obvious. During the Russo-Japanese war, several Russian cruisers which managed to pass through the Tsugaru Strait terrorised our Pacific coast, sinking our merchantmen at the very mouth of the Bay of Tokio. After a bitter experience like this, Japan cannot but feel the absolute necessity for a good number of small submarines, and we find it difficult to understand why these minor undersea craft, not at all of an ocean-going class, should not be exempted from limitation — especially when surface craft under 600 tons and even larger ones with certain qualifications as to speed and guns have been so exempted. Nevertheless, animated by the desire for conciliation, we have consented to drop what we consider a just and reasonable demand on our part.

Thirdly, we owe it to candour to say that this spirit of concession on our part has been amply reciprocated by both the American and British delegates, to whom we wish to express our sincere appreciation and gratitude on this occasion. Such provisional agreements as were arrived at by the Technical Committee could not have been secured without important concessions and sacrifices on the part of each of the three Powers. We are confident that all the delegations are resolved to continue in the same spirit and to labour for the happy solution of the cruiser question, on which agreement is yet to be sought. The first step towards the achievement of that end is to discover

I will now refer to my experience as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet during the war in carrying out the duties imposed upon me so far as they related to trade protection. The duties of the cruisers attached to the Grand Fleet were to stop the exit of German men-of-war and raiders of mercantile type from the North Sea, and at the same time to assist in enforcing the blockade, watch for the exit of the High Sea Fleet, and be prepared to act as a scouting force for the Grand Fleet should such exit take place. To carry out these duties, my cruiser force in 1914 consisted of eight obsolete protected cruisers, usually outside the North Sea, eight armoured cruisers and 10 light cruisers. By 1916 these numbers had become 24 armed merchant vessels outside the North Sea, eight armoured cruisers and 22 light cruisers. It will, of course, be realised that a portion only of the cruiser force could be at sea at any one time. These numbers were found to be inadequate for effectively watching the North Sea by day. At night it was naturally impossible to take any measures that would prevent vessels from escaping observation. My usual dispositions were intended to ensure that, if I had two or more watching lines of cruisers, at least one of those lines must necessarily be passed during daylight by a hostile vessel leaving the North Sea, and the watching lines stood south by day and north by night in order to add to the chances of interception. The distance between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway is 150 miles, and the shortest line, 180 miles further south between the coasts of Scotland and Norway, was 240 miles long, this line itself being about 250 miles distant from Heligoland. I think it will be realised that, apart from the difficulty due to the probable use of Norwegian territorial waters by vessels attempting to break out of the North Sea, the problem of watching effectively lines of such length as those indicated required a far larger number of cruisers than those available to me; and I often wished that Providence, when creating the world, had given the British Isles a more north-easterly trend so as to shorten the distance between the Shetland Islands and the coast of Norway. The best proof of the inadequacy of our cruiser fleet in the North Sea is perhaps to be found in the fact that, in spite of the excellence of our intelligence organisation at the Admiralty, by means of which we usually had warning of the anticipated attempt of a raider to leave a German port for attack on our trade, over 50 per cent of the raiders which did make this attempt succeeded in evading our watching cruisers. Two were sunk in the attempt, the *Greif* and a vessel whose name was unknown. It is, too, to be remembered that all the raiders which attempted the return passage to German ports succeeded in evading capture when re-entering the North Sea.

In addition to the success attending these raiding vessels, it must also be borne in mind that two German light cruisers succeeded in attacking and destroying a convoy of merchant ships between Norway and the Orkneys in 1917, these vessels not being sighted by our watching cruisers, which were out in considerable numbers on this particular occasion, either before or after their attack. The raiding cruisers, being of high speed, traversed the greater portion of the North Sea on their northward journey during the hours of darkness. It is not always easy for landmen to visualise the difficulties of maintaining a watch at sea over a large area during the hours of darkness. I recollect that, in order to convince the War Council of this difficulty — on this particular occasion I was Chief of the Naval Staff — I produced to the Council a chart of the North Sea with the sea itself coloured black to represent darkness, the maximum range of vision (about half a mile) of each watching cruiser being shown to scale in white. The result was to place on the chart a number, equal to the watching cruisers, of small points about half the size of a pin's head, each point indicating the position of a cruiser at a particular moment; and it then became obvious to the War Council that the cruisers could not be blamed if the enemy tracks did not run into one of these particular movable pin points.

Let us consider the position of the Chief of the Naval Staff at the Admiralty when news reaches him that a raider is operating in any particular area. His natural impulse would be to send as many cruisers as possible to run down and destroy that vessel. But the officer in command of the raider knows quite well that, after a certain period, the fact of his presence in that area has become known, and he changes his pitch, so that if the Chief of the Naval Staff denudes one area of cruisers to strengthen another, he risks disaster in the area which he has weakened. The obvious remedy is to have a sufficiency of cruisers in each area; and it would be a mistake to imagine that even the numbers for which we are asking can give absolute security. The Oceans are so large and the limits of visibility so small in comparison that the chances of sighting a vessel of which you are in search must be problematical. Possibly it may be of interest to mention that, in 1904, a time of profound peace, the British Navy comprised 157 cruisers, built and building, with a total tonnage of about 750,000. At the outbreak of war the tonnage was about 720,000. Naval history teems with instances of successful evasion of pursuit by raiding vessels, and it is only necessary to mention two instances in the Great War to emphasise this point. The first is the case of the *Berlin*, a German liner fitted for mine-laying at the outbreak of war. She made one attempt to get out of the North Sea in August 1914, but it happened that she ran into one of our cruisers near the Skagerrak and returned to port, emerging again in October for another attempt. On this occasion her luck beat any previous record. It happened that at this period the whole Grand Fleet was out and dispersed in squadrons guarding the exit from the North Sea during the passage across the Atlantic of the Canadian troop convoy. The *Berlin*, in her passage out, and between the dates of October 16th and 22nd, passed within 20 miles of one squadron on October 16th, just out of sight of the second, and ten miles astern of a third, on the same day. She then passed just astern of a fourth in the dark, and within ten miles of a fifth, again in the dark, on October 17th. On October 21st she was within ten miles of a sixth squadron, also in the dark, and finally, about eight miles away from the *Iron Duke*, my fleet flagship, which was then in company with two battle-squadrons, which she passed in the early dawn of October 22nd. The visibility and darkness conditions prevented her from being sighted on any one of those occasions. She then laid the minefield which sank the *Audacious* off the North of Ireland.

We have listened with great interest to the views of the British Empire delegation as to special needs for numbers of light cruisers. We have heard the striking statement by Admiral Earl Jellicoe as to the strength of the forces needed to hunt down commerce-raiders. No one is more qualified to speak with authority upon the problem of dealing with commerce-raiders during the last war, and I would not be understood as seeking to controvert anything he has said in the course of his remarks. I confess, however, that the American delegation entertains very serious misgivings in regard to the effort to prepare in time of peace for all possible contingencies of this character in time of war. It seems clear to us that this same duty of hunting down commerce-raiders may fall upon any one of our navies in time of war, but that, if in time of peace we are building up forces to perform this duty, it effectively closes the door to any real limitation of cruiser strength.

It may be timely for me to take advantage of this opportunity to state certain fundamental bases of the American position. It is our belief that naval needs are relative. This has already been recognised in drawing up the Washington Treaty, and the soundness of this theory has been proven in practice. Thus we feel that limitation by one Power makes possible limitation by other Powers. On the other hand, a programme of building by one Power may well call for a corresponding building programme by others, while a friendly agreement among the principal naval Powers enables them to effect a serious limitation and even reduction without in any sense imperilling their security. It is difficult for us to accept the idea of absolute naval needs. We feel that the conception of relative naval needs alone makes international agreement for limitation of navies possible. If we assume that naval needs are absolute, each country must be the sole judge of its naval needs, which cannot then be subject to reduction by agreement with other Powers.

Another fundamental point for us is that any agreement can be justified only in the case that it constitutes a genuine limitation which prevents the evils of competitive building, that it allays international distrust and suspicion, and limits the burdens of taxation. While it may be said theoretically that even agreement upon high tonnage levels may be described as a limitation, inasmuch as it is agreement not to build beyond certain figures, it is, however, a limitation in name only. We do not feel that we should be justified in agreeing upon tonnage levels so high that, far from limiting the burdens of taxation and preventing competitive building, we should merely sanction by international agreement programmes of naval expansion.

Our task is therefore by mutual sacrifice to reach a limitation which attains the ends we all have in view of lightening the burdens of taxation and putting an end to competitive building.

In our opinion, the fairest method of limitation is that of total tonnage by classes, inasmuch as within clearly defined limits each country is left free to build the types and numbers of vessels which it considers best suited to its special needs, its geographical position, its overseas commitments and its national security. If there were any mistrust or suspicion on the part of any one of us as to the intentions of the others, we might well demand the most meticulous scrutiny of the details of each other's building programmes and insist upon a careful balance of guns and ships, of types and characteristics. However, I am confident that all my colleagues about this table would repudiate with equal vehemence the thought of conflict between us. We believe, therefore, that we can safely leave each country free within carefully restricted tonnage limitation upon which, I trust, we can agree to build in each class as it may see fit. For our part, we have no desire to question this right of others to choose the type of vessels that they desire within the general limitation fixed by treaty, and we are confident that there is nothing in our national policy which could give any ground for misgiving on the part of others if we should dispose of a restricted tonnage according to our special requirements.

One of the objectives of the American proposal was to make possible the greatest economy in connection with any future construction of auxiliary craft by the three Powers. Obviously such a result can best be achieved by fixing an agreement upon the lowest possible total tonnages in each of the three classes. We do not achieve it merely by a limitation of the displacement of individual vessels, or of gun calibre, if such limitation is combined with the multiplication of the number of vessels.

In connection with the question of economy, I desire briefly to state the American position with regard to the proposals for decreasing the size and extending the life of capital ships.

As we have already indicated in earlier statements in committee, the American delegation is prepared to consider in a preliminary way the proposals which Mr. Bridgeman has presented, after we have reached agreement on the other problems before us. We have, however, clearly indicated that we do not feel that this is the time for definite decisions on these questions, although we recognise that during the next four years useful preliminary work may be done. No capital ships are to be laid down by any of us until the close of 1931. No economy can be realised prior to that date by any decisions which may be reached here with respect to capital ships. Further, we are quite prepared to suggest, if agreeable to the other signatories to the Washington Treaty, that the Conference to be held in 1931 pursuant to the terms of that Treaty be called early in that year rather than after August 17th. This would allow ample time for its recommendations to be put into effect before any further construction of capital ships is undertaken by the three Powers represented here.

One of the primary purposes for which Mr. Bridgeman desired this plenary session was to furnish an opportunity to eliminate certain misconceptions which have arisen regarding the proposals which have been made. One of the most persistent misconceptions has been that regarding our attitude on the construction of 10,000-ton cruisers. It has been frequently stated that our insistence upon the possession of a considerable number of these cruisers was an obstacle to the fixing of a low total tonnage level for that category. Possibly the simplest way of disposing of this misapprehension is to state that we have felt that the question of numbers and types of ships could not profitably be solved without at the same time agreeing upon a reasonable total

a definite basis for discussion. The American proposal suggests in effect a global tonnage of between 450,000 and 550,000 tons of surface auxiliary strength for the United States and the British Empire. The Japanese delegation believe that, as limitation is our aim, we should naturally take the lower of the two figures as a starting-point. They have, therefore, proposed that the figure of 450,000 tons for the United States and the British Empire be adopted as the basis of our discussion, asking, on that footing, an allotment of somewhat above 300,000 tons for themselves. The figures thus proposed approximately represent a reduction all round of 30 per cent of the tonnages of the three Powers in ships built, building and projected. We are gathered here in order to effect limitations in naval armament, and thereby to reduce the burden of the taxpayer. Limitation which does not actually limit expenditure and its burden cannot be said to be a real limitation. We had that in mind when we proposed at the opening session of the Conference that no nation should in future build or acquire vessels for the purpose of increasing its naval strength.

Now the Conference is faced with the problem, on the one hand, of limiting cruiser tonnage as far as possible and, on the other hand, of satisfying the requirements of each country in regard to those classes of vessels. One of the best ways to meet this difficult situation will be by agreeing to very drastic reductions in the number of 10,000-ton cruisers. For this reason, the Japanese delegation have proposed to the American and British delegates that the number of cruisers of the 10,000-ton type be limited to ten or less each for the United States and the British Empire and to seven or less for Japan. We earnestly hope that friendly consideration may be accorded to our proposal by our colleagues, for we feel that, by thus drastically cutting-down the numbers of this type of cruiser, we shall be able to effect material reductions in the total tonnage of the cruiser class, thereby leaving to each country a convenient surplus for building a sufficient number of cruisers of smaller types.

A further means of alleviating the difficult situation above mentioned may be found in some arrangement by which each nation may be allowed to retain vessels in excess of its allotted tonnage or those past replacement age under certain conditions and within certain limits, in order to enable that nation to possess an additional number of ships needed for specific purposes.

The Japanese delegation make these proposals in the sincere hope that they may be received with favour by the American and British delegations and be submitted to the Technical Committee for examination, in which event we feel confident that a satisfactory result will follow.

The supreme and ultimate object of the limitation of armaments is the maintenance and promotion of the peace of the world. Should any limitation that may be agreed upon here be of such a nature as to leave the nations in possession of enormous armaments, the cause of limitation would suffer a serious blow, for it cannot be supposed that the existence side by side of such tremendous engines of battle would make peace any the more secure. It is considerations like these that actuate the various proposals made by the Japanese delegation. It is from the same motives that they have declared and would once more declare that they are quite prepared to go to as low a point in limitation as the other Powers are willing to accept.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, — On behalf of the American delegation I should like to supplement what has already been said by Mr. Bridgeman and by Viscount Ishii by expressing our earnest hope that the discussions which have thus far taken place and which are continuing in a spirit of the greatest friendliness and cordiality may lead to an acceptable agreement. The methods which we have pursued in dealing with the problems of the Conference have perhaps in themselves created a less optimistic impression than would have been the case had we begun with the simplest problems, announced their solution, and then proceeded to deal with the more serious difficulties. We were agreed, however, that the cruiser problem presented the greatest difficulties and that, if it could be solved, we should quickly reach agreement on the numerous secondary questions which must be settled before we can draw up a treaty.

I think it is generally agreed that this was the best method of approach, inasmuch as it would obviously be futile to confine ourselves to a limitation of other auxiliary craft and not deal with the fundamental question of cruisers. As has already been stated, our technical experts have agreed upon a large number of provisional recommendations in regard to the types and characteristics of other classes of auxiliary vessels. These recommendations must remain tentative and cannot be definitely adopted until they can be taken up in connection with a solution of the cruiser problem.

As stated in our original proposals, we are desirous of agreeing upon a genuine limitation of all classes of auxiliary craft and have suggested certain tonnage levels for the various categories as a basis of discussion, namely, 450,000 to 550,000 tons of surface auxiliary craft in two classes, cruisers and destroyers. At the same time we expressed a readiness to go to still lower tonnage levels if this was agreeable to the other Powers. It would be with the greatest reluctance that we would go to any higher tonnage levels, and then only if such higher levels constituted a real limitation of existing programmes of naval construction and furnished the only possible meeting ground for the three Powers.

The Japanese delegation has advanced proposals which are substantially in accord with the minimum levels we suggested. We should obviously be gratified if an agreement might be reached on that basis. Difficulties have arisen in finding a common ground for discussion between the low level of tonnage limitation, upon which we are in substantial agreement with the Japanese delegation, and the higher levels which would be involved in a fulfilment of the naval requirements which have been outlined by Mr. Bridgeman. The finding of this common ground of agreement, while at the same time keeping within figures which constitute a real limitation and which will obviate for the life of this treaty the dangers and burdens of competitive building, is now the real task before the Conference.

THIRD PLENARY SESSION.

Geneva, Thursday, August 4th, 1927, at 3 p.m.

Present:

<i>United States of America:</i>	The Hon. Hugh GIBSON. Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES. Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG. Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD. Mr. A. W. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain, Dominions and India:</i>	
Great Britain:	Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD. Rear-Admiral A. D. P. R. POUND.
Canada:	Hon. E. LAPOINTE. Dr. W. A. RIDDELL.
Australia:	Rt. Hon. Sir J. COOK.
New Zealand:	Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe OF SCAPA. Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.
Union of South Africa:	Mr. J. S. SMIT.
Irish Free State:	Mr. M. MacWHITE.
India:	Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.
<i>Japan:</i>	Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO. Viscount Kikujiro ISHII. Mr. Sadao SABURI. Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI. Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
<i>Secretariat-General:</i>	The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON (Secretary-General). Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL. Mr. Naotake SATO.
<i>French Mission d'Information:</i>	Comte CLAUZEL. Capitaine de frégate DELEUZE. M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian Unofficial Observers:</i>	Captain Don Fabrizio RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto Cugia DI ST. ORSOLA.

A Survey of the Work of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen — We have met this afternoon in a final plenary session in order to make a general survey of the work which we have accomplished, and to outline the divergencies which have rendered present agreement impossible. It has been agreed that each delegation shall take occasion to make a statement of its position, and that, upon the termination of these statements, the Chairman is to present a joint declaration which will be submitted to the Conference for approval, and which, if adopted, will constitute our resolution of adjournment.

The statements are now in order, and I shall first call upon Mr. Bridgeman.

The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen — I think I shall be in agreement with you, Sir, and with most of my colleagues of the three delegations round the table when I say that, whatever may be the results to-day, I cannot think that our discussions have been by any means useless. I think that the explorations we have made will have been advantageous in preparing for further advances in the direction of limitation.

tonnage for that class. It has been made abundantly clear by the American delegation that the number of maximum-sized cruisers desired would be dependent upon the total tonnage agreed upon. It has been frequently stated that we have, as a preliminary to any agreement, insisted upon the possession of 25 vessels. It is obvious that, if agreement could be reached upon the tonnage levels which we have advocated, it would be impossible for us, during the life of the proposed Treaty, to add to the fleet such a number of maximum-sized cruisers. I have clearly informed my colleagues that I was willing to discuss the numbers of such vessels once we have agreed upon a tonnage limitation.

In this connection it has been stated that the 10,000-ton cruiser was forced upon a reluctant world by American insistence. Anyone who is familiar with the subject is aware that there is no foundation for this statement; the 10,000-ton type was decided upon by general agreement in Washington as non-controversial and as responsive to the existing situation created by the possession of a similar type by certain navies. I think it may tend to clarify the situation if I remind my colleagues that the first American construction of such vessels was not begun until 1926, several years after other navies had initiated construction of such ships. We have not yet completed and will not complete until 1929 one single vessel of this class, and we have no programme authorised or appropriated for which is commensurate with the programmes nearing completion elsewhere.

In the light of this situation, it is difficult to maintain the contention that the American Government is responsible for the existence of this type or for setting the pace for competitive construction of large cruisers.

In conclusion, I should like to summarise the position of the American delegation at this stage of the Conference. We feel that there are now no serious obstacles to the reaching of an early agreement by the Three Powers with respect to limitation of destroyers and submarines, provided an agreement regarding cruisers is reached. We feel that we are in such close agreement with the Japanese delegation with respect to total tonnage limitation and types of the cruiser class that we could easily find a basis of agreement with them. But that is not enough. All three of us must be in agreement. If some basis can be found which is mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese delegations, I feel sure that it will be possible for the American delegation to make the agreement complete.

The accomplishment of this task will involve sacrifices on the part of all of us. I am confident that I reflect not only the views of the American delegation but the views of all those assembled here when I state that agreement between the three Powers we represent is worth more to all of us than any technical advantage, and that the mutual confidence and the feeling of security to be derived from such an agreement has more value than any number of guns and ships. If the result of the Conference cannot be construed by world opinion as a self-denying ordinance freely entered into by three of the great naval Powers, then it has no value whatever and will do infinite harm. It is incumbent upon all of us to approach this task in no spirit of narrow technical consideration, but in the broader and more generous spirit of promoting trust and good understanding between our three nations. In that spirit we can achieve success.

Is there any other question to come before the Conference this afternoon? Do I take it that it is the desire of the Conference that I adjourn this meeting? Then the meeting is adjourned.

The meeting adjourned at 4.25 p.m.

After working for some time on these lines, we found ourselves in marked disagreement with the American delegation on the subject of cruisers.

We had been told that "our respective navies should be maintained at the lowest level compatible with national security", and we proceeded to explain quite plainly what was our problem in this respect. We said that it was numbers that we required, and if a limit could be put upon the number of large cruisers and a low maximum size on the smaller cruiser, we would arrive at a much lower total tonnage than would be possible if other countries demanded an unlimited number of ships of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns. But we found that the American delegation were unwilling to put a limit, within the total tonnage, to the number of cruisers carrying 8-inch guns. Although we stated our reason for wanting a number of small cruisers, we do not understand what are their reasons for demanding so many large cruisers or so many with weapons of such high offensive power as the 8-inch gun.

We have stated that the geographical position of our mother-country and of the Dominions must be borne in mind. We said so in accepting President Coolidge's invitation, and we have frequently repeated that a number of small cruisers are of vital necessity to an Empire whose widely scattered parts are divided from each other by seas and oceans, and whose most populous parts are dependent for their daily bread on seaborne trade and would perish if we failed to protect it. No doubt it is not easy for countries differently placed fully to realise our feelings in this matter. But no Briton who was at home during the war, at its most anxious time, will forget the feeling that the situation brought home to us. Month by month we found our rations of bread, meat, sugar and other articles being lowered, and we could see the spectre of starvation slowly approaching. Is it to be wondered at that every one of us feels that it is a duty to make what provision we can to protect ourselves and our children against a recurrence of such a danger?

Though we are carrying a heavy burden of taxation and though we are suffering from industrial depression, you will find few people in Great Britain who will demur to providing the money which is necessary to keep open the waterways for our food and raw materials. We regard it as an insurance against a terrible risk, and, like other insurances, it is a provision against unforeseen disaster and not a provision against danger from any particular country or against any present menace. A sufficient proof that we are not nervous about any danger from American action lies in the fact that we have made no complaint as to the American superiority in destroyers and submarines or shown any desire to build up to equality in those classes.

We have, as I say, made no concealment of our needs or of the reasons for our requirements.

No one could have put the case more clearly than did Mr. French, Chairman of the House Naval Committee, in presenting the naval estimates in the American House of Representatives on January 4th last: "Stop the lanes of the sea to the ships of Great Britain, and suffering would be brought to the people of the British Isles within a period of weeks. . . . Turn to the United States. Our country," he said, "could be cut off from the rest of the world and there would be food for our people; there would be fuel oil for our use; there would be materials of all kinds for our service. The lanes of the sea might be closed to us for weeks or for years. Should the necessity arise, the United States, within her own territory, could sustain her people without suffering and could produce the material to meet whatever emergency naval necessities might require." At the same time, without delay we set to work to fix the tonnage of our requirements at the lowest possible figure. Though we had 114 cruisers just before the war and many more some ten years earlier, we are only asking for a maximum of 70 now. No one can say we have not gone far in reducing our requirements.

It was pointed out at the last plenary session that one obstacle to a settlement was that we could not reconcile our differences with Japan — that, if some basis could be found which was mutually acceptable to the British and Japanese delegations, it would be possible for the American delegation to make the agreement complete.

We have consequently made a great effort to put our requirements into a form which will be acceptable to the Japanese delegation, and we have been met by at least an equally strong attempt on the part of the Japanese delegation to the same end.

The proposals which were published a few days ago embody the result of these efforts. We understand that these proposals in the main would not meet with opposition from the Japanese delegation. These, together with the other proposals we have made, would bring about in the near future a very sensible limitation of naval armament.

This scheme, as was carefully explained by Sir Austen Chamberlain in a statement made in the House of Commons on July 27th, the full text of which I am circulating to the Conference, is a temporary arrangement intended to last till 1936, the date of the expiration of the Washington Agreement. I am also circulating the draft proposals contained in this scheme with a brief explanation of the various clauses.

To sum them up, the British delegation's proposals entail savings far in excess of any other scheme before the Conference.

Our proposals for reductions in size, tonnage and calibre of guns and extension of life of capital ships would save over £50,000,000 to the British Empire during the period of replacement and proportionately large savings for other countries.

Our cruiser proposals would save £1,000,000 on every cruiser to be constructed in future after the ratio in large cruisers has been attained.

For destroyers and submarines, they would stop the ever-increasing tendency to raise the size and cost of these vessels.

In each case we should have eliminated competitive building.

In each case we should have effected economy.

In each case we were considering security and banishing aggression from our minds.

All three Powers have most certainly had the same goal in view. In attempting to reach it, we have travelled sometimes together in pairs, sometimes all three on the same track. At other times we have sought different roads, and the examination of those different routes will have contributed towards the final selection of the right one, which perhaps may, after all, be one that has not yet been discovered by us.

My Government desire me to try to make clear the way in which we have approached the task and our genuine desire for a limitation of naval armaments.

In the message from President Coolidge conveyed to the Conference at the first plenary session, we were enjoined to come to an agreement "rendering impossible any form of naval competition between the three Powers". This was subsequently amplified by a statement by the Chairman of three cardinal points which should guide us. They were: (1) elimination of competitive building; (2) we were to consider security and defence and not aggression; (3) we must study economy. The British delegation have endeavoured to keep those points faithfully in mind in all the proposals which they have put forward.

The first was the avoidance of competition, and it was with that end in view that we proposed that there should be two classes of cruisers, two of destroyers and two of submarines, in each of which a maximum tonnage for each individual vessel should be fixed. Without this provision it seemed to us that the mere fixation of total tonnage could not remove the danger of competition and would in fact increase it. If one Power used their total tonnage for the construction of the largest type of vessels, it would lead to an attempt on the part of other Powers to follow their example, and to an increase instead of a decrease in offensive strength, and the maximum would, as experience has shown, become the standard size. This was well exemplified by the decision taken at Washington to limit the cruiser to 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns. The effect has been that this maximum has been taken as the standard for most cruisers built since that date.

It was for this reason that, while agreeing to the ratio proposed by the United States of America in the largest type of cruisers — that is 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns — we desired to limit the numbers of those large cruisers. We offered to refrain ourselves from laying down any more, and not to proceed with the *Dorsetshire*, on which money has already been spent, whilst America was to be able to build up to equal numbers and Japan to the number of eight. We suggested that no other cruisers should be built except those of a lower tonnage and mounting no gun larger than 6 inches.

Again, in destroyers, the American plan gave the opportunity of building destroyers up to the size of 3,000 tons, and if this size were to be adopted, there would be little difference between a large destroyer and a small cruiser, and the tendency would have been to build destroyers of the largest type. We therefore proposed to limit the size and armament of destroyer leaders and destroyers to figures which took into account the existing practice of the three Powers. On this point, fortunately, we were all able to agree. It was for the same reason that we proposed two classes of submarine. But in this we were actuated by the additional motive of limiting offensive strength. We regard the larger submarine, as we regard the larger cruiser, as a weapon of offence. And by this restriction in the size and number of large submarines we desired, in the Chairman's words, to avoid "the suspicion of aggressive intent".

In all these cases we also suggested a limit of the guns they should carry, and I am glad to say that, as far as guns are concerned, we were able to agree in respect of destroyers and submarines. But, as regards the displacement of vessels, the size agreed upon has in each case exceeded the figures proposed by us.

Again, in all these proposals, our plan would have led to greater economy, and more of the taxpayer's money would have been saved in each country. We cannot therefore be charged with departing from the Chairman's third injunction to exercise "a wise economy".

We made another proposal in the direction of economy which, if adopted, would save many millions of pounds to all three countries. This was the reduction in future of the size of the battleships and the extension of their age-limit.

It is true that in this direction no actual building can be begun before 1931. But the preparation for designs begins about two years before the keel is laid, and, if we could agree upon our future policy now, we should save a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty and we should be setting an example to the world. When I first mentioned this it was seized upon by suspicious parties as an attempt to give us a permanent advantage, though under the Washington Treaty we were permitted to build the *Nelson* and the *Rodney* in exchange for scrapping four other battleships, in order to give us an equivalent in vessels mounting 16-inch guns with those of the United States of America and Japan, and so establish the balance of 5: 5: 3 which was the basis of that agreement. It is true that these two ships of ours were the last to be built, but it never entered our heads that our proposal could be regarded as calculated to disturb the balance arranged at Washington for battleships. I therefore explained, when making the proposal, that it would necessitate some elasticity in the figures in the replacement table. My object was to show that we were willing to agree to any modification which might become necessary in order to preserve the balance arrived at in Washington.

I hoped that the Conference would at least have agreed to pass a resolution that, unless any unforeseen circumstances arise before 1931, we recommend this reduction in the size and this extension in the age of battleships. For in this direction lies much the greatest saving which can be effected. The Japanese delegation have expressed their sympathy with our view, and the American delegation — and I thank them both — have consented, if agreements on other points can be reached, to consider it in a preliminary way. I hope that that will be one of the directions in which our efforts will be further developed in the future. A clear pronouncement on this point would be an enormous advance in limitation and economy.

4. The following vessels over 6,000 tons to be retained in their respective fleets:

British Empire	Four <i>Hawkins</i> class carrying 7.5-inch guns.
	The <i>York</i> carrying 8-inch guns.
	Two <i>Emerald</i> class carrying 6-inch guns.
United States of America	Ten <i>Omaha</i> class carrying 6-inch guns.
Japan	Four <i>Furutaka</i> class carrying 8-inch guns.

Note. — The general intention of this proposal is to provide for the retention of existing ships which, though still in full efficiency, fall neither within the 10,000-ton 8-inch class nor the contemplated class with a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and maximum armament of 6-inch guns.

The British delegation, recognising that this proposal would leave the United States of America with no 8 inch-gun cruisers in this class, are prepared to agree to the construction by the United States of vessels which, in the opinion of the naval advisers of the three delegations, would equalise the strength of the British Empire and the United States of America in this class.

5. All other cruisers to be divided into two classes:

- (a) 10,000-ton cruisers.
- (b) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6 inches in calibre.

6. 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number:

For British Empire and United States of America	12
For Japan	8

7. Maximum standard displacement for flotilla leaders to be 1,850 tons and for destroyers 1,500 tons. Flotilla leaders and destroyers not to carry a gun above 5 inches.

8. That, of the total tonnage in the destroyer class, 100 per cent may be used for vessels of 1,500 tons and under, but not more than 16 per cent of the total may be used for the flotilla leader class, *i.e.* vessels above 1,500 tons and limited to a maximum of 1,850.

9. Submarines to be divided into two classes:

Class A	1,800 down to 1,000
Class B	Maximum 600

Submarines not to carry a gun in excess of 5 inches.

10. The maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines of either class of whatever age to be as follows:

(a) British Empire and U.S.A.	90,000
(b) Japan	60,000

of which total tonnage not more than two-thirds may be used for Class A submarines.

11. Except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10, the total tonnage allocated to be used as each Power thinks best.

Appendix II.

EXPLANATORY NOTES ON BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY 28TH, GIVEN IN APPENDIX I.

The first clause fixes a total tonnage for all active cruisers, destroyers and submarines at a figure of 590,000 tons for the British Empire and U.S.A. and 385,000 for Japan. The second clause enables each Power to retain in addition 25 per cent of vessels over age. As far as the British Empire is concerned, these are cruisers built before or during the war, which, owing to their lack of speed or sea-keeping qualities, would be of minor defensive value only.

Clause 3 gives age-limits for large and small cruisers, destroyers and submarines which accord with those provisionally agreed by the Technical Committee.

Clause 4 allows the retention of a class of cruisers already in existence which are above the limit of 6,000 tons with 6-inch guns proposed for small cruisers and below the type of 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns. This includes:

10 of the <i>Omaha</i> class with 6-inch guns belonging to the U.S.A.	} belonging to the British Empire.
4 of the <i>Furutaka</i> class with 8-inch guns belonging to Japan.	
4 of the <i>Hawkins</i> class with 7.5-inch guns.	
2 of the <i>Emerald</i> class with 6-inch guns.	
1 <i>York</i> with 8-inch guns.	

What have we done to try to meet the objections to our original plans?

We have frankly stated our needs and given our reasons for holding them, and explained our conception of national security.

We have agreed to try to fix total tonnages, provided that there is a proper division of classes and a maximum fixed for each type. This we understood to be agreed by the American delegation at the Preparatory Disarmament Conference, and we had presumed that it would also be welcomed here.

We have made repeated efforts to put our total tonnage at the lowest figure compatible with security and our final effort is embodied in our latest proposals. But we have had to raise the maximum figures for limiting the size of destroyers and submarines to meet the wishes of the other parties, thereby increasing the tonnage we should have liked in these cases to diminish.

We have offered to agree upon a maximum building programme over a period of years, so that each nation should have complete knowledge of the position of others. But that has not proved acceptable.

After the war, like the U.S.A., we have scrapped a very large number of warships amounting to a tonnage of the enormous figure of 1,797,000 tons in battleships, cruisers and destroyers in the interest of limitation. In the same way now, no impartial critic, we think, can say we have not made our full share of concessions as a contribution towards arriving at an agreement.

I am given to understand that the American delegation object to the limitation in second-class cruisers to a 6-inch gun calibre, and insist on freedom to mount any gun up to 8 inches in these ships. Whilst we are unable fully to understand their objection, I can assure them that our attitude is not due to the fear of any unfriendly action on their part. It is due to the feeling that, as we came here to try to agree to the limitation of armaments in the future, we cannot append our signature to a clause which would violate the three cardinal points laid down at the outset of our Conference by the American delegation. We believe it could have no other effect than that of a considerable increase in the offensive strength of the fleets of the world.

It is obvious that, without any agreement and without calling a Conference, America has the power and the means to build as many cruisers within the limit of 10,000 tons and 8-inch guns as she pleases.

We hoped that, in the endeavour to bring about effective limitation, she would have been willing to join with us in setting a lower cruiser standard for future cruiser construction which would have been an example to all nations.

It is a great disappointment to us to part without arriving at a comprehensive agreement, and we should have been glad of an agreement even if it had only included those items on which there seems to be no difference of opinion.

I made a formal suggestion to this effect which was, however, found to be unacceptable. I am circulating a copy of its text (Appendix III).

But if it is now found impossible to agree upon a formula which is acceptable to all parties, this would not indicate a spirit of antagonism between the Three Powers; still less would it mean that we intended to enter upon a competition in new construction. We shall not then disperse in a spirit of bitterness or despair. The peace of the world does not depend so much upon a comprehensive form of words and mathematical tables suitable to the various needs of each Power as on the friendly and peaceable spirit of the great nations. No formula could succeed in ensuring peace if the spirit of peace was not present, and no failure to find a formula is disastrous if the nations concerned still hold fast to the will for peace and the detestation of aggression, to which I am convinced all present to-day adhere as steadfastly as we did before we met.

I am speaking to-day not only for His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of India, which I represent at this Conference, but I am authorised by the delegates representing His Majesty's Governments in Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa to say that they are in agreement with the statement of the case which I have had the honour to make.

Appendices to Mr. Bridgeman's Speech.

Appendix I.

BRITISH PROPOSALS OF JULY 28TH, 1927.

The British proposals in respect of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, for incorporation in a Treaty to remain in force until 1936, referred to above, are as follows:

1. The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines below the age-limit for replacement is not to exceed:

(a) For British Empire and U.S.A.	590,000
(b) For Japan	385,000

2. In addition, each Power may retain 25 per cent of the total tonnages given in paragraph 1 (a) and (b) in vessels over age.

3. Age-limits before which replacements cannot take place:

10,000-ton cruisers	18 years
Other cruisers	16 years
Destroyers	16 years
Submarines	13 years

As a result of this conversation, the two naval officials presented to their respective delegations the following memorandum:

1. Total tonnage of surface auxiliary combatant craft.
 - (a) Figures suggested by Admiral Kobayashi:

For the British Empire	484,000 tons
For Japan	315,000 tons
 - (b) Figures suggested by Admiral Field:

For the British Empire	500,000 tons
For Japan	325,000 tons
2. Retention of an additional 25 per cent of total tonnage in old vessels.
3. 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number:

For the British Empire and the U.S.A. (each)	12
For Japan	8
4. Retention of the following vessels:

For the British Empire	The <i>York</i> and the four cruisers of the <i>Hawkins</i> class.
For the U.S.A.	Ten cruisers of the <i>Omaha</i> class.
For Japan	Four cruisers of the <i>Furutaka</i> class.
5. Question of other 8-inch gun cruisers. Japan has no intention of laying down any other 8-inch gun cruisers before December 31st, 1936.
6. Agreed maximum percentage as between cruisers and destroyers.
7. Submarines.
 - (a) Admiral Kobayashi said Japan required about 70,000 tons of submarines.
 - (b) Admiral Field suggested 60,000 tons of submarines for each.

It will be seen that, at this conversation, we proposed to meet the British view in the matter of total tonnage by increasing somewhat the figure which we presented at the second plenary meeting. The figure of 315,000 tons was the maximum to which we could possibly go in surface craft tonnage for ourselves. Not unmindful, however, of the spirit of conciliation now shown by the British delegation in proposing the greatly reduced figure of 500,000 tons for their surface craft, the Japanese delegation felt bound to explore all possible avenues in order to meet their British colleagues halfway. The clue to a solution was found in submarine tonnage. Japan originally asked for 70,000 tons of submarines, while the British delegation proposed 60,000 tons for each of the three nations. We now decided to accept this British figure for submarines so as to be in a position to raise our surface craft tonnage to the level demanded by the British delegation without thereby having to add anything to our total auxiliary tonnage.

As to the retention of old vessels, the Japanese delegation expressed the opinion at the last plenary meeting that it might be allowed within certain limits and under certain conditions. They had in mind vessels built before the Great War or otherwise limited in combatant value. They are also persuaded, as a result of subsequent study, that the proposed ratio of 25 per cent of the allotted tonnage is somewhat too high.

The British figures regarding the 10,000-ton cruisers, not being very far from our own proposal, were accepted by us.

As regards the limitation or elimination entirely of the smaller cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, we informed the British delegation that, although we found it impossible to agree to the British proposal as a matter of principle, the question would not present any practical difficulty for the purpose of the proposed treaty as far as Japan was concerned, because, on the basis of the proposed tonnage allocation, we had no intention of laying down before 1936 any more of these 8-inch-gun cruisers.

In regard to the retention of intermediate cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, we suggested that, in view of the fact that the United States had no vessels of this class, while the British Empire and Japan each had several of them, the right to construct during the currency of the proposed treaty a certain number of 8-inch-gun cruisers over and above the allocation in the 10,000-ton class should be conceded to that country.

Thus, upon the more important of the questions at issue, a provisional understanding along the lines above outlined was arrived at between the Japanese and British delegations. We frankly hoped that the back of the work before us had been broken, and that the Conference was now in a fair way towards a successful conclusion. We anticipated that the visit to London of the British delegates would only further accelerate that happy consummation. We could not therefore help from feeling a poignant disappointment when it was found at the last informal meeting that, in spite of the utmost endeavours on the part of all the three delegations, there still remained differences, apparently insoluble, between the British and American delegations.

The main difficulty lies as ever in the question of cruisers, their allotted tonnages and more especially the calibre of their guns. Our views in this matter are not entirely in accord with those

But, in view of the fact that the United States of America have no 8-inch gun cruisers in this class, we propose that there should be added for the United States of America vessels with 8-inch guns sufficient in the opinion of the naval advisers of the three delegations to equalise their strength with the British Empire in this class.

Clause 5 proposes a division of all other cruisers into two classes:

- (1) 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns.
- (2) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6-inch.

Clause 6 suggests a limit in the number of the larger cruisers to 12 for U.S.A. and the British Empire and eight for Japan.

The object of these two clauses, as I have already explained, is to prevent a competition in building among the naval powers of the World, which would most certainly ensue if every country were able to build up to their limit in the larger size; and there is no other way of stopping this competition.

We are prepared to lay down no more 10,000-ton cruisers, while America may proceed to build up to the number we now possess either built or building, and Japan up to total of eight.

Clause 7 fixes the maximum tonnage of destroyer flotilla leaders at 1,850 tons and destroyers at 1,500 tons and the size of the gun at 5 inches.

Clause 8 enables any Power to use all its total tonnage in destroyers in the smaller class if it so desires, and restricts the tonnage of flotilla leaders to 16 per cent of the whole.

Clause 9 divides submarines into two classes:

- (1) between 1,000 and 1,800, and
- (2) below 600 tons,

for the same reason which I have stated before, namely, the elimination of competition. It also fixes the size of the gun at 5 inches.

I repeat here that, in fixing the maximum displacement in destroyers and submarines, we have taken not our figures but the higher figures which were desired by the other Powers.

Clause 10 gives the maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines as 90,000 for U.S.A. and British Empire and 60,000 for Japan, and restricts the construction of the larger class to two-thirds of that total.

In Clause 11 it is explained that, except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10, the total tonnage allotted can be used as each Power thinks best. This gives a small margin of elasticity for transfer of tonnage from one class to another according to the special requirements of each country.

Appendix III.

BRITISH PROPOSALS. — AUGUST 4TH.

Even if there is for the present no apparent prospect of coming to a complete agreement about small cruisers, it would be most unfortunate if the Conference were to separate without arriving at some international arrangements tending to economy. A large measure of agreement has already been reached with regard to 10,000-ton cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers and submarines. It seems to us that a similar agreement might well be reached with regard to battleships. These results are not all that had been hoped for, but they are of great value, and it would be an international misfortune if they were lost on the present occasion. Sooner than see the Conference wholly fail, we are authorised to sign an agreement even if it embodied only points on which provisional agreement has already been reached by the three delegations.

Mr. Michael MACWHITE: Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen — On behalf of the Government of the Irish Free State, I wish to express my deep regret that it has not been found possible, during the discussions which have taken place at this Conference, to reach an agreement that should be considered as satisfactory to all the parties concerned.

The question of disarmament is an extremely difficult one to solve, much more so than is generally realised. The difficulties, however, that have been encountered here were not of such a nature as to discourage the efforts to bring about further limitation. My Government therefore sincerely hopes that another opportunity will soon present itself when an agreement leading to limitation and ultimate disarmament will result.

Admiral Viscount SAITO: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen — The Japanese delegation deem it proper first and foremost to dwell upon the conversation which, consequent on the second plenary meeting, was entered into by the naval representatives of the British Empire and Japan upon the question of surface auxiliary craft. This two-Power conversation was thought desirable and indeed necessary, for by that time it was clear and felt by all the delegations that the wide divergence between the British and Japanese delegations' proposals in regard to the total amount of tonnage to be allocated must first of all be reconciled if there was to be any agreement at all.

secondary class of cruisers, provided that the secondary type of cruisers should not be of a maximum individual displacement which will preclude the mounting of 8-inch guns, a calibre of gun which was agreed upon by the signatories of the Washington Treaty. Unfortunately, these efforts to meet the British position, together with other American proposals to which I shall refer later, were not considered sufficient. Any further concessions on our part would have involved a complete surrender of the right to build ships responsive to our needs, and we were obliged to take the ground that, if agreement were to be reached, there must be some measure of reciprocity in concession. We frankly recognise that the naval needs of various Powers differ, and we have never contested the argument which had been put forward that the naval requirements of the British Empire could best be met by numbers of vessels. One of the virtues of the system of limitation of naval strength by total tonnage in classes is that each country is left free to use its tonnage allotment according to its special needs. We have felt, however, that the making of a treaty to which we could honestly subscribe as representing a limitation of armaments was dependent upon meeting these requirements within total tonnages which constituted a limitation and not an expansion. With a large number of naval bases scattered along its lines of communication, we can quite well understand the desire of the British Empire for a certain number of cruisers of the smaller type. At the same time, we feel that it should be recognised that our own geographical position and our lack of bases resulting in part from the restrictions of the Washington Treaty require a larger type of cruiser affording a longer cruising radius. We felt further that the repeated expression of our willingness to reduce the total cruiser tonnage to the lowest limits acceptable to the British delegation was sufficient evidence that we have no thought of engaging in a programme of construction which can be any cause for apprehension.

The British delegation, in its proposals, sought to secure agreement to limit very strictly the number of the larger type of cruisers with 8-inch guns and to limit all other construction to small-sized cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, a type of ship of relatively small use to us because of its lack of cruising and operating radius and protection. The immediate and obvious result of acquiescing in these British proposals would have been that the British Empire would have been able to build exactly what it desired and that we, on the other hand, would be restrained from building what we consider we might need and yet the tonnage levels insisted on by the British Empire would result in a substantial increase even over present strength.

It may be well here to touch upon the view which has been expressed that we have rendered agreement difficult by our alleged insistence upon freedom to build a large number of 10,000-ton cruisers armed with 8-inch guns. These the British delegation terms offensive vessels as distinguished from the 6,000-ton cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, which they call defensive cruisers. No such distinction was recognised at the time of the Washington Treaty. The 10,000-ton cruiser with 8-inch gun armament was fixed by the Washington Treaty, and this decision was supported by the British delegates at that Conference and adopted as non-controversial. Furthermore, the United States did not commence the construction of cruisers of this size. Five cruisers of this type have now been practically completed by the British Empire and six more are in process of construction, while four vessels of 9,750 tons are now in commission. The United States has two 10,000-ton cruisers which are about 15 per cent completed and six for which the contract has been recently let. We have none that will be afloat for approximately two years. In the Act authorising the construction of these cruisers, it was provided that, in the event of an international conference for the limitation of naval armament, the President was empowered in his discretion to suspend in whole or in part any construction authorised by the Act.

The British Empire delegation has drawn a sharp distinction between the offensive and aggressive character of 8-inch-gun cruisers and the essentially defensive character of the 6-inch-gun cruisers which they feel would adequately serve for our purposes. The American delegation cannot but feel that every warship possesses essential offensive characteristics and that no ship is built for the sole purpose of defending itself against attack. We cannot follow the reasoning which attributes to 6-inch-gun cruisers a purely defensive role. We are told that they will police trade routes and protect British commerce on the sea. But, in order to afford effective defence to British commerce upon the seas, these cruisers must in time of war effectively deny the sea to others. When we come down to essentials, the claim on the part of any nation for the right to maintain in time of peace a cruiser strength sufficient to afford complete security to its commerce in case of war renders impossible any effective naval limitation by international agreement.

When we are asked to limit strictly the number of cruisers on which 8-inch guns may be mounted and eventually to abandon that gun altogether in favour of the 6-inch gun, we are compelled to consider the effect of such a limitation upon our situation in view of the fact that the British Government had at its disposal approximately 888,000 tons of fast merchant ships, capable of being readily converted into cruisers and armed with many 6-inch guns, as contemplated by the Washington Treaty. We, on the other hand, have only 188,000 tons of such ships. As was so ably brought out by Lord Jellicoe, converted merchant ships played a great part in the late war.

There is another matter which has given us cause for reflection. At the time of the adoption of the Washington Treaty, as I have mentioned before, the delegates of the British Empire looked upon a total tonnage for surface auxiliary craft of 450,000 tons as an acceptable and reasonable figure. But now we are faced with a programme calling for 647,000 tons of auxiliary surface craft, a tonnage far in excess of that contemplated at the time of the Washington Conference. What has brought about this change on the part of the British Government? What new factor in world affairs has appeared upon the horizon which has caused them apprehension? One of the mightiest fleets on the high seas, that of Germany, has disappeared. So far as we know, no other great maritime nation has embarked on any programme which could conceivably be considered a menace to the British Empire. Other than the Powers here represented, there are in the entire

of the British delegation. As has been recounted, however, we succeeded in reaching, as between ourselves and the British Empire, a degree of agreement sufficient to warrant the hope that it might form the basis of a settlement that would include the United States. In the earnest hope that our colleagues representing the other two Powers would yet succeed in reducing to a vanishing point the difference which divided them, we were determined to put forward every exertion loyally and to the best of our ability to assist them in accomplishing this great result.

As our last effort in that direction, we ventured to present to our American and British colleagues a tentative plan of compromise which unfortunately was found unacceptable.

It is with very great and sincere regret that we see this Conference, which started with such high hopes and in so genial an atmosphere and which promised such considerable results for the cause of moderation in warlike expenditure, now about to separate without having arrived at any definite agreement. It would, indeed, have been difficult for anyone to imagine that a Conference of these three nations which are bound to one another by such special ties of friendship should fail to be carried through to a successful outcome, that any difference among them should prove so fundamental as to baffle all efforts for conciliation.

But should we call this a failure? Should we really speak of a "rupture of negotiations"? I for one decline to view the matter in that light, for I am convinced that in some form or another these attempts to limit extravagance and competition by formal agreement, as they are limited in practice by common sense, will go on and will eventually succeed.

The Hon. Hugh GIBSON: As I indicated in my opening remarks, the Conference has just reached a point where we have been reluctantly forced to admit that we cannot continue our work with any hope of a successful conclusion. Since the proposals which have been laid before us by Mr. Bridgeman represent a final decision of the British Empire delegation, I have already informed Mr. Bridgeman that we shall be forced frankly to admit that our efforts at present to find a basis for negotiation acceptable to all three Powers have not been successful.

I should like to take this occasion for stating somewhat fully the American views on the subject, not by way of argument with my colleagues but because the solution of this problem can be found only if all conflicting views are clearly stated and left for mature consideration.

First of all, let us consider why we came here. The President of the United States, on February 10th, extended to the Powers signatories to the Washington Treaty an invitation to meet in Geneva to agree upon the extension to auxiliary craft of the principles of that Treaty. The British Empire and Japan accepted this invitation. The President's initiative in calling the Conference was in conformity with the repeatedly expressed desire of our Congress, as specifically set forth in an Act of February 11th, 1925, that armaments should be effectively reduced and limited in the interests of the peace of the world and for the relief of all nations from the burdens of inordinate and unnecessary expenditure. The President's invitation left no room for doubt as to the purpose he had in mind, and the proposals to be made by the American delegation could have been forecast with considerable accuracy. It was known from the President's message that we would propose limitation of auxiliary craft by categories, that we were in favour of limiting them according to the principles of the Washington Treaty. It was not difficult to forecast even the tonnage levels which we would suggest, as it was obvious that no fresh complications in the world situation had called for a material increase over the figures suggested by us at Washington in 1922, namely, 450,000 tons for both classes of auxiliary surface vessels.

In strict conformity with the spirit and letter of the President's invitation, the American delegation on the opening day of the Conference laid on the table clear, simple and comprehensive proposals for a genuine limitation of naval armaments. We were confident that proposals of this general character would be acceptable to the Powers represented here. It was not unreasonable to feel that, even if the specific figures suggested by us as a basis of discussion were not acceptable, a reasonable limitation might be achieved on the basis of the present state of the strongest navies in the different categories; that is to say, the British Empire in cruisers and the United States in destroyers and submarines, with the result that, by agreeing upon such figures, we should be relieved of the dangers of competitive building. The Japanese delegation subsequently indicated its willingness to negotiate on the basis of the minimum tonnage figures suggested by the American delegation. It should be recalled that the minimum figures of the American proposals involved a considerable reduction in the destroyer and submarine tonnage now possessed by the United States.

From the first, however, we encountered a serious difficulty in the claim of the British Government that it needed a considerably larger number of cruisers than it now possesses. Instead of the 48 cruisers now in service, the British Empire delegation has set forth in the report of the Technical Committee a need for 15 8-inch gun cruisers and 55 cruisers of a smaller type, a total of 70. The claim for these figures was defended on the ground of the absolute naval needs of the Empire. The American delegation has never been able to reconcile the conception of absolute naval needs with the negotiation of a treaty to fix limitations on the basis of mutual concessions. If the sole purpose of our negotiation be that of setting forth the view of each Power as to its requirements without regard to the navies of others, it is difficult to see how we can arrive at a treaty for the real limitation of navies. Further, we have not yet been able to understand why, in a time of profound peace and at the moment that we are seeking to reduce the burdens of naval expenditure, the British Government considers a considerable programme of naval expansion as an absolute and even a vital necessity.

In an effort to meet the views of the British Empire delegation, we have indicated our willingness to make very substantial modifications in our original proposals respecting cruisers. We have agreed to discuss a tonnage in the cruiser class far in excess of what we had hoped might be fixed as a limitation for the future. This was done in an effort to help meet the British claim for numbers of vessels. Further, we have agreed to discuss the number of 10,000-ton cruisers and to accept a

We regret exceedingly that we have as yet not been able to harmonise the conflicting views on naval limitation. We believe that on broad principles, looking ahead to its influence on disarmament among the nations of the world and the interest of peace, an agreement between the principal naval Powers is of surpassing importance. We believe that we can all afford to make a very strict limitation which will largely decrease our armaments in the near future and consequently decrease the burden of taxation and the fear of war. We cannot believe that, if the three great naval Powers are all willing to make this limitation and reduction, there is any resultant danger to their respective Governments, their trade routes or their possessions. We believe we should deal with this subject on a broader and higher ground than our need of meeting all conceivable eventualities.

From generation to generation during the last 100 years, it has become more evident that these three nations intend to and will live in a state of peace, and we should approach this subject of naval limitation on the basis that war between them is unthinkable. The interruption of our work should not be interpreted as indicating a permanent inability to agree upon effective methods of naval limitation, and it is our hope that a thorough study of the whole problem of naval armaments may lead to the finding of some method of reconciling the views of our respective Governments and that a satisfactory agreement may be shortly concluded for a greater limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

In conclusion, I should like to express on behalf of the American delegation our warm personal esteem for our associates of the British Empire delegation and of the Japanese delegation. It has been a privilege to work with them on this problem, and we trust that, even though we have not succeeded in reaching agreement at this time, our work may mark a step forward toward eventual agreement acceptable to us all. We are all of us united in the sincere desire to promote good understanding and friendship between our three countries, and I am confident that the inability to agree will not discourage us in our efforts to achieve substantial limitation in naval armaments.

Before proceeding to present the joint Declaration, I am desired to state on behalf of the three delegations that we have been very glad to welcome the French and Italian representatives at our meetings and to keep them fully advised of the course of our negotiations. I also desire to take this occasion to express, on behalf of the American delegation — I feel I may say on behalf of the other delegations — our warm thanks to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations for the generous measure of assistance he has accorded us; and to express our thanks as well to the very helpful secretarial staff under the able direction of Mr. Howard Huston, who has contributed so materially to our comfort and to the prompt and efficient handling of the large volume of secretarial work entailed by the Conference. I am confident that my colleagues will desire that our Secretary-General be requested to convey an expression of our appreciation to Sir Eric Drummond.

I will now read the joint Declaration:

In pursuance of the suggestion of the President of the United States, the Plenipotentiary Delegates of the President of the United States, of His Britannic Majesty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, met at Geneva on June 20th to consider the limitation of auxiliary naval craft.

Meetings have been held from that date until August 4th, during which period the delegates and their advisers have considered in detail various methods of effecting this object. On many important questions, provisional agreements have been reached, certain of which are embodied in the annexed Report of the Technical Committee of the Conference. These points of agreement relate particularly to the limitation of destroyers and submarines, and it was only when the Conference took up the question of the limitation of the cruiser class that difficulties were encountered. These difficulties proved to be of a character to render it desirable to adjourn the present negotiations until the respective Governments have had an opportunity to give further consideration to the problem and to the various methods which have been suggested for its solution.

The American delegation presented the view that, within total tonnage limitations, which they initially suggested should be between 250,000 and 300,000 tons in the cruiser class for the United States and the British Empire and between 150,000 and 180,000 tons for Japan, each of the Powers should have liberty to build the number and the type of vessel which they might consider best suited to their respective national needs, with freedom, subject to the limitation of the Washington Treaty, to arm these vessels as they saw fit.

The British delegates, whilst putting proposals tending to a limitation of the size of vessels of all classes, have opposed the principle of limitation by total tonnage alone on the ground that the largest ship and the heaviest gun permissible must inevitably become the standard. They desired, first, a strict limitation of the number of 10,000-ton 8-inch cruisers, and secondly the establishment of a secondary type of cruiser of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons, carrying guns of a maximum calibre of six inches. The British delegates contended that the establishment of this type would alone enable the British Empire, within a moderate figure of total tonnage, to attain the numbers which it regards as indispensable to meet its special circumstance and its special needs.

The Japanese delegates presented the view that low total-tonnage levels should be fixed which would effect a real limitation of auxiliary naval vessels. As for the question of the 8-inch-gun cruisers, while the Japanese Government could not agree to any restriction as a matter of principle, they had no difficulty in declaring that, provided a tonnage level of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface vessels were fixed for Japan, they would not build any further 8-inch-gun cruisers until 1936, except those already authorised in existing programmes.

world but five navies possessing modern cruisers of effective combat value; the strongest of these has approximately 72,000 tons, and the total effective cruiser tonnage of all five combined is now less than 200,000.

The British contention has been that their proposals make for economy, while ours call for a large outlay. We cannot admit the justice of such a claim. We have proposed a low limitation on total tonnage, which means a very large saving. Economy can only be realised by reduction of total tonnage. The fact is that, within the total tonnage limitation, the larger the unit size of vessels the greater is the economy, both in initial construction and in operation and maintenance. Both high total tonnage and small units are necessarily expensive. I should like once more to stress that the American proposals would obviously permit of drastic economies, and that a proposition largely to increase the tonnage of auxiliary craft beyond that which any country now possesses would impose, we believe, an unnecessary burden.

The latest proposals of the British Empire delegation do not indicate any substantial reductions in the tonnage demands or modifications in the position taken by the British representatives on the Technical Committee during the early days of the Conference. The proposals of the British Empire delegation which have recently been submitted to us contained the points of difficulty which we have encountered from the outset, and, in addition, a new difficulty is that a combined tonnage limitation for all auxiliary craft, including submarines, is suggested. This total, fixed at 590,000 tons, is to be augmented by an additional 25 per cent of so-called over-age ships. But the age-limit for replacement within the tonnage limitation of 590,000 tons has been so reduced that we have, in effect, a proposal for a total tonnage limitation of effective auxiliary vessels of over 737,000 tons. If we deduct from that figure the highest submarine and destroyer tonnage heretofore suggested by the British Empire delegation, namely, 90,000 tons of submarines and approximately 221,000 tons of destroyers, there would remain a tonnage limitation for cruisers of at least 426,000 tons. This is over 75,000 tons in excess of the British cruiser strength upon completion of vessels now under construction. This figure could be materially increased under the combined tonnage system proposed by the British through the utilisation of a part of the destroyer and submarine tonnage for cruiser construction.

It is obvious that, in a treaty fixing total tonnage limitations, any such figures would not be a present limitation and that even without a treaty it is unlikely that any of the Powers would reach any such maximum tonnages before 1931, when in any event we are to meet again to consider the question of naval armaments. Thus for the immediate future the only real effect of the British proposals is to restrict types of cruisers, not building programmes, and to obligate the United States, in case it should desire to build within the total tonnage limitations proposed, to construct many 6,000-ton 6-inch-gun cruisers, a type which, we have clearly indicated, is not adapted to our needs.

I cannot but feel that the British Government has an unnecessary apprehension as to the use which might be made by the United States of reasonable freedom of action in the cruiser class within strict tonnage limitations. It is to be remembered that, if the total tonnage for cruisers should be fixed as low as 300,000 for the United States and the British Empire, a certain part of this will be consumed in the construction of the maximum-size cruisers of a number to be agreed upon. A further considerable part is already taken up as far as the United States is concerned by the existence of ten 6-inch-gun ships of the *Omaha* class aggregating approximately 70,000 tons. The only practical question arising therefore is whether, in addition to building an agreed number of maximum-size cruisers, none of which have yet been completed by the United States, our future construction of secondary cruisers with 8-inch guns within this narrow limit could be on such a scale as to give concern to the British Empire.

In an effort to meet any possible concern of the British Government on this score, an apprehension which, I hasten to add, we consider unwarranted by anything in our past or present policy, we had already suggested the possibility of inserting in the Treaty a political clause providing in effect that, if the building programme of any one of the signatory Powers within the tonnage limitation agreed upon for cruisers should give concern to any other contracting Power, a meeting of the signatories could be called at any time after 1931 and, if a satisfactory agreement was not reached, the Treaty might be shortly terminated. It is difficult to see why this would not adequately meet any possible apprehension, as it would not be possible for a Power to make any substantial progress on a building programme within the short time prior to the termination of the Treaty. Furthermore, I may add that we are so confident that nothing in our own policy could give ground for such concern that we felt no hesitation in suggesting such a clause.

The American delegation was greatly impressed by a statement recently made by the British Foreign Secretary to the effect that war between the British Empire and the United States was already outlawed in the hearts of both nations. We give our thorough endorsement to this view, and the sincerity of this endorsement has been proved by the fact that our Government has not indicated misgivings or concern because the British Empire has built up a cruiser force entirely disproportionate to our own. We find it difficult, however, to reconcile the British conviction that war is already outlawed between us with their present unwillingness to recognise our right to build a limited number of the type of ships we would desire or with their willingness to risk the success of this Conference because they fear the problematical possession by us during the life of this Treaty of a small number of 8-inch-gun cruisers, and this in spite of the fact that any apprehension which might be occasioned by such problematical construction is amply covered by the political clause which offers a release from the obligation of the Treaty.

Before concluding, I should like to take occasion in the name of the American delegation to express once more our appreciation to the Japanese delegation for the proposals they have brought forward and supported as regards low tonnage limitation. We feel that the firm desire of their country to effect limitation of armament at or below existing tonnage levels will have a profound influence.

PART II.

MINUTES OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(including Minutes of an Informal Meeting
held on Friday, June 24th, 1927).

Chairman: The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.

FIRST SESSION.

Geneva, Tuesday, June 21st, 1927.

Present:

<i>United States of America.</i>	The Hon. Hugh GIBSON. Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES. Mr. A. W. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain.</i>	Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD. Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
<i>Japan.</i>	Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO. Viscount Kikujiro ISHII. Mr. SABURI. Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI.
<i>Secretariat-General.</i>	The Hon. Hugh WILSON (Secretary-General). Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL. Mr. Naotake SATO. Mr. Howard R. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information:</i>	Comte CLAUZEL. Capitaine de frégate DELEUZE. M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian Unofficial Observers:</i>	Captain Don Fabrizio RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto Cugia DI ST. ORSOLA.

Mr. GIBSON said the meeting had been convened for the purpose of organising the work of the Conference, and it was to be left free to the Powers to appoint their own representatives on the Executive Committee.

He proceeded to read a short memorandum, as follows:

"With a view to the proper consideration of the proposals submitted by the Government of the United States, of the British Empire, and of Japan on June 20th, it is suggested that a Technical Committee be formed to exchange statistics of the present cruiser, destroyer and submarine tonnage of each of the three Powers, and of the designed tonnage of ships of these classes comprised in programmes now authorised and appropriated for. In this manner the Conference will be in a position to start its deliberations on an agreed basis of fact."

Various methods were considered of reconciling the divergent views indicated above, but, while material progress has been made, the points of divergence reduced, no mutually acceptable plan has been found to reconcile the claim of the British delegates for numbers of vessels, for the most part armed with 6-inch guns, with the desire of the American delegates for the lowest possible total tonnage limitation with freedom of armament within such limitation, subject to the restriction as to armament already set by the Washington Treaty.

Faced with this difficulty, the delegates have deemed it wise to adjourn the present Conference with this frank statement of their respective views, and to submit the problem for the further consideration of their Governments, in the hope that consultation between them may lead to an early solution.

Further, the delegates agree to recommend to their respective Governments the desirability of arranging between the Signatories of the Washington Treaty that the Conference to be called pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 21 of that Treaty should be held earlier than August 1931, the date contemplated under the terms of that instrument, in order that any decisions reached by such a Conference may come into force before the capital ship construction programme commences, namely, in November of that year.

In making these recommendations and in submitting the statement of the points of agreement, as well as of the points on which agreement has not yet been achieved, the delegates desire to place on record a statement of their conviction that the obstacles that have been encountered should not be accepted as terminating the effort to bring about a further limitation of naval armament. On the contrary, they trust that the measure of agreement which has been reached, as well as the work which has been done in clarifying their respective positions, will make it possible, after consultation between the Governments, to find a basis for reconciling divergent views and lead to the early conclusion of an agreement for the limitation of auxiliary naval vessels which will permit of substantial economy and, while safeguarding national security, promote the feeling of mutual confidence and good understanding.

Gentlemen, it is my understanding that, unless there be an objection, this Declaration shall be adopted as our resolution of adjournment.

The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN: Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen — It is my privilege now to move a proposition which I am sure will be very cordially received by all the delegations, and that is a very hearty vote of thanks to Mr. Gibson for taking the Chair at our meetings. He has not had a very easy task. To drive three teams at the same time is much harder than trying to manage two, and I am sure that you will all agree with me in saying that he has carried out his duties with the greatest courtesy and consideration. We have tried to make his task easier and to behave as circumspectly as we are capable of doing, and I hope he will forgive me if I have in any way contributed to his discomfort. I have no doubt that, if we had been a disorderly body of men, he would have known how to deal with us in a different way, but as it is, I am sure we all thank him for the good temper and courtesy with which he has presided, and we wish him a rest after his very difficult task and success in his future career.

Viscount SAITO: The Japanese delegation most heartily support the motion so happily made by the British delegate

The CHAIRMAN: I am very grateful to Mr. Bridgeman for proposing a vote of thanks to the Chairman, and to Viscount Saito for having seconded it, and to both of them for the very kindly and friendly terms of their remarks. The duties of Chairman of this Conference have not been arduous, thanks to the attitude of helpful co-operation which my colleagues have always shown in all matters bearing upon our meetings. I can only repeat that it has been a memorable privilege to be associated in this work with our colleagues of the British Empire and Japanese delegations, and that I am particularly sensible of the kind feeling which has prompted this vote of thanks.

It now remains for me merely to declare the Conference adjourned.

The Conference adjourned at 4.15 p.m.

INFORMAL MEETING.

Geneva, Friday, June 24th, 1927.

Present :

<i>The United States of America :</i>	The Hon. Hugh GIBSON. Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES. Mr. A. W. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions :</i>	
Great Britain :	The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD. Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Australia :	The Right Hon. Sir Joseph COOK.
New Zealand :	The Honourable Sir James PARR.
<i>Japan :</i>	Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO. Viscount Kikujiro ISHII. Mr. SABURI. Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI.
<i>Secretariat-General :</i>	The Hon. Hugh WILSON (Secretary-General). Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL. Mr. Naotake SATO. Mr. Howard R. HUSTON.

Mr. GIBSON (Temporary Chairman) said that at last Tuesday's informal meeting it had been decided that the delegations should meet each other and begin the work of the Conference. He suggested that Mr. Bridgeman be asked to be Chairman for all the meetings of the Executive Committee.

Viscount ISHII and Admiral SAITO supported this proposal, and the Right Honourable W. C. BRIDGEMAN accepted the chairmanship of the Executive Committee. He then took the chair at the present meeting.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether it was desired to have an agenda for these meetings.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that it would be preferable to leave open the question of an agenda, and notice could be given in the case of important questions, but it was desirable to keep these meetings as informal as possible.

The CHAIRMAN said that definite questions could be put upon the invitations to meetings, but a second heading "Other business" could be inserted so that they could discuss any other question that might arise without giving notice.

This was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN said that, in the conversations which had been taking place in order to find the amount of common ground on which they could progress, something approaching a common basis had been reached with regard to submarines which would enable the Naval Committee to begin work and formulate a general agreement for discussion by the Conference.

Admiral FIELD said that, as a result of private conversations to obtain a basis for the discussion of the submarine question, he felt that the Japanese and British naval experts were very nearly agreed upon a basis. He had mentioned the suggested basis to Admiral Jones and some of his colleagues and gathered that they would be able to give a reply upon it quite soon. It was only necessary to get the agreement of the United States delegation before the question might go to the Naval Committee. He suggested that, as soon as they had a common basis, they should circulate an agenda for the Technical Committee on this question. They would thus have definite headings to discuss and might endeavour to reach a detailed agreement, and in such a way they could take each class of vessel, preparing the ground beforehand without waiting for agreement on any particular class.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN suggested that the phrase referring to a Technical Committee and to the exchange of statistics might be worded more clearly, as "Committee of Experts" and "to exchange information and statistics".

Viscount CECIL hoped that such a Committee would avoid undue formality, and suggested the phrase "the technical advisers should meet to exchange information".

Admiral JONES said that, as the information would be necessarily recognised as authoritative, the Technical Committee would have a certain official status as regards the full Commission.

Viscount ISHII pointed out that this Technical Committee would exchange information on general questions and would be a kind of Preparatory Committee for the Conference.

Admiral JONES said that the Japanese system of tonnage was somewhat different, and that, particularly in the case of submarines, the Committee would need to reconcile and publish their own and the Washington standard tonnage.

Viscount ISHII agreed to a proposal by Viscount CECIL to add the words "and any other information tending to clarify the proposals of the three Powers" after "appropriated for".

Mr. GIBSON said that, as it was a question both of exchanging and reconciling statistics, it would be desirable to say "exchange agreed statistics".

The text as amended was adopted.

Viscount CECIL asked when it was proposed to resume the plenary meetings of the Conference.

Mr. GIBSON was personally much in favour of private discussion of points of disagreement. He thought that the work would be more quickly accomplished if points of disagreement were not ventilated in public, and that it would thus be easier to reach eventual agreement with other Powers. The Conference should not meet until able to announce some fundamental or partial agreement arising from frank and private discussion.

Admiral FIELD understood that the Committee of Experts would discuss the proposals with a view to arriving at an agreed basis to be submitted for approval to the Executive Committee.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN stated that something wider than a Naval Committee would be needed to reconcile certain points, and agreed with the Chairman that the Naval Committee should be reinforced by other members.

Viscount ISHII suggested that it was unwise at first to state in the public meeting the points of difference between the delegations and to give the Press opportunities to seize certain points for undesirable comment.

VISCOUNT CECIL agreed with Viscount ISHII and urged that private conversations should be really private, and not meetings of a Committee. He was convinced that formal private meetings were invariably disastrous.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee ought to issue a *communiqué* after its meetings.

After discussion, *it was decided* to issue *communiqués* after meetings of the Committee.

The Committee decided to adopt and publish immediately the resolution amended as follows:

"With a view to the proper consideration of the proposals submitted by the Governments of the United States, of the British Empire, and of Japan, on June 20th, it is suggested that a Technical Committee be formed to exchange agreed statistics of the present cruiser, destroyer and submarine tonnage of each of the Three Powers and of the designed tonnage of ships of these classes comprised in programmes now authorised and appropriated for, and any other information tending to clarify the proposals of the Three Powers. In this manner the Conference will be in a position to start its deliberations on an agreed basis of fact."

The Executive Committee decided to meet again on Friday, and adjourned at 11.35 a.m.

and whether the limitation would be on numbers in the category or combination of the total tonnage and numbers.

The question of the size or age of an individual unit would, however, bring up a serious difficulty which could only be discussed after a general basis had been found. For instance, in the Japanese proposal to make the *status quo* a practical basis for ages, there was a great difference according to the ages accepted as to what would be the *status quo*. They could therefore not decide on the age of ships unless they knew they were going to discuss the proposal as to the ages.

Admiral FIELD gathered that the Japanese delegation had already conceded this point and that they were ready to discuss the question of a total tonnage for each Power. He suggested that they should not enter into formal discussion until a basis had been decided on in private conversation.

Mr. GIBSON felt that it would simplify the decision of the Executive Committee if they could know the results of the exchange of views between the experts.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the Committee were agreed in not wishing to take a final decision on one particular category until they had seen the whole picture of the different categories.

Admiral JONES pointed out that they might discuss the age of submarines on a purely technical basis and then discover that the age they had decided on would not fit in with the Japanese proposals based on the *status quo*, which in turn was based on ages. For instance, regarding the Japanese proposal and the *status quo* based on the ages of cruisers of 16 years, it made a great difference to the present strength of the different navies if that age were raised to 20 years. It was a very different thing, in valuing the strength of a navy on an age limit of 13 years, to take it from the point of view of submarines on a limit of 15 years.

Admiral FIELD pointed out that the Japanese delegation was prepared to consider the submarine question from the total tonnage point of view. Having put down what they considered suitable as the total tonnage in each class, they would then have to investigate, when the age limit was decided, how many of the existing vessels would be included in it, and this would be a question following on the decision on the main issue.

Admiral JONES recalled that the Japanese proposal was calculated by assessing strength in submarines on the basis of a certain age.

Admiral FIELD said that, as the Japanese delegation had agreed to discuss submarines and were ready to ask for a definite total tonnage in each class, they would have to discuss total tonnage and what it included. There would be a period of transition, and, if the *status quo* did not fall in with that, they would have to make some special agreement on the transition period.

Viscount CECIL felt that it would be necessary to have an important committee composed of delegates of each Power as a kind of higher committee dealing with questions from a general point of view. There would also be an expert committee, and when a deadlock was reached in the conversations of the higher committee, they might invoke the assistance of the experts and talk with them on broader lines. The experts might meet and discuss submarines so that some common understanding might come from these deliberations.

The CHAIRMAN thought that these details about age and other things might be worked out by the Technical Committee, without prejudicing the Executive Committee to agree to their decisions afterwards.

Admiral JONES thought that they might have to have committees on cruisers and destroyers working on very similar lines. There was undoubtedly a basis for discussion in these matters as to whether the limitation was to be by total tonnage or by numbers or by a combination, leaving out all quantitative questions. Coming, however, to the details of the ages, the question was decidedly modified by the basis on which they were going to consider their limitation.

Viscount CECIL agreed that, as soon as the experts reported that they were near agreement, they might well have a cruiser committee, and that, if told that it was possible to reach agreement along any particular line, they should certainly make the attempt.

Admiral JONES explained that he was talking not so much about details as about the original Japanese proposal, which referred to the *status quo* as deciding the strength, relative and otherwise, of the three navies. This *status quo* was based on ages prescribed by them, and no Technical Committee could decide on the ages without knowing what the basis would be.

The CHAIRMAN thought that this could hardly be decided without the views of the Technical Committee.

Sir James PARR felt that they were a general Committee and that it would be profitable for anyone to propose a possible solution of the problem in the first instance in general terms before that Committee.

The general Committee might then ask the Technical Committee to enquire into that particular arm and its solution. He thought they might have discussed Admiral Field's suggestion, after which they would be better prepared to send the question of submarines to the Technical Committee.

Admiral JONES thought that, until a definite plan of the general basis for discussion had been reached, it would be unwise to attempt to settle any of the minor points. When they knew on what basis they were coming to an agreement they would know better how to approach the details of the question, of which submarines formed only a small part. It would be necessary as regards the political situation to know on what fundamental basis these questions were to be approached. Was it proposed to have two general committees, one to consider the question of submarines and the other to consider the question of cruisers and destroyers?

Mr. GIBSON thought that this would be so, and that thus the subject would be divided into its component parts.

Viscount ISHII said that his delegation was not acquainted with the progress made at the various private conversations. But he found it appropriate to allow the experts to talk among themselves more officially in committee meetings.

As regards the subjects to be discussed, the experts might well meet and divide amongst themselves the work as regards cruisers and destroyers in one Committee, and as regards submarines in another. The two Committees would hardly, however, be able to sit simultaneously, as certain experts might wish to attend both, and, moreover, each Committee was largely dependent upon what happened in the other.

Mr. GIBSON thought that it might be left to the Committee to decide its own method of working and suggested that, if the Committee reached a point where there was a complete deadlock of opinion, they might refer it back to the Executive Committee and thus save considerable time.

The CHAIRMAN thought that, by going ahead and substantiating a considerable amount of agreement, they would have a good effect on public opinion. He thought that the Naval Committee might therefore take up each subject when they found it fairly near to agreement without prejudicing the final decision of the Executive Committee or of the Conference.

Sir James PARR asked whether the Naval Committee would seek for the fundamental bases mentioned by Admiral Jones.

Mr. GIBSON thought that an early ascertainment of what basis of agreement already existed might simplify their own discussions in laying down the proposed general principles.

The CHAIRMAN asked Admiral Jones what he meant by the phrase "coming to agreement on general principles".

Admiral JONES explained that there were certain political considerations to be settled, and from them could be determined the general directions to the Technical Committees as to their method of procedure in meeting the situation and the order in which they were to consider certain questions.

Viscount CECIL suggested that they should hear the results of the discussion of a basis for the submarine question. They might then ascertain whether there was a basis for discussing any other question, and the conclusions could be made subject to political consideration.

The CHAIRMAN said that the general principles would be in the minds of all members of the Committee, and in going step by step these would fit into a harmonious whole.

Mr. GIBSON thought that the Executive Committee might guide the consideration of the various problems if obstacles were reached in the Sub-Committees, but that at the moment they might best lay down general principles.

Admiral JONES asked whether, for example, they wished the Technical Committee to discuss such questions as whether they would take cruisers, whether the limitation should be by total tonnage or by numbers, or by a combination of the two, etc., before beginning to deal with any quantitative question.

The CHAIRMAN explained that this was the intention.

Admiral FIELD thought that it would be impossible to lay down a general principle to cover all types and classes of vessels. They might need a variation of the principle for submarines not quite the same as that for cruisers. It would be better to discuss in private conversation each class and type and to try to reach a common basis for discussion. For example, the way they had been working hitherto meant that, if they found by private conversation that the principle of total tonnage was more acceptable to the three delegations than that of numbers, they would be prepared to give up their idea of numbers.

They might by private conversations agree to two classes of submarines, to a maximum tonnage for each class and to a definite age limit. There would then be nothing to prevent their discussing these questions in detail, and, at the end of their general deliberations on these subjects, the results could go to the Executive Committee for consideration from the political point of view and then afterwards to the plenary session to be announced. Thus they would deal with questions by degrees without waiting for a general principle. He thought the naval experts could work better on these lines, i.e., not to go into a committee until they had a formal basis.

Admiral JONES agreed that there should be two Committees, one to deal with cruisers and destroyers and the other to deal with submarines, whose present work would be limited to finding a basis for discussion as regards tonnage, the maximum limit, whether there would be two classes,

The CHAIRMAN read a draft *communiqué* for the Press, which *was adopted*, after discussion, in the following form:

"The delegates met and decided to ask Mr. Bridgeman to act as Chairman of the Executive Committee.

"They decided to ask the naval advisers to form groups to study from a technical point of view the question of limitation of cruisers, destroyers and submarines."

The CHAIRMAN asked how the position stood with regard to the battleship proposals. He hoped that they might be discussed by some informal or other committee fairly soon, with a view to resolving the existing differences before the matter was taken up by the plenary Conference. Without wishing to press for undue speed, he would be extremely glad to know the position as to the next meeting of the plenary Conference, or as to the ideas of the other delegations regarding the best way to approach the question before such a meeting.

Mr. GIBSON wished to explain that his instructions prepared in Washington did not envisage the discussion of this subject. He had therefore had to refer it to Washington, and, without wishing to delay the matter unduly, would be in a far better position to discuss it on instructions sent after receipt of his reports of their conversations, and after consideration had been given in Washington to the British proposal.

Viscount ISHII wished to make a perfectly plain statement as to the position of the Japanese delegation in regard to the British proposal. Under the terms of their credentials, the Japanese delegates were authorised to discuss any question concerning the limitation of naval armaments, but their instructions were for the present limited to questions connected with cruisers, destroyers and submarines. The British proposals, however, involved very important questions of national economy, and, like Mr. Gibson, they felt obliged to ask for fresh instructions. They therefore desired to have the discussion on this question postponed until their new instructions had been received.

Mr. GIBSON explained that he was in exactly the same position as Viscount Ishii but hoped to receive instructions within a very few days.

Viscount ISHII said that they would endeavour to get their instructions as soon as possible, but thought that it might take a week.

The CHAIRMAN said that he quite appreciated the position, and thanked the American and Japanese delegations for their promise to inform him as soon as their instructions had arrived. He might be troubled by public opinion at home, demanding why progress had not been made, and hoped there would be as little delay as possible.

Admiral JONES asked for information as to the size of the technical groups, and, after discussion, *it was decided* that each Power would be represented by four naval officers, with assistants if necessary.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL asked what arrangement would be made with regard to the attendance of the French and Italian observers at future meetings.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that notifications of formal committee meetings should be sent to these gentlemen.

The question was then discussed as to whether any *communiqué* should be issued with regard to the British proposal as to battleships, and it was agreed not to issue any *communiqué* on this subject.

The Committee adjourned at 12.30 p.m.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if this Technical Committee met to discuss points of agreement or disagreement on submarines, they would report that they had reached agreement at any rate on a number of points, and the remainder might then be referred back to this Committee for decision. This would constitute considerable progress.

Admiral JONES said that the vital point was in reality the question of the cruiser, and that it would be preferable to reach a decision on the main issue before taking up a minor point.

Admiral FIELD stated that it was very important to discuss submarines before destroyers. The wishes of the British delegation in regard to destroyers were greatly affected by the decision arrived at as regards submarines, and although it was suggested in the general proposal of the United States that destroyers and cruisers should be taken together during a transition period, they had not yet decided whether these vessels should ultimately be considered separately, and until that was settled it would be impossible to take cruisers before submarines, as they would have to alter their demand for destroyers in case of any unexpected result from the submarine discussion.

Admiral JONES understood that the question of the number of destroyers would be based upon agreement.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether it was agreeable that the experts should consider all the subjects on which sufficient agreement had been reached to enable them successfully to discuss them, and to begin with submarines.

Mr. DULLES submitted the following resolution:

"The Executive Committee decided that the Technical Committee should immediately form two Sub-Committees, one to study the question of the limitation of cruisers and destroyers, and the other the limitation of submarines, that any preliminary recommendations of these Technical Sub-Committees should be referred to the Executive Committee without prejudice to the position of any other Powers in the light of the basic principles or of the tonnages which may eventually be adopted and which might require an adjustment of any technical recommendations made at the present time."

Viscount ISHII said that he was prepared to accept this.

Mr. DULLES explained that age, for example, if it was decided to proceed on the basis of the Japanese proposal, would be a vital question, since *status quo* was determined on the basis of the age fixed for vessels. The Technical Committee might fix 20 years for cruisers, but in applying this later to some general proposition the Executive Committee might have to make it 19.

The CHAIRMAN thought that it might be sufficient to say that any such points would be submitted to this Committee, which would decide on further procedure.

Viscount CECIL thought it would be a good plan to give out something in rather more general terms and less complicated in the *communiqué* to the Press, and Viscount SAITO agreed.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that notification of future meetings might be sent to the French and Italian observers, who had already been informed that they would be welcome at the meetings of the Conference and its Committees.

After discussion as to whether it would be desirable to ask these observers to attend meetings of the Technical Committee, *it was decided* that it would be preferable to keep the technical committees as far as possible on the basis of conversations, and that it would be more suitable for negotiations involving possible differences of opinion in the Technical Committee to be discussed as privately as possible.

After discussion, in which Viscount CECIL, the CHAIRMAN and Mr. GIBSON took part, the following amendment to Mr. Dulles' resolution was proposed by the CHAIRMAN:

"The delegates asked their technical advisers to form two groups, one to study the question of the limitation of cruisers and destroyers, and the other the limitation of submarines, that any preliminary recommendations of these technical groups should be referred to the Executive Committee"

After discussion, *it was decided* that the minutes should indicate that this was an informal meeting and not a meeting of the Executive Committee. The resolution was then discussed.

Viscount ISHII proposed that the last sentence should be modified to read as follows: "may require an adjustment of such technical recommendations".

With this amendment, *the resolution was adopted* as follows:

"The delegates asked their technical advisers to form two groups, one to study the question of the limitation of cruisers and destroyers, and the other the limitation of submarines, that any preliminary recommendations of these technical groups should be referred to the Executive Committee, without prejudice to the position of any of the Powers, in the light of the basic principles or of the tonnages which may eventually be adopted, and which may require an adjustment of such technical recommendations."

with a view to arriving at some kind of an understanding in regard to capital ships. Care should, however, be exercised in the handling of the question, so that it may not be allowed to stand in the way of the principal object of the present Conference — the limitation of auxiliary naval armament. It would therefore be advisable that the question of capital ships should be held up until an agreement shall have been reached in regard to auxiliary vessels."

The CHAIRMAN asked if they wished to have this discussion now.

Viscount ISHII replied that the Japanese delegation did not wish to have this discussed at present, but they had felt it their duty to inform the Committee as soon as they had received instructions from home.

Mr. GIBSON said that the American Government had given its careful consideration to the British proposals regarding the size and replacement age of aircraft carriers. He was glad to inform Mr. Bridgeman that they would not object to an informal exchange of views with respect to these proposals if and when they succeeded in reaching agreement with regard to auxiliary craft. They wished this exchange of views not to be of a character which would prejudice the decision to be taken by any of the Powers at the 1931 Conference but rather of a nature to elicit information for the purpose of a more thorough study of the British proposal.

He would be disposed to recommend that, in the event of the successful conclusion of their other work, the Conference adopt a resolution laying these proposals before the Governments of all the Powers parties to the Washington Treaties, and it should further recommend that, if agreeable to all the signatory Powers, the 1931 Conference should be held early in that year rather than in August, in order to give ample time to determine the effects of any decision reached by that Conference with regard to the capital ship replacement programme which was due to begin in November of that year.

The CHAIRMAN understood this to mean that the American delegation wished any resolution reached on capital ships to be submitted to the other Powers before 1931.

Mr. GIBSON said that the question had been raised as to the inconvenience which would result if the Conference met in the month of August while replacement began in November, as there would not be sufficient interval between the findings of the Conference and the beginning of the replacement programme. He felt that it would be in harmony with the spirit of the Treaty if that Conference might take place in January of 1931 instead of in August, so as to afford time to act on its decisions.

The CHAIRMAN remarked that this would hardly give time for design.

Mr. GIBSON said that the American Government felt that, if they had four years to study these proposals, work out what they were going to do, and formulate an agenda for the Conference in January, they would be able to go ahead in November.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that this rather depended upon the solidity of the agreement reached here.

Mr. GIBSON said that, after this exchange of views and a study of the question by the Governments, they would have four years to discuss the matter and would have reached definite conclusions before the beginning of the Conference.

Viscount CECIL said that, in the Japanese and American statements, it was suggested that the capital ship discussion should take place at a later stage. He would only say that he did not think the British delegation could possibly agree not to raise this question at all unless there was agreement on every other point. They could not be understood to be bound not to raise the question at some period during the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN said that he entirely agreed with Lord Cecil.

The next business was the report of the Technical Committee. He would like to thank the experts for having given great attention to this difficult problem and for having produced something which made it easier for the Committee to discuss the matter. He would ask Admiral Field, the Chairman of the Technical Committee, to read the report through; they might afterwards comment on it paragraph by paragraph.

Admiral FIELD read the First Report of the Technical Committee (Annex No. 7).

The CHAIRMAN said that on the first page they might well begin with Class A. They had to alter the figure 8 to 9 in the second line. The prefaces under the different heads were merely statements of the course of the discussion, and he presumed that that day they wished rather to talk about the results.

Viscount CECIL asked whether it was intended to publish this document, or at any rate to make it possible to do so.

Mr. GIBSON said that they might omit anything which they were not ready to publish. They had originally intended to publish, but he was not entirely clear on the subject.

The CHAIRMAN said that, in the third paragraph, the American delegation made a statement indicating the "modifications of their original proposal that they were prepared to consider in the light of other proposals that had been advanced". He presumed that there would be some record kept as to what that statement was.

SECOND SESSION.

Geneva, Friday, July 8th, 1927.

Present:

United States of America:

The Honourable Hugh GIBSON.
Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES.
Mr. A. W. DULLES.
Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.

Great Britain and Dominions:

Great Britain:

The Right Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.
Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD.
Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.
Captain W. A. EGERTON.

Canada:

Hon. E. LAPOINTE.

Australia:

Sir Joseph COOK.

New Zealand:

Sir James PARR.

Union of South Africa:

Mr. J. S. SMIT.

Irish Free State:

Mr. J. A. COSTELLO.

Japan:

Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO.
Viscount Kikujiro ISHII.
Mr. Sadao SABURI.
Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI.

Secretariat-General:

The Hon. Hugh R. WILSON.
Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL.
Mr. Naotake SATO.
Mr. H. R. HUSTON.
Captain H. R. MOORE.
Mr. Toshio SHIRATORI.

French Mission d'Information:

Count CLAUZEL.
Commander DELEUZE.
M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.

Italian unofficial observers:

Captain RUSPOLI.
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN opened the meeting and said that he understood that Admiral Viscount Saito wished to make a statement.

Admiral Viscount SAITO said that, at the last meeting of this Committee, the Japanese delegation had stated that they would refer to Tokio the proposal of the British delegation concerning capital ships. The instructions which they had since received were to the following effect:

"The British proposal presents various technical problems on some of which the Japanese Government are unable to express their views without mature consideration. They are at the same time of opinion that the matter might with profit be taken at the present Conference

units; it meant that they were agreeing to a larger displacement for the destroyer leader than he believed existed anywhere. The British Empire alone had any experience of destroyer leaders and they were convinced that 1,750 tons was large enough. He felt that it looked very bad if this Conference resulted in the limit being raised.

Mr. GIBSON said that, though they had to discuss these points and reserve the right to modify these recommendations, it might perhaps be better to content themselves with saying that the Report was in the form in which they had asked for it, and later take it up point by point, reserving the full discussions for another time.

The CHAIRMAN said that they must have a full discussion in public, but he was ready to reserve his remarks till an early plenary session.

Viscount ISHII thought that that morning they had to take note of the report and to proceed to a correction of its text. After consideration of its recommendations, they might enter into a full discussion.

Viscount CECIL suggested that, if they were going to discuss the substance, it might be more conveniently done in a plenary meeting.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might not reach a decision at the first plenary meeting, but that a discussion would be desirable, after which the Executive Committee might meet again.

Mr. GIBSON thought that a preliminary discussion here might eliminate some of the questions and limit the amount they would have to discuss in plenary session.

Viscount ISHII thought there might be several meetings of the Executive Committee before going into plenary session.

The CHAIRMAN said that they did not wish to go into plenary meeting to demand decisions but rather to have an opportunity of expressing their views and their reasons before the public and to see how far they could get agreement in public on certain rather important points. They would probably not take any decision at that plenary meeting.

Viscount ISHII doubted whether this would be a wise procedure, as it might be difficult to change a decision made before the public.

He did not fear a public meeting, but for the success of the Conference it might be better to discuss matters first in the Executive Committee.

Mr. GIBSON said that he shared Viscount Ishii's view. There were matters on which they might readily make concessions in a meeting of this kind, whereas, if they had gone before a public meeting and stated the Governmental position, it would be more difficult for them to recede from it. It would be well to eliminate as many questions as possible on which they could readily make concessions, and only go before the plenary meeting on questions which must be ventilated there.

Viscount CECIL agreed that it was undoubtedly true that there was danger in public discussion, but there was also the danger that the enterprising Press would give possibly untrue descriptions of what happened in private discussions. The British delegation had somewhat suffered from semi-public proceedings in which their views had not been represented outside as they would have wished. It had sometimes been reported and apparently believed that they had said things and taken attitudes which they had certainly never said or taken.

Mr. GIBSON said that there was no desire to prevent a full statement of anybody's views in public session, but if they could reach agreement here upon any of these things it was all to the good, though he agreed it was quite impossible for them to finish everything in the Executive Committee.

Viscount CECIL said that they should not only have a plenary session but have it as soon as possible.

Viscount ISHII said that they had not received the recommendations of the Technical Committee until that morning, and that they must not sacrifice their vital interests in their desire to please the public.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had no desire to force what might be an unsatisfactory answer from anyone who was not ready to give it, but he felt strongly that they should have an opportunity as early as possible to re-state their attitude in view of all that had been said outside about it. They would not ask for an answer straightaway from the other delegations, though they might ask a few questions which some day might have to be answered. A public meeting was most necessary if only for the purpose of stating their case.

Mr. GIBSON said that he agreed to this, and had only questioned the practicability of discussing details in a plenary session when they could have a preliminary discussion here.

The CHAIRMAN said that, in going through the report, they might have another Executive Committee meeting the following day, and they might now briefly indicate where they thought alterations might be made so that they might consider them before the following day. He would personally want to discuss the maximum displacement and to suggest a lowering of it on all the different heads, as well as age in some cases. There was also the question of total tonnage which would

Viscount CECIL said that he felt that the paragraph as at present worded would lead the public to wonder why the statement referred to was not published, and he suggested that they might word the paragraph to run that the American delegation indicated modifications of their original proposal.

The CHAIRMAN said that the point which he was dealing with was that he believed that this statement was given in full in one of the drafts of the report, and that it was then desired by the American delegation to put it in its present form. He did not know if the Committee wished the whole or a version of this to be published, but he did want the whole record to be available for those who wanted to read the history of the Conference.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that, in the meantime, they might publish the report as by the Executive Committee and not as by the Technical Committee.

Viscount CECIL agreed with Mr. Gibson and said that he understood that, though the question of publication was a separate question, they ought in drafting the document to have the possibility of publication in view and therefore exclude anything they did not wish to be published.

Viscount ISHII said that there was one point he wished to make very clear. He had understood that it had been agreed here, before the Committee went into discussion, that the experts in the Technical Committee would express their opinion, but that any decisions to which they might come would necessarily be provisional and that, when the points came up to the Executive Committee, each delegate would be free to express an opinion on them.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that these decisions in the report were entirely provisional.

Viscount ISHII said that even the present recasting did not necessarily mean that they fully and entirely concurred in the decisions, for, as with the American delegation, the agreement would be for them "provisional upon final agreement as to total tonnage limitations in all categories".

They could not come to a complete agreement on a special point without agreeing on the general points. As to publication, he thought they might submit the document first to the Secretariat and let them take out what was not to be published.

Viscount CECIL agreed and said that nothing could be settled until the plenary Conference met.

Viscount ISHII said that, if they published points which would appear to the public as having been decided and which had not in fact been decided by the Executive Committee, they would deceive the public. He doubted even the desirability of publishing at this time.

Viscount CECIL suggested that this document, which had necessarily been seen by a large number of people, ought certainly to be published in some form or another.

The CHAIRMAN said that these might be called the "provisional recommendations of the technical experts".

Viscount CECIL agreed with Viscount Ishii that they must make it very clear that this was not a final document, but he would be sorry to see a decision reached by the Executive Committee treated as a final agreement, as the plenary session might desire to make modifications of what the Executive Committee had decided. He would therefore like it to be in the most provisional form that could be devised.

After discussion, it was decided to issue a preliminary statement to the effect that the Executive Committee that day considered the following provisional recommendations embodied in a report from the Technical Committee.

It was also agreed that the third paragraph of page 2 of the report should read: "The American delegation indicated certain modifications of their original proposal" instead of "made a statement indicating".

The CHAIRMAN asked whether they might usefully discuss the cruiser class that morning.

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese delegation were going to put in a statement dealing also with submarines, and they would prefer to defer this statement till later, as it covered all classes of auxiliary ships.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might now turn to Class D — destroyers. At the bottom of page 3, the words "the following agreements were reached" referred only to agreements in the Technical Committee.

Viscount CECIL said that if they decided to publish they would have to modify certain phrases so as not to lead to a misunderstanding.

The CHAIRMAN proposed that the sentence should run: "the following provisional recommendations were made" instead of "agreements were reached".

This proposal was carried.

The CHAIRMAN said that, with regard to the destroyer recommendations, he wished to raise one or two points. He suggested that the maximum fixed for destroyer leaders, as high as 1,850 tons, was contrary to the desire to reduce the aggressive power as much as possible in the various

Viscount CECIL said that they would ultimately have to publish the whole of the minutes of the proceedings. They were agreed that something on these lines should be communicated to the Press, and the question was as to the best form.

Sir James PARR understood that it might not be necessary to give all this to the Press but had asked whether the whole report would ultimately be on record.

Viscount CECIL said that that would certainly be so. He agreed with Mr. Gibson that it would be better not to set out their points of disagreement too much. He had particularly in mind the section dealing with cruisers. Here they could hardly say that there were any "provisional recommendations", for there were not even suggestions as to how the discussions should proceed.

Mr. GIBSON felt that they should touch upon this question in order to show that the Committee had made an effort and that the question had to be passed on to the Executive Committee.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might say that it had been considered.

Viscount CECIL pointed out that they might say that there had been provisional agreement to study two types of cruiser. This would at least be something.

Admiral JONES said that it had been considered inadvisable to let the Press have the minutes, and the object in drawing up the report was to draft something that might be given to the public. They had therefore left out as far as possible the contentious points, but he felt that, if they began to cut this down, they would have the public still guessing.

Viscount CECIL said that, in view of this, the best thing would be that the whole thing should be published, subject to any verbal changes which might be made by the Secretariat.

Mr. GIBSON said that he had no objection to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that the proposal then was that, subject to small verbal adjustments the whole report should be published.

Viscount ISHII agreed.

Mr. GIBSON pointed out that it would need a different heading.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was agreed that, subject to a few minor amendments to be made by the Secretariat and submitted to Mr. Gibson, Viscount Saito and himself for approval, the whole should be published (Annex No. 8).

Sir James PARR said that this would be subject to the fact that care would be taken to make it clear to the public that as a Committee they had not adopted it but had merely been considering it.

The CHAIRMAN said that further consideration of the report would be adjourned until 10.30 a.m. the following day.

There remained the statement to be made by the Japanese delegation (Annex No. 9).

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese experts had not yet expressed themselves in regard to the required tonnage of auxiliary vessels for their navy. The Japanese delegation now submitted their statement containing their figures for these classes of ships together with a statement of what they felt was the most appropriate basis of discussion for the question of cruisers. Their statement had already been communicated informally to the delegations, but they wished to submit it to the Committee that it might be put on record.

They would again express their sincere and honest hope that the other delegations would see their way to agree to their proposals regarding the basis for the discussion of the cruiser question.

The CHAIRMAN said that there was some misunderstanding in regard to the second paragraph of the Japanese statement. The British delegation was circulating a statement on this point. It was a rather complicated matter, as the Japanese calculation was based on figures which differed from the British ones.

Admiral FIELD explained that the figure of 472,000 tons quoted in the Japanese statement as the surface auxiliary strength of the British Navy was calculated on the basis of age limits which were in force in Great Britain in 1925 but which had since been altered. It had been based on an age limit of 15 years for cruisers and 12 for destroyers, whereas the present age limits for these were 20 and 16 years respectively. Calculating, therefore, on the present age limits which were and would remain in force in the British Empire, instead of 472,000 tons the figure would be 664,746 tons. It was, of course, possible to produce any figure desired by altering the age limits. The misunderstanding had occurred as the Japanese calculation had been on the age limits published in the Parliamentary paper of 1925, whereas in 1926 they had decided to make their vessels last longer for reasons of economy.

The CHAIRMAN said that they felt that the figure for comparison should be the figure after the alteration of the age limit and that the paper they were circulating would explain the matter (Annex No. 10).

Viscount ISHII said that the figure the Japanese delegation gave was based on calculations made by the British delegation in accordance with the Japanese system of calculation, and on that basis the figure came to 472,000 tons.

have to be considered. These were the points he especially wished to have considered by the Executive Committee.

They were now at the bottom of page 3 of the report, and he wondered if anyone suggested for consideration any modification of the provisional recommendations on destroyers including (e), (f) and (g).

Mr. GIBSON proposed on page 4 (g) to insert the word "Treaty" after the word "Washington" to make the statement clearer.

This was agreed to.

Viscount CECIL suggested that the words "the method of transition from the *status quo* to the Treaty status" were rather an obscure statement for the public to understand.

Admiral FIELD said that it would be better for the American delegation to explain the point, as they had drafted the paragraph. In their technical discussions, he had endeavoured to say that adjustment for the transition period would be easy to agree upon if they kept their minds clear in reaching agreement as to the characteristics of future vessels. He felt that every delegation would be ready to agree to alterations or suggestions of any Power to overcome the difficulty of a transition period which would include vessels which did not exactly fit into the displacement, gun-power or age limit. They were really aiming at some agreement as to the characteristics of any ship to be built or laid down in the future.

Viscount CECIL said that the last phrase of this paragraph was equally unsatisfactory. It read: "and, further, that any agreement reached in the Technical Committee would be provisional until a decision had been reached". They had begun by saying that every recommendation was provisional and now said that a particular one was only provisional until a certain thing had happened.

Admiral JONES said that the American delegation felt that any agreement reached in regard to destroyers and cruisers must include an adjustment of this nature.

Viscount CECIL thought that they might say "total tonnage in the destroyer class at this time, until a decision has been reached as to the total tonnage of the cruiser class . . .".

It was agreed that the redrafting of this paragraph should be considered before the following day by the Secretariat.

The CHAIRMAN said that they now came to submarines. His remarks on size and age applied here also, but he attached more importance to size.

Viscount CECIL said that the British delegation would probably at some time wish to make it clear that their own preference was for the total abolition of submarines, and that they assented with reluctance to their being considered for limitation.

He understood that every surface vessel under a certain size was exempted if not designed for a speed greater than 18 knots. He understood that this meant that, if the vessel had any one of the conditions mentioned, it was disqualified for exemption.

The CHAIRMAN asked what was the suggestion as regards a Press *communiqué*.

Mr. WILSON suggested that the Secretary would like some advice as to how to deal with this matter. It was a question of policy as to what to publish in this document.

Viscount ISHII said he was not quite clear as to the question of publishing a report of what they had just done. He had no objection, provided that it was made clear to the public that it was merely a provisional recommendation, to its publication to-day or to-morrow.

Viscount CECIL said that, from the point of view of publication, he would like it to look as if they had done as much as possible. He suggested that they leave out as far as they could the doubts and difficulties and merely publish the results.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might publish the provisional agreements of the technical experts but not their individual views.

Admiral JONES said that he thought it could all be published.

The CHAIRMAN explained that this Report would be on record in the proceedings for all the members of the delegations.

Sir James PARR asked whether it would be open to the public.

Viscount CECIL said that practices differed but that he was all for publication, subject to the one paragraph to which he had drawn attention and which he thought should be clarified.

The CHAIRMAN understood that, at the Washington Conference, everything, including the smaller discussions, was finally published in the Report.

Viscount ISHII said that he agreed to publication subject to the clarification suggested by Lord Cecil. He wondered whether it would not be best to limit their publication to what had been actually decided by the Technical Committee.

THIRD SESSION.

Geneva, Saturday, July 9th, 1927.

Present:	
<i>United States of America:</i>	The Honourable Hugh GIBSON. Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES. The Honourable Hugh WILSON. Mr. A. W. DULLES. Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG. Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions:</i>	
Great Britain:	The Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD. Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD. Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH. Captain W. A. EGERTON.
Canada:	Hon. E. LAPOINTE.
Australia:	Sir Joseph COOK.
New Zealand:	Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe.
Irish Free State:	Mr. J. A. COSTELLO.
<i>Japan:</i>	Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO. Viscount Kikujiro ISHII. Mr. Sadao SABURI. Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI. Captain Teijiro TOYODA.
<i>Secretariat-General:</i>	The Hon. Hugh WILSON. Mr. R. H. CAMPBELL. Mr. Naotake SATO. Mr. H. R. HUSTON. Captain H. R. MOORE. Mr. Toshio SHIRATORI.
<i>French Mission d'Information:</i>	Count CLAUZEL. Commander DELEUZE. M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian unofficial observers:</i>	Captain RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that they had now to engage in a rather more searching discussion of the provisional recommendations of the experts. He wondered if they might dispose of the Exempt Class first, in which there seemed to be no difference of opinion at all.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that it would be futile to go through what was more or less accepted until they had broken the back of the main problem.

Viscount CECIL thought that, by promoting an atmosphere of agreement on the things which could be agreed upon, they might approach more usefully the more difficult questions.

Admiral FIELD said that, if they accepted the Japanese figure of 472,000 tons, they would have to scrap ships at 15 years instead of 20, and that the Japanese basis would necessitate their scrapping a number of ships whose lives they had extended. He realised that the Japanese calculation was quite correct on its basis.

The CHAIRMAN said that there was a second paragraph in their paper on submarines to which he would draw attention. He wondered whether anyone wished to discuss Viscount Ishii's statement then.

Mr. GIBSON said they would prefer to consider these matters in the interval before the following day's meeting. He would like to take this opportunity to say on behalf of the American delegation that the proposals submitted by the Japanese delegation constituted in their view a genuine limitation of auxiliary craft. They were in most hearty agreement with the fundamental purpose of their proposals and would be glad if they could be made a basis of discussion.

The CHAIRMAN said the only other question was when they were going to have a plenary meeting.

Viscount CECIL asked what exactly was to be discussed the next day.

Mr. GIBSON said that they would have to discuss the difficult question of cruisers, but that it was hardly worth while to go into the difficult question of maximum displacement of smaller ships until they knew they had some hopes of breaking the back of the big problem.

Sir James PARR asked whether it would be possible to meet that afternoon to deal with the big question so as not to leave another day for the Press to publish all sorts of statements.

Mr. GIBSON felt that they would need rather more time to discuss these things thoroughly but that they might hand out a fairly full statement to the Press that day.

Viscount ISHII agreed that they might meet at 10.30 the following morning. They had not considered the immediate publication of the statement they had handed in, but, if agreeable to other delegations, they would prefer to publish it.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if it was published, the British delegation's statement would have to be published at the same time.

He was very anxious to convene another plenary Conference and would suggest they might have it on Monday.

Viscount ISHII said that there was no particular objection on the part of the Japanese delegation, though he thought it might not be very helpful to the success of the Conference.

Viscount CECIL said they might leave it that it should be on Monday afternoon, subject to anything which might happen the next day to make them wish to change it.

Mr. GIBSON explained that he understood this meeting was desired in order that the British position might be stated and that, if there were any other questions to be raised, he hoped they might be informed as soon as possible. They were prepared to agree to this.

Viscount ISHII asked what would be discussed at the plenary meeting on Monday.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was desired to give the British delegation an opportunity of stating their case in order that it might not be misrepresented. He would not press for an immediate answer to everything he raised. They might say that they would go back into the Executive Committee or give their answers in another plenary Conference. It would be a general discussion. They would be able, he hoped, to report some progress from this Committee, and it would give them the opportunity of stating their case once more.

The Committee adjourned at 12.50 p.m.

Admiral FIELD said they had not quite this number unless Mr. Gibson was counting in the old ships.

Mr. GIBSON answered affirmatively. He said that the British delegation's desires in regard to this class of ship would decidedly influence how they would wish to use their tonnage allocation, how far their programme could envisage the construction of further ships of this type, or when that programme would be stopped and devoted to the construction of smaller ships.

Admiral FIELD said that the request of the United States delegation that they should consider the total tonnage of cruisers before going into the characteristics of the individual vessels raised considerable difficulty from the point of view of the naval officer. The total tonnage gave him no information whatever as to the offensive power of the vessels included in it. A larger total tonnage figure did not necessarily mean a more offensive force. They had been asked to accept 400,000 tons, and had been told that for the United States it meant 25 cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns and about 20 cruisers of smaller tonnage with 8-inch or 6-inch guns. If they were to accept this blind figure, they would only be able to replace their old ships with cruisers of approximately 3,800 tons displacement. It was quite impossible to criticise the British proposed total tonnage figure as an expansion in naval power, since this would depend entirely upon what individual ships composed the force. He maintained that the offensive power of 30 cruisers of 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns was far greater than twice the number of 6-inch cruisers of half the individual displacement. This total tonnage figure was therefore definitely misleading, and the Technical Committee had been confronted with the statement that they could not come to agreement on the individual power of the unit until they had blindly acquiesced in agreeing to the total tonnage. This was exactly the opposite way to that used by a naval officer considering the armaments for his country. Even if they could not agree to a total tonnage, he strongly hoped that they might agree in some measure on the offensive power of the individual vessel and then proceed to consider whether they could limit the numbers or total tonnage of the vessels with those particular characteristics. The more in detail they decided the characteristics of each class, the easier it would be to agree to its total tonnage.

Mr. GIBSON thought that they might be able to get at the question in another way. The American figures as regards 10,000-ton ships were merely a theoretical estimate of what would be constructed under a certain tonnage level, and they were ships that might or might not be constructed. The ships actually existing rather set the standards in such matters, and if they knew the construction programme within the period contemplated for the Treaty, they might discuss the matter more intelligently, and by taking the British programme of 10,000-ton cruisers as a point of departure, they might estimate more precisely in terms of ships.

The CHAIRMAN understood Mr. Gibson's proposal to mean that they should set to work on a regular programme and see what each of them had in mind.

Mr. GIBSON said that they wished to take full account of the ideas which had been brought forward. They did think that total tonnage was a sound method of arriving at a programme. Moreover, if they reached agreement through an indication of allocations in special types or through a programme, they would instinctively translate it back into total tonnage in considering whether it would be a genuine limitation. It was therefore a different way of reaching the same result.

Admiral JONES said that he did not wish to say what would or would not convey ideas to a naval mind, but he would draw attention to the fact that, in all their mention of total tonnage, the American delegation had prescribed the limit of size and of calibre and had given in the tonnages put forward what they considered their necessities in maximum-size cruisers. It was not compulsory on any nation to build up to the limit decided on; they could distribute the tonnage as they thought fit. They could not tell their building programme for ten years ahead, but in every proposal that they had put forward they had given a very fair idea as to how they would distribute their tonnage, and they did feel that their figures gave a clear indication to a naval mind of what they were looking forward to.

Viscount CECIL ventured to recall the proposal of the Japanese delegation that they should agree as a first step to limit these large cruisers with 8-inch guns to ten for America, ten for themselves and seven for the Japanese. He did not know how their naval advisers would consider this, but he thought that some such definite limitation would be a point of departure from which they could go on to discuss how best to make a total limitation of the rest. He felt sure that, if they could reach agreement on some point in connection with the large cruisers, it was worth doing. He understood that, broadly speaking, the British delegation were in favour of the Japanese proposal, though the details would have to be examined by their technical advisers.

The CHAIRMAN acquiesced.

Admiral JONES said that the view of the American delegation was that they could not approach limitation from that angle. They must have some idea as to what the total tonnage would be in order to consider their needs as to the division of that total tonnage. They could not start by limiting the tonnage of one type of vessel within that class and then proceed to discuss total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN asked the Committee whether it would be better to proceed with submarines, cruisers or destroyers.

Mr. GIBSON was strongly in favour of beginning with cruisers. If they could reach agreement on that question, they would not have difficulty in working out the details of the others.

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese delegation had no objection to proceeding with cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN thought that the British delegation had given all the information they could as to their view.

Mr. GIBSON said that the fundamental step they had to take before they could really approach a definite solution of the cruiser problem was to find some means of bringing the British and the Japanese positions close enough together for at least purposes of discussion. Until that was done there was no real purpose in discussions on particular phases of the problem, as he saw it. They frankly preferred the levels for surface craft indicated in the Japanese proposals as a basis of discussion. At the same time, their own original proposals covered a certain range of tonnages, and they had furthermore expressed their readiness to discuss figures higher than the maximum of their original proposals. They had done this with a good deal of reluctance, because they felt that the higher they went the less definite limitation they secured, and they had been prepared to go to higher levels solely in the hope of securing a reasonable limitation agreement. His reason for stating this part of the American position again was merely to make clear their anxiety to find some means of reconciling the positions of both the British and the Japanese delegations. In order to do that, it would be necessary for them to come closer together. Agreement with one or the other delegation was not sufficient; what they must have was an agreement accepted by all three. As a matter of fact they could to-day take the Japanese proposal as a basis of discussion, but this would be of no avail whatever if they were both in hopeless disagreement with the other proposal. Personally, he felt that it would be extremely helpful to all of them if the Japanese delegation felt free, whenever it suited their convenience, to give further information with respect to the very interesting proposals which they had submitted yesterday, and that might give them some idea as to the possibilities of bringing closer together the two extreme views.

Viscount ISHII said that the main point of their proposal was the suggestion that the total minimum American figures be the basis of their discussion. If this was adopted in principle by the other delegations, he believed it would facilitate progress of the discussions. He would be gratified if the British delegation would be prepared to agree to a discussion on the basis of 450,000 tons for the combined classes of auxiliary surface vessels.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation's difficulty in considering such a figure was that it was far below anything which they could at present consider as the figure of security for themselves. It was impossible for them to consider total tonnage at all until they knew what type of ship the other two Powers proposed to build. If the others intended to build a number of large cruisers and to raise the displacement of destroyers, it would necessitate raising the British total tonnage. They were anxious to reduce their requirements to the lowest possible limit, but they could not tie themselves down until they knew what the other two parties were doing. Such action might mean having to scrap a large number of ships or not being able to build anything like what they wanted.

He thought the Japanese and British delegations were agreed to limit the number of large-type cruisers, and if they could get agreement on this, it would be going some way towards getting as low a tonnage as they could. Security was their first consideration, which for them depended very largely on numbers.

Viscount ISHII said that the common desire of the Conference was to reduce as far as possible total tonnage. He realised the necessity for three Powers to have a certain number of cruisers. He suggested, therefore, that the only course was to limit the number of big cruisers: for example, ten ships for Great Britain, ten for the United States and seven for Japan. They might then use the rest of the tonnage for smaller cruisers. This personal suggestion was supported by Viscount Saito, and he would suggest its consideration by the other delegations.

The CHAIRMAN thought that, if they began with this, it would be a much more helpful way of getting towards agreement on tonnage.

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese delegation were prepared to consider favourably a suggestion by Mr. Bridgeman that, if a certain number of ships were allowed to be employed after they had reached the age limit, this would facilitate the question of total tonnage and also the numbers of smaller cruisers.

Mr. GIBSON said that, as regards the large cruisers, the American position had been definitely stated as to how they would contemplate using the tonnage allotted to them. It was, however, very difficult for them to give an absolute indication as to what they would desire to do, as they had always maintained that this was a matter of relativity. They had not at present any of the large 8-inch cruisers, but he understood that the British Navy had four 10,000-ton cruisers completed and 11 in course of construction.

Admiral JONES said that the American delegation had done this in stating what they had suggested as limits.

Viscount ISHII felt there was still possibility for agreement. He understood that the number of 25 large vessels which the Americans would like to have had been put forward on a hypothesis that the maximum tonnage for cruisers was raised to 400,000 tons. He had been at first grieved at this figure, which indicated an increase of about 33 per cent on the original American proposal for maximum tonnage. The American delegation had later said that they were willing to reduce that tonnage and to take 450,000 tons for all surface auxiliary vessels as a basis for discussion. In that case the United States would be prepared to reduce the number of 25.

The CHAIRMAN said that he quite understood this, but that it was plain that, unless they came below 400,000 tons, they would not get any reduction in the big cruisers. They could not possibly go on on that basis. If the matter were left open so that they could discuss a programme telling them what everyone was going to do in the next few years, they would do their best to get their total tonnage as low as possible. It was not in their interest to have more than necessary. They were not, however, going to fix a limit now of what that total tonnage was going to be.

Mr. GIBSON said that their door was wide open to any proposals of that character, or of any other kind that might lead to an agreement.

Admiral FIELD said that they had given the American delegation a programme, but that this could not be absolutely accurate as they had not agreed on the characteristics of the small cruisers. If there were ten of the large cruisers by 1936, they would still have 32 pre-Washington cruisers which had not come to their age-limit, and they would build approximately 28 of the new-type smaller cruisers, about which they had not settled even the tonnage or characteristics. They had given as accurate a programme as they could, but had not yet received proposals from the United States as to what they would build under these conditions.

Admiral JONES said that they could not lay down a building programme and promise not to build more than a certain number of vessels a year. They had not yet built any of these 10,000-ton cruisers. They could, of course, say how many they would like to build and the total tonnage they would stop at, but they were always powerless if Congress refused one year to make an appropriation.

Viscount CECIL said that this would only be an external limit and would not mean that they were bound to build those cruisers, but that they could not build more than the fixed number. If they did not build in a particular year they could always build more the next. He would emphasise the necessity of trying to understand and meet the British view.

The CHAIRMAN wondered if it would be possible to re-open conversations on the question of a programme either by putting destroyers and cruisers together in one category or dealing with them separately. They could express merely the opinion of the Governments which they represented at present as to the limit of their programme up to 1931 or some such date.

Mr. GIBSON said that they would gladly explore the possibilities of any such proposal. It might be better not to do it in a large body, but, with all the figures before them, the question might be discussed informally before the next meeting.

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese experts were not in a position to present a building programme going beyond 1931.

The CHAIRMAN said they might take 1931 as the date.

Viscount CECIL said it would be very interesting to see what the position would then be. They would have a document showing what each country thought would be a reasonable figure for itself up to 1931.

Admiral JONES pointed out that the United States could not have a 10,000-ton cruiser completed before 1929. Their building programme for 1930 was practically laid down, and they could not build much more than eight 10,000-ton cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation had never wanted 10,000-ton cruisers, but that they were obliged to build them because of the limit fixed at Washington.

Mr. GIBSON replied that the resolution fixing the limit of this size of ship had been warmly supported by Mr. Bridgeman's predecessor, Lord Lee, who had pointed out that that figure was based on the existence of some ships approximating that size.

Viscount CECIL suggested that each delegation might lay down their possible programme up to 1931.

Mr. GIBSON said they could set down everything they had and everything they could evolve.

Viscount CECIL said that, if the Japanese delegation would do this, they would be glad to do so too, and would put down the lowest figures to up to 1931 to which they could safely go, dealing with the large and the small cruisers. They would then at any rate have a basis on which to see whether they might not make some small adjustment.

Viscount CECIL suggested that, if they could reach some kind of provisional agreement with a reservation that the whole subject would have to be reviewed in later discussions, it would be very desirable.

Admiral JONES said that the American delegation could not reach provisional agreement on a limitation of the tonnage of 10,000-ton maximum-size cruisers until they knew what the total amount for the class, whether in numbers or anything else, was going to be.

They could not have a limitation of 10,000-ton cruisers and then talk of a total limitation of 400,000 tons, since they considered their need for the maximum-size cruisers dependent upon the total tonnage in the cruiser force. They had in every proposal defined their limits.

The CHAIRMAN said that all they had heard about these cruisers was that the American delegation proposed 25 of 10,000 tons each.

Admiral JONES explained that they had no wish to go to that number.

Earl JELlicoe said that he had understood that the American delegation could not go below 250,000 tons in 10,000-ton cruisers.

Admiral JONES said that they had not said this in the original proposition, but, in working in the table on a 400,000-ton basis, they had put down 250,000 tons, saying that, if the basis were reduced, they would reduce their total number of the maximum size. They felt that the number of 10,000-ton cruisers depended on the total tonnage.

Earl JELlicoe asked if it were not logical to have a certain number of large cruisers. Surely the number was not dependent on total tonnage?

Admiral JONES replied that this was the American thesis.

Earl JELlicoe pointed out that the proportion was 25 to 40, or five-eighths.

The CHAIRMAN said that this meant an enormous increase in the offensive power. It was quite impossible for Great Britain, who depended for her security on a certain number of cruisers, to say, without knowing what other people were going to do, what their total tonnage could be. They sympathised with the proposal to limit the offensive power and number of large cruisers, and, without pledging themselves to Viscount Ishii's exact figures, 10:10:7, they would be agreeable to something approximating those figures. If this were fixed, it would be much easier for them to consider what would be necessary in other ships for their security.

Viscount CECIL wished to point out that Admiral Jones's proposal would mean that, by limiting themselves to 10 cruisers of 10,000 tons, the result would follow that the remainder of the cruisers would have to be limited to a total of 60,000 tons. If they constructed them as small as 6,000 tons each, there would then be 10 more cruisers, *i.e.*, 20 in all, on the proportion that Admiral Jones suggested. The result would be that the whole of the 20 cruisers would be necessary for the battle fleet, leaving none at all for watching trade routes. This would be the result of a statement that 25:40ths of the cruisers must be big ones.

Admiral JONES recalled that they would be very glad to accept the Japanese proposal as a basis of discussion. He wished to point out, however, that the American delegation were not demanding twenty-five 10,000-ton cruisers under the Japanese proposal.

The CHAIRMAN said that this would mean that the limits of the British navy should not be above 400,000 tons.

Admiral JONES said that they did not wish to go to this figure. They would be very glad to accept the Japanese proposal as a basis for discussion. They had said that they could not consider anything above 400,000 tons, as they did not feel that anything beyond that limitation would be a fair thing to take home to their people.

Mr. GIBSON said that they did not presume to question the right of any country to build what it liked. They had, however, to take back to their country a treaty which would be acceptable and would represent a genuine limitation. They could not agree to a treaty which would not be accepted by the Senate when they took it home. After careful consideration, they thought that, if they went up to 400,000 tons, they were getting perilously close to the point where its acceptance would be endangered. If the British delegation felt that, in conformity with their fundamental duty of protecting their own interests, they could come within that limit he would be very gratified. If not, however, it must be recognised that the American delegation had kept to the limit which they felt would be acceptable at home and that they were not endeavouring to dictate something to which others must conform.

Admiral JONES said that they might be able to discuss this matter. He understood the British delegation would accept the 10 cruisers as a basis of discussion. Were they prepared to say, before beginning, what would be the minimum number of other cruisers and what types they would require?

The CHAIRMAN said that if the other delegations would put their cards on the table the British delegation would do the same.

The American delegation stated as follows:

"The American Government has given its most careful consideration to the proposals submitted on behalf of the British Empire delegation with respect to the size and replacement age of capital ships and aircraft carriers.

"I have great pleasure in informing Mr. Bridgeman that we will raise no objection to an informal exchange of views with respect to these proposals, in case we are successful in reaching agreement with regard to auxiliary craft and after such agreement has been reached. It is our desire that such exchange of views should not be of a character to prejudice the decision to be taken at the 1931 Conference by any of the Powers, but rather of a nature to elicit information with respect to the British proposal, to enable our Governments to give these proposals thorough and intelligent study.

"I should further be disposed to recommend, in the event of the successful conclusion of our other work, that this Conference adopt a resolution laying these proposals before the Governments of the Powers parties to the Washington Treaties and that the Conference should further recommend that, if agreeable to all the Signatory Powers, the 1931 Conference should be held early in 1931 rather than in August, in order to give ample time to determine the effects of any decision reached by the Conference with regard to the capital ship replacement programme which begins in November of that year."

The British delegation made a reservation to the effect that they could not consider themselves bound not to raise the question during the Conference, even if complete agreement should not be reached on all other points.

Mr. GIBSON said that the American delegation would instinctively translate the figures back into the terms of total tonnages, in which they persisted in thinking.

Admiral JONES said it was practically impossible for them to give a building programme up to 1931. Their building programme did not exist at present, but was largely dependent upon what they were going to do here. They could, of course, state what they would like to have and what they would like to lay down next year. They were now considering a programme in which everything with the exception of small units must be started by the middle of 1928.

Viscount CECIL pointed out that something of this kind would be useful, and, if they were to explore this question of programmes, they must of necessity have programmes to compare.

Mr. GIBSON suggested that they would make more progress in an informal discussion on this subject to see what this offered in the way of possibilities. If something developed as a result, they could refer it to the Technical Committee.

Viscount ISHII agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that they could not get any further on the question of destroyers until they had settled whether they were to be considered separately or not, but there was still the submarine class, in which there was not a great deal of difference of opinion.

Viscount ISHII thought that, as they had not come to an agreement on the all-important question of cruisers, there was no particular utility in discussing submarines. If, however, the other delegations wished to discuss them now, the Japanese delegation would not object.

Mr. GIBSON agreed with Viscount Ishii that there was little practical utility in discussing questions of detail until they had dealt with this fundamental question, on which in any case they would have to concentrate their efforts.

He would ask what would be the feeling of the Executive Committee as regards the question of publishing the statements made the previous day as to the examination of the question of capital ships.

The CHAIRMAN thought that it would be a very good thing to have both the American and Japanese statements published.

Mr. GIBSON thought that they might say that the question arose during the meeting of the Committee and that the following statements were made in a discussion of the question.

Viscount ISHII agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British reservation would also be included.

As for that day's meeting, they might say that they had discussed the cruiser question further.

After discussion, the Secretariat was instructed to draw up the annexed communiqué to the Press.

Viscount ISHII said that he understood that, for the plenary Conference proposed for Monday, there would be no particular agenda.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation wished to make their position clear, but that he did not think they would be ready or that it would be wise to debate the matter very far.

The Committee adjourned at 11.45 a.m.

COMMUNIQUE.

At the session of the Executive Committee this morning, it was decided to hold a second plenary session of the Conference on Monday, 11th instant, at 3 p.m. In view of the fact that the large conference-room of the Secretariat is now occupied, it was decided that the session should be held in the large hall at the Hôtel des Bergues on the first floor. Journalists who desire to have seats reserved for themselves at this meeting are requested to hand in their names as soon as possible and in any case not later than Monday, July 11th, at 10 a.m. at the desk of the concierge in the Secretariat of the League of Nations.

Discussions of the cruiser question were begun. Suggestions were made which will be given further consideration.

In the course of a discussion regarding the British proposals concerning capital ships, a statement was made by the Japanese delegation as follows:

"The British proposal presents various technical problems on some of which the Japanese Government are unable to express their views without mature consideration. They are at the same time of opinion that the matter might with profit be taken up at the present Conference with a view to arriving at some kind of an understanding in regard to capital ships. Care should, however, be exercised in the handling of the question, so that it may not be allowed to stand in the way of the principal object of the present Conference — the limitation of auxiliary naval armament. It would therefore be advisable that the question of capital ships should be held up until an agreement shall have been reached in regard to auxiliary vessels."

PART III.

MINUTES OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.

Temporary Chairman: Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.

FIRST SESSION.

Geneva, Wednesday, June 22nd, 1927.

Present :

<i>United States of America :</i>	Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD, U.S.N. Captain A. ANDREWS, U.S.N. Captain W. W. SMYTH, U.S.N.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions :</i>	
Great Britain :	Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. Captain W. A. EGERTON, C.M.G., R.N.
Australia :	Captain H. J. FEAKES, R.A.N.
New Zealand :	Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL, C.B., C.M.G.
<i>Japan :</i>	Rear-Admiral K. HARA. Mr. S. SABURI. Captain T. HORI. Captain T. TOYODA. Captain M. KOGA. Constructor-Commander K. FUJIMOTO. Commander I. SATO.
<i>Secretariat-General :</i>	The Hon. Hugh WILSON (Secretary-General). Captain H. R. MOORE, D.S.O., R.N. Captain SHIRATORI. Mr. H. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information :</i>	Commander DELEUZE. M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian unofficial observers :</i>	Captain RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

and the extra tonnage had been given just in order to embody these extra facilities. They did not want destroyer leaders to be more than a slightly superior destroyer, and it was certainly intended to restrict that type of vessel to something definitely below the offensive gun power of even the smallest cruiser. The limit of the 5-inch gun was intended both for flotilla leaders and destroyers.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA concluded that there was no necessity to make a distinction between flotilla leaders and destroyers and thought that they might have one category of destroyers since the difference was only 350 tons.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN pointed out that, if the ultimate agreement were on a total tonnage principle, this might lead to all destroyers being of the maximum limit.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA asked why the submarine had been divided into large and small classes and how the maximum tonnages for these two classes had been reached.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN replied that the general principle on which they had approached this subject was to talk of numbers rather than tonnage. Other delegations had proposed a total tonnage rather than numbers, and they would have to agree upon the ultimate way to approach the subject.

In arriving at total tonnage, however, the naval experts had written down the number and size of the vessels they intended at the moment to include in that tonnage. They had thought it wise to say frankly that each nation required a certain number of submarines for purely coastal defence and any nation, according to the length and danger of their coast-line, would ask for a reasonable number of these small craft, which would not have a radius of action sufficient to take the offensive at great distances. Each nation would also ask for a certain number of the larger type of submarine which could operate overseas, and they thought they could get further limitation by allowing an agreed number of the large and the small type. The maximum tonnages had really been reached by considering their own latest design of submarine, in which 600 tons was quite big enough for coast defence and 1,600 tons to provide the strength and endurance for overseas work. This was a surface tonnage, and, of course, larger if the submarine were submerged, and this question had arisen at Washington when the standard of Washington displacement was agreed to. The British Government had decided mainly on the score of expense to continue to calculate their displacement in their own way, but for this Conference they had calculated the tonnage of all their ships by Washington standards.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA said that it appeared to him that the new tonnage was much bigger than that appearing in the blue papers.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN explained that this was a totally different method of calculation.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA thought that the normal tonnage ought to be much bigger than the standard tonnage.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN stated that in the old days they had used the legend tonnage at which the ship's trial by the constructors took place, and which was calculated without taking into account stores, ammunition, water, etc. This calculation had been the practice for many years and it had been misleading, and only after the Washington Treaty had they found a definite standard in order to see what tonnage meant.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA asked why the difference between 6-inch guns for cruisers and 5-inch guns for destroyers and submarines respectively was so small.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN explained that the 6-inch gun was a vastly superior weapon to the 5-inch, and that they had put 5-inch because other nations were inclined to use that calibre.

* * *

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that he would like to have the names of the officers and members attending the Conference for the information of the Secretary-General. He thought, however, that the Technical Committee would not always necessarily be constituted as it was to-day.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL asked to whom to send notices convening meetings.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation naval experts would always include himself, Captain Egerton, Admiral Beal and Captain Feakes, though there might be occasion when all of these might not attend.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL asked whether the meeting wished a *communiqué* issued to the Press.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that all that was necessary to say was that the technical experts met that day in accordance with the arrangement made by the Executive Committee to exchange detailed information with regard to elucidating further detail concerning the respective proposals.

The Temporary Chairman said that they would be glad to receive further details about the Japanese proposals.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that the meeting had been called with the object of exchanging further information as to the respective proposals, so that each delegation should be fully informed as to the detailed meaning of the initial proposals.

The British Government had issued tables (Annex No. 11) in the form requested by the American delegation showing the tonnage and numbers of all cruisers, destroyers and submarines in the British Navy. This system used the Washington standard tonnage and was in accordance with the proposals of the Japanese delegation. They had also added a table (see Annex No. 11 a) giving the number and total tonnage of vessels being built and those projected for, and they would be glad to have similar information from the other delegations.

Tables (Annex No. 11 b) had also been issued showing the actual replacements under the British proposal for the extension of the life of capital ships, which would be ready if this question were to be discussed.

They had also issued a comprehensive classification table (Annex No. 4) giving the tonnage and limits of each type of vessel, and he thought it would be very valuable if they could receive the impressions of the other experts with regard to that table and to know whether they thought the tonnage ought to be a little bigger or smaller. It was desirable to arrive at some basis for discussion, and perhaps after all the necessary information had been exchanged in private conversation they would find that there were certain particular points on which they could go into committee.

The particular question of submarines, for instance, might be cleared up without delay, and it would be very desirable when all the information had been circulated that they could meet in private and ascertain if there was a basis of agreement for that class of vessel.

The British delegation would be very ready to give any further information as to their proposal.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA asked the reason why the following replacement ages had been so fixed and how they would be applied:

8-inch cruisers	24 years
Destroyers	20 "
Submarines	15 "

What would be the replacement age for cruisers armed with guns under 8 inches in calibre?

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that the age-limit proposed by the British Government had been reached by careful technical study. In the case of a cruiser, it had been found that, after 8½ years' use, the hull was in extremely good condition and that it was well worth repairing or replacing boilers, auxiliary machinery, etc., by a thorough refit which would make the ship practically as good as new. The hull of a ship would be judged worthy of at least two thorough overhauls, but probably not of a third. The result of the calculations was that a cruiser would last 24 years, a destroyer 20 years and a submarine 15 years before replacement would be necessary.

These proposals were only intended to apply to ships built since the Washington Treaty, including all cruisers built since that date. Considerable modifications would, however, have to be allowed for older ships.

It was, of course, possible to take greater care of the ship when it was known that it had to last a long time, but the new age-limit could hardly be applied to very old ships.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA asked whether they were concerned with ships laid down or constructed since the Washington Treaty, and wondered how an age-limit was to be applied to all ships and particularly old ships.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that this referred to ships laid down. The British Government had considered the age-limit of the aircraft carriers and had calculated that an aircraft carrier should last as long as a cruiser. Certain ships, however, had been built as cruisers and later converted into aircraft carriers, and they had concluded that it would be fair to ask that these vessels should only last 20 years instead of 24 years. The existing practice in the British Navy had been that a cruiser should last 20 years, a destroyer 16 and a submarine 12, but, after careful consideration as to how they could be made to last longer, they had put forward the extended life at any rate for recent ships.

Replying to Captain Teijiro Toyoda's question why the maximum tonnage of cruisers had been put at 7,500 tons with guns of 6-inch calibre, the TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that it had been felt that the Washington limit of tonnage — 10,000 tons with 8-inch guns — had led in practice to all nations building expensive ships very nearly approaching that tonnage. The British Government did not necessarily want all their cruisers of this powerful type, and they therefore proposed that the number with 8-inch guns should be strictly limited and that the 5:5:3 ratio should be applied to them. They might agree on the actual number for each nation and, if possible, agree for a less expensive cruiser with an agreement either for a total tonnage for these vessels within that maximum limit or as to the number that each nation should maintain.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA asked whether, by fixing the maximum tonnages of flotilla leaders and destroyers separately, it was desired to prescribe the total tonnages for these ships separately. Was it intended to apply the limitation of 5-inch guns to both flotilla leaders and destroyers?

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that this was not intended. The difference in tonnage in these ships was not very great. It was that between 1,750 and 1,400 tons. It was desirable that a leader should have more accommodation and certain more complicated control mechanism, etc.,

SECOND SESSION.

Geneva, Monday, June 27th, 1927.

Present:

United States of America:

Rear-Admiral H. P. JONES.
Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
Captain J. M. REEVES.
Captain A. J. HEPBURN.
Captain A. ANDREWS.
Captain W. W. SMYTH.
Commander H. C. TRAIN.

Great Britain and Dominions:

Great Britain:

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Captain W. A. EGERTON.

Canada:

Commodore W. HOSE.

Australia:

Captain H. J. FEAKES.

New Zealand:

Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe.

Japan:

Mr. S. SABURI.
Vice-Admiral S. KOBAYASHI.
Rear-Admiral K. HARA.
Captain T. HORI.
Captain T. TOYODA.
Captain M. KOGA.
Commander S. KOBAYASHI.
Commander N. NOMURA.
Commander I. SATO.
Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.
Eng.-Lieut.-Commander YANAGIHARA.

Secretariat-General:

Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE.
Captain H. R. MOORE.
Mr. SHIRATORI.
Mr. H. R. HUSTON.

French Mission d'Information:

Commander DELEUZE.

Italian unofficial observers:

Captain RUSPOLI.
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA said that he had a memorandum on this subject (Annex No. 5) and a Table (Annex No. 6), which would be included in the provisional minutes.

Captain EGERTON asked whether the suggestion in the first paragraph of the Japanese proposal that the basis be up to and including the programme adopted at the end of 1927 was reflected in the American Fleet.

Admiral SCHOFIELD replied that the American list included programmes authorised prior to June 20th, 1927.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA said that they had intended A, B, C and D to indicate Washington standard tonnage, and they concluded that this would be understood to be by the Washington standard.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN gathered that the meaning of B and C was that the tonnage of the ships designed in the programme already approved should not be altered, and Captain Teijiro TOYODA agreed that this would be done during the discussion.

Captain EGERTON suggested that it would be necessary for their deliberations to be based upon a definite date and said that the British table had been made out to June 20th, 1927.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA stated that this was also the case with the Japanese table.

Admiral SCHOFIELD explained that the American tables referred to June 20th, but that, so far as ages were concerned, they included 16-year-old vessels completed in the calendar year 1911 and similarly 12-year-old vessels completed in the calendar year 1915.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN agreed that this introduced a small difference, as they had not the date on which each vessel was completed. Whatever agreement was reached regarding the tonnage table or number of vessels to be made or maintained, they would have to give particular consideration to vessels named by each Power which were not to be included.

Captain EGERTON said that in both the American proposals a reference was made to designed speed. He asked how this could be determined.

Admiral SCHOFIELD recognised this difficulty and suggested that the matter might be dealt with by taking vessels near the border line and deciding whether they were above or below the designed speed. The only designed speed they had mentioned was in their proposal 17 knots to differentiate between vessels which were and were not limited by the proposal. He did not think that the difficulties were very serious.

Referring to the American list of standard tonnages, these were determined by taking the designed tonnages published in 1924 and subtracting fuel and feed-water. In some cases there had been additions to the weights, as, for instance, in the *Omaha* class of light cruiser. In such cases no account was taken of this in giving the standard tonnage. Similarly, destroyers in active commission were, as a class, displacing somewhat more than destroyers which had been in reserve since the war, but no account was taken of such an increase in weight in submitting the designed displacement minus the fuel and feed-water.

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that the British and Japanese had allowed for such an increase. When a ship had been in commission for same time, slight alterations and improvements slightly increased her weight, and they had allowed for such increases, though not a very serious matter.

Captain EGERTON understood that the American system of taking the displacement and making a certain deduction might produce a result materially different from that arrived at in the British calculation.

Admiral SCHOFIELD explained that the *Omaha* class of cruisers had a designed displacement of 7,500 tons, and, after subtracting fuel and feed-water, the result was a displacement of about 6,600 tons. Such vessels, however, were actually somewhat larger than 6,600. Their lists showed how they reached what they called standard displacement. It would be convenient if they could compare a list of the ships of the British Navy, which they had prepared for their own use before coming here, to make sure that its information was accurate, and they would be glad to have similar information from the Japanese delegation.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL asked the delegates to inform Mr. Huston when they desired additional copies of documents, together with the numbers required.

Captain Teijiro TOYODA wished to put certain questions to the American delegation.

Admiral SCHOFIELD suggested that, as one of these questions was rather complicated, it would be preferable to circulate written answers before the next meeting of the Committee. This would be done in advance in order that delegates might study them (Annex No. 14).

The TEMPORARY CHAIRMAN said that any delegate might suggest another meeting if further information was required which could not be obtained by private conversation, and he thought that the Committee might now adjourn. He explained that the present Committee dealt only with the exchange of information, and that members would receive the minutes of the meeting with the questions and answers given.

The Committee adjourned at 12.30 p.m.

summarised by asking whether there were restrictions to be included in Class C which the United States would find unacceptable in Class B.

Admiral JONES said that he understood that it was suggested to move the restrictions in Class C up to Class B.

The CHAIRMAN said that, although they had not really had a "C" class in mind, they had, however, felt that such vessels as minesweepers, service vessels such as supply ships, depot ships, oilers, etc., should come under Class C. The question was whether it was desirable to divide them or not. It was desired that the Class B should have little greater freedom than the Class C in the way of armament and speed.

Admiral JONES asked for a few moments to consider if they could put under Class B restrictions which would cover the Chairman's point, and at the same time certain restrictions which would allow Class C to be left in.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that they might discuss the two classes separately and come to agreement. They would first take up Class B and see what restrictions they should put under it.

The proposal read "all naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 3,000 tons displacement having a speed of less than 17 knots". If these were to constitute a class by itself their tonnage should definitely be restricted to something lower than 3,000 tons. They would suggest 2,000 tons as sufficiently high. The class would thus be comparable to the destroyer, but they might prevent this by reducing the speed. They felt that 17 knots was not quite high enough to meet the needs of an ocean-going minesweeper. They would therefore suggest a speed of 20 knots with a restriction on the number and size of the guns. They would suggest that such vessels should not carry guns over 6 inches in calibre and not more than four of those guns. They should not be fitted with torpedoes. They would be far larger than a torpedo boat, which would easily come into the "under 600 tons" class. They would suggest that such vessels should not be fitted to lay mines. If any or some of these restrictions were agreed to they would nearly approach those on what the Americans called non-combatant vessels.

Captain TOYODA understood that, so far as combatant vessels were concerned, Class C was up to 10,000 tons, since these were limited by the Washington Treaty, while non-combatants were not limited. Their own proposal was therefore much bigger than either the British or American proposals.

Captain EGERTON asked, if Class B was to be kept, what tonnage limits the Japanese suggested.

Captain TOYODA said that this would be from 600 to 10,000 tons. There would be, however, a limitation that the speed be 20 knots and the armament not more than four 6-inch guns. This would be the basis for their discussion. They would group all these vessels together, beginning with surface vessels as written down.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether, in view of the restrictions suggested by the British and Japanese delegations, they would be prepared to discuss the question as a whole.

Admiral JONES said that in the first place he felt that the speed was too high. Tonnage would be up to 10,000 tons or bigger. He felt that a vessel of good sea-keeping qualities carrying four 6-inch guns, and an unlimited number of 3-inch guns with a speed of 20 knots, was a very formidable vessel to put in an exempt class.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might be able to come down to a speed of 18 knots, as he did not wish to exclude 18 knots for a minesweeper. This was the designed speed and not one at which one could work for long periods without a certain amount of strain. If the designed speed was 18 knots, he understood that this meant the full speed, i.e., maximum speed.

Admiral JONES said that modern machinery would run on a designed speed for quite a long time and that he understood by designed speed one that could be maintained fairly consistently. A ship might keep up her maximum speed for a very considerable time.

The main point was that it was very undesirable to loose upon the world in unlimited numbers what might prove a formidable weapon. He was prepared to accept 17 knots, even though this appeared rather high.

Earl JELICOE understood from this that it would be desirable to keep to Classes B and C.

Captain TOYODA pointed out that there were many ships doing more than 20 knots which could quickly be converted into cruisers. If converted cruisers were excluded they should also exclude combatant vessels up to 20 knots.

Rear-Admiral JONES explained that he wished to keep vessels not here recognised as combatant or which did not belong to a Navy as far as possible out of the discussion and to deal solely with naval vessels which were in time of peace designated as such.

Captain TOYODA pointed out that there ought to be some standard of measurement for combatant cruisers.

Rear-Admiral JONES explained that they did give a measurement as between 600 and 3,000 tons for one class. There would be another class which included larger vessels such as supply and refrigerating ships, etc., which might come under Class C. They would be willing to name

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he had tried to persuade Vice-Admiral Kobayashi to preside at these meetings, but that he asked that his name be not put forward. He therefore proposed that Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. Field should continue in the chair.

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. Field took the chair.

The CHAIRMAN said that he much appreciated being asked to take the chair, and voiced the general hope that these deliberations would lead to good results in a short time. He informed the Committee that Commodore Walter Hose, Naval Adviser to the Canadian delegation, had arrived that day. He wished to add his name to those of the members of the Technical Committee. Turning to the first question on the agenda adopted informally on Saturday last, which was to specify the qualities which would exempt vessels from inclusion in the discussions in this Conference, the British delegation had prepared a draft (Annex No. 15) giving in tabular form the United States and Japanese proposals, with an extract from the classification table circulated by the British delegation. They had extracted the description of some of the vessels in that classification which they considered should not be included in the terms of this Conference.

With reference to Question A on the circulated sheet, it would be seen that the United States proposed that all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons displacement should be excluded, while the Japanese proposed that surface ships not exceeding 700 tons should be excluded. In their classification table there was a vessel called a torpedo boat which they suggested should not exceed 400 tons nor mount guns over 3 inches in calibre.

The British delegation did not think it necessary to limit the guns of these very small vessels, as their size acted as sufficient limitation. They thought, however, that 700 tons was rather high, and they would agree to the United States proposal of a 600-ton limit, i.e., to rule out all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons displacement.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI stated that his delegation would agree to a limit of 600 instead of 700 tons.

The following proposal was then agreed to:

"That all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons displacement will not be restricted in the terms of this Conference."

The CHAIRMAN said that, in Class B, the United States proposed that all naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 3,000 tons displacement with a speed of less than 17 knots should be treated in the same way. The Japanese had not a separate exemption table for this intermediate class, and the British delegation had put in Class B the description of what they considered the tonnage and armament limit for minesweepers and similar small craft, since they had not originally intended an intermediate class.

Rear-Admiral JONES asked for a distinct understanding of what was meant by the term "tons" when referred to in these discussions.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that any reference to displacement in any part of this Conference meant Washington standard tonnage.

This was agreed to.

Rear-Admiral SCHOFIELD rose to explain why, in the American proposal, Classes A and B were considered separately. If Class B were not defined in somewhat similar terms to those used, and if it were included with Class A, it would involve the consideration under Class A, not only of vessels under 600 tons but of vessels of the destroyer class, since Class A had no speed limitation as given in Class B. Vessels of over 17 knots in Class B were subject to limitation under the destroyer class according to the American proposal.

Class B was recognised as a class of vessel built primarily for fighting purposes but restricted in their employment by reason of their low speed. Class C was, however, a class not built for fighting purposes but for the service of the Fleet, and were not really combatant vessels, though also restricted by speed.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the term "combatant vessel" was somewhat ambiguous. These service ships were allowed a certain armament and were, strictly speaking, combatant vessels, though equipped with only a defensive armament. He did not, however, wish to press the point as to a division between Class B and C, which was only a question of simplicity. If these two classes could be put together they would have to say "all naval surface combatant vessels and all other naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships".

The restrictions were, he thought, more or less the same with the exception of mines.

Admiral SCHOFIELD said that as regards Class B there were no restrictions regarding battery or armour or mines or torpedoes, whereas there were these restrictions in the case of Class C.

Captain TOYODA suggested that it would be simpler to include Classes B and C together.

The CHAIRMAN explained that the British delegation considered that the restriction with regard to torpedoes should be included in Class B.

They imposed a definite limit to the size of guns which did not exist in the American proposal. There was undoubtedly a great difference between Classes B and C in the original American proposal, but there was not so much difference if they imposed a limitation of guns and excluded the torpedo. There was also the question of armament and mines, but the question might be

The CHAIRMAN said that the next point was "(3) are armoured" and the next "(4) are fitted to launch torpedoes or mines" and the next "(5) are fitted to receive planes on board from the air".

These were agreed to by the British delegation.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that he agreed to these words.

The CHAIRMAN read point (6), "are capable of a speed greater than 17 knots". He would here suggest that the figure be 18. He hoped that the United States and Japanese delegations would be able to meet them on this point.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that he would be prepared to do this.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that, in spite of his great desire to reduce a dangerous unit in the unlimited class, he would reluctantly accept 18.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had a further restriction to add with regard to aircraft. There was a restriction about being able to receive planes on board, but some vessels unable to receive planes on board could launch them rapidly and efficiently by the use of a number of catapults. He would suggest that a ship should not be allowed to mount more than one launching apparatus.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he recognised the force of this argument and felt that they could accept a restriction to one centre-line catapult or two catapults firing one on each beam.

Captain EGERTON suggested the wording "not more than two catapults, but should either of these be mounted on the centre-line the restriction would be limited to one".

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he would like their acceptance to be provisional for a short time.

Captain TOYODA pointed out that as these were only auxiliary craft, the Japanese proposal had originally intended that they should not be allowed to carry catapults at all.

The CHAIRMAN explained that, in the case of an aeroplane depot ship carrying aeroplanes in pieces for transport from one port to another, it was very much easier to fly these machines off rather than hoist them out in pieces to be assembled on shore.

There was, moreover, another point: that a vessel, if going from one port to another with a valuable cargo — for instance, of torpedoes — should be able to reconnoitre by aeroplane to see if there was anything in the way.

Captain TOYODA said that he grasped the idea in this connection and would like the restriction to be limited to one catapult.

The CHAIRMAN said that the United States delegation provisionally agreed to one on the centre-line, but thought that, if necessary from a constructional point of view, one should be allowed on each beam.

Rear-Admiral JONES explained that a ship so fitted would not really be able to fire more than one at a time, but if the wind were extremely favourable she might be able to fire two.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation would accept this text provisionally.

The CHAIRMAN said that the next item on the programme was submarines, and the last item aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons. The Japanese had proposed that the latter should be exempt. He would, however, suggest that it would be wrong to have no restrictions on vessels under 10,000 tons and felt that these should come out of the cruiser tonnage allowed under the Washington Treaty.

Captain TOYODA explained that, by the Washington Treaty, aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons were unlimited because they were in the experimental stage. The Japanese Government had one ship still in such a stage and felt it was unfair to bind ships still in the experimental stage and put them in the category of cruisers whose value was well known.

Rear-Admiral JONES felt that the existing position of a Government with one experimental ship under 10,000 tons might easily be met, but that it would be very dangerous to accept an unlimited class of aeroplane carriers under 10,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that he agreed with Admiral Jones. They must remember that no vessels at all under 10,000 tons were limited by the Washington Treaty. This Conference hoped to agree to definite limitations for vessels under 10,000 tons, and, though exceptions could be made, it would not be logical to leave an aircraft carrier class under 10,000 tons unlimited. In the case of the particular one already referred to, a certain allowance could be made by agreement, so that such a ship's existence would not be counted in during her life.

Captain EGERTON pointed out that the United States and Great Britain each had such a vessel.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that they might say that each signatory should be allowed one vessel under 10,000 tons if wanted for experimental purposes. They would be able to take care of the existing tonnage, and the main question was that they should not build an unlimited number.

Captain TOYODA thought that perhaps this question might be re-introduced in 1931. He asked what was meant by "a small aircraft carrier which they proposed to exclude from the discussion".

certain restrictions to be put up under Class B, which would practically meet what had here been accepted as regards speed, since under Class C they would find the big vessels referred to carrying certain guns.

It would be greatly preferable to confine their attention to naval vessels so considered in time of peace.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that they first consider restrictions to be agreed on for Class B and then deal with the Class C.

Captain TOYODA said that he agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that Class B include all naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 2,000 tons. Ships would not be allowed to mount a gun greater than 6 inches in calibre nor a battery of more than 4 guns over 3 inches in calibre. They would not be fitted to launch torpedoes or mines nor be designed for a speed greater than 18 knots.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the United States would accept a reduction in the maximum tonnage under Class B to 2,000 tons, as well as the limit of calibre of 6 inches. They would agree to ships carrying not more than four guns of over 3 inches in calibre. They would not accept for the moment under that category "ships not designed or fitted to launch torpedoes or mines". They had no objection to minesweepers fitted to lay harbour mines and essentially for defensive minefields. Ships fitted to lay floating mines in an action at sea should be limited. He did not see why ships laying mines in their own waters and minesweepers to sweep their own harbours should be in the limited class, particularly when under the given speed.

He had no objection to quote "not designed or fitted to launch torpedoes".

As regards speed, they felt that this should be brought as low as anyone would accept, perhaps even lower than 18 knots for 2,000 tons. It was not a question of offensive mines being used in an action. As regards the ability to lay mines, a low speed would take away from minesweepers certain tactical offensive qualities.

The CHAIRMAN felt that this was not always the case in close waters. A vessel of 2,000 tons with another 700 or 800 tons added would not have great difficulty in carrying 150 mines.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he agreed, and that, in consequence he was very anxious to reduce speed. A vessel could not really be classed as combatant when brought down to the lower speed.

Captain TOYODA said that (b) in the Japanese proposals covered from 600 to 2,000 tons. They agreed to armaments of 6 inches and as to the number of not more than four over 3 inches. They would agree that they be not fitted or designed to launch torpedoes, but would like to support the American suggestion as to mines and to maintain a speed of 20 knots.

The CHAIRMAN said that they were all agreed to the restrictions as far as No. 3. The British delegation would be prepared, in view of the desire of the United States and Japan that mines should be retained, to cut out the restrictions as regards mines. The text would therefore be "are neither designed nor fitted to launch torpedoes".

As regards speed, the British and Japanese suggested 20 knots, but the United States would much prefer their original proposal of 17 knots. He would suggest that they meet the American proposals halfway and reduce their own proposition to 18 knots.

Captain TOYODA said that he would agree to 18 knots.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that their object was to keep out of the exempt class what they considered fairly formidable fighting craft under certain conditions. As they had agreed to the reduction of the tonnage to 2,000 tons and had taken off the torpedoes, they felt that they could come down to 18 knots in that the ship would not be quite so formidable.

As regards mines, they were really rather desirous of omitting these since they had a number of minesweepers which could be fitted up to drop harbour defensive mines. They did not wish to limit such vessels, which had a low speed.

The CHAIRMAN said that they had now reached Class C. The United States proposal was the most complete, and it might be desirable, as the Japanese had already eliminated a certain amount of their own proposal, to discuss that of the United States as a basis for agreement.

The first restriction (1) provided that they should not "mount a gun greater than 5.5 inches in calibre". He suggested that the calibre be 6 inches, to bring it into line with the other craft.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that they would like it to be 6 inches.

This was agreed upon.

The CHAIRMAN said that the second clause was "mount a battery firing an aggregate of projectiles of more than 500 lb." He suggested that it should read "mount a battery of more than four guns above 3 inches in calibre".

Captain EGERTON explained that this would allow countries to put in guns of less than 3 inches if desired.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed to accept this wording for "future construction and future acquisition" with certain exceptions, e.g., vessels taken over already constructed from some other service.

This was agreed to.

displacements of destroyers were getting bigger and bigger, and also because, in making a new programme, it was easier not to limit it to such classes.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the British view was that, without a definite gap between the two classes, the competition would go on in building larger and larger destroyers. He would suggest that they should that day decide whether to discuss the question as a whole or whether to discuss cruisers with a view to arranging a definite limitation of maximum tonnage and an allocation within that category, and then separately discuss the maximum tonnage and allocation of destroyers. He felt that it would be more simple to take these classes separately, but, until this point had been decided, they could not consider either destroyers or cruisers, and the British delegation felt that the destroyer question should not be dealt with until after that of submarines. If it was decided that they should be discussed together, he would have to ask that they be postponed until after the submarine question, which would be an unfortunate delay.

Earl JELlicoe pointed out that the British view also differed in suggesting that destroyer tonnage be limited to something like 1,750 tons instead of 3,000 tons. He did not know if they could decide whether there should be any limit on the displacement of destroyers as a class or whether they should go straight from the destroyers to the cruisers by a difference of one ton.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that it was not a very important question at the moment how to limit destroyers or destroyer leaders. It was mainly a question whether to consider the surface craft in one of two classes.

The limit of 3,000 tons was not necessarily proposed for destroyers as such but rather for a class of surface vessels. The other question as to the limit of the destroyer or leader would be discussed later in each class. The American view was that to have only one class of surface vessels was open to a similar objection as the global tonnage system, which left a degree of uncertainty and uneasiness as to what would be done within a large limit. It would therefore be preferable to deal with auxiliary surface craft in two classes to be called either "Cruiser Class and Destroyer Class" or "Class A and Class B".

The CHAIRMAN said that this was quite clear and that he recognised the advantages of discussion in two classes.

Rear-Admiral JONES desired to make his statement slightly clearer and read the following passages:

"Class A is intended to fix a total tonnage within which certain larger vessels may be built of any type, whether of cruisers, mine-layers, aircraft carriers or some special type.

"Class B is intended to fix a total tonnage within which certain smaller vessels within those tonnages may be built of any type, whether flotilla leaders, destroyer or gunboat of that speed or within that class."

Captain TOYODA said that they had no objection to considering the question in two classes, but hoped that such a division would not restrict or limit the later discussion of total tonnage. They could not say for the moment whether such total tonnage ought to be discussed under Class A or Class B separately or not.

Captain EGERTON said that he understood that the Japanese delegation agreed to divide the question into two classes but without prejudice to their final agreement as to how it would be expressed.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would now be free to discuss the maximum tonnage of each class with the age and other particulars.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed that they would then be free to discuss other points in Class A or Class B separately.

The CHAIRMAN desired to thank the Japanese delegation for receding from their original proposal to enable the meeting to discuss these questions in so far as limits might be placed while reserving their final agreement as to the total allocation in each class.

As regards the programme for the next day, they might now endeavour to draw up a rough agenda.

The United States suggested that they take class (a) or the cruiser class and discuss limits, age and the transition period. This transition period would be one where there would be a great deal of "give and take" in order not to have to get rid of vessels or scrap them before their age.

The submarine question would be held up until they received an answer from Japan on the question of restricting small submarines.

Admiral KOBAYASHI asked Admiral Jones what was meant by "limit" — total tonnage or maximum tonnage of each vessel.

Rear-Admiral JONES explained that the upper unit tonnage of Class A was fixed. The maximum unit tonnage was settled, but it might be open to question as to the lower limit or dividing line. They might reach the discussion of the total limitation for Class A with the provisional understanding on the part of the Japanese as to later consideration of total tonnage of both classes.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that they agree to discuss surface vessels, Class A, cruiser or cruiser category. They might discuss this on the morrow with an agenda as follows:

Admiral JONES said that, if a country wished to use up anything in the cruiser tonnage, according to the American proposals, they could build aircraft carriers if they wished up to the limit of the agreed tonnage for cruisers.

Captain TOYODA said that he agreed if it was understood that the *Hosho*, the *Hermes* and the *Langley*, possessed by the Japanese, British and United States Governments respectively, should be excluded.

Admiral LONG pointed out that these vessels were dealt with by the Washington Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN said that these particular vessels were dealt with, but that any more would have to come under an agreement reached as to cruisers.

Captain TOYODA asked the meaning of the words "small aircraft carriers" in the following extract from Mr. Bridgeman's speech:

"It will be noted that we have not made any definite proposals with regard to miscellaneous vessels such as minelayers, small aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, minesweepers, etc."

Did this mean that the aircraft carrier being built for the Australian Navy would be exempted?

The CHAIRMAN and Captain EGERTON explained that this ship would not be excluded.

Admiral JONES said that he would like to reserve the question of aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons for the time being. They reserved the right to raise the question as to the right of each other nation to build if it wished one experimental aircraft carrier under 10,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that this would not affect the general principle for the future. All they asked was that any further aircraft carrier of that type should be considered as a fighting vessel.

Captain TOYODA said that under these conditions he would agree.

The CHAIRMAN then proposed the consideration of (d) referring to submarines. The United States and British proposals read "no exemption proposed". The Japanese, however, read "submarines not exceeding 700 tons displacement" to be exempt. He asked the Japanese delegation whether they would be prepared to reconsider their proposal, as it was felt that any submarines were potential offensive vessels and should be included in the discussions.

Captain TOYODA said that they considered that a vessel of 700 tons would not be any menace to any country. This was a discussion between three nations separated by 6,000 or 7,000 miles, and he did not think that a 700-ton submarine would form any menace to other countries.

Rear-Admiral JONES pointed out that a Dutch submarine of 800 tons, possibly standard tonnage, had recently made a trip from Holland to the Dutch East Indies via the Panama Canal unaccompanied. If the number of torpedoes carried were restricted, a 700-ton submarine could go quite a long way.

The CHAIRMAN expressed his agreement with Admiral Jones and said that very much smaller submarines had a much larger radius of action. Their endurance might not be quite so long, but the British "L" class of submarine, for example, were quite efficient vessels at only 800 tons. On principle, submarines ought to be restricted whatever the tonnage.

Captain TOYODA said that he thought that, for the present, they would have to reserve the answer to this question, as it would have a great bearing on the tonnage allocated to each country under their proposal.

The CHAIRMAN hoped that it would be possible to have an answer to this question fairly soon.

Admiral KOBAYASHI said that, before they could agree to any deviation from the original proposal, it would be necessary to receive the authority of their Government.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that they now discuss item B on the agenda for that day's meeting. That was the question whether they would have one class, including cruisers and destroyers, or whether for the future limits these classes would be considered separately. The British proposal suggested separate consideration. He asked Admiral Jones to explain the American proposal in relation to the future, not the transition period.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they had aimed at two general classes, not necessarily defining an individual type within the class but confining the classes rather by limits of tonnages.

Admiral SCHOFIELD said that it was the desire of the United States Navy, when studying the question, to provide a definition of classes that would cover all vessels of less than 10,000 tons displacement. It had seemed desirable to establish a dividing line between the cruiser class and the destroyer class, and a study of existing vessels in the navies of the world suggested that the dividing line be about 3,000 tons. There was a further line of division between the destroyer class and the exempt class which they had discussed that afternoon. The term "3,000 tons" was not intended to define a destroyer or to limit or predict its probable tonnage but was merely a dividing line between the two classes of vessel which might equally well have been called "Classes A and B" instead of "Cruiser Class and Destroyer Class".

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese view was quite similar to that just put forward. It would be difficult to fix the classes by the terms "cruiser" and "destroyer", as the tonnage

THIRD SESSION.

Geneva, Tuesday, June 28th, 1927.

Present :

United States of America :	Rear-Admiral H. P. JONES.
	Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
	Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
	Captain J. M. REEVES.
	Captain A. J. HEPBURN.
	Captain A. ANDREWS.
	Captain W. W. SMYTH.
Great Britain and Dominions :	Commander H. C. TRAIN.
	Commander H. H. FROST.
Great Britain :	Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
	Captain W. A. EGERTON.
	Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.
Canada :	Commodore W. HOSE.
Australia :	Captain H. J. FEAKES.
New Zealand :	Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe.
Japan :	Mr. Sadao SABURI.
	Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI.
	Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
	Captain Teikichi HORI.
	Captain Teijiro TOYODA.
	Captain Mineichi KOGA.
	Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI.
	Commander Naokuni NOMURA.
	Commander Ichiro SATO.
	Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.
Secretariat-General :	Eng.-Lieut.-Commander YANAGIWARA.
	Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE.
	Captain H. R. MOORE.
	Mr. SHIRATORI.
French Mission d'Information :	Mr. H. R. HUSTON.
	Commander DELEUZE.
Italian Unofficial Observers :	Captain RUSPOLI.
	Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

(a) British proposals for two types, *i.e.*, whether it be agreed to have two classes; (b) maximum displacement of individual ships; (c) minimum displacement; (d) age for replacement; (e) armament; (f) method of deciding quantitative limit.

This would provide a broad field.

If anyone thought that any particular question was a difficult one the question could be deferred.

As regards the question of whether they should issue a *communiqué* with regard to the afternoon's discussions, he felt that it would be very unwise to give a *communiqué* too often. It would be better to wait until they had something rather more definite.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he agreed, but that the Press would naturally expect something.

The CHAIRMAN said they might say that considerable progress was made in deciding what vessels should not be considered for limitation at this Conference.

It would, he thought, be rather unwise to publish the fact that they had agreed to (a), (b) and (c), but that with regard to (c) the question of catapults had been reserved. They ought, moreover, to inform the Executive Committee of their agreements before publishing them. He did not think, as a matter of principle, that they should issue details.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that it would be wise to issue some *communiqué*, and that they might say that they had made considerable progress in the Technical Committee as to what classes of vessels should not be considered as subject to limitation by the Conference, but that the details were still subject to careful consideration.

After discussion, the following *communiqué* was issued:

"Very satisfactory progress was made by the Technical Committee to-day on the important question of deciding the particular types of vessels of small combatant value that shall be excluded from limitation to be agreed upon at the Conference.

"The proceedings showed a marked desire on the part of the different delegations to meet each other's views on the various points under discussion.

"The Committee will meet again at 10.30 to-morrow to discuss the question of the cruiser class."

The Committee adjourned at 5.30 p.m.

The geographical position of Great Britain made the number of cruisers a very vital question. They had felt that they would be satisfied with 15 10,000-ton cruisers or any other number that might be arranged by agreement and then, if they could get an agreement for a lower maximum tonnage for all cruisers outside that particular type, they would state a definite number of smaller cruisers.

They had considered a figure of 15 10,000-ton cruisers, or 8-inch cruisers approximating 10,000 tons to be agreed upon, and 55 small cruisers for which they would agree to a lower maximum tonnage and a 6-inch gun armament. If it was later agreed that mine-layers and small aircraft carriers should be included in this they would ask for five more to cover this.

This would amount to a total of 15 10,000-ton cruisers and 60 small type, and their proposal was that the maximum tonnage of the smaller type should be 7,500 and the maximum armament a 6-inch gun. There were, of course, a certain number of cruisers already in existence which were not 10,000 tons and which did not come within the proposed limit of 7,500. These were the Furutakas, the Omahas, with 6-inch guns, and the British 8-inch B class. There were also several British cruisers of various ages which would be included in either class by agreement for the term of their life.

Rear-Admiral JONES asked what limit of total tonnage was proposed for the 60 small cruisers

The CHAIRMAN explained that here lay a great difficulty. Great Britain definitely required numbers of cruisers in order to provide cover over large distances, but if other countries were to build large ones up to 10,000 tons, Great Britain would necessarily need to increase the size of her own cruisers.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he understood that Great Britain wanted 60 smaller cruisers with a maximum limit of 7,500 tons. This would produce an enormous cruiser tonnage which would hardly be a real limitation. He therefore asked: Was it intended to fix a total tonnage for the smaller class?

The CHAIRMAN asked if this meant that they should not build up to their total numbers in the maximum tonnage.

Rear-Admiral JONES felt that 60 cruisers of 7,500 tons and a total cruiser tonnage of 600,000 was no limitation.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that at Washington it was decided not to limit the total tonnage of cruisers except that their maximum tonnage should not exceed 10,000 and their guns 8 inches. Great Britain now took a big step further in proposing to limit the numbers allowed to be built.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that this new limitation was of little practical use. Their idea was to bring the total tonnage down as low as possible.

The CHAIRMAN said that this figure had not been arrived at as something to bargain with but was definitely what had always been intended. They had always considered this the minimum cruiser force with which they could be satisfied. In the war they had had something like 137 cruisers, and these had not been sufficient.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation quite realised Great Britain's demand for numbers of cruisers. The figure presented at first at Washington by the American delegation was accepted by the British and was considerably smaller than this. No nation could really compare what it required in peace-time with what it would need in case of war.

The CHAIRMAN said that he thought that the proposals at Washington were that there should be 450,000 tons of cruisers and destroyers together.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that this meant auxiliary surface craft.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was nearly the same as the proposals for this Conference when divided up. Great Britain had said that they could not agree to such an allocation of surface craft and must reserve the right to build any cruisers necessary for security. They were now definitely giving a number, the minimum necessary to protect communications with the Dominions, some of which were so far away as to be almost isolated. He suggested that this figure was not really as large as it appeared.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe wished to point out that this figure of 600,000 tons was entirely due to the fact that the 10,000-ton cruiser had been agreed to at Washington. If the British number of 70 was translated into 5,000-ton ships, the total would be brought down to 350,000 tons, *i.e.*, somewhere near the United States proposal.

Rear-Admiral JONES pointed out that any amount of tonnage in 5,000-ton cruisers would be practically of no value to the United States.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe agreed, but said that it would have been of value to Great Britain had the 10,000-ton cruiser not existed and thus forced their tonnage requirements up.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if they could restrict the number of large cruisers to something definite agreed to by each Power and to restrict other cruisers by having a lower tonnage, it would not be so very large.

Rear-Admiral JONES fully realised that it was possible to limit the total tonnage down until the individual unit became impracticable. He understood from Mr. Balfour's statement at the

The CHAIRMAN reminded the Committee that the subject before them was the cruiser class, which was being discussed separately with the agreement of the Japanese delegation, but without prejudice to the two types, cruisers and destroyers, being ultimately taken together if desired.

As regards the provisional agenda, the British delegation were ready to discuss these items in any order, but it would appear that the first one should be taken first, since they had made a definite proposal that there should be two types of cruisers. They should endeavour to agree upon the allocation of the large cruisers, and later upon the smaller craft.

The reason for the suggestion that there should be two types was a desire to lessen expenditure by scaling down the size of armaments in this particular type of vessel. Since the Washington Treaty had fixed the maximum tonnage of cruisers at 10,000 tons and the armaments to a gun not exceeding 8 inches in calibre, nearly every Power had been laying down powerful cruisers reaching very nearly up to these limits. Their object was to agree on a definite number or total tonnage of these powerful cruisers, and then, after agreement on a definite number, to consider the possibility of agreeing upon limits of tonnage and gun power for the smaller and less expensive cruisers.

It would be well if the other delegations would state whether they were agreeable to having two types, as this was a preliminary question.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American proposal contemplated a total tonnage of the cruiser type, it being left to the discretion of a Power to build within that total tonnage according to her needs. They were opposed to two types, as the small type of cruiser was of little value to them owing to their situation. They consequently preferred total tonnage in a class, and from the point of view of economy it appeared that a total tonnage built in smaller types was more expensive than a total tonnage built in larger types. Moreover, the cost of maintenance was higher for the greater number of small types, as well as the cost of construction.

Captain TOYODA asked what was meant by two types, and whether it was proposed gradually to decrease the maximum tonnage of cruisers and to abolish the 10,000-ton type.

The CHAIRMAN explained that this was not necessarily so. The idea was to agree on total tonnage or number of big cruisers, and later consider cruisers of 7,500 tons and under with the 6-inch gun and decide how many would be required.

Captain TOYODA understood that they would be free to build any ships under 7,500 tons. By the Washington Treaty they could build any ship up to 10,000 tons, *e.g.* 7,500 or 8,000-ton ships, according to the requirements of the country, and he did not see why there was a need of having two types now, and would be glad to have further explanations.

The CHAIRMAN desired, first, to refer to one or two points raised by Admiral Jones. They recognised that the larger type of cruiser was very useful to the United States, but a 7,500-ton cruiser, Washington standard displacement, was by no means a small cruiser. At the same time, from the technical point of view, a well-balanced ocean-going cruiser of about 7,500 tons could not really be fitted with anything bigger than a 6-inch gun.

The British view, from the point of view of economy, was that, though perhaps cheaper to build a small number of large cruisers than a large number of small cruisers, the geographical position and responsibility of Great Britain made it essential that she should have a large number of cruisers. It would be very difficult if other nations would only build cruisers of about 10,000 tons displacement, and they were naturally trying to get large cruisers definitely limited and a separate limit put upon the smaller cruisers, owing to their great need for a large number. It would be much less expensive to have a definite limitation as to the number of large cruisers and a total tonnage of the smaller ones. He would ask Admiral Jones to give some idea as to why an approximately 7,500-ton cruiser would fail to meet the needs of the United States.

Rear-Admiral JONES recalled that the basis of discussion must necessarily be on the question of relative proportion. They had hitherto simply studied limitation by total tonnage in a class, and they could not say offhand whether a 7,500-ton cruiser which had a certain radius of action would meet all their requirements.

If the British and Japanese delegations would furnish a complete statement as to the types desired — the displacement, the ages, the armament and the numbers required, with a total tonnage in each of the two classes — they would be glad to study how the two methods of reaching an equitable limitation could be reconciled.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation would be ready to state their exact requirements, but that he hoped that other delegations would also do this.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation had stated their proposal as based on total tonnage. They were prepared to make this as low as any other Power would accept, and had named something from 250,000 to 300,000 tons in the cruiser class. They thought that, within this proposition, a fair distribution could be found.

Captain TOYODA said that he agreed that all countries should reserve their right to build any ship within a limit of total tonnage up to 10,000 tons. They would be prepared to reduce the tonnage of cruisers to 7,500 or 8,000 tons if this did not limit the armament, and they would agree to have two types, since the larger type of cruiser was extremely expensive. They would prefer to discuss armament separately.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood that the United States would be satisfied with from 25 to 30 10,000-ton cruisers, but would like to know the British requirements as regards the question of having two types.

Captain TOYODA said that they were ready to do this if it involved lowering the tonnage from 10,000 to something like 7,500 or 8,000.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the question might well be deferred.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he agreed, but could not accept the Japanese proposal that acceptance of a smaller type would involve the abolition of the 10,000-ton cruiser. He was, however, ready to consider the possibility of having two classes.

The CHAIRMAN said that, as the 10,000-ton cruisers already built would last at least 20 years, they might leave that question for the future. They could take it for granted that such cruisers would remain in existence.

Captain TOYODA felt that, if Admiral Jones were ready to consider two classes on condition that the 10,000-ton cruiser be not abolished, there was no necessity to allocate a maximum tonnage, and if by the Washington Treaty they were free to build up to 10,000 tons, there was no need to have two types.

The CHAIRMAN said that the idea was to limit these very powerful ships as they had already limited capital ships.

Captain EGERTON suggested to Captain Toyoda that, as 10,000-ton cruisers would not be scrapped and would last for a longer period than the agreement made here, there was no object in raising this particular difficulty.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI asked if the 10,000-ton cruiser would finally be abolished and that those now in existence would be the last.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was thought advantageous to endeavour to obtain agreement to a definite limit in numbers for the 10,000-ton 8-inch cruiser, and that this cruiser would be kept during the life of the agreement reached by this Conference. This was the original proposal, but it was not a rigid one, and the subject could well be discussed.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that it was unnecessary to set up another type, as each nation could build cruisers of any tonnage less than 10,000 tons according to its needs.

The CHAIRMAN felt that this would mean that all nations would lay down 10,000-ton cruisers, and only if other nations laid down something smaller would Great Britain be free to do so. By treating such heavy cruisers as a class apart they could agree to limit them, which would be a considerable step forward.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI agreed that every nation had a certain limit, and that if, under her total-tonnage allocation, a certain Power wished to build the largest type only, she could hardly be prevented.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if they agreed to a total tonnage for vessels below 10,000 tons, it would mean that nations requiring the greatest number would build a smaller type than those requiring a small number.

He would suggest that this question be deferred until the United States had considered the British proposal with a view to modification.

Rear-Admiral JONES was not quite sure when his calculations would be finished. The question was really rather theoretical, as a large number of the existing ships would have to be taken into account during the life of the Treaty, and into any status which they fixed or counter-propositions that they made.

The CHAIRMAN understood that this was so for the term of the Treaty. He had hoped to agree to maximum tonnages, total tonnages, calibre of guns, age-limits, and so on for the future, so that the question of how it would affect existing navies would be considered afterwards.

They would all want certain ships and classes of ships to be exempted from the age-limit because of their state, and there would be an attitude of give-and-take. It would be simpler to lay down principles for the future than to endeavour to fit principles to present conditions which were rather theoretical and had nothing to do with requirements.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he would hate to go before the world and lay down a principle for the future which was going to recognise the projection of 600,000 tons of cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN said that this followed the Washington precedent where they had dealt with capital ships. They had agreed, in spite of their different types and tonnages, that the capital ship of the future should not exceed 35,000 tons nor have guns of more than 16 inches. There had been very few ships which fitted those principles, and they had then proceeded to consider a fair apportionment, and they made a readjustment of their 22 ships of various tonnages in order to bring it down in 1936 to 15 capital ships as laid down by the Washington Treaty.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he did not wish to adjust future tonnages to anything like 600,000 tons. The Washington proposition had been laid down after a study of conditions, and they had scrapped a number of ships beyond the 35,000-ton limit. They would prefer not to project 600,000 tons into the future until they had considered the question of meeting the existing situation with themselves and with Japan during the life of this Treaty.

Washington Conference that Great Britain had agreed to the figures proposed by the United States at first and that certain other questions had then arisen to change the situation and therefore the auxiliary surface craft were unlimited. He rather thought that the 10,000-ton limit had been arrived at from some existing cruisers of the British *Hawkins* class.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe said that at that time most of the British cruisers were about 5,000 tons or less, so that, if Great Britain had accepted 450,000 tons total surface tonnage, it would have been something near what he had just stated. He would ask Admiral Jones whether, because the United States needed vessels of a large radius of action, they could not obtain this with ships mounting 6-inch instead of 8-inch guns.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he did not know down to what displacement radius of action could be obtained. There were certain 8-inch-gun ships in existence, but they had not laid down many because they had hoped to come to an agreement not to build up to a large tonnage.

They recognised that certain existing conditions had influenced the acceptance of the Washington Treaty figure, but they must now consider the present situation. They would take the British figures and give them consideration, though the total tonnage appeared to be a very large amount.

The CHAIRMAN said that their total tonnage had greatly increased owing to the fashion of building cruisers nearly up to Washington standard with an 8-inch gun, though they would have preferred a 6-inch gun limit at Washington. They hoped to limit these very powerful cruisers, and he would ask Admiral Jones why a 6,000- or 7,000-ton cruiser was of no value to the United States since the radius of action was not materially affected, as Washington standards did not include fuel or feed-water.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that it was possible to get radius of action with a 7,000-ton cruiser and a 6-inch gun, but that they proposed the limitation of total tonnage, and they must finally agree whether the British numbers could be got within that limitation.

The United States also had long lines of communication, depended on overseas communications, and also depended upon ships to guard her commerce and to deny the sea to enemy commerce and to control neutral commerce — questions which were inseparably interlocked.

The CHAIRMAN regretted if he had misunderstood Admiral Jones. He realised that nations had a right to state what they felt their minimum requirements to be and was glad to know that the United States would consider the possibility of two types, a limit in the big cruisers, with a total-tonnage limit in the smaller type.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that the American delegation might take and study this question with a view to a counter-proposition which might bring down the enormous tonnage and put everyone on a fair and equitable basis.

They were anxious to study this question and to reach a decision in the light of present requirements.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe pointed out that, to bring the British requirements down to a total displacement of 300,000 tons, assuming that the total of the Washington 10,000-ton cruisers was 15, would mean that the British cruisers would be of something less than 3,000 tons displacement.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that their proposal was not a rigid one involving a necessary reduction to 300,000 tons but was for purpose of discussion. Certainly a limit of 600,000 tons was far above what they had contemplated.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe said that the chief thing was to keep the number of big cruisers as low as possible, which would make more tonnage available for other cruisers.

Rear-Admiral JONES said he understood this, and that the American delegation would endeavour to meet the British views, as they desired a real limitation.

Admiral Earl JELlicoe wondered whether it would be possible for any delegation to say what was the smallest cruiser which would be useful to them, and whether they might study that proposal as well as the question of the largest.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood the United States delegation would consider whether they could agree to a smaller type of cruiser and at what tonnage. He thought that they understood the British view. The British delegation felt that the way to reduce a large total-tonnage figure was to limit the number of bigger cruisers and agree to a smaller maximum tonnage for less powerful craft.

Captain TOYODA said that they had expected to discuss that day merely the characteristics of each ship and not questions of the forces likely to be required.

The CHAIRMAN said that he did not wish to press for any information about numbers if this was undesirable. They could not, however, consider the minimum individual displacement, ages or armament until they had agreed that there should be two types of cruisers. The United States delegation felt that the British numbers were such that they would consider whether they could reduce the British total tonnage by a possible combination of the large and small type. They could hardly discuss details until a counter-proposal had been received. He only asked the Japanese delegation if they had any ideas as to the question of having two types.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would not press the point as regards the 10,000-ton cruiser, and Admiral KOBAYASHI agreed that, up to 1936, two types could remain.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that this was exactly what it was desired to study, whether these two types could be accepted and what types could be accepted during the life of the Treaty, in order to find a lower total tonnage than 600,000 tons.

Captain TOYODA said that he understood that they would have two types of a lower tonnage from 10,000 to 8,000 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would not necessarily abolish the 10,000-ton cruiser. This decision would be made later.

Captain TOYODA agreed to consider two types for the term of this Conference.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested a free and complete liaison between the various delegations to give full information in this enquiry. At present they knew that the British wanted 15 ships of 10,000 tons and 60 ships of a maximum tonnage of 7,500. In order to study this from the situation of the *status quo* and the life of the Treaty, there must be a full exchange of information.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would furnish each other with a statement of the cruiser force they expected to have available in 1936. The closest liaison would exist in order that the information should be perfectly clear.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they could not state what their Navy would be in 1936 except what their Navy would be under their proposal of 300,000 tons. It would then be, if they could build up to it by that time, 23 10,000-ton cruisers and then 7,500-ton cruisers. The latter were now in existence.

The CHAIRMAN said that under the British proposal they would have 15 8-inch cruisers, a certain number of 7,500-ton cruisers in place of some old cruisers, and still a certain number of old cruisers of various tonnages.

Captain EGERTON suggested a definite statement of what was built, being built and projected, and what would be laid down on an average for the years intervening between the present projected programme and the year 1936, together with what they would scrap in the intervening years. The result would be the existing fleet at that date.

The British Government had some comparatively new ships of less than 10,000 tons which would all be included in the complete statement.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would not be able to state the tonnage of the new ships without knowing on what basis they were going to renew cruisers. According to their proposal, they would stop when they had 15 8-inch cruisers and would then start replacing with smaller cruisers. On the American statement they would go on with 10,000-ton cruisers.

Captain EGERTON said that this year they would, according to their programme, lay down one 10,000-ton cruiser and two 8,300-ton cruisers. If the lower limit was agreed to, their building programme for this year would be reduced to the new standard, but under the American proposal this remained at 10,000 tons.

Rear-Admiral JONES felt that the issue was being lost sight of. The proposal was simply one of 250,000 tons to 300,000 tons in the cruiser class. If each nation built as they wished above existing tonnage this would naturally last longer than the life of the Treaty. If they decided on 300,000 tons they could not build under their proposal more than 234,000 tons in the cruiser strength during the life of the Treaty.

Their proposal was on a total-tonnage basis, and on a two-tonnage basis the British Government had stated what they would wish for: 15 10,000-ton cruisers and, if necessary, 60 7,500-ton cruisers.

The British Government, however, would not have sufficient tonnage to expend in building 60 such cruisers during the life of the Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that this was so.

Rear-Admiral JONES proposed to study on the proposed basis how they could accept a true classification basis which, if it reached 600,000 tons, would not be a real limitation. If they could find such a basis this would be the object of their study, and, in consequence, he would like a perfectly free liaison between the different delegations.

This study would, however, be impossible if the Japanese delegation insisted upon the abolition of the 10,000-ton cruiser.

Mr. SABURI said that the Japanese view was that they asked whether, when their own 10,000-ton cruisers were ready to be replaced, the new ones would be 10,000-ton or 7,500-ton cruisers. As, however, the larger cruisers would have a longer life than that of the Treaty, the question was rather theoretical.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they could not establish the principle of the abolition of the 10,000-ton cruiser, which would not take place for 20 years.

The CHAIRMAN said that this question would not be able to be reopened in the Committee for some days. He felt that the question of submarines would not be so difficult, and they were only

The CHAIRMAN suggested that it would be better to decide first of all what the period of the Treaty should be.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the original proposal was that it should be coterminous with the Washington Treaty, possibly expiring in 1936. The question whether it would continue after 1936 would normally be decided in 1934. The future was as yet undecided, and the best thing to do was to take the present status and study whether they could manage to accept the proposal of two classes under the present status during the life of this Treaty.

Captain EGERTON asked on what age-limit they proposed to assess the life of existing ships in order to arrive at a status in 1936.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they proposed an age-limit for this cruiser class of 20 years.

Captain EGERTON said that the Japanese were in favour of 16 years. The age-limit for existing ships had not been discussed. Their proposals were for future ships.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that existing ships must be considered. They did not desire 600,000 tons in addition to the existing ships.

Captain EGERTON pointed out that they had to decide what the age-limit was to be for ships at present in the fleet in order to see what ships would exist in 1936.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American proposal was 20 years.

The CHAIRMAN asked if it would be possible to decide upon the age-limit of ships before deciding upon anything else. He felt that Admiral Jones's suggestion was a very important one, and the British delegation would also work out details upon it.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that there were three suggested age-limits for the life of a cruiser. They might perhaps take these and work out this point on the basis of the probable life of the Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would have to work on an age-limit which would govern them all.

Rear-Admiral JONES suggested that it might be worked out on a common age-limit on the basis of the life of this Treaty. He agreed with the Chairman that the present British age-limit of 24 years for cruisers was rather a long life for existing ships.

The CHAIRMAN said that they could discuss an age-limit for existing ships and agree upon an age-limit for this calculation.

Admiral KOBAYASHI said that he was willing to discuss this.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they were not necessarily trying to get an age-limit eventually for new construction but to agree upon an age-limit basis on which they could work out what they were trying to get at now.

The CHAIRMAN said that this would be upon what ships were in existence during the period of the Treaty. The United States proposed to discuss whether to consider the total tonnage or numbers for cruisers only for the time of this Treaty, and to see whether this would not enable an agreement to be reached for the next eight years on something smaller than the original proposal, which had been for the future.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI asked whether this meant that they were to study the table of ships to decide which ships should be kept.

Rear-Admiral JONES explained that they were ready to discuss as a fixed thing what the age-limits should be for this Treaty, both for future construction and for the consideration of existing ships. If such ships could not be replaced under an age-limit except by later special agreement, then they would be considered as in the strength during the life of this agreement.

He thought that a consideration of the replacement programme would come later. They might now study the situation under the British proposal.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood the Japanese delegation had some difficulty in deciding the age-limit for existing ships. There were a large number of British ships built in one year, and, in order not to have to lay down too many cruisers in one year to replace these, they had already decided that in regard to old ships they should spread their replacement, replacing some of their old ships earlier than the average age and some of them a little later. They might therefore, instead of deciding a definite age-limit for existing ships, prepare a statement of what they proposed to replace between now and 1936 and what the state of the Navy would be then.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed that this would be a good basis upon which to work.

Referring to the Japanese statement that they would not consider the possibility of two classes unless the abolition of the 10,000-ton cruiser was included, if this decision was fixed there would be no point in making all this study.

The CHAIRMAN agreed, but felt that the Japanese would agree to reconsider this question, as it was quite impossible to decide upon the abolition of the 10,000-ton cruiser, most of which were in a comparatively new state and could not well be scrapped.

Admiral KOBAYASHI agreed to the two types of cruisers

FOURTH SESSION.

Geneva, Wednesday, June 29th, 1927.

Present:

<i>United States of America :</i>	Rear-Admiral H. P. JONES. Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG. Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD. Captain A. ANDREWS. Captain W. W. SMYTH. Commander H. C. TRAIN.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions :</i>	
Great Britain:	Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD. Captain W. A. EGERTON. Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.
Canada:	Commodore W. HOSE.
Australia:	Captain H. J. FEAKES.
New Zealand:	Admiral of the Fleet Earl JELlicoe.
<i>Japan :</i>	Mr. Sadao SABURI. Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI. Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA. Captain Teikichi HORI. Captain Teijiro TOYODA. Captain Mineichi KOGA. Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI. Commander Naokuni NOMURA. Commander Ichiro SATO. Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.
<i>Secretariat-General :</i>	Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE. Captain H. R. MOORE. Mr. SHIRATORI. Mr. H. R. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information :</i>	Commander DELEUZE.
<i>Italian Unofficial Observers :</i>	Captain RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that that day's subject was destroyers, and he would begin by saying that they recognised the reservation by the Japanese delegation of the right finally to discuss the question of cruisers and destroyers together.

He thought that it might be possible, without taking any decisions, to discuss some of the limitations for the destroyer class which would make clearer their ideas in the original proposal on this class and bring to light any difficulties in reaching a basis for discussion. They might, perhaps, discuss questions such as the maximum limit of tonnage for this class, the age-limit for

waiting for the Japanese to agree to a limitation of all submarines. He wondered when it would be possible to discuss this matter.

Captain TOYODA said that he hoped he would have a cabled reply in three days.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that this study would take up a considerable part of the delegation, including a large proportion of those who were members of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN said that they could produce a statement in twenty-four hours.

Rear-Admiral JONES was not sure when they would be able to produce their answer as to the two-basis discussion.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was very desirable to proceed with the discussion of some other class of vessel, and he suggested they should next discuss destroyers. Although he was adverse from coming to any final decision on the destroyer question until a decision on submarines had been reached, he thought that there were certain questions which they could discuss in Committee—for example, the question of a maximum tonnage, minimum tonnage, the size and calibre of the gun and the age-limit of the destroyer, without going so far as to discuss the actual allocation of tonnage. It would be well to consider the various classes of ships in this way, as they would doubtless encounter in each a certain difficulty which would mean slight delay before they could complete the subject. A preliminary discussion such as they had had that day on cruisers was very necessary, so that there would be no delay in getting information from their respective Governments on questions of disagreement. He would therefore suggest at any rate one meeting on each class of ship to discover the points agreed upon and those which would require further information from home.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed that they might go ahead the next day to exchange views on the question of destroyers with a view to discussing and bringing out the points. They could not very well take a decision, however, as a number of people would be working out another problem.

It was then agreed to have a preliminary discussion on destroyers the next day in order to find out what difficulties existed.

The CHAIRMAN asked that the meeting might be put at 10.45 a.m. the next day, as there was a meeting of the British Empire representatives in view of M. Lapointe's recent arrival from Canada and that of the Irish Free State Ministers.

It was decided to meet at 10.45 a.m. on the morrow.

The question of a *communiqué* to the Press was then discussed, and *it was decided* to issue the following *communiqué*:

"The meeting this morning was for the preliminary examination of the proposal relating to the cruiser class of vessels.

"The British proposed that this class be divided into two classes — an 8-inch cruiser of maximum displacement of 10,000 tons and a 6-inch cruiser of maximum displacement of about 7,500 tons.

"Both the Japanese and American delegations requested the necessary time to examine this proposal in the light of the effect it would have on the navies of each Power concerned during the life of the Treaty.

"The Committee will meet again at 10.45 a.m. to-morrow for a preliminary discussion on destroyers."

The Committee adjourned at 1.15 p.m.

Rear-Admiral JONES asked if the British delegation would be prepared to give their ideas as to the total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Japanese delegation desired that the total tonnage of any class should not be discussed in this Committee.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he was merely anxious to have the figures proposed by the British delegation.

The CHAIRMAN and Captain EGERTON said that this was 207,200 tons of destroyers and leaders, which was below the maximum figure proposed by the American delegation.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would now discuss the maximum displacement of the destroyer type, for which the British proposal was 1,400 tons, with a maximum size of gun not exceeding 5 inches and a replacement age limit of 20 years.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that they would prefer to put the limit on the size of destroyers themselves at 1,500 tons and for destroyer leaders at 2,000 tons. Their suggestion as to 3,000 tons was in view of the fact that there were certain destroyer leaders in existence of somewhat over 2,500 tons. They would accept the limitation of 5 inches for the calibre of gun. As regards age, they felt that 20 years was rather high for a destroyer, owing to the powerful machinery carried in a lightly constructed hull. They suggested 16 to 17 years, preferably 16 as being rather more economical, especially where a destroyer was used a great deal, and those in the proposed tonnage would be in practically continuous use.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese idea was that the maximum displacement of destroyers should be 1,500 tons with a calibre of gun of not more than 5 inches. They would have preferred 12 years, but they would be prepared to increase the age limit to 16 years for destroyers. They had no view to express as regards leaders, in which they had no experience.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British Government had made a special study of the ways and means of preserving destroyers by a system of regular refits, regular dockings, and inspection of machinery. They had concluded that they could keep a destroyer efficient for 20 years if at some time in her life she was given a really thorough refit. The object of extending the life of a vessel was to reduce the expense of replacement, and during the long period of peace which they hoped would follow, the longer they could make their vessels last the cheaper it would be. They felt, however, that there would not be great difficulty in reaching an age limit upon which they would all agree.

There appeared to be agreement on the maximum calibre of gun, but there was a difference between the British and United States delegations on the maximum tonnage of the leaders. Perhaps the Japanese delegation would consider this question and give some opinion on the point.

This would not necessarily mean that Japan need build leaders, but she would know that neither Britain nor the United States could build them bigger than a certain tonnage.

Captain EGERTON wished to explain that the British figure of 207,200 tons was calculated on the basis of the British proposal for displacement of the destroyer and the leader. If a bigger tonnage in destroyer or leader was agreed upon, it would necessarily increase this total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was impossible to say what would be the total tonnage without knowing the description of these ships, though of course they could give the number. As regards destroyers, there was not much difference between their proposed tonnage and that suggested by the other delegations. They would be able to state definitely at the next meeting whether they could give the figure.

It was not desired to reach definite decisions at this meeting, but they might record a considerable measure of agreement in discussing the description of these vessels.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he would agree to this.

The CHAIRMAN asked Admiral Kobayashi whether he was prepared to discuss total tonnage in each class in the Committee without making a final decision before reference to the Executive Committee. Was there any objection to a statement or discussion of their requirements of total tonnage in this Committee? The British and United States delegations had stated what total tonnage they felt they would require.

Captain EGERTON said that, as a Technical Committee, it was in no way necessary to put up these numbers for bargaining purposes. This had not been done, and would not be the right policy.

Captain TOYODA felt that the question was too great to be discussed here.

Captain EGERTON said that the delegations might express their ideas in order to make a recommendation to the Executive Committee, and that the Japanese experts would necessarily have to make such a recommendation to their higher authorities.

Captain TOYODA said that they could talk this matter over provisionally, but that they had not made any preparations to discuss it now.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would like to decide when, after the exchange of information, they would be able to meet and decide on a recommendation to the Executive Committee on the destroyer question.

future construction, and whether there should be two definite maxima. He would now state briefly the British proposals and what he understood to be those of the other delegations, subject to correction by them.

Broadly speaking, the British proposed a maximum tonnage for the destroyer leader and a maximum tonnage for the destroyer, that they should discuss the number of destroyers in each category, and that there should be an age-limit and a limit to the size of the guns carried. They would, however, be prepared to agree, if the other delegations preferred, to discuss the question in terms of total tonnage rather than numbers.

The United States proposed that the destroyer class should be any vessel under 3,000 tons, an agreed allocation by total tonnage on a 5:5:3 ratio, and that the British and United States should have from 200,000 to 250,000 tons of destroyers.

The Japanese proposal was briefly that the destroyer strength should be gauged by the total tonnage actually existing in each navy at the present date.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American proposal was for tonnage between 600 and 3,000 and not for any tonnage below 3,000. They would prefer their present thesis of total tonnage as a basis of limitation, as it would be easier to find out what a building programme was going to cost by dealing in tonnages rather than in numbers. They were, however, ready to study the possibility of reconciling the theses of limitation by numbers, and limitation by total tonnage, though they did strongly advocate eventual limitation by total tonnage, by which was meant the total tonnage of the class. They felt it better to reach an idea along this line before discussing detailed questions as to the types in the class or the limitation of individual tonnages in the class and calibre of guns. They were, however, prepared to discuss the questions as brought up.

Captain TOYODA said that in the Japanese proposals the words "existing strengths" meant the destroyers built and building and implied the use of categories.

They would prefer a discussion by total tonnage to one by numbers for the sake of simplicity, but they would rather like to discuss the matter together with Class A, as the Chairman had suggested at the beginning. They could separately discuss total tonnage of destroyers but would like to reserve the idea of discussing it together with Class A.

The CHAIRMAN said that, as the United States and Japanese delegations preferred to discuss this question on the basis of total tonnage, the British delegation would have no objection. He did not think that it was proposed to discuss what the total tonnage would actually be before going on to the details, and wondered if there would be any objection to discussing the question as to whether there were to be two types, involving a total tonnage of leaders and a total tonnage of destroyers.

He would explain that, if there was a total tonnage taken together of both types agreed upon, they might agree that only a proportion of the whole tonnage could be leaders, i.e., vessels of larger displacement which might be allowed a certain percentage of the whole tonnage, e.g., 10 per cent.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation would very much prefer to discuss the question as to the limitation of the class on a total tonnage basis in order later to discuss the characteristics of vessels within that class which could hardly be agreed upon until tentative arrangements had been made on the total tonnage limitation. The primary object as it affected security, taxation and competition was really total tonnage, and they therefore proposed that this be dealt with first before the subordinate decisions on the type within the class and the characteristics and divisions of vessels. He therefore suggested that that morning they exchange views on the ideas of the characteristics of the vessels and the limitation as to the tonnage of each, but they could not then come to a definite decision on this point, and they would prefer to study the situation in the light of proposals which might arise.

The CHAIRMAN said that his main desire was that the work should proceed. He would, however, have preferred that they should know the type of vessel they were going to discuss, and the limits between which they could be built, the size of armament and so forth, before discussing the numbers, or rather the total tonnage.

Captain TOYODA said that he realised the importance of the total tonnage question but felt that it was one which ought rather to be discussed in the Executive Committee. It might be more advisable for the Technical Committee to confine its discussions to the characteristics, maximum tonnage, guns, or age-limit of destroyers.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation were not averse to exchanging views as to the individual tonnage of units, age and so on, but he would ask that no decisions be made that morning as certain members were absent engaged on other work.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood that the Japanese delegation were not prepared to say anything about total tonnage. He hardly felt it desirable that one nation should state their total tonnage when another was not in the position to do so.

Rear-Admiral JONES pointed out that the American delegation had already stated theirs.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British total tonnage would be considerably under the figure proposed by the United States. He assumed that there was no objection to discussing an exchange of information as to the description of the vessels, and proposed that they begin by discussing an exchange of views as to the maximum displacement of the destroyer type.

delegation were more anxious to get along faster than they were, but he felt it unwise to press for a decision when a delegation wished for time to study a proposal that had been put forward. The decisions must not be forced.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that he had said that in that day's discussions they could state that there seemed very little divergence on some points, but that no decisions were being taken. The delegations would consider points of disagreement, and they would not go further than this. He wished, however, to know how soon they would be able to take up the question of destroyers again in order to reach a decision.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that his delegation were ready to take up the question again on the morrow. Their point was that the decisions on details were really subordinate to those regarding the final total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would be very ready to discuss the question again on the morrow and to come to decisions if the Japanese would be ready so soon.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that in these questions there were two theses to discuss, the British being to show national requirements. He rather preferred Admiral Jones' proposal, as any discussion of naval strength must involve questions of ratios. It was difficult to discuss these points until the chief delegates had decided in what way they would proceed, as tonnage desired, etc., related to bigger political questions of ratios, which he could hardly discuss here.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood that there was no objection to discussing an agreement on the details mentioned, but the actual total displacement in each category must first be discussed by the Executive Committee.

Captain TOYODA said that they would be ready to discuss this question on that basis on the morrow. These big questions ought to be discussed by the chief delegates, the Technical Committee dealing only with minor matters, as at Washington.

The CHAIRMAN said that there seemed no objection to discussing details the next day, and, if possible, arriving at some agreement as a Technical Committee with regard to the points raised, without discussing total allocation.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would meet for this purpose at 10.30 a.m. the next day. He would ask the Japanese delegation if they had any more information about submarines.

Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI said that they were waiting for a cable.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might deal with submarines the day after the morrow, when the Japanese would probably be in a position to exchange views.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation might then be able to take up a further exchange of views on cruisers.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would settle the next day the programme for the following day.

It was decided to issue the following communiqué to the Press:

"The Technical Committee had under discussion the destroyer class, and a preliminary exchange of views on the characteristics of this class of vessel for future construction revealed a considerable measure of agreement between the three delegations.

"The Committee agreed to meet again to-morrow at 10.30 a.m."

The Committee adjourned at 12.10 p.m.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he had understood that that day's discussion was to be confined to a provisional exchange of views so that they would have something more to work upon when they came to discuss a recommendation to the Plenary Committee. It had been said that each delegation had now stated their requirements. The United States delegation must always come back to their original thesis that all requirements above a certain absolute minimum necessarily regardless of the three Powers must be on the relative situation and not so much on the absolute situation, which they believed could not be determined in reality.

The CHAIRMAN asked if they were only to consider what their relative situations would be in any particular.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he had not entirely said this. The American requirements were very largely *vis-à-vis* certain situations or *vis-à-vis* any situation that might arise between the three Powers. Though there was for all Powers a minimum below which they could not come regardless of each other, the final decision must be one of the relative situation.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was unable to discuss this. The British delegation was quite ready to state its absolute minimum requirements. This was not simply calculated on the existence of the three Powers taking part in the Conference. It must necessarily be affected by the general situation.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed, but said that there was a point where the rest of the world must be considered.

He would ask whether, if another Power stated her minimum requirements as greater than those of Great Britain, she would alter those already put down.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British requirements would not be altered in order to meet the minimum requirements of other nations even if these were above their own.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that this was not entirely the American attitude, which was and must be relative. He felt that this was the only general basis for an eventual decision.

The CHAIRMAN said that it would be very difficult to get anywhere in discussions if they were to be absolutely relative. In other words, the question ultimately worked out on a ratio.

Two persons might easily agree to wear the same patterns in their clothing, but they would necessarily need different sizes, and the present situation was rather similar.

Rear-Admiral JONES felt that this simile did not fit the case. The situation with the navies of the world was that, if one nation built more ships, other countries felt that they needed more, and the matter became a race. This they wished to stop and to come to a level where agreement might be found as to the relations which should exist between the three Powers represented.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British proposals were founded upon the fact that, in some particulars, one nation required a greater proportion of one type of craft than another. All ships were not the same size, and the balance need not be disturbed because one Power built a comparatively large ship and another built two smaller ones.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the position to be considered was that existing between the different nations.

The CHAIRMAN said that, according to such a thesis, they could not as technical experts discuss any question whatever until the Powers concerned had agreed on a definite basis of strength in every particular.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that, as he had stated, this was the original American proposition that they should first decide the basis for the discussion of the whole question, and later be in a better position to discuss the details. This idea, however, had been abandoned.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the question had been raised in the Executive Committee, and that two delegations had considered that it would be better to discuss the details first.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the present discussion would be better carried on in the Executive Committee. They were now trying to arrange the general principles of an allotment in each individual class of vessel.

In arriving at any destroyer tonnage basis, they must keep in mind their proposal as to the transition period between the present status and the status to be agreed upon.

The CHAIRMAN agreed that, if they arrived at an agreement as to future strength of displacement or total tonnage or age limit and as to the method adopted and time taken to reach that status, there must be a long transition period with concessions to suit the convenience of any Power before reaching the future strength or status.

The question of whether they could discuss details for an agreement as to displacements, age-limits, maximum gun-power, and so forth, before tackling the big subject of allocation, was very important. They might make considerable progress on the details of these points without dealing with the actual allocation, but, if this was undesirable, they might refer the matter to the Executive Committee and explain the situation.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he understood, and thought the Japanese delegation were also of the opinion, that that morning's discussion was to be merely an exchange of views on these different questions rather than an attempt to reach decisions upon them. He did not believe any

and were therefore less offensive; they also were less expensive, and he was sure that it was desired to scale down wherever possible. The United States delegation had very rightly pointed out, with regard to the maximum tonnage of the leader, that their figure was rather higher than that of Great Britain because they considered the fact that other nations outside the Conference were building vessels of larger displacement than even they proposed. He hoped, however, that they would also remember that, in considering their relative needs with a view to cutting down in every way where they could attain agreement, it was a good plan to keep displacements lower even than that to which other nations were building, if only in the hope that they might follow this example. They should not be influenced too much by the fact that other nations happened to be building larger vessels, but should rather concentrate in getting agreement on a displacement which they thought was sufficient, remembering that there would have to be in the Treaty some proviso that, if other nations did not follow their example but built vessels much larger, they would have the right to ask to be excused or to meet to reconsider the question. He would ask the United States and Japanese delegations to give every consideration to this, and, if possible, to endeavour to agree to something slightly smaller than their original proposals.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he would first point out that the original American proposal of a maximum in this class of 3,000 tons was made as a tentative figure, as they had recognised the existence in the world of destroyer leaders approaching that figure. They had said yesterday that they were prepared to fix the maximum for destroyer leaders at less than this, but he would like it understood that their proposal of 3,000 tons as a maximum unit tonnage for this class was made not with any particular people in view but merely to cover a situation existing in the world.

They were ready to accept a reduction of that maximum size for destroyer leaders to 2,000 tons. Whether it would be advisable to lower the maximum unit tonnage of this Class B, which they had merely named the destroyer class, was a question to be considered on its own merits; but as to destroyers themselves and leaders, they had stated their readiness to accept maximum unit tonnages for these two types within the destroyer class, or Class B, and they here accepted the position regardless of what any other nations might have.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation had no experience as to the flotilla leader. They could not therefore state any figures, but it sounded reasonable to them not to have a very great difference of tonnage between the flotilla leader and the destroyer.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation agreed that they should endeavour to keep the leader class simply a large destroyer and not run the risk of her becoming a small cruiser. He would, however, be extremely glad if the Japanese delegation, having reached the conclusion, in view of the opinion expressed yesterday, that the displacement of the leader should only be slightly in excess of that of the destroyer, would state their views as to whether the figure should be either 2,000 or near the British proposal.

Perhaps, however, they would prefer the question of the destroyer displacement itself settled first, as they were very near agreement.

Captain TOYODA said that he would prefer this.

The CHAIRMAN wished to ask the United States if they were adamant on the question of the tonnage of the destroyer being 1,500 or whether they would be prepared to reduce this a little to meet the British proposal of 1,400 tons.

Rear-Admiral Jones said that it was realised that sea endurance in all units was a particular need of the United States, since any lines they had to consider on the sea were necessarily long ones, in view of the fact that they had no outlying distant bases, and, as far as he knew, did not intend to seek such. Therefore, in considering sea endurance or radius of action, they felt that to come below 1,500 tons would be a serious sacrifice and that, unless it was a case of absolute necessity, they did not feel that they could come below that point. He would like to point out that, while this extra 100 tons would give them a condition to suit their requirements, the extra tonnage in the limit which had been proposed amounted only to 14,000 tons on the number of destroyers, *i.e.*, equal to less than ten destroyers of maximum displacement.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the latest British design of destroyer was 1,320 tons, and he thought that the latest United States destroyer was a little over 1,200, so their proposals were a definite increase on what they were building at the moment.

Rear-Admiral JONES wished to correct the Chairman upon this point. The latest American design for destroyers, though none had yet been built, was 1,700 tons normal displacement, or about 1,500 standard displacement. This was the latest design to meet their requirements.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had quoted from the list of the latest destroyers built by the United States, which had been in 1921 to 1922.

Rear-Admiral JONES pointed out that this was a war design to meet war conditions.

The CHAIRMAN asked Admiral Kobayashi for his views with regard to the maximum displacement of the destroyer.

Captain TOYODA said that, though the difference was only a hundred tons, he felt that 1,500 tons was more reasonable from their own point of view.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation would reluctantly agree to a maximum tonnage of 1,500 tons.

FIFTH SESSION.

Geneva, Thursday, June 30th, 1927

Present:

United States of America:

Rear-Admiral H. P. JONES.
Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
Captain A. ANDREWS.
Captain W. W. SMYTH.
Commander H. C. TRAIN.
Commander H. H. FROST.

Great Britain and Dominions:

Great Britain:

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Captain W. A. EGERTON.
Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.

Canada:

Commodore W. HOSE.

Australia:

Captain H. J. FEAKES.

New Zealand:

Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.

Japan:

Mr. Sadao SABURI.
Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI.
Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
Captain Teikichi HORI.
Captain Teijiro TOYODA.
Captain Mineichi KOGA.
Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI.
Commander Naokuni NOMURA.
Commander Ichiro SATO.
Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.

Secretariat-General:

Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE.
Captain H. R. MOORE.
Mr. SHIRATORI.
Mr. H. R. HUSTON.

French Mission d'Information:

Commander DELEUZE.

Italian Unofficial Observers:

Captain RUSPOLI.
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that on the preceding day the Committee had reached agreement as to the size of gun for the destroyer type and had also exchanged opinions on the maximum tonnage and age limit of destroyers and leaders. He thought that that morning they might consider those opinions and perhaps reach definite agreement on a suitable figure for the maximum tonnage and age limit of this class of vessel.

In the British proposal, the maximum displacement for destroyers and leaders was based upon the strong desire to keep the limits low. Ships of a lower tonnage had a lower radius of action

He felt that it was more desirable to have a dividing line which would be the maximum unit tonnage in the smaller class, Class B. As regards the question of the most suitable dividing line, he would make a suggestion that, if the dividing line were, for instance, the maximum unit tonnage in the lower class (to be called, if desired, destroyer leaders), the total tonnage of that class could be used in destroyers rather than in destroyer leaders, only part of it being used for the latter.

The CHAIRMAN said that this depended upon whether they would agree to a maximum displacement for destroyers. With only the dividing line of their original proposal of 3,000 tons a Power might build the whole of its total tonnage in cruisers up to that tonnage if there was no maximum displacement for the destroyer. If this existed, however, together with a total tonnage, they could not build destroyers above that maximum displacement. He understood that Admiral Jones wished to revert to the original United States proposal that the dividing line between Classes A and B should be an agreed figure, which he suggested should be 3,000 tons. He understood that they did not wish a maximum displacement for the leader class but would be able to build them of any size up to 3,000 tons.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that this was of course their original proposal. Another question was whether they could agree on a dividing line between the destroyer class (which for them included the leaders) and the cruiser class. Though they had proposed 3,000 tons for the reason that certain vessels existed within that limit, the question was whether and to what point they should bring that dividing line down.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation proposed that this should be the maximum individual displacement of the leader.

Rear-Admiral JONES wanted to know if this meant that the dividing line between Classes A and B should be the maximum unit displacement in the destroyer class. Another question would then arise as to whether there would be a proposed minimum tonnage for the cruiser class.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation would not propose one.

Rear-Admiral JONES understood then that the minimum of the cruiser class would come down to practically the maximum of the class below.

This would raise a further question. They wanted to clear up in the mind of anyone any possibility of future charges as to bad faith. If, in the administration and organisation, any nation cared to build a small cruiser out of their cruiser tonnage or numbers and to use it in the administration of its destroyer flotillas, what would be the British view?

The CHAIRMAN said it would come out of their total approved tonnage, which they would use up by making such destroyer leaders. This would hardly complicate the issue but merely reduce the efficient cruiser tonnage available.

Rear-Admiral JONES thanked the Chairman for his patient and most satisfactory manner in dealing with these questions. He would like to ask one further question in order to be perfectly clear. Within the total tonnage of Class B or the destroyer class, was it to be understood that any types of vessel could be built to any displacement below the upper limit, provided only that the displacement limit of 1,500 tons be placed on destroyers? In other words, they would bring back to that class the same thing that they were putting in the cruiser class, so that, as long as they used up their tonnage, they could build any class of vessel that they thought their conditions needed.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was so and that they could build a destroyer with guns or torpedoes or mines only, or with any armament so long as there was nothing bigger than a 5-inch gun and her maximum tonnage did not exceed 1,500 tons. He thought that these variations in the composition of armament should be left to discretion except as to the limit of calibre of gun.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that provisionally the American delegation was prepared to accept the line of demarcation of 1,850 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that he was extremely grateful and felt sure that they all appreciated this concession.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he understood the British idea to be that anything over 1,500 tons would be a destroyer leader, but under 1,500 tons they could build any type they wished within the total tonnage of the class.

The CHAIRMAN asked the Japanese delegation whether they would agree to the 1,850 tons maximum for the flotilla leader, which had been conceded as a dividing line by the United States.

Admiral KOBAYASHI said that he had no objection.

Captain EGERTON wished to explain to the Japanese delegation the exact situation.

The United States and Great Britain were agreed that the maximum unit displacement of a destroyer be 1,500 tons, and if her speed was over 18 knots, whether she had guns, torpedoes, mines, or anything else, she would have to come out of the destroyer tonnage, and if between 1,500 and 1,850 tons and over 18 knots, she would come out of the tonnage allocated to destroyer leaders. The tonnage of leaders and destroyers would be grouped together as the total tonnage, with one restriction: that they could not build more than the decided amount in the bigger type. No agreement had yet been reached on this point, but it was Admiral Jones' proposal that leader tonnage could be used for destroyers but destroyer tonnage could not be used for leaders.

As regards the maximum displacement of the leader class, he did feel it very important not to have too great a margin between the leader and the destroyer, and he would ask the United States earnestly to consider whether they could meet the British view by coming down slightly from the figure of 2,000 tons. The increased displacement proposed was not in order to make the vessels more powerful but to include extra accommodation and facilities for the administrative staff of the flotilla.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that it was only right to state what conditions they had been working under for some time past and what still was their organisation. It called for a flotilla of 18 vessels. At the present time there were 19, because one destroyer was used as a destroyer leader, though this was very unsatisfactory owing to the impossibility of finding accommodation on that destroyer for all of the necessary staff for the flotilla commander. They had had to spread the staff over other vessels of the flotilla in order to give them even living accommodation. In order to take care of this extra personnel, they estimated it would require a vessel in the neighbourhood of 2,000 tons, and, as the number of leaders was naturally small, they did not feel that even an increase of 500 tons would make a very great difference in the total tonnage, while giving a very much more efficient vessel from the administrative standpoint than the smaller one.

Captain TOYODA said that it was difficult for the Japanese delegation to express an opinion on this point, as the difference was 350 tons by the British proposal and 500 tons by the American proposal. It was difficult for them to express a view upon these figures.

The CHAIRMAN wished to repeat that he felt an increase of 500 tons from destroyer to leader was very large, in fact an addition of one-third to the destroyer's tonnage. The British delegation had considered 350 tons as the highest figure necessary. They had increased the tonnage of the destroyer to meet the views of the American and Japanese delegations, and he hoped that the United States would see their way to agreeing to some figure between 2,000 tons and their own suggestion of 1,750. He hoped that the United States delegation would reconsider this point and see if they could reach a figure perhaps about 1,850, allowing a margin of 350 over the destroyer displacement.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that, as he had stated at the beginning, there were certain points on which the American delegation had no intention of being adamant. They had proposed a figure which they thought would do away with the pressure which would probably be brought by destroyer flotilla commanders and others in the future looking more or less to their own comfort and to administrative efficiency. They still felt that it would be wiser to admit a vessel that would largely satisfy this pressure for increased comfort and administrative efficiency. He thought that the United States delegation would be willing to consider the smaller type mentioned of 1,850 tons. He would like to adjourn for a few minutes to consider this question and to give a final answer.

The meeting adjourned for half an hour.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation had decided that it would be well to revert to their original proposal for two classifications of auxiliary surface vessels — a cruiser class, Class A, and a destroyer class, Class B, but before they could come to any real decision or give definite views, they would like some idea as to what would be the recommendation for a final decision as to the line of demarcation between the two classes. They had proposed 3,000 tons as the line of demarcation and would reserve any further statement as to the limitation or possible methods of dealing with the situation until after a decision as to the line of demarcation between the two classes.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British idea was that, if they could agree on the maximum displacement of a destroyer, this would automatically limit that class of vessel to a maximum displacement for the individual, and the question of demarcation would partly be decided by that and by the consideration of the question of cruisers. There would be the question of whether they were to have a minimum displacement for cruisers. If this was not considered desirable, the demarcation between the cruiser and the destroyer would be the maximum displacement of the latter. In other words the original American proposal of 3,000 tons would be altered to whatever they agreed to be the maximum displacement of the leader unless they agreed upon a minimum displacement for cruisers.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he understood that, if they accepted the principle of two categories for auxiliary surface vessels, the dividing line between Class A and Class B would be the maximum unit tonnage accepted for Class B.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was so.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that he understood the Chairman to make another proposal, namely, to decide upon a minimum unit tonnage in Class A and a maximum unit tonnage in Class B.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had not made such a definite proposal but had said that, if there was an agreement of that kind, this would be the situation.

He suggested this as an alternative only if it was considered desirable by the three delegations to place a separate minimum displacement on Class A. Otherwise the displacement of the leader class would automatically become the dividing line.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that, in order to deal with the tonnages as they proposed to deal with them, he thought it would be preferable to fix a dividing line between the two classes and to deal with the total tonnages in each class.

plenary meeting until a further decision had been reached as to the total tonnage of cruisers and, if possible, the method of transition from the *status quo* to the status they hoped for. The British delegation had proposed a tonnage somewhat above their minimum and below their maximum.

The CHAIRMAN asked Admiral Kobayashi whether he would now be prepared to give a tentative figure which would be open to further consideration when they saw the whole picture.

Captain TOYODA said that he regretted that the figures were not yet ready.

The CHAIRMAN asked whether the Committee was agreed that the report of their tentative agreement should be submitted to the Executive Committee as far as they had gone. It would be very valuable for them to have time to consider this information.

Rear-Admiral JONES pointed out that the delegates of each country were kept fully informed as to the progress of the work here, and that, before the report was submitted in plenary session which was then open to all the world, it would be preferable to know roughly what they agreed on here as to the total tonnage in each of those classes in order to work out where they would stand in the transition period.

The CHAIRMAN agreed, but felt that the Executive Committee might think it desirable to publish some of the figures, and he did not think it would be right, until they had informed them what their agreement was in so far as it had gone, to publish those figures from the Technical Committee.

He thought that it would be for the delegates, as they accumulated this information, to decide whether it was desirable to call a meeting of the Executive Committee to decide such a question as, for example, how far the agreement on characteristics should be published to show what progress was being made, leaving aside the total tonnage question.

Rear-Admiral JONES agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that he would now like to express the keen appreciation of the British delegation of the very generous consideration by the United States and by the Japanese of the British point of view in coming a long way towards meeting the original figures which they had proposed. He very greatly appreciated that they could come to agreement in this way.

As regards the question of the following day's agenda, he understood that the Japanese delegation were ready to study the question of the characteristics of the submarine, and as the United States would perhaps like further time to consider the cruiser question, they might deal with submarines the next day as they had dealt with destroyers that day.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that the American delegation would be able to take up on the next day the provisional discussion of the submarine question. It might perhaps be possible to discuss cruisers on the Saturday.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if they made great progress on the characteristics of submarines, it might be wiser to finish with that subject in a short meeting on Saturday than to plunge into the rather difficult cruiser question. This might be decided the following day.

It was decided to issue the following *communiqué* to the Press:

"The Technical Committee continued the discussion of the smaller auxiliary surface vessels referred to as Class B by the United States, which includes destroyers and destroyer leaders, and provisional agreement was reached as to the characteristics of this class of vessel for future construction, including both destroyer and destroyer leaders.

"It was decided to discuss the characteristics of the submarine class on Friday at 10.30 a.m."

The Committee adjourned at 1.10 p.m.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that this was their understanding of the proposal, and the United States delegation had agreed to the line of demarcation between Class A and Class B as 1,850 instead of 2,000 tons.

Captain TOYODA said that he understood that, instead of 2,000 tons, the new line would be 1,850, above which there would be the cruiser category and below which destroyers, flotilla leaders and anything else. The guns below 1,850 tons would be 5-inch. He was prepared to agree to this, save that in the Japanese proposals with regard to the age-limit they had drawn a line of 3,000 tons, above which the age-limit would be 16 years and below which 12 years. They were quite agreeable to the new line of demarcation.

The CHAIRMAN said that the United States also suggested within the total tonnage for the destroyer class a definite proportion for leaders and a definite proportion for destroyers.

In order to arrive at the proportion to put into leaders, the British suggestion was to fall in with their ordinary practice, which consisted in having one leader to every eight destroyers.

Captain EGERTON said that this would mean a total tonnage of 221,600, of which not more than 29,600 would be employed in the leader class.

The CHAIRMAN said that this worked out at approximately 16 per cent.

Rear-Admiral JONES proposed that not more than 16 per cent of the total tonnage of Class B be built in vessels with unit displacement not more than 1,500 tons.

Captain TOYODA understood that the maximum tonnage to be given to vessels of more than 1,500 tons would be 16 per cent, but that below that tonnage they could build 100 per cent.

Admiral KOBAYASHI said that the Japanese delegation agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was now agreed that, of the total tonnage in the destroyer class, 100 per cent could be used for vessels 1,500 tons and under, but not more than 16 per cent of the total could be used for the leader-class vessels above 1,500 tons but limited to 1,850 tons.

The next question was the age-limit. Here the British suggestion was 20 years, the United States 16 or possibly 17 and the Japanese 16. He would briefly point out that, apart from the question of expense, an increased age-limit not only lessened the burden of armament but produced the effect that a certain percentage of the vessels by age had a less offensive power. The British Government had carefully considered the question of preserving this type of vessel and had devised a method which they thought would enable them to last much longer than they had considered a year ago. He would therefore ask the United States whether they would be prepared to increase the age-limit to anything above 16 years.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that, unlike the Washington Treaty, which provided in certain cases for compulsory scrapping at a certain age, in the original American proposal the question of scrapping at the age-limit was entirely discretionary and was a matter for the individual Power concerned. The question was when they could replace if they did scrap. They therefore preferred their original proposal of 16 years, as they had not that great method the British had of keeping these vessels. They agreed with the Japanese delegation and recognised to some extent their argument as to climatic conditions, etc., and, while preferring for discretionary scrapping and replacement 16 years, they would go as far as the Japanese delegation would agree. They still felt, however, that 20 years was too long.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation had very carefully studied the question of a further extension of the age-limit, but regretted that, after studying the statistics of the life of torpedo-boats and destroyers, they had found from their own experience that only a few vessels lived 15 years. Sixteen years was therefore a maximum life for these vessels in their navy, and though prepared to consider the question again, they must at present hold to the figure 16, which had yesterday been extended from their original idea of 12.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Committee might decide tentatively that they were now agreed to a life of 16 years for the destroyer class, though hoping that the Japanese delegation might be able to go a little further. It would be at the discretion of each Power to keep their destroyers for a greater age if they wished to do so, but they could not be replaced at any age under 16 years.

The remaining question as to the destroyer class was that of total tonnage. He was aware that any tentative agreement in the Technical Committee was always open to reconsideration when they had reviewed the whole picture, but it would be a great advance if they could presently say to the Executive Committee that they had reached provisional agreement on these characteristics. He would state that, under the new maximum displacement here agreed upon, the total British tonnage for the destroyer class would be 221,600 tons. Perhaps the United States would give the Committee their proposal with regard to the total tonnage, which would make it easier for the Japanese to make a tentative suggestion which would go to the Executive Committee for further consideration and would also be further considered with the whole picture before them. It was not a question of binding themselves but rather of trying to help matters by giving each delegation as much information as possible.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that at the first plenary session the delegation of the United States had said that they would be willing to come in any category to as low a figure, generally speaking, as any other delegation would agree to and they would stand by this rather than give any definite figure at the moment. Whatever this might be, their agreement here would be provisional, and they would prefer not to come to a final decision for submission in report to the

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the American delegation still felt that their own proposals were the best, though they had given sympathetic and serious study to what they had heard. They would be glad to hear from the other delegations as to their conclusions.

He would like to suggest that the three proposals be stated, so that they would be fresher in the minds of the Committee, and would also be put on record in the minutes.

The CHAIRMAN recalled that the Committee had recorded that the United States proposal was that there should be a total tonnage allocation to the United States and the British Empire of from 60,000 to 90,000 tons, and to Japan from 36,000 to 54,000 tons.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation had not yet had a reply from their authorities at home on the question whether submarines under 700 tons ought to be excluded or not. Until he heard definitely about this question, which was being very carefully studied, he could not make a statement upon it.

As to the total tonnage allocation, which had been suggested by the United States, unless that question was settled it would be difficult for them to say anything about it, but he would recall that, according to the Japanese proposal, by an arithmetical calculation, *a* plus *b* plus *c* minus *d*, their tonnage would be about 70,000. This was rather a curious calculation, but he reminded them of this figure in view of the suggestion of the United States.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British proposal was that they should have two definite classes of submarines, that each be governed by a maximum displacement, that the size of gun should be not more than 5 inches in either class, and that the allocation should be by numbers, though on the latter point they were not adamant and were prepared to discuss it in terms of total tonnage. Their reasons for having two classes were that they hoped for a definite agreement on the limit to the total tonnage which could be used for overseas submarines, *i.e.*, the larger class for offensive operations, and that a definite tonnage could be allocated to the smaller class with a comparatively small radius of action and which could be regarded as local defence vessels. They had felt it would be easier to come to an agreement on that principle, and of course they also hoped to keep the total tonnage, at any rate of the larger class, as low as possible.

It was, however, impossible to discuss this question without finding out first of all whether the other delegations would be prepared to consider two types. The Japanese delegation had at present no instruction on this point, but he hoped that this would not prevent their discussing the matter, always with a reservation that any agreement as to characteristics would have to be modified and reconsidered if the Japanese eventually found themselves unable to give agreement with regard to submarines under 600 tons. It was more or less a parallel question to that of surface vessels, and the Japanese proposal was in accordance with their general proposal that all vessels under 700 tons should be exempt from the terms of the Conference. They had already conceded something on this point, and he hoped that the new instructions from Tokio would permit them to meet the British delegation on the question of submarines. He would therefore ask the Japanese delegation if they would agree to discuss the characteristics of the two types of submarine.

Captain TOYODA said that they were ready to do this, but wondered if there were room for discussion about excluding from the Treaty submarines under 700 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that this question had already been discussed for surface vessels. They had agreed to put the limit at 600 tons.

Captain TOYODA agreed, but said that, at the first meeting, the British and United States delegations objected in principle to the exclusion of submarines below 700 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that they certainly felt very strongly about it, as under certain conditions, when the distances were not great, a 600-ton submarine was definitely an offensive weapon. He understood that the United States delegation had strongly agreed with them on this point.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that they had agreed that there should be no exemption of submarines.

Captain TOYODA said that they were ready to discuss the other matters.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the American delegation was also ready to do this, but he felt that the characteristics they were going to discuss would be rather limited, since the total tonnage and the proposed exemption had not been determined.

Their idea had been to reduce the total tonnage in the Conference, not only of submarines but of all auxiliary combatant craft, to as low a level as possible. They were willing to enter into discussion, but would have to remember that they had not yet decided upon that exemption.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might discuss the maximum displacement of the submarine class for future construction.

Rear-Admiral LONG suggested that the question of the displacement of submarines was somewhat different from the surface craft. It might be useful to decide what they meant when they spoke of displacement, so far as this Conference was concerned.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British had always spoken of displacement as surface displacement, not the submerged displacement, and as in their earlier discussions the standard Washington displacement was taken, he thought they should endeavour to apply that to the submarines.

SIXTH SESSION.

Geneva, Friday, July 1st, 1927.

Present:

United States of America:

Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
Captain A. J. HEPBURN.
Captain A. ANDREWS.
Captain W. W. SMYTH.
Commander H. C. TRAIN.

Great Britain and Dominions:

Great Britain:

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Captain W. A. EGERTON.
Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.

Canada:

Commodore W. HOSE.

Australia:

Captain H. J. FEAKES.

New Zealand:

Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.

Japan:

Mr. Sadao SABURI.
Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI.
Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
Captain Teikichi HORI.
Captain Teijiro TOYODA.
Captain Mineichi KOGA.
Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI.
Commander Naokuni NORUMA.
Commander Ichiro SATO.
Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.
Lieutenant-Commander Kyosuke MIZUNO.

Secretariat-General:

Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE.
Captain H. R. MOORE.
Mr. SHIRATORI.
Mr. H. R. HUSTON.

French Mission d'Information:

Commander DELEUZE.

Italian unofficial observers:

Captain RUSPOLI.
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had just heard that there was a strong rumour that Commander Byrd, U.S.N., had landed on the coast of Normandy, and he would like to offer their heartiest congratulations on a very fine achievement.

Rear-Admiral LONG thanked the Chairman for his expression of congratulation.

The CHAIRMAN said that they would now deal with the submarine class, on which they had had one or two private conversations and considerable time to study the various original proposals. He would ask the United States delegation if, on consideration of all the proposals, they had any modifications or suggestions to make on this point.

Captain TOYODA said that they would be interested in the Chairman's explanation of his reason for a lower displacement in the bigger type.

The CHAIRMAN said that this limited the offensive power. With a total allocation of submarines between the maximum displacement, taking the United States figure of 1,700 tons and 1,000 tons, they could only build a certain number within this. If there was no minimum displacement, they could build a much larger number of submarines of something below 1,000 tons, and they would increase their offensive power. This was not such a strict limit as having two types.

They considered that, under their proposals, greater limitation could be achieved than by leaving it to each country concerned.

Captain TOYODA said that the original British idea was to limit by number, but that apparently they were now more in favour of total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN explained that they had not altered their view, but were conceding this point as a compromise.

Captain TOYODA said that, when they came to a compromise, a minimum displacement might be necessary as a compromise towards the total tonnage view.

The CHAIRMAN said that the British delegation had thought it better to agree to a strict limitation of numbers within each class but had found that the United States and Japan were in favour of total tonnage. They suggested that, instead of holding to the proposal of total tonnage with absolute freedom to build any size or type of submarine within it, the Japanese delegation might meet them halfway by having some limit of numbers, not according to their original suggestion but with some restriction of a minimum displacement for a bigger class.

Rear-Admiral LONG suggested that it would help the discussion if they knew the British idea as to the proportion or numbers they proposed to put into each of these two classes.

The CHAIRMAN said that they were prepared to give an approximate idea for the British Empire, but they did not wish to influence the other Powers, which might consider an entirely different proportion more suitable. They thought of asking for from 40 to 45 of the larger class between the maximum and minimum displacement and 15 to 20 of the smaller class below 600 tons, the total in each case being 60. They would like about one-third in small submarines and two-thirds in the larger type.

Captain EGERTON said that the total tonnage would vary between 76,000 and 81,000, according to what limits of displacement were decided on when they exchanged views with other Powers.

The CHAIRMAN said that the other delegations would perhaps consider this matter in the light of this information, and they might revert to this question on the following day as to the maximum tonnage.

Rear-Admiral LONG asked whether the British proposal was that the lower limit of the larger submarines be 1,000 tons and the higher limit of the smaller ones 600 tons, so that there would be a hiatus between the 1,000 tons and the 600 tons in which no one could build.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was correct.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that they felt they would have to remember in their study the different situations of the various Powers, and particularly of the three Powers represented. Their thesis was therefore that each Power be free to build units within the total tonnage limit which best served its particular needs. They were ready to consider the British proposal sympathetically, but could hardly reach a definite conclusion until they knew what would be done about exemption and total tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN said that he had been rather presuming there would be no exemption. The British delegation felt strongly that it would be very unwise to have any submarines exempt, as, owing to their characteristics, this would practically allow them to build an unlimited number.

Captain TOYODA said that, before turning to other questions, they would like to make clear their own point as regards submarines. They felt that submarines under 600 tons ought to be excluded and the maximum displacement be 2,000 tons, below which it would be better to leave it to the country's discretion as to the types of submarine they built for their own requirements. They were ready to consider the question and might be able to deal with it the next day.

The CHAIRMAN said that they could now turn to the maximum calibre of guns to be carried by this class of vessel. The British proposal was nothing above a 5-inch gun.

Rear-Admiral LONG and Captain TOYODA said that they could agree to this.

The CHAIRMAN said the next question was the age for replacement of new construction. The British proposal was 15 years, though they had had a strong wish to increase the age as far as possible. They had carefully studied the question and had reached the figure of 18 years as a possibility, but they had actually lowered the figure to 15 to meet the probable desires of other nations. It was only a proposal for new construction, not for vessels in existence built before the Washington Treaty.

Rear-Admiral LONG suggested the following definition as a good one for standard displacement: "The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of a vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-water-tight structure) — fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board".

They felt that this was a very clear and comprehensive definition.

Captain EGERTON said that this was in conformity with the Washington standard displacement for surface vessels, and was the nearest approach that could be got in the case of submarines.

Rear-Admiral SCHOFIELD said that the chief difference was in the matter of water.

The submarine carried battery water and water for the crew, and, in order to arrive at something satisfactory, they had thought it best to exclude all water, and lubricating oil was also excluded.

Captain EGERTON understood that being fully manned meant that kit was included, though this was a variable weight.

The CHAIRMAN said that he thought the British delegation would be ready provisionally to accept the American definition. They would just refer it home as a matter of form to their constructors, but he could see no difficulty in regard to it.

Captain EGERTON said that the words "fully manned" were used for surface vessels in the Washington Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was practically what was agreed to in Washington for surface vessels, save for the question of water. He did not think that the Japanese constructors would have difficulty in making the calculation.

Captain TOYODA said that he would be prepared to accept this provisionally.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might now endeavour to reach agreement on the maximum displacement of the submarine. The British proposal was not to exceed 1,600 tons.

Rear-Admiral LONG pointed out that the American proposal had not given a maximum displacement for the submarine, and that, though they felt it would be better not to assign a maximum displacement, they felt that 1,700 tons was the lowest maximum they could agree to.

The CHAIRMAN said that he understood that the United States agreed to the principle that it was desirable to keep the maximum displacement of submarines as low as possible.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that he could hardly say this. They really believed it better not to do so, but in a spirit of conciliation they were willing to discuss 1,700 tons.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese proposed 2,000 tons because there were so many submarines being built between 1,400 and 3,000 tons. Submarines of more than 2,000 tons could be used for other purposes — for instance, for attacking mercantile marine — and they felt that this figure was the lowest maximum displacement for war purposes against combatant craft. The conditions of the sea and temperature in Japan demanded a lot of space for sailors to live comfortably, and their experience led them to the conclusion that 2,000 tons would be a suitable figure for the maximum displacement of submarines. He quite realised that this figure excluded all fuel and all water.

The CHAIRMAN said that, as there was considerable divergence of opinion, they might defer this particular question until the next day and consider carefully whether they could modify their views. After study of the question, the British delegation felt that they could get practically everything necessary out of a submarine of 1,600 tons plus fuel and water. They calculated the endurance of such a submarine as something over 10,000 miles.

Captain TOYODA said that conditions in Japan and its shipbuilding capacity differed considerably from those of Great Britain and the United States. He felt that this amounted to a national requirement.

The CHAIRMAN said that the question now arose whether the delegations would consider the British proposal of two types. The object of the British proposal was that, if there was no division and each nation could build submarines of any displacement within the total tonnage finally agreed upon, it did not limit them quite so definitely in their offensive power; they could build submarines of considerable offensive power with a large radius of action on a displacement of 1,000 tons and upwards, and would be free to build the whole of their submarines in that displacement, which would mean greater offensive power. They felt that this should be diminished. A line should be drawn and a total tonnage allocated for the large class, between whatever maximum might be agreed on down to perhaps 1,000 tons, and another total allocation agreed upon for submarines below 600 tons. Their existing submarines with a considerable radius of action were in the region of 800 tons, and he felt there were definite advantages in limiting this type of vessel as far as they could with fairness. Their latest design of submarine was in the region of 1,500 tons.

He would ask Admiral Kobayashi if he had any grave objection to a lower limit for the maximum displacement for the sea-going craft.

SEVENTH SESSION.

Geneva, Saturday, July 2nd, 1927.

Present:

<i>United States of America:</i>	Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG. Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD. Captain A. J. HEPBURN. Captain A. ANDREWS. Captain W. W. SMYTH. Commander H. C. TRAIN. Commander H. H. FROST.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions:</i>	
Great Britain:	Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD Captain W. A. EGERTON. Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.
Canada:	Commodore W. HOSE.
Australia:	Captain H. J. FEAKES.
New Zealand:	Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.
<i>Japan:</i>	Mr. Sadao SABURI. Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI. Rear-Admiral Kamjiro HARA. Captain Teikichi HORI. Captain Teijiro TOYODA. Captain Mineichi KOGA. Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI. Commander Naokuni NOMURA. Commander Ichiro SATO. Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO. Commander YANAGIHARA. Lieutenant-Commander Kyosuke MIZUNO.
<i>Secretariat-General:</i>	Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE. Captain H. R. MOORE. Mr. SHIRATORI. Mr. H. R. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information:</i>	Commander DELEUZE.
<i>Italian unofficial observers:</i>	Captain RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that the meeting would now renew its consideration of the submarine question. The only point of general agreement was that the maximum calibre of gun should be 5 inches. As regards the other characteristics, various proposals had been made by each delegation, and they had agreed to reconsider these proposals in the hope of getting a little nearer agreement that day.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that, as the American proposal as to age lay between those of the British and Japanese delegations, they would be glad to hear the Japanese view. They had put a figure of 13 years.

The CHAIRMAN suggested they might make it 14, as this would suit the British delegation, who were considering the possibility of having two classes, with a different age for replacement in each.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese figure was 12 years; they had very carefully studied it in connection with the age of destroyers, but were unable to find reasons to change the age of submarines from that which they had suggested.

They had not studied the new proposal of a different age of the bigger class, and they would reconsider the matter.

The CHAIRMAN said that the question might be taken up on the morrow as to a different age-limit for the large and small classes.

He would like to raise one point before adjournment. In every class of vessel for which they came to an agreement as to characteristics and age-limit for future construction, there would be a number of existing vessels not quite within these characteristics or with regard to which they would not wish applied the full age-limit agreed on for new construction. The best way to deal with these vessels and the class in which they would be put for the total allowance would be for each nation to make a list of the vessels they would like specially treated. They could consider these lists in private and doubtless reach agreement on them, and then put them before the Committee for approval without discussing them at great length. The question was rather complicated, but he had no doubt there would be little difficulty in reaching an agreement which they could formally record at a meeting of the Committee. This affected the exempted class, the destroyer class, the submarine class and ultimately the cruiser class.

Captain EGERTON said that, so far as the replacement of existing vessels went, he understood that, after agreement on the basis of total tonnage, they would merely have to see that they did not exceed this. This would avoid the questions of age-limit for existing vessels, which would not have to be discussed if they agreed eventually on a total tonnage basis.

The CHAIRMAN said that, if there was an agreement not to replace any vessel under a certain age for new construction, it would not apply to vessels constructed before a certain date. They would therefore have to define "new construction", which would be anything constructed after a certain date, to which those rules would apply. They had in mind the date of the Washington Treaty, but thought that they should agree to this before going any further.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that they agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that each nation would make a list of vessels having that in view. They would say that with regard to the age-limit, maximum displacement, etc., they would like certain vessels to be counted in the total tonnage for destroyers, for example, which were above the maximum displacement, and that they did not wish the age-limit laid down for new ships to apply to them.

Captain EGERTON said that it would be necessary to say "the date of ratification of the Washington Treaty", which was actually ratified on August 17th, 1923.

Rear-Admiral SCHOFIELD said that that would be the definite date.

It was agreed that each delegation would make out a list of vessels older than the specified date, which would apply to all classes of vessels. Each delegation would present a list for consideration by the others, and after that there would be adjustments.

Captain EGERTON said that they might make a preliminary interchange of lists of ships, and Admiral LONG agreed.

The CHAIRMAN said that they hoped to progress with the submarine question the next day and to go as far as possible. There was a considerable amount of work to be done on the cruiser question, and they would therefore agree, with a view to having a little more time, that there should be no formal meeting on Monday. They hoped to take up the question of cruisers on the Tuesday following, and to deal with submarines the next day.

It was decided to issue the following *communiqué* to the Press:

"The Technical Committee held a preliminary discussion on the characteristics of submarines and exchanged more detailed information on the meaning of their original proposals.

"It was decided that, in the light of this further information, the various proposals should be carefully considered by each delegation and the subject continued at 10.30 a.m. to-morrow.

"Up to the present time, discussions in the Technical Committee have been confined principally to the characteristics of the different classes of vessels, and certain tentative agreements have been reached. Such provisional agreements, however, remain subject to revision after decision has been made by the plenary session as to the major question of total tonnage and numbers in the different classes of vessel."

The Committee rose at 12 noon.

Captain TOYODA said that they would support this view unless the small class of submarine was exempted.

The CHAIRMAN said that, in this case, their original figure given as the number of submarines they would desire to maintain no longer held good. If there was only one class they would have to express their requirements in total tonnage without any restrictions.

The next question was the age-limit. The British delegation suggested 15 years, the United States 13 and the Japanese 12. He would be glad to know if the United States were prepared to raise their figure to meet the British view.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the American delegation felt that 13 years was the useful life for a submarine, and realised that, as the submarine grew older, its operations became more hazardous for the crew. They were, however, willing to adjust their figures largely according to the agreement that could be reached between the British and Japanese delegations.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation were prepared to extend it to 13 years.

Admiral LONG said that he agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that the provisional agreement was then 13 years, and he understood that, if nations wished to keep their submarines longer, they could do so without replacement.

Rear-Admiral LONG and Captain TOYODA agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that the question of total tonnage allocated could not be discussed owing to the reservation on the part of the Japanese delegation, first, that they had no instructions on the subject and, secondly, that they felt that total tonnage allocation was more a matter for the Executive Committee. He felt that this was as far as they could go that day on the submarine question.

There was one other point which he would like to raise. In talking about the exempt class of surface auxiliary vessels, there had been a reservation on the part of the United States and Japanese delegations with regard to the catapult for exempt vessels being limited to one on the centre line or two, one on each broadside. If instructions had been received they might perhaps record agreement upon this now.

Captain TOYODA and Admiral LONG said that they agreed to this.

Rear-Admiral LONG asked whether the American proposal made the preceding day about the definition as to the standard displacement of submarines was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN and Captain TOYODA said that they agreed to this.

The CHAIRMAN said that the subject for discussion at the following Tuesday's meeting might now be decided. He asked Admiral Kobayashi if he would have received instructions by then to enable the Committee to finish the submarine question.

Captain TOYODA said that he thought this would be possible.

The CHAIRMAN asked Admiral Long whether it would be wiser to finish this question and give a little more time to a private consideration of cruisers, or whether he would prefer to go ahead with cruisers.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that he would prefer to continue with the cruiser question.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might dispose of the other matter first if the Japanese had their final instructions and then go on with cruisers.

It was decided to issue the following communiqué to the Press:

"The Committee continued their discussion on submarines and reached provisional agreement on some points which had been left undecided at the previous meeting.

"The Committee will meet again at 10.30 a.m. on Tuesday to renew their discussions on the characteristics of cruisers."

The Committee adjourned at 11.15 a.m.

The first characteristic that they came to after the gun was the maximum displacement, where the British proposal was 1,600 tons. The United States, who had placed no definite limit in their original proposal, came to 1,700 tons to meet the British view. The Japanese had stated that 2,000 tons was the minimum they could accept as far as they had considered the question, but he would ask the Japanese delegation whether they could not come down to the United States figure, to which compromise he thought that the British delegation would also agree. Without reiterating the arguments already stated from the British point of view for wishing to keep the maximum tonnage low, he would remind the Japanese delegation that, in a similar discussion on destroyers, the United States had made a very big concession to reach a figure to meet the British and Japanese view. He hoped that the Japanese delegation would be able to do something in the nature of a compromise.

Captain TOYODA said that they had carefully studied the question. The climate of Japan was very hot, and they had to install cooling machines in order to keep the ships comfortable, and there was also pressure from men who had served in submarines to provide better accommodation. Though, from their point of view, 2,000 tons was not too much, they were prepared in a spirit of conciliation to come down to 1,850 tons, which had been the figure accepted as a compromise for the flotilla leader. It was to be remembered that the comfort and accommodation of the crew in such a small space was an important question.

The CHAIRMAN said that they all had to serve in hot climates, and this was particularly true in the case of the southern parts of the United States.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that they found it extremely hot even in the northern part of their country during the summer. A figure of 1,850 tons would be agreeable to them.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was an enormous increase upon the original British proposal, and they would have to refer the matter home before they could get final agreement. He would suggest 1,800 tons, as being halfway between 1,600 and 2,000. If they would agree to this, he felt that he could represent it in such a way as to induce acceptance by the authorities at home.

Captain TOYODA asked if it would be very difficult to refer the question home, as the difference was only 50 tons.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was really a difference of 250 which he was referring home, and not even a halfway figure between 1,600 and 2,000. He recalled that the United States were agreeable to a figure between the two and had suggested 1,700.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the American delegation would agree to any figure over 1,700 tons.

The CHAIRMAN hoped to be able to say to his Government that the Japanese were agreed to come to a figure exactly halfway between their own and the British proposals.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation would in a spirit of conciliation come down to 1,800.

The CHAIRMAN thanked the Japanese delegation and said that they could at least agree provisionally to a figure of 1,800.

The next question was perhaps more difficult, because they had suggested as a modification to their original proposal that the other delegations might consider the question of having two types of submarine and a total tonnage agreement in regard to each type. This was the governing principle, and he would be very glad to know whether the other delegations were agreeable to anything of the kind.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the question appeared to be linked very decidedly with the Japanese proposition of the exempt class, and he did not quite see how they could properly discuss it now.

The CHAIRMAN said that they might discuss it subject to the reservation on the part of the Japanese delegation.

Captain TOYODA said that he expected to have an early reply from his Government, who were carefully studying the question.

The CHAIRMAN said that this was a vital question on which the United States and British delegations felt strongly. If there was an exempt class there was no question of total tonnage but an absolute freedom to build an unlimited number of submarines.

Captain TOYODA said that surface vessels below 600 tons were already exempt, though there was, of course, considerable difference between the activities of submarines and surface craft both below 600 tons.

He was unable at present to forecast what his instructions would be. They might ask a reduction on the maximum displacement of exempted submarines or some allowance on submarine tonnage.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was not much good discussing this question of classes except to record that the United States and Japanese delegations reasserted their view that it was desirable only to have one class.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that the American delegation was in favour of only one class.

The CHAIRMAN said that before beginning the subject of cruisers he would like to ask the Japanese delegation whether they had further news from Tokio on the question of the proposal to exempt submarines under 600 tons, which was not decided.

Captain TOYODA said that the Japanese delegation had received instructions on this subject and would like to make the following statement on the question of excluding from limitation the small-type submarine:

"It has already been agreed that all surface craft under 600 tons, and the surface combatant craft not exceeding 2,000 tons and 18 knots in speed and carrying not more than four 6-inch guns, should be excluded from the limitation on account of the fact that such ships are chiefly for the purpose of defence. Although there is some difference in the radius of action, it cannot be denied, according to our experience in the waters adjacent to Japan, that the small-type submarines of this nature are incapable of participating in long-distance manoeuvres, because of the difficulties in providing for accommodation of the ship's complement. Accordingly, there is no reason for not excluding, as well, the small-type submarines, which are equally for defensive purposes. In other words, the Japanese representatives can hardly deviate from their previous position with regard to this matter. However, it is not our desire to check the progress of the Conference by pressing this point, and we shall agree provisionally to include such submarines in the limitation. In doing this, however, we must emphasise that special consideration should be given to this point of view at the time of allocating the total tonnage of the submarines."

The CHAIRMAN said that this concession by the Japanese delegation, which he was sure they all appreciated, finished the discussions of this Committee, at any rate for the present, of the submarine question. This left only the total tonnage allocation undecided, and as he understood that the Japanese delegation wished this particular point in all classes of auxiliary vessels to be discussed in the Executive Committee, he did not think it would be useful to reopen the subject then, and they might go on to the question of cruisers.

Since their last meeting on this question they had had some days to consider the various points of view and the best method of approaching the subject. He understood the strong desire of the United States delegation was that they should endeavour to reduce their total tonnage of cruiser force as near as possible to 300,000 tons, the figure proposed by the United States. Having heard the British reason for a definite number of cruisers, and realising their difficulty, the American delegation was anxious to reach a figure for agreement, and the British delegation had endeavoured to study various programmes of new construction and replacement to try to meet this desire on the part of the United States. The fact emerged, however, from all these deliberations that, if they desired a certain number of cruisers and wanted to reduce the total tonnage, there was absolutely only one possible way of doing it, which was by reducing the individual displacement of vessels within that total tonnage. He was sure that it was not desired that the British Empire should be the only Power to build small cruisers, and, this fact being accepted, the only thing to do was to come to some agreement on limiting the total tonnage of the more powerful cruiser and fixing a lower maximum displacement for the future, and then agreement could be reached as to how all their needs could be met by a certain proportion of large cruisers and a certain proportion of small. This really amounted to the original question: Were the other delegations prepared to agree to a limit in the total tonnage of the powerful cruisers? This was the principle to which the question came, and, until it was settled and a smaller type of cruiser agreed upon, they could not calculate how nearly they could bring their total tonnage to the figure which the United States desired. He would ask Admiral Jones whether he had considered this question.

Rear-Admiral JONES wished to say at first that the American delegation viewed with a certain amount of sympathy the demand of the British delegation as regards numbers and had tried to work out some scheme by which the limitation by tonnage could be worked so as to meet the British demand. He would read this statement setting forth the position of the American delegation very plainly. The position was one from which they could hardly consider receding much:

"The position of the United States delegation is that we cannot discuss cruiser tonnages in excess of 400,000 tons for the period ending December 31st, 1936.

"That, during that period, we would require full liberty of action to build 10,000-ton cruisers up to a total of 250,000 tons, recognising at the same time the full right of other Powers to build cruisers of similar characteristics up to tonnages in accordance with the principles of the Washington Treaty.

"That we have no intention or desire to replace the ten cruisers of the *Omaha* class carrying 6-inch guns during that period except in the case of loss of one or more of those units.

"That, in an effort to meet the British viewpoint regarding a limitation in the number of large cruisers, we are willing, for this period and without prejudice to future action, to limit our further construction within a total tonnage limitation of 400,000 to vessels of a smaller tonnage, to be agreed upon.

"We do not see any reason for limiting the calibre of gun in the smaller class of cruisers to anything different from that in the larger class.

"We believe that each Power should have full liberty in the design and armament of a smaller class of cruisers should such a class be adopted for the period in question.

"This statement of American policy should be construed as our maximum effort to meet the British viewpoint.

EIGHTH SESSION.

Geneva, Tuesday, July 5th, 1927.

Present:

United States of America:

Rear-Admiral H. P. JONES.
Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG.
Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD.
Captain J. M. REEVES.
Captain A. J. HEPBURN.
Captain A. ANDREWS.
Captain W. W. SMYTH.
Mr. G. A. GORDON.
Commander H. C. TRAIN.
Commander H. H. FROST.

Great Britain and Dominions:

Great Britain:

Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD.
Captain W. A. EGERTON.
Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.

Canada:

Commodore W. HOSE.

Australia:

Captain H. J. FEAKES.

New Zealand:

Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.

Japan:

Mr. Sadao SABURI.
Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI.
Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA.
Captain Teikichi HORI.
Captain Teijiro TOYODA.
Commander Sonosuke KOBAYASHI.
Commander Naokuni NOMURA.
Commander Ichiro SATO.
Construction-Commander FUJIMOTO.
Engineer-Lieut.-Commander YANAGIHARA.
Lieutenant-Commander Kyosuke MIZUNO.

Secretariat-General:

Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE.
Captain H. R. MOORE.
Mr. SHIRATORI.
Mr. H. R. HUSTON.

French Mission d'Information:

Commander DELEUZE.

Italian unofficial observers:

Captain RUSPOLI.
Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

NINTH SESSION.

Geneva, Friday, July 8th, 1927.

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Present:

<i>United States of America:</i>	Rear-Admiral A. T. LONG. Rear-Admiral F. H. SCHOFIELD. Captain J. M. REEVES. Captain A. J. HEPBURN. Captain A. ANDREWS. Captain W. W. SMYTH. Commander H. C. TRAIN. Commander H. H. FROST.
<i>Great Britain and Dominions:</i>	
Great Britain:	Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD. Captain W. A. EGERTON. Vice-Admiral Aubrey SMITH.
Canada:	Commodore W. HOSE.
Australia:	Captain H. J. FEAKES.
New Zealand:	Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL.
<i>Japan:</i>	Mr. Sadao SABURI. Vice-Admiral Seizo KOBAYASHI. Rear-Admiral Kanjiro HARA. Captain Teikichi HORI. Captain Teijiro TOYODA. Commander Ichiro SATO. Engineer-Lieut.-Commander YANAGIHARA.
<i>Secretariat-General:</i>	Mr. F. R. DOLBEARE. Captain H. R. MOORE. Mr. SHIRATORI. Mr. H. R. HUSTON.
<i>French Mission d'Information:</i>	Count CLAUZEL. Commander DELEUZE. M. Jean PAUL-BONCOUR.
<i>Italian unofficial observers:</i>	Captain RUSPOLI. Commander Don Umberto CUGIA DI ST. ORSOLA.

The CHAIRMAN said that that morning's meeting was to formally approve the first report of the Technical Committee referring partly to the discussions and mainly to the provisional agreements reached up to date (Annex No. 7). This report would go to the Executive Committee only and was not final in any way. There was not much need to be particular about the legal wording or anything of that sort, as the report was fully covered by being only provisional. He would suggest that they went through it page by page to see if there were any small amendments which the delegations would suggest, and then consider it approved.

"We greatly prefer that, within a total tonnage limitation and within the characteristics of cruisers provided for in the Washington Treaty, each Power enjoy full liberty of action.

"We invite attention to the fact that our original proposal was for a total tonnage limitation in the cruiser class of between 250,000 and 300,000 tons. We still ardently desire that the total tonnage limitation of cruisers to be agreed upon shall be very much lower than 400,000 tons, as we believe that an agreement on such a figure would be an extremely useful service to the cause of limitation. If it is found possible to agree upon a figure materially lower than 400,000 tons, the American requirements regarding cruisers of the larger class could be revised downward.

"Any limitation on the basis of a cruiser tonnage in excess of 400,000 tons we regard as so ineffective a limitation as not to justify the conclusion of a treaty at this time."

Captain TOYODA said that they had just heard Admiral Jones' new proposal, and, as new proposals took rather a long time to study, he would prefer not to make any statement for the moment.

The CHAIRMAN said that it would be well to have a little time to consider this new proposal in detail in order thoroughly to understand it before meeting on the question again. He would suggest that they adjourn to enable the proposal to be thoroughly considered by the Japanese and British experts and delegations. They would not meet again until they heard that the Japanese delegation were ready to discuss the question.

Rear-Admiral JONES wished to explain that, though the Japanese delegation called this a new proposal, it was in fact a proposal put forward with the intention of meeting as far as possible the proposal put forward by the British delegation, and was not a new proposal but rather a suggestion for meeting each other.

Captain TOYODA said that he had meant that the American proposal gave a new figure.

Rear-Admiral JONES said that several copies of the American statement made that morning were available for the members of the delegations but not for publication.

The CHAIRMAN said that it would be quite understood that the United States proposal had been circulated to them for their private information so that they might study the details before meeting again. These copies were not for publication and were confidential.

It was agreed that the following *communiqué* should be issued to the Press:

"An agreement was arrived at on a submarine question which had been outstanding.

"A brief discussion of cruisers followed with a view to examining ways of adjusting the requirements in cruisers of the several Powers.

"The Committee adjourned to enable the delegations to study this question in detail."

The meeting adjourned at 11.10 a.m.

PART IV.

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Wednesday, July 6th, 1927.

Present:	
United States of America.	Mr. GIBSON. Admiral JONES. Mr. DULLES.
Great Britain.	Mr. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL. Vice-Admiral FIELD. Mr. CAMPBELL.
Japan.	Viscount SAITO. Viscount ISHII. Mr. SHIRATORI.

Viscount ISHII explained that since the Japanese experts in the Technical Committee had not indicated the views of Japan with respect to total tonnage limitations, Viscount Saito wished to take this occasion to present their view in an informal manner and that they would later take occasion to present it more formally in the Executive Committee.

Viscount SAITO then read the following statement:

"It will be remembered that in the statement made by the Japanese Delegation at the first Plenary Meeting, emphasis was laid upon the existing status which they proposed should form the basis of any allocation of tonnages that might be decided upon at the present Conference.

"According to the basis of calculation as submitted by the Japanese Delegation, the surface auxiliary strength of the British Empire would be 472,000 tons.

"The tonnage allocation suggested by the American Delegation in regard to surface auxiliary vessels is from 450,000 to 550,000 tons for the United States and British Empire, subject to the intimation that the United States would welcome any proposal for still lower tonnage levels.

"Limitation being our main object, it would seem to the Japanese Delegation that the adoption in principle of the minimum figure proposed by the United States Delegation as a basis of our discussion would be a course most conducive to a speedy consummation of the task before the Conference.

"If, consequently, we may take the figure of 450,000 tons for the United States and British Empire as a basis, the Japanese Delegation would propose for the tonnage of surface auxiliary vessels to be allotted to Japan a figure of somewhat above 300,000 tons, it being understood that they are quite prepared at the same time to accept reduced figures in concert with the other delegations.

"In addition to this, the Japanese Delegation desire now to propose a figure of around 70,000 tons for Japan in respect of submarines."

Mr. BRIDGEMAN asked how the figure of 472,000 tons had been arrived at.

Viscount ISHII explained that the Japanese Delegation had adopted it as being their calculation of the *status quo* of the position of the British Empire in cruisers and destroyers. This had

Rear-Admiral LONG and Vice-Admiral KOBAYASHI agreed to this.

Page 1 was adopted without alteration.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Japanese delegation had suggested a slight alteration on page 2. They wished to replace the paragraph commencing "During the discussion of the cruiser class" with the following paragraph:

"During the discussion of the cruiser class, the Japanese delegation made no proposal as to total tonnage in that class, but stated that they were ready to lower the maximum displacement of cruisers to 8,000 tons approximately, with 8-inch guns."

The paragraph then went on its present form: "The Committee adjourned to enable the delegates to consider the cruiser question in the light of the discussion which had taken place". He understood that the Japanese delegation wished to put on record that they agreed to this displacement of 8,000 tons.

This amendment was agreed to.

Pages 3, 4, 5 and 6 were agreed to without alteration.

The CHAIRMAN said that the Japanese delegation suggested that, on page 7, the words under the heading "General" be altered as follows: "It was agreed that the new age-limits for replacement should apply to all vessels" instead of, as at present, "the term 'new construction' should include". He felt that this did not alter the sense but made it a little clearer.

Rear-Admiral SCHOFIELD asked what was meant by new age-limits.

The CHAIRMAN said that this meant those that they had provisionally agreed to in the report.

After discussion, the following text was agreed upon:

"That the age-limits to be agreed upon for replacement of new construction should only apply to vessels of all classes laid down subsequent to August 17th, 1923, the date of final ratification of the Washington Treaty."

Rear-Admiral LONG proposed that the last paragraph of the report should read as follows:

"In every discussion of characteristics of different classes of vessels, it was decided that all agreements reached should be regarded as provisional upon final agreements as to total tonnage limitations in all categories."

The CHAIRMAN said that this was rather a controversial point and did not think that, as a Technical Committee, they were in a position to lay down such a policy.

Rear-Admiral LONG said that he understood that, in all the discussions, the agreements were provisional on those conditions.

The CHAIRMAN said that it was sufficient to say they were provisional and that he would not mind if the United States wished to put in a statement as to their position, but as a purely Technical Committee they could hardly lay down that all these things depended on final agreement as to total tonnage limitations in all categories.

Rear-Admiral LONG suggested that the text might read as follows: ". . . provisional and, so far as the American delegation is concerned, provisional upon final agreements as to total tonnage limitation in all categories".

The CHAIRMAN said that otherwise the British delegation would have been agreeing to a principle which they did not think feasible. They had maintained that it was impossible for them to state finally what the total tonnage should be until they knew what the maximum displacements or characteristics of the vessels were. They had originally proposed to state their needs in numbers, and of course in doing so they would have given the characteristics of each vessel.

Rear-Admiral Long's amendment was agreed to.

The CHAIRMAN said that this completed their task as a Technical Committee. He thought the report might either be signed by himself as Chairman or by a representative of each of the three delegations and then handed to the Executive Committee.

It was agreed that the Chairman should sign the report on behalf of the Committee and hand it to the Executive Committee.

The Committee adjourned at 10.35 a.m.

not be covered by the agreement. He did not know how that suggestion would be regarded at home, but he would like the American and Japanese Delegations to think it over.

Admiral FIELD, reverting to the programme proposal, said that it would work out in this way, namely, that the Americans would be shown as building at a quicker rate than the British Empire in order to catch up. If some such agreement could be reached, it would be a powerful contribution to the limitation of armaments.

Viscount CECIL urged that the experts should investigate all these possibilities; perhaps the Japanese experts would find that something could be devised on the above lines which would also meet the Japanese point of view.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN asked whether it was understood that the Executive Committee would meet on Friday. *That was agreed.*

After some further general discussion,

It was understood:

- (a) That the Japanese Delegation would submit their proposal formally at the meeting of the Executive Committee on Friday;
- (b) That the experts should study the possibilities of limiting building programmes on lines which would be acceptable by all three Delegations.

given them the figure of 472,000 tons. His Delegation were most anxious on their return home to be able to show that some actual reduction had been agreed to. They had therefore taken the lower global figures quoted under the American proposals for cruisers and destroyers and had added them together. The result gave a total of 450,000 tons, which they thought should be the basis of discussion. If a lower figure could be reached, they would of course welcome it.

Mr. GIBSON said that the proposal of the Japanese Delegation should be carefully examined. He need hardly add that any proposal which would get them down to the original American figures necessarily appealed to him.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that the quota allowed to the British Empire under the Japanese proposal was one which it was impossible to consider. The American Delegation had recently proposed 400,000 tons. He had pointed out that the British Empire could not get down to that figure even if the Americans substantially reduced the large number of big cruisers which they had said they desired to build, though, if the number of large vessels was radically reduced, the result might give a position which the British Delegation could at all events consider. The first thing to do was to consider the American proposal for building so large a number of 10,000-ton cruisers and an unrestricted number of others mounting 8-inch guns. This seemed to give their proposals generally an offensive rather than defensive character.

Mr. GIBSON asked how much of all this would actually come into force before 1936. If they were to discuss building programmes which would not be complete by 1936, the disparity between the three sets of requirements might not be so great.

Admiral FIELD said that they had examined the plan for working on the basis of actual programmes. The effect would be that the British Empire would hardly build at all, while the Americans would build something like 350,000 tons. It would be physically impossible to equalise matters within the life-time of the treaty unless the British Empire scrapped vessels prematurely and did not build at all. In order to get down to the figure of 400,000, it would mean that the British Empire would have to have another ten-year holiday which, for technical and industrial reasons, was undesirable.

Admiral JONES said that it was no use going into figures beyond the life-time of the treaty. He would like to examine the British programme and see what it would amount to by 1936. We might agree to have another conference after that. Generally, he expressed his willingness to examine any further schemes under the programme proposal which the British Delegation might desire to put forward.

Mr. GIBSON said that it was most desirable to explore every means of reaching agreement.

Mr. GIBSON and Admiral JONES both thought that there was some difference in regard to the basis of calculation under discussion; the several delegations did not seem to be talking the same language.

Here followed a general discussion as to how programmes could be so adjusted as to bring the three sets of requirements closer together.

Admiral JONES reverted to his view that different bases were being discussed, and that the three Delegations were talking in different terms.

Admiral FIELD replied that, however looked at, it always came back to this, that the British Empire could not get down to anything like 400,000 tons unless the number of large cruisers to be built by the United States was radically reduced.

Viscount ISHII said that the Japanese delegates could not accept anything which would oblige Japan to increase the existing Japanese programme.

Viscount CECIL said that Admiral Jones had made a very welcome suggestion, and he would like to know whether the Japanese Delegation could entertain it.

Viscount ISHII said that, if he might speak quite frankly, the Japanese Delegation wanted to get the tonnage figure reduced to the point where it would approximate to the Japanese proposal. If the United States would reduce their number of big cruisers to 10, and there were agreement that in future no more should be built, there might be something which the Japanese Delegation could agree to.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said there was another suggestion he would like to make which seemed to offer a possible solution. It was this: neither the Americans nor the Japanese think that a ship is any good after twenty years of age. The British Navy regard twenty-four years as a possible age-limit. Perhaps, therefore, the American and Japanese Delegations would consider the suggestion that there should be a total tonnage agreement for vessels under twenty years of age, and that the British Empire should retain a certain number of older vessels for use in home waters which would

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Wednesday, July 13th, at 11 a.m.

Present:

United States of America.

Mr. GIBSON.

Mr. DULLES.

Great Britain.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN.

Viscount CECIL.

Japan.

Admiral Viscount SAITO.

Viscount ISHII.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN stated that he felt that the plenary meeting scheduled for the next day was necessary in order to enable him to present a statement of the British position. He was confident that the statements of the various positions would be in measured terms, that he could give this assurance so far as his own statement was concerned, and that he would be glad to give both Delegations an outline of his remarks in advance of the meeting.

There was a brief discussion of the proposal put forward by the British Representatives on the Mixed Committee¹. The Japanese delegates felt that the proportionate total tonnage figure for Japan under this proposal would be in excess of what they were authorised to agree to. The American delegates indicated that they would have difficulty in agreeing to the smaller type cruiser being limited to 6,000 tons displacement.

Viscount ISHII then submitted a memorandum in the following terms:

"If the three Powers retain the existing ships, complete the ships under construction, and execute all of the authorised programmes, the displacement tonnage of auxiliary surface craft, in the near future, will be represented by the following figures:

For Great Britain	691,000 tons
For United States of America	648,000 tons
For Japan	442,000 tons

"If the three Powers were successful in arriving at an agreement to cut down approximately thirty per cent respectively from the above figures, it may be said that an effective limitation has been realised.

"In such an event the strength which will be allotted to the respective powers will be as follows:

For Great Britain	about 484,000 tons
For United States of America	about 454,000 tons
For Japan	about 310,000 tons"

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that it was impossible for him to discuss any such drastic total tonnage limitations, but indicated that he would have his experts again study the whole matter.

Viscount CECIL then inquired whether it would not be possible for the Japanese Delegation to accept on paper a larger total tonnage limitation for auxiliary surface craft than 310,000 tons even though such larger limit might not be built up to.

Viscount ISHII replied that from the point of view of Japan such a procedure would be dangerous as the attitude of naval men was to build up to the limit which they might be allowed under a treaty. He referred to the provision of the Washington Treaty limiting cruisers to 10,000-ton vessels and pointed to the fact that the tendency was to build all new cruisers of the maximum size.

Viscount CECIL then suggested that, instead of taking a thirty-per-cent reduction, it might be possible to accept a twenty-per-cent reduction. After all, this would constitute a substantial reduction in naval strength and yet might bring total tonnage figures susceptible of discussion.

Viscount ISHII stated that he did not feel that he could go into technical discussions, but, after consultation with Viscount Saito, stated that they did not feel that it would be possible for them to accept a figure in excess of 315,000 tons.

Mr. GIBSON stated that it was evident from the discussions that the first and essential problem was to endeavour to find a common meeting ground as to total tonnage limitation for cruisers between the British and Japanese Delegations and that until some such meeting ground was found there was little use in discussing other points.

¹ A small committee composed of one naval adviser and one civilian from each delegation.

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Saturday, July 9th, at 4 p.m.

Present:

United States of America.

Mr. GIBSON.

Mr. DULLES

Great Britain :

Mr. BRIDGEMAN.

Viscount CECIL.

Japan.

Admiral Viscount SAITO.

Viscount ISHII.

Viscount CECIL suggested as a possible way out of the impasse regarding cruisers that a study should be made of building programmes between now and 1931 which would determine the completed cruiser tonnage in 1934.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN indicated that he would be prepared to consider abandoning the projected programme of 10,000-ton 8-inch gun vessels, excluding, of course, vessels now under construction, with the possible exception of one vessel on which work had not far progressed and which might therefore be stopped. This suggestion was made in the hope that no further vessels of this character would be constructed, though, of course, it was understood that the United States would be accorded the full liberty of constructing 10,000-ton vessels up to the number which might be constructed by the British Empire.

Mr. GIBSON said that he would be glad to have his Naval Advisers study the plan suggested, but that, in his opinion, to secure limitation, building programmes would have to be translated into total tonnage figures and that if the programme in question left open the possibility of constructing cruisers in excess of 400,000 tons it would not, in his opinion, constitute a limitation.

Viscount ISHII indicated that Japan was planning the construction of eight 10,000-ton vessels but could possibly eliminate one of these vessels not yet laid down, subject to a proportionate limitation on the part of the other two Powers.

Mr. GIBSON stated that he was prepared to negotiate as to the number of such vessels if in so doing it would be possible for the British Empire to bring its total tonnage figures for cruisers within a total which would constitute a real limitation.

submarine tonnage figure of 70,000 tons suggested by the Japanese delegation, and adding it to the total of 315,000 tons for auxiliary surface craft, which was the figure the Japanese delegation had hitherto indicated they did not wish to exceed. Viscount Ishii indicated that, as submarines are the most costly vessel ton for ton, he felt that this adjustment would be appreciated by the Japanese Treasury.

With respect to point two, Mr. GIBSON asked what age-limit was to be taken as determining over-age vessels.

Viscount ISHII said that Japan was prepared to consider the American suggestion of twenty years for cruisers and sixteen for destroyers.

Viscount CECIL said that, as he understood the discussions of the Admirals, the memorandum had been drawn up on the basis of the Japanese proposals as to age-limits, namely, sixteen years for cruisers and twelve for destroyers.

In reply to a question by Mr. Gibson, Mr. BRIDGEMAN and Viscount CECIL emphasised that the vessels mentioned under point four would be included within the total tonnage limitation of 500,000 tons suggested by Admiral Field; that the purpose of mentioning these ships was to make clear that they could be retained although in excess of the 6,000 tons which the British delegates desired to fix as the maximum unit size below 10,000 tons, but should not be included among the number of 10,000-ton vessels mentioned in point 3.

In connection with the discussion of the memorandum, it was brought out by Mr. BRIDGEMAN that the memorandum was prepared on the assumption that the limits suggested were to be embodied in a treaty to terminate in 1936.

Viscount CECIL enquired regarding the submarine proposal in point 7 (b) and asked for an expression of the views of the Japanese delegation with regard to Japan having the same total tonnage as the United States and Great Britain.

Viscount ISHII replied that this suggestion had been made by Admiral Field, but that, if the United States wished a larger number of submarines, Japan would not raise any objection.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN expressed appreciation of the efforts made by the Japanese delegation in devising a suitable method of meeting the British viewpoint as to total tonnage limits. He indicated that the British delegation was prepared to carry forward negotiations on the basis of the memorandum, subject to the approval of the British Government, before whom the entire matter had been laid.

Viscount ISHII stated that the Japanese delegation had also laid the matter before the Japanese Government for approval.

In connection with point 5, Mr. GIBSON brought out that the situation in the United States differed from that of Japan with respect to the future construction of 8-inch-gun cruisers, in that, while Japan would under the proposals have no available tonnage for such cruisers, the United States would have considerable tonnage available on the basis of the totals proposed, and that on this point he would have further views to present.

At the conclusion of the meeting the following Press communiqué was prepared:

"Following the discussions in the plenary meeting and acting on the suggestion there made that one of the chief difficulties was to reconcile the views of the British and Japanese delegations, conversations have been proceeding between the three Powers with respect to auxiliary surface craft with the purpose of bridging those differences. The progress has been sufficiently encouraging to warrant the further examination of the matter in detail."

* Vice-Admiral Sir F. FIELD subsequently stated that, owing to his illness, he was prevented at the time from examining the memorandum embodied in the above record and that the suggestion attributed to him in paragraph 7 (b) should read:

"Admiral Field suggested that, if Japan would reduce to 60,000 tons, the other two Powers should make a corresponding reduction."

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Monday, July 18th, at 11 a.m.

Present:

United States of America:	Mr. GIBSON. Mr. DULLES.
Great Britain:	Mr. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount Cecil
Japan:	Admiral Viscount SAITO. Viscount ISHII.

Viscount ISHII referred to an informal conversation between Admiral Kobayashi, of the Japanese delegation, and Admiral Field of the British delegation, which had taken place after the plenary meeting of the 14th, and which further developed the possible bases for negotiation brought out by the mixed Committee. He emphasised the informal character of the discussions, which he stated were for the purpose of reconciling the differences as to total tonnage figures existing between the British and the Japanese delegations, the American delegates being in a position to approach the figures of either. The discussion of the two Admirals had produced results which made it appear feasible to undertake further consideration of the matter by the delegates of the three Powers. He stated that, of course, no agreement had been reached, but that the Japanese delegation had telegraphed to its Government a full statement of what had transpired. They had also kept the American delegation fully advised of the discussion. Viscount Ishii then circulated a memorandum which outlined the discussions between the two Admirals, which, after examination, Mr. Bridgeman stated appeared to represent an accurate statement of the conversations as outlined to him by Admiral Field.

The text of the memorandum was as follows:

(1) Total tonnage of surface auxiliary combatant vessels:

(a) Figures suggested by Admiral Kobayashi:

For the British Empire	484,000 tons
For Japan	315,000 tons

(b) Figures suggested by Admiral Field:

For the British Empire	500,000 tons
For Japan	325,000 tons

(2) Retention of an additional 25 per cent of total tonnage in old vessels.

(3) 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number:

For the British Empire and U.S.A. (each).	12
For Japan	8

(4) Retention of the undermentioned vessels:

For the British Empire: the *York* and 4 cruisers of the *Hawkins* class.
For U.S.A. 10 cruisers of the *Omaha* class.

For Japan 4 cruisers of the *Furutaka* class.

(5) Question of other 8-inch-gun cruisers:

Japan has no intention of laying down any other 8-inch-gun cruisers before December 31st, 1936.

(6) Agreed maximum percentage to cruisers and destroyers.

(7) Submarines:

(a) Admiral Kobayashi said Japan required about 70,000 tons of submarines.

* (b) Admiral Field suggested 60,000 tons of submarines for each of the three Powers.

In explanation of the memorandum, Viscount Ishii stated that the figure of 325,000 tons of auxiliary surface vessels for Japan had been arrived at by eliminating 10,000 tons from the previous

* See following page.

vessels, the issue was clearly one between the United States and Great Britain, and he asked the British delegates to clearly consider the probable course of action of the United States in the way of construction of 8-inch-gun vessels; first, if friendly agreement were reached and a treaty secured, and, secondly, if negotiations broke down because of the British attempt to impose on the United States a type of vessel which is unsuitable for the latter.

Mr. GIBSON added that, in his opinion, if an attempt were made to deny the United States liberty of armament within strict tonnage limitation there was danger they would find they had driven the United States into an extensive building programme. He made it quite clear that, in his opinion, a treaty which deprived the United States of its liberty of action with respect to arming the proposed second class of cruisers as they saw fit would be unacceptable; that Great Britain had assured cruiser supremacy for many years to come, an overwhelming merchant fleet which could be armed; that the American delegation could not be expected to accept restrictions as to arming cruisers, and that an attempt to deny the United States their liberty of action would be the best method of arousing popular resentment and driving that country into a big building programme.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN stated that American insistence upon the right to build 8-inch-gun cruisers would force them to readjust their tonnage levels upward; that they had already made considerable concessions to arrive at tonnage levels which the three delegations could all discuss, but that this had been conditional upon the elimination of 8-inch-gun cruisers, except on a specified number of 10,000-ton vessels.

Mr. GIBSON asked Mr. Bridgeman to look at the whole problem along the broad political lines he had indicated. The crux of the whole problem was whether the British Empire felt that the United States was likely to dispose of approximately 100,000 tons or less available for cruiser construction on the tonnage basis proposed (*i.e.*, after deducting the tonnage required in the construction of a specified number of 10,000-ton vessels) in such a way as to threaten the security of the British Empire. If they did not have this apprehension, there should be no real reason for contesting the right of the United States to build within such limited tonnage as it saw fit.

Finally, Mr. GIBSON re-emphasised that, in his opinion, the British view was based upon apprehension of a situation arising which, in his opinion, was not likely to arise, namely, adoption by the United States of a building programme of 8-inch-gun vessels which would be a source of apprehension to the British Empire. He suggested the possibility of including in the treaty a political clause which would permit re-examination of the cruiser provisions in the event that the construction of 8-inch-gun vessels was a cause of apprehension to any of the contracting Powers.

A discussion then followed on this suggestion and various possible modifications of it were considered, and it was decided to go into the matter further at an early meeting of the delegates.

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Tuesday, July 19th, at 11 a.m.

Present:	
<i>United States of America:</i>	Mr. GIBSON. Mr. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain:</i>	Mr. BRIDGEMAN, Viscount CECIL.
<i>Japan:</i>	Admiral Viscount SAITO. Viscount ISHII.

The delegates proceeded to discuss further the memorandum of Admirals Field and Kobayashi.

Mr. GIBSON pointed out that, in his opinion, the suggestion of 500,000 tons as a limitation for all auxiliary surface craft with the retention, in addition thereto, of twenty-five per cent of over-age vessels was in effect a camouflage method of increasing the total tonnage to 625,000 tons; that, while this latter figure was within range of the figures which the American delegation had reluctantly indicated a willingness to discuss, he felt that it would be more candid to give the total tonnage including so-called over-age ships. If the age-limits were fixed, as proposed, at sixteen years for cruisers and twelve years for destroyers, the over-age ships would be an effective part of the naval strength of the various countries. If the age limits were twenty and sixteen years respectively, the situation might be different.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that the discussions had been on the basis of the sixteen- and twelve-year age-limits, but that possibly some slight adjustment might be made.

Viscount ISHII stated that the Japanese delegation had felt that, for ships constructed prior to the Washington Conference and which had gone through the war, the figure of sixteen and twelve years might be equitable, but for post-Washington ships they would desire age-limits of twenty and sixteen years respectively. He indicated that the idea of a separate class for over-age ships would be convenient for them, since on this basis they could adjust their ideas of low total tonnage with the desire of the British Empire delegation for a tonnage including over-age ships which would give them the number of vessels they desire.

Mr. GIBSON pointed out that, except for destroyers and for certain decrepit armoured cruisers, the United States would have nothing which would be available to put in the over-age class, but that, if agreement could be reached on other questions, he would be prepared to discuss a formula for the retention of certain over-age vessels, but could not commit himself to it at the present juncture.

Viscount ISHII stated that, in his opinion, it would be fair to allocate to the United States 8-inch-gun cruisers to compensate for the retention by the British Empire of the *Hawkins* class and the *York* and by Japan of the four *Furutakas*, and to modify paragraph 4 of the British-Japanese memorandum to this effect.

Mr. GIBSON indicated his appreciation of this suggestion.

Mr. GIBSON then stated that he wished to give an outline of the American views of the question upon which future discussions depended, namely, the 8-inch gun. He felt that, if this question were discussed solely from the technical point of view, it was doubtful if a solution could be realised; that the only possible way to reach a solution was through discussing the problem from the point of view of its practical application to the relations of the countries concerned; that it was, in effect, the question of how each country was likely to use a part of its cruiser tonnage and that he wished to present the broad political aspects of this question rather than its technicalities. He made it clear that, on the basis of 300,000 tons of cruisers, and assuming twelve or more 10,000-ton cruisers were constructed, and with retention of the 10 *Omahas*, the United States would have available only about 100,000 tons for other cruiser construction; and that, as a practical matter, during the life of the treaty it was in his personal opinion problematical whether the United States would avail itself of all of this tonnage in 8-inch-gun cruisers in addition to the construction of a given number of 10,000-ton cruisers. He stated that, in view of the Japanese situation, which on the basis under discussion would permit no new construction of vessels other than specified 10,000-ton

Mr. GIBSON then asked for some precise statement of the British attitude in order that his Government might know exactly what the position was.

Viscount CECIL replied that it was to the effect that, unless the treaty provided for a limitation of the 8-inch gun, the British Government would regard it as a treaty, not for a limitation, but for an increase of armaments.

Mr. GIBSON repeated that he could hold out no hope at all that his Government would give way on the gun, though he would of course at once put the case to them. He, for his part, would furnish a precise statement that evening of the American attitude, which the British delegates could telegraph to London; the two Governments would thus know exactly how the issue stood. (See copy of statement — Appendix III.)

Mr. BRIDGEMAN asked whether, apart from the gun, the American delegates were prepared to accept the British proposals.

Mr. GIBSON replied that, though there were other difficulties with respect to which they would ask for modifications, he did not regard any of them as insuperable, but rather as subject to adjustment by negotiation.

Viscount ISHII asked for some further explanation of the concession which the British delegates were authorised to make in regard to the intermediate class.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN explained the matter again and pointed out that the object was to equalise the relative strengths between the British Empire and the United States. He asked the Japanese delegates whether they accepted the British point of view in regarding it as desirable to limit the 8-inch gun in a treaty running till 1936.

Viscount ISHII said that, while the Japanese Government had no intention before 1936 to lay down any more cruisers carrying an 8-inch gun beyond those in the maximum class, they could not agree to be bound by any treaty provision in the sense of the British proposal. He intimated, however, that, if the British and American delegates could find some solution in this matter, the Japanese delegation would not be an obstacle to general accord.

Viscount CECIL enquired whether the other delegations desired to raise any objection to the publication of the British proposals.

Mr. GIBSON and Viscount ISHII, replying in the negative, it was agreed that the document should be published at once, but that a note should be added describing the concession which the British Government were prepared to make in regard to the intermediate class.

Admiral JONES stated that, in his opinion, the publication of the British proposals would cause immediate Press comment in the United States and that the American Press would, in his opinion, pass a verdict on the proposals which would render further negotiations difficult.

Viscount CECIL then raised the question of a plenary meeting; he thought it would be better, as the proposals were to be published, to take an early opportunity of explaining them further in public. He suggested a plenary session on Saturday.

Mr. GIBSON did not offer any objection to a plenary session, but said that he would prefer to defer it until Monday in order that he might have time to learn the views of his Government.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that he would be happy to agree to a postponement till Monday.

Viscount ISHII acquiesced, and it was decided to announce a plenary session for Monday next on the understanding that the date might of course be altered if it was found desirable.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN asked the Japanese delegates whether, in their opinion, if the question of the gun were settled, agreement might be reached on the other matters.

Viscount ISHII replied that the Japanese delegates would have to communicate with their Government in regard to the submarine question. They had originally agreed to the allocation to Japan of 65 per cent. of the total tonnage allocated to the British Empire and United States for surface vessels in the hope that the submarine tonnage would be settled on the basis of 60,000 tons for each of the three Powers. The original Japanese requirement had been put at 70,000 tons, but they had agreed to transfer 10,000 tons to surface tonnage. If the British Empire and the United States now required 90,000 tons in submarines, the Japanese delegation would desire to return to their original figure of 70,000 tons.

It was decided to issue a communiqué to the Press in the terms shown in Appendix I to this paper.

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Thursday, July 28th, at 3.30 p.m.

Present:

United States of America:

Mr. GIBSON,
Rear-Admiral JONES,
Mr. DULLES.

Great Britain:

Mr. BRIDGEMAN,
Viscount CECIL,
Rear-Admiral POUND,
Mr. CAMPBELL.

Japan:

Admiral Viscount SAITO,
Viscount ISHII,
Mr. SABURI.

After an expression of regret for the delay due to the return of the British delegates to London, Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that the British Government had made a thorough study of the situation, as a result of which he and Lord Cecil had returned with instructions to work for the negotiation of a treaty up to 1936 somewhat on the lines of the scheme which was under consideration at the time when the Conference was adjourned. There were, however, one or two modifications, as would be seen from the document which was then handed round.

Mr. Bridgeman then gave an oral explanation of the new features: the first of these was the substitution of one total tonnage figure for all classes of vessel instead of separate figures for surface craft and submarines; there was the addition of two "Emeralds" to the British ships to be retained for their lifetime, *i.e.*, ships falling neither within the maximum class nor the secondary class: in this connection, the British Government were prepared to agree to the construction by the United States of vessels which, in the opinion of the naval advisers, would equalise the disparity — owing to difference of gun-power — between the British Empire and United States in this class; there was also the division of submarines into two types, which was a revival of an earlier British proposal; finally, in order to give elasticity, there was a provision allowing for the possibility of some transfer, within certain limits, between the different classes.

Mr. GIBSON referred to the statement he had made at the last meeting setting forth his Government's view with respect to freedom of armament for cruisers and the 8-inch gun. He enquired whether the British delegates had had an opportunity to make known this position to the British Government and whether the British Government were adamant in its view with respect to the abolition of the 8-inch gun for new construction other than the 10,000-ton cruisers and certain specified vessels.

Viscount CECIL explained that this was the case and that they had instructions not to deviate from this point.

Mr. GIBSON said that he would telegraph the British proposals to Washington, but that, unless the British delegates were able to find some method of meeting the American Government's view on this point, he could hold out no hope of agreement. How far could they go to meet the American view and was this their final word on the subject?

Mr. BRIDGEMAN said that they had no authority to do more than agree to some arrangement such as referred to above for equalising relative strengths in the intermediate class of cruiser.

Mr. GIBSON said that, in that case, all he could do was to telegraph the British proposals to his Government, but that he felt the Conference was up against a deadlock. Unless this question could be satisfactorily settled, he did not think the number of large cruisers would be likely to arise. He then referred to what has become known as the "political clause", a re-draft of which was handed round. (See Appendix II.)

Viscount CECIL intimated that this clause would not meet the situation; it was necessary to limit the gun, for which the clause did not provide.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN added that he could not agree to any clause which left this question open.

10. The maximum tonnage to be devoted to submarines of either class of whatever age to be as follows:

(a) British Empire and U.S.A.	90,000
(b) Japan	60,000

of which total tonnage not more than two-thirds may be used for Class A submarines.

11. Except for the restrictions imposed in paragraphs 6, 8 and 10, the total tonnage allocated to be used as each Power thinks best.

Appendix 2.

SUGGESTED DRAFT OF POLITICAL CLAUSE.

In the event that, prior to December 31st, 1936, any one of the Contracting Powers shall consider that the tonnage allocation in the cruiser class has been utilised by any other of the Contracting Powers in a manner to call for an adjustment of the total tonnage allocation of that class, such High Contracting Party may, at any time subsequent to January 31st, 1937, and upon six months' prior notice, convoke a meeting of the Powers Parties to the present Treaty with a view to ascertaining whether such an adjustment can be made by mutual agreement. In the event that no agreement is reached at such a conference, any of the High Contracting Parties may give notice of the desire to terminate the present Convention, and this notification shall be effective within one year after the receipt thereof by the other Parties to the Treaty. In such an event, the Treaty shall terminate with respect to all the Parties thereto.

Appendix 3.

It will be remembered that, in its original proposals, the American delegation indicated its belief that, within a total tonnage limitation for cruisers, each Power should be free to dispose of its tonnage as best suited its special needs. In view, however, of the importance attached by the British delegation to restrictions of types, the American delegation agreed, as will be remembered, to discuss the number of maximum-size cruisers, subject to agreement on a tonnage level which would constitute a genuine limitation, and with the further condition that the secondary type of cruiser within such tonnage limitations should be of a maximum individual displacement which would not preclude mounting 8-inch guns (a calibre which was agreed upon by the signatories of the Washington Treaty).

Appendix 1.

COMMUNIQUE — JULY 28TH, 1927.

The delegates met this afternoon and resumed the discussion which had been interrupted by the return of the British delegates to London.

Mr. Bridgeman communicated the attached proposals, which, subject to certain modifications, follow the lines of those which were under consideration at the last meeting of delegates.

It was agreed to hold a plenary session of the conference on Monday next.

The British proposals in respect of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, for incorporation in a treaty to remain in force until 1936, referred to above, are as follows:

1. The combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines below the age-limit for replacement is not to exceed:

(a) For British Empire and U.S.A.	590,000
(b) For Japan	385,000

2. In addition, each Power may retain 25 per cent. of the total tonnage given in paragraph 1(a) and (b) in vessels over age.

3. Age-limits before which replacement cannot take place:

10,000-ton cruisers	18 years
Other cruisers	16 years
Destroyers	16 years
Submarines	13 years

4. The following vessels over 6,000 tons to be retained in their respective fleets:

British Empire:	4 <i>Hawkins</i> class, carrying 7.5-inch guns.
	The <i>York</i> , carrying 8-inch guns.
	2 <i>Emerald</i> class, carrying 6-inch guns.
United States of America:	10 <i>Omaha</i> class carrying 6-inch guns.
Japan:	4 <i>Furutaka</i> class carrying 8-inch guns.

Note. — The general intention of this proposal is to provide for the retention of existing ships which, though still in full efficiency, fall neither within the 10,000 ton 8-inch class or the contemplated class with a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and maximum armament of 6-inch guns.

The British delegation, recognising that this proposal would leave the United States of America with no 8-inch gun cruisers in this class, are prepared to agree to the construction by the United States of vessels which, in the opinion of the naval advisers of the three delegations, would equalise the strength of the British Empire and the United States of America in this class.

5. All other cruisers to be divided into two classes:

- (a) 10,000-ton cruisers.
- (b) Smaller cruisers of a maximum displacement of 6,000 tons and mounting a gun not exceeding 6 inches in calibre.

6. 10,000-ton cruisers to be limited in number:

For British Empire and U.S.A.	12
For Japan	8

7. Maximum standard displacement for flotilla leaders to be 1,850 tons and for destroyers 1,500 tons. Flotilla leaders and destroyers not to carry a gun above 5 inches.

8. That, of the total tonnage in the destroyer class, 100 per cent. may be used for vessels of 1,500 tons and under, but not more than 16 per cent. of the total may be used for the flotilla leader class, *i.e.*, vessels above 1,500 tons and limited to a maximum of 1,850.

9. Submarines to be divided into two classes:

Class A.	1,800 down to 1,000
Class B.	Maximum 600.

Submarines not to carry a gun in excess of 5 inches.

Viscount ISHII said that, so long as there was any objection to the Japanese compromise plan on the part either of the American or of the British delegation, he had, of course, no intention to push the matter any further.

Mr. GIBSON then read a telegram which he had sent to the Secretary of State and the reply of the Secretary of State thereto to the effect that it was the belief of both that public discussion of contentious problems at this time might jeopardise a future solution and they therefore thought it best that a joint declaration be made and the plenary session limited to the adoption of such declaration only. He enlarged upon the telegrams, pointing out that public opinion was much excited, that the present place and time did not offer a good atmosphere for discussion. He believed that the Governments working together in more unclouded surroundings might find a solution but that a solution would be made almost impossible if public opinion were crystallised by open debate here.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN replied that he had instructions from his Government to present the British case and that therefore he must do so. His speech, he said, would be in measured terms, and he felt sure that it would contain nothing which would conflict with the aim which Mr. Gibson had in view and with which he was in cordial agreement.

Viscount ISHII stated that, since any proposal which would avoid ill feeling would be welcomed by him, Mr. Gibson's proposal would have been acceptable to him.

It was then decided that the speeches should be made and that the joint declaration to be worked out by a drafting committee would then be adopted, upon which the Conference would be adjourned.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN stated that the British delegation would have been glad to reach agreement on other than the cruiser question, since that could not be solved, and on some phase of the battle-ship proposals.

Appendix.

- (1) The British Empire and Japan to undertake that, before December 31st, 1931, they shall not lay down, except for replacement, any more auxiliary vessels besides those included in their authorised programmes; it being understood that the said programmes shall not be altered except in so far as is provided for in the next following article.

- (2) The number of cruisers of the 10,000-ton class shall not exceed 12 each for the United States and the British Empire and 8 for Japan.

The British Empire shall be at liberty to utilise, in such a way as she may see fit, the remaining cruiser tonnage in her authorised programmes.

The maximum unit tonnage of cruisers of smaller class shall be 8,000.

- (3) The United States to undertake that, at no period before December 31st, 1931, her auxiliary naval strength shall exceed that of the British Empire.

The Contracting Parties to undertake that they shall furnish to one another information concerning such building plans and programmes as may be decided upon before December 31st, 1931: Provided that, in the event that any of the Contracting Parties shall consider that a readjustment of the present agreement is required as a consequence of any plans or programmes adopted by any of the other Contracting Parties, a Conference shall be called with a view to secure such readjustment.

- (4) Questions regarding auxiliary vessels not provided for in the present Convention shall be settled in a later Conference to be held as soon as possible and not later than the beginning of 1931.

INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Wednesday, August 3rd, at 10 p.m.

Present:

United States of America:

Mr. GIBSON.
Admiral JONES.
Mr. DULLES.

Great Britain:

Mr. BRIDGEMAN.
Viscount CECIL.
Admiral POUND.
Mr. CAMPBELL.

Japan:

Viscount SAITO.
Viscount ISHII.
Mr. SABURI.
Mr. SATO.

Mr. WILSON (*Secretary-General*).

Mr. GIBSON, referring to the suggestions put forward informally by the Japanese delegation on August 1st (see Appendix), made the following statement:

"If the Japanese delegation should see fit to make the suggestions which have been tentatively outlined in very general terms, the American Government feels that they should receive very careful consideration. The acceptability of such suggestions would depend upon the interpretation which may be placed upon certain of its terms. If 'authorised programmes' include, in the case of the British Empire, ships projected but for which money has not been appropriated, the cruiser strength of the British Empire would, according to the statistics available to us, be far in excess of any figure which in the opinion of the American delegation would constitute a limitation.

"If, on the other hand, only ships actually appropriated for, in addition to ships now building, are included, this would give a total tonnage for cruisers which, taken in conjunction with the other suggestions in the draft memorandum, would, in the opinion of the American delegation, constitute a possible basis for further discussion."

From the discussion it resulted that the Japanese delegation had not endeavoured to stipulate what exactly should be understood by "authorised". They had endeavoured to provide a basis of negotiation and a means by which there should be no increase of present programmes until 1931, since it was already apparent that real limitation had failed. The British delegation made it clear that their understanding of "authorised programmes" was such a programme as had been passed by the Government and submitted to Parliament. In other words, the "authorised programme" in their case would mean the programme submitted to the House of Commons in 1925, which has a five years' life. It included the cruisers which appear under headings W, X, Y and Z of a statement prepared and circulated by the British delegation under date of June 23rd. This paper indicated a total cruiser tonnage of approximately 458,000 tons, including ships appropriated for but not yet laid down and ships projected but not yet appropriated for.

Admiral POUND stated that he had understood that the "July 28th proposals" (namely, the British proposals which followed the lines of the conversations between Admirals Field and Kobayashi), as far as they relate to tonnage, were acceptable to the United States and that the only thing that the American delegation could take exception to in that matter was the gun calibre. Mr. Gibson replied that he had not stated that these figures were acceptable, but that they did not present an insuperable obstacle. The calibre of gun was the great difficulty. Mr. Gibson had not felt it worth while to discuss tonnage figures until the other matter was settled.

The American delegates then declared that this understanding by the British delegates of "authorised programme" did not make them feel that the Japanese proposal offered a satisfactory basis for discussion at the present time. They very much appreciated Viscount Saito's generous initiative, but the figures under the British interpretation represented so high a level that the American Delegation did not feel that they could carry home a treaty constituting real limitation on this basis.

PART V.

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INFORMAL MEETING OF DELEGATES

Thursday, August 4th, at 11.30 a.m.

Present:	
<i>United States of America:</i>	Mr. GIBSON. Admiral JONES. Mr. DULLES.
<i>Great Britain:</i>	Mr. BRIDGEMAN. Viscount CECIL. Admiral POUND. Mr. CAMPBELL
<i>Japan:</i>	Viscount SAITO. Viscount ISHII. Mr. SABURI.
	Mr. WILSON (<i>Secretary-General.</i>)

The draft final declaration was accepted by the delegates with certain amendments in the form to be issued at the plenary session.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN, under instructions from his Government, presented a final proposal (see Appendix).

Mr. GIBSON stated that, as he had before made clear in his speech at the second plenary session, the American delegation was of the opinion that, unless we could find a solution for the most difficult question, there was no use making a partial agreement, especially in view of the interdependence of the various type of craft.

Viscount ISHII felt that it might have been possible to make some agreement on this basis. It would, of course, have been necessary to consult the technicians on the subject; but, in view of the attitude of the American delegation, it was not worth pursuing the discussion further.

Appendix

THE FINAL PROPOSAL OF MR. BRIDGEMAN.

Even if there is for the present no apparent prospect of coming to a complete agreement about small cruisers, we think it would be most unfortunate if the Conference were to separate without arriving at some international arrangements tending to economy. A large measure of agreement has already been reached with regard to 10,000-ton cruisers, flotilla leaders, destroyers and submarines. It seems clear to His Majesty's Government that a similar agreement might easily be reached with regard to battleships. These results are not all that had been hoped for, but they are of great value and it would be an international misfortune if they were lost on the present occasion. His Majesty's Government, sooner than see the Conference wholly fail, would be prepared to sign an agreement, even if it embodied only the points on which provisional agreement has already been reached by the three Powers.

ANNEX 2.

REPORT OF THE CREDENTIALS COMMITTEE.

Pursuant to a call from the Secretary-General of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament, the Credentials Committee met at 11 a.m. on Wednesday, July 6th. The Committee consisted of:

Mr. George A. GORDON, of the American delegation;
Capt. H. R. MOORE, D.S.O., R.N., of the British delegation;
Mr. Kiyoshi YAMAGATA, of the Japanese delegation.

The full powers of the following delegates were examined and found to be in good and due form:

United States of America:

The Honourable Hugh GIBSON.
Rear-Admiral Hilary P. JONES, U.S.N.

Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire that are not Separate Members of the League of Nations:

Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, M.P.
Viscount CECIL OF CHELWOOD.
Vice-Admiral Sir F. L. FIELD, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

Dominion of Canada:

Hon. E. LAPOINTE, K.C., M.P.
Mr. W. A. RIDDELL, M.A., Ph.D.

Commonwealth of Australia:

Rt. Hon. Sir J. COOK, G.C.M.G.

Dominion of New Zealand:

The Hon. Sir James PARR, K.C.M.G.
Admiral of the Fleet EARL JELlicoe OF SCAPA, O.M., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.
Rear-Admiral A. F. BEAL, C.H., C.M.G.

Union of South Africa:

Mr. J. S. SMIT.
Mr. C. PIENAAR.

The Irish Free State:

Mr. K. O'HIGGINS.
Mr. J. A. COSTELLO, K.C.

The Empire of India:

Rt. Hon. W. C. BRIDGEMAN.

The Empire of Japan:

Admiral Viscount Makoto SAITO.
Viscount Kikujiro ISHII.

The above listed full powers were deposited with Mr. Howard R. Huston, of the Secretariat-General of the Conference, for retention until the moment of signature, and thereafter to be filed and made a part of the permanent archives of the Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armament.

ANNEX 1.

RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR THE CONFERENCE FOR THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

I.

The Conference meeting at Geneva on the invitation of the President of the United States of America comprises delegations of the Governments of the British Empire, Japan and the United States. It is called with the purpose of examining the possibilities of further extension of naval limitation so auspiciously inaugurated by the Washington Naval Treaty, and of elaborating a Convention embodying the conclusions reached.

II.

The Powers shall be severally represented by plenipotentiary delegates. These delegates may be assisted by technical advisers or experts, as well as secretaries, interpreters and stenographers.

The Minutes of the meetings shall mention the names and designations of all persons present.

III.

The United States of America, as convening Power, shall provide the Chairman of the Conference.

IV.

There shall also be constituted a Secretariat-General, comprising a Secretary-General named by the American Government and representatives of each of the participating Powers. This body shall be entrusted, under the control of the Chairman, with the preparation of the Minutes of the sessions, the administrative organisation of the Conference and, in a general way, the duty of insuring the regular, punctual and impartial execution of such tasks as may be assigned to it.

V.

A Committee on Credentials shall be constituted to receive and examine the credentials of all delegates participating in the Conference. Such further technical committees or sub-committees as may be found necessary shall be formed by agreement between the delegations. The chairmanship of such committees or sub-committees shall be decided by arrangement among the several delegates.

VI.

In the absence of the Chairman, the Conference shall be presided over by the chief delegate of one of the other Powers in alphabetical order of his country and in turn.

VII.

A Drafting Committee, composed of legal experts of the participating Powers, shall be formed to ensure the co-ordination and drafting of the decisions of the Conference.

VIII.

The Secretariat-General shall be responsible for the issue of such official *communiqués* as the Conference may decide to publish.

IX.

Provisional Minutes drawn up by the Secretariat-General shall be approved by the Secretary-General and distributed, with the least possible delay, to each delegation.

In the interests of expedition, this preliminary distribution shall be considered as taking the place of a reading of the Minutes at the opening of the sessions.

If no modification is requested by the delegates in writing within forty-eight hours of the distribution of these provisional Minutes, their text shall be considered as approved.

(a) The total combined tonnage of both cruiser and destroyer classes of vessels of all ages shall not exceed at any time for:

United States.	550,000 tons
British Empire	550,000 tons
Japan	330,000 tons

(b) The total tonnage of the cruiser class, less than 20 years old from date of completion, shall not be augmented so as to exceed for:

United States.	300,000 tons
British Empire	300,000 tons
Japan	180,000 tons

(c) The total tonnage of the destroyer class, less than 15 years old from date of completion, shall not be augmented so as to exceed:

United States.	250,000 tons
British Empire	250,000 tons
Japan	150,000 tons

(d) All excess in the allowed combined tonnages of vessels of the cruiser and destroyer classes now existing shall be scrapped. The choice of vessels to be scrapped shall be made by the Power whose vessels are to be scrapped. Within the allowed tonnages, no vessel scrapped shall be replaced until the date when she would have reached the age-limit of her class.

ANNEX 3.

OUTLINE OF AMERICAN PROPOSALS.

The proposed new Treaty to supplement the Washington Treaty should be coterminous with it and contain provisions for extension or modification similar to those of the Washington Treaty. It might be desirable to provide for the possibility of reconsideration in the event that the requirements of national security of any contracting Power in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that Power, materially affected by any change of circumstances.

Provisions for the limitation of auxiliary naval armament should be by classes of vessels as follows:

- (a) The cruiser class;
- (b) The destroyer class;
- (c) The submarine class;
- (d) An exempt class not subject to limitation.

Limitation by total tonnages in each of the several classes should be modified as necessary to provide for transition from the *status quo* to the final allowed tonnages in each of the several classes.

The United States, while suggesting tonnage limitations in the various classes, will accept as low a total tonnage limitation in each of the several classes of auxiliary vessels, on the basis of the principles of the Washington Treaty, as the British Empire and Japan will accept.

Definitions.

The cruiser class shall include all surface naval combatant vessels which are of standard displacement of more than 3,000 tons and not exceeding 10,000 tons and not carrying guns exceeding 8 inches in calibre.

The destroyer class shall include all surface naval combatant vessels, of standard displacement of 600 tons and not more than 3,000 tons, which have a designed speed greater than 17 knots.

The submarine class shall include all vessels designed to operate below the surface of the sea. An unrestricted class should include vessels of limited combatant value. The technical definition of vessels to fall within such a class should be the subject of future agreement.

Replacement.

The age-limit for replacement in the several classes shall be as follows:

- (1) Cruisers, 20 years.
- (2) Destroyers, 15-17 years.
- (3) Submarines, 12-13 years.

Proposals for Tonnage Limitation by Classes.

Cruiser Class:	Total Tonnage Limitation.	
For the United States	250,000	to 300,000
For the British Empire	250,000	to 300,000
For Japan	150,000	to 180,000
Destroyer Class:		
For the United States	200,000	to 250,000
For the British Empire	200,000	to 250,000
For Japan	120,000	to 150,000
Submarine Class:		
For the United States	60,000	to 90,000
For the British Empire	60,000	to 90,000
For Japan	36,000	to 54,000

In order to provide for the transition from the *status quo* to the proposed definitive tonnage limitations in the cruiser and destroyer classes, it is suggested that, during a transition period, existing cruiser and destroyer tonnage be considered together and that the tonnage to be scrapped be the excess over the combined cruiser and destroyer tonnage limitations. Replacement in each class should, however, only be permitted within the allowed maximum tonnage of that class. As applied to cruisers on the basis of a total tonnage of 300,000 tons and to destroyers on the basis of a total tonnage of 250,000 tons, the proposal would work out as indicated below.

Annex 4 (continued).

<i>Type of Warship.</i>	<i>Description.</i>	<i>Limitations proposed.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Destroyers (includes Flo-tilla Leaders).	Warships of small displacement possessing great speed. A gun armament effective against their own kind, with the torpedo as their chief weapon. May also be fitted to carry mines, aircraft, etc.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: torpedo-boat destroyers: 1,400 tons (1,422 metric tons); leaders: 1,750 (1,778 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 5 inches (127 millimetres).	
Torpedo Boats (includes Coastal Motor Boats). See Note II.	A small type of destroyer lacking in sea-keeping qualities.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 400 tons (406.4 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 3 inches (76 millimetres).	<i>Note II.</i> This class is intended to include all surface vessels of 400 tons and under that may employ the torpedo as a weapon.
Submarines.	Warships possessing the power of submersing, which enables them to operate unseen, to deliver surprise attacks and to decline action with superior forces. Principal weapon the torpedo.	(a) Large submarines: maximum standard surface displacement permitted: 1,600 tons (1,626 metric tons) or (b) Small submarines: maximum standard displacement permitted: 600 tons (610 metric tons). (c) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 5 inches (127 millimetres).	
Sloops, Minesweepers, etc.	A small type of war vessel of medium speed suitable for patrol work, convoy or mine-sweeping according as to how they are fitted.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 5 inches (127 millimetres). (c) These vessels may not employ the torpedo as a weapon.	

ANNEX 4.

PROPOSED CLASSIFICATIONS AND LIMITATION OF WARSHIPS. PREPARED BY BRITISH DELEGATION

<i>Type of Warship.</i>	<i>Description.</i>	<i>Limitation proposed.</i>	<i>Remarks.</i>
Battleships and Battle Cruisers (Capital Ships). See Note I.	Warships of great displacement that embody the maximum armament, protection and mobility which it is practical to combine in a single vessel. In the battle cruiser, armament and protection are, in some degree, sacrificed to speed.	(a) Maximum standard displacement not to exceed 30,000 tons. (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 13.5 inches (342 millimetres).	<i>Note I.</i> The main elements in the offensive armament of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers and armoured coast defence vessels are the gun and the torpedo. These may be combined with other offensive weapons, such as mines and aircraft, without altering the classification.
Armoured Coast Defence Vessels. See Note I.	Warships specially constructed for operating in the vicinity of a coastline. Generally heavily armed and well protected, but possessing poor mobility.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 12 inches (305 millimetres). (c) Maximum speed for which ship may be designed: 18 knots.	For example: A warship of greater displacement than 7,500 tons (7,620 metric tons), which mounted a gun of <i>larger</i> calibre than 6 inches (152 millimetres) and which possessed a deck on which aircraft could land and from which aircraft could fly off, would be classified as a battleship, battle cruiser or armoured coast defence vessel.
Cruisers. See Note I.	Warships of medium displacement in which moderate armament and protection are combined with great speed.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 7,500 tons (7,620 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 6 inches (152 millimetres).	If the largest gun mounted in such a warship was of 6-inch calibre, the ship would still be classified as a battleship or battle cruiser if its displacement <i>exceeded</i> 25,000 tons (25,400 metric tons); but, if the displacement was 25,000 tons (25,400 metric tons) or <i>less</i> , this ship would be classified as an aircraft carrier.
Aircraft Carriers. See Note I.	Warships designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft. They must be so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon. The aircraft carrier acts as a mobile base of operations for aircraft.	(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 25,000 tons (25,400 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 6 inches (152 millimetres).	<i>Or again</i> , a warship of 7,500 tons (7,620 metric tons) or less which is built to carry aeroplanes, seaplanes, etc., but which does not possess a deck on which aircraft can land and from which aircraft can fly off would be classified as a cruiser.

ANNEX 5.

NOTES ON JAPANESE PROPOSALS.

Attention was called at the outset to the fact that the capital ships and aircraft carriers covered by the Washington Naval Treaty are not included in the proposal.

1. In Article 1 it is clearly indicated that the new building programmes to be adopted during the period of agreement, in addition to the existing authorised programmes, shall be solely for replacement constructions and shall not be for the purpose of increasing naval strength.

The above-mentioned authorised programmes, according to the investigation of the Japanese experts, are as follows:

For the United States of America Up to and including the programme adopted in the spring of 1927.

For the British Empire Up to and including the programme adopted in the summer of 1925.

For Japan Up to and including the programme adopted in the spring of 1927.

2. Article 2 has to do with how the naval strength to be allowed each Power shall be determined. The idea is that the following four sets of figures should be taken as the factors in prescribing the respective tonnages:

A. The tonnage of existing ships which have not reached the replacement age.

B. The designed tonnage of the ships under construction.

C. The designed tonnage of ships included in authorised programmes but not yet laid down.

D. The tonnage of ships passing the replacement age during the execution of authorised programmes.

It may be further explained that the agreement should be made on the basis of A and B, taking C and D into consideration. A simple example of an agreement that might be reached under the plan is to determine the naval strength by the formula A+B+C—D.

The calculation of tonnages and determination of the strength are to be made under two separate categories of surface auxiliary crafts and submarines.

3. In Article 3 are enumerated the ships which are not to be included in the limitation.

A. The small ships under 700 tons displacement are too limited in seaworthiness and radius of action to be used as modern weapons of war for anything more than coast defence. Accordingly, they have been excluded from this agreement, regardless of whether surface craft or submarines.

B. It is also intended to exclude from the agreement the ships of limited speed and armaments, such as fleet auxiliaries and small gunboats, which do not take position in line of action. The ships under 20 knots and carrying less than four 6-inch guns are considered under the present conditions to come within this category.

C. Aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons are as yet no more than experiments or for purpose of training. Moreover, their effectiveness at high seas is still unknown. Accordingly they should not be subjected to a limitation in the same manner as cruisers and other surface craft possessing definite fighting effectiveness.

4. The replacement ages specified in Article 4 have been worked out on the basis of past experiences and from the point of view of economy in maintenance of old ships.

Although the replacement ages are fixed in this manner, a consideration is given to the fact that, due to the European war, certain Powers have a comparatively large number of ships of certain classes under age, and it may be necessary to build new ships to adjust their relative proportion with other classes of ships. In such cases it is anticipated to permit replacement of certain tonnage of ships under age. On the other hand, it is also taken into consideration that in some cases it may be necessary to replace certain ships under age but actually in bad condition before replacing the ships which have passed the replacement age.

5. The ships replaced must be disposed of in some way. Although the scrapping is the most unmistakable method, it may be necessary to leave the way open to retain some replaced old ships for employment in other than combatant services or by reducing speed and armaments to conform with the provisions of (b) of Article 2. Moreover, in case there are tonnages in excess of the naval strength agreed upon for each Power, such tonnages must be properly disposed of. For these ships, also, the method of disposal already suggested may be applied. In these cases, it may be necessary to consider respective national conditions and to permit appropriate exceptions. In any event it must be decided after further investigation.

6. In case considerable numbers of ships reach replacement age simultaneously and such ships are replaced at the same time, it will result in sudden increase of new strength. Moreover, the result will be a great expansion of expenditures for armaments at one time. It would be more advantageous for each Power to effect replacements over a number of years. Furthermore, it is considered more desirable, not only from the point of view of national finance but also of industrial and social policy, to equalise the amounts of annual construction as far as possible. With this end in view, it is hoped to make appropriate provisions regarding execution of replacements.

Type of Warship. River Gunboats. See Note III.	Description.	Annex 4 (continued).	Limitations proposed	Remarks.
	Small vessels specially designed for operating in shallow waters and in rivers.		(a) Maximum standard displacement permitted: 750 tons (762 metric tons). (b) Maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted: 5 inches (126 millimetres). (c) These vessels may not employ the torpedo as a weapon.	Note III. It is realised that certain agreements exist between certain nations regarding patrol craft employed on inland waterways. There is no intention of upsetting existing agreements, and these might merely be "noted" by the Conference.
Fleet Auxiliaries.	Vessels employed by fleets in an auxiliary capacity such as: Fuel ships. Supply ships. Tenders. Repair ships. Salvage ships. Tugs. Transports, whether for personnel, aircraft, munitions or stores.		(a) No limitation regarding displacement. (b) Designed speed not to exceed 20 knots. (c) Guns mounted for defence must not exceed a calibre of 6 inches (152 millimetres). (d) These vessels may not employ the torpedo as a weapon.	

Surface Vessels built.

Class	Number	Total Tonnage	Year of Completion
Cruiser class	5	33,000	1923
"	4	26,400	1924
"	1	6,600	1925
Total	10	66,000	
Destroyer class	7	5,918	1915
"	8	7,181	1916
"	5	4,586	1917
"	50	50,618	1918
"	105	108,609	1919
"	73	77,077	1920
"	29	30,418	1921
"	3	3,153	1922
Total	280	287,560	

Other Surface Vessels by Name	Tonnage	Year of Completion
Melville	6,175	1915
Henderson	8,660	1917
Isabel	711	1917
Whitney } Guns authorised	9,780	1924
Dobbin } but not on board	9,780	1924
Holland	9,807	1926
Total	44,913	

Submarines Built.

Class	Number	Tonnage	Year of Completion
Submarines	2	1,624	1919
"	9	7,679	1920
"	4	3,236	1921
"	8	7,126	1922
"	19	15,480	1923
"	8	7,730	1924
"	5	5,340	1925
"	1	1,960	1926
Total	56	50,175	

Building.

Class	Number	Tonnage	Year of Completion
Submarines	1	2,769	1927
"	1	2,822	1928
"	1	2,822	1922
Total	3	8,413	

Authorised.

Class	Number	Tonnage
Submarines	3	8,466
Total submarines: 67,054.		

ANNEX 6.

Japan.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF JAPANESE SURFACE AUXILIARY CRAFT AND SUBMARINES

(in relation to paragraph 2 of the Japanese proposals of June 20th, 1927).

Compiled according to the actual state of June 20th, 1927.

Prepared by the Japanese Delegation.

Surface over 3,000.

	A	B	A+B	C	D	A+B+C+D
Number	22	8	30	2	3	29
Tonnage	105,965	74,200	180,165	20,000	13,200	186,965

Ships under 3,000.

Number	81	12	93	14	25	82
Tonnage	83,655	19,630	103,285	23,800	22,280	104,805
Total	189,620	93,830	283,450	43,800	35,480	291,770

Submarines.

Number.	42	13	55	7	2	60
Tonnage	40,904	19,618	60,522	11,870	1,440	70,952

N.B. — A. Completed ships actually possessed which have not reached the replacement age.

B. Ships now in course of construction.

C. Ships not yet laid down but which are embodied in authorised building programmes.

D. Ships which will pass the replacement age during the execution of such programmes.

Under the Japanese plan, the following tonnage would enter into the naval strength of the United States. They are grouped by year of completion in each type of vessel under the classifications of built, building and authorised. The tonnages are expressed approximately in standard tons.

Surface Vessels building.

Class	Number	Total Tonnage	Year of Completion
Cruiser class	2	20,000	1929
Cruiser class	6	60,000	1930
Total	8	80,000	

Surface Vessels authorised.

Class	Number	Total Tonnage
Destroyer class	12	20,400 ¹

¹ Were authorised in 1916. Actual tonnage undetermined.

- (c) Maximum calibre of guns to be 5 inches.
- (d) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 16 years.
- (e) That all vessels Class B may be built having individual displacement not to exceed 1,500 tons, with further proviso that not over 16 per cent of total tonnage of vessels of this class can exceed individual displacement of 1,500 tons.
- (f) Demarcation line between Class A (cruiser class) and Class B (destroyer class) of auxiliary surface combatant vessels to be as follows:

Class A (cruisers) to include surface combatant vessels between 1,850 and 10,000 tons individual displacement, except exempt class.

Class B (destroyers) to include surface combatant vessels between 600 and 1,850 tons individual displacement, except exempt class.

- (g) That "tonnage" shall mean Washington standard tons.

The American delegation stated that they would prefer not to give definite figures as to numbers or total tonnage in the destroyer class at this time, and, further, that any agreement reached in the Technical Committee would be provisional until a decision had been reached as to total tonnage of the cruiser class, and as to the method of transition from the *status quo* to the Treaty status.

The British delegation stated their requirements in the destroyer class as 221,600 tons, of which not more than 29,600 tons would be built in units exceeding 1,500 tons displacement. These figures were provisional pending final agreement on submarines.

The Japanese delegation stated that their proposal concerning the total tonnage of the destroyer class was not yet ready.

Submarines.

The submarine question was discussed by the Technical Committee on July 1st and 2nd. The American delegation re-stated their original proposal made at the plenary session.

The British delegation proposed two classes of submarines, the first class ranging in tonnage from 1,000 to 1,600 tons individual displacement; the second class to include all submarines below individual displacement 600 tons; and the maximum calibre of guns for both types to be 5 inches.

During the discussion of the submarine class, the British delegation stated their possible requirements as 40 to 45 submarines of the larger class and 15 to 20 submarines of the smaller class, total in each case being 60, and that total tonnage of the submarine class would vary from 76,000 to 81,000 tons according to limits of individual displacement agreed upon.

The American delegation opposed the division of submarines into two classes. The Japanese delegation also opposed this division into classes unless submarines of less than 700 tons displacement were exempt.

The following agreements were reached regarding characteristics of the submarine class:

- (a) That the method to be used in calculating the surface displacement of submarines should be as follows:

The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of a vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

- (b) That the maximum individual surface displacement of submarines should be 1,800 tons.

- (c) That the maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted on a submarine should be 5 inches.

- (d) That the age-limit for replacement of new construction of this class should be 13 years.

- (e) That there shall be no exempt class of submarines.

Note. — The Japanese delegation withdrew their proposal that submarines under 700 tons displacement should be exempted from limitation, on the condition that special consideration should be given Japan at the time of allocating the total tonnage of this class.

Exempt Classes.

Exempt classes of naval auxiliary surface vessels were discussed on June 27th and the following agreements were reached:

- (a) That all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons standard displacement be exempt.

- (b) That all naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 2,000 tons individual standard displacement should not be subject to limitation, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch calibre.
- (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch calibre.
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 18 knots.

ANNEX 7.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: FIRST REPORT TO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

Geneva, July 8th, 1927.

The Technical Committee, which was appointed on June 21st, 1927, met on June 22nd and has held nine meetings.

The Technical Committee herewith submits a report indicating the views expressed by the representatives of the three delegations and the provisional agreements arrived at.

On Monday, June 27th, the Committee, after a general discussion, agreed to divide naval auxiliary surface combatant vessels into two classes for the purpose of discussion, this without prejudice to later discussion of total tonnage of the two classes as requested by the Japanese delegation.

The order for discussion of these classes was:

First: Class A (Cruiser Class);

Second: Class B (Destroyer Class); and

Third: Submarine Class.

Class A — Cruiser Class.

At a meeting of the Technical Committee on June 28th, the cruiser class was taken up for discussion. The American delegation re-stated their proposal made at the plenary session of 250,000 to 300,000 tons in the cruiser class, adding that it would accept as low a tonnage in that class as any Power on the principles of the Washington Treaty.

The British delegation proposed two classes of cruisers — a limited number of 10,000-ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns, and a limited number of cruisers of maximum individual displacement of 7,500 tons with maximum calibre of gun 6 inches. The British stated their requirements as 15 of the 10,000-ton 8-inch cruisers, and 55 cruisers of the smaller class carrying 6-inch guns; and, further, if small aircraft carriers and minelayers were included, they would require five additional vessels of the cruiser class. It was then agreed that the American and Japanese delegations would study the British proposal.

The discussion resulted in a general provisional agreement to study two types of cruisers. Subsequent to this meeting, there were numerous informal conversations among the different delegations concerning the cruiser question, which was not considered again by the Technical Committee until July 5th, when the question was re-opened and the American delegation made a statement indicating the modifications of their original proposal that they were prepared to consider in the light of the other proposals that had been advanced.

During the discussion of the cruiser class, the Japanese delegation made no proposal as to total tonnage in that class, but stated that they were ready to lower the maximum displacement of cruisers to 8,000 tons approximately, with 8-inch guns.

The Committee adjourned to enable the delegates to consider the cruiser question in the light of the discussions which had taken place.

Class B — Destroyer Class.

Class B (the destroyer class) was taken up for discussion on June 29th and 30th, the Japanese delegation reserving the right to discuss auxiliary surface combatant vessels as one class.

The American delegation proposed that total tonnage of this class be decided upon prior to discussing characteristics. The Japanese delegation agreed to discuss characteristics of this class, but expressed the opinion that total tonnage or number in class should be left for decision by the chief delegates.

During a discussion of the characteristics of this class, the following proposals were made:

By the British delegation:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement destroyer leaders to be 1,750 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement destroyers to be 1,400 tons.
- (c) Maximum calibre of guns to be 5 inches.
- (d) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 20 years.

By the American delegation:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement destroyer leaders to be 2,000 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement destroyers to be 1,500 tons.
- (c) Age-limit for replacement, 16 years.

By the Japanese delegation:

- (a) As to leaders, no proposal.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement of destroyers to be 1,500 tons.
- (c) Age-limit for replacement to be 12 years.

The following agreements were reached as to characteristics of the destroyer class:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement destroyer leaders to be 1,850 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement destroyers to be 1,500 tons.

During the discussion of the cruiser class, the Japanese delegation made no proposal as to total tonnage in that class, but stated that they were ready to reduce the maximum displacement to 8,000 tons approximately, with freedom to carry 8-inch guns.

The Committee adjourned to enable the delegates to consider the cruiser question further.

Class B — Destroyer Class.

Class B (the destroyer class) was discussed on June 29th and 30th, the Japanese delegation reserving the right to deal with auxiliary surface combatant vessels as one class.

The American delegation proposed that the total tonnage of this class be decided upon prior to the discussion of characteristics. The Japanese delegation agreed to discuss characteristics of this class, but expressed the opinion that the decision in regard to tonnages or numbers in this class should be left to the delegates.

During the discussion of characteristics the following proposals were made:

By the British delegation:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement of destroyer leaders to be 1,750 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement of destroyers to be 1,400 tons.
- (c) Maximum calibre of guns to be 5 inches.
- (d) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 20 years.

By the American delegation:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement of destroyer leaders to be 2,000 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement of destroyers to be 1,500 tons.
- (c) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 16 years.

By the Japanese delegation:

- (a) As to leaders, no proposal.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement of destroyers to be 1,500 tons.
- (c) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 12 years.

The following provisional recommendations as to characteristics of the destroyer class were agreed upon:

- (a) Maximum individual displacement of destroyer leaders to be 1,850 tons.
- (b) Maximum individual displacement of destroyers to be 1,500 tons.
- (c) Maximum calibre of guns to be 5 inches.
- (d) Age-limit for replacement of new construction to be 16 years.
- (e) That the individual displacement of Class B vessels may not exceed 1,500 tons, with the proviso that 16 per cent of the total tonnage of Class B vessels may be used in construction of vessels exceeding 1,500 tons and less than 1,850 tons displacement.
- (f) The demarcation line between Class A (cruiser class) and Class B (destroyer class) of auxiliary surface combatant vessels to be as follows:

Class A (cruisers) to include surface combatant vessels between 1,850 and 10,000 tons individual displacement, excluding vessels of the exempt class.

Class B (destroyers) to include surface combatant vessels between 600 and 1,850 tons individual displacement, excluding vessels of the exempt class.

(g) That displacement shall be calculated according to the standard condition defined in the Washington Treaty.

The American delegation stated that they would prefer not to give definite figures as to numbers or total tonnage in the destroyer class at this time. On the basis of the above provisional recommendations, the British delegation stated their requirements in the destroyer class as 221,600 tons, of which not more than 29,600 tons would be built in units exceeding 1,500 tons displacement. These figures were provisional pending final agreement on submarines.

The Japanese delegation stated that they preferred not to make any proposal concerning the total tonnage of the destroyer class.

Class C — Submarine Class.

The submarine question was discussed by the Technical Committee on July 1st and 2nd.

The American delegation re-stated their original proposal made at the plenary session.

The British delegation proposed two types of submarine, the larger type ranging in tonnage from 1,000 to 1,600 tons individual displacement; the smaller type to include all submarines under 600 tons displacement; the maximum calibre of guns for both types to be 5 inches, and the replacement age of new construction to be 15 years.

During the discussion of the submarine class, the British delegation stated their possible requirements as 40 to 45 submarines of the larger type and 15 to 20 of the smaller type, the total in either case being 60, and that the total tonnage of such vessels would vary from 76,000 to 81,000 tons according to maximum displacements agreed upon.

The American delegation opposed the division of submarines into two classes. The Japanese delegation also opposed such division unless submarines of less than 700 tons displacement were exempt.

The following provisional recommendations regarding characteristics of the submarine class were agreed upon:

- (a) That the method to be used in calculating the surface displacement of submarines should be as follows:

(c) That all naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, should not be subject to limitation provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch calibre.
- (2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch calibre.
- (3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.
- (4) Are designed for a speed greater than 18 knots.
- (5) Are armoured.
- (6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines.
- (7) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.
- (8) Mount more than one aeroplane-launching apparatus on the centre line, or two, one on each broadside.

(d) Certain existing vessels of special type to be exempted by name by mutual agreement.

Aircraft Carrier Class.

The question of small aircraft carriers was discussed and it was agreed to reserve this for further discussion.

General.

It was agreed that the age-limits to be agreed upon for replacement of new construction should only apply to vessels of all classes laid down subsequent to August 17th, 1923, the date of final ratification of the Washington Treaty.

In every discussion of characteristics of different classes of vessels, it was decided that all agreements reached would be regarded as provisional and, in so far as the American delegation is concerned, provisional upon final agreements as to total tonnage limitation in all categories.

Signed on behalf of the Committee:

F. L. FIELD, *Vice-Admiral,*
Chairman of the Committee.

ANNEX 8.

TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: FIRST REPORT AS REVISED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE AND ISSUED TO THE PRESS.

Geneva, July 8th, 1927.

The Technical Committee, which was appointed on June 21st, 1927, met on June 22nd and has held nine meetings.

The Technical Committee herewith submits a report indicating the views expressed by the representatives of the three delegations and the provisional recommendations agreed upon.

On Monday, June 27th, the Committee, after a general discussion, agreed to divide naval auxiliary surface combatant vessels into two classes for the purpose of discussion, this without prejudice to later discussion of total tonnage of the two classes as requested by the Japanese delegation.

The order for discussion of these classes was:

- First: Class A (Cruiser Class);
- Second: Class B (Destroyer Class); and
- Third: Class C (Submarine Class).

Class A — Cruiser Class.

At a meeting of the Technical Committee on June 28th, the cruiser class was taken up for discussion. The American delegation resisted their proposal made at the plenary session of 250,000 to 300,000 tons in the cruiser class, adding that it would accept such lower tonnage in that class, on the principles of the Washington Treaty, as might be acceptable to the other delegations.

The British delegation proposed two types of cruisers — a limited number of 10,000-ton cruisers carrying 8-inch guns and a limited number of cruisers of maximum individual displacement of 7,500 tons carrying a gun armament not to exceed 6 inches in calibre.

The British stated their requirements as 15 8-inch-gun cruisers, and 55 cruisers of the smaller type carrying 6-inch guns; if small aircraft carriers and minelayers were included in the cruiser class, they would require five additional vessels. It was agreed that the American and Japanese delegations would study the British proposals with a view to further discussion in the Technical Committee.

Following numerous informal conversations among the different delegations, the cruiser question was re-opened in the Technical Committee on July 5th, and the American delegation indicated certain modifications of their original proposal which they were prepared to consider in the light of other proposals that had been advanced.

According to the basis of calculation as submitted by the Japanese delegation, the surface auxiliary strength of the British Empire would be 472,000 tons.

The tonnage allocation suggested by the American delegation in regard to surface auxiliary vessels is from 450,000 to 550,000 tons for the United States and British Empire, subject to the intimation that the United States would welcome any proposal for still lower tonnage levels.

Limitation being our main object, it would seem to the Japanese delegation that the adoption in principle of the minimum figure proposed by the United States delegation as a basis of our discussion would be a course most conducive to a speedy consummation of the task before the Conference.

If, consequently, we may take the figure of 450,000 tons for the United States and British Empire as a basis, the Japanese delegation would propose, for the tonnage of surface auxiliary vessels to be allotted to Japan, a figure of somewhat above 300,000 tons; it being understood that they are quite prepared at the same time to accept reduced figures in concert with the other delegations.

In addition to this, the Japanese delegation desire now to propose a figure of around 70,000 tons for Japan in respect of submarines.

ANNEX 10.

STATEMENT BY BRITISH DELEGATES REGARDING SURFACE AUXILIARY VESSELS (CRUISERS AND DESTROYERS).

July 7th, 1927.

With reference to the statement which the Japanese delegation propose to place before the Executive Committee, in which it is calculated that the total tonnage of auxiliary surface vessels, built, building and projected, of the British Empire will be 472,000 tons—a figure only slightly in excess of the minimum total tonnage figure for those vessels proposed by the United States, viz., 450,000 tons, it must be remembered that this figure of 472,000 is based on the Japanese age-limits. If, however, the calculation is made on the existing British age-limits, viz., 20 years for cruisers and 16 years for destroyers, the resultant figures would be as follows:

	A	B	A + B	C.	D.	A + B + C — D
	<i>Ships over 3,000 tons.</i>					
Number	48	12	60	12	3	69
Tons	240,036	116,740	356,776	108,100	14,580	450,296
	<i>Ships under 3,000 tons.</i>					
Number	168	2	170	27		
Tons	173,060	2,540	175,600	38,850		214,450
				Total		664,746

Column A refers to ships built.

Column B refers to ships under construction.

Column C refers to ships authorised and projected but not yet laid down.

Column D refers to those ships (included in A) that will reach the age for replacement during the execution of the programme shown in column C.

Ships in column D include all ships over 3,000 tons whose dates of completion are prior to June 20th, 1912, i.e., 20 years' life, and for ships under 3,000 tons whose dates of completion are prior to June 20th, 1915, i.e., 16 years' life.

Submarines.

With regard to the total submarine tonnage figures of 70,000 tons mentioned in the last paragraph of the Japanese statement placed before the meeting, the British delegation desire to place on record that the limitation British figure of 76,000-81,000 tons given for this type of vessel during discussion at the Technical Committee will have to be increased to a figure in the region of 116,500 tons. The British delegation would emphasise that this increase is very largely due to the fact that neither the United States nor the Japanese representatives would agree to submarines being divided into two types, and there is therefore no guarantee that the total tonnage finally agreed upon will not be used entirely for constructing submarines of large offensive power.

The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of a vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure), fully manned, engined and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

(b) That the maximum individual surface displacement of submarines should be 1,800 tons.

(c) That the maximum calibre of gun that may be mounted on a submarine should be 5 inches.

(d) That the age-limit for replacement of new construction of this class should be 13 years.

(e) That there shall be no exempt class of submarines.

Note. — The Japanese delegation withdrew their proposal that submarines under 700 tons displacement should be exempted from limitation, on the condition that special consideration should be given Japan at the time of allocating the total tonnage of this class.

Exempt Classes.

Exempt classes of naval auxiliary surface vessels were discussed on June 27th and the following provisional recommendations were agreed upon:

(a) That all naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons standard displacement be exempt.

(b) That all naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 2,000 tons individual standard displacement should be exempt from limitation, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

(1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch calibre.

(2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch calibre.

(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.

(4) Are designed for a speed greater than 18 knots.

(c) That all naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, should be exempt from limitation provided they have none of the following characteristics:

(1) Mount a gun greater than 6-inch calibre.

(2) Mount more than four guns above 3-inch calibre.

(3) Are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes.

(4) Are designed for a speed greater than 18 knots.

(5) Are armoured.

(6) Are designed or fitted to launch mines.

(7) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.

(8) Mount more than one aeroplane-launching apparatus on the centre line; or two, one on each broadside.

(d) Certain existing vessels of special type to be exempted by name by mutual agreement.

Small Aircraft-Carrier Class.

The subject of small aircraft carriers was broached, but it was agreed to reserve it for later discussion.

General.

It was recommended that the age-limits to be agreed upon for replacement of new construction should only apply to vessels of all classes laid down subsequent to August 17th, 1923, the date of final ratification of the Washington Treaty.

The American delegation stated, in the course of the meetings, that its agreement to all recommendations decided upon in Committee was provisional upon decisions that might be reached upon the two following points, viz.:

(1st) Total tonnage limitations in all categories;

(2nd) Methods to be adopted to provide for transition from the *status quo* to the ultimate status contemplated by the Treaty.

Signed on behalf of the Committee:

F. L. FIELD, *Vice-Admiral,*
Chairman of the Committee.

ANNEX 9.

STATEMENT BY THE JAPANESE DELEGATION.

July 8th, 1927.

It will be remembered that, in the statement made by the Japanese delegation at the first plenary meeting, emphasis was laid upon the existing status which they proposed should form the basis of any allocation of tonnages that might be decided upon at the present Conference.

Vessels Built.

Number	Total tonnage	Year of completion
3	2,400	1917
11	8,800	1918
5	4,070	1919
5	5,490	1920
2	1,670	1921
2	2,656	1923
2	1,670	1924
2	3,395	1925
2	1,600	1926
Total . . 34	31,751	

June 21st, 1927.

ANNEX 11 a.

British Empire.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF BRITISH CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES
(in relation to paragraph 2 of the Japanese proposals of June 20th, 1927).

Prepared by the British delegation.

For the purposes of this return, the date June 20th, 1911, is taken as the datum date for cruisers and June 20th, 1915, as the datum date for destroyers and submarines, *i.e.*, vessels built subsequent to these dates are included in the numbers and tonnage.

Type of ship	Built	Building	Money appropriated for but not yet laid down	Projected, but money not yet appropriated	Totals
<i>Cruisers.</i>					
Number	48 ¹	11	3	9	71
Tonnage	240,036	110,000	28,300	79,800	458,136
<i>Destroyers².</i>					
Number	168	2	—	27	197
Tonnage	173,060	2,540	—	38,850	214,450
<i>Submarines.</i>					
Number	34	3	6	18	61
Tonnage	31,751	4,145	9,240	28,800	73,936
<i>Cruiser-Minelayer.</i>					
Number	—	1	—	—	1
Tonnage	—	6,740	—	—	6,740

¹ Of these, *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* will reach the age-limit in October 1927.

² "Destroyers" include "Flotilla Leaders". Washington standard displacement is used throughout for tonnage.

ANNEX 11.

British Empire.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE AND DATE OF COMPLETION OF CRUISERS, DESTROYERS AND SUBMARINES

(in relation to paragraph 2 of the Japanese proposals of June 20th, 1927).

Prepared by the British delegation in the form suggested by the American delegation.

SURFACE VESSELS

Vessels Building.

Class	Number	Total tonnage	Year of completion
Cruiser	4	40,000	1927
Cruiser	3	30,000	1928
Cruiser	4	40,000	1929
Destroyer	2	2,540	1927
Cruiser-Minelayer	1	6,740	1927

Vessels authorised and Money appropriated for but not yet laid down.

Cruiser	3	28,300	—
Destroyer	Nil	—	—
Cruiser-Minelayer	Nil	—	—

Vessels projected, but Money not yet appropriated.

Cruiser	9	79,800	—
Destroyer	27	38,850	—
Cruiser-Minelayer	Nil	—	—

Vessels Built.

Cruiser:	2	9,720	1911
	1	4,860	1912
	2	10,240	1913
	2	10,240	1914
	7	27,340	1915
	6	25,120	1916
	6	25,410	1917
	7	37,326	1918
	6	32,100	1919
	1	4,850	1921
	4	19,000	1922
	1	9,860	1924
	2	16,870	1925
	1	7,100	1926
Destroyer :	11	11,360	1916
	39	39,885	1917
	65	67,740	1918
	42	41,640	1919
	5	3,165	1920
	2	2,025	1922
	1	1,120	1923
	3	3,165	1924
	2	2,960	1925
Total	168	173,060	—

SUBMARINES.

Vessels Building.

Number	Total tonnage	Year of completion
3	4,145	1927

Vessels authorised and Money appropriated for but not yet laid down.

6	9,240	—
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Vessels projected but Money not yet appropriated.

18	28,800	—
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Japan.

Year	Ships laid down	Ships completed	Ships scrapped (age in parentheses)	Ships retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1930	—	—	—	8	2
1931	A	—	—	8	2
1932	B	—	—	8	2
1933	—	—	—	8	2
1934	C	A	Kongo (21)	7	3
1935	—	B	Hiei (21)	6	4
1936	D	—	—	6	4
1937	—	C	Haruna (22)	—	—
			Kirishima (22)	4	5
1938	E	—	—	4	5
1939	F	D	Fuso (24)	3	6
1940	—	—	—	3	6
1941	G	E	Yamashiro (24)	2	7
1942	—	F	Ise (25)	1	8
1943	H	—	—	1	8
1944	—	G	Hiuga (26)	—	9
1945	—	—	—	—	9
1946	—	H	Nagato (26)	—	9

France and Italy.

Should France and Italy wish to conform to this increase in age-limit for capital ships, the tables showing their replacement programmes in the Washington Treaty could be amended so as to give their existing capital ships an increased average age up to about 25 years.

ANNEX 11 c.

British Empire.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF AUXILIARY NAVAL ARMAMENT

(in relation to U.S.A. proposals of June 20th, 1927).

Prepared by the British delegation.

Notes:

- (1) Age-limits: cruisers 20 years, destroyers 15-17 years, submarines 12-13 years.
- (2) Destroyers under 600 tons Washington standard displacement are not included.
- (3) All submarines under the age-limit are included.
- (4) "Destroyer" includes flotilla leaders.

W. Ships built.

Class	Number	Tonnage	Remarks
Cruiser	48	240,036	Total surface vessels.
Destroyer	168	173,060	413,096 tons.
Submarine	55	40,541	

X. Ships building.

Cruiser	11	110,000	Total cruisers W+X	350,036	532,376
Cruiser-minelayer	1	6,740	Total destroyers W+X	175,600	
Destroyer	2	2,540	Cruiser-minelayer	6,740	
Submarine	3	4,145	Total submarines W+X	44,686	

ANNEX 11 b.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE WASHINGTON TREATY, CHAPTER II,
SECTION II, BASED ON AN INCREASED AGE-LIMIT FOR CAPITAL SHIPS
UP TO AN AVERAGE LENGTH OF LIFE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS.

Prepared by the British delegation.

British Empire.

Year	Ships laid down	Ships completed	Ships scrapped (age in parentheses)	Ships retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1931	C	—	—	17	3
1932	D	—	—	17	3
1933	E	—	—	17	3
1934	F	C	Iron Duke (20)	15	4
			Marlborough (20)		
1935	G	D	Emperor of India (21)	13	5
			Benbow (21)		
1936	H	E	Tiger (22)	11	6
			Queen Elizabeth (21)		
1937	I	F	Warspite (22)	9	7
			Barham (22)		
1938	J	G	Malaya (22)	7	8
			Royal Sovereign (22)		
1939	K	H	Revenge (23)	6	9
1940	L	I	Resolution (24)	5	10
1941	M	J	Royal Oak (25)	4	11
1942	N	K	Repulse (26)	3	12
1943	O	L	Valiant (27)	2	13
		M	Renown (28)	1	14
1944	—	N	Ramillies (28)	—	15
1945	—	O	Hood (26)	—	15
1946	—	—	—	—	—

United States of America.

Year	Ships laid down	Ships completed	Ships scrapped (Age in parentheses)	Ships retained	
				Pre-Jutland	Post-Jutland
1930	—	—	—	15	3
1931	C	—	—	15	3
1932	D	—	—	15	3
1933	E	—	—	15	3
1934	F	C	Florida (23)	14	4
1935	G	D	Utah (24), Wyoming(23)	12	5
1936	H	E	Arkansas (24)	11	6
1937	I	F	Texas (23), New York (23)	9	7
1938	J	G	Nevada (22), Oklahoma (22)	7	8
1939	K	H	Arizona (23)	6	9
1940	L	I	Pennsylvania (24)	5	10
1941	M	J	Mississippi (24)	4	11
1942	N	K	New Mexico (24)	3	12
1943	O	L	Idaho (24)	2	13
1944	—	M	Tennessee (24)	1	14
1945	—	N	California (24)	—	15
1946	—	O	Maryland (25)	—	15

ANNEX 12.

MEMORANDUM BY AMERICAN MEMBER OF TECHNICAL COMMITTEE.

June 22nd, 1927.

Reply to the "Questions concerning the American Proposal" asked by the Japanese delegation at the first meeting of the Technical Committee on June 22nd, 1927:

1. *Question.* — "We should like to know what kinds of ships, in your estimation, will come under the category of the exempt class (d)."

Answer. — The unrestricted class of vessels is subject under the American proposal to technical agreement. The American delegation presents no hard-and-fast proposal regarding this class, except that it proposes as exempt surface vessels exclusively. In the studies of the American delegation, they have concluded that the following classes of vessels might properly be excluded from any limitation arrived at:

- (a) All naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons displacement.
- (b) All naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 3,000 tons displacement having a speed of less than 17 knots.
- (c) Certain existing vessels of less than 3,000 tons displacement having a speed of 17 knots or more as follows:
 - United States vessels:
 - 1 converted yacht of 938 tons.
 - British vessels:
 - 6 small surface vessels having a total tonnage of 6,092 tons.
 - Japanese vessels:
 - 6 minesweepers of a total tonnage of 4,200 tons.
 - 3 small gunboats of a total tonnage of 4,063 tons.

These vessels not subject to replacement.

- (d) All naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) Mount a gun greater than 5½ inches in calibre.
- (2) Mount a battery firing an aggregate weight of projectiles of more than 500 pounds.
- (3) Are armoured.
- (4) Are fitted to launch torpedoes or mines.
- (5) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.
- (6) Are capable of a speed greater than 17 knots.

- (e) Certain existing special vessels as follows:

- United States vessels:
 - 2 old minelayers of 3,800 tons each.
- British vessels:
 - 5 monitors of a total tonnage of 34,270 tons.
- Japanese vessels:
 - 2 old minelayers of a total tonnage of 17,685 tons.
 - 2 old training ships of a total tonnage of 28,258 tons.

These vessels not subject to replacement.

2. *Question.* — "Is there any special reason for fixing the displacement tonnage of destroyers at over 600 tons and speed at over 17 knots?"

Answer. — The limits proposed for the destroyer class appeared to be natural limits. The American proposal was not intended to imply that destroyers would be of 3,000 tons displacement or of 600 tons displacement, but rather that the class in which the destroyers are limited in total tonnage should be defined by an upper limit of 3,000 tons displacement and a lower limit of 600 tons. It was the desire of the American delegation to provide tonnage limitations such that there would be no specific displacements between 600 and 10,000 tons not covered by a limitation. There was no other special reason for the dividing lines between the destroyer and cruiser classes and between the destroyers and exempt classes. It will be noted that the American proposal recognises that vessels other than cruisers strictly so called may be included within the cruiser class limitation and that vessels other than destroyers or destroyer leaders strictly so called may be included in the destroyer class limitation of total tonnage.

Y. Ships for which Money has been appropriated, but not yet laid down.

Class	Number	Tonnage	Remarks
Cruiser	3	28,300	Total cruisers W+X+Y . . . 378,336
Destroyer	—	—	Total destroyers W+X+Y . . . 175,600
			Cruiser-minelayer 6,740
Submarine	6	9,240	Total submarines W+X+Y . . . 53,926

Z. Ships projected, but Money not yet appropriated.

Cruiser	9	79,800	Total cruisers W+X+Y+Z . . . 458,136
Destroyer	27	38,850	Total destroyers W+Z+X+Y . . . 214,450
			Cruiser-minelayer 6,740
Submarine	18	28,800	Total submarines W+X+Y+Z . . . 82,726

Washington standard displacement is used throughout.

ANNEX 11d.

British Empire.

NUMBER AND TONNAGE OF SURFACE AUXILIARY CRAFT AND SUBMARINES

(in relation to paragraph 2 of the Japanese proposals of June 20th, 1927).

Prepared by the British delegation.

	A	B	A+B	C	D	A+B+C+D
SURFACE SHIPS.						
<i>Over 3,000 tons, Age-limit 16 years.</i>						
Number	48	12	60	12	16	56
Tonnage	240,036	116,740	356,776	108,100	70,245	394,631
<i>Under 3,000 tons, Age-limit 12 years.</i>						
Number	168	2	170	27	134	63
Tonnage	173,060	2,540	175,600	38,850	136,640	77,810
<i>Total.</i>						
Number	216	14	230	39	150	119
Tonnage	413,096	119,280	532,376	146,950	206,885	472,441
SUBMARINES.						
<i>All types included. Age-limit 12 years.</i>						
Number	55	3	58	24	29	53
Tonnage	40,541	4,145	44,686	38,040	18,245	64,481

Column A refers to ships built which have not reached the age for replacement.

Column B refers to ships under construction.

Column C refers to ships authorised and projected but not yet laid down.

Column D refers to those ships (included in A) that will reach the age for replacement during the execution of the programme shown in column C.

Note:

- (i) The year for the completion of the programme laid down in column C is assumed to be, for cruisers 1932, for destroyers and submarines 1931, i.e., ships in column D include all ships over 3,000 tons whose dates of completion are prior to June 20th, 1916, and all ships under 3,000 tons and submarines whose dates of completion are prior to June 20th, 1919.

- (ii) Washington standard tonnage is used throughout.

ANNEX 13.

AUXILIARY FIGHTING SHIPS AND FLEET AUXILIARIES

PROPOSALS FOR UNRESTRICTED CLASSES

U.S.A. Proposals	Japanese Proposals	British Proposals
(a) All naval surface combatant vessels of less than 600 tons displacement.	(a) Surface ships not exceeding 700 tons displacement.	(a) Surface ships not exceeding 400 tons displacement which do not mount guns of over 3 inches in calibre.
(b) All naval surface combatant vessels of 600 to 3,000 tons displacement having a speed of less than 17 knots.	(b) (See (c) below.)	(b) Surface ships of 1,500 tons displacement and below that do not mount guns of over 5 inches in calibre and that do not employ the torpedo as a weapon.
(c) All naval vessels not specifically built as fighting ships nor taken in time of peace under Government control for fighting purposes, which are employed in fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way other than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:	(c) Surface vessels carrying not more than four guns that exceed 3 inches in calibre but do not exceed 6 inches in calibre provided that the speed does not exceed 20 knots. Such vessels may carry, in addition to the above armament, any number of guns not exceeding 3 inches in calibre.	(c) Surface vessels whose designed speed does not exceed 20 knots, whose guns do not exceed a calibre of 6 inches and which do not employ the torpedo as a weapon.
(1) Mount a gun greater than 5.5 inches in calibre.		
(2) Mount a battery firing an aggregate weight of projectiles of more than 500 pounds.		
(3) Are armoured.		
(4) Are fitted to launch torpedoes or mines.		
(5) Are fitted to receive planes on board from the air.		
(6) Are capable of a speed greater than 17 knots.		

Submarines

(d) No exemption proposed.	(d) Submarines not exceeding 700 tons displacement.	(d) No exemption proposed.
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Aircraft carriers

(e)	(e) Aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons.	(e)
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3. *Question.* — "Is there any special reason for the replacement ages fixed? What is the reason for showing two different figures for replacement ages for destroyers and submarines?"

Answer. — There is no reason, other than experience, for the replacement ages fixed. These ages were arrived at by the technical experts in Washington after considering the experience of the American Navy, and the ages there determined are those submitted in the American proposals. They represent the best experience available to us as to the useful life of the vessels in these classes.

The reason for showing two different figures for replacement ages of destroyers and submarines is to indicate limits of replacement ages which would be acceptable to the United States. For instance, a replacement age for destroyers of either 15, 16, or 17 years might be acceptable.

4. *Question.* — "Kindly explain how the tonnages to be allotted to each Power for different classes of ships have been derived, and also how the two different tonnages for each class of ship are to be applied."

Answer. — The two tonnages for different classes of ships are purely estimates of limitation within which limits it was hoped the conferring Powers might find an acceptable total tonnage limitation.

The tonnage for each class of ships should be applied for each of the several Powers according to the principles of the Washington Treaty. For instance, if 300,000 tons of cruisers were allowed the United States, the same amount would be allowed the British Empire and 180,000 tons allowed Japan. If 275,000 tons of cruisers were allowed the United States, the same amount would be allowed the British Empire and 615,000 tons of cruisers would be allowed Japan.

5. *Question.* — "Kindly give the reason for considering the existing cruiser and destroyer tonnage together during the transition period."

Answer. — The reasons for considering the existing cruiser and destroyer tonnage together during the transition period were two:

First. — To prevent the scrapping of comparatively good ships in one class and the building of ships in another class to replace them;

Second. — The maintenance of as reasonable an adjustment of naval strengths during the transition periods as possible.

Little		Crosby	
Kimberly		Meredith	
Sigourney		Bush	
Gregory		Cowell	
Stringham		Maddox	
Dyer		Foot	
Colhoun	1,027	Kalk	1,027
Stevens		MacKenzie	
McKee		Renshaw	
Robinson		O'Bannon	
Ringgold		Hogan	
McKean		Howard	
Harding		Stansbury	
Gridley		Hopewell	
Fairfax	990	Thomas	1,049
Taylor		Haraden	
Bell		Abbot	
Schley		Bagley	
Champlin		Clemson	
Mugford	1,027	Dahlgren	
Chew		Goldsborough	
Hazelwood		Semmes	
Williams		Satterlee	
Crane		Mason	
Rathburne		Abel P. Upshur	
Talbot		Hunt	
Waters	990	Welborn C. Wood	
Dent		George E. Badger	
Dorsey		Branch	
Lea		Herndon	
Lamberton		Dallas	
Radford		Chandler	
Montgomery		Southard	
Breese	1,049	Hovey	
Gamble		Long	
Ramsay		Broome	
Tattnall		Alden	
Badger		Smith Thompson	
Twiggs	1,047	Barker	
Babbitt		Tracey	
Jacob Jones		Borie	
Buchanan		John D. Edwards	
Aaron Ward		Whipple	
Hale		Parrot	
Crowninshield		Edsall	
Tillman		MacLeish	1,051
Boggs		Simpson	
Kilty		Bulmer	
Kennison		McCormick	
Ward		Stewart	
Claxton		Pope	
Hamilton		Peary	
Tarbell		Pillsbury	
Yarnall	990	John D. Ford	
Upshur		Truxtun	
Greer		Paul Jones	
Elliot		Hatfield	
Roper		Brooks	
Breckinridge		Gilmer	
Barney		Fox	
Blakeley		Kane	
Biddle		Humphreys	
Dupont		McFarland	
Bernadou		James K. Paulding	
Ellis		Overton	
Cole		Sturtevant	
J. Fred Talbot		Childs	
Dickerson		King	
Leary	1,047	Sands	
Schenck		Williamson	
Herbert		Reuben James	
Palmer		Bainbridge	
Thatcher	1,027	Goff	
Walker		Barry	

ANNEX 14.

UNITED STATES SHIPS: DISPLACEMENTS IN WASHINGTON STANDARD TONNAGE.

Prepared by the United States delegation.

An approximation of the standard tonnage of existing United States ships of over 600 tons displacement, obtained by subtracting the weight of fuel and reserve feed-water from normal displacement. No allowance has been made for changes in weights since normal tonnage was last determined.

The normal displacement is the displacement of the vessel fully equipped, ready for sea, with normal stores, ammunition and fuel, in accordance with our national system of measurement.

LIGHT CRUISERS (First Line).

Authorized and appropriated for.

No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
No. 26		No. 29	
No. 27	10,000	No. 30	10,000
No. 28		No. 31	

Building.

Pensacola	10,000	Salt Lake City	10,000
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Built.

Omaha		Richmond	
Milwaukee		Concord	
Cincinnati	6,600	Trenton	6,600
Raleigh		Marblehead	
Detroit		Memphis	

CRUISERS (Second Line).

Built.

Rochester	7,400	Seattle	
Pittsburgh		Charlotte	13,534
Huntington		Missoula	
Pueblo	12,715	St. Louis	9,000
Frederick		Charleston	
Huron			

LIGHT CRUISERS (Second Line).

Built.

Chester		Chattanooga	
Birmingham	3,209	Galveston	2,693
Salem		Cleveland	
Olympia	5,465	New Orleans	2,983
Denver	2,693	Albany	
Des Moines			

DESTROYERS (First Line).

Built.

Duncan	797	Rowan	905
Aylwin		Allen	865
Parker		Caldwell	
Benham	819	Craven	
Balch		Gwin	939
O'Brien		Conner	
Nicholson		Stockton	
Winslow	832	Manley	
Cushing		Wickes	
Wadsworth	854	Philip	990
Sampson	905	Evans	

SUBMARINES (First Line).

Built.			
S-1	816	S-28	
S-2	751	S-29	
S-3		S-30	
S-4		S-31	
S-5		S-32	
S-6	812	S-33	
S-7		S-34	816
S-8		S-35	
S-9		S-36	
S-10		S-37	
S-11		S-38	
S-12		S-39	
S-13	808	S-40	
S-14		S-41	
S-15		S-42	
S-16		S-43	
S-17		S-44	845
S-18		S-45	
S-19		S-46	
S-20		S-47	
S-21		S-48	
S-22	816	S-49	915
S-23		S-50	
S-24		S-51	
S-25			
S-26			
S-27			

SUBMARINES (Second Line).

Built.			
H-2	341	R-2	
H-3		R-3	
K-1		R-4	
K-2		R-5	
K-3	361	R-6	
K-4		R-7	
K-5		R-8	
K-6		R-9	
K-7		R-10	
K-8		R-11	543
L-2		R-12	
L-3	419	R-13	
L-9		R-14	
L-11		R-15	
N-1		R-16	
N-2	328	R-17	
N-3		R-18	
O-1		R-19	
O-2		R-20	
O-3		R-21	
O-4		R-22	
O-6	487	R-23	462
O-7		R-24	
O-8		R-25	
O-9		R-26	
O-10		R-27	
O-11		H-4	
O-12		H-5	
O-13	451	H-6	340
O-14		H-7	
O-15		H-8	
O-16		H-9	
R-1	543		

FLEET SUBMARINES (First Line).

Building.			
V-5	2,822	V-6	2,822

Hopkins		Percival	
Lawrence		John Francis Burnes	
Belknap		Farragut	
McCook		Somers	
McCalla		Stoddert	
Rodgers		Reno	
Osmond Ingram		Farquhar	
Bancroft		Thompson	
Welles		Kennedy	
Aulick		Paul Hamilton	
Turner		William Jones	
Gillis		Zeilin	
McDermut		Yarborough	
Laub		La Valette	
McLamhan		Sloat	
Edwards		Wood	
Greene		Shirk	
Ballard		Kidder	
Shubrick		Selfridge	
Bailey		Marcus	
Thornton		Mervine	
Morris		Chase	
Tingey	1,051	Robert Smith	1,051
Swasey		Mullany	
Meade		Coghlan	
Sinclair		Preston	
McCawley		Lamson	
Moody		Bruce	
Henshaw		Hull	
Meyer		McDonough	
Doyen		Farenholt	
Sharkey		Sumner	
Toucey		Corry	
Breck		Melvin	
Isherwood		Litchfield	
Case		Zane	
Lerner		Wasmuth	
Putnam		Trever	
Worden		Perry	
Flusser		Decatur	
Dale		Hulbert	
Converse		Noa	
Reid		William B. Preston	
Billingsley		Preble	
Charles Ausburn		Sicard	
Osborne		Pruitt	

DESTROYERS (Second Line).

Built.			
Drayton	649	Mayrant	649
Perkins		Walke	
Sterett		Jarvis	
Warrington		Jenkins	

LIGHT MINELAYERS.

Built.			
Stribling	1,027	Hart	1,027
Murray		Ingraham	
Israel		Ludlow	
Luce		Burns	
Mauzy		Anthony	
Lansdale		Sproston	
Mahan		Rival	

MINELAYERS (Second Line).

Built.			
Baltimore	4,026	Aroostook	4,286
San Francisco	4,060	Shawmut	

OILERS.

Built.

<i>Kanawha</i>		<i>Trinity</i>	15,504
<i>Maumee</i>	12,916	<i>Robert L. Barnes</i>	3,700
<i>Cuyama</i>		<i>Ka-weah</i>	
<i>Brazos</i>	13,216	<i>Laramie</i>	13,062
<i>Neches</i>	13,685	<i>Mattole</i>	
<i>Pecos</i>		<i>Rapidan</i>	
<i>Sara Thompson</i>	5,153	<i>Salinas</i>	15,504
<i>Patoka</i>		<i>Sepulga</i>	
<i>Sapelo</i>	15,304	<i>Tippicanoe</i>	
<i>Ramapo</i>			

AMMUNITION SHIPS.

Built.

<i>Pyro</i>	9,893	<i>Nitro</i>	9,893
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CARGO SHIPS.

Built.

<i>Killery</i>	2,904	<i>Sirius</i>	
<i>Capella</i>	9,870	<i>Spica</i>	9,870
<i>Regulus</i>	9,156	<i>Vega</i>	

TRANSPORTS.

Built.

<i>Henderson</i>	8,660	<i>Chaumont</i>	8,964
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AUXILIARIES. — MINESWEEPERS.

Built.

<i>Lapwing</i>		<i>Pelican</i>	
<i>Owl</i>		<i>Falcon</i>	
<i>Robin</i>		<i>Seagull</i>	
<i>Swallow</i>		<i>Tern</i>	
<i>Tanager</i>		<i>Penguin</i>	
<i>Oriole</i>		<i>Swan</i>	
<i>Finch</i>		<i>Whippoorwill</i>	
<i>Heron</i>		<i>Bittern</i>	
<i>Turkey</i>		<i>Sanderling</i>	
<i>Woodcock</i>		<i>Chewink</i>	
<i>Quail</i>	840	<i>Cormorant</i>	840
<i>Partridge</i>		<i>Gannet</i>	
<i>Eider</i>		<i>Grebe</i>	
<i>Thrush</i>		<i>Mallard</i>	
<i>Avocet</i>		<i>Ortolan</i>	
<i>Boblink</i>		<i>Peacock</i>	
<i>Lark</i>		<i>Pigeon</i>	
<i>Widgeon</i>		<i>Sandpiper</i>	
<i>Teal</i>		<i>Vireo</i>	
<i>Brant</i>		<i>Warbler</i>	
<i>Kingfisher</i>		<i>Willet</i>	
<i>Rail</i>			

AUXILIARIES. — MISCELLANEOUS.

Built.

<i>Hannibal</i>	1,804	<i>Antares</i>	
<i>General Alava</i>	862	<i>Procyon</i>	9,870
<i>Gold Star</i>			9,156

UNCLASSIFIED.

Built.

<i>Annapolis</i>	910	<i>Wheeling</i>	870
<i>Dubuque</i>	981	<i>Wilmington</i>	1,282
<i>Newport</i>	910	<i>Briarcliff</i>	
<i>Paducah</i>	981	<i>Newton</i>	5,460

Built.

<i>T-1</i>		<i>V-1</i>	
<i>T-2</i>	1,026	<i>V-2</i>	1,960
<i>T-3</i>		<i>V-3</i>	

FLEET SUBMARINES (Minelaying Type).

Building.

<i>V-4</i>	2,769
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PATROL VESSELS. — GUNBOATS.

Built.

<i>Helena</i>	1,282	<i>Tulsa</i>	1,270
<i>Sacramento</i>	1,141	<i>Elcano</i>	526
<i>Asherville</i>	1,270		

PATROL BOATS. — CONVERTED YACHTS.

Built.

<i>Mayflower</i>	2,385	<i>Niagara</i>	1,837
<i>Scorpion</i>	767	<i>Isabel</i>	711
<i>Nokomis</i>	915		

DESTROYER TENDERS.

Built.

<i>Melville</i>	6,175	<i>Bridgeport</i>	9,546
<i>Dobbin</i>		<i>Allan</i>	
<i>Whitney</i>	9,780	<i>Denebola</i>	7,578
<i>Buffalo</i>	5,283	<i>Rigel</i>	
<i>Black Hawk</i>	7,091		

SUBMARINE TENDERS.

Built.

<i>Fulton</i>	1,165	<i>Rainbow</i>	4,168
<i>Bushnell</i>	2,896	<i>Savannah</i>	6,110
<i>Holland</i>	9,807	<i>Canopus</i>	6,615
<i>Beaver</i>	5,320	<i>Argonne</i>	9,005
<i>Camden</i>	7,596		

HEAVIER-THAN-AIR AIRCRAFT TENDER.

Built.

<i>Wright</i>	9,553
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REPAIR SHIPS.

Built.

<i>Medusa</i>	8,089	<i>Vestal</i>	6,378
<i>Prometheus</i>	6,378		

STORESHIPS.

Built.

<i>Bridge</i>	7,360	<i>Boreas</i>	
<i>Rappahannock</i>	11,116	<i>Yukon</i>	10,813
<i>Arctic</i>	10,813		

COLLIERS.

Built.

<i>Neptune</i>	17,380	<i>Orion</i>	
<i>Proteus</i>		<i>Jason</i>	17,150
<i>Nereus</i>	16,980		

CRUISERS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)
"E" class:		"Caledon" class:	
<i>Emerald</i>	7,100	<i>Caledon</i>	4,180
<i>Enterprise</i>		<i>Calypso</i>	
		<i>Caradoc</i>	
"D" class:		"Centaur" class:	
<i>Dauntless</i>	4,850	<i>Centaur</i>	4,120
<i>Danae</i>		<i>Concord</i>	
<i>Delhi</i>		"Cambrian" class:	
<i>Despatch</i>		<i>Calliope</i>	3,920
<i>Durban</i>		<i>Cambrian</i>	
<i>Dragon</i>		<i>Canterbury</i>	
<i>Dunedin</i> (New Zealand Division)		<i>Castor</i>	
<i>Diomedé</i> (New Zealand Division)		<i>Champion</i>	
Improved "Birmingham" class:		<i>Constance</i>	
<i>Hawkins</i>	9,800	"Caroline" class:	
<i>Vindictive</i>	9,996	<i>Carysfort</i>	3,895
<i>Frobisher</i>	9,860	<i>Cleopatra</i>	
<i>Effingham</i>	9,770	<i>Comus</i>	
		<i>Conquest</i>	
"Carlisle" class:		"Chatham" class:	
<i>Gairo</i>	4,200	<i>Lowestoft</i>	5,120
<i>Calcutta</i>		<i>Birmingham</i>	
<i>Capetown</i>		<i>Melbourne</i> (Australian Navy)	
<i>Colombo</i>		<i>Sydney</i> (Australian Navy)	
<i>Carlisle</i>		<i>Brisbane</i> (Australian Navy)	
"Ceres" class:		"Weymouth" class:	
<i>Cardiff</i>	4,290	<i>Yarmouth</i>	4,860
<i>Ceres</i>		<i>Dartmouth</i>	
<i>Coventry</i>		<i>Weymouth</i>	
<i>Curacao</i>		<i>Adelaide</i> (Australian Navy)	
<i>Gurlew</i>			5,100

AIRCRAFT CARRIERS.

<i>Hermes</i>	10,850	<i>Glorious</i>	22,500
<i>Eagle</i>	22,600	<i>Argus</i>	14,000
<i>Furious</i>	22,450	<i>Pegasus</i> (seaplane carrier)	3,150
<i>Courageous</i>	22,500	<i>Ark Royal</i> (seaplane carrier)	6,900

FLOTILLA LEADERS.

"Scott" class:		"Shakespeare" class:	
<i>Bruce</i>	1,530	<i>Broke</i>	1,480
<i>Campbell</i>		<i>Keppel</i>	
<i>Douglas</i>		<i>Shakespeare</i>	
<i>Mackay</i>		<i>Spenser</i>	
<i>Malcolm</i>		<i>Wallace</i>	
<i>Montrose</i>			
<i>Stuart</i>			

"Kempfenfelt" class:

<i>Abdiel</i>	1,310	Standard Displacement (tons)
<i>Anzac</i> (Australian Navy)		
<i>Grenville</i>		
<i>Saumarez</i>		
<i>Seymour</i>		

DESTROYERS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)
Special class (Australian Navy):		<i>Yarra</i>	565
<i>Huon</i>	565	<i>Swan</i>	
<i>Parramatta</i>		Thornycroft "M" class:	
<i>Torrens</i>		<i>Patrician</i> (Canadian Navy)	860
<i>Warrego</i>		<i>Patriot</i> (Canadian Navy)	

ANNEX 15.

BRITISH AND DOMINION SHIPS: DISPLACEMENTS UNDER WASHINGTON
STANDARD CONDITIONS.

Prepared by the British delegation.

Building.

BATTLESHIPS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)
<i>Nelson</i>	35,000	<i>Rodney</i>	35,000

CRUISERS.

"Kent" class:		"London" class:	
<i>Berwick</i>	10,000	<i>London</i>	10,000
<i>Cumberland</i>		<i>Devonshire</i>	
<i>Suffolk</i>		<i>Shropshire</i>	
<i>Cornwall</i>		<i>Sussex</i>	
<i>Kent</i>		<i>Norfolk</i>	
<i>Australia</i> (Australian Navy)		<i>Dorsetshire</i>	8,400
<i>Canberra</i> (Australian Navy)		<i>York</i>	

SEAPLANE CARRIER.

<i>Albatros</i> (Australian Navy)	Standard Displacement (tons)
	5,000

DESTROYERS.

<i>Amazon</i>	1,330	<i>Ambuscade</i>	1,210
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SUBMARINES.

	Standard Surface Displacement (tons)		Standard Surface Displacement (tons)
<i>Oberon</i>	1,345	<i>Orpheus</i>	1,540
<i>Oxley</i> (Australian Navy)	1,400	<i>Osiris</i>	
<i>Otway</i> (Australian Navy)	1,400	<i>Oswald</i>	
<i>Odin</i>	1,540	<i>Otus</i>	
<i>Olympus</i>			

Built.

BATTLESHIPS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)
"Royal Sovereign" class:		<i>Valiant</i> (unbulged)	31,100
<i>Ramillies</i>	29,150	<i>Queen Elizabeth</i> (bulged)	
<i>Revenge</i>		<i>Warspite</i> (bulged)	
<i>Resolution</i>			
<i>Royal Oak</i>		"Iron Duke" class:	
<i>Royal Sovereign</i>		<i>Benbow</i>	26,250
"Queen Elizabeth" class:		<i>Emperor of India</i>	
<i>Barham</i> (unbulged)	30,000	<i>Marlborough</i>	
<i>Malaya</i> (unbulged)		<i>Iron Duke</i>	

BATTLE CRUISERS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)
<i>Hood</i>	42,100
"Repulse" class:	
<i>Renown</i>	32,000
<i>Repulse</i>	
<i>Tiger</i>	28,900

Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)	
<i>Admiralty modified "T" class:</i>			
<i>Vansittart</i>	1,120	<i>Wiveern</i>	1,120
<i>Venomous</i>		<i>Wolverine</i>	
<i>Verity</i>		<i>Worcester</i>	
<i>Veteran</i>		<i>Wren</i>	
<i>Volunteer</i>		<i>Thornycroft "W" class:</i>	
<i>Wanderer</i>		<i>Wolsey</i>	1,120
<i>Whitehall</i>		<i>Woolston</i>	
<i>Whitshed</i>		<i>Thornycroft modified "W" class:</i>	
<i>Wild Swan</i>		<i>Wishart</i>	1,140
<i>Witherington</i>		<i>Witch</i>	

SUBMARINES.

Standard Surface Displacement (tons).		Standard Surface Displacement (tons).	
"X" class:		L.25.	800
X.1.	2,525	L.26.	
		L.27.	
"R" class:		L.33.	870
R.4.	405	L.52.	
R.10.		L.53.	
		L.54.	
		L.56.	
"M" class:		L.69.	
M.2.	1,510	L.71.	
M.3.			
"L" class:		"K" class:	
L.1.	800	K.26.	1,786
L.2.		"H" class:	
L.3.		H.22.	420
L.4.		H.23.	
L.5.		H.24.	
L.6.		H.25.	
L.7.		H.27.	
L.8.		H.28.	
L.11.		H.30.	
L.12.		H.31.	
L.14.		H.32.	
L.15.		H.33.	
L.16.		H.34.	
L.17.		H.43.	
L.18.		H.44.	
L.19.		H.47.	
L.20.		H.48.	
L.21.		H.49.	
L.22.		H.50.	
L.23.			

SLOOPs.

Standard Displacement (tons).		Standard Displacement (tons).	
"Anchusa" class:		"Azelea" class:	
Bryony	1,345	Clematis	1,165
Chrysanthemum		Heliotrope	
Harebell			
"Aubretia" class:		"Acacia" class:	
Heather	1,260	Bluebell	1,165
"Arabis" class:		Daffodil	
Cornflower	1,175	Dahlia	
Crocus		Foxglove	
Cyclamen		Hollyhock	
Delphinium		Laburnum	
Geranium (Australian Navy)		Magnolia	
Godetia		Mallow (Australian Navy)	
Marguerite (Australian Navy)		Veronica	
Rosemary		Vulcan II	
Snapdragon		"24" class:	
Verbena		Ladas	1,090
Wallflower		Sir Hugo	
Wistaria			
Lupin	1,285		

Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)		
<i>Admiralty "R" class:</i>		<i>Tenedos</i>		
<i>Restless</i>	900	<i>Thanet</i>	905	
<i>Romola</i>		<i>Thracian</i>		
<i>Rowena</i>		<i>Tilbury</i>		
<i>Salmon</i>		<i>Tintagel</i>		
<i>Skate</i>		<i>Tribune</i>		
<i>Starfish</i>		<i>Trinidad</i>		
<i>Tancred</i>		<i>Trojan</i>		
<i>Tempest</i>		<i>Truant</i>		
<i>Tenacious</i>		<i>Trusty</i>		
<i>Tetrarch</i>		<i>Turbulent</i>		
<i>Thistle</i>	<i>Thornycroft "S" class:</i>		905	
<i>Thruster</i>	<i>Torbay</i>			
<i>Tormentor</i>	<i>Torador</i>			
<i>Torrid</i>	<i>Tourmaline</i>			
<i>Admiralty modified "R" class:</i>		<i>Yarrow "S" class:</i>		
<i>Tower</i>	915	<i>Torch</i>	790	
<i>Trenchant</i>		<i>Tomahawk</i>		
<i>Ulster</i>		<i>Tumult</i>		
<i>Umpire</i>		<i>Turquoise</i>		
<i>Undine</i>		<i>Tuscan</i>		
<i>Urchin</i>		<i>Tyrian</i>		
<i>Ursula</i>		<i>Admiralty "V" class:</i>		
<i>Thornycroft "R" class:</i>		<i>Valentine</i>	1,090	
<i>Taurus</i>	905	<i>Valkyrie</i>		
<i>Teazer</i>		<i>Valhalla</i>		
<i>Yarrow "R" class:</i>		<i>Valorous</i>		
<i>Tyrant</i>	760	<i>Vampire</i>		
<i>Admiralty "S" class:</i>		<i>Vancouver</i>		
<i>Sabre</i>		<i>Vanessa</i>		
<i>Saladin</i>		<i>Vanity</i>		
<i>Sardonyx</i>		<i>Vanoc</i>		
<i>Scimitar</i>		<i>Vanquisher</i>		
<i>Scotsman</i>		<i>Vectis</i>		
<i>Scout</i>		<i>Vega</i>		
<i>Scythe</i>		<i>Velox</i>		
<i>Seabear</i>	<i>Vendetta</i>			
<i>Seafire</i>	<i>Venetia</i>	905		
<i>Searcher</i>	<i>Venturous</i>			
<i>Seawolf</i>	<i>Verdun</i>			
<i>Senator</i>	<i>Versatile</i>			
<i>Seapoy</i>	<i>Vesper</i>			
<i>Seraph</i>	<i>Vidette</i>			
<i>Serapis</i>	<i>Vimera</i>			
<i>Serene</i>	<i>Violent</i>			
<i>Sesame</i>	<i>Vivacious</i>			
<i>Shamrock</i>	<i>Vivien</i>			
<i>Shark</i>	<i>Vortigern</i>			
<i>Shikari</i>	<i>Thornycroft "V" class:</i>		1,120	
<i>Simoon</i>	<i>Viceroy</i>			
<i>Sirdar</i>	<i>Viscount</i>	<i>Admiralty "W" class:</i>		
<i>Somme</i>	905	<i>Voyager</i>	1,100	
<i>Sparrowhawk</i>		<i>Wakeful</i>		
<i>Spindrift</i>		<i>Walker</i>		
<i>Splendid</i>		<i>Walpole</i>		
<i>Sportive</i>		<i>Walrus</i>		
<i>Stalwart</i> (Australian Navy)		<i>Warwick</i>		
<i>Steadfast</i>		<i>Watchman</i>		
<i>Sterling</i>		<i>Waterhen</i>		
<i>Stormcloud</i>		<i>Wessex</i>		
<i>Strenuous</i>		<i>Westcott</i>		
<i>Stronghold</i>	<i>Westminster</i>	905	1,100	
<i>Sturdy</i>	<i>Whirlwind</i>			
<i>Success</i> (Australian Navy)	<i>Whitley</i>			
<i>Swallow</i>	<i>Winchelsea</i>			
<i>Swordsman</i> (Australian Navy)	<i>Winchester</i>			
<i>Tactician</i>	<i>Windsor</i>			
<i>Tara</i>	<i>Wolfhound</i>			
<i>Tasmania</i> (Australian Navy)	<i>Wrestler</i>			
<i>Tattoo</i> (Australian Navy)	<i>Wryneck</i>			

TWIN-SCREW MINESWEEPERS.

Standard Displacement (tons)		Standard Displacement (tons)
<i>Aberdare</i>		<i>Malvern</i>
<i>Abingdon</i>		<i>Marazion</i>
<i>Albury</i>		<i>Marlow</i>
<i>Alresford</i>		<i>Mistley</i>
<i>Badminton</i>		<i>Newark</i>
<i>Bagshot</i>		<i>Northolt</i>
<i>Burslem</i>		<i>Pangbourne</i>
<i>Carstairs</i>		<i>Petersfield</i>
<i>Caterham</i>		<i>Ross</i>
<i>Derby</i>		<i>Sallash</i>
<i>Dorking</i>		<i>Saltburn</i>
<i>Dundalk</i>		<i>Selkirk</i>
<i>Dunoon</i>	710	<i>Sherborne</i>
<i>Elgin</i>		<i>Stafford</i>
<i>Fareham</i>		<i>Stoke</i>
<i>Fermeoy</i>		<i>Sutton</i>
<i>Ford</i>		<i>Tiverton</i>
<i>Forres</i>		<i>Tonbridge</i>
<i>Gainsborough</i>		<i>Tralee</i>
<i>Greta</i>		<i>Truro</i>
<i>Harrow</i>		<i>Weybourne</i>
<i>Huntley</i>		<i>Widnes</i>
<i>Kendal</i>		<i>Yeovil</i>
<i>Leamington</i>		<i>Tedworth</i>
<i>Lydd</i>		

PATROL BOATS.

<i>P.C.74</i>		<i>P.59</i>	
<i>Dart</i> (late <i>P.C.73</i>)	610	<i>P.40</i>	560
" <i>Spey</i> (late <i>P.38</i>)			

MONITORS.

	Standard Displacement (tons)
<i>Erebus</i>	
<i>Terror</i>	7,200
<i>Marshal Soult</i>	6,400

MINELAYERS.

<i>Adventure</i>	6,740
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ジュネーヴ海軍
軍備制限会議
不 許 複 製

Documents on
Japanese Foreign Policy

The Conference for the
Limitation of Naval Armament,
held at Geneva from June 20th
to August 4th, 1927.

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勢 力 表

EXISTING EFFICIENT
YEARLY TONNAGE OF AUXILIARY CRAFT
I — Cruiser

	1927—6	'28—6	'29—6	'30—6	'31—6	'32—6	'33—6	'34—6	'35—6	'36—6	'37—6	'38—6	'39—6	'40—6	'41—6	'42—6	'43—6	'44—6	'45—6	'46—6	'47—6
										J A P A N											
年 次 建 造 量	14,200	40,000	20,000	20,000																	
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	4,400	8,800	0	0	0	0	0	0	3,230	3,230	20,400	15,440	10,340	13,255	5,170	17,490	7,100	14,200	40,000	20,000	20,000
同 兵 力 增 減 量	+ 9,800	+31,200	+20,000	+20,000	0	0	0	— 3,230	— 3,230	—20,400	—15,440	—10,340	—13,255	— 5,170	—17,490	— 7,100	—14,200	—40,000	—20,000	—20,000	
現 有 有 効 噸 数	108,855	118,655	149,855	159,855	189,855	189,855	189,855	189,855	186,625	183,395	162,995	147,555	137,215	123,960	118,790	101,300	94,200	80,000	40,000	20,000	0
										G R E A T B R I T A I N											
年 次 建 造 量	50,000	60,000	28,000	26,000	26,000	26,000															
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	13,500	4,650	14,030	3,268	29,815	15,370	27,090	30,240	24,880	0	12,705	9,175	0	8,950	22,850	50,000	60,000	28,000	26,000	26,000	
同 兵 力 增 減 量	+36,500	+55,350	+13,970	+22,732	— 3,815	+10,630	—27,090	—30,240	—24,880	0	—12,705	— 9,175	0	— 8,950	—22,850	—50,000	—60,000	—28,000	—26,000	—26,000	
現 有 有 効 噸 数	216,523	253,023	308,373	322,343	345,075	341,260	351,890	324,800	294,560	269,680	269,680	256,975	247,800	247,800	238,850	216,000	166,000	106,000	78,000	52,000	26,000
										U N I T E D S T A T E S											
年 次 建 造 量	0	20,000	30,000	30,000																	
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	20,910	34,850	13,940	0	0	0	20,000	30,000	30,000
同 兵 力 增 減 量	0	+20,000	+30,000	+30,000	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	—20,910	—34,850	—13,940	0	0	0	—20,000	—30,000	—30,000
現 有 有 効 噸 数	29,700	69,700	89,700	119,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	149,700	128,790	93,940	80,000	80,000	80,000	80,000	60,000	30,000	0

**EXISTING EFFICIENT
YEARLY TONNAGE OF AUXILIARY CRAFT
II — Destroyer**

	1927—6	'28—6	'29—6	'30—6	'31—6	'32—6	'33—6	'34—6	'35—6	'36—6	'37—6	'38—6	'39—6	'40—6	'41—6	'42—6	'43—6	'44—6
						J A P A N												
年 次 建 造 量	2,630	17,000	11,900	11,900														
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	810	7,440	4,620	2,360	7,050	11,465	10,370	11,330	5,000	4,630	6,485	9,205	2,630	17,000	11,900	11,900		
同 兵 力 增 減 量	+ 1,820	+ 9,560	+ 7,280	+ 9,540	— 7,050	— 11,465	— 10,370	— 11,330	— 5,000	— 4,630	— 6,485	— 9,205	— 2,630	— 17,000	— 11,900	— 11,900		
現 有 有 効 噸 数	80,765	82,585	92,145	99,425	108,965	101,915	90,450	80,080	68,750	63,750	59,120	52,635	43,430	40,800	23,800	11,900	0	
						G R E A T B R I T A I N												
年 次 建 造 量	0	0	10,800	10,800	10,800													
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	2,185	33,376	69,075	61,885	26,190	2,465	990	2,440	2,235	4,090	2,325	0	0	0	10,800	10,800	10,800	
同 兵 力 增 減 量	— 2,185	— 33,376	— 58,275	— 51,085	— 15,390	— 2,465	— 990	— 2,440	— 2,235	— 4,090	— 2,325	0	0	0	— 10,800	— 10,800	— 10,800	
現 有 有 効 噸 数	207,256	205,071	171,695	113,420	62,335	46,945	44,480	43,490	41,050	38,815	34,725	32,400	32,400	32,400	32,400	21,600	10,800	0
						U N I T E D S T A T E S												
年 次 建 造 量	0	6,000	6,000	6,000														
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	4,955	6,052	10,600	90,589	104,498	77,640	1,110	3,330	0	0	0	0	0	0	6,000	6,000	6,000	
同 兵 力 增 減 量	— 4,955	— 52	— 4,600	— 84,589	— 104,498	— 77,640	— 1,110	— 3,330	0	0	0	0	0	0	— 6,000	— 6,000	— 6,000	
現 有 有 効 噸 数	298,774	293,819	293,767	289,167	204,576	100,080	22,440	21,330	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	18,000	12,000	6,000	0	

EXISTING EFFICIENT
YEARLY TONNAGE OF AUXILIARY CRAFT
III — Submarine

	1927— 6	'28— 6	'29— 6	'30— 6	'31— 6	'32— 6	'33— 6	'34— 6	'35— 6	'36— 6	'37— 6	'38— 6	'39— 6	'40— 6	'41— 6	'42— 6	'43— 6	'44— 6	'45— 6
									J A P A N										
年 次 建 造 量	8,913	9,720	6,600	0	6,920														
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	0	580	450	0	3,298	4,920	9,998	5,619	4,741	6,544	2,968	8,736	8,913	9,720	6,600	0	6,920		
同 兵 力 增 減 量	+ 8,913	+ 9,140	+ 6,150	0	+ 3,622	— 4,920	— 9,998	— 5,619	— 4,741	— 6,544	— 2,968	— 8,736	— 8,913	— 9,720	— 6,600	0	— 6,920		
現 有 有 効 噸 數	47,854	56,767	65,907	72,057	72,057	75,679	70,759	60,761	55,142	50,401	43,857	40,889	32,153	23,240	13,520	6,920	6,920	0	
									G R E A T B R I T A I N										
年 次 建 造 量	0	2,450	7,350	7,350	7,350	8,425													
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	0	0	2,250	12,120	8,600	6,370	1,660	0	2,850	1,660	3,285	2,725	0	2,450	7,350	7,350	7,350	8,425	
同 兵 力 增 減 量	0	+ 2,450	+ 5,100	— 4,770	— 1,250	+ 2,055	— 1,660	0	— 2,850	— 1,660	— 3,285	— 2,725	0	— 2,450	— 7,350	— 7,350	— 7,350	— 8,425	
現 有 有 効 噸 數	41,520	41,520	43,970	49,070	44,300	43,050	45,105	43,445	43,445	40,595	38,935	35,650	32,925	32,925	30,475	23,125	15,775	8,425	0
									U N I T E D S T A T E S										
年 次 建 造 量	2,750	5,500	2,750	2,750	2,750														
同 艦 齡 超 過 量	416	1,248	1,497	14,002	11,827	10,100	916	5,416	15,764	6,814	5,336	2,020	2,750	5,500	2,750	2,750	2,750		
同 兵 力 增 減 量	+ 2,334	+ 4,252	+ 1,253	— 11,252	— 9,077	— 10,100	— 916	— 5,416	— 15,764	— 6,814	— 5,336	— 2,020	— 2,750	— 5,500	— 2,750	— 2,750	— 2,750		
現 有 有 効 噸 數	75,356	77,690	81,942	83,195	71,943	62,866	52,766	51,850	46,434	30,670	23,856	18,520	16,500	13,750	8,250	5,500	2,750	0	

- 1 New Tonnage
- 2 Depreciation
- 3 Yearly Plus or Minus
- 4 Existing Efficient Tonnage