

April 21, 2011

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

Seismic Damage Information (the 105th Release)
(As of 08:00 April 21st, 2011)

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) confirmed the current situation of Onagawa NPS, Tohoku Electric Power Co. Inc.; Fukushima Dai-ichi and Fukushima Dai-ni NPSs, Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. (TEPCO); Tokai Dai-ni NPS, Japan Atomic Power Co. Inc. as follows:

Major updates are as follows.

1. Nuclear Power Stations (NPSs)

● Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

- In order to cool the Spent Fuel Pool of Unit 4, the Fresh water spray of around 100t using Concrete Pump Truck (62m class) was carried out. (From 17:08 till 20:31 April 20th)
- The pump for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was temporarily stopped in order to change the position of the hose of the temporary RHR Seawater System of Unit 6. (09:51 April 20th) After carrying out the work of transferring of the pump for temporary Residual Heat Removal (RHR), cooling was resumed.
- The test implementation of spraying anti-scattering agent to prevent the spread of radioactive materials on the ground surface was carried out in the area of about 1,900 m² around the Radioactive Waste Treatment Facilities (From 12:00 till 13:30 April 20th).
- Removal of rubble (Amount equivalent to a container) using remote-control heavy machineries was carried out. (From 9:00 till 16:00 April 20th)

For more information:


NISA English Home Page

<http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/index.html>

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

(As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

Major Events after the Earthquake



- March 11th 14:46 Under operation, Automatic shutdown by the earthquake
- March 11th 15:42 Report based on the Article 10 (Total loss of A/C power)
- March 11th 16:36 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Inability of water injection of the Emergency Core Cooling System)
- March 12th 01:20 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Unusual rise of the pressure in PCV)
- March 12th 10:17 Started to vent.
- March 12th 15:36 Sound of explosion
- March 12th 20:20 Started to inject seawater and borated water to the Reactor Core.
- March 23rd 02:33 The amount of injected water to the Reactor Core was increased utilizing the Feedwater Line in addition to the Fire Extinguish Line. (2m³/h →18m³/h)
- 09:00 Switched to the Feedwater Line only.(18m³/h →11m³/h)
- March 24th 11:30 Lighting in the Central Control Room was recovered.
- March 25th 15:37 Started to inject fresh water.
- March 29th 08:32 Switched to the water injection to the Reactor Core using the temporary motor-driven pump.
- March 31st 12:00 ~2nd 15:26 Started to transfer the stagnant water from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Surge Tank of Suppression Pool Water (SPT)
- March 31st 13:03~16:04 Water spray by Concrete Pump Truck (Fresh water)
- April 3rd 12:02 The power supply to the temporary motor-driven pump was switched from the temporary power supply to the external power supply.
- April 3rd 13:55 Started to transfer the water from the Condenser to CST.
- April 6th 22:30 Started the operation for the injection of nitrogen to PCV.
- April 7th 01:31 Confirmed starting the injection of nitrogen to PCV.
- April 9th 04:10 Started using highly pure nitrogen generator in the injection of nitrogen to PCV.
- April 10th 09:30 Completed transferring the water from the Condenser to CST.
- April 11th around 17:16 Loss of external power supply due to an earthquake occurred (at Hamadori in Fukushima Prefecture) and water injection to the Reactor Core and nitrogen injection to PCV were suspended.
- April 11th 17:56 External power supply was recovered.
- April 11th 18:04 Resumed injecting water to the Reactor Core.
- April 11th 23:19 Restarted operation for injecting nitrogen to PCV.
- April 11th 23:34 Confirmed starting injection of nitrogen to PCV.
- April 17th 16:00~17:30 Confirmed the situation in the reactor building using an unmanned robot.
- April 18th 11:50~12:12 Stopped the water injection into the reactor core to replace the current hose with a new one.
- April 19th 10:23 Completed the work of strengthening connection of the power supplies between Units 1-2 and Units 3-4.

Current Conditions : Fresh water is being injected to the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Core

(Editorial committee for Nuclear Energy Handbook, Nuclear Energy Handbook)


- *1 Residual Heat Removal System
- *2 Emergency Diesel Generator
- *3 Primary Containment Vessel
- *4 Suppression Pool

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station **Unit 2**

(As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

Spraying freshwater by temporary motor-driven pump through existing cooling system

Major Events after the Earthquake 1/2



- March 11th 14:46 Under operation, Automatic shutdown by the earthquake
- March 11th 15:42 Report based on the Article 10 (Total loss of A/C power)
- March 11th 16:36 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Inability of water injection of the Emergency Core Cooling System)
- March 13th 11:00 Started to vent.
- March 14th 13:25 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Loss of reactor cooling functions)
- March 14th 16:34 Started to inject seawater to the Reactor Core.
- March 14th 22:50 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Unusual rise of the pressure in PCV)
- March 15th 00:02 Started to vent.
- March 15th 06:10 Sound of explosion
- March 15th around 06:20 Possible damage of the suppression chamber
- March 20th 15:05 ~ 17:20 Approximately 40 ton seawater injection to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) via the Fuel Pool Cooling Line (FPC)
- March 20th 15:46 Power Center received electricity.
- March 21st 18:22 White smoke generated. The smoke died down and almost invisible at 07:11 March 22nd.
- March 22nd 16:07 Injection of around 18 tons of seawater to SFP
- March 25th 10:30 ~ 12:19 Sea water injection to SFP via FPC
- March 26th 10:10 Started to inject fresh water to the Reactor Core.
- March 26th 16:46 Lighting in the Central Control Room was recovered.
- March 27th 18:31 Switched to the water injection to the core using the temporary motor-driven pump.
- March 29th 16:30 ~ 18:25 Switched to the temporary motor-driven pump injecting fresh water to SFP.
- March 29th 16:45 ~ 1st 11:50 Transferred the water from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Surge Tank of Suppression Pool Water (SPT)
- March 30th 9:25 ~ 23:50 Confirmed malfunction of the temporary motor-driven pump injecting fresh water to SFP(9:45). Switched to the injection using the fire pump Truck, but suspended as cracks were confirmed in the hose. (12:47, 13:10) Resumed injection of fresh water(19:05)
- April 1st 14:56 ~ 17:05 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump.
- April 2nd around 9:30 The water, of which the dose rate was at the level of more than 1,000mSv/h, was confirmed to be collected in the pit located near the Intake Channel of Unit 2. The outflow from the lateral surface of the pit into the sea was also confirmed.
- April 2nd 17:10 Started to transfer the water from the Condenser to the CST.
- April 3rd 12:12 The power supply to the temporary motor-driven pump was switched from the temporary power supply to the external power supply.
- April 3rd 13:47 ~ 14:30 20 bags of sawdust, 80 bags of high polymer absorbent and 3 bags of cutting-processed newspaper were put into the Pit for the Conduit.
- April 4th 7:08 ~ 7:11 Approximately 13kg of tracer (bath agent) was put in from the Pit for the Duct for Seawater Pipe.
- April 4th 11:05 ~ 13:37 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump.
- April 5th 14:15 Tracer is confirmed to outflow through the permeable layer around the pit into the sea. 15:07 Started to inject coagulant.
- April 6th around 5:38 The water outflow from the lateral surface of the pit was confirmed to stopped.
- April 7th 13:29 ~ 14:34 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump.
- April 9th 13:10 Completed transferring the water from the Condenser to CST.
- April 10th 10:37 ~ 12:38 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump .
- April 11th around 17:16 Loss of external power supply due to an earthquake occurred (at Hamadori in Fukushima Prefecture). Water injection to the Reactor Core was suspended.
- April 11th 17:56 External power supply was recovered.
- April 11th 18:04 Resumed injecting water to the Reactor Core.

Current Conditions: Fresh water is being injected to the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Core

*1 Residual Heat Removal System
 *2 Emergency Diesel Generator
 *3 Primary Containment Vessel
 *4 Suppression Pool

Major Events after the Earthquake 2/2

April 12th 19:35~April 13th 17:04 Transfer from the trench of the turbine building to the Condenser.

April 13th 11:00 Suspended the transfer for checking leaks, etc.

April 13th 13:15~14:55 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump.

April 16th 10:13~11:54 Freshwater injection to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump. (The temporary motor-driven pump stopped at 11:39 due to an earthquake that occurred at around 11:19. SFP was confirmed to be filled to capacity through observing a rise of the water level in the Skimmer Tank.)

April 16th around 11:19 An earthquake occurred (in the southern part of Ibaraki Prefecture).

April 18th 13:42~ Confirmed the situation in the reactor building using an unmanned robot.

April 18th 12:13~12:37 Stopped the water injection into the reactor core to replace the current hose with a new one.

April 18th 09:30~17:40 Injected coagulant (soluble glass) into the power cable trench.

April 19th 08:00~15:30 Injected coagulant (soluble glass) into the power cable trench.

April 19th 10:08~ Started to transfer the stagnant water with high-level radioactivity from the trench of the turbine building to the buildings of radioactive waste treatment facilities.

April 19th 10:23 Completed the work of strengthening connection of the power supplies between Units 1-2 and Units 3-4.

April 19th 16:08~17:28 Injected freshwater to SFP via FPC using the temporary motor-driven pump .

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 3

(As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

Major Events after the Earthquake

Spraying freshwater by Concrete Pump Truck

Spent Fuel Pool Water Temperature — °C
Condition: Indicator failure

Spent Fuel Pool Cooling System

Reactor Pressure A 0.058MPa*
(under monitoring of the change of the situation)

Reactor Pressure C 0.014MPa*
(under monitoring of the change of the situation)

Condition: No large fluctuation

*converted to absolute pressure

Reactor Water Level A -1,850mm

Reactor Water Level B -2,250mm

Condition: Uncovering of the core from the top of the active fuel to the levels described above

Reactor Water Temperature — °C

Condition: No data available

Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Temperature

Feedwater Nozzle Temperature : 104.0°C

(under monitoring of the change of the situation)

Temperature at the bottom head of RPV : 110.4°C

PCV*3 Pressure 0.1050MPa
Condition: No large fluctuation

S/p*4 Water Temperature A 42.5°C

S/p*4 Water Temperature B 42.5°C

Condition: Tend to decrease

S/p*4 Pressure 0.1769MPa

Condition: No large fluctuation

External Power

Two lines secured

EDG *2

Power source car, Temporary DGs

RHRS*1

Injecting freshwater by temporary motor-driven pump

Current Conditions: Fresh water is being injected to the Spent Fuel Pool and the Reactor Core

- March 11th 14:46 Under operation, Automatic shutdown by the earthquake
- March 11th 15:42 Report based on the Article 10 (Total loss of A/C power)
- March 13th 05:10 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Inability of water injection of the Emergency Core Cooling System)
- March 13th 08:41 Started to vent.
- March 13th 13:12 Started to inject seawater and borated water to the Reactor Core.
- March 14th 05:20 Started to vent.
- March 14th 07:44 Occurrence of the Article 15 event (Unusual rise of the pressure in PCV)
- March 14th 11:01 Sound of explosion
- March 16th around 08:30 White smoke generated.
- March 17th 09:48~10:01 Water discharge by the helicopters of Self-Defense Force
- March 17th 19:05~19:15 Water spray from the ground by High pressure water-cannon trucks of Police
- March 17th 19:35~20:09 Water spray from the ground by fire engines of Self-Defense Force
- March 18th before 14:00~14:38 Water spray from the ground by 6 fire engines of Self-Defense Force
- March 18th ~14:45 Water spray from the ground by a fire engine of the US Military
- March 19th 00:30~01:10 Water spray by Hyper Rescue Unit of Tokyo Fire Department
- March 19th 14:10~20th 03:40 Water spray by Hyper Rescue Unit of Tokyo Fire Department
- March 20th 11:00 Pressure of PCV rose(320kPa).Afterward fell.
- March 20th 21:36~21st 03:58 Water spray by Hyper Rescue Unit of Tokyo Fire Department
- March 21st around 15:55 Grayish smoke generated and was confirmed to be died down at 17:55.
- March 22nd 15:10~16:00 Water spray by Hyper Rescue Unit of Tokyo Fire Department and Osaka City Fire Bureau.
- March 22nd 22:46 Lighting in the Central Control Room was recovered.
- March 23rd 11:03~13:20 Injection of about 35 ton of sea water to the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) via the Fuel Pool Cooling Line (FPC)
- March 23rd around 16:20 Black smoke generated and was confirmed to be died down at around 23:30 and 24th 04:50.
- March 24th 05:35~16:05 Injection of around 120 ton of sea water to SFP via FPC
- March 25th 13:28~16:00 Water spray by Kawasaki City Fire Bureau supported by Tokyo Fire Department
- March 25th 18:02 Started fresh water injection to the core.
- March 27th 12:34~14:36 Water spray by Concrete Pump Truck
- March 28th 17:40~31st around 8:40 Transferring the water from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) to the Surge Tank of Suppression Pool Water (SPT)
- March 28th 20:30 Switched to the water injection to the core using a temporary motor-driven pump.
- April 3rd 12:18 The power supply to the temporary motor-driven pump was switched from the temporary power supply to the external power supply.
- April 11th around 17:16 Loss of external power supply of Unit 1 and 2 due to an earthquake occurred (at Hamadori in Fukushima Prefecture) and water injection to the Reactor Core was suspended.
- April 11th 18:04 External power supply of Units 1 and 2 recovered (April 11th 17:56). Resumed injecting water to the Reactor Core.
- April 17th 11:30~14:00 Confirmed the situation in the reactor building using unmanned robot.
- April 18th 12:38~13:05 Stopped the water injection into the reactor core to replace the current hose with a new one
- April 19th 10:23 Completed the work of strengthening connection of the power supplies between Units 1-2 and Units 3-4.
- <Water spray by Concrete Pump Truck (Fresh water)>
- March 29th 14:17~18:18, March 31st 16:30~19:33, April 2nd 09:52~12:54, April 4th 17:03~19:19, April 7th 06:53~08:53, April 8th 17:06~20:00, April 10th 17:15~19:15, April 12th 16:26~17:16, April 14th 15:56~16:32, April 18th 14:17~15:02

- *1 Residual Heat Removal System
- *2 Emergency Diesel Generator
- *3 Primary Containment Vessel
- *4 Suppression Pool

(Editorial committee for Nuclear Energy Handbook, Nuclear Energy Handbook)

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 4

(As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

Spraying freshwater by
Concrete Pump Truck

Spent Fuel
Pool Cooling
System

In periodic inspection
outage

Spent Fuel Pool Water
Temperature — °C
Condition: Indicator failure

No fuel inside the
Reactor Core

External
Power

EDG*2

RHRS*1

Two lines
secured

Power source car,
Temporary DGs

Injecting freshwater
by temporary
motor-driven pump

*1 Residual Heat Removal System

*2 Emergency Diesel Generator

*3 Reactor Pressure Vessel

Major Events after the Earthquake

In periodic inspection outage when the earthquake occurred
 March 14th 04:08 Water temperature in the Spent Fuel Pool (SFP), 84°C
 March 15th 06:14 Confirmed the partial damage of wall in the 4th floor.
 March 15th 09:38 Fire occurred in the 3rd floor. (12:25 extinguished)
 March 16th 05:45 Fire occurred. TEPCO couldn't confirm any fire on the ground. (06:15)
 March 20th 08:21~09:40 Water spray over SFP by Self-Defense Force
 March 20th around 18:30~19:46 Water spray over SFP by Self-Defense Force
 March 21st 06:37~08:41 Water spray over SFP by Self-Defense Force
 March 21st around 15:00 Work for laying cable to Power Center was completed.
 March 22nd 10:35 Power Center received electricity.
 <Water spray by Concrete Pump Truck (Seawater)>
 March 22nd 17:17~20:32, March 23rd 10:00~13:02, March 24th 14:36~17:30, March 25th 19:05~22:07, March 27th 16:55~19:25
 March 25th 06:05~10:20 Sea water injection to SFP via the Fuel Pool Cooling Line (FPC)
 March 29th 11:50 Lighting in the Central Control Room was recovered.
 April 11th around 17:16 An earthquake occurred (at Hamadori in Fukushima Prefecture).
 April 12th 12:00~13:04 Sampled the water in SFP.
 April 19th 10:23 Completed the work of strengthening connection of the power supplies between Units 1-2 and Units 3-4.
 < Water spray by Concrete Pump Truck (Fresh water)> March 30th 14:04~18:33, April 1st 08:28~14:14, April 3rd 17:14~22:16, April 5th 17:35~18:22, April 7th 18:23~19:40, April 9th 17:07~19:24, April 13th 0:30~6:57, April 15th 14:30~18:29, April 17th 17:39~21:22, April 19th 10:17~11:35, April 20th 17:08~20:31

**Current Conditions: No fuel is in RPV*3.
Fresh water is being injected to the Spent Fuel Pool.**

(Editorial committee for Nuclear Energy Handbook, Nuclear Energy Handbook)

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 5 (As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

In periodic inspection outage

Water Temperature in the Pool : 37.2°C
Condition: Recovery of heat removal function

Reactor Pressure : 0.108MPa*
Reactor Water Level : 1,890mm
Reactor Water Temperature : 42.7°C
Condition : Pressure is under control.
*converted to absolute pressure

Reactor Pressure Vessel Temperature:
Monitoring by Reactor Water Temperature

Spent Fuel
Pool Cooling
System

Removing heat by
altering water in the
reactor core and in
the spent fuel pool

Major Events after the Earthquake :

March 20th 14:30 Cold shutdown

March 21st 11:36 Receiving electricity from external power supply

March 23rd 17:24 Pump for Residual Heat Removal Seawater System (RHRS) was automatically stopped when the power supply was switched from the temporary to the permanent.

March 24th 16:14 Repair of the RHRS pump was completed.

March 24th 16:35 Started to cooling.

April 4th 21:00 – 8th 12:14 Discharged the groundwater with low-level radioactivity in the Sub Drain Pit to the sea (around 950 ton).

External
Power

One line
secured

EDG*2

Share two EDGs of
Unit 6

RHRS*1

Removing heat by
altering water in the
reactor core and in
the spent fuel pool


*1 Residual Heat Removal System

*2 Emergency Diesel Generator

Conditions of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station Unit 6

(As of 13:00 April 21st, 2011)

In periodic inspection outage



Major Events after the Earthquake:

March 20th 19:27 Cold shutdown

March 22nd 19:17 Receiving electricity from external power supply

April 4th 21:00 – 9th 18:52 Discharged the groundwater with low-level radioactivity in the Sub Drain Pit to the sea (around 373 ton).

April 19th 11:00-15:00 Transferred stagnant water under the base of the turbine building to the condenser for measuring the amount of it.

April 20th 9:51-15:56 The pump for Residual Heat Removal (RHR) was temporarily stopped in order to change the position of the hose of the temporary RHR Seawater System.

One line secured

Two EDGs

Removing heat by altering water in the reactor core and in the spent fuel pool

*1 Residual Heat Removal System

*2 Emergency Diesel Generator

(Editorial committee for Nuclear Energy Handbook, Nuclear Energy Handbook)

Instructions

11:00 April 21, 2011

Attention to :

Governor of Fukushima prefecture,

Mayor of Hirono town,

Mayor of Naraha town,

Mayor of Tomioka town,

Mayor of Okuma town,

Prime Minister of Japan

Head of 2011 Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

Concerning Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Nuclear Power Stations

In relation to the accident that occurred at Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station (NPS) of Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. (TEPCO), the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters issues the following instructions in accordance with the provisions of the Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Act No. 156 of 1999):

Residential and other area subject to evacuation shall be changed from residential and other area within 10km radius to residential and other area within 8km radius from TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ni NPS.

Announcement shall be made to residents and others in the subject areas with the respective jurisdictions of each municipality.

Official Notice

April 21, 2011(11:00)

<p>1. Areas subject to Emergency Response Measures</p> <p>8-km radius area from TEPCO's Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station</p>
<p>2. Overview of the Nuclear Emergency</p> <p>Date and time of emergency occurrence: March 12, 2011 (05:22)</p> <p>Place of occurrence: Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station of TEPCO</p>
<p>3. Matters for announcement to residents and others in area as described in 1.</p> <p>That change shall be made to areas subject to evacuation from within 10-km radius to 8-km radius of Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station of TEPCO.</p>

April 21, 2011

Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency

Regarding the review of evacuation area of Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station

While the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) continues full efforts to address the accident of Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS) this time, the situation of all Units of Fukushima Dai-ni NPS has currently reached cold shutdown and is stable. The situation is also that, one month having gone by since the event, the amount of radioactive materials in the reactor has decreased to less than 1/100th of that immediately after the shutdown, and decay heat has decreased to approximately several tenths.

Therefore, regarding Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, it is thought that probability of a major accident occurring in the future has significantly gone down and that, even in the event of an irregular situation by any chance, developments of events are expected to proceed at a slow pace, enabling to keep enough time to respond and effect on the peripheral environment is limited.

Furthermore, reliability of power supply and water injection functions at Fukushima Dai-ni is now considered to be secure to a certain degree, while not all equipments have been completed, since (1) Four circuits of external power supply have recovered and can receive electricity; (2) Two emergency Diesel Generators (DGs) are achieving standing by to every Unit including cross-shared DGs between Units; (3) There are 17 power-supply vehicles deployed to supply required power to every Unit; and (4) Eight pump trucks containing the required water volume are deployed in addition to one cooling system for purposes of cooling the reactor and the spent fuel pool.

Based on the above situation, the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters, hearing the opinion of the Nuclear Safety Commission, has made the decision to narrow the current evacuation area from within 10km radius to within 8km radius from Fukushima Dai-ni NPS, and issued the official notice as such (see attachment).

Consequently, evacuation instruction for area between 8km radius and 10 km radius from Fukushima Dai-ni NPS would be lifted, while area within 20km radius from

Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS continues to be treated as evacuation area. Also, as for the area that fall between 20km radius and 30km radius from Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS is treated as in house stay area.

Attachments: Instructions and Official Notice in accordance with provisions under the Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.

(Contact Person)

Mr. Toshihiro Bannai

Director, International Affairs Office,
NISA/METI

Phone:+81-(0)3-3501-1087

Instructions

07:00 April 21st 2011

Governor of Fukushima Prefecture
Mayor of Tomioka Town
Mayor of Futaba Town
Mayor of Okuma Town
Mayor of Namie Town
Head of Kawauchi Village
Mayor of Naraha Town
Mayor of Minami-Soma City
Mayor of Tamura City
Head of Katsurao Village

Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters
of 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni Nuclear Power Stations
Prime Minister

Regarding the accident occurred in Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station (NPS), Tokyo Electric Power Co. Inc. (TEPCO) pursuant to the provisions of Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Act No.156 of 1999), instructions are given as follows:

Instructions

In accordance with the attachment of “Regarding the Establishment of a Restricted Area“ (On 21 April 2011 issued by the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter), to establish a restricted area as the area within the 20km radius from the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS, TEPCO pursuant to the provisions of Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Act No. 223 of 1961) applied by replacing the terms and phrases pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, and to prohibit the access to the area or to order to leave the area to any persons other than those engaged in emergency response measures, excluding the case that the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village permits the temporary access.

Hereafter, regarding this issue, to follow any new instructions given by the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarter of 2011 Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs.

Well inform the residents and so on in the subject area in each municipality of these contents.

<References>

- The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Act No. 223 of 1961)
 - * After being replaced the terms and phrases pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Act 156 of 1999)

(Right to establish a restricted area in a city, town or village)

Article 63. During the period from the issuance of a declaration of a nuclear emergency situation to the issuance of a declaration of the cancellation of a nuclear emergency situation, the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village may, when deemed necessary to prevent danger to life or limb, establish a restricted area to which access shall be restricted or prohibited to any persons other than those engaged in emergency response measures, or may order any persons other than those so engaged to leave the area.

2. In cases described in the preceding paragraph, if the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village, or officials performing duties provided under that paragraph on his behalf are not on the scene, or if they request, police or maritime safety officials may perform the duties on their behalf. When such duties have been performed on behalf of the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village, the police or maritime safety officials shall immediately report their action to the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village.
3. (Omission)

Article 116. Any person who falls under either of the two items below shall be liable to a fine of up to one hundred thousand yen or detention:

- (1) (Omission)
- (2) Any person who has failed to comply with a ban, restriction or order for departure enforced by the mayor of a city or town or the head of a village under Article 63, paragraph 1 (including a prefectural governor acting on behalf of the mayor of a city or town or the head of a village under Article 73, paragraph 1), or by the police maritime safety officials under Article 63, paragraph 2 or by members of self defense troops dispatched for disaster relief under the provisions of Article 63, paragraph 1 as applied to Article 63, paragraph 3.

Regarding the Establishment of a Restricted Area

April 21, 2011

Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act (Act No. 223 of 1961) replaced the terms and phrases pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Act No. 156 of 1999), the establishment of a restricted area by the mayor of the city or town or the head of the village and the restriction of access to the area to any persons other than those engaged in emergency response measures, shall be based on the following viewpoint.

1. Viewpoint on the Establishment of a Restricted Area

(1) Restricted Area

① Policy

- As the current state of the area where the directive to leave and evacuate had been issued, we have confirmed some residents and so on still remaining inside the area or accessing to the area. It is difficult to ensure safety for these persons and there is a concern that it may have a harmful influence to outside the area. Therefore, the aforementioned area shall be newly established as a restricted area, for the purpose of preventing danger to life or limb of the residents, etc.

② Plan of Establishment

- The heads of the local governments concerned, receiving the instructions from the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters pursuant to the provisions of Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, shall establish a restricted area pursuant to the provisions of Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act replaced the terms and phrases pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 2 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness.
- A restricted area is established as the one where the access is restricted. Any person other than those engaged in emergency response measures are restricted to access to the area. The permission criteria for temporary access shall be set forth separately by the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.

- In principle, some physical measures to prevent the access shall be taken in establishing a restricted area.

(2) Date of Establishment

At zero in the morning on 22 April, 2011

(3) Scope of the Area

The scope of a restricted area is within the area that the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters has directed the local governments concerned to have residents and so on leave for evacuation, pursuant to the provisions of Article 20, paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness (Namely, the area within the 20km radius from Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, including the sea area).

2. Coordination with the Police, etc.

The establishment of a restricted area needs to be ensured its effectiveness by inspections by the police, etc., in addition to the physical measures to prevent the access on the roads. For that reason, when issuing the instructions from the Director-General of Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters pursuant to the provisions of Article 20 paragraph 3 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, close coordination shall be made with the police, etc.

(Reference)

<Legal Effects of Establishment of a Restricted Area>

- Disobeying the restriction of the access to a restricted area shall be liable to a fine of not more than one hundred thousand yen or detention. (Article 116 of the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act replaced the terms and phrases pursuant to Article 28, paragraph 1 of the Act on Special Measures Concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness)