

Press briefing at the Prime Minister's Office for members of the foreign press

11 April 2011

Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Relations: Sorry for keeping you waiting, especially for those of you who had tried to attend Prime Minister Kan's Press Conference. We apologize for the postponement of the Prime Minister's press conference that was scheduled to be held this evening. The press conference itself is most likely to be postponed to tomorrow afternoon.

Let me just introduce ourselves. My name is Noriyuki Shikata, Deputy Cabinet Secretary for Public Relations at the Prime Minister's Office. To my right is Mr. Hidehiko Nishiyama, Deputy Director-General of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), and to his right is Mr. Ichiro Nakagawa, Counselor of the Resources Enhancement Promotion Department, Japan Fisheries Agency. To the far right is Mr. Takeshi Matsunaga, Assistant Press Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

To my left is Mr. Shinichi Kawarada, Advisor to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and to his left is Mr. Masanori Shinano, Counselor Secretariat of the Nuclear Safety Commission (NSC), and last is Mr. Eiichi Yokota, Senior Technical Officer of the Food Safety Department of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW).

At the outset, I would like to introduce to you a couple of points, first coming from Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano's press conference today. This afternoon, Mr. Edano announced the holding of the Great East Japan Earthquake Reconstruction Design Council, and this was approved by the cabinet. This is the new Reconstruction Design Council that is established in order to come up with a new reconstruction plan for the Tohoku region. We think that it is very important to come up with a grand vision for Tohoku, and without being stuck with a traditional framework, we would like to come up with a grand reconstruction vision that could be highly regarded in history.

There are 15 council members being elected and the chair will be Professor Makoto Iokibe. He is now the President of the National Defense Academy. He is also Professor Emeritus of Kobe University and he has been Deputy President of the Hyogo

Earthquake Memorial 21st Century Research Institute. He has been working on the reconstruction of the Hyogo area in terms of new city planning for the 21st century. So given the fact that he has been a leading political scientist and historian, and having gone through the Great Hanshin Earthquake, we think that he is a very appropriate person to work on this.

The first person assisting Professor Iokibe as a deputy is Mr. Tadao Ando, a very renowned architect, and he also worked on the reconstruction of areas hit by the Great Hanshin Earthquake. Also, another person who will assist the Chair is Professor Takashi Mikuriya. He is a professor of Tokyo University, a political scientist, and he also studied the reconstruction process of both the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Great Hanshin Earthquake.

There is going to be a separate working group established in terms of looking into these issues from an expert point of view, and there are 19 experts being selected. The first meeting will be held on 14 April and we are planning to put together a new basic law or basic bill for reconstruction that is going to be compiled by the end of April. This Reconstruction Design Council is planned to be placed under the legal framework and is expected to put together basic recommendations by the end of June. We will be discussing very intensively in this council.

Another point is there is a newly-established headquarters created in response to economic damage due to the nuclear power plant accident. These headquarters will be headed by Minister Kaeda, as a newly-created Minister in charge of responding to economic damage caused by the nuclear power plants. So this is something I will be tackling including the issues like coming up with guidelines for compensation for those who incur economic damages due to the situation surrounding the nuclear power plants, especially Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant.

Next, Mr. Edano also announced a new policy measure on the side of the Japanese government to designate a planned evacuation zone, and this is the area that we are talking about in terms of further than a 20km radius. As will be explained by my colleague from the NSC, there have been some results of integrated doses of external exposure – you probably heard this – and that will be explained later. We have found that the areas beyond the 20km radius could be exposed to over 20mSv during the course of the next one year, approximately until next March. So we will be consulting

with the local communities in terms of planned evacuations, and at this juncture we are hoping that this planned evacuation will be carried out during the next one month to come.

The next is, as some of you may have noticed, the Prime Minister sent messages to the international community, including on our website and also through some of the international media by placing advertisements, giving thanks for the assistance and all the condolences extended by the international community. This is something we will be distributing very soon.

Very lastly, I will just introduce you to one occasion that will be held in front of Shimbashi station. There is a place called SL Space, where there will be Iwaki City of Fukushima Prefecture having a kind of market of their agricultural products, including strawberries, cucumbers, tomatoes, and other agricultural products. The mayor of Iwaki City will come, and also Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano is planning to attend. The ceremony will be taking place from 11:00 a.m., tomorrow. This is something that is being organized by Iwaki City in terms of avoiding the reputational damage that seems to be taking place already.

And very lastly, we announced that Mr. Edano will come to this occasion tonight, but due to complications of his scheduling he could not make it, but I am hoping that he will be able to come for tomorrow evening's press briefing for you. So I would like to conclude my remarks and ask Mr. Nishiyama of NISA to go next.

Mr. Nishiyama: Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to update the status of Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant. Regarding Unit 1, we had been injecting nitrogen to the containment vessel of Unit 1 throughout today. However, after today's 5:35 earthquake, it stopped. We will resume nitrogen injection as soon as possible. We found that there are some leaks in the vessel, but there is no change in the monitoring data. We will continue to inject nitrogen after we resume so that hydrogen and oxygen will not be mixed under an explosive proportion.

Regarding Unit 2, the parameters of the reactor are relatively stable. We introduced 60t of pure water through the spent fuel pool cooling system and the power source was changed from diesel generators to the outside grid, which means that stable power supply became possible. Regarding trench water, we will begin to pump up the water in

the trench attached to the turbine building of Unit 2 to the hot well. Our agency, NISA, checked the structural strength of the hot well, possibility of leakage into the sea via small pipes, and the procedure to pump up. But during the test of leakage, TEPCO found some possible leakage, so they are now checking so that they can actually transfer the highly radiated water through those hoses. One more thing about Unit 2, as the next step, TEPCO is preparing for transferring the highly radiated stagnant water in the turbine building of Unit 2 to the radiated waste disposal system. NISA, our agency, requested TEPCO to report in written form the necessity of transfer, evaluation of safety, and the measures regarding permanent storage and purifying treatment.

Regarding Unit 3, parameters of the reactor are relatively stable. Regarding the spent fuel pool, we threw 80t of pure water to the spent fuel pool of Unit 3 with a concrete pumping machine. We changed the power source of water injection to the concrete pumping machine from diesel generators to the outside grid.

Regarding Unit 4, no water throwing operation is scheduled today. We changed the power source as we did with respect to Unit 3.

Regarding our operation to release the slightly radiated water from the sub-drain of Units 5 and 6 and also from the radiated waste disposal system, TEPCO almost finished the operation and NISA, our agency, is requesting TEPCO to report how much water they released to the sea and how much radioactive materials they released to the sea. We will inform those facts to the representatives of countries in Tokyo and also Japanese prefectural and municipal governments who have concerns with the operation. Of course, we will publish the results.

In addition to those activities, we sprayed synthetic plastic to settle the radiated dust so that it will not fly over to other places. And the series of actions regarding this spraying of synthetic plastic are experimental ones and we will evaluate the effectiveness and decide whether we will spray it over all the Fukushima Daiichi Plant. We began placing silt fences to prevent the possible spilling water being proliferated into the sea. That is all for my report today. Thank you very much for your attention.

Mr. Shikata: Next, Mr. Kawarada, please.

Mr. Kawarada: In relation to the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, in areas

farther beyond 20km, we have set monitoring posts and used monitoring cars in order to measure the radiation and radioactivity levels. As for the spatial radiation dose rate, the dose rate is gradually declining and that has become a trend. Also, from land, the sea, and from the air, we are conducting the monitoring and we have some data on the sea results. The results are almost flat, meaning that there are several monitoring posts where the effects of the Nuclear Power Plant are not appearing. As of 11 April, that is today, there are some monitoring posts which have measured some radiation measurements. As for the national radiation and radioactivity level measurements, MEXT has received reports from across the country, and in and around Fukushima there are some monitoring posts that have measured relatively higher levels, but for the rest of the country, the measurements remained relatively flat, unchanged.

Mr. Shikata: I would like to ask Mr. Masanori Shinano of the Nuclear Safety Commission to go next.

Mr. Shinano: Thank you very much. We have prepared three types of material from the NSC. First is related to the result of the analysis of the environmental monitoring results. This report covers 10:00 a.m. of 9 April to 10:00 a.m. 10 April – the data that was published between these hours. Generally speaking, we did not obtain data which would indicate impact on human health. There are some differences that we find in these numbers as compared to before. First is the concentration in air of iodine and cesium. The value is lower for these dust samplings. And number five, which is the environmental radioactivity level by prefecture for tap water or drinking water. For cesium and for iodine the numbers are lower than that of the previous day. So this is a result of the analysis data which I can provide you with today.

I have material which says “To the Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters.” Today, the Chief Cabinet Secretary expressed a review that we have conducted for the evacuation zone. Before this announcement last year, the headquarters of the government had sought some scientific recommendations from NSC, and the content of the advice that we gave is summarized in this material. The first page is the indication that it is from the NSC to the Director-General of the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters and actual substances are covered from the second page.

As was already explained earlier, at present, depending on the exposure or the dosage,

up to the radius of 20km, we have set an evacuation area from a 20 to 30km radius, and we have indoor evacuation instructions. Aside from them, there are no specific instructions, but when there is an area with higher dosage, we have recommended voluntary evacuation. However, the period of these evacuations have become much, much longer than anticipated and we do need to consider the future. Therefore, we needed to consider a possibility of introducing a new philosophy regarding the establishment of these evacuation areas and zones. To be more specific, since there was an explanation earlier, I will not repeat myself. But in the past 10mSv as well as 50mSv were the two standards which had determined the boundary for these zones, but we have newly introduced the concept of 20mSv. IAEA and ICRP had proposed this emergency exposure situation recommendation of 20 to 100mSv and we took the safest of this range that was recommended by these organizations. Up until the present, Japanese nuclear emergency preparedness and the guidelines have not adopted this 20mSv principle, but in view of international trends, we newly recommended the introduction of this 20mSv as one of the criteria to be used for these evacuations.

For each of these evacuation areas, in addition to the advice that I already referred to, in each of these areas there are things to be considered by the residents. For example, in the planned evacuation areas we need to ask the residents to evacuate in a planned way to another area, and in such emergencies the residents who are asked to evacuate need to be prepared to have places to evacuate to. Also, there is thinking as to how these zones can be reevaluated or reviewed. This is stated in number three.

If it was judged that the release of radioactive material from nuclear plants is under control, there would be reconsiderations made, and for that purpose we need to further intensify the environmental monitoring in these areas. We have been requested from the Nuclear Emergency Response Headquarters to provide advice and yesterday we did provide such advice from the NSC to the Headquarters. This is the second point that I wanted to cover.

The third area is the results of the simulation using the System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information (SPEEDI), and regarding this simulation, on 28 March we disclosed these results and this was an estimation by SPEEDI between 12 March, that is, immediately after the quake, and 5 April. That is the evaluation of child pediatric thyroid glands. I believe I've explained the SPEEDI simulation, but the most important reference point, which is the release source, was not made clear.

Therefore we used the daily monitoring results to be able to estimate the data on the source of the discharge from the surrounding areas, and then from there, from the source, we will re-estimate the radiation or integrated dose in the surrounding areas. We've repeated this process many times and although this is not complete, as a result of pursuing higher accuracy data, we have been able to compile this data, which is estimation by SPEEDI between 12 March and 5 April. 12 March is immediately after the earthquake. That is the integrated dose of external exposure. So this is the estimation using SPEEDI of the integrated dose of external exposure. As I explained during my explanation of the monitoring data, to the north western side of Fukushima Daiichi power plant, there seem to be areas with higher dosages or higher levels of contamination and this has been substantiated by the estimation results of SPEEDI. There was a strong request from you for us to disclose the estimations done by SPEEDI and that's why we decided to respond to those requests and provide the results to you.

Mr. Shikata: Mr. Eiichi Yokota of MHLW please.

Mr. Yokota: I would like to talk about the reports received from MHLW this weekend about the results of food sampling surveys. The first one is about 8 April, which is a Friday. We were able to compile the results of 56 samples and there were none which exceeded the provisional standards. The next page indicates the results of sampling taken on 9 April. 63 samples were examined on that day, and the hashed portion to the very right are those samples which exceeded the provisional limit. One is sand lances taken off Fukushima where the samples examined exceeded the provisional limit. However, all fishing off the coast of Fukushima has been prohibited, therefore these sand lances have not made their way into the distribution routes.

And the third piece of paper is data reported to MHLW on 10 April. 38 samples in total were examined and the hashed areas on the right are those samples which exceeded the provisional limit: Fukushima-made shiitake, three samples, grown outdoors, which exceeded the provisional limits, but they were all grown outdoors. And Fukushima prefecture I believe has requested that these producers voluntarily restrain shipment. And there is another document which is a sum up of the radionuclide test results carried out by MHLW: 1,269 samples have been examined and 169 were found to have exceeded the provisional radiation limits. Thank you.

Mr. Shikata: Mr. Nakayama of the Fisheries Agency is next.

Mr. Nakayama: Today I would like to report to you on two counts. One is that on the homepage of the Fisheries Agency we have posted some information on the characteristics of marine produce, also we have reinforced the monitoring surveys which is reported to you in the documents. Let me very briefly outline it. First of all, the paper titled FA, concerning the Fisheries Agency, here we talk about DE radionuclides and the characteristics we find in fish. First of all there is the concentration factor you will see in red there, and for cesium it is between 5 and 100, and for iodine it is 10. DDT is 12,000; PCB is about 1,000,000. They have a very high concentration factor compared to that cesium as well as iodine has a very low biological concentration factor. The first chart indicates those characteristics. On the right hand side you will see the graph, where you see the concentration factor on the vertical axis and on the horizontal axis you will see sea water, zoo plankton, mollusks, crustaceans, small finned fish and large finned fish. For DDT for example, the concentration factor is very, very high, in other words they become very much accumulated as the fish becomes larger, but for cesium, for example, the concentration factor is not very high, and they sort of level off after a certain point. Why is it that cesium is not concentrated? For that you need to look at the next chart, the periodic table. When you look at 1A, cesium is within the same group as potassium, K. What this means is that if you look at the fish diagram below you will see that like potassium, cesium is excreted even if it is taken into the body of these fish. And when you move further, in the next graph you will see that from 1990 to the year 2000, the background seawater and the concentration of the cesium in the fish body was followed in 1990, because of various events the concentration was higher, but in 2000 it has declined along with the level in the seawater. In other words, the concentration in the seawater is followed by the concentration in the fish body for cesium. In the diagram below we experimentally had these fish intake this cesium in the laboratory and tried to follow their decline. As is indicated on the right hand square, the biological half-life means how long it takes for the fish to metabolize and reduce the amount to half. For cesium it is 50 days. In other words, in 50 days half of the material that exists in the body will be metabolized. And in the left graph, you will see that from 1985 to 1986 you see that there is a sudden rise when the Chernobyl accident took place, but one year later it had declined. In other words, for cesium, metabolization occurs very quickly and is reduced to a very low concentration. We have actually put this up on our home page.

The second paper deals with the result of the inspection of radioactive material in

fishery products, based on intensified monitoring since 8 April. We have taken 20 monitoring results from each prefecture's sand lances. Juvenile sand lances or sand lances had, in 58 or 59 cases, higher than the regulation values. But Fukushima, where the result was higher than the regulated value, is not fishing these products. Therefore these products will not be distributed in the market.

Mr. Shikata: Next I would like to ask Mr. Matsunaga of MOFA to come up with brief remarks.

Mr. Matsunaga: Thank you Mr. Shikata. This evening I would like to make two points. First of all, about the Diplomatic Bluebook of 2011. The relevant paper was circulated for your reference. The Diplomatic Bluebook does not actually cover the Earthquake itself, but when the Bluebook was presented at the Cabinet on 1 April, there was a statement made by Foreign Minister Matsumoto. At the Cabinet Meeting Foreign Minister Matsumoto noted that "Japan is now facing its greatest national crisis since WWII, in the wake of the Great East Japan Earthquake of 11 March and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will make every effort in conducting diplomacy so that Japan will overcome the difficult times ahead and recover." This is for your reference.

The second point I would like to make this evening concerns the activities of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). On one previous occasion I explained about the monitoring system arranged by the CTBTO. They have very sophisticated and worldwide monitoring stations. The other day, the organization issued a fact sheet which is circulated for your reference. In that fact sheet they stated that "the levels detected at stations outside Japan up until 7 April have been far below levels that could cause harm to humans and the environment. The levels are comparable to natural background radiation such as cosmic radiation and radiation from the environment on earth, and are lower than from man-made sources, such as medical applications, nuclear power plants under normal operations, or isotope production facilities." That's all from me. Thank you.

Mr. Shikata: Now I would like to open the floor for questions.

QUESTION (Mr. Normile, Science): Regarding the evacuations or the further planned evacuations, can you say how many people will be affected? Is it going to be the entire 30km zone or is it just going to be certain areas in that zone? How long will these

people have to be relocated? I guess that is for Mr. Shinano.

Mr. Shinano: I am from the NSC. As the NSC has mentioned at the outset, the role of the NSC is up to the stage of providing scientific advice for the government to decide, so I am not able to respond to your question regarding what zone is going to be designated and how many people and how long these people are going to be affected.

On the other hand, whether the evacuation area is going to include the entire 30km diameter area, the approach we are taking is whether or not the cumulative dose will exceed 20mSv over a period of one year. So our approach is not preoccupied with whether or not it is within a radius of 30km, and it is going to be the Emergency Preparedness Headquarters that is going to designate the evacuation area. But if you could look at the graph that plots the estimation by SPEEDI, you can see that there are a number of high dose areas in the north western area. The estimates shown in the SPEEDI graph are estimates up to 6 April. When we translate that into a duration of one year, if there are areas in the north western parts where there is a risk of exceeding 20mSv as a cumulative dose over a one year period, the area will be designated as an evacuation area, even if it is beyond a 30km area.

Mr. Shikata: Let me just supplement. When looking at this map, when we are talking about deliberate evacuation area, in concrete terms we are talking about Katsurao Village, which is kind of in the north western part, Namie City, I think Iitate Village is part of it, Kawamata City and a part of Minami-Soma, so we are talking about the north western side which is beyond a 20km radius. But when you look at the southern parts, we are not seeing higher doses. So cities include Hirono, Kawauchi, Naraha, or Tamura City, they are basically designated as evacuation prepared areas. So there are some distinctions in terms of the status of those cities, although some cities or villages are further away from Fukushima Daiichi than others, they could be designated as deliberate evacuation areas.

QUESTION (Ms. Kolonko, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung): I have two questions; the first is concerning the highly radioactive water. You keep saying you are preparing to pump out the water. Are you actually pumping out the water or not, and why are you still preparing to pump out the water? The other question is, you mentioned just now that in reactor one you found leaks in the vessel. Was that correct? Are these new leaks? Were these leaks that occurred after today's earthquake or how are we to understand

this? Thank you.

Mr. Nishiyama: First of all, regarding the transfer of the stagnant water, we had to first prepare the container to which we could transfer the stagnant water, and we had to make room in the container to which we could transfer the water. This took a considerable amount of time. But finally we now have a situation where we can transfer the water in the trench of Unit 2 into the condenser and the transfer of the stagnant water is about to begin.

In response to your second question about the leakage in Unit 1, up to now we had assumed that there is probably a leak in view of the fact that hydrogen and other radioactive materials have been released from Unit 1. But recently through our work of injecting nitrogen into Unit 1, we have been able to know more clearly that there is some kind of leakage.

QUESTION (Mr. Neidhart, Sueddeutsche Zeitung): A question for Mr. Shinano and Mr. Nishiyama. So far it looked like, or at least I thought that most of radiation was from iodine 131. Now we have learned that 80% of current radiation is from two isotopes, cesium 134 and 137. That means that we will have more or less stable radiation for up to a year or even longer if it's 137. First question, is that the reason why the government finally decided to increase the evacuation zone? Because the radiation will stay high in these areas for a long time and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), for example have recommended this evacuation for quite a while. And the second question, does this higher amount of cesium mean that the damages at the reactors are worse than first assumed?

Mr. Shinano: First of all, in response to your question of whether we are going to increase the evacuation zone, I do not believe that is necessarily the case. Rather, what we are going to be doing is review the evacuation zone so that it would be more in line with the actual dose levels that we will see in those of the areas.

And as you are aware, up to now, a major cause of the exposure to radiation was due to iodine with a half life of 8 days, but now we are seeing large amounts of cesium 134 which has a half life of 2 years, and furthermore, going forward we may see cesium 137, which has a half life of 30 years, so we foresee such changes in the type of nuclides as we go on.

If you can please refer to page seven in the document that was distributed today from my colleague from MEXT you see the change in the ambient radiation dose rate with time. And you can see, in the beginning, immediately after the accident, there was a very large effect of iodine, which was seen in high doses, but now those rates of iodine are gradually declining, and from now, as you can see on the right hand side, we expect to see the effect of cesium. But in terms of the actual dose, we expect that the actual dose will be going down, so we need to take this fully into consideration as a fact, and we consider that the period of high radiation dose is behind us.

Mr. Nishiyama: In response to your second question, immediately after the earthquake we had a hydrogen explosion and there was a leakage from the reactor and there was some damage to the fuel which has led to an explosion due to the buildup of hydrogen resulting in the release of radioactive material. So we already knew from that point that there was a certain leakage in the reactor. At that time, the ratio of cesium to iodine was one in which the level of iodine was two digits higher than the level of cesium. But that was the radioactive material that was released at that time and I do not believe there has been any change to the situation since then.

QUESTION (Mr. Kincaid, The Economist): This may have been answered and I may have missed it. In case I have not, why is it that we are detecting the cesium now, rather than the iodine? Why are these radio isotopes appearing? We have not spoken about the strontium, why not?

Mr. Nishiyama: First of all, if I may explain the relationship between iodine and cesium, iodine has been released in far larger amounts, but it has a short half life and therefore has already declined as of now. That is why we tend to see more of the cesium. And regarding strontium, if we move on with our analysis, there is the possibility that strontium may also be detected.

QUESTION (Mr. Kincaid, The Economist): Just a follow-up on that, obviously I'm not a scientist, but why will we start to see strontium in the future, but not have detected it earlier? I recognized obviously that the other radio isotopes emit gamma rays and strontium does not, but is there any other reason other than that testing takes longer to detect?

Mr. Nishiyama: In order to detect the strontium it takes a lot of time, and in view of the fact that the volume of strontium is very small in the first place, it cannot be detected unless an expert takes quite a lot of time to analyze. And that is why we probably have not detected strontium yet. Whereas in the case of plutonium, in order to detect fallout from nuclear tests and so forth, we have special very precise devices to detect plutonium. That is why we were able to detect plutonium ahead of other materials.

QUESTION (Mr. Bradshaw, New York Times): Two questions, first regarding the leaks you now believe have occurred in Unit 1, do you tend to think the point of the leak is above or below the water level? Is it large enough a leak that it is only gaseous or are you also seeing liquid leaking from the reactor vessel? Is there any sign of corium leaking from the reactor vessels? Presumably not, or you would mention it maybe?

And as a second question, has today's power outage suggested a vulnerability to further tsunamis, in the sense that it seems that there is a rather long lag for engaging the trailer mounted diesel generators after the loss of external power, and that that still needs to be done manually, so is that a vulnerability of the site in the event that you need to evacuate it for further tsunami warnings or actual tsunamis. Thank you.

Mr. Nishiyama: First of all, regarding your question about the leakage in Unit 1, when I mentioned leakage earlier I was talking about mainly leakage in the containment vessel, and so first of all water is injected into the pressure vessel for cooling the fuel, and depending upon the degree of damage to the fuel, the steam or radioactive material that are released would first move from the pressure vessel to the containment vessel, and then be released from the containment vessel to the outside. And the leak from the containment vessel is mainly gases, and therefore the leakage is mainly from the upper part. In response to your question about the tsunami, the power generation plants were supposed to be installed in a way that would not be affected by tsunami, but this time we experienced a tsunami that was far beyond our anticipation and that is why we are facing the problems that we are now facing.

QUESTION (Mr. Bradshaw, New York Times): I am sorry, I was asking about this afternoon's earthquake. My understanding was that the site was temporarily evacuated because of concern maybe about a follow up tsunami, and that external power was also lost to the water cooling, and that because you were evacuating the personnel from the site because of the possibility of tsunami you did not have anybody on site this

afternoon who could immediately turn on the diesel generators. So the question is whether you have a plan to make the diesel generators on site, that is the temporary diesel generators, automatic, in the way the permanent backup generators built in to the reactor are automatic? Those, as I understand, are supposed to engage in 10 seconds. In this case, you had an earthquake this afternoon about 5:00, and you lost the external power but at the same time people left, so there was nobody to turn on these manually operated diesel generators, so is that another vulnerability, to the extent that people leave, and there is nobody there, and you don't seem to have an automatic system in the event that you lose external power again.

Mr. Nishiyama: In a normally operating nuclear power station, not the Unit 1 that was damaged by the tsunami this time, but in the case of a normally operating nuclear power station, when the external power source is lost the diesel generator will start operating automatically. But in this case, since the damage has already been done from the previous tsunami we did not have those in place, and so we were considering dealing with the situation this time either by restoring the outside power source or by injecting cooling water from the fire engine.

Mr. Shikata: I am afraid that we are out of time and we would like to conclude this evening's press briefing. Thank you for coming.