
2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

25 March 2026

Original: English

ADVANCE UNEDITED VERSION

New York, 27 April – 22 May 2026

Recommendations for consideration by the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Joint working paper submitted by the members of the
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada,
Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands (Kingdom of the),
Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Türkiye and the United
Arab Emirates)**

1 The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative is committed to actively contributing to the eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. To this end, the Initiative has submitted working papers for the meetings of the current Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle on transparency and accountability, strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, disarmament and non-proliferation education, and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy

2 The recommendations below are largely based on those working papers as well as a series of working papers submitted during the previous review cycles, which have enduring relevance.

3 A diversity of views and geographical regions are represented within the Initiative. The recommendations in this paper reflect the common commitment of the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which is the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime and the basis for cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology. The Initiative considers the three pillars of the Treaty to be interdependent and mutually reinforcing. The recommendations are aimed at contributing to forward-looking, balanced and substantive outcomes at the eleventh Review Conference.

Recommendations

4 Emphasizing that commitments and agreements made by States parties during previous review conferences remain valid and should be implemented in full, while acknowledging that progress and subsequent developments have addressed certain

Actions, progress remains inadequate, particularly under the disarmament pillar, and that efforts of States parties should build upon those commitments and agreements, in furtherance of the purpose of the Review Conference, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative makes the following recommendations:

Pillar I. Disarmament

1. Implementation of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

5 The Conference reaffirm the importance of the full and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty. The Conference note that, following decades of reductions in nuclear arsenals, progress is stalled amid increased strategic competition and rising nuclear risks, including a new arms race. In this context, the Conference emphasize the urgent need to reinvigorate efforts to advance nuclear disarmament. The implementation of Action 5 of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan remains essential to accelerated, concrete progress towards nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, peace, and undiminished and increased security;

6 Recalling the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, which included as a practical step for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, the Conference call upon all nuclear-weapon States, inter alia, to:

6.1 Promptly identify, agree, and implement concrete measures of progress and targets—supported by transparent public reporting—to ensure further reductions in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons regardless of their type or location, leading to their total elimination and the achievement and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons in accordance with the Treaty, including Article VI and past commitments;

6.2 Agree and implement tangible measures to reduce the risks posed by nuclear weapons, while affirming that such efforts are in no way a substitute for nuclear disarmament;

6.3 Intensify confidence-building and transparency measures as essential steps towards reducing risks and advancing disarmament;

6.4 Review their nuclear doctrines to enhance predictability, reduce the risk of misunderstandings and misperceptions, and strengthen crisis stability as part of broader efforts to reduce nuclear risks. The review should focus on concrete steps to further reduce the operational status, role, and significance of nuclear weapons. In order to reduce risks, nuclear doctrines should be made public and accessible to foster accountability and enable informed and meaningful dialogue with non-nuclear-weapon States;

6.5 Support efforts and initiatives that promote the participation of civil society, research centres and academia in raising public awareness of the urgency and importance of, and informing policy development on, nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, including through their engagement in plenary sessions and intersessional meetings of the Treaty;

7 The nuclear-weapon States are called upon to report on the above to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee in 2028. The 2030 Review Conference will take stock and identify next steps for the full implementation of Article VI of the Treaty;

8 The Conference note with concern that the expiry of the New START Treaty in February 2026 leaves the world without any legally binding, verifiable agreements between nuclear-weapon States on the size or deployment of nuclear arsenals. In this context, the Conference call for the urgent development of new, verifiable arms control arrangements by nuclear-weapon States that address contemporary nuclear arms control challenges and prevent a nuclear arms race, consistent with the disarmament obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Conference recall the obligation under Article VI of the Treaty to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

2. Transparency

9 The Conference welcome the Non-Proliferation Treaty national implementation reports submitted by States parties and reiterate that the principle of transparency, together with those of irreversibility and verifiability, is indispensable for nuclear disarmament and underpins the other two principles;

10 The Conference stress that increased transparency, through the enhancement of the reporting mechanism, the submission of national implementation reports and the discussion of those reports, helps to build confidence and trust and establishes common ground that can facilitate nuclear disarmament, including through further reductions in nuclear weapons towards their total elimination;

11 The Conference emphasize that transparency is critical to reviewing the comprehensive implementation of the Treaty. In the absence of a specific accountability mechanism for nuclear disarmament obligations under the Treaty, robust reporting by States parties can provide greater transparency and accountability within the Treaty review process;

12 The Conference recall that all States parties should report during a Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle with accurate, up-to-date and complete information on their fulfilment of obligations and commitments under the Treaty. Nuclear-weapon States and those with significant peaceful nuclear capabilities should report at least twice in a Treaty review cycle. The Conference notes, in this regard, that standardized reporting templates have been developed by various States parties for broader use;

13 The Conference further call upon nuclear-weapon States to improve the transparency of information related to their nuclear weapons in a comparable manner and with numerical information such as the number, type and status of nuclear warheads, the number and types of delivery vehicles, the number and types of weapons, delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts, the amount of fissile material produced for nuclear weapons and explosive devices, measures taken for risk reduction and measures taken to reduce the role and significance of nuclear weapons without prejudice to national security;

14 The Conference agree that future preparatory committees and review conferences, starting with the 2030 review cycle, will allocate time to discuss the reports by all States parties and that at least one preparatory committee session in the review cycle will allocate time specifically to discuss the reports of nuclear-weapon States. The Conference emphasize that such occasions are to be held in an interactive format that

enables questions to be raised and clarification sought and made on the content of national implementation reports;

15 The Conference also encourage nuclear-weapon States to use additional available opportunities and channels to further explain and share information regarding topics covered in their respective reports in an interactive and inclusive format;

16 The Conference call upon nuclear-weapon States to report using a standard reporting template that clearly sets out efforts in relation to each action of the 2010 Action Plan consistent with Action 21 and its call for standardized reporting at appropriate intervals. This reporting form would build on the “common framework” developed by nuclear-weapon States and take into account various reporting aids developed by States parties;

3. Fissile material cut-off treaty

17 The Conference note with concern the continued lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and acknowledge that the long-awaited commencement of negotiations on such a treaty could make a substantial and concrete contribution towards nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects, the implementation of Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and, ultimately, a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference confirm that the immediate commencement of negotiations is a shared priority for all States parties to the Treaty and, more generally, for the international community;

18 The Conference recognize the work that has been undertaken with the aim of facilitating future negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices including the consensus report of the high-level fissile material cut-off treaty expert preparatory group released in July 2018 and efforts within the Conference on Disarmament;

19 The Conference reiterate the longstanding calls to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices without delay or preconditions, and call upon States parties to undertake further work to facilitate the successful conclusion of such a treaty, either in advance of or in parallel to negotiations;

20 Pending the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, the Conference welcome existing voluntary moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and call upon nuclear-weapon States that have not already done so to declare and implement such a voluntary moratorium;

4. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

21 The Conference call for the prompt entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and urge all States that have yet to ratify the Treaty to do so without delay or preconditions, particularly the now nine remaining States listed in its Annex 2. The Conference welcome the ratifications since the Tenth Review Conference by Equatorial Guinea, São Tomé and Príncipe, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, and Papua New Guinea;

22 The Conference acknowledge the progress made to establish the CTBT verification regime, as evidenced by the work of the IMS and the International Data Centre (IDC) and by the experience gained through the development of the on-site inspection mechanism. The Conference note the importance of continued assistance by States parties to the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) in its work in preparing for the entry into force of the Treaty. This includes the early completion, continued provisional operation and maintenance of the IMS, which has demonstrated that it is an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory element of the global verification and compliance aims of the CTBT and has tangible scientific and civil benefits;

23 The Conference reiterate that ratification by nuclear-weapon States that have yet to do so would provide further impetus towards the entry into force of the CTBT and strengthen confidence. The Conference also reiterate that nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility to encourage ratification of the CTBT, and call upon them to take actions in this regard;

24 The Conference resolve that all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons uphold and maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions in line with the zero-yield standard while stressing that the entry into force of the CTBT will have a more permanent and legally binding effect to end nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions and enable the use of on-site inspections to collect evidence relevant to potential treaty violations. The Conference also urge all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT pending its entry into force;

5. Nuclear risk reduction

25 Considering the deteriorating international security environment and the subsequent increased risk of nuclear conflict and the deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from such a conflict, the Conference recognize that reducing the risk of nuclear conflict and preventing nuclear war is in the interest of all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with the nuclear-weapon States bearing a special responsibility in this regard;

26 The Conference welcome and encourage further work and discussions on nuclear risk reduction by international bodies, in the framework of their respective mandates such as the United Nations Disarmament Commission, the Conference on Disarmament and institutions such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research;

27 The Conference, in addition, acknowledge the increased attention given to nuclear risk reduction during the current Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, as expressed by the work of think tanks, academics and States parties and their groups, such as, the Stockholm Initiative on Nuclear Disarmament, the Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament initiative, the group on Reducing the Risk of Nuclear Conflict and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative;

28 The Conference encourage further work in this area towards the elaboration of practical nuclear risk reduction measures, recognizing, inter alia, the relevance of the following:

28.1 Sustained efforts to enhance transparency on nuclear arsenals;

28.2 Pursuit of early conflict prevention and resolution in relation to nuclear threats;

28.3 Intensified dialogue, both among nuclear-weapon States and between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, on risk perceptions, nuclear doctrines, and force postures;

28.4 Declaratory restraint and efforts to reduce perceived ambiguity and entanglement between nuclear and conventional weapons;

28.5 Negative security assurances;

28.6 De-alerting and reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons systems;

28.7 Notification and data exchange agreements;

28.8 Minimizing vulnerabilities related to potentially disruptive new technologies and cyber capacities;

28.9 Enhanced military-to-military contacts and the establishment of crisis-proof communication lines and risk-reduction centres;

28.10 Prevention of unintended or accidental use;

28.11 Further investigation of operational uncertainties, pathways to nuclear use, sharing of best practices and de-escalation pathways.

6. Nuclear disarmament verification

29 The Conference emphasize the importance of nuclear disarmament verification as a practical and effective step towards the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, reiterating that such verification is essential to achieving full compliance with the object and purpose of the Treaty and to build the trust and confidence between parties to nuclear arms control and disarmament agreements. Nuclear disarmament verification further enables States to take appropriate and timely action in instances of non-compliance. The Conference reaffirm that nuclear disarmament verification is essential for nuclear disarmament;

30 The Conference welcome the work undertaken by the Group of Governmental Experts established under General Assembly resolution 71/67 of 5 December 2016 to consider the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament, and the adoption by the Assembly of resolution 74/50 of 12 December 2019, by which it established a group of governmental experts to further consider nuclear disarmament verification issues; and welcome the adoption of General Assembly resolution 80/53 of 1 December 2025 to establish a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification within the United Nations;

31 The Conference further note the contributions of activities and initiatives on this matter carried out during the review cycle in a national capacity and in bilateral, plurilateral as well as multilateral formats by both governmental and non-governmental experts such as the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification;

32 On the basis of commitments made by the States parties in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference and in the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan, the

Conference encourage further conceptual and practical work on nuclear disarmament verification. In this regard, the Conference highlight the importance of maximum inclusivity, of partnerships and transfer of knowledge, consistent with the Treaty, between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States in nuclear disarmament verification and of capacity-building and confidence-building measures, including transparency;

7. Humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons

33 Concerned about growing risks of nuclear war, the Conference reiterate its deep concern about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, as set out in the 2010 Review Conference Final Document. The Conference affirm, in view of such consequences, that it is in the interest of all States that nuclear weapons never be used again and that the recognition of the catastrophic humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons underpins our efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, as stipulated in the preamble of the Treaty;

34 The Conference be mindful that no national or international response capacity exists that would adequately respond to the human suffering and humanitarian harm that would result from a nuclear weapon explosion in a populated area, and that such capacity most likely will never exist;

35 The Conference stress the significance of raising and spreading awareness of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons across borders and generations through such efforts as disarmament and non-proliferation education and the translation of the testimonies of the hibakusha (those who have suffered the use of nuclear weapons) into multiple languages;

36 Mindful that 2025 marked 80 years since the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Conference acknowledge the importance of preserving memory of those who have been affected by nuclear weapons use and testing, and invite the world's political leaders, young people and others to visit and engage with affected communities to raise awareness of the realities of nuclear weapons use and testing;

37 The Conference emphasize that the discussion on this issue must be inclusive and universal and reaffirm the importance of further deepening our understanding of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons using fact-based scientific studies. In this regard, the Conference note the establishment and ongoing deliberations of the independent Scientific Panel on the Effects of Nuclear War under General Assembly resolution 79/238.

8. Disarmament and non-proliferation education

38 The Conference underscore the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education as a practical means to advance the objectives of the Treaty in support of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference recognize that it is vital to seek the most effective ways to raise awareness among all people regardless of age, gender and nationality, including by making full use of appropriate communications and new information technologies;

39 The Conference consider that disarmament and non-proliferation education should be apolitical and aim to foster and nurture critical thinking, skills and knowledge that would enable people to engage actively in advancing the objectives of the Treaty;

40 The Conference acknowledge that disarmament and non-proliferation education require collective efforts that include all parts of society, including educational institutions, academia, think tanks and research institutes, the scientific community and centres of excellence, as well as all levels of government, international organizations, civil society, the private sector and the media and encourage them to learn from each other and create synergies to advance educational initiatives;

41 The Conference call upon States parties to take concrete measures to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, whether collectively or in their national capacities, including promoting and facilitating meaningful dialogue and redoubling efforts to implement the relevant recommendations contained in the report of the Secretary-General (A/57/124), as called for in Action 22 of the 2010 Review Conference Action Plan, and bearing in mind developments in information technology and advancements in enhancing gender equality;

42 The Conference encourage all States parties to facilitate efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education, including, inter alia, efforts in which the young generations can actively engage, including through dialogue platforms, mentoring, internships, fellowships, scholarships, model events and youth group activities;

Pillar II. Nuclear non-proliferation

9. Safeguards

43 The Conference recognize the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in verifying the non-diversion of declared nuclear material, as well as the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, and consider the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, in combination with an additional protocol, to be the current international verification standard under Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference underline the importance of respecting the mandate, technical authority and independence of the IAEA;

44 The Conference welcome the fact that 182 States have brought into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA and that additional protocols are currently being implemented by 144 States and Euratom. The Conference further welcome the increasing number of additional protocols in force, as these contribute to global nuclear non-proliferation objectives and strengthen the effectiveness and efficiency of IAEA safeguards;

45 The Conference note that IAEA provides increased assurances regarding both the non-diversion of nuclear material placed under safeguards and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for States with both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in force;

46 The Conference, bearing in mind the importance to non-proliferation and disarmament of universalizing the safeguards regime, urge States that have not yet done so to conclude and ratify both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol without delay and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force and urge remaining States that have not yet amended their small quantities protocol to accelerate efforts in this respect or to apply the comprehensive safeguards agreement in full;

47 The Conference emphasize that the safeguards system provided under Article III of the Treaty should evolve when necessary to maintain its effectiveness as a tool for preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

48 The Conference further emphasize that only the combination of a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol is adequate for effectively implementing safeguards and therefore achieving the objective set out under Article III of the Treaty;

49 The Conference call upon States parties to discuss ways in which they can support IAEA efforts on comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol universalization, for example, through outreach and by providing assistance or engaging in capacity-building activities, where possible. States parties should consider how regional structures and organizations can play a role in this regard;

50 The Conference welcome the continued evolution of both effective and efficient safeguards and support progress made by the IAEA to effectively develop and implement State-level safeguards approaches;

51 The Conference reiterate that, while using nuclear material for peaceful purposes, States parties are always required to comply with their non-proliferation obligations under Article III, and other relevant provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to prevent the diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

10. Negative security assurances and nuclear-weapon-free zones

52 The Conference recognize that reaffirming and strengthening negative security assurances would help to improve the overall security environment and strengthen confidence in the non-proliferation regime. In this regard, invite the nuclear-weapon States, consistent with the UN Charter and building on Security Council resolutions 984 (1995), 1887 (2009) and 2310 (2016), to renew and, where appropriate, reinforce negative security assurances, while recognising interest in legally binding assurances and expressing readiness to consider practical steps towards such arrangements in appropriate fora;

53 The Conference also recognize that the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination. Negative security assurances are not to be seen as ends in themselves but as interim steps towards the shared goal of a world without nuclear weapons;

54 The Conference, in accordance with the commitments made by States parties in previous review conferences, note that various aspects of negative security assurances merit further consideration, recognizing the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances;

55 The Conference note with concern the continued lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament on negative security assurances and reiterate the longstanding calls to, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument;

56 The Conference reaffirm the conviction that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards realizing the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation;

57 The Conference encourage nuclear-weapon States to take all measures necessary to bring into force the pending protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties;

58 The Conference call upon all nuclear-weapon States to review any reservations or interpretative declarations made to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties and their protocols contrary to the object and purpose of such treaties, with an aim to their withdrawal;

59 The Conference note the conference process on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and underscore the urgent need for progress in that regard and encourage all countries of the Middle East to participate in and engage meaningfully in the process with a view to the full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 Action Plan without further delay;

60 The Conference support efforts to enhance institutionalization, cooperation, and consultations among the existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including Mongolia;

61 The Conference note the establishment and ongoing deliberations of the qualified group of experts on a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, under General Assembly resolution 79/241;

11. Democratic People's Republic of Korea

62 The Conference reaffirm the commitment of the States parties to the international community's goal of the complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement of all weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles of all ranges of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as well as its related programmes and facilities, in accordance with Security Council resolutions; To this end, the Conference support the IAEA maintaining its enhanced readiness for the Agency to play its essential role in verifying the DPRK's nuclear programme;

63 The Conference call upon all members of the international community to fully implement relevant Security Council resolutions and strongly urge the DPRK to return to full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Conference note, with deep concern, the disbanding of the 1718 Committee Panel of Experts on the DPRK after fourteen years of unanimous support. The Panel of Experts provided independent and objective reporting and was central to upholding the UN 1718 Committee sanctions regime;

Pillar III. Peaceful uses

12. Peaceful uses

64 The Conference reaffirm Article IV of the Treaty, which stipulates that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all States parties to

develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty;

65 The Conference recognize that applications of nuclear energy require, at all stages, commitments to and implementation of the highest standards of safety, security and safeguards in order to maintain the broadest confidence in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

66 The Conference acknowledge the progress made on the peaceful uses and applications of nuclear technology and their potential to help to fulfil a wide variety of basic human development needs worldwide;

67 The Conference further acknowledge the role of peaceful uses and applications of nuclear technology in supporting States parties in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and specific Sustainable Development Goals, including in the areas of human and animal health, nutrition, food and agriculture, water resource management, environment, industry, materials and energy;

68 The Conference encourage States parties to support the expansion of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology to their fullest potential, including where possible or desirable through incorporation into national development plans;

69 The Conference acknowledge that the IAEA, including through its Technical Cooperation Programme, has an important role in assisting States parties in the safe and secure application and uses of nuclear technology and in assisting States parties with climate change adaptation and mitigation through the peaceful use of both power and non-power nuclear applications;

70 The Conference encourage the IAEA, its member States and development partners to work together to advance the recognition of nuclear science and technology as a tool for development within the development framework;

71 The Conference acknowledge the importance of communicating effectively and raising public awareness of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear technology;

72 The Conference encourage the IAEA and its Member States to further promote those benefits and to share knowledge and technology in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;

73 The Conference acknowledge the importance of bilateral, regional and multilateral cooperation in strengthening and enlarging the contribution of nuclear technology to peace, health and prosperity;

74 The Conference further acknowledge the need for all stakeholders to work together to bridge the gaps in nuclear science and technology among IAEA Member States, taking into account and emphasizing the importance of the specific needs of developing countries, including those of least developed countries;

75 The Conference recognize that regions face different challenges that may be best addressed through regional cooperative arrangements, such as those among States parties in Asia and the Pacific, Arab States, Latin America and the Caribbean and Africa, which can be effective in providing assistance and facilitating technology transfer, complementing and enhancing the technical cooperation activities of the IAEA in

individual countries, conducting cooperative research relevant to their regions, and promoting South-South and triangular cooperation;

76 The Conference recognize the ministerial-level IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Science, Technology and Applications and the Technical Cooperation Programme held in 2024 as a milestone event. The Conference reiterate acknowledgement of the contribution of, and the potential for nuclear science, technology and applications, to meet a wide variety of social, economic and human development needs and recommit to make every effort and take practical steps to ensure that the resources for the Technical Cooperation Programme activities are sufficient, assured and predictable;

77 The Conference encourage States parties that have not yet done so to consider joining international legal instruments on civil liability for nuclear damage and adopting suitable national legislation in this regard;

13. Nuclear safety

78 The Conference reaffirm that the use of nuclear technology must be accompanied, at all its stages, by commitments to and ongoing implementation of the highest standards of safety and security, as well as effective safeguards consistent with national legislation and respective international obligations of States;

79 The Conference emphasize the importance of the development, implementation and continuous improvement of appropriate legal and regulatory infrastructure as well as efforts and investments in education, training and human resource development to strengthen nuclear safety;

80 The Conference underline the central role of the IAEA in enhancing global nuclear safety, encourage all States parties to become party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management, and urge contracting parties to fulfil their obligations under the Convention and the Joint Convention;

14. Nuclear security

81 The Conference acknowledge achievements and remain committed to sustaining and strengthening the effective and comprehensive nuclear security of all nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities;

82 The Conference acknowledge existing and emerging nuclear security threats and States parties commit to addressing such threats;

83 The Conference reaffirm the importance of the physical protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, technology and facilities as a key element of nuclear security, and underline the need to take measures to identify and address new and evolving challenges and risks, including cyberattacks;

84 The Conference emphasize the central role of the IAEA in strengthening nuclear security globally and facilitating and coordinating international cooperation in this regard;

85 The Conference encourage States parties to support the IAEA's work in assisting countries in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes, including through guidance development, advisory services and capacity-building and, accordingly, its central role in facilitating and coordinating international cooperation to strengthen nuclear security, as well as its role in facilitating, as appropriate, regional activities;

86 The Conference welcome the fact that, since the previous Review Conference, several States parties have become parties to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment, which entered into force in 2016. The Conference urge all parties to those conventions to fully and effectively implement their obligations thereunder and further encourage all States parties that have not yet done so to become parties to those conventions as soon as possible;

87 The Conference call upon all States parties to achieve and maintain the highest standard of nuclear security and welcome international and regional cooperation to enhance nuclear security, including through training and capacity-building opportunities, such as those provided by the IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre, national and regional centres of excellence and Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres;

88 The Conference highlight the ministerial-level IAEA International Conference on Nuclear Security held in 2024 as a milestone event, for the sharing of knowledge and experience and promoting cooperation for and political commitment to nuclear security.

89 The Conference reaffirm the purpose of the review process as set out in the relevant decisions of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the 2000 Review Conference;

15. Strengthening the review process

90 The Conference acknowledge that there is a clear need to continue practical discussions and take concrete actions to improve the efficiency and practice of the Non-Proliferation Treaty review process with a view to strengthening it, as agreed in the 10th Review Conference (with the establishment of a working group) and recognize the need to further enhance effectiveness, transparency, inclusivity, efficiency and responsiveness of the review process;

91 The Conference emphasize that actions to strengthen the review process are no substitute for making progress on substantive outcomes and that the goal of reviewing the Non-Proliferation Treaty's working methods should be to facilitate substantive, transparent and inclusive dialogue, thereby contributing to efficient work within Review Conferences and Preparatory Committee meetings and, ultimately, the effective implementation of the Treaty;

92 The Conference consider further modalities for the consideration of the national implementation reports of all the nuclear-weapon States at the Preparatory Committee meetings during the next Review cycle. The Conference emphasize that the formulation of the draft final outcome document of the Review Conference should be carried out in a transparent and inclusive process;

93 The Conference call upon all States parties to continue to seek further progress in strengthening the review process and to implement it with a view to achieving effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, continuity and coordination;

16. Miscellaneous

94 The Conference reaffirm the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a cornerstone of international security. Its integrity and credibility rely on the sustained commitment of its States parties to its universalization and effective implementation across its three pillars. The Conference underscore the value of holistic, cooperative measures and dialogue to advance universality, including by encouraging non-State parties to accede as non-nuclear weapon States, and reinforce confidence in the Treaty's benefits. To this end, it is important to take a holistic approach, both to encourage non-State parties to accede as non-nuclear weapon States and to discourage them from withdrawing;

95 The Conference note that States parties exercising their rights under Article X of the Treaty will remain responsible under international law for violations of the Treaty committed prior to withdrawal, and nuclear material and facilities should remain subject to the safeguards regime following withdrawal from the Treaty;

96 The Conference emphasize that withdrawal does not change any other existing legal obligations or political commitments between the withdrawing State or any other party, including the obligations that apply to nuclear materials, equipment and scientific and technological information acquired by a State prior to withdrawal;

97 The Conference encourage States parties to require as a condition of nuclear exports that the recipient State agree that, in the event that it should terminate, withdraw from, or be found by the IAEA Board of Governors to be in non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement, the supplier State would have a right to require the return of nuclear material and equipment provided prior to such termination, non-compliance or withdrawal, as well as any special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment.
