

Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Enhancing transparency for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and strengthening the review process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

**Working paper submitted by the members of the
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia,
Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands (Kingdom
of the), Nigeria, the Philippines, Poland, Türkiye and the United
Arab Emirates)**

1. The present working paper builds on the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative 2022 working paper on strengthening the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ([NPT/CONF.2020/WP.53](#)) and 2019 working paper on enhancing national reporting as a key transparency and confidence-building measure ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.III/WP.24](#)). It aims to make concrete proposals to enhance transparency, especially through national reporting on the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to contribute to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives as well as to the ongoing efforts of parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to strengthen the Treaty review process.

2. Annex I to this paper contains a reporting template proposed by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative¹ that can be used by all States parties to provide information about implementation of their Treaty obligations and commitments, particularly the action plan of 2010.

Significance of transparency

3. As the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has stressed in previous working papers,² the principle of transparency – like those of irreversibility and

¹ First proposed in 2017 by the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working paper ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17](#)).

² Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative working papers on transparency include: [NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12](#) (2012), [NPT/CONF.2015/PC.III/WP.10](#) (2014), [NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17](#) (2015), [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17](#) (2017) and [NPT/CONF.2020/PC.II/WP.26](#) (2018).



verifiability – is indispensable for nuclear disarmament³ and underpins the other two principles.

4. Without transparency, nuclear disarmament cannot be verified and States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty cannot have complete confidence that nuclear disarmament measures have been accomplished in an irreversible manner. By building confidence and trust at the regional and international levels, increased transparency helps establish common ground for dialogue and negotiation that can facilitate further reductions in nuclear weapons towards their total elimination. In addition, increased transparency also provides additional reassurance of the commitment of the parties to the Treaty to implementing their non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty.

Strengthening the review process by ensuring accountability – the role of reporting

5. The Non-Proliferation Treaty review process plays a key role as an accountability mechanism, particularly in regard to the nuclear-weapon States. It is critical that transparency and reporting are firmly embedded into the strengthening of the Treaty review process.

6. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative considers that adequate reporting is an essential instrument both for providing greater transparency and for greater accountability as part of the strengthened review process of the Treaty. Reporting that provides clear information can serve as a baseline from which to measure progress made on implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

7. Strengthening the review process with a view to realizing the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty was first agreed upon at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference as an integral part of the indefinite extension of the Treaty. The significance of the strengthened review process was to ensure accountability, in particular of nuclear-weapon States, in exchange for the indefinite extension of the Treaty.

8. Since then, the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons adopted the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament. Step 9 (b) calls for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament. Step 12 commits States parties to reporting regularly on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

9. Non-nuclear weapon States demonstrate transparency in the implementation of non-proliferation obligations through reports to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors based on the IAEA safeguards, underpinned by detailed legally binding agreements between States parties and IAEA. There exists no specific transparency mechanism for nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate implementation of their nuclear disarmament obligations. Hence, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has been emphasizing the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament activities and the fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under the Treaty.

³ In 2010, the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty committed to the principle of transparency, together with the principles of irreversibility and verifiability, in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations.

10. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has highlighted the benefits of standardized reporting forms that contribute to ensuring baselines and establishing a common frame of reference, thereby helping to meet the difficult challenge of measuring progress on implementation of the Treaty.

11. Furthermore, reporting is not an end in itself but should provide for an ongoing process of dialogue and improvement. Such dialogue has the added benefit of building trust and understanding required for improved cooperation on Treaty implementation. The consensus portion of the 2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty outcome document “affirmed that improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process is an ongoing responsibility of States parties” ([NPT/CONF.2010/50 \(Vol. I\)](#), para. 112). The Working Group on further strengthening the review process of the Treaty to discuss and make recommendations to the Preparatory Committee on measures that would improve the effectiveness, efficiency, transparency, accountability, coordination and continuity of the review process of the Treaty, as agreed in the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, offers an opportune occasion to deepen discussion among the States parties on this issue.

Concrete proposals to enhance transparency through reporting

12. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has proposed draft standard reporting templates⁴ with suggested reporting elements under each 2010 action plan item. Since 2012, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative has proposed, vis-à-vis nuclear-weapon States, to include information on the following, without prejudice to national security, notably:

- (a) The number, types (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads;
- (b) The number and types of delivery vehicles;
- (c) The number and types of weapons, delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts;
- (d) The amount of fissile material produced for military purposes;
- (e) The measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

The above-mentioned elements to be included in the report were echoed in the working paper on possible elements of consensus by the members of the Group of Non-Aligned States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ([NPT/CONF.2020/WP.75](#), para. 15).

13. In this regard, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recalls Action 21 of the Action Plan of 2010 in which all nuclear-weapon States are strongly encouraged to agree upon a “standard reporting form”.

14. Further, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative underlines the importance of regular reporting on Treaty obligations and related commitments by the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The reference in the draft final document of the tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, notably that the “Nuclear weapon States will present national reports twice in

⁴ Draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form for nuclear-weapon States ([NPT/CONF.2015/PC.I/WP.12](#), submitted in 2012), reporting template for non-nuclear-weapon States ([NPT/CONF.2015/WP.17](#), submitted in 2015), reporting template for all States parties ([NPT/CONF.2020/PC.I/WP.17](#)).

every review cycle at appropriate intervals” ([NPT/CONF.2020/WP.77](#), para. 35 (b)) could serve as a good basis to institutionalize the reporting mechanism.

15. The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative also calls on nuclear-weapon States to engage with non-nuclear-weapon States in a meaningful and ongoing dialogue on transparency regarding their nuclear arsenals and limiting nuclear competition. This dialogue should be accompanied by timely submission of national reports by the nuclear-weapon States, followed by open explanation and interactive discussion, especially with non-nuclear-weapon States and civil society participants, at future Non-Proliferation Treaty-related meetings. Ideally, the reports should be submitted no later than four weeks prior to both the Second Preparatory Committee meeting and the Review Conference. This reporting schedule would allow sufficient time for States parties to consider the documents and engage in constructive discussions at those meetings.

16. In order to facilitate access to information and enable concrete reviews, the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative recalls the publicly accessible repository established by the Secretary-General in accordance with Action 21 of the Action Plan in 2010, and calls for regular updates and improvements to the quantity and quality of information contained therein.

17. States parties may wish to consider establishing an independent publication on Non-Proliferation Treaty reporting that would provide an added layer of transparency and accountability.

Annex

Future national reporting templates on implementation of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: suggested coverage of topics for different categories of States parties to the Treaty – indicative matrix

Note: The present document proposes only the topics to be addressed by three categories of States in a future reporting template. The full version of such a reporting template would contain much more detail than appears here.

In the final three columns: Yes denotes that reporting is expected/No denotes that reporting is not expected/Optional denotes reporting preferred, if applicable.

2010 Non-Proliferation Treaty
action No.

Topic		Non-nuclear-weapon States			
		(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	
Nuclear disarmament					
1	Principles and objectives	• National policy on nuclear disarmament	Yes	Yes	Yes
2		• Membership in regional/multilateral groups that promote nuclear disarmament	Yes	Yes	Yes
		• National policy on irreversibility, verifiability and transparency			
		• Support for General Assembly resolutions supporting irreversibility, verifiability and transparency			
3		Measures to reduce national stockpiles of nuclear weapons	Yes	No	No
4		New START	Yes	No	No
5	Disarmament of nuclear weapons	• Reductions in national stockpiles in each of the post-1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycles	Yes	No	No
		• Current stockpiles of nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles: specified details			
		• Current stockpiles of fissile material for nuclear weapons: specified details			
		• Measures to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in doctrine			
		• Policy reviews on nuclear weapon stockpiles, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture			
		• Measures to reduce the operational readiness of the nuclear arsenal and efforts to engage non-nuclear-weapon States on this			
		• Measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons			
		• Confidence and-security-building measures to enhance transparency			

Topic		Non-nuclear-weapon States		
		(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With "advanced nuclear capabilities" ^a	(iii) Without "advanced nuclear capabilities" ^a
6				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for a Conference on Disarmament subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament • Participation in any working groups on nuclear disarmament 	Yes	Yes	Yes
7				
	Support for a Conference on Disarmament subsidiary body to discuss effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons	Yes	Yes	Yes
8	Security assurances			
	Negative security assurances	Yes	No	No
9				
	Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties: efforts to ratify relevant protocols or review reservations	Yes	No	No
	Nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties: support for establishment; name of treaty to which party	Yes	Yes	Yes
10				
	Status; efforts to ratify; efforts encouraging Annex 2 States to sign/ratify	Yes	Yes	Yes
11				
	Date of signature and ratification; status of reporting policy on moratorium	Yes	Yes	Yes
12				
	Summary of reports made since 2011 to the biennial conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (Article XIV conferences)	Yes	Yes	Yes
13	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty			
	National implementation activities and activities promoting entry into force	Yes	Yes	Yes
14				
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Efforts to construct/complete/certify International Monitoring System stations • Efforts to help the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization strengthen its verification regime • National efforts to help develop the on-site inspection capabilities of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 	Yes	Yes	Yes

Topic			Non-nuclear-weapon States		
			(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
15		Fissile material cut-off treaty: support for launching negotiations; summary of contributions to the group of governmental experts and the Group of Eminent Persons	Yes	Yes	Yes
16		Specific details on current status and future plans	Yes	No	No
17		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Status of development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile materials 	Yes	No	No
	Fissile materials	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proposals/statements supporting development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of excess fissile materials from military stockpiles by nuclear-weapon States 			
18		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any current or future plans to dismantle, or convert to peaceful uses, facilities that produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons purposes • Confirmation that domestic nuclear facilities do not produce fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 	Yes	No	No
19	Nuclear disarmament verification	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament • Summary of national, regional and international efforts to promote greater transparency, confidence and efficiency in the verification of nuclear disarmament 	Yes	Yes	Yes
20		Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty • Paragraph 4 (c) of the Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed in 1995 • The 13 practical steps agreed in 2000 	Yes	Yes	Yes
21	Transparency and reporting	Transparency and reporting (by nuclear-weapon States): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Any agreed standard reporting form and determined reporting intervals • Efforts toward such agreement/determination 	Yes	No	No
		Efforts encouraging nuclear-weapon States to agree on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting interval	Yes	Yes	Yes

Topic			Non-nuclear-weapon States		
			(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
22	Education	Efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation education	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Nuclear non-proliferation				
23		Efforts to promote universalization of adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty	Yes	Yes	Yes
24	International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards	Safeguards agreements concluded with IAEA (e.g., comprehensive safeguards agreement; Additional Protocol; and/or modified small quantities protocol)	Yes	Yes	Yes
25		Efforts to conclude a comprehensive safeguards agreement or to encourage other States to do so	Yes	Yes	Yes
26		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• National efforts to comply with non-proliferation obligations• Initiatives (e.g., Non-Proliferation Treaty working papers) promoting high compliance standards• IAEA conclusions: non-diversion and absence of undeclared material/activities	Yes	Yes	Yes
27		National steps to address cases of non-compliance with non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty (e.g., implementing Security Council sanctions regimes and statements in international forums, such as the IAEA General Conference and Board of Governors)	Yes	Yes	Yes
28		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Dates of signature and entry into force of the Additional Protocol• Efforts to implement the Additional Protocol	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Efforts to encourage others to implement the Additional Protocol	Yes	Yes	Yes
29	IAEA safeguards	Efforts to promote/assist conclusion/implementation by other States of a comprehensive safeguards agreement	Yes	Yes	Yes
30		Support for wider application of safeguards in nuclear-weapon States	Yes	Yes	Yes
31		Efforts to amend or rescind an existing small quantities protocol	No	No	Yes
32		Efforts to review and evaluate IAEA safeguards	Yes	Yes	Yes
33		<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Status of payment of assessed contributions to IAEA• Extrabudgetary, voluntary and/or in-kind contributions to IAEA	Yes	Yes	Yes

Topic	Non-nuclear-weapon States		
	(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
34 Contributions to an international technology base to improve IAEA safeguards	Yes	Yes	Yes
35 Efforts in export control regimes, Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) and other arrangements (e.g., legislation or bilateral arrangements) to help ensure that nuclear-related exports do not lead to proliferation	Yes	Yes	Yes
36 Export control Implementation of nuclear export control lists in domestic legislation/regulations	Yes	Yes	Yes
37 Efforts to show that a recipient State’s safeguard/compliance record is considered in making nuclear export decisions	Yes	Yes	Yes
38 Support for States’ legitimate right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy (e.g., list of States with which nuclear cooperation agreements concluded)	Yes	Yes	Yes
39 Key policy criteria considered when determining whether to engage in nuclear cooperation with a State	Yes	Yes	Yes
40 • Efforts to strengthen physical protection of nuclear facilities • Efforts to implement commitments made in Nuclear Security Summit process	Yes	Yes	Yes
41 • Summary of efforts to apply IAEA INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 (Corrected) • National reviews of physical protection policies and practices	Yes	Yes	Yes
42 • Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment: Summary of progress in signing, ratifying and implementing • Efforts to promote ratification/implementation of the Convention and its 2005 Amendment	Yes	Yes	Yes
43 Steps taken to implement: • Revised IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources • Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources	Yes	Yes	Yes
44 • Efforts to strengthen national capabilities against illicit trafficking of nuclear material – or to assist other States to do so • Participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative • Participation in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism	Yes	Yes	Yes

Topic	Non-nuclear-weapon States		
	(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Summary of any reports provided in accordance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) • Status of participation in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database • Status of participation in the nuclear security activities of INTERPOL 			
45 Progress in signing, ratifying and implementing the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	Yes	Yes	Yes
46 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Activities to strengthen national regulatory controls of nuclear material, including establishing and maintaining a State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material, as well as any regional-level systems • Summary of cooperation with IAEA on accounting/control of nuclear materials • Summary of support for IAEA programmes relevant to these actions, including relevant work of the IAEA nuclear safety and security programme 	Yes	Yes	Yes
Peaceful uses of nuclear energy			
47 Summary of the types of peaceful uses of nuclear energy being pursued nationally (e.g., power generation, mining, medical, agricultural)	Yes	Yes	Yes
48 National policy on nuclear cooperation, including legislation on export controls	Yes	Yes	Optional
49 Technical cooperation Efforts to further the development and application of nuclear technologies to areas that will help to meet the needs of developing countries	Yes	Yes	Yes
50 International efforts to assist developing countries, identifying those activities which are undertaken through the IAEA technical cooperation programme	Yes	Yes	Yes
51 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • List of countries with which nuclear cooperation agreements are in effect (see actions 37 and 38) • List of nuclear cooperation agreements awaiting implementation 	Yes	Yes	Optional

Topic		Non-nuclear-weapon States		
		(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
52	Efforts to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of the IAEA technical cooperation programme (e.g., by advocating for accountability and transparency in the operation of the programme, supporting the implementation of recommendations made by the Agency’s Office of Internal Oversight Services, etc.)	Yes	Yes	Yes
53	• Efforts in IAEA Board of Governors Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee	Yes	Yes	Optional
	• Efforts to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme, including through any voluntary financial or in-kind contributions			
54	Rate of attainment on assessed voluntary contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund	Yes	Yes	Yes
55	Any voluntary contributions to the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative or other extrabudgetary contributions to IAEA	Yes	Yes	Yes
56	Efforts with regard to capacity-building and human resource development on peaceful uses of nuclear energy	Yes	Yes	Yes
57	Title and date of key national legislation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy	Yes	Yes	Yes
58	Efforts to develop multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle	Yes	Yes	Optional
59	• Status vis-à-vis the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	Yes	Yes	Yes
	• Status vis-à-vis the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2005 Amendment could be reiterated (see actions 42 and 45)			
60	• How international best practices on nuclear safety and security have been implemented nationally	Yes	Yes	Yes
	• Any contributions to the IAEA Safety Standards Series, IAEA Nuclear Security Series and review meetings of the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management			

Topic	Non-nuclear-weapon States		
	(i) Nuclear- weapon States	(ii) With “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a	(iii) Without “advanced nuclear capabilities” ^a
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any participation in or contributions to workshops to share best practices, including with the nuclear industry, private sector and non-governmental organizations such as the World Institute for Nuclear Security 			
61 • Any national efforts to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes and/or convert nuclear facilities to low-enriched uranium	Yes	Yes	No
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any international assistance provided to other States to reduce the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear programmes 			
62 National regulations on the transport of radioactive materials, particularly the implementation of the IAEA updated standards on transport regulations (No. SSR-6, 2012)	Yes	Yes	Optional
63 • Date of signatures and ratifications of:	Yes	Yes	Yes
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage; – Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage; and/or – Paris Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy 			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Title and date of adoption of any national legislation on nuclear liability 			
64 Summarize national position and efforts taken to prohibit [and prevent] armed attacks on or threats against nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes during their operation or while under construction	Yes	Yes	Yes

^a For present purposes, “advanced nuclear capabilities” is understood to mean that a State has nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and/or uranium enrichment capabilities.