

Roadmap towards Restoration from the Accident at Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station

Basic Policy: By bringing the reactors and spent fuel pools to a stable cooling condition and mitigating the release of radioactive materials, we will make every effort to enable evacuees to return to their homes and for all citizens to be able to secure a sound life.

Areas	Issues	Current Status (as of April 16 th)	Targets, Countermeasures and Risks		Mid-term Issues
			<Step 1 (around 3 months)> Radiation dose is in steady decline.	<Step 2 (around 3 to 6 months*)> Release of radioactive materials is under control and radiation dose is being significantly held down. * After achieving Step 1	
I. Cooling	(1) Cooling the Reactors	Current Status [1] (Units 1 to 3) Cooling achieved by water injection while there is partial damage to fuel pellets. ⇒Continued injection of fresh water and further cooling measures are required. Countermeasure [1]: Injecting fresh water into the RPV by pumps. Risk [1]: Possibility of hydrogen explosion due to condensation of steam in the PCV when cooled, leading to increased hydrogen concentration. Countermeasure [2]: Injecting nitrogen gas into the PCV (start from Unit 1.) Countermeasure [3]: Consideration of flooding the PCV up to the top of active fuel.	Target [1] (Unit 1 to 3) Maintain stable cooling. Countermeasure [9]: Flood the PCV up to the top of active fuel. Countermeasure [10]: Reduce the amount of radioactive materials (utilization of standby gas treatment system (filter), etc.) when PCV venting (release of steam containing radioactive materials into the atmosphere). Countermeasure [11]:Continue preventing hydrogen explosion by injecting nitrogen into the PCV. Risk [4]: Increase in water leakage into the turbine building in the process of flooding the PCV. Countermeasure [12]: Consideration and implementation of measures to hold down water inflow (e.g., circulating the water back into the RPV by storing and processing the accumulated water in the turbine building.) Countermeasure [13]: Consideration of recovering heat exchange function for the reactor (installing heat exchangers). Risk [5]: Possibility of prolonged work in high dose level area (→keep countermeasures [9] and [12])	Target [3] Achieve cold shutdown condition (sufficient cooling is achieved depending on the status of each unit.) Countermeasure [17]: Maintain and enhance countermeasures in Step 1 if needed.	Issue [1] Prevention of breakage, clogging and water leakage of structural materials (reactor and pipes, etc.) due to corrosion caused by salt.
		Current Status [2] (Units 1 to 3) High likelihood of small leakage of steam containing radioactive materials through the gap of PCV caused by high temperature. ⇒Lowering the amount of steam through cooling and implementation of leakage prevention are required. Countermeasure [4]: Lower the amount of steam generated by sufficiently cooling the reactor (to be achieved by measures in Steps 1 and 2.) Countermeasure [5]: Consideration of shielding the leakage by covering the reactor building (coordinate with issue [4].)			
		Current Status [3] (Unit 2) Large amount of water leakage, indicating high likelihood of PCV damage. ⇒Repairing the damaged location is required. ⇒Need to control the amount of water injection since leakage increases as injection increases. Countermeasure [6]: Consideration of sealing the damaged location (e.g., filling with grout (glutinous cement)) Countermeasure [7]: Cooling at minimum water injection rate (control the leakage of contaminated water.) Risk[2]: Possibility of prolonged work of sealing the damaged location (→countermeasures [12] and [14])	Target [2] (Unit 2) Cool the reactor while controlling the increase of accumulated water until PCV is sealed. Countermeasure [14]: Continue cooling by current minimum injection rate. Countermeasure [15]: Continue prevention of hydrogen explosion by nitrogen injection into the PCV. Countermeasure [16]: Continue consideration and implementation of sealing measure at damaged location. Implement cooling measures similar to those for Units 1 and 3 once the damaged location is sealed. Risk[2]: Possibility of prolonged work of sealing the damaged location (→continue countermeasures [12] and [14])		
		Current Status [4] Secured multiple off-site power (1 system each from TEPCO and Tohoku EPCO) and deployed backup power (generator cars / emergency generators) Risk [3]: Possibility of (partial) loss of power from the grid caused by ensuring aftershocks and lightning in summer. Countermeasure [8]: Install interconnecting lines of offsite power soon.			

Note: Reactor pressure vessel is denoted as “RPV” and primary containment vessel is denoted as “PCV.”

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I. Cooling	(2) Cooling the Spent Fuel Pools	<p>Current Status [5] Fresh water is injected from outside for Units 1, 3, 4 and through normal cooling line for Unit 2. ⇒Reduction of worker exposure and countermeasures for aftershocks are required. Countermeasure [18]: Consideration/implementation of improving reliability of external water injection by concrete pumpers (“Giraffe”, etc.)/switch to remote-controlled operation.</p> <p>Current Status [6]: Confirmation of release of radioactive materials from the pool Countermeasure [19]: Sampling and measurement of steam/pool water by “Giraffe”, etc. ⇒Most fuels in Unit 4 have been confirmed intact according to the result of pool water analysis.</p> <p>Current Status [7]: Walls of the building supporting the pool have been damaged. ⇒Tolerance evaluation is especially needed for Unit 4. Countermeasure [20]: Seismic tolerance assessment of Unit 4. ⇒A certain level of seismic tolerance has been confirmed. Countermeasure [21]: Continue monitoring and examine necessary countermeasures (→ countermeasure [26].)</p>	<p>Target [4]: Maintain stable cooling. Countermeasure [22]: Continuation of water injection by “Giraffe”, etc (reliability improvement (enhanced durability of hoses)/switch to remote-controlled operation.) Countermeasure [23]: Add cooling function to normal Fuel Pool Cooling system and continue injecting water for Unit 2. Countermeasure [24]: Examination and implementation of restoration of normal cooling system for Units 1, 3, and 4. Risk [6]: Possibility of inability to restore normal cooling line due to damages to the building. Countermeasure [25]: Examination and implementation of installing heat exchangers. Countermeasure [26]: (Unit 4) Installation of supporting structure under the bottom of the pool.</p>	<p>Target [5]: Maintain more stable cooling function by keeping a certain level of water. Countermeasure [27]: Cooling by installation of heat exchangers. Countermeasure [28]: Expansion of remote-controlled operation areas of “Giraffe”, etc.</p>	<p>Issue [2]: Removal of fuels (including Units 5 & 6.)</p>
II. Mitigation	(3) Containment, Storage, Processing, and Reuse of Water Contaminated by Radioactive Materials (Accumulated Water)	<p>Current Status [8]: Leakage of high radiation-level contaminated water assumed to have originated from Unit 2 reactor occurred, but was subsequently stopped. Countermeasure [29]: Identify leakage path and examine and implement preventive measures. • Placing sandbags with radioactive-material adsorption material (zeolite) in the bay. • Installing fences in the bay to prevent contamination from spreading (silt fence.) • Blockage between trenches and buildings, etc</p> <p>Current Status [9]: Leakage and accumulation of high radiation level contaminated water at Unit 2’s turbine building, vertical shafts and trenches. Countermeasure [30]: Transferring accumulated water to facilities that can store it (condenser and Centralized Waste Treatment Facility). Countermeasure [31]: Preparing decontamination and desalt of transferred accumulated water. (→Countermeasure [38]) Countermeasure [32]: Preparing to install tanks.</p> <p>Current Status [10]: Increase of storage volume of water with low radiation level. Countermeasure [33]: Preparing to store with tanks and barges. Countermeasure [34]: Preparing for decontamination and desalt of contaminated water (→Countermeasure [41]) Countermeasure [35]: Preparing to install a reservoir.</p> <p>Current Status [11]: High likelihood of underground water around the building (sub-drainage water) to be contaminated. Countermeasure [36]: Preparing to decontaminate sub-drainage water after being pumped up.</p>	<p>Target [6]: Secure sufficient storage place to prevent water with high radiation level from being released out of the site boundary. Countermeasure [37]: Utilization of “Centralized Waste Treatment Facility”, etc. to store water. Countermeasure [38]: Install water processing facilities; decontaminate and desalt highly-contaminated water and store in tanks. Risk [7]: Possibility of delay in installing water processing facilities or poor operating performance of the facilities. Countermeasure [39]: Examination and implementation of backup measures (installment of additional tanks or pools or leakage prevention by coagulator, etc.)</p> <p>Target [7]: Store and process water with low radiation level. Countermeasure [40]: Increase storage capacity by adding tanks, barges, Megafloat, etc. Countermeasure [41]: Decontaminating contaminated water using decontaminants to below acceptable criteria.</p>	<p>Target [8]: Decrease the total amount of contaminated water. Countermeasure [42]: Expansion of additional tanks to store high radiation-level contaminated water. Countermeasure [43]: Continuation and reinforcement of decontamination and desalt of high radiation-level water. Countermeasure [44]: Continuation and reinforcement of decontamination and desalt of low radiation-level water. Countermeasure [45]: Reuse of processed water as reactor coolant. Countermeasure [46]: Decontamination to the level below criteria level.</p>	<p>Issue [3] Installation of full-fledged water treatment facilities.</p>

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II. Mitigation	(4) Mitigation of Release of Radioactive Materials to Atmosphere and from Soil	Current Status [12]: Debris are scattered outside the buildings and radioactive materials are being scattered. Countermeasure [47]: Inhibit scattering of radioactive materials by full-scale dispersion of inhibitor after confirming its performance by test. Countermeasure [48]: Prevent rain water contamination by dispersion of inhibitor. Countermeasure [49]: Removal of debris. Countermeasure [50]: Examination and implementation of basic design for reactor building cover and full-fledged measure (container with concrete roof and wall, etc.) Countermeasure [51]: Consideration of solidification, substitution and cleansing of contaminated soil (med-term issues.)	Target [9]: Prevent scattering of radioactive materials on buildings and ground. Countermeasure [52]: Improvement of work condition by expanding application and dispersion of inhibitors to the ground and buildings. Countermeasure [53]: Continue removal of debris. Countermeasure [54]: Begin installing reactor building cover (with ventilator and filter.) Risk [8]: Considerable reduction of radiation dose is a prerequisite to launch construction (→continue countermeasure [52] and [53].)	Target [10]: Cover the entire buildings (as temporary measure). Countermeasure [55]: Complete installing reactor building covers (Units 1, 3, 4.) Risk [9]: Possibility of cover being damaged by a huge typhoon. Countermeasure [56]: Begin detailed design of full-fledged measure (container with concrete roof and wall, etc.)	Issue [4]: Cover the entire building (as full-fledged measure) Issue [5]: Solidification, substitution and cleansing of contaminated soil.
III. Monitoring/ Decontamination	(5) Measurement, Reduction and Announcement of Radiation Dose in Evacuation Order/Planned Evacuation/Emergency Evacuation Preparation Areas	Current status [13]: Monitoring of radiation dose in and out of the power station is carried out. Countermeasure [57]: Monitoring sea water, soil and atmosphere within the site boundary (25 locations.) Countermeasure [58]: Monitoring radiation dose at the site boundary (12 locations.) Countermeasure [59]: Consideration of monitoring methods in evacuation order/planned evacuation/emergency evacuation preparation areas. (→countermeasure [60] to [63]) (Note) With regard to radiation dose monitoring and reduction measures in evacuation order/planned evacuation/emergency evacuation preparation areas, we will take every measure through thorough cooperation with the national government and by consultation with the prefectural and municipal governments.	Target [11]: Expand/enhance monitoring and inform of results fast and accurately. Countermeasure [60]: Consideration and implementation of monitoring methods in evacuation order / planned evacuation / emergency evacuation preparation areas (in cooperation and consultation with national/prefectural/municipal governments.) Countermeasure [61]: Announce accurately monitoring results of long half-life residue radioactive materials such as cesium 137.	Target [12]: Sufficiently reduce radiation dose in evacuation order / planned evacuation / emergency evacuation preparation areas. Countermeasure [62]: Monitoring of homecoming residences <in cooperation and consultation with national / prefectural / municipal governments.> Countermeasure [63]: Examination and implementation of necessary measures to reduce radiation dose (decontamination of homecoming residences and soil surface) <in cooperation and consultation with national/prefectural/municipal governments.>	Issue [6]:Continue monitoring and informing environmental safety.