



The 4th Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation



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Contents

Preface

Policy Recommendations

Welcome Message	1
Mr. Nobutaka Machimura, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan	
Mr. Pierre Pettigrew, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canada	
Opening Remarks - Briefing on the Canadian Security Policy	5
Paul Chapin, Canadian Chairman Director General, International Security Bureau	
Session I: Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security	11
Dr. Akiko Fukushima, Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Research Advancement (NIRA)	13
Mr. Ian Trites, First Secretary, Embassy of Canada in Japan	24
Session II: Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation	29
H.E.Kinichi Komano, Ambassador in charge of NGO, Afghanistan Assistance Coordination & Human Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs	31
Dr. Tim Donais, Assistant Professor, University of Windsor	35
Comments Ms. Eileen Olexiuk, Deputy Head of Mission, Canadian Embassy in Kabul	46
Session III: Fight against terrorism	49
Dr. Toshiya Hoshino, Professor, Osaka University	51
Dr. Brian L. Job, Professor, University of British Columbia	57
Session IV: Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament	69
Dr. Setsuko Aoki, Professor, Keio University	71
Dr. Robert Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor, Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament, Foreign Affairs Canada	80
Session V: Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region	101
Dr. Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University	103
Dr. David Dewitt, Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University	112
Public Symposium	129
Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation	131
Briefing of the last four symposiums	134
Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation	136
Fight against terrorism	138
Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament	140
Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region	142
Current Situation in Afghanistan	145
Question & Answer	147
ANNEXES	151
2005 Canada-Japan Agenda For Peace and Security Cooperation	153
List of Participants	156
Symposium Program	158

Preface

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA), Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS), and Foreign Affairs Canada hosted in Tokyo on June 12, 2005 the Fourth Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation. The objectives of the symposium were to review and examine the current extent of cooperation between Canada and Japan in the field of peace and security and to explore possibilities for further collaboration. Bringing together Canadian and Japanese foreign ministry and defense officials, academics, NGO and media representatives, the symposium provided a valuable opportunity to enhance creative and productive dialogues between our two countries.

The symposium originated as an initiative that was recommended in the 1997 Job-Nishihara Report, and its biannual meeting was agreed by Prime Ministers Chretien and Obuchi in the 1999 *Canada-Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation*. Since the first symposium in Vancouver in September 1998, two other symposiums were held in Tokyo in November 2000 and in Vancouver in November 2002. This fourth symposium had a couple of notable features. First, the fourth symposium was the first meeting since Prime Ministers Paul Martin and Junichiro Koizumi agreed to make it an annual event. We believed, that by making it an annual endeavor, we could further solidify our bilateral efforts in peace and security. Second, based upon our successful experiences in the previous three symposiums, the public session was prepared following the closed symposium. We believed that our collective knowledge should be shared with a greater number of people.

We wish to thank all of the distinguished participants and presenters, whose collective expertise and commitments were the key to developing peace and security relationship between our two countries. This book contains papers and statements presented at the symposium. The opinions and views expressed herein represent those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the governments of Canada and Japan, nor their respective institutes or organizations.

Policy Recommendations

In the sessions of the 4th symposium, the following are notable policy recommendations and comments.

(1) Arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

Japan and Canada should take strong initiatives in overcoming the impasse in arms control and disarmament, and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as the engagement in these matters has become a challenge for maintaining international security. More specifically, cooperation in the areas of Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was suggested. In addition, Japan and Canada should work together to strengthen the non-proliferation regime and promote joint research on verification of arms control and disarmament treaties.

The issues of arms control and disarmament and the non-proliferation are often separately considered. Instead, these matters should be regarded as closely related, thereby requiring well-balanced achievements in both issue areas. A new framework to deal with these tasks should be established. For instance, it was suggested to create in the Asian region a non-proliferation regime and a nuclear weapon free zone.

Furthermore, there is potentially room for bilateral cooperation in the area of space security, which has undergone considerable changes in recent times.

(2) Post-conflict peace consolidation

Japan and Canada are expected to play their envisaged roles in institutional maintenance in the security area. Specifically, suggested areas of cooperation include the establishment of Peacebuilding Commission, which was proposed by Secretary-General Kofi Annan at the High-Level Panel on UN reform, and the reform and implementation of international law better suited to the present international security environment. Such efforts include PSI and the International Criminal Court.

Public security is paramount to realize peace consolidation and development in the post-conflict situations. Japan and Canada could seek cooperation in international civilian police, a field with increasing attention in the maintenance of public security. In post-conflict development assistance, the two countries should cooperate in the monitoring of development assistant projects.

(3) Human security

While Japan and Canada had not necessarily shared the common interpretation of the human security concept, such gap has been narrowed in recent years. Human security is indeed a promising issue area for the two countries to enhance cooperation. Concrete measures are required toward advancing cooperation in human security.

(4) Post-conflict assistance in Afghanistan

Japan and Canada have so far played significant roles in assisting the reconstruction of Afghanistan. The next task is to keep policy challenges in Afghanistan as 'policy agenda'. In this regard, the two governments should well inform their own citizens of the various government activities in Afghanistan in order to receive public support. Also, Japan and Canada should make sustained efforts so that international organizations such as the United States continue to place due importance on the issue of Afghanistan.

From this summer, Canada intends to send a PRT team to Afghanistan to increase its support in peace-

building and development. This PRT team may potentially prove a concrete measure of Japan-Canada cooperation.

(5) Counter-terrorism capacity building

Canada and Japan could work together to help third countries strengthen their legal framework and law enforcement capacity in order to better respond to terrorist threats. Potential areas for collaboration include transport security and CBRN terrorism prevention.

(6) Status of Canada-Japan symposium

To connect this symposium to policy-making, it was suggested that this symposium be placed as ‘track two’ and an array of security meetings be annually held in the following order; Symposium, PM talk and MM dialogue. With this order, the results of this Canada-Japan symposium on peace and security are utilized at “track one” meetings and then issues raised at the “track one” meetings are brought back to the “track two” level for brainstorming in the following year. This would generate a cycle that more effectively utilizes this symposium.

Welcoming Message

by H.E. Mr. MACHIMURA Nobutaka, Minister for Foreign Affairs

I am pleased to welcome all of you that have gathered here today to participate in the Fourth Japan-Canada Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation.

In recent years, Japan and Canada have strengthened bilateral security cooperation. Japan has dispatched Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the Indian Ocean to supply fuel to Canadian and other naval vessels. As well, Japan Self-Defense Force and Canadian Forces have been closely working together in UNDOF operations on the Golan Heights for nearly a decade. We are fast becoming essential partners in promoting international peace and security.

As such, the Fourth Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation is being held at a particularly important timing and provides an arena for creative thinking to further enhance bilateral cooperation. In January 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro and Prime Minister Paul Martin issued a joint communiqué, entitled “2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation.” The two leaders reaffirmed their commitment to intensified cooperation in the security area, and agreed that this symposium be held annually rather than the alternating years. This agreement highlights the important role of this forum in the future relationship of our two countries.

I very much hope that prominent experts assembled here enjoy fruitful discussions and I wish this Symposium a great success.

町村信孝

MACHIMURA Nobutaka
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Japan

Messege from the Minister

by H.E. Mr. Pierre S. Pettigrew, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Canada

The expanding international commitment to the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is the most hopeful movement of our time. It promises unprecedented levels of wealth, security and quality of life. Yet challenges remain. New threats have emerged from unconventional sources. In this new environment, Canada remains committed to making a distinctive contribution to a safer world.


Canada and Japan have long understood that multilateral cooperation is essential to enhance-global and regional security. A renewed multilateralism that contributes to these objectives can only be achieved with the participation of global players like Japan and Canada, and bilateral cooperation can help support global goals. The past decade has seen Canada-Japan peace and security cooperation flourish as both countries have played important roles in the international peace and security sphere.

Since the early 1990s, the Canada-Japan bilateral security dialogue has expanded and deepened with consultations at every level on a wide range of subjects, including on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, as well as on defence and development issues. Our partnership has delivered concrete results. For example, our peacekeepers have cooperated in the Golan Heights, our navies have worked side by side in the fight against terrorism in the Indian Ocean, and we have engaged in shared efforts to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

On the occasion of a visit to Tokyo by Prime Minister Martin last January, we renewed the 2005 Canada-Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation which identifies five priorities for increased bilateral cooperation - courter-terrorism, transnational crime, human security, non-proliferation and disarmament, and defence exchanges.

Canada's commitment to there priorities-was reaffirmed in the International Policy Statement released by the Canadian Government in April. In this context, this 4th Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation Symposium provides a timely oppportunity to consider how Canada and Japan might enhance our cooperation in the area of defence and security with a view to advancing our shared international and regional security objectives.

I wish you all the best for a fruitful and productive Symposium in Tokyo.



Pierre S. Pettigrew

Building a More Secure World

Paul Chapin, Canadian Chairman Director General, International Security Bureau

1. Introduction

Good morning. It is a great pleasure for me to be here this morning. And to co-chair this fourth Japan-Canada Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation.

I am especially honoured to share this obligation with my distinguished colleague from the Gaimusho, Mr Umemoto - and to be in the company of so many knowledgeable individuals from government and university.

With such talent, can anyone doubt that we will solve the world's peace and security problems today?

Our Symposium this week is another manifestation of the continued constructive cooperation between Canada and Japan on peace and security issues.

It follows on the heels of a very successful visit to Japan by the Canadian Prime Minister in January. During this visit, Prime Ministers Martin and Koizumi endorsed the 2005 Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation and agreed to hold the Symposium on an annual basis.

If you look at the agenda for this year's symposium, you can understand why our leaders have decided to make this event an annual one. Canada and Japan have a rich cooperation on peace and security and there is certainly a lot to discuss.

The theme of my opening remarks is "Building a More Secure World". What I want to discuss this morning is the outlook in three areas of particular concern for Canada: national security, the government's new approach to Canada's

international relations, and our arms control agenda. I also want to speak briefly of the scope for cooperation that I believe exists between Japanese and Canadians.

2. National Security

National security is not something Canadians have had to think much about. Throughout its history, Canada has been privileged with a greater measure of national security than almost any other country in the world. For a very long time, we have been able to rely for our security on three great oceans and a peaceful neighbour to the south.

It was not until 1957 that we established the first significant capability to defend Canada - a joint Canada-US air defence system still in existence today called the North American Air Defence Command. The original purpose of NORAD was to deal with the emerging threat of long-range Soviet bombers that could reach our continent. Later, NORAD's mandate was expanded to include warning of missile attack - though no defences against missiles were put in place until the US began standing up a limited BMD system just months ago.

Otherwise, Canada vested its security in the United Nations and in NATO. If there was trouble in the world, we contributed peacekeepers - but that was mainly because we wanted to help, not because we felt threatened.

That changed on 9/11. The events of that day not only made it impossible for any US administration to continue as before, it also compelled major changes in outlook and activity in Canada.

I am not yet sure many appreciate how much Americans were affected by 9/11 or how fundamental the changes in the US have been. We have witnessed:

- the most far-reaching reorganization of the US government since the New Deal in the 1930s,
- the most important reformulation of US foreign policy in half a century, and
- a new US global defence posture with new military commands for every region of the world, including North America.

In Canada, the effects of 9/11 were also direct and long-lasting. 25 Canadians died that day, our air space was closed down, our borders were sealed, and trade and investment flows were interrupted.

Since then, Canada has spent \$8.3 billion on new security-related activities including:

- enhanced intelligence collection,
- the creation of a government-wide operations centre,
- critical infrastructure protection,
- smart borders with the United States,
- new passports with facial recognition biometric technology,
- a new public health agency,
- the consolidation of domestic security responsibilities into a single department for public safety and emergency preparedness, and
- enhanced counter-terrorism resources for capacity building in other countries.

In April 2004, the government published Canada's first National Security Policy providing the strategic context for future activity in this field, and in April of this year the government issued a progress report. The most recent national budget also contributed a further \$1 billion to domestic security measures.

3. New Directions in Canadian Foreign Policy

A second important response to the new security environment was the issuance a few weeks

ago of the government's International Policy Statement.

The International Policy Statement is a little different from international policy reviews undertaken by previous Canadian governments. It is not just a foreign policy review, but an examination of all the major dimensions of Canada's engagement with the world - and how these interact.

The result is what we have been calling a "whole -of-government" strategy for managing Canada's international affairs, incorporating the views of all the "international" departments of government and personally endorsed by the Prime Minister.

As many here will know, the big themes are relations with the United States, defence and international security, trade and commerce, international assistance, and what's been called the "new multilateralism".

For the purposes of this symposium, what's news is the following:

Canada in North America

First, the IPS accords a very high priority to finding North American solutions to North American problems. Only a continental approach, for example, can solve continental security concerns.

Hence the work that has been undertaken to strengthen coordination of cross-border law enforcement and counter-terrorism programs, to build a border that can expedite movement of low-risk people and goods, and to interdict threats before they reach North America.

We have also started work on renewing the NORAD agreement. As the agreement lapses every five years, there is an opportunity between now and May 2006 to examine the entire range of continental defence issues - and to decide whether they are best addressed through binational institutions like NORAD or the Binational Planning Group set up after 9/11, or more traditional bilateral cooperation

arrangements.

In fact, NORAD has already undergone profound changes. On the morning of 9/11, NORAD scrambled jet fighters to try to intercept the hijacked aircraft. Regrettably, the damage was done by the time civil aviation authorities asked for help from the military. Since then, NORAD has substantially enhanced its connections with civil aviation on both sides of the border, placed many more interceptors on alert in many more locations, and now routinely conducts air combat patrols to protect cities and critical infrastructure.

Since 9/11, NORAD has flown over 40,000 sorties conducting air defence operations. In response to cues from either the FAA or NAVCAN, NORAD has tracked some 5000 aircraft of potential interest, and has scrambled or diverted fighters from air patrol over 2000 times. Given the volume of traffic, much of the action has been over US airspace. But Canadian F-18s have played an active part. In the last few weeks alone, they have participated in two diversions of aircraft approaching across the Atlantic - in one case escorting the flight to Halifax, in the other handing it off to US aircraft for escort to Bangor, in the state of Maine.

Defence and international security

A second major IPS initiative is the general priority accorded defence and international security. The IPS speaks not only about revitalizing the North American partnership, but also about Canada making a difference globally through building a more secure world.

How this is to be done will be as much of a challenge in future as it has been in the past, but the IPS and the 2005 Budget provide us with tools to play both a "home" game and an "away" game more effectively. These tools, I believe, are going to transform how Canada deals with international security problems.

Let me list a few of the most important ones:

- Central agencies such as the PCO and the

Department of Foreign Affairs have been reorganized to bring greater focus and coherence to our international efforts.

- For the first time, Foreign Affairs is going to have resources of its own to respond quickly to unexpected crises. The department is creating a Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) to speed the interdepartmental coordination necessary for mounting effective peace support or humanitarian relief operations.
- With failed and fragile states likely to continue to pose security threats - whether directly through crime, drugs and terrorism, or indirectly through their destabilizing effects on neighbours - we are also equipping ourselves with the means to respond better to security sector reform issues. So we are creating a \$100 million a year Global Peace and Security Fund that the START team will be responsible for administering.
- The IPS also put considerable emphasis on rebuilding the Canadian military's capacity to deploy expeditionary forces abroad. The new defence policy will make the Canadian military more effective by integrating land, sea, air and special operations forces; more relevant by adapting capabilities and force structure to deal with new threats; and more responsive by enhancing capabilities to act quickly.
- Specifically, the Canadian Forces will have the ability to deploy three kinds of joint formations: a special operations group to respond quickly to terrorist and other threats to Canadians, a standing high-readiness contingency force capable of being deployed within 10 days, and other mission-specific task forces structured for longer term deployment.
- Finally, change is not being restricted to Foreign Affairs or the Department of National Defence. The Canadian International Development Agency is making significant changes in the role it plays in support of international peace operations, and it will be focussing on fewer countries to ensure greater effectiveness. Also, the RCMP and other departments are playing an

increasingly important role for us abroad. The RCMP, for instance, currently has some 150 officers deployed abroad.

4. Arms Control

A third issue I want to mention briefly is the leadership role Canada is playing on non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues.

There are those who consider arms control to be somehow antithetical to national security. This is not our view. On the contrary, we believe that arms control and military preparedness are mutually reinforcing. The weapon your enemy does not have is a weapon you don't have to defend against. For all parties, balanced and verifiable disarmament means a more stable and less threatening security environment.

So Canada can be found in the bureaucratic trenches in New York, Geneva, Vienna and elsewhere advancing a full agenda of arms control initiatives.

For both our countries, the outcome of the recent Nuclear Non-Proliferation Review Conference in New York was a major disappointment. Delegates spent four weeks deliberating on some of the most important arms control matters they will ever deal with - with virtually nothing to show for their efforts. At the conference, parochial interests were allowed to override the collective long-term interest in sustaining the Treaty's authority and integrity. Time that might have been devoted to substance was squandered by procedural brinkmanship.

If there is a silver lining in what happened, it lies in the hope that leaders and citizens alike will be sufficiently concerned by the conference's failure that they will mobilize behind prompt remedial action.

But it is important to understand that the failure was not just of the delegates at the conference. It reflected a larger reality. The world today confronts many of the same arms control challenges in other

forums, including the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, and the meetings of the board of governors of the IAEA.

It is also important to understand that solutions to the problems of arms control do exist. What is needed is harder work on concerting the political will to implement the solutions. So rather than looking back on where we have fallen short, we must look ahead to what we can and must accomplish. I am confident that we will come up with concrete proposals to that effect at our session on NACD this afternoon.

Canada, for its part, fully intends to pursue its objectives:

- to strengthen controls on nuclear weapons through the International Atomic Energy Agency,
- to encourage the destruction of chemical weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention,
- to institute strong verification provisions for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and
- to gain universal support for the Hague Code of Conduct on non-proliferation of ballistic missiles.

Canada already maintains some of the world's toughest export controls on WMD-related materials and equipment, and we will remain a leader in international regimes coordinating such controls.

We are also making a huge contribution to the Global Partnership Program to combat the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. As many will know, we have committed \$1 billion over 10 years to the program, one of the most innovative ventures ever undertaken.

Working with the United States, other countries, and such institutions as the IAEA, we are helping to fund a variety of projects in Russia - and potentially the other states of the FSU - ranging from the physical protection of old nuclear and chemical weapons materials to their safe

dismantlement and disposal of Soviet-era nuclear submarines.

Nor will we forget the need for action on conventional weapons such as landmines and small arms which, weapon-for-weapon, are less destructive than WMD but actually kill and injure more people in today's conflicts.

5. Conclusion

By way of conclusion, let me say a few words about areas that I would place high on any agenda for future peace and security cooperation between our two countries. Each area has to do with modernizing some dimension of the international security regime.

The first is the need to modernize key international security institutions. Whether it is the United Nations, NATO, regional organizations such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the non-proliferation regime - it is clear that the multilateral institutions on which we rely for our security are not performing up to their potential. In fact, never before has there been such a disconnect between how the international security system is supposed to work and how it actually does work.

The second is the need to modernize international law. Many of the conventions and treaties we are working with were developed in

another age, suited to their times but not fully applicable to the challenges of the 21st century. Most international instruments, for example, ignore the existence of non-state actors - both the good ones and the bad ones. National sovereignty is still assumed to trump all other considerations.

Which brings me to the third area: the need to modernize our doctrines. New concepts and approaches are being introduced - the responsibility to protect, the duty to prevent, the right to preempt. Some time soon, we will have to reach a consensus on the acceptability and application of these doctrines.

The great English writer John Milton once observed that peace has its victories, as much as war. I think we can agree that victories will not be easy to come by in the years immediately ahead. Doing international security better in the 21st century will require greater political will, intellectual leadership, and entrepreneurial diplomacy than the world has been used to in recent years.

But Japanese and Canadians have reserves of optimism, wisdom, and hard work that I am confident we can marshal to our common cause of peace and security.

I look forward to the discussions we will have today and tomorrow on these and others issues.

Session I

Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security

Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security¹

Akiko Fukushima

Director of Policy Studies and Senior Fellow

National Institute for Research Advancement, Tokyo, Japan

1. Introduction

Japan and Canada have traditionally had an active economic partnership, including trade in lumber, coal and other resources. Since the passage of the International Peacekeeping Cooperation Law in 1992 in Japan, the two nations have started to forge a cooperative relationship in the field of peace and security. With no experience of UN peacekeeping operations, Japan sought advice and training for its peacekeepers from Canada and the Nordic countries prior to its participation in UNTAC, in an attempt to benefit from their long-term experience. Furthermore, Japanese logistical support troops and their Canadian counterparts have worked together in the field since February 1996, when Japan first sent SDF troops to the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights, and this cooperation continues.

The “2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation,”² adopted when Prime Minister Martin visited Japan in January 2005, states, “Peace and security is an area in which the Governments of Canada and Japan... continue to share much in common in their foreign policy objectives, and therefore, have a potential for working more closely and more effectively.” Policy experts broadly agree that Japan and Canada share similar foreign policy values and views of the world, and that their agendas with respect to international

peace and security, including orientation towards and active engagement in multilateralism, conflict prevention, peace support and peace building operations, poverty reduction and human security are well matched. This was officially recognized in November 1997 when Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Canada and met with Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, leading to the establishment of this symposium. The similarities between the two nations were also delineated in a joint study paper authored by Professor Brian L. Job and Professor Masashi Nishihara in March 1997.³

Yet there is also a perception that these similarities have remained in the domain of shared recognition and have not been fully translated into action. Human security is often cited as an illustration. Both Japan and Canada have positioned human security as a cornerstone of their respective foreign policies. Differences have, however, been pointed out in the Japanese and Canadian definitions of human security. In particular, different attitudes towards the use of force for purposes of humanitarian intervention have been a source of deep division, preventing the two countries from engaging in practical collaborations in this field. However, a closer look at the gulf between the two countries on human security issues in a 2004 study of my own⁴ revealed that it is narrower than it is narrower than commonly perceived.

¹ The author would like to express her sincere gratitude to Japanese and Canadian scholars, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Japanese Defense Agency, and the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo for their comments and information.

² The “2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation” was announced by Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Martin on January 19th 2005.

³ Brian L. Job and Masashi Nishihara, “Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Study: Broadening The Agenda,” March 1997, printed in *The 3rd Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation*, November 23-24, 2002 pp.110-131

⁴ Akiko Fukushima “Human security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Governmental Thinking and Practice,” August 2004, CCHS Human Security Visiting Fellow Paper. Available at http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/Research/en/index.php

This paper reviews the evolution of Japanese and Canadian policies on peace and security, especially since the Third Symposium was held in Vancouver in November 2002, looks at concrete cooperation for peace and security between Japan and Canada and assesses the rationale for Japan-Canada cooperation. It goes on to examine why more substantive cooperation has been slow in coming, and concludes by suggesting some concrete ideas for cooperation which can be discussed in this round of the symposium.

2. Evolution of Japanese and Canadian Policies for Peace and Security

Since the Third Symposium in Vancouver in 2002, security policy in both Japan and Canada has undergone a major evolution, a fact which has significant implications for our respective global roles in peace and security and for cooperation

between our nations.

In addition to its dispatch of SDF personnel to UN peacekeeping operations, Japan has made further proactive efforts to maintain and promote international peace and security, within its constitutional limits, since the September 11 terrorist attacks. New security-related legislation has been introduced to enable this, as shown in Table 1. This includes the enactment of the Counter-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which enabled Japan to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) by sending Maritime Self-Defense Force support vessels (two destroyers and one supply ship) into the Indian Ocean to supply fuel, initially to US naval vessels and subsequently to naval vessels of Coalition Forces, including Canadian vessels, as shown in Table 2. This is the first time that the SDF has been sent overseas in a non-peacekeeping role. Canadian vessels rank fourth in terms of the amount of oil provided by the MSDF.

Table 1. Major security-related legislation established and actions authorized by the Japanese Government

1992	International Peace Cooperation Law
1998	Amendment to International Peace Cooperation Law (to enable SDF involvement in international election monitoring by regional organizations and use of small arms by order of superior officers)
1994	Report of the Advisory Group on Defense Issues, "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan" (Higuchi Report)
1995	National Defense Program Guidelines (+ Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan 1996-2000)
1997	Revised Japan-US Defense Guidelines
1999	Law Concerning Measures to Ensure the Peace and Security of Japan in Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan
2000	Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan 2001-2005
2001	Counter-terrorism Special Measures Law and Dispatch of MSDF to provide refueling for US vessels ,etc.
2001	Amendment to International Peace Cooperation Law (defreezing)
2002	Decision to deploy Aegis destroyer to Indian Ocean
2003	Decision to extend refueling by MSDF to non-US vessels (Operation Enduring Freedom)
2003	Final Report of the Commission on Human Security
2003	Launch of indigenous surveillance satellites
2003	Revision of Japan's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter
2003	Armed Attack Situation response related law
2003	Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and reconstruction Assistance in Iraq
2003	Cabinet decision to acquire BMD systems
2003	Dispatch of ASDF to Kuwait
2004	Dispatch of GSDF troops (engineers/support) to Iraq for reconstruction
2004	7 laws and 3 treaties on legislation concerning contingency response measures
2004	Report of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities (Araki Report)
2004	New National Defense Planning Guidelines (+Mid-term Defense Build-up Plan 2005-2009)
2004	Decision on the extension of the Basic Plan regarding humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by the Self Defense Forces in Iraq
2005	Japan's Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance

Table 2. Refueling by Maritime Self Defense Force (as of March 29, 2005)

	Quantity	Frequency	Amount (Yen)
US	348,000KL	283	13,4 billion
UK	8,900KL	23	340 million
France	13,000KL	51	510 million
New Zealand	2,500KL	15	100 million
Italy	5,000KL	24	210 million
Netherlands	1,500KL	7	60 million
Greece	2,000KL	10	80 million
Canada	8,500KL	37	340 million
Spain	2,100KL	10	90 million
Germany	1,800KL	10	70 million
Pakistan	5,000KL	32	240 million

Moreover, Japan introduced the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2003, and has sent some 600 troops to Samawah in southern Iraq since December of that year. The Japanese troops are to function in non-combat roles and to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq. Here Japanese and Canadian policy diverged, with Canada deciding not to send its troops. In Japan, by contrast, it was a major political breakthrough to dispatch GSDF personnel to Iraq outside the scope of a UN peacekeeping operation.

Meanwhile, Japan has also made progress towards reconfiguration of its security policy framework. The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities was created to examine future Japanese security and defense policies to assist in the revision of the 1995 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), and published its report (the Araki report) in October 2004. It is normal practice to establish a Council composed of businesspeople, scholars and ex-bureaucrats to discuss the nature of the changes to be made in a revision of the NDPO. The Council established to discuss the revision of the previous NDPO, which published the Higuchi Report, was named the Council on Defense Capabilities. The addition of “security” to the name of the new Council reflects a new awareness of security as an important element in determining Japan’s defense capabilities. The Council’s report delineated changes in the international security environment

and the consequent requirement for changes in security policy and defense forces. While noting the importance of regional threats emanating from Russia, China and North Korea, including a possible armed clash across the Strait of Taiwan, the Araki Report also observed that Japan faces a range of threats from traditional inter-state wars to civil wars, ethnic conflicts, piracy and international terrorism as well as domestic threats from endogenous terrorist and criminal organizations. The Araki Report recommends an “integrated security strategy” to meet these threats. The two goals of the strategy are to defend Japan and to reduce threats to international security.

On December 10, 2004, the Japanese government released the new NDPO (now called National Defense Planning Guidelines, or NDPG). It follows the Araki Report in noting the existence of new threats in addition to traditional threats. The NDPG points to the situation on the Korean Peninsula and across the Strait of Taiwan, in addition to the fact that China “has been modernizing its nuclear and missile capabilities as well as naval and air forces and expanding its area of operation at sea” as matters to which Japan has to be attentive. Following the Araki Report again, the NDPG indicates two objectives for Japan’s security policy: “to prevent any threat from directly reaching Japan and ... to reduce the chances of any threat arising in various parts of the world in order

to prevent it from reaching Japan.” The NDPG stated that Japan will achieve these objectives through its own defense preparedness, that is, the maintenance of a multi-functional, flexible and effective defense force, its alliance with the United States and cooperation with the international community. This constitutes a departure from the Basic Defense Force Concept embraced by NDPO since 1976 when the first version was adopted. It meant the existence of Japan’s defense capabilities are more important than actual activities. In the new NDPG significance of defense capabilities are now in action.

Japan has opted to participate in research and development for the US Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) program, in order to protect itself from a possible missile strike by North Korea and a joint test is scheduled for late 2005. The Japanese government will consider moving into the joint development phase in FY 2006. The proposed system, comprising land- and sea-based interceptors, will be activated in 2007.

With respect to legal constraints on Japan’s involvement in collective defense and collective security, serious consideration is now being given to constitutional reforms. The current debate is to keep the preamble of the Constitution which states that “...we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty through this land and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of

government...” However, serious consideration is now being given to revision to Article 9. Article 9 of the Constitution states that “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim for Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” The current debate is to keep the first paragraph but to either revise the wording and/or interpretation of the second paragraph which bans Japan possessing armed forces and participating in collective security operations. This is to recognize SDF we possess today and to allow Japanese SDF to participate in collective defense and security operations, perhaps limited to peacebuilding and peacekeeping type activities.

The report of the Commission on Human Security was published in 2003. The Commission was co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Professor Amartya Sen⁵, and supported by the Japanese government. Human security is an important policy perspective in Japan, and following the recommendations of the report, the nation introduced the concept more explicitly in the new Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter it adopted on August 29, 2003. In FY 2003 the budget item Grant Assistance for Grassroots Projects was reorganized to include human security

⁵ The Commission on Human Security was established in 2001. In addition to the co-chairs, Ms. Ogata and Professor Sen, 12 eminent persons from around the world comprised the commissioners. The goal of the Commission was to develop the concept of human security and propose a program of action that the international community should take to achieve human security. Recommendations focusing upon the following ten points were made in the final report of May 2003:

1. Protecting people in violent conflict
2. Protecting people from the proliferation of arms
3. Supporting the security of people on the move
4. Establishing human security transition funds for post-conflict situations
5. Encouraging fair trade and markets to benefit the extreme poor
6. Working to provide minimum living standards everywhere
7. According higher priority to ensuring universal access to basic health care
8. Developing an efficient and equitable global system for patent rights
9. Empowering all people with universal basic education
10. Clarifying the need for global human identity while respecting the freedom of individuals to have diverse identities and affiliations.

as a line item and allocated approximately 15 billion yen. The Medium-Term Policy on ODA, adopted in February 4, 2005, emphasizes the human security perspective in ODA more strongly than the previous policy. It states that “Japan will address the four priority issues of ‘poverty reduction,’ ‘sustainable growth,’ ‘addressing global issues’ and ‘peacebuilding’ described in the ODA Charter bearing in mind the perspective of ‘human security,’ in order to reduce the vulnerabilities faced by people, communities and countries.”

Japan has also further enhanced the Trust Fund for Human Security that it established in the United Nations in March 1999. As of May 2005, total contributions amounted to approximately US\$ 256 million. The Fund has supported more than 120 projects conducted by UN agencies to realize human security around the globe. Responding to criticisms in order to manage the Fund more effectively, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations, OCHA, established the Human Security Unit in autumn 2004, and the Guidelines of the Fund were revised in January 2005.

In April 2005 the Government of Canada released its International Policy Statement (IPS) – A Role of Pride and Influence in the World. This document is unique in the sense that it represents an integrated strategy for diplomacy, defense, development and commerce. A comparison of the NDPO and the IPS highlights the commonalities between Japan and Canada: both nations share values of freedom, democracy and human rights, both regard their respective alliances with the United States as fundamentally important, both share an interest in the security of the Asia Pacific region and both have security and defense policies based on three pillars: namely, self-defense, cooperation with the US and cooperation with the international community for peace and security. Both recognize the nexus between domestic and

international security. Given the similarities in policy between the two nations and Japan’s increased level of participation in international peace and stabilization efforts as described above, there is certainly significant potential for security cooperation between Canada and Japan.

3. Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security in Retrospect

A Stocktaking of Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security

Since the last symposium in November 2002, Japan and Canada have collaborated in furthering international peace and security. Japanese and Canadian forces have continued to closely cooperate in the UNDOF in the Golan Heights. In addition, as mentioned above, vessels of Japan’s MSDF have provided fuel to Canadian navy vessels taking part in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean.

In terms of human security, Japan has participated in the Human Security Network meeting, which Canada took the initiative in launching as an observer in 2004 and as a guest in 2005. This was significant, as Japan had previously refrained from participating in the Network due to differences in the Japanese and Canadian understandings of human security. As mentioned above, Canada and Japan have been divided on the issue of humanitarian intervention; Ambassador Komano stated in his speech⁶ that “the Japanese Government appreciates the notion of “responsibility to protect.” When the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS)⁷, which was created by Canada after the debate over the bombing of Kosovo, published its report entitled “The Responsibility to Protect” in 2001, the Japanese government did not welcome the report. The ICISS

⁶ Statement by H.E. Kinichi Komano, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Human Security, on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network held in Ottawa, 18-20 May 2005.

⁷ Canada created the Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in September 2000. The Canadian initiative came in response to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s call to forge a new international consensus to reconcile the sovereignty of states with humanitarian intervention. The crux of the matter was the definition of the circumstances in which the international community could or should legitimately intervene in intra-state conflicts.

report did not use the phrase “the right to intervene” but instead referred to “the obligation to react, to prevent and rebuild” and used “the responsibility to protect” as the title of its report because it was deemed to be less threatening than “right to intervene” to those concerned about intervention in sovereign states. The report defined strict criteria for intervention, namely large-scale killing and ethnic cleansing. This concept was further delineated in the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change released in December 2004 and the March 2005 Report by the UN Secretary-General entitled “In Larger Freedom: Towards Security, Development and Human Rights for All,” which Ambassador Komano also welcomed in his speech at the Human Security Network Meeting. This represented a major evolution of the official Japanese position, which narrows the gulf between the two countries on the issue of human security. Ambassador Komano specifically referred to humanitarian intervention as a last resort in his speech to the Human Security Network.

As the Appendix shows, Japan and Canada have also regularly held meetings, dialogues, visits and defense exchanges. These contacts have certainly helped each government to better understand the security policies of the other, including issues such as participation in Missile Defense. These regular contacts prepare Japan and Canada for possible future joint actions. Such ongoing exchanges may not attract a great deal of attention, but represent a steady process of confidence building.

However, that has been the extent of cooperation between the two nations, and it falls far short of the potential indicated in joint statements and the joint paper authored by Job and Nishihara. Why have the similarities perceived in official documents not been translated into actual cooperation?

Rationales for Japan-Canada Cooperation for Peace and Security

“Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Study: Broadening The Agenda”⁸ listed the rationales for closer security cooperation between Canada and Japan. Included in the rationale was that Canada and Japan are common minded in exercising a constructive voice in international affairs through their engagement in multilateral institutions and that the United States is both Japan’s and Canada’s predominant international partner.⁹

Have those rationales declined in importance? From the mutual wish of the two nations to be constructive voices in international affairs to their relations with the United States and their mutual orientation towards engagement in multilateral institutions, the rationales listed in 1997 are as relevant as ever.¹⁰

Nonetheless, rationales have not been translated into substantive cooperation. The paper suggested that Japan should seek to play a role in peace and security through multilateral institutions and that the nation could benefit from working together with Canada. However, this is not being put into practice. At the United Nations, which is promoting reforms on the occasion of its 60th anniversary, Japan and Canada are in different groups with regard to Security Council reform, with Japan part of the G-4 and Canada siding with the Uniting for Consensus group. At OSCE, Japan is an active partner in cooperation and Canada is a full participant, but there is no evidence of the two cooperating in the Organization. Both Japan and Canada participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Conference but do not collaborate in a conspicuous manner.

⁸ Ibid., Brian Job and Masashi Nishihara.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 113-115.

¹⁰ Brian L. Job and Masashi Nishihara, “Canada-Japan Security Cooperation Study: Broadening The Agenda,” March 1997, printed in *The 3rd Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation*, November 23-24, 2002 pp.113-114

What hinders our cooperation?

Although Japan and Canada share thematic and philosophical similarities in terms of peace and security policies, as described above, a closer look reveals differences in relative weights and priorities. Japan and Canada are like-minded but different. The differences stem mainly from the different security environments in their respective neighborhoods. Located in North America, Canada is protected by the Atlantic and Pacific and borders the US. Located in Northeast Asia very close to two potential trouble spots, namely the Strait of Taiwan and the Korean Peninsula, Japan's security environment is very different to Canada's.


Given its regional security environment, Japan naturally situates its defense policy in the context of potential flashpoints in the region. Canada, meanwhile, prioritizes terrorism to ensure its domestic safety and security. Both Canada and Japan regard their respective alliances with the US as very important, but their relative emphasis on the alliance is naturally different. This is reflected in the nations' respective policies concerning Missile Defense, with Japan deciding to participate and Canada deciding against participation. With a background of greater experience in peacekeeping operations, Canada places more relative weight on international peace cooperation than Japan. This has led to differences in the nations' policies on OEF and OIF. As in Canada, Japanese public opinion

was divided on the Japanese dispatch of SDF to Iraq for reconstruction as shown in Fig.1. There is, however, strong support for the Japan-US alliance, as shown in Fig.2. The latter might have enabled the Koizumi government to dispatch SDF to Samawah although extending the operation beyond December 2005 may produce a substantial reduction in public support.

Canada has a wide range of choices in terms of security activities, from counter-terrorism to peacebuilding, but Japan's experience in international security is still limited and legal constraints on the nation's use of force overseas further limit its choices.


Japan has defense exchanges with countries like the UK, France and Germany, which have militaries (210,000, 260,000, and 280,000 personnel respectively) more or less the same size as its own (240,000 personnel). On the other hand, it also has exchanges with Australia, whose military (50,000 personnel) is smaller than Canada's (60,000 personnel), because Australia has close relations with the Asian region and provides patrols for the SDF in Iraq. Japan has defense exchanges with China and South Korea because of the regional security situation. Japan regards Canada with confidence and is not concerned about a possible Canadian invasion of Japan. On Canada's part, the IPS does not allude to collaboration with Japan other than in the economic field.

Figure 1. Results of surveys on dispatch of self-defense force personnel to Iraq



Source: The Asahi Shimbun Survey
 Note: The rates in Nov. and Dec. 2004 are on the extension of the dispatch period.

Figure 2. Results of surveys on attitude to Japan-US alliance



Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan: Survey Report, 2003 January.
 (<http://www8.cao.go.jp/survey/h14/h14-bouei/2-6.html>)

Notwithstanding the above, Japan certainly feels close to Canada, and there is a sense of mutual trust between the two countries. Differences exist, but they are narrowing, as seen in the example of human security. Japan and Canada have taken separate initiatives such as the creation of the Commission on Human Security (CHS) and the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), neither of which included members from the other nation. However, in the 2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation, the two governments acknowledged their respective efforts, and stated that they “will explore the coordination of approaches and activities on human security to protect and empower people threatened in their survival, livelihood and dignity.” As for the recommendation of the ICISS report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect* which alluded to the question of humanitarian intervention, the major dividing line between Japan and Canada on human security, the Japanese government acknowledged the responsibility to protect in the 2005 Agenda document, referring not to the ICISS report but to the UN High Level Panel report and Kofi Annan’s report “*In Larger Freedom*,” which introduced the concept from ICISS. Furthermore concerning Japan’s view of the relationship between the responsibility to protect and human security, Kinichi Komano, Ambassador in charge of Human Security, explained in his speech at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network in Ottawa in May 2005 that “human security gives priority to prevention, thereby excluding the ideas of use of force from this concept,” but admitted that “If all the non-military efforts do not produce any good outcome, we understand that the responsibility to protect these suffering people should fall upon the international community which may have recourse to military intervention or ‘humanitarian intervention,’ as a last resort.”¹¹ On the other hand, while humanitarian intervention involving the use of force is certainly a part of Canada’s definition of human security, it is not the exclusive or even primary focus. Thus, the so-called official gap between Japan and Canada on human security seems to be narrowing. The

differences have generated ill feeling if not outright antagonism, but seem to be less pronounced than government officials, NGOs, academics, etc., have generally thought. Both Japan and Canada are currently interested in the practical implementation of the human security approach which opens a path for practical cooperation in this area. For two years Japan has been participating as an observer in the Human Security Network which Canada took the initiative in launching, and in which Japan did not initially participate. This suggests that the official positions on human security of the two governments are converging rather than diverging.

Other topics suggested for cooperation in the 2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation, namely terrorism, transnational organized crime, regional stability and human security, NACD (non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament) bilateral security and defense exchanges, UN reform and North Korean issues, can also be further advanced.

As Japan becomes ever more active in promoting its security efforts, and as differences between the two nations narrow, the possibilities for collaboration between Canada and Japan are increasing. It would be especially practical for the two nations to combine their efforts, with Canada covering those areas in which Japan is unable to implement practical action. Moreover, Japan and Canada can explore unique cooperation as the two shares conceptual and thematic values which might be different from or be complementary to their respective cooperation with the United States.

4. Some Suggestions for Future Japan-Canada Cooperation

In this symposium, we will take up the topics of post-conflict peace consolidation, the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament and peace and security in the Asia Pacific region. Each topic merits in-depth consideration from the perspective of Japan-Canada

¹¹ Statement by H.E. Kinichi Komano, Ambassador of Japan in charge of Human Security, on the occasion of the Seventh Ministerial Meeting of the Human Security Network held in Ottawa, 18-20 May 2005.

Cooperation. We should consider ideas that go beyond rhetoric and enhance practical cooperation between our nations.

Although the positions of the two nations differ with regard to UN Security Council reform, with Japan part of the G4 coalition and Canada forming part of “Uniting for Consensus,” can we work together to make the 60 year old institution more fit for today’s global security environment? Peacebuilding, or consolidation of peace, is a potential area for cooperation. Peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations have been a national vocation of Canada. Canada has been a key player in promoting UN peace operations and member states have consulted Canada for its advice in such operations. The Japanese government now supports the concept of consolidation of peace, which emphasizes the promotion of peace by stabilizing areas in conflict and ensuring security while engaging in humanitarian and rebuilding efforts, even prior to a ceasefire agreement. The DDR Program in Afghanistan is one example. Japan is one of the leading nations in the DDR Program, and Canada is participating in the ISAF, leading PRT in Kandahar. Is there any scope for cooperation in Afghanistan for peacebuilding? Perhaps Japan and Canada can combine their strengths and develop genuine complementarities. Although conflicts and post-conflict situations are different in each case, by studying peacebuilding in Afghanistan, where both nations are engaged, Japan and Canada, based

on their respective experiences, can jointly make proposals for the UN role in peacebuilding, to assist in reforming the institution for the 21st century.

Canada and Japan share an interest in non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD), and with the failure of the NPT Review Conference last month there should be scope for collaboration in this area. Member states need to examine NPT review process to make it more relevant to non-proliferation where Canada and Japan may be able to cooperate in proposing reform proposals separately and/or together.

On human security, as described above, the differences are closing. What matters is actual implementation of the concept. Japan is now participating in the Human Security Network; what concrete actions can we take together? Perhaps our two nations can develop a synergy by combining their respective aid projects.

To conclude: Prime Minister Martin and Prime Minister Koizumi agreed to make this symposium annual rather than bi-annual; can we come up with ideas to make the symposium more substantive, including inter-symposia research projects? A case study of peacebuilding in Afghanistan and lessons learned can be an academic contribution to governmental efforts in reforming of the United Nations.

5. Appendix Official Contacts Between Japan and Canada, 1996-2005¹²

I. Japan-Canada joint statements and cooperation

February	1996	Japanese Self Defense Forces (logistical support troops) began working with Canadian counterparts in the UN peacekeeping operations in the Golan Heights, the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF).
November	1996	a joint document “Japan and Canada: an Agenda for Cooperation,” by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto
November	1997	a joint statement, “Strengthening Japan-Canada Relations for the Twenty-first Century”
September	1999	joint statements, “Canada and Japan: Global Partnership for the Twenty-first Century” and “Canada-Japan Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation.”
January	2005	a joint statement by Prime Minister Martin and Prime Minister Koizumi and “2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation.”

II. Visits by Prime Ministers, Foreign Ministers, and the Like

From Japan to Canada

1996	FM Yukihiko Ikeda
1997	PM Ryutaro Hashimoto (APEC Vancouver Summit) FM Keizo Obuchi (to sign APLMB Treaty)
1998	FM Keizo Obuchi
2000	PM Yoshiro Mori
2002	PM Junichiro Koizumi, FM Yoriko Kawaguchi (for G-8 Kananaskis Summit)
2003	FM Yoriko Kawaguchi, Agriculture Minister Kamei
2004	Official visit of Princess Takamado on the occasion of the 75 th Anniversary of Japan-Canada diplomatic relations.

From Canada to Japan

1996	PM Jean Chrétien
1997	FM Lloyd Axworthy
1998	FM Lloyd Axworthy (for Nagano Winter Olympics)
1999	PM Jean Chrétien (with Team Canada)
2000	PM Jean Chrétien, FM Lloyd Axworthy (for G-8 Okinawa Summit)
2002	Deputy FM Gaëtan Lavertu
2003	Minister of International Trade Pierre Pettigrew,
2003	Lyle Vancliff, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-food.
2003	Alan Rock, Minister of Industry
2003	William Graham, Minister of Foreign Affairs
2003	David Kilgour, Minister of State (Asia-Pacific)
2004	Robert Speller Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food
2004	Andy Mitchell, Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food
2005	PM Paul Martin (summit meeting with PM Junichiro Koizumi)
2005	Raymond Chan, Minister of State (Multiculturalism) as the guest of honour of the Canada Day of Aichi Expos.
2005	Daniel Hays, Speaker of the Senate by the official invitation of the House of Councillors

¹² Data for 1996-2002 was taken from the Appendix of Professor Masashi Nishihara’s paper at the 3rd Symposium, “A Review of and Prospects for Japanese-Canadian Cooperation for Peace and Security,” in *The 3rd Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation*, November 23-24, 2002. The author thanks the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japan Defense Agency and the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo for assistance in updating the data.

III. Bilateral Defense Relations

Visits by High-Level Defense Officials

October	1992	Admiral Hajime Sakuma, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, SDF, to Canada
May	1996	Defense Minister David Collenette to Japan
September	1996	General Jean Boyle, Chief of the Defense Staff, Canadian Forces, to Japan
June	1998	General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defense Staff, CF, to Japan
July	1999	General Yuji Fujinawa, Chairman, Joint Staff Council, SDF, to Canada
November	2000	Major General Gameron Ross, Director-General, International Security Policy Operations (former UNDOF Commander) to Japan
April	2001	Vice Admiral Ron Buck, Commander, Maritime Forces Pacific, to Japan
March	2002	Defense Minister Art Eggleton to Japan
May	2002	Admiral Toru Ishikawa, Chief of Staff, Maritime SDF, to Canada
October	2002	Vice Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff, Canadian Forces, to Japan
July	2003	General Raymond Henault, Chief of the Defense Staff, Canadian Forces, to Japan
May	2004	Vice Admiral Ron Buck, Chief of Maritime Staff, Canadian Forces to Japan

Bilateral Political-Military (PM) Talks (Biannual)

September	1997	First Meeting (Tokyo)
January	2000	Second Meeting (Ottawa)
November	2002	Third Meeting (Tokyo)
March	2005	Fourth Meeting (Ottawa)

Bilateral Military-to-Military (MM) Talks (Annual)

April	1998	First Meeting (Tokyo)
January	2000	Second Meeting (Ottawa)
November	2000	Third Meeting (Tokyo)
November	2002	Fourth Meeting (Tokyo)
March	2005	Fifth Meeting (Ottawa)

Bilateral Staff Talks

May	1993	First Meeting (Tokyo)
May	1994	Second Meeting (Ottawa)
May	1995	Third Meeting (Tokyo)
October	1996	Fourth Meeting (Ottawa)
April	1998	Fifth Meeting (Tokyo)
May	1999	Sixth Meeting (Ottawa)
November	2000	Seventh Meeting (Tokyo)
March	2002	Eighth Meeting (Ottawa)
December	2003	Ninth Meeting (Tokyo)
March	2005	Tenth Meeting (Ottawa)

Bilateral Navy-to-Navy (NN) Talks

September	2002	First Meeting (Ottawa)
June	2004	Second Meeting (Tokyo)

Bilateral Visits by Ships

Japanese training ships have visited Canada 19 times since 1960, including recent visits in 1998, 2001, 2002 and 2004. Canadian ships have visited Japan 18 times since 1958, most recently in 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004.

Symposium on Japan-Canada Peace and Security Cooperation

September	1998	First Meeting (Vancouver)
November	2000	Second Meeting (Tokyo)
November	2002	Third Meeting (Vancouver)
June	2005	Fourth Meeting (Tokyo)

Status report on Canada-Japan peace and security cooperation

By Ian Trites, Canadian Embassy Political Section

It is a real pleasure to be with you today to discuss the excellent collaboration that exists between Canada and Japan in the area of peace and security. As you are aware, this relationship has evolved and broadened considerably since the first such Symposium was held in Vancouver in 1998. Of course the global security environment has changed considerably over the past decade and the foreign and security policies of both Canada and Japan have had to adapt to new international and domestic realities. It is our sincere hope that our efforts during this Fourth edition of the Symposium will continue to provide ideas for deepening our bilateral security relations in the future.

I would like to outline the three broad areas of my presentation: 1) the key elements of our bilateral cooperation in peace and security over the last few years; 2) the Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation endorsed by Prime Ministers Martin and Koizumi last January; and 3) possible areas for future cooperation based on our lessons-learned.

First let me say that the views expressed here are my own, and not the official view of the Government of Canada.

I'd like to start by examining some developments that have occurred over the last two years. The last symposium on Canada-Japan peace and security cooperation was held in Vancouver in the autumn of 2002, only one year after the events of September 11, 2001. Given this timing, it is not surprising that symposium participants paid a lot of attention to counter-terrorism. I am pleased to say that this work was very useful to the governments of the two countries. It bore fruit as shortly after this, a plan of cooperation was designed in counter-terrorism capacity building, focusing on

Southeast Asian countries, and APEC economies.

One year later, we sent an expert to share Canadian experiences on responses to bio-terrorism at a seminar held in Tokyo on Crisis Management of Chemical and Biological Terrorism. This seminar, sponsored by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), brought together representatives from Southeast Asia to exchange information on best practices.

At about the same time, the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo hosted an APEC seminar on Anti-Money Laundering/Anti-Terrorism Financing Policy Development. Canadian and Australian legal and financial experts shared their experience on international developments and obligations, human rights and privacy, legislation and the roles of financial intelligence units in combatting money laundering and terrorist financing in APEC. To keep the momentum, a complementary Tokyo workshop on accession to Counter-Terrorism conventions, was organised immediately after this seminar by the Japanese Government with Canadian participation.

Another joint Canada-Japan initiative took place in July 2004, when a Canadian expert from the Counter-Terrorism Technology Centre in Alberta presented on the Canadian first responder programme, at a workshop co-sponsored by Japan. This event, held at the Southeast-Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia, was attended by representatives from a number of countries in Southeast Asia, a priority region for both Canada and Japan.

Our two countries are active members of the G8-affiliated Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), which was formed in July 2003 under the

French Presidency of the G8 and continue to work together in this context.

Navy-to-Navy cooperation continues to be one of the strongest areas of defence cooperation between the two countries. In April of 2003, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force started providing free fuel to the Canadian Navy working in the Indian Ocean under Operation Enduring Freedom and has continued this cooperation since then. Canada has been one of the largest recipients of Japanese fuel. After some months without a Canadian ship in that region, I understand that HMCS Winnipeg just arrived in the area a few days ago so we trust this cooperation will continue. Last summer, the visit by HMCS Regina to Tokyo was also a great success, with a demonstration of interdiction boarding capacity.

Peacekeeping is another area where our countries have worked together. Canadian and Japanese peacekeepers have worked side by side in the field. For the past eight years, our forces have sustained their cooperation in the UN Peacekeeping mission in the Golan Heights.

When Canada was President of SHIRBRIG (Stand-By High Readiness Brigade) in 2003, we encouraged Japan to consider participation in this organization due to the contribution that their highly-trained forces could bring to the grouping. Japan responded positively by sending observers to the SHIRBRIG Steering Committee meetings in 2004 and 2005.

As Japan continues to conduct a review of its Peace Cooperation activities with a view to eventually proposing a generic peacekeeping law, dialogue between our officials has intensified at various levels. For instance, over the past two years, a number of officials from the Defense Agency and other departments, as well as several journalists and academics have visited the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre and met with Canadian officials responsible for peacekeeping.

Last summer, we held a seminar at the Canadian Embassy in Tokyo on "Peace Support Operations and the Role of Civilians" which was

moderated by one of the pre-eminent Japanese experts in this field, Ambassador Yasushi Akashi. General Andrew Leslie, former Deputy Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan shared his experience and emphasized the need for close cooperation with civil society and also a "whole-of-government" approach involving defence, diplomacy and development working closely in tandem. This generated lively discussion from the Japanese participants particularly regarding Japan's increasing role in peace support activities.

Another area of close dialogue between Canada and Japan has been The Responsibility to Protect, the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. The Canadian Embassy and the United Nations University held a large seminar in the fall of 2002 to stimulate the debate around this issue. Since then, Canada and Japan have had close discussions of the "R2P" concept, bilaterally (e.g. in the context of the January 2005 Prime Minister's visit) and multilaterally (e.g. at the United Nations, and the Human Security Network).

Speaking of our multilateral cooperation, Japan and Canada work hand in hand in the ASEAN Regional Forum to move forward the preventive diplomacy concept. At an ARF workshop held in Tokyo in March 2004, Canada presented a paper on the ARF and preventive diplomacy. We believe that after 10 years of confidence building measures, the ARF must now consider the pursuit of practical measures in the interest of enhancing our cooperation and capacity to address the pressing security challenges which are facing us all. The upcoming ARF ministerial meeting in Vientiane next month will represent another opportunity for Japan and Canada to work together for the ARF to make a valuable contribution to international efforts to promote peace and security.

In the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Canada and Japan together promoted the expansion of political discussions to include human security. I am encouraged that we have recently made good progress in that direction. Japan was invited to participate as an observer in the Human

Security Network last year in Mali and was represented at this year's meeting in Ottawa as well.

However, the most visible element of Canada-Japan peace and security cooperation was the renewal of our Cooperation Agenda, as was proposed by several participants at our last Symposium. During the visit to Japan of Prime Minister Martin on January 19, 2005 the two prime ministers launched the "2005 Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation Agenda" as an update of the 1999 version. It focus on the following seven elements: 1) counter-terrorism; 2) organized transnational crime; 3) regional stability and human security; 4) non-proliferation arms control and disarmament; 5) bilateral security and defence exchanges; 6) UN reform to deal with new threats; and 7) cooperation on North Korea issues.

One of the features of the 2005 Agenda is that it makes this Symposium an annual event. In fact, this symposium used to be almost an annual event, because special symposia were regularly added to normal ones. I am thinking of the 1999 Symposium on "Peacebuilding and Development" and of the 2001 "Think Peace and Security" symposium. However, the pace slowed down in 2003 and 2004. We now have a clear mandate to re-energise our dialogue. This will be a challenge for officials and academics alike, but I strongly believe that it is worth the effort.

Each in their own ways, Canada and Japan continued to attach a lot of importance to reconstruction efforts. For instance, we are working on complementary activities such as security sector reform in Iraq and demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration in Afghanistan. Even though we have not undertaken any specific bilateral projects, through our coordination efforts we succeed in conducting our respective operations in a coherent manner. The absence of joint projects should not be seen as failure, given that our overall goal is to maximise the benefits we get from our relationship, rather than cooperating for the sake of cooperating. This being said, the Canadian Provincial Reconstruction Team to be established in Afghanistan this summer offers renewed opportunities for bilateral cooperation.

The December 2004 earthquake and tsunami was among the most destructive natural disasters of the last several decades in terms of lives lost, missing and displaced. The international community was quick to mobilize around the disaster. Several international meetings took place in the weeks following the disaster, including the UN World Conference on Disaster Reduction in Kobe, Japan (January 18-22). Both Canada and Japan made a significant contribution to the tsunami response, including with the deployment of Canadian military assets in Sri Lanka and Japanese Self-Defense Force to Aceh. Canada appreciated collaborating with Japan on consular issues in the affected countries, and on the humanitarian and recovery response. Canada firmly believes in the importance of donor countries sharing lessons learned from this disaster, so that we can enhance global crisis response efforts. This is another area where Canada and Japan can cooperate.

Political-Military Talks and Military-Military Talks were held in Ottawa in March 2005 and provided an opportunity to exchange insights on security situations such as North Korea, Iraq, Darfur, Afghanistan and the Middle East. It underlined once again the depth and range of our "like-mindedness" on international security issues. The Political-Military talks also provide an opportunity to explore other areas for enhanced cooperation, including on peace support operations and civil-military cooperation and post-conflict reconstruction. The views expressed this weekend on these issues will contribute to rich discussion which is already taking place at the official level

Now let's look at some of our cooperation in the area of peacebuilding. Our aid agencies, JICA and CIDA, have been collaborating in this field for several years. In 2003, determined to respond more effectively to the new post-911 development challenges, a *Canada-Japan Framework Agreement on ODA Cooperation* was signed, with a focus on policy dialogue, exchanging our knowledge and cooperating at the field level. Peacebuilding and human security were identified as priority areas for collaboration.

We have conducted joint reviews of our CIDA-JICA peacebuilding projects in Guatemala and Cambodia. In September 2003, we held a joint workshop in Ethiopia to disseminate the lessons learned from our joint experience. More recently, CIDA and JICA, together with other donors and international financial institutions, collaborated at the Tokyo February 2004 international symposium on capacity development and aid effectiveness.

As our relationship is maturing and in line with our framework agreement, now we work more and more at the policy level. It is in this context that, twice a year, in a spirit of the “whole of government” approach, Tokyo-based officials from CIDA, Foreign Affairs and National Defence continue to exchange knowledge and experience with JICA experts on post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. This “whole-of-government” approach to post-conflict development is emphasized in our new Canadian International Policy Statement. We strongly believe that such an approach is essential to produce more effective results not only between our respective departments but also in capitals of partner countries like Japan, and at the field level.

Foreign Affairs is also engaged in efforts to improve the capacity of the multilateral system to provide peacebuilding assistance to post-conflict countries. The December 2004 High-Level Panel Report recommended the establishment of an intergovernmental Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) and a Peacebuilding Support Office (PSO). In general terms, the focus of the PBC would be to encourage the organisation and application of peacebuilding measures in a proactive and strategic manner, so as to assist national governments to prevent the causes of violent conflict. Canada will be working both bilaterally and multilaterally to help bring this important idea to fruition.

In tackling the challenging task of post-conflict peace support, we must remember that women are key to rebuilding shattered families and communities. Canada and Japan could benefit by sharing their experience and engaging in reintegration activities from a gender perspective as women are not just victims, they are also part of

the solution. By becoming informed actors, we should work together to reshape peace support activities to better respond to the gender dimensions of complex emergencies.

Landmines is another area that we have collaborated on in the past and holds potential for future cooperation as well. Since the Ottawa convention eight years ago, both countries have been active in mine action; indeed Japan was one of the first signatories to help bring the convention into force. As Japan remains the second largest donor in mine-action and has been active in multilateral efforts to end this scourge, it too has demonstrated its credentials as a leader in this field.

However, given that more than 200 million anti-personnel mines are still stockpiled in 67 countries, in many places mine-action a precondition to development. Therefore exploring more effective ways to benefit mine-affected communities remains a current and global challenge. Given our common interest and commitment, mine action is another area where we could benefit from strengthened cooperation.

The Way Forward

Where will our cooperation on peace and security take us next? The 2005 Agenda provides a blueprint. Let me describe current plans.

1) Responding to terrorism: We continue to look for opportunities to jointly assist countries of the Asia Pacific region to strengthen legal frameworks and enhance law enforcement capacity to counter terrorism. The regular Japanese training sessions at the Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia offer excellent potential.

2) Fighting transnational organized crime: Our goal here is to strengthen coordinated efforts against transnational organized crimes. For example, our two countries recently signed the UN Convention Against Corruption and we have been working together for years with the Paris-based Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to fight money-

laundering. The successful implementation of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, with its protocols, is also a priority. This is an area where we are particularly looking for fresh ideas.

3) Enhancing regional stability and human security: Canada and Japan are both strong advocates of human security and have committed significant resources to such initiatives. As Mr. Fumihiko Yoshida has recommended in his recent book "Human Security", Canada and Japan should seek to increase their cooperation on human security. Despite some diminishing differences in our approach to human security, there is excellent potential to initiate cooperation projects under the numerous areas of shared interest. Ideas like joint financing of the human security centre in Amman are being explored in Tokyo and Ottawa, but also in New York in the UN Human Security Unit. On regional stability, we will maintain our policy dialogue on regions like Afghanistan, the Middle East Peace Process, and Sudan.

4) Advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD): Canada and Japan share common views on key NACD issues. Japan is a founding participant of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and hosted a PSI maritime interdiction exercise last year off Tokyo Bay. A Canadian naval officer participated as an observer. In the G8, Japan shares Canada's approach to the implementation of the G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation. As non-nuclear-weapon States with advanced nuclear energy industries, Canada and Japan are like-minded in approaches to strengthening controls on the transfer of sensitive nuclear technologies. Both countries are equally committed to the multilateral architecture supporting disarmament.

The Government of Canada expressed regret at the failure of the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to deliver concrete commitments on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We believe that a number of measures that should be taken to enhance the disarmament and non-proliferation norms and peaceful use goals

embodied in the NPT. These include:

- resolving the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament;
- achieving the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty;
- promoting universal acceptance of the International Atomic Energy Agency's comprehensive safeguards and its additional safeguards protocol; and
- strengthening national export controls on nuclear technologies.

These areas as well as those listed in the 2005 Agenda provide yet other areas where Canada and Japan can cooperate.

5) Increasing bilateral security and defence exchanges: We have been exploring ways of allowing Canadian defence sector exporters to compete in Japan, perhaps through a bilateral defence and security co-operation agreement, similar to those Canada has with NATO and other like-minded countries. We will continue to hold Political-Military Talks and Military-Military Talks.

6) Enhancing the ability of the United Nations to deal with new threats: Canada and Japan have an active dialogue on the reform of all areas of UN activities - peace and security, development, and UN institutional reform. We have of course discussed extensively the issue of expansion of the permanent membership of the UN Security Council, on which Canada and Japan support different options. However, we have not let this distract us from discussing areas where we do agree, such as the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission for example.

In conclusion, we have come along way since the Job-Nishihara report was released in 1997 exploring the rationale of improving our bilateral security relations. While recent years have witnessed an increase in cooperation between Canada and Japan on peace and security, there remains plenty of potential for more joint work in the future. The 2005 Agenda, and the results from this Symposium, will help us continue to advance a very mutually beneficial relationship.

Session II



Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation

Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation, Afghanistan's case

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The joint efforts for reconstruction in Afghanistan by its Government and people and the international community is a comparable success so far.

It does not mean, however, that the eventual restoration of peace there has been guaranteed. The ground reality is far from being complacent.

Today, while summarizing the progress towards peace and development in Afghanistan, I would weigh how it has been brought about and on Japan and Canada's role in it, and then try to make some points crucial for consolidating the peace building efforts and finally to suggest the areas of further cooperation by both countries.

1. Achievement made so far by the peace building efforts in Afghanistan.

After 23 years of civil war, Afghanistan is a typical failed country and not only state security, but human security has been lacking in all its aspects. Afghanistan, therefore, was a real test case for applying the concept of human security and realizing it on the ground.

In spite of all difficulties faced with yet, improvement is obvious in such areas as school enrollment, number of returnees (refugees and IDPs), polio-myelitis being almost eradicated. In addition, the political process based upon the Bonn Agreement has come to its final phase. The President has been elected for the first time in its history directly by the people.

In the security sector which is always the main concern in the post-conflict situation, while insurgencies continue, some remarkable progress has been observed in, among others, the building of National Army and DDR.

I could point to two noteworthy factors attributed to this comparative success.

2. Factors attributed to the comparative success

(1) Coordinated support by the international community.

Generally speaking, for the success in reconstruction of a failed state, three different process should be proceeded in a balanced and coordinated manner, since these are closely interconnected; without progress in one process, other processes will be deferred, either, and vice versa. These are (i) political process, (ii) security sector reform and (iii) development.

In case of Afghanistan, the international community has not only worked together, but shared the burden as much as possible. UN has undertaken the lead for supporting political process.

U.S. and NATO have been taking primary responsibility in the fight against terrorism and the maintenance of security. G7 countries have shared the lead nation role in different security sector reforms. Development efforts have been underpinned by the W.B. and U.N. agencies and shared not only by the traditional donors, but new donors such as Iran and India.

(2) People's participation first in the political process.

The presidential election last October was a watershed in the history after the collapse of the Taliban Regime in a sense that majority of the people went to the polling stations, thus defying the real and verbal threats of the Taliban. Actually, Afghan people demonstrated their will and expectation for peace of the country and welfare of their own life by action.

By singling these two points out as extraordinary for the comparative success in the reconstruction efforts, I don't say that these two factors are to be sustained automatically. It goes without saying that without intentional and strenuous efforts by the both sides, these factors will erode as time passes.

According to some studies, it is shown that majority of post-conflict peace building efforts are destined to fail within 5 years. The reason is obvious; first, the attention of the international community and, therefore, its aid are to diminish after some years of the halt of fighting, and second, on the contrary, the expectation of the people for peace dividend is to turn to the disappointment and frustration, because of the unrealized economic benefit for the majority of people. This discrepancy tends to increase and lead to a failure of the peace building efforts. Afghanistan, some argue, is to enter such a danger phase.

3. Japan- Canada cooperation on the ground

During my tenure as the Ambassador to Afghanistan from spring 2002 to autumn last year, the Government of Japan has made several important policy decisions and put the concept of human security and the peace building support at the centre of her foreign policy and aid policy as its important instrument.

I am certain that these policy changes have taken place, to a larger extent, based upon Japan's commitment and contribution to the Afghan reconstruction efforts and I am also sure that our

experiences in Afghanistan have enriched the contents of these politics. Afghanistan is a real challenge for post conflict peace building and a serious test case for realizing human security.

Japan's contribution in the three pronged reconstruction strategy in Afghanistan is as follows;

In the traditional development assistance area, we tried to create synergy effects, by basing our individual aid programmes and projects on and relating them to the Ogata Initiative, the gist of which is the comprehensive regional development approach. Ms. Ogata has initially advocated this approach for the purpose of supporting the resettlement of returnees in the places of their origin (for this to happen, the people of recipient community should be also included as beneficiaries and for the community development to be sustainable, it should be linked to the comprehensive and regional development.).

Later, this approach has been widely recognized as valid for ensuring the alternative livelihood of the poppy cultivating farmers and disarmed militias, too. In addition, it might have a far wider implication, to the effect that the rehabilitated community could be a firm foundation for security and safety of the area and democratization process of the country. Therefore, rehabilitation of the community and its sustained development is the key to the realization of human security in Afghanistan.

In the security sector reform, where, despite of the above mentioned policy change announced by my Government, we have owned less experiences and not enjoyed enough expertise and experts of our own.

In security related area, we started from supporting the restoration of demining capacity in Afghanistan which had been badly damaged on the occasion of the bombardment by the Coalition forces against the Taliban, and then extended our involvement to the core area of security reform, that is to lead the DDR programme, together with the UN on behalf of the international community. As the chair of the DDR Steering Committee, I was

under a continued and strong pressure. The results of hard work has born fruits after my departure there, that is, over 80% of the targeted militias under the command and control of the MOD has been disarmed, with the accompanying achievement of over 98% of heavy weapons cantonment, now.

Canada acts as a lead nation in the demining programme in Afghanistan. Now not only humanitarian consideration but developmental requirement (as a condition for starting infrastructure projects) urge expedite its implementation. Japan continues to work together with Canada in this sector.

For some time when I was in Kabul, Canada as a lead nation of ISAF played a critical role to realize demilitarization of Kabul which has a close relation with DDR programme and Canada's proactive role in it was of a great help to DDR too.

Without ISAF's presence and good work in which Canada always assumes a primary responsibility, any achievement I mentioned before was not possible.

I can say with certainty that Japan-Canada cooperation in Afghanistan has made a great contribution in bringing Afghanistan to the present state of relative stability and resilience.

4. Primary issues ahead of us

The challenges ahead of us are still daunting, however.

Primary issues are as follows;

(1) Security

Security will continue to be the most critical issue for at least the coming few years. Recent violent demonstrations in different cities of Afghanistan triggered by the Newsweek Magazine's article on desecration of the Quran at the Guantanamo Detention Centre in Cuba showed the complexity of the security problems, which are inextricably linked with the frustration of people to the slow progress of development, all kinds of

criminals and presumably the involvement of some foreign countries.

The parliamentary and provincial assembly elections which are near at hand are far more complicated politically and also in terms of logistics than the presidential election. Its security implication has become more serious in the present volatile situation.

While strengthened presence of the international forces is still very much required, the security sector reform in its all aspects should be expedited. In the end of the day, it is the Afghan Government who should shoulder the responsibility of security of the country and safety of the people.

In this regard, Japan continues to play a role as a focal point in the next phase of DDR, that is to address the illegal armed groups which are not under the control of the MOF for their disbandment. Also extremely important is to keep the disarmed commanders and soldiers genuinely reintegrated in the civil society after the official end of the reintegration support programme, June next year.

(2) Counter Narcotics (CN)

CN is the serious and complicated issue. It is a real concern that Afghanistan will degenerate to a narco-mafia state, if corrective measures and actions will not be taken in a serious and quick manner. The 8 pillar Implementation Plan has been announced by the Government. Capacity building for interdiction and enforcement, and community development support as the viable approach for the alternative livelihood are rightly put at the centre in the Plan. The rehabilitation and development of community as an integrated part of the comprehensive regional development programme will have a decisive effect on the success or failure of the overall CN strategy.

(3) Capacity building of the Government and Empowering the people

Without reestablishing the Government (central and local) and building its capacity, neither state security nor human security is achievable and sustainable. The reconstruction work in Afghanistan should, therefore, be undertaken from both sides, from

top down approach for the state building and bottom up approach for the local and community development.

In this process, we cannot overemphasize the importance of involving and mobilizing the people who demonstrated their willingness to participate in the reconstruction of own country through the presidential election, by not only protecting them but also empowering them.

(4) Overarching issues

As reconstruction work will build up and many programmes and projects in not only development but security sectors will start operating, the issue of sustainability especially from financial perspective will loom large. It is the domestic revenue increase that can counter to these financial requirements. It needs a great deal of work and takes time for the Government to be able to raise enough internal resources on its own. Hence, as an interim measure, though it will last rather long period, every device and support should be worked out and extended for supplementing the Government efforts.

Another important issue is coordination. On the one hand, there are too many players active on the stage from both Afghan side (not only in the centre but the peripheral,) and the international community side and a wide variety of issues and sectors are involved in an interconnected manner on the other. Therefore, the effectiveness of the joint efforts depends on how much coordination will work. The key to this issue is, of course, the strengthened leadership of the Afghan Government.

5. Role of Japan-Canada cooperation

Afghanistan continues to require the strong commitment and support by the international community even after the completion of Bonn-process (parliamentary election).

First and foremost, it is for the maintenance and strengthening of the commitment and support level by the international community that both countries should work together and take a lead. We can draw an important lesson from recent violent demonstrations

in Afghanistan that if the international community will not continue to act as a whole and will leave an impression that the Afghan reconstruction is the project of a foreign country, it will make havoc of the joint efforts tremendously.

On the security side, Canada continues and, I understand, will strengthen its pivotal role in ISAF by moving its troops to Kandahar. There, Canada will not only lead PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team), but undertake overall security responsibility in the region by increasing the number of troops. PRT is the innovative and evolving concept for reversing the vicious circle between the lack or shortage of security on the one hand and development on the other. Kandahar is one of the priority areas of our aid programme for supporting the comprehensive regional development which I explained already. Therefore, there is ample room for both countries to work together so that Kandahar as the stronghold of the former Taliban regime could be the model for the whole country in terms of realizing security and development at the same time.

Another aspect of security cooperation between two countries is to reinforce the existing cooperation in DDR programme and DIAG as its extension. Canada was so helpful not only as a collaborator in keeping the programme in the right direction, but also as a financial supporter to the programme.

Even though, in the DIAG programme, major responsibility will be born by the Afghans, Canada is expected to continue working together with us on behalf of the international community to support their efforts. This is very true to the demining programme, too.

Since security is not inseparable from development, there is an expectation that Canada and Japan work together in community development programme, too.

By continued commitment to supporting the Afghan people in their reconstruction efforts, Canada and Japan can show a good example for realizing human security and post-conflict peace-building in Afghanistan which could be replicated in other countries.

The Achilles' Heel of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding

Timothy Donais, University of Windsor

From Iraq to Afghanistan and from Haiti to Liberia, the ongoing struggle to achieve post-conflict stability underlines the extent to which the distinction between war and peace in such contexts is increasingly difficult to sustain. In each case, the 'post-conflict' environment has been characterized by chronic and often extreme levels of public insecurity, even if the post-conflict state itself has been 'secured' through external military intervention. The persistence of high levels of public insecurity not only presents a major obstacle to building sustainable peace in war-torn societies, but it also reveals the inadequacies of current mechanisms for the provision of security in states recovering from conflict. Given the often profound implications of ongoing public insecurity for all aspects of the peacebuilding process, it is no exaggeration to suggest that public insecurity currently represents the weak link – or Achilles' Heel – of international peacebuilding efforts.

While each conflict follows its own particular trajectory, at the level of public security most recent transitions from war to peace have followed a discernible pattern. Over the past decade, international peace support operations aimed at shepherding war-torn societies from conflict to peace have been largely successful in preventing the renewal of militarized conflict, but have had more difficulty in containing less organized forms of violence and insecurity. Typically, in the relatively lawless interregnum between war and peace, criminals and remnants of ousted regimes begin to regroup and assert themselves, ethnic or factional tensions persist, forms of retributive or vigilante justice emerge, and local communities become disillusioned with a peace process that

appears incapable of delivering security. At the same time, international actors begin to lose both credibility and resolve, and the timelines for achieving sustainable peace grow ever longer. Indeed, one of the clearest lessons to be drawn from the past decade of peacebuilding is that addressing post-conflict chaos and instability, either in the form of terrorism, organized crime, ethnic unrest, or widespread banditry and anarchy is an essential first step along the road to sustainable peace and renewed social and economic development. As Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holme have argued, pointing to the emergence of a 'security first' approach to peacebuilding, "a fundamental precondition for economic and social progress is that an adequate level of security is established and maintained ... in addition to the paramount importance of a cessation of hostilities, the path back to 'normalcy' passes through the (re)establishment of public security."¹ Without security, in other words, there can be neither peace, nor development, nor justice.

While the existence, and persistence, of post-conflict security gaps has long been recognized, effectively plugging these gaps has to date been a task beyond the grasp of either international or domestic actors. Typically, security responsibilities in post-conflict environments are divided among military peacekeepers, local police, and international civilian police. Just as typically, the former have been unwilling and unprepared to take on mundane public security tasks, the latter have been under-powered and under-resourced, while local police establishments remain in the post-conflict period as much a part of the problem as part of the solution.

¹ Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holm, "Introduction," in *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, ed. Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holm (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 3-4.

This paper will explore the dimensions of the post-war security gap – understood here specifically as the period between the signing of a peace agreement (or end of active hostilities) and the (re)establishment of domestic institutions able to provide minimally-acceptable levels of security – and its implications for the practice of post-conflict peacebuilding. Paying particularly attention to the role and potential of international civilian policing in post-war environments, the paper will also assess the tools at the international community’s disposal to respond to this gap, as well as recent international prescriptions addressing this issue and the prospects for implementing such prescriptions. It will also suggest that given the peacebuilding and human security implications of post-conflict security matters, this issue is a natural fit with long-standing foreign policy preoccupations of both Canada and Japan, and an area where both countries could make enhanced contributions. The paper will conclude by suggesting that in the absence of strong political will on the part of leading international actors, the international community’s peacebuilding toolkit will remain incomplete and inadequate, and post-conflict states will continue to be dangerous, insecure places well after ‘peace’ has been declared.

1. Outlining the Post-Conflict Security Gap

In states that have collapsed, experienced serious internal strife, or been subject to regime overthrow, security gaps emerge from the absence of authoritative domestic institutions possessing both the legitimacy and capacity to monopolize the use of force within a given territory. This, of course, echoes the classic Weberian definition of the state, and indeed the foremost task of post-conflict peacebuilding is to facilitate the establishment of functioning, legitimate, and sustainable institutions of governance through which social relations can be managed non-violently. Given the unstable and violent environments from which post-conflict

states emerge, the most important post-war institutions are those responsible for security and order, without which neither social nor economic reconstruction is possible. As Annika Hansen has suggested, “security is the key to a ‘new social contract’ between the population and its government or society in which the population is willing to surrender the responsibility for its physical safety into government hands.”² Since the security threats facing most post-conflict states are largely internal rather than external, and since one of the primary goals of international peacekeeping efforts is to isolate, contain, and remove domestic military forces from the political process (eventually re-directing their energies towards external rather than internal security tasks),³ it therefore follows that a core peacebuilding challenge is the restoration of legitimate and effective policing capacity.

The argument that domestic order and stability is key to sustainable peace is not particularly novel, since Thomas Hobbes argued more than three centuries ago that Leviathan, capable of imposing domestic order, was a prerequisite of civilized society. Yet while the challenge and importance of restoring order – now taken to mean order underpinned by the rule of law – in post-conflict societies is clear, the obstacles to achieving it are formidable. Typically, police work in post-conflict societies takes place within a dysfunctional or disintegrating justice system, while police themselves are poorly-trained, under-resourced, and/or compromised by their involvement in the conflict itself. Just as often, the pre-existing policing culture in post-conflict societies has been geared towards protecting the ruling regime rather than the public, and is fundamentally inconsistent with modern notions of ‘democratic policing’. In some cases, as in Kosovo and East Timor, there was a complete absence of effective internal post-war policing capacity, while in others, such as Bosnia and El Salvador, existing police forces continued to be used in the afterwar period as coercive instruments of one or more parties to the conflict.

² Annika Hansen, “International Security Assistance to War-torn Societies,” in *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies*, ed. Michael Pugh (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 35.

³ Contemporary Iraq might be considered an exception in this regard, given the active involvement of Iraqi military forces in efforts to contain the ongoing anti-occupation insurgency.

As is now clear from post-conflict police development efforts in contexts as diverse as Haiti, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, the task of re-structuring, retraining, and rebuilding domestic policing agencies is one better measured in years rather than months. This process involves not only technical training and bureaucratic reorganization but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, the consolidation of new social arrangements linking the police both upwards to political authority and downwards to the communities they are supposed to serve. In other words, police reform efforts inevitably have socio-political as well as technical components, and are inextricably linked with broader political developments in the post-conflict period.⁴ The key, in many ways, lies in the restoration of legitimacy: a critical mass of the citizenry must accept police authority, as well as the authority of the political leadership to whom the police are accountable, as legitimate. Clearly, in countries emerging from conflict, this acceptance will not happen overnight. In the meantime, the transition from war to peace is regularly accompanied by a range of serious threats to public security. Some of these threats are legacies of the war itself, while others emerge from the relative lawlessness of the transition period. As Charles Call and William Stanley have suggested, “once safe from the crossfire of warring armies, civilians often face new threats from violent criminals, excombatants, rioters, vigilantes, or members of other ethnic groups with whom they are to cohabit under a peace agreement.”⁵

A key dilemma for post-conflict peacebuilding in this context, therefore, is how to bridge the gap in security provision that almost inevitably persists throughout the crucial early years of any peace process, between the cessation of formal hostilities and the (re)establishment of credible domestic security forces that can maintain order and the rule

of law with broad public consent. While each of the primary security actors present in any peacebuilding context – international peacekeepers as well as international and local police – play a role in limiting the extent of the post-war security vacuum, collectively they often fall short in terms of generating the necessary level of security required for sustainable peace to take hold.

Because security has been for so long equated with military security, there remains a tendency to assume that an international peacekeeping force – or militarized intervention forces more broadly – can deliver an adequate level of security in a given post-conflict situation. Yet in parallel with the emergence of human security as a counter-narrative to traditional notions of military or state security, there has been a growing recognition that there are real limits to the level of security that militarized peacekeeping forces can provide. Simply put, soldiers are not police officers, and in post-conflict contexts the primary role of military force is to provide an outer shell of security, containing domestic security forces and responding to outbreaks of large-scale violence, with civilian police dealing with the less dramatic manifestations of post-conflict insecurity.⁶ In the words of one recent analysis, in fact, “most militaries are not appropriate for public security tasks, since their training, equipment, and doctrine emphasize use of overwhelming force rather than the controlled application of force necessary for police work.”⁷ From Haiti to Bosnia to Iraq, external military forces have been largely unprepared to deal with civil unrest, ordinary and organized crime, and low-intensity violence, and their responses have often oscillated between inertia and brutality.

Military forces are, with few exceptions, not only inappropriate but also reluctant agents of law enforcement. Militaries tend to view public security

⁴ Haiti’s recent troubles, which have been marked by increasingly politicized and brutal behaviour on the part of police, are indicative of the extent to which success of police reform is dependent on political ‘normalization’.

⁵ Charles T. Call and William Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars,” *Global Governance* 7 (2001): 151.

⁶ Michael Dziedzic, “Introduction,” in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1998), 11.

⁷ Call and Stanley, “Protecting the People: Public Security Choices After Civil Wars,” 157.

work as thankless, dull, and a misuse of valuable war-fighting capacity, and have tended to be more concerned with mission creep and self-protection (and more recently with hunting down terrorists) than with the security of the general population, which is usually seen – somewhat disingenuously – as the primary responsibility of local authorities.⁸ Military forces in post-conflict situations are often pushed into policing work, largely against their will, simply because no other organization has sufficient authority or means to do the job. As Rachel Bronson has argued, despite the reality that using combat troops in civilian policing roles is inefficient and expensive, “the failure to think seriously about how to handle civil strife makes it more likely, not less, that combat forces will become mired in policing operations.”⁹

This is not to suggest that military force doesn't have an important role to play in the restoration of public order and security in post-conflict situations. Especially in the immediate aftermath of hostilities, external military forces are often the only defence against violent anarchy. Peacekeeping troops also make important contributions to public security through patrolling tense neighborhoods, maintaining area security, raiding and seizing arms caches, and providing military muscle to back up the work of international civilian police. However, if international intervention requires a continuum of force ranging from conventional warfare to local law enforcement,¹⁰ then the most appropriate and effective use of military force lies at the upper end of this continuum. The further the military moves in the direction of local law enforcement, the greater the risks that the treatment will be worse than the disease.

The international community's primary tool

for the provision of post-conflict security at the lower ranges of the security continuum has been the use of international civilian police, or CIVPOL. As of 30 April 2005, more than 6,100 CIVPOL from 77 countries were serving in UN operations around the world, although nearly half of currently active CIVPOL – just short of 3,000 – are in Kosovo.¹¹ Despite the increasing ubiquity of international civilian police as fixtures of UN peace support operations, the development of CIVPOL as a key instrument of post-conflict security and stabilization has been hampered by a number of structural and political constraints.

The first and most fundamental of these is the fact that UN civilian police, for the most part, lack both the means and the mandate to actually enforce the law in post-conflict environments. The two prominent exceptions to this are, of course, Kosovo and East Timor, where the relatively small size of both territories and the near-complete vacuum in terms of local law enforcement capacity both enabled and necessitated an international executive policing mandate. For the most part, however, the international community has resisted executive police roles in post-conflict zones, for reasons of both pragmatism and self-interest. As the UN's experience in Kosovo has shown, cobbling together an effective police force with officers from dozens of different countries representing an equal number of different policing cultures is a daunting task, further complicated by the fact that few of these officers will speak the local language or understand the local culture. Sovereignty issues also come into play, as political leaderships in post-war states are usually reluctant to cede whatever policing powers they possess to outside actors. At the same time, giving a CIVPOL force executive policing authority raises troubling questions about whose laws are to

⁸ Both Security Council Resolution 1386, on Afghanistan, and Bosnia's Dayton Peace Accords emphasise that public security is the responsibility of local authorities; this has also been the case in Iraq, where poorly-trained and unprepared Iraqi police officers continue to serve more as hapless cannon fodder than effective agents of law enforcement.

⁹ Rachel Bronson, “When Soldiers Become Cops,” *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (November-December 2002).

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ Figures are drawn from *UN Missions Summary of Military and Civilian Police*, 30 April 2005; available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/April%202005_4.pdf (last accessed 25 May 2005); and *UN Monthly Summary of Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Missions*, 30 April 2005, available at http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/contributors/2005/April%202005_1.pdf (last accessed 25 May 2005). The authorized strength of the UN's International Police Task Force in Bosnia, which ended in 2002, was also approximately 1,800.

be enforced, since post-conflict states typically suffer from a legal vacuum, while the international community lacks a pre-packaged transitional justice system that could be applied in such circumstances. Just as importantly, perhaps, police-contributing nations have been loath to expose their officers to undue risks, and executive policing mandates undoubtedly entail a more confrontational, and hence more dangerous, approach to post-conflict policing missions than those focused on assisting, mentoring, and supporting domestic policing agencies.

As a result, the standard UN CIVPOL model has been one of unarmed international police working with local police forces on the basis of what has become known as the SMART concept, according to which the core CIVPOL tasks are supporting, monitoring, advising, reporting, and training.¹² While many of these tasks are essential to long-term police restructuring and development, they necessarily assume mutual trust, good will, and willingness to reform on the part of local police forces.¹³ Post-war situations such as Bosnia, where the conflict – in which the police were active protagonists – was not so much resolved as displaced from the military to the political realm, have demonstrated this assumption to be highly questionable in some circumstances. At the same time, the SMART approach also fails to address short-term concerns about local police capacities, which in most cases are far less developed than those of the criminals they confront and far below the level required to restore order amid post-conflict chaos. In most cases, therefore, a non-executive international policing mandate often represents a long-term solution at a time when the fundamental priority must be the stabilization of the short-term security situation.

As an institution, CIVPOL is also highly dependent on member state contributions of both human and material resources, and the image of the UN Secretary General going cap in hand to member states seeking contributions to peacekeeping missions is equally applicable to civilian police operations. In fact, securing CIVPOL contributions from member states is even more difficult than securing military contributions, since “the fact that civilian officers are busy in the daily fight against crime in their home countries makes it difficult to spare them for international duties.”¹⁴ The relative shortage of police officers available for peacekeeping work has also had an impact on the quality of personnel within international police missions, as UN recruitment efforts have been forced to focus more on raw numbers than on ensuring that missions are staffed with the most capable and motivated individuals. And while much has been made of the inadequacies of international civilian police from the developing world, particularly in terms of language abilities, driving skills, and human rights records, it is also the case that not even the developed Western democracies contribute their best and brightest to UN policing missions.¹⁵ At the same time, the fact that each mission needs to be created from scratch, with contributions sought anew from individual member states, has meant serious deployment gaps. In Kosovo, Bosnia, and most recently in Haiti, delays in getting people and equipment on the ground in the immediate aftermath of the conflict left international police particularly ill-prepared to address violent flare-ups in the crucial early days of the peace implementation process.

While in many ways imperfect, inadequate, and underdeveloped, international civilian policing missions have nonetheless become an integral component of peacekeeping operations and have

¹² Halvor Hartz, “The UN Instrument for Police Reform,” in *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, ed. Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holm (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 31.

¹³ See Frank Gregory, “The United Nations Provision of Policing Services (CIVPOL) Within the Framework of ‘Peacekeeping’: An Analysis of the Issues,” *Policing and Society* 6, no. 145-161 (1996).

¹⁴ Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holm, “Postscript: Towards Executive Authority Policing? The Lessons of Kosovo,” in *Peacebuilding and Police Reform*, ed. Espen Barth Eide and Tor Tanke Holm (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 211.

¹⁵ The United States, for example, relies largely on officers recruited and trained by a private consulting firm to fulfill its CIVPOL commitments. On personnel problems associated with this system, see Robert Perito, *Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force* (Washington: US Institute of Peace Press, 2004), 281-289.

made positive contributions to peacebuilding efforts across a wide spectrum of post-conflict interventions. After a slow start in Bosnia, the UN's International Police Task Force gradually evolved into an effective force for change. While initially hobbled by a feeble mandate, the mission slowly developed a form of 'advising with leverage' – which coupled a non-executive mandate with the authority to screen local law enforcement personnel and dismiss those found guilty of wartime atrocities, postwar abuses, or general incompetence – that may yet prove to be a model for future international civilian policing missions.¹⁶ Similarly, UN operations in both East Timor and Kosovo have done a credible job of plugging at least part of the post-war security and law enforcement gap, even if neither experience will be easily replicated elsewhere. Perhaps the most telling statement on the relevance of even an underdeveloped CIVPOL presence can be found in both Iraq and Afghanistan, where the absence of international civilian police (at least beyond a long-term training function) has exposed the huge gaps between the security provided by international military forces and that provided by domestic security forces. The Afghan and Iraqi experiences also underline the value of genuinely multilateral police assistance efforts, given the increasingly well-publicized deficiencies of both the US-led police assistance effort in Iraq and the German-led initiative in Afghanistan.¹⁷ For all its flaws, the UN is often the only institution with the willingness, legitimacy, and ability to take on the complex and long-term challenge of restoring public security and re-engineering domestic

security institutions.¹⁸

2. Advancing the Policy Agenda

Driven by the difficult realities of post-conflict contexts, there has of late been a growing international consensus on the need for improved management of post-conflict security tasks. This emerging consensus is reflected in the reports of recent blue-ribbon international panels such as that led by Lakhdar Brahimi on the future of UN peacekeeping and the more recent Commission on Human Security chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen.¹⁹ Both reports focused considerable attention on the need to improve the international community's civilian policing mechanisms, with the Brahimi Report calling for a 'doctrinal shift' in the direction of a more activist and interventionist CIVPOL, to reflect the vital importance and urgency of restoring the rule of law in post-conflict situations. In a similar vein, the Ogata/Sen report suggests that in societies recovering from violent conflict, "there is a need to gradually shift the focus of international actors from ensuring military security to public safety."²⁰ More recently, the Secretary-General's high-level panel on UN reform also addressed questions of post-conflict policing, both directly through the proposal to establish a small, permanent core of senior police officers and managers to conduct advance planning and mission preparation, and indirectly through the proposed creation of a permanent UN Peacebuilding Commission and Peacebuilding Support Office.²¹

¹⁶ William Lewis, Edward Marks, and Robert Perito, "Special Report: Enhancing International Civilian Police in Peace Operations," (US Institute of Peace, 2002); available at: <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr85.html> (last accessed September 2003).

¹⁷ See, for example, Jim Krane, "U.S. General: Iraq Police Training a Flop," Associated Press, June 9, 2004; available at: <http://newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/6/9/213503.shtml> (last accessed 25 May 2005); and Mark Sedra, "Police Reform in Afghanistan: An Overview," in *Confronting Afghanistan's Security Dilemma*, ed. Mark Sedra, Bonn International Center For Conversion Brief 28, October 2003; available at: <http://www.bicc.de/publications/briefs/brief28/content.html> (last accessed 25 May 2005).

¹⁸ At present, the one organization with capabilities comparable to the UN is the European Union, which has recently established a standby force of 5,000 civilian police, and which took over civilian policing duties from the UN in Bosnia at the beginning of 2003.

¹⁹ Lakhdar Brahimi, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, New York: United Nations, 21 August 2000.; Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, *Human Security Now*, New York: Commission on Human Security, 2003.

²⁰ Ogata and Sen, *op.cit.*, 62.

²¹ *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change (New York: United Nations, 2004), 70-71, 83-85; available at: <http://www.un.org/secureworld/> (last accessed 25 May 2005).

Such high-level attention to the problems of policing in post-conflict societies has already prompted a modest strengthening of the UN's Civilian Police Division in New York, which since the release of the Brahimi report has tripled in size and significantly enhanced what had previously been rudimentary capacities in the areas of planning, mission management, training, and analysis of lessons learned. Complementing these top-down reforms is the reality that, at the mission level, the lessons of the past decade are slowly being translated into improved cooperation and coordination between peacekeepers and CIVPOL, with Kosovo being the best example of this effort to close the gap between military and civilian security provision.²²

The growing recognition of the need to bridge the gap between international military and international police capabilities in peacebuilding situations has also led, in recent years, to the increased use of constabulary or *gendarmerie*-style forces which combine military and police functions. Deployed in Kosovo, Bosnia, and most recently in Haiti as Multinational Specialized Units (MSUs), these forces have been tasked with responsibilities for riot and crowd control, counter-terrorism, criminal intelligence and anti-organized crime activities. As armed civilian police with military training and status, the MSUs appear tailor-made to take on security duties ill-suited to either civilian police or peacekeepers. Recent experience has revealed, however, that such militarized police forces represent at best a partial solution to the post-conflict security gap. Even more so than with regular police personnel, *gendarmerie*-style units are in short supply, since a relatively small number of countries maintain such forces, and pressures to retain them for domestic needs are always strong. Equally problematic has been the tendency of MSU's to adopt highly-restrictive rules of engagement which have limited their utility as crime-fighters and security-providers. Despite these drawbacks, however, the potential of

constabulary-type forces within peacebuilding operations is considerable, particularly if such units are deployed under civilian control and are able to work closely with existing civilian police missions.

While such developments represent a credible start in the direction of prioritizing public security provision in post-conflict environments, much more can and should be done. Recent events in Haiti – where a tentative peacekeeping force and a weakly-mandated CIVPOL contingent have done little to alleviate chronic and de-stabilizing public insecurity – simply reinforce the conclusion that conventional approaches to post-conflict security provision are no longer adequate.²³ Indeed, as reform momentum stalls it is becoming increasingly clear that yet another gap with regard to post-conflict security is emerging: that between the widespread recognition of the problem and the lack of political will within the international community to seriously address it.

Since questions of post-conflict public security represent an important intersection between peacebuilding and human security, the challenge of advancing both policies and practices in this area seems a natural foreign policy fit for both Canada and Japan, and an arena of potentially fruitful joint collaboration. The starting point for such collaboration would be a recognition that multilateral capacities to deliver post-conflict policing services should be enhanced and strengthened, and the UN's role in particular as the key institutional embodiment of international post-conflict police assistance should be both reaffirmed and reinforced. Beyond this, there exists a wide range of practical policy issues, and problems, to be addressed.

First, greater attention should be devoted to developing sustainable, reliable and robust standby arrangements through which UN member states contribute police to peace support missions, and there is much that both Canada and Japan could do to assert themselves as international leaders in this

²² John G. Cockell, "Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo," *Global Governance* 8 (2002).

²³ For more on the current security situation in Haiti, see *Keeping the Peace in Haiti?* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Law Student Advocates for Human Rights and Rio De Janeiro/Sao Paulo: Centro de Justica Global), March 2005; available at: http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/hrp/CAP/Text/Haiti_English_Final.pdf (last accessed 20 May 2005).

area. Post-conflict police support services remain an underprovided public good within the international community, and a greater commitment from police-contributing states would help generate important momentum to overcome this deficit. Member states should therefore be encouraged to free up more domestic police officers for international duties, and for longer periods, as part of their contribution to global peace and security. Canada, for example, could start by re-visiting the terms of the Canadian Police Arrangement (CPA), the relatively under-developed and ad hoc agreement through which Canadian police officers are deployed on peace support missions. Moving to replace the current CPA with a dedicated international civilian police division, based within the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, would not only send an important signal of Canada's commitment in this area, but would also provide Canada with a flexible policy tool for rapid deployment as well as for engaging seriously in international training and research.²⁴

For Japan, similarly, re-engaging with the question of contributing Japanese civilian police to multilateral missions would represent one more concrete manifestation of the country's commitment to post-conflict peace consolidation. Japan effectively withdrew from international civilian policing after the country's traumatic experience in Cambodia in the early 1990s, when two Japanese members of the UN peacekeeping mission (one of whom was a civilian police officer) were killed. Yet despite this bad memory, the emerging role of the Japanese Self-Defence Forces in peacekeeping and peacebuilding activities suggests that a re-consideration of Japanese involvement in international civilian policing may be possible. Certainly, Yasushi Akashi, one of Japan's most senior international diplomats and a former head of UN missions in both Cambodia and the former

Yugoslavia, has recently gone on record as supporting the re-deployment of Japanese civilian police in peace support contexts.²⁵ For both Canada and Japan, reviewing questions of civilian police deployments might also be done within the broader context of efforts to more carefully coordinate and integrate national non-military responses to post-conflict security and stabilization challenges, following the lead of recent efforts by the United States and the United Kingdom in this area.²⁶

Secondly, questions of quality within CIVPOL missions are just as important as questions of quantity, and ensuring the integrity and credibility of international civilian policing missions remains a critical challenge, particularly if serious consideration is given to investing such missions with greater authority. Here as well, there is considerable scope for positive contributions from both Canada and Japan. As noted above, one of the most frequent criticisms made of CIVPOL missions surrounds the uneven qualifications of the personnel who comprise them. While the UN itself has taken steps in recent years to tighten up recruitment practices – in part through the establishment of Selection Assistance Teams to ensure that CIVPOL candidates meet basic qualifications – there remains a pressing need for training aimed specifically at creating a multinational cadre of police officers with the specialized skills needed for operations in post-conflict contexts. Canada, for example, has a developing expertise in this area, and the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre is currently engaged in a multi-year project aimed at enhancing the capacities of countries of Francophone Africa to contribute military, civilian, and police personnel to international peace operations.²⁷ Over time, this and similar projects could be brought together, in conjunction with the UN, like-minded bilateral

²⁴ See Timothy Donais, "Peacekeeping's poor cousin: Canada and the challenge of post-conflict policing," *International Journal* 59, 4, Autumn 2004: 943-963.

²⁵ Cited in "People - Yasushi Akashi: Observations from a Seasoned UN Diplomat," *Web Japan*, 30 March 2005; available at: <http://web-japan.org/trends/people/peo050330.html> (last accessed 17 July 2005).

²⁶ In 2004, the US established the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (<http://www.state.gov/s/crs/>) to coordinate US civilian peacebuilding contributions; the UK equivalent, established in 2001, is known as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (<http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/global-conflict-prevention-pool.pdf>).

²⁷ For more on this project, known as the Peacekeeping and Security Capacity Building Program, see the project website at <http://www.pdcmps.ca/eng/> (last accessed 25 May 2005)

partners, and regional organizations such as the European Union, to form the basis of an integrated training system for international ‘policekeepers’. Such a training system would involve not only ensuring that all police officers sent on international missions met basic requirements in terms of law enforcement skills and human rights training, but also receive more specialized training on dealing with refugee or displaced populations or with questions of post-conflict disarmament or demobilization. Combined with the development of much stricter mechanisms of accountability for CIVPOL members while on mission, such efforts could substantially enhance both the reputation and the effectiveness of post-conflict policing efforts.

Finally, and perhaps most crucially, while the continuing development of capacity for re-training and re-organizing domestic security forces remains the best long-term solution to post-war instability and insecurity, strengthening CIVPOL capacity to deal with the immediate and pressing security concerns in the early stages of a peace process must also be a fundamental priority. This means not only getting sufficient numbers of adequately trained and equipped international police on the ground as early as possible after the signing of a peace deal, but also rethinking how multilateral police assistance missions operate, particularly in the early stages of a mission. In this context, a key priority should be to ensure that the high-level panel’s recommendations on policing and peacebuilding become a reality, and Canada and Japan can help bring this about through commitments of resources, personnel, policy ideas and political will. If properly configured and adequately resourced, the combination of a small core of senior police planners and a more broadly-mandated Peacebuilding Commission could at least partially address many of the key flaws in current post-conflict policing practice.

From an operational side, a police planning cell of 50-100 senior officers – working in conjunction with existing capacities within the UN’s Civilian Policing Division – could make a major contribution to ensuring that rule of law tasks are appropriately addressed as soon as possible in post-conflict environments. An effective planning cell

would permit earlier and more accurate assessments of what the key public security challenges are likely to be in the post-war period and what mix of policing resources (and in what quantities) are needed to meet these challenges. Such a capability could also help ensure appropriate mandates for police assistance interventions. Depending on the particular political dynamics at play in post-conflict situations, CIVPOL missions may be required to carry out executive policing, closely scrutinize and even supervise the work of local police forces, help disrupt organized criminal networks, engage in wholesale restructuring of domestic policing agencies, and/or engage in the traditional CIVPOL roles of advising, mentoring, and training. While the politics of mandate-setting are complex and often bear scant relation to the actual situation on the ground, enhancing the UN’s capacity to analyze and recommend CIVPOL tasks and responsibilities may ultimately lead to a better balance between operational effectiveness and respect for host-state sovereignty. Of equal importance from an operational perspective, a more strongly-institutionalized advance planning capability, in combination with a more robust commitment by police-contributing states to provide sufficient amounts of qualified personnel in a timely manner, would also help reduce, if not completely eliminate, the deployment gap. The recent experience with MINUSTAH in Haiti is only the latest example of how disorganized, belated deployments of civilian police components can compromise the effectiveness of both short-term peacekeeping and longer-term peacebuilding. Any initiative promising to reduce this gap, therefore, should be strongly encouraged.

On the strategic side, the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission would significantly enhance the UN’s institutional capacities to deal with the challenges of failing and post-conflict states. As currently configured, international peacebuilding efforts suffer from systemic coordination problems, and a Peacebuilding Commission could provide a focal point for a more sustained, coordinated, and strategic international approach to the complex challenges of shepherding states from war to peace. With regard to post-conflict policing more specifically, an activist and

influential Commission could play a crucial role in ensuring better coordination and integration not only among mission components with specific security mandates, but also between these components and other elements of the broader peacebuilding agenda.

On the one hand, improving the management of post-war security challenges necessarily implies closer coordination among various security elements in peace support operations. In Kosovo, for example, the lessons of earlier and inadequate cooperation on security matters from the Bosnia mission translated into near-daily meetings between the head of NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Special Representative, as well as 'joint security operations' involving UN police and KFOR soldiers. As John Cockell has suggested, such coordination needs to be developed and sustained at the strategic, tactical, and operational levels,²⁸ and a permanent Peacebuilding Commission offers the most logical site for such coordination capacities to be housed, promoted, and developed. As noted above, if post-conflict security is understood as a continuum requiring a range of capacities from war-fighting to community-level policing, then proper coordination of all the actors involved – from military peacekeepers to international gendarmes to both international and local police – is essential not only to contain post-war security crises but also to ensure the success of the entire peacebuilding project. At the same time, ensuring that the post-conflict security gap is filled – and the roles of various security actors adjusted as domestic institutions gain capacity – also requires careful coordination with other rule of law and security-related initiatives, such as disarming, demobilizing and re-integrating former fighters and re-building legal, judicial and penal systems. In this context, the Peacebuilding Commission represents a potential, and essential, multilateral counterpart to recent unilateral efforts (noted above) to ensure more coordinated responses to the intertwined challenges of post-conflict stabilization.

On the other hand, with respect to the integration of CIVPOL efforts with broader

peacebuilding goals, too little attention has been paid to date to the politics of post-conflict policing. In the absence of the rule of law, which is the norm in post-conflict environments, existing domestic security forces are almost inevitably drawn into ongoing and unresolved political struggles and used as instruments of political power. The ongoing politicization of public security provision at the domestic level has proven to be a major obstacle to effective post-conflict policing, and CIVPOL efforts to train and mentor their local counterparts as a means of inoculating them against political pressures or corruption have had, at best, only modest success. Dealing with this problem, where it exists, in a more effective manner requires a two-pronged strategy. First, it calls for a more activist and robust CIVPOL presence – firmly grounded in international human rights norms – and a mandate not only to oversee and scrutinize local law enforcement agencies, but also to discipline and dismiss local officers who abuse their authority for personal or political gain. This need not necessarily imply a radical shift in the balance of power between international and domestic police organizations – many CIVPOL missions already possess vetting and screening mandates aimed at weeding out the criminal and the incompetent within domestic policing structures – but rather a broadening and deepening of existing authority. Second, mechanisms must also be developed to deter political elites and police managers who seek to manipulate the police for political ends. While the Bosnia scenario, where an international High Representative possesses the authority to dismiss elected officials for abuse of power, is unlikely to be replicated elsewhere, what might be possible is for the consistent, sustained, and strategic use of carrots and sticks by the international community to gradually alter the cost-benefit analysis of those who would co-opt police power for political ends.

At the same time, greater emphasis should also be placed on addressing questions of organized crime and corruption from the very beginning of the peace implementation process. Multi-agency task forces on organized crime and corruption should be established early on to diagnose the extent

²⁸ Cockell, "Civil-Military Responses to Security Challenges in Peace Operations: Ten Lessons from Kosovo."

of the problem in each case, assess the legal and political obstacles involved, and mobilize both international and domestic resources. Given the murky nature and cultural embeddedness of these phenomena, such efforts must invariably involve competent and committed local actors, and identifying appropriate domestic partners will be a crucial early task in efforts to ensure that organized crime and corruption do not fatally undermine peacebuilding efforts. Addressing these questions will almost inevitably entail efforts to disrupt and transform criminalized economic power structures which may have emerged from the initial conflict, and which in many cases link organized criminals with high-level political elites. Such structures often pose the greatest obstacles to post-conflict peacebuilding, largely because conflict economies – and those who benefit from them – thrive on lawlessness and instability. As Annika Hansen has argued, however, until now “a major shortcoming of international efforts to establish the rule of law has been the reluctance to deal with informal networks of power.”²⁹ Given the complex nature of this task, and the high probability of considerable opposition among powerful domestic elites, this reluctance is perhaps understandable, yet it may ultimately undermine efforts to restore order, security, and peace.

In short, the lessons of the past decade of post-conflict policing indicate the need for a more multidimensional international civilian policing capacity, that can be more or less robust, and more or less intrusive, as particular situations dictate. Building up this capacity will inevitably be a long-term process, and the high-level panel’s recommendations, if put into place, would provide a solid institutional foundation for this development to begin.

3. Conclusion

The inadequacies inherent in current international capacities to help war-torn countries move from conflict to peace are yet another reminder that, as former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson once noted (in a less politically-correct era), “we prepare for war like precocious giants, and for peace like retarded pygmies.”³⁰ Over the past decade, the conventional combination of military peacekeepers and international civilian police has proven to be a necessary but not sufficient vehicle for providing the security that is crucial in post-conflict transitions. Yet, as with countless other issues in the international sphere, the real issue lies less with the accurate diagnosis of the problem, but with the lack of political will to act upon it.

Strengthening international capacities for post-conflict security provision will not, on its own, solve all of the difficult peacebuilding puzzles with which the international community is currently contending. But improving international capacities in this area would help provide a degree of public security that, in addition to saving lives, could provide ordinary citizens with something of a peace dividend, bolster public support for the peace process, and create the conditions whereby democratic elections produce moderate and progressive leaders committed to building peace rather than making war. Failing to address this issue, on the other hand, will ensure that post-conflict peacebuilding work will remain dangerous, slow, and uncertain, and will increase the likelihood not only that peace processes become dominated by the criminal and the corrupt, but also that an unstable peace will slide back into full-fledged war. While one litmus test of the international community’s resolve to deal with these issues will be the responses to the high-level panel’s recommendations on peacebuilding issues, another might well be whether discussions concerning a meaningful CIVPOL presence in either Afghanistan or Iraq ever make it onto the international agenda.

²⁹ Annika Hansen, *From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations*, Adelphi Paper 343 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002), 91.

³⁰ Cited in Harry Broer and Michael Emery, “Civilian Police in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” in *Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*, ed. Robert Oakley, Michael Dziedzic, and Eliot Goldberg (Washington: National Defence University Press, 1998).

Comments by Eileen Olexiuk Deputy Head of Mission, Canadian Embassy in Afghanistan

Comments on Ambassador Komano's Presentation on Afghanistan and Notes on Possible Areas for Canada-Japan Cooperation in Afghanistan

Ambassador Komano's presentation very succinctly described the situation on the ground in Afghanistan as still being precarious, notwithstanding the quite remarkable progress made in the past three years to lift Afghanistan from its status as a "failed state".

Indeed, as Ambassador Komano remarked "Afghanistan is a real challenge for post conflict peace building and a serious test case for realizing human security." He adds that "rehabilitation of the community and its sustained development" is key to delivering the peace benefit to the Afghans and ensuring their human security.

Afghanistan is in a dangerous phase. It could be relegated to the sidelines as the international community turns its attention to other areas of concern. Komano suggests, "By continued commitment to supporting the Afghan people in their reconstruction efforts, Canada and Japan can show a good example for realizing human security and post conflict peace building in Afghanistan which could be replicated in other countries".

1. Suggested Areas for Canada-Japan Cooperation and Coordination

- ensure that Afghanistan stays on the agenda in multilateral fora: the UN and its agencies, the G-8 and its relevant working groups; and strive to encourage broad participation in a "partnership for good governance and development."
- encourage Afghanistan's neighbours, especially Pakistan and Iran, to support democracy-building in Afghanistan and to refrain from supporting any groups or initiatives that would endanger Afghanistan's path to political maturity and good governance.
- Canada and Japan have already consulted and cooperated closely on creating a secure environment: supporting DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration) not only with financial contributions but also with diplomatic interventions to overcome challenges and by engaging international security forces in support of the process; bringing the cantonment of heavy weapons within the DDR program (initially witnessed scepticism); mine action

including demining for humanitarian and reconstruction objectives to allow development activities to progress.

- further ensure the safety and security of communities by continuing a similar close consultation and cooperation on the sequence to DDR: a program to disband illegal armed groups (DIAG), and a program to rationalize and reduce the stockpiles of anti-personnel landmines and ammunition scattered throughout the country.
- make concerted efforts to learn from each other's approach to reconstruction and development: Canada's assistance policy is to provide its main funding in support of the government's national programs, including through the national budget, thus contributing to capacity building for managing development and fiscal responsibility, while Japan has taken a more grass-roots approach to deliver its main funding through comprehensive regional development (areas of concentration are Kandahar, Jalalabad and Mazar-e Sharif.)

- share lessons-learned and experiences at the national and regional levels from these two distinct approaches which both seek to develop communities through local empowerment of the people.

2. Possible Areas of Cooperation Related to The Establishment of a Canadian Led Provincial Reconstruction Team (Prt) in Kandahar

Such cooperation on the ground, including consultations with their respective embassies in Kabul, would lend practical examples to better inform policy-makers of both governments on broader thematic areas of cooperation discussed at the Canada Japan Peace and Security Symposium. The two which most come to mind are: reforming or improving UN peace support operations and advancing the human security agenda.

- seconding Japanese Self Defence Forces (SDF) to the PRT would enhance mutual understanding of military peace support operations, with the added

advantage for Japan of having more direct access to Afghan security forces in theatre, and to Canada of promoting a multinational style of PRT.

- seconding Japanese police to complement the Canadian police engaged in training and mentoring the new Afghan National Police thus enhancing the capacity of the PRT to address non-military threats to security, i.e., the “security gap” so often witnessed in post-conflict situations.

- seconding Japanese diplomats and aid officials to join Canadian and possibly also US, UK and Netherlands civilians in the civilian office of the PRT would help to ensure a well-coordinated approach to community development, provincial and district capacity building and good governance in Kandahar and neighbouring provinces.

- embedding major donor representatives, such as Japanese officials, in a Canadian PRT, would ensure that the security for major projects, such as construction of the Kandahar-Herat highway, could benefit from up to date threat assessments conducted with military assets.

Session III



Fight against terrorism

Fight against Terrorism in the Security-Development-Human Rights Complex: the Case for Implementing the “Human Security Trinity”

Toshiya Hoshino (Osaka University)

1. Introduction

In the spring of the year 2005, when he was preparing the much awaited report that was expected to outline the blueprint of the reform of this six decades old world body, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan of the United Nations had one ambitious agenda in his mind. It was not unique by any means. But no one has ever fully succeeded it. It was a challenging attempt to consolidate the remedies to tackle the issues related to peace and security, economic development, and human rights in the world all in a package whenever possible. The title of the report he chose was “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.” It reflected his idea to bring together “three freedoms” to liberate those people who are in the extremely severe human condition; namely, freedom from want, freedom from fear, and freedom to live in dignity. Incidentally they are three key concepts that constitute the strategy to enhance human security of those in the most vulnerable situations. And it is the “trinity” of these human security interests, in my interpretation, that he proposed to pursue in today’s world.

Many of the new threats that we face today represent what I call “security-development-human rights complex,” the tragic situation in which political rivalries, economic deprivations, and the limitations of human opportunities and their life chances intrinsically combine one another to form a negative spiral. Armed conflicts among and inside states, which bring about extremely serious deprivation of individual human lives and rights, usually have combined political and economic causes. Many human tragedies, from extreme poverty and starvation to the spread of such infectious diseases like HIV/AIDS, often go side by side with state failures and illiberal governance.

The radical pursuit of human rights, which in itself is a noble goal, can bring about political turmoil. And the myriad of terrorist incidents are exacerbated by the loss of hope or the surge of hatred among individuals, who are likely to find their home base in failed and impoverished states. The combination of armed confrontation, terrorism, and the spread of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological as well as their delivery systems) is a grave nightmare scenario.

If the rise of new threats, particularly in the present post-9/11 era, is caused by the complex and negative mixture of security, development, and human rights imperatives, it is necessary to tackle the issues, both from their consequences and root causes, by employing the “human security trinity” approach. In this paper, the author would like to make the case why it is important to take the “human security trinity” approach in countering the most intractable threat of terrorism.

2. Terrorism Threats in Contemporary Context.

Terrorism, or the act of terror, is nothing new in our human history. Whatever forms and definitions it may take, it has been with us from the time immemorial. Unlike the more traditional “fixed-type” threats, i.e. those that are coming from geographically and territorially fixed sources (like “the Soviet threats”), the terrorist threat can be characterized as a “mobile-type” threat. And contrary to the previously more nationally or regionally-oriented and politically-motivated terrorist activities (such historic examples like “Japanese” Red Army and the “Irish” Republican Army), the post-9/11 terrorist threats are considered

more global and often more fundamentalist in nature. Thanks to the rapid and wide-spread advancement of information, telecommunication and transportation technologies, coupled by the combined political, economic, financial, and social waves of globalization and anti-globalization, terrorists' mobility and penetrability have grown enormously.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States shocked the world both by the fact that the non-state actor of Al-Qaeda asymmetrically challenged the world's only super power, the United States and by the magnitude of their destruction, the loss of human lives, all caused by the suicide attacks of extreme Islam fundamentalists. It was not the first set of incidents that Al Qaeda committed at all. The simultaneously coordinated massive bombings of the American Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, in 1998 have made the name world famous. The previous bombing of the World Trade Center building in New York in 1993 was also implicated with the group.

In fact, Al Qaeda is not an organization or a network. Welcome to the era of the Internet. Just like the Internet penetrates wherever the openings exist in the nets, members of Al Qaeda take advantage of the openness of modern societies and operate across borders. Today's terrorists maintain websites to state their cause and show-off their cruelties. They also make use of the states in dire situations as their operational base. Afghanistan under the Islam fundamentalist Taliban regime was a good example, which supported Al Qaeda. To be more precise, and looking from the real power balance in Afghanistan, it was the government of Taliban which was supported by Al Qaeda terrorists, not the other way around. In fact, it was one of the rare examples of "Terrorist sponsored State" rather than the "State sponsored terrorism.

It is this kind of role reversal that prompted Secretary-General Annan to pursue the question of peace and security, economic development, and human rights in a package when he pursued the major reform of the UN activities and structures. Endorsing the High-Level Panel's proposal, Mr. Annan stressed that terrorism can be defined

operationally. That is, "in addition to actions already proscribed by existing conventions, any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act" (para. 91).

Poverty does not necessarily produce terrorists. But terrorists certainly make use of the minds of those who are in desperate situations, politically, economically, and psychologically. We must also stop the terrorists possessing the weapons of mass destruction. It is the fundamental reason to tackle the contemporary threats of terrorism in a "security-development-human rights" complex by employing "human security trinity" approach.

3. The Utility of "Human Security Trinity" Approach against Terrorism Threats

When the United States government branded its counter-terrorism policies as "war against terror," there are both advantages and disadvantages. We need to scrutinize the balance sheet. "War" is a powerful rhetoric to correctly emphasize the totality and graveness of contemporary terrorist threats and consequences. But in its flip side lies the primarily military and state-centric connotation. Our fight against terrorism can be a war, but it is a highly asymmetrical one which requires comprehensive approach that includes non-military as well as military means.

Contrary to the general perception, the US "war" on terror covers many grounds. Certainly their offensive actions in Afghanistan (Operation "Enduring Freedom") and in Iraq (Operation "Iraqi Freedom") were predominantly military in nature. But even in these operations, we can identify a number of new tactical moves. The Marines Corps' sea-based expeditionary assaults in Afghanistan (which was invented as some of the key ground staging points was unavailable for political reasons) and the heavy use of intelligence apparatus both in Afghanistan and Iraq were the examples. The "war"

rhetoric also highlighted the importance of “Homeland Security,” the defensive side of the equation. The strong imperative to defend the Homeland motivated the US government to consolidate the relevant domestic mechanisms from emergency management, immigration, law enforcement to national defense under the unitary jurisdiction of the newly created Department of Homeland Security.

I do believe that it is indispensable to see the government agencies collaborate across their traditional jurisdictional boundaries for the common purpose of fighting terrorism. Again, the graveness of its threat requires the total governmental approach. It should be noted, however, that both offensive and defense measures in the government-level, as well as state-to-state-level collaboration, alone are not sufficient if we were to “win” the fight against terrorism. The more human-centered approaches need to be introduced to supplement, if not supplant, the state-centric approaches.

Human security is an idea to give priorities to the lives, liberty, and wellbeing of those people under severe “inhuman” situations. Protecting and empowering them are considered two of the key principles to promote the human security interests.

Based on the preceding practices as well as the studies, the Secretary-General put together the report “In Larger Freedom” in March 2005. The report is a result of systemic amalgamation of recently elaborated ideas coming from many influential intellectual enterprises on security, development, and human rights, most notably the ones by the Commission of Human Security (on human security concept and practices), the International Committee of Intervention and State Sovereignty (on the idea of “responsibility to protect”), the Millennium Project (for the effective and timely implementation of the Millennium Development Goals) and the High-Level Panels on Threats, Challenges, and Changes (which proposed the concept of “comprehensive collective security”) among others.

“Three freedoms” that the Secretary-Generals’ report underlined—freedom from want, freedom

from fear, and freedom to live in dignity—constitute the building blocks to enhance human security interests. And what is essentially important about the report is in the idea to bring these three approaches together in implementing the policies. The boldness of this attempt can be understood if we recall all the past efforts to enhance economic development, inter- and intra-national peace and security, and individual human rights. Differences in emphases, approaches, and expertise of those in the separate development, security, and human rights policy communities scarcely had a dialogue and had much less effective collaboration.

Beyond the pronounced basic orientation of bringing the three freedoms together, however, even the Secretary-General’s report itself does not concretely guide us to effectively implement the collaboration. To be a little critical to the report, it cannot help but giving an impression that the additional bridges need to be spanned between respective effort to enhance “three freedoms,” strategically combining the efforts to enhance collective security measures, sustainable development, and the protection of human rights. The concept of “trinity” I introduced stresses the importance of “integrative” and “mutually reinforcing” effects in the process of promoting three freedoms.

Where do we start it? I believe the idea and the importance of “trinity” approach in human security is self-evident. What is more difficult is its implementation. And in response to this question of implementation, I would like here to propose to start it in the concrete counter-terrorism activities.

The testing grounds for this are Afghanistan and Iraq, two countries currently under reconstruction and peacebuilding. Avoiding Afghanistan to go back to the terrorists bleeding ground and preventing Iraq to be the “second Afghanistan” is among the most immediate challenges we have. In both countries, under the tyrannical and authoritarian rule of former-Taliban and former-Saddam Hussein regimes, the people’s fundamental human rights and opportunities were the first casualties. The combination of extreme poverty and political oppression are now replaced

by the new governments and economic rehabilitation. Introducing the “human security trinity” perspective from the viewpoint of stopping the resurgence of terrorism is something we need. The challenges are tough. And we need a patient effort. The political will and the determination of local people to outlawing terrorist approach are prerequisite to the international attempt. So that educational and capacity building (empowerment) assistance are the important starting point.

The comparison of international involvement in the reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq will give us some guidance for future efforts. First on similarities, both started by the forceful overturn of previous rogue regimes, followed by the reinstitutions of local governance through elections of political leaders, the promulgation of brand new constitution, and the formation of representative legislative and administrative branches. International society provided transitional administrative support, either directly or indirectly, as well as providing security and stabilization assistances. The negative similarities lie in a series of violent incidents, including suicide bombings in Iraq, that were intended to derail their passage to peace.

The level of international support to the US interventions, however, differed starkly between the cases in Iraq and in Afghanistan. In Iraq, the legitimacy question of America’s military actions and its subsequent pro-longed occupation plagued their effectiveness. The lack of preparedness in the so-called “phase IV” or stabilization stage, as opposed to the well-prepared attack and regime change stages, on the part of the US forces has cost the tragic loss of the many lives of American soldiers. The challenges in Afghanistan is no less serious. And the local security environment outside of greater Kabul area, with the rise of rivaling warlords, still haunts the much desired progress for peacebuilding. Nonetheless, the role of ISAF (International Security Assistance Force) together with the UN mission in Kabul gives a glimmer of hope for the better future. The efforts to replacing opium harvest into normal cash crops are one of the successful cases of combining effective development, security, human rights efforts that can

contribute to the fight against terrorism.

The Millennium Project report, on which the Secretary-General’s report bases its development and “freedom from want” agenda, has a special emphasis on “fast-track” projects in the process of ameliorating the plights of developing countries. In view of the fact that many aid donor countries are suffering from “aid fatigue,” it is useful to promote an agenda to see the encouraging, visible result on the part of developing world. But from the viewpoint of securing peace and enhancing wellbeing of the people, it is necessary to give proper attention to those countries and peoples, mostly in failed or failing states, which are well below the qualifications to be given the “fast-track” privileges. Starting from assisting those who are in hopelessly tragic situations must be given higher priorities from the human security trinity perspective. It will certainly help our fight against terrorism in the longer run.

4. Countering Terrorism in Intelligence Cycle

Before concluding the analysis and policy consideration of fighting terrorism in the contemporary context, I would like to stress the importance of proper handling of intelligence and the utility of intelligence cooperation (including information and intelligence exchanges) among allies and friendly countries.

There is no need to stress the importance of intelligence gathering in our fight against terrorism. It is for this reason that the problem (and possibility) of “intelligence failures” was quickly pointed out in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Main and obvious focus was on whether the tragic attacks would have been avoided had the intelligence community collaborated more effectively. After having an intense period of policy review and debate, the US government unveiled a plan to reformulate its intelligence community and appointed the new Director of National Intelligence in February who has the authority to oversee all the 15 US intelligence agencies.

The jury is still out whether this newly created, powerful intelligence office will successfully serve the intended purposes. But the critical re-evaluation of intelligence-policy relations is something we have to do not just in the US but in our home base, Japan and Canada. It is because there are so many pitfalls in intelligence gatherings and its use to policy making.

The figure 1 is a general picture to find out where the policy successes and failures can happen in relation to intelligence activities. It is about when we are likely to make policy failures in our handling of intelligence. In this simple figure, “intelligence” is depicted as the efforts of Actor A (us) to collect, analyze, and disseminate (internally) about the activities of Actor B (them). Actor A’s decision is to be made based on the intelligence gathered and processed in the intelligence cycle (the cycle of collection-analysis-dissemination of intelligence on Actor B). So-called “intelligence failures” do not always take a single form. In fact, successes and failure of intelligence and its use in decision-making can happen at various stages. First and foremost, intelligence failures can happen either at the levels of collection, analysis, or dissemination level. It may be a matter of Actor A’s capability, technical or otherwise, in the first place. But even when it has certain capability-base, there can be a problem of access in collection stage, estimation in analysis stage, and flow in dissemination stage. Intelligence successes or failures then intrinsically relate to the


successes and failures at the decision-making level. The critical tests at this stage are two: whether the decisions can be made on proper intelligence, and even when the actor has proper information, whether the enough political will exists to effectively make use of the intelligence.

Looking from the Iraq episode from this intelligence and decision making perspective, it can be said that the “policy failures” on the part of the US vis-à-vis Iraq happened in two levels. One was at the level of intelligence collection (1-a) and the other at that of decision-making (2-a). In other words, not sufficient intelligence (i.e. evidence or “smoking gun” of Iraq’s possession or development of the weapons of mass destruction) were obtained to support the US claim and the decisions were made based on the preconceived conclusion of overturning the Saddam Hussein regime. There is not an easy task to collect necessary information with regard to Iraqi’s WMD capabilities. Nonetheless, Washington made an extra stride and disclosed a part of what they gathered and believed true about Iraq’s case. It was at the United Nations Security Council on February 5, 2003, when then-Secretary of State Colin Powell made a full briefing. In spite of his passionate account, Secretary Powell was not successful in convincing the world. It was not so much the problem of briefing itself as its contents and the intelligence information on which the briefing content’s was based.

Apart from the limitations and problems in intelligence gathering, estimation, and flow, there is a classic problem of political use of intelligence, or “politicization of intelligence,” that is, using the improper intelligence for the preconceived purposes (for instance, the overturn of Saddam Hussein regime).

The effective gathering, exchange, and cooperation in every phase of intelligence cycle is necessary in our fight against terrorism, whether to fulfill the mandates of UN counter-terrorism treaties, such UN Security Council resolutions as 1373 and 1540, as well as conducting individual government’s anti-terrorist measures. There are so many lessons to be learned from the miss-handling of intelligence and the political use of intelligence

Figure 1: Policy Making in the Intelligence Cycle



Test of Policy Successes and Failures

- (1) Intelligence Successes and Failures
 - a. Collection Successes and Failures (Access/Capabilities)
 - b. Analysis Successes and Failures (Estimation/Capabilities)
 - c. Dissemination Successes and Failures (Flow/Capabilities)
- (2) Decision-Making Successes and Failures
 - a. With or Without Proper Intelligence
 - b. With or Without Political Will

information in our experience in Iraq. This is something we need to scrutinize more in detail to learn lessons.

5. Conclusion

Our fight against terrorism requires us to play both home game and away game. It is because terrorism is the un-conventional, trans-border, and multi-dimensional challenge to our security. It therefore cannot be contained without the sufficient trans-border, public-private collaboration. Where

then do we start? Both Japan and Canada share a lot of policy principles and priorities. Our common interest in human security and peacebuilding and the joint faith in multilateralism will form the foundation of the effective collaboration. Though certain differences in emphasis and approaches remain, if the two governments, together with academic and civil society contributions, the fight against terrorism will prove to be effective. One principal policy orientation for the success is, in my view, the “human security trinity” approach by identifying the terrorist threats in the security-development-human rights complex.

Responding to Terrorism: Challenges and Opportunities for Canada and Japan

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1. Introduction¹

It is an appropriate time to renew discussions in the Fourth Symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Cooperation. Last year both Canada and Japan issued long-awaited major national security policy statements. For Japan, its *National Defense Policy Outline* culminates several years of remarkable change in that country's defense and security policies.² For Canada, 2004 saw the release of this country's first national security policy,³ followed earlier this year by the long-awaited *International Policy Statement* that presents a blueprint for integration of government priorities across diplomatic, defence, development, and commercial dimensions.⁴ Since the Third Symposium in 2002, (as evidenced in the cited documents and national policies), international terrorism has remained high on the agendas of both states. Indeed, in their joint statement, *2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation*, Prime Ministers Koizumi and Martin highlight "responding to terrorism" as their first priority for bilateral cooperation. They set out a common agenda as follows:

The Governments of Canada and Japan, recognizing the need to help build a wide range of capacities in countries of the Asia Pacific region to fight terrorism, will also strengthen cooperation in assisting them, in particular, to strengthen their legal frameworks and enhance law enforcement capacity

to counter terrorism, to ensure transport security, and to better respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. In addition to strengthening bilateral consultation and cooperation, both Governments will work to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the United Nations, G8, APEC and other fora. Both Governments underscore the importance of observing legal norms concerning human rights and refugees' rights in taking actions against terrorism.⁵

This paper proceeds from this starting point. It begins by affirming that Canada and Japan regard terrorism from a common perspective, i.e., as a criminal act without justification. It goes on to point out that, although Canada and Japan had both experienced the effects of domestic and international terrorism prior to 2001, neither society nor its government regarded such threats of sufficient concern to have created coordinated and comprehensive national response strategies. All of this, of course, changed with the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. Canada and Japan immediately joined with the US in the fight against international terrorism as it emanated from Afghanistan. However, their strategies were quite different, indicative of their domestic political and constitutional contexts and of the unique and essential relationship Tokyo and Ottawa each has with the US. Since then, these distinctions have become even more apparent as the US orchestrated

¹ The author acknowledges the support for research and writing on international security, from the Security and Defence Program of the Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia, and the support of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Canada, for participation in this Symposium. Thanks are due to Professor Yoshi Kawasaki of Simon Fraser University for advice and information and to Ms Simone Purdon and Ms Erin Williams of UBC for research assistance. The views expressed are the author's and do not represent those of any institution.

² Available at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou05/e17taiko.pdf

³ Available at http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/Publications/NatSecurnat/natsecurnat_e.pdf

⁴ Available at <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/cip-pic/ips/ips-en.asp>

⁵ Available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/asia/japan/2005_Peace_Security_Agenda-en.asp

a coalition to go to war against Iraq, with Japan onside and Canada declining to contribute troops.

That being said, there are more commonalities than differences in the Canadian and Japanese approaches to combating international terrorism. Both are skeptical of a “war on terrorism” strategy that relies on the use of military force as the first and primary policy instrument. Counter-terrorism is necessarily “multidisciplinary” involving efforts of intelligence, law enforcement, justice, health, and development agencies. Canada and Japan both believe that international legal norms and international humanitarian law must be respected in counter-terrorist campaigns. Both are like-minded in emphasizing the need to orchestrate effective multilateral cooperation in regional and global contexts.

The bulk of the paper is devoted to exploring the challenges and opportunities in addressing terrorism on the basis of such principles and priorities. It notes the areas where Canada and Japan already are cooperating bilaterally and within multilateral fora, such as the ARF, APEC, the G8, and the United Nations. It concludes by suggesting possibilities for future collaboration across a spectrum of issues relevant to combating terrorism in the short and long term.

2. A Common Understanding of Terrorism

The recent United Nations High Level Panel report provides a consensus reference point regarding terrorism for both Canada and Japan. Thus, an act of terrorism is:

any action ... that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature of context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.⁶

Canada and Japan share three understandings concerning terrorism. First, both have resisted, in both domestic and international contexts, being drawn into the fruitless exercise of defining terrorism with reference to a political context. Terrorist acts are regarded as criminal acts. For Canada, terrorist activities fall under the Canadian Criminal Code and the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001. The government has sought to avoid the labeling of “terrorist groups”, (a matter of intense public debate), instead maintaining under the Act a register of groups (“listed entities”) with whom, or on whose behalf, financial transactions are illegal. This proceeds from the Canadian government’s obligations pursuant to UNSCR 1373.⁷ The situation in Japan appears very much the same, i.e., the government proceeds indirectly through rigorous enforcement of laws limiting the financial activities associated with UN-designated groups rather than directly through the naming and outlawing of specific groups.⁸ In this context, combating terrorism in both countries is in the hands of law enforcement, and security and intelligence agencies.

Second, while there can be no excusing of terrorist acts themselves, there is an appreciation by both Canada and Japan that terrorism is fostered within particular contexts, combinations of circumstances that facilitate the resort to extremist behavior, including terrorism. Managing the threats

⁶ See *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*. 2004. Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Changes; available at <http://www.un.org/secureworld>. The Report has been criticized for its failure to mention “state terrorism”.

⁷ See http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/national_security/counter-terrorism/ListingBackgrounder_e.asp. While belonging to such groups is not itself considered an illegal act, contributing to them is, as is any such group’s activity to raise funds.

⁸ See Hideaki, Mizukoshi. 2003. “Terrorists, Terrorism, and Japan’s Counter-Terrorism Policy.” *Gaiko Forum*:53-63. for a review of Japanese counter-terrorism policies. He notes (p. 61) that there are “no comprehensive legal mechanisms for designating and monitoring terrorists or terrorists groups.” This echoes Naofumi Miyasaka’s comments in his paper for the 2002 Canada-Japan Symposium that Japan law “still lacks ... definitions of terrorism, designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, and threat assessment.” See Miyasaka, Naofumi. 2002. “Canada-Japan Cooperation in Combating Global Terrorism.” in *The 3rd Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation*. Vancouver. p. 51. The Japanese government’s 2004 Action Plan for the Prevention of Terrorism available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/action.pdf> suggests that this situation continues to date.

from terrorism, therefore, requires attention to longer-term social, economic, and political factors. The most precarious environments appear to be those characterized by poor governance, economic disparity, entrenched discrimination, and unaddressed historical grievances—captured under the popular label of “failed or failing states.”⁹ Accordingly, as noted in the Prime Ministers’ statement above, Canada and Japan seek to address this dimension of the terrorist problem through capacity building strategies that promote equitable development and good governance.

Third, Canada and Japan appreciate that efforts to address terrorism must respect and protect human rights, must be carried out in accord with domestic and international law, must be applied with consistency, and must be designed with attention to cultural sensitivities. In their respective domestic contexts, ones in which the actions of government are largely open to public scrutiny, this has meant that the Canadian and Japanese governments have to be particularly attentive to safeguarding individuals’ constitutional rights, guarantying due process, and protecting citizens’ privacy.¹⁰ In the international context, these issues are much more contentious, involving claims of national security, competing jurisdictions, and conflicting policy agendas. Still, as ongoing events demonstrate, failure to respect international norms and conventions, human rights, refugee rights, etc. runs the very real risk of sustaining, even increasing, support for the causes and tactics espoused by terrorist actors.

Acts of terrorism and the activities of terrorists in planning and carrying out terrorist campaigns necessarily involve a range of illegal and security-threatening phenomena, including transnational crimes such as money-laundering, human

trafficking, drug trafficking, smuggling, and potentially the transfer of CBRN materials. Thus, many states include threats from international terrorism in their broad concern for non-traditional security threats to their states and people. When viewed in this manner, addressing terrorism can be seen as a component of a larger, human security focused agenda. Indeed, for Canada and Japan, responding to international terrorism encompasses both freedom from fear and freedom from want priorities, thus bridging the gap that emerged between Ottawa and Tokyo as human security champions in the 1990s.¹¹ One can argue that as attention increasingly has been drawn during this decade to the plight of peoples trapped in failed and failing states, often in environments experiencing extremist violence and terrorism, the differences between the freedom from fear (Ottawa) and freedom from want (Tokyo) approaches inevitably have been narrowed. Thus, as both Canada and Japan find themselves in the aftermath of 9/11 forced to devise rationales and logics for their counter-terrorism strategies, doing so within a human security framework can provide a comfortable basis from which to proceed.¹²

3. Terrorism, Not a New Phenomenon for Canada or Japan

It is worth pausing for a moment to note that Canada and Japan have experiences with terrorism that pre-date 2001 by several decades. As set out in schematic form in Figure One, both societies have been victimized by domestic and international terrorist groups. These respective histories have served as backgrounds to their contemporary perceptions of terrorist activities and their reactions and responses. For Canada, the FLQ’s actions showed that extremist violence can arise from a

⁹ As noted later, this term is over-used and under-determined. A much more complete and sophisticated understanding of the “root causes” of terrorism is called for. See for instance, Margaret Purdy, 2004. “Countering Terror: The Missing Pillar.” *International Journal*, 60

¹⁰ In Canada, besides operation of the legal system, one also sees the vigorous involvement of the Privacy Commissioner. See, for instance, http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/2005/sp-d_050509_e.asp. See also Hideaki, Mizukoshi. 2003.

¹¹ See Kiki Fukushima, 2004. “Human Security: Comparing Japanese and Canadian Government Thinking and Practice.” *Canadian Consortium on Human Security Visiting Fellow Paper*. Vancouver: Centre of International Relations, University of British Columbia. Available at http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/Research/en/index.php

¹² This argument is very much in line with Dr. Fukushima’s as set out in her paper for this Symposium.

frustrated secessionist movement. They also demonstrated (a) that terrorism can turn a population against a cause, but also (b) that government may over-react in times of crisis. In retrospect these memories have faded quickly. Much more salient is the Canadian public's appreciation that their territory has served as a locale and as a base for international terrorism. The 1985 Air India bombings, in particular, led the government to focus attention on the extremist elements within diaspora ethnic communities in Canada and to attempt to control the passage of persons and finances to and from their conflicted homelands. Canadian politicians and policy makers continue to be embroiled in debates over whether or not groups that combine social and political agendas, like the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), should be banned or otherwise restricted in their Canadian activities.¹³

Japan's exposure to terrorism also dates back to the 1970s with the Japanese Red Army, a group who in concert with the PFLP (in the 1980s) perpetrated a series of spectacular and violent incidents in Japan, the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Not surprisingly, it is the sarin gas attack perpetrated by members of the millennialist Aum Shinriko cult group on Tokyo's population in 1995 that is more predominant in the minds of Japanese today. This deadly incident brought home the vulnerability of modern urban environments to terrorist activity. The drawn out aftermath through the course of the Japanese courts system demonstrated the difficulty of obtaining convictions for terrorism in an open judicial system that protects individuals and requires rigorous evidentiary proof of the conduct of terrorist actions. These difficulties have been experienced in the Canadian judicial system as well, e.g. with the Air India case, complicated in part because of the exhaustive procedural processes of federal immigration and refugee regulations.

This being said, these prior experiences with terrorism did not lead Canada or Japan during the 1990s to undertake coherent and consolidated

counter-terrorism policies either regarding their own borders and territories or the against the activities of terrorists operating from their soil.

However, in this same decade, on the international scene as the linkages between terrorist groups and transnational criminal networks became more apparent, Canada and Japan were supportive of efforts by the UN and other multilateral bodies in the establishment of a series of conventions against money laundering, drug trafficking, transfer of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) materials.

4. Response to 9/11: Similar Goals, Divergent Paths Solidarity in the Aftermath of September 2001

The attacks on Washington and New York galvanized the international community. Without hesitation, Canada and Japan expressed their support for the United States' right to undertake military action as self defence against those responsible for the 9/11 incidents—at the United Nations and (for Canada) in NATO. That Ottawa quickly joined the US-led coalition in the war against the Afghan regime, supplying ground troops and coordinating the efforts of its naval vessels stationed in the Persian Gulf, was not a surprise. The Canadian public was broadly supportive of this participation, which was seen as appropriate and continued the pattern of engagement of Canadian forces in multilateral missions during the 1990s, such as in the Kosovo campaign.

In contrast, Japan's response was historically exceptional. Seeking to avoid any fall-out similar to that experienced by Japan after the first Gulf War, Prime Minister Koizumi, seized this opportunity to mobilize the political system to support a proactive Japanese response.¹⁴ The resultant Counter-Terrorism Special Measures legislation was path-breaking in its authorization of deployment of Japanese forces (naval supply vessels in the Gulf

¹³ Thus, for instance, the LTTE is remains off the "listed entities" register. See footnote 7.

¹⁴ See Tomohito Shinoda. 2003. "Koizumi's Top-Down Leadership in the Anti-Terrorism Legislation: The Impact of Political Institutional Changes." *SAIS Review* 23:19-34.

Figure 1
Canadian and Japanese Experiences with Terrorism
Prior to September 2001*

Canada	Dates	Details
	1963 - 1970	Quebec Liberation Front (FLQ) conducts over 20 violent incidents in Quebec, culminating in 1970 kidnapping of a British diplomat and killing of Canadian official; Canadian federal government's deployment of troops under the "War Measures Act".
	1980s - 1990s	Armenian terrorist groups (ASALA and JCAG) attack Turkish facilities and diplomats in numerous countries: 1982 wounding one and killing another Turkish diplomat; 1995 wounding the Turkish Ambassador in Ottawa.
	1980s - 1990s	Sikh terrorist groups fighting against the government of India, using Canada used as a funding and operational base. 1985 bombs planted in planes in Vancouver kill 2 in Tokyo airport and hundreds on Air India flight; trial of suspects for latter incident in 2004-05; violence and intimidation, including killings, within the Canadian Sikh community by extremist groups.
Japan		
	1970s - 1980s	Japanese Red Army (Nihon Sekigun) conducts series of attacks around the world, often in cooperation with the PFLP (e.g. Lod Airport), subsequently in the 1980s in Asia and Europe; 1988 bombings in Japan killing 8 in Tokyo. Leader, Fusako Shigenobu, arrested in 2000.
	1990 - 1995	Aum Shinriko activities, including 1993 and 1994 attempts and the 1995 attack in Tokyo subway system utilizing sarin gas; also killing high level Commission of National Police official
	1997	Tupac Amaru group attacks and holds hostages in Japanese Embassy, Lima, Peru; hostages eventually freed.

* This is not intended as a comprehensive list. Its purpose is to illustrate Canadian and Japanese experiences with both domestic and international terrorism prior to 2001.

and selective non-combat units in Afghanistan) to support the Operation Enduring Freedom.

On the domestic front, the "threat" to Canada became defined around the vulnerability of its joint land, sea, and air borders with the United States. Sustained trans-border traffic of persons and goods is essential to the health of the Canadian economy. The temporary closure of the 49th parallel border with the US after 9/11 brought this home in a dramatic fashion. Ottawa immediately looked to cooperate with the US in securing their borders against terrorist penetration. This agenda has remained the central pillar of Canada's counter-terrorism agenda; within months the Canada-US Smart Border Declaration was signed. The 2002

federal budget labeled a "security budget" allocated CAN \$6 billion to security-related programs, all but several million devoted to enhancing domestic agency response capacities (which had been seriously neglected), to tightening the borders (which had been historically very open), and to increasing security and intelligence capacities. Joint programs for monitoring of incoming persons, cargos and containers were established which see US customs officers in Canadian ports. A Binational Planning Group was set up along side the existing NORAD and NORTHCOM commands to facilitate joint planning of the defence of North American, especially against terrorist attack.

Canada remains extremely sensitive to the prospect of the US imposing additional regulations

and restrictions that will have a detrimental impact on Canadians and the Canadian economy. US politicians still continue to emphasize the threat from the north, pointing to the openness of the vast land border and to perceived laxness in the Canadian enforcement and judicial systems. Their calls for changes in Canadian policies have served to intensify an ongoing, post-9/11 debate within Canadian society over how to achieve the right balance between prudent security requirements and the rights of individuals for freedom of movement, expression, etc. Thus, passage of Bill C36, the Anti-Terrorism Act, was embroiled in controversy which continues to the present.¹⁵ Another contentious issue has been Canada's modification of its laws concerning refugees by reaching a no safe third country agreement with the US, a step that will reduce the number of refugee claimants reaching Canadian soil.

Over the last several years the Canadian government has kept attention focused on the threats posed by international terrorism, pointing to the continued high potential of attacks on North America,¹⁶ and the priority of "ensuring Canada is not a base for threats to our allies."¹⁷ But increasingly the threat of terrorism is placed within a broader spectrum, one in which terrorism is viewed as associated with, or an integral part of, non-traditional security threats. Thus, the *National Security Policy* statement's couching of terrorism ...

Terrorism is a global challenge that has been recognized by the United Nations as a crime against humanity. Canada is not immune to this threat.

But the threats we face are not limited to terrorism. The SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak demonstrated the power of individuals to unintentionally transmit threats around the globe at the speed of air travel.¹⁸

and its association of terrorism with organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed

and failing states, and organized crime.

5. The War on Terrorism

While Canada has sought to sustain a very close relationship with the US on matters of border security, Canadians have become increasingly uncomfortable with the Bush administrations "war on terrorism," regarding its emphasis on the use of military force the primary tool to combat terrorism and its encompassing of the range of US geopolitical strategy under this label as misguided. Matters came to a head with the US determination to undertake a war on Iraq. Ottawa declined to provide troops in support of this mission, sending them to the ISAF, NATO command in Afghanistan. On this matter and on another priority of Washington's, i.e., ballistic missile defence, Canada has chosen to forego cooperation on initiatives that in the administration's eyes are part and parcel of their agenda of combating international terrorism.

The contrast between Tokyo's and Ottawa's response is quite stark. Continuing his efforts to assert a more vigorous international presence and to cement a closer partnership with the United States, Prime Minister Koizumi voiced his strong support for the US war against Saddam Hussein even before it was underway. Passage of the Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in July 2003 set the stage for Japanese force deployment which took place in December. This was despite the terrorist killing of two Japanese aid workers in that country and despite the apparent unpopularity of the deployment with the Japanese public. Thus, at year's end, ASDF vessels were deployed to waters off Iraq to be followed by ground troops to engage in reconstruction activities.¹⁹ Notably this is the first time Japanese forces have been deployed in such an active combat zone, albeit that they are not

¹⁵ See footnote 10.

¹⁶ The recently released Defence component of the *International Policy Statement* states: "Global terrorism has become a deadly adversary, and Canadians are now, in some ways, more individually threatened than at any time during the Cold War."

¹⁷ Quoted from *Securing an Open Society: Canada's National Security Policy*, 2004.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* p. 1.

¹⁹ See "Japan Dispatches the SDF to Iraq," 2004. *Japan Echo*, 31, 1. Available at <http://www.japanecho.co.jp/sum/2004/b3101.html>.

tasked with combat roles. The extent to which these actions by Japan are motivated more by a desire for solidarity with the US, in light of broader strategic considerations in the Asia Pacific, is a matter for debate.

Concerning ballistic missile defence, a similar question arises, although on this matter Japan's policy priorities involve a distinct homeland security logic. That is, having a functional missile defence system may provide some protection against threats or attacks from North Korea, a regime whose past behaviors (e.g., its 1998 missile tests) and its current nuclear weapons development are regarded as "terroristic" by the Japanese government and people.²⁰

Thus, when the fight against international terrorism is viewed from the perspective of alignment with its major proponent, the United States, Japan and Canada find themselves in quite different relationships. However, as the Prime Ministers' declare, this does not diminish the prospects, indeed the necessity, of Canadian-Japanese cooperation against the broader threats posed by international terrorism.

6. A Common Agenda

No country can individually secure itself from the threat of international terrorism. This is particularly true for advanced industrial countries like Canada and Japan who are heavily dependent upon international trade and commerce. Both therefore have strong interests on the one hand in providing homeland security, and on the other hand in ensuring the continued smooth movement of persons and goods across their borders and around the world.

From this one can infer that there would be substantial bilateral cooperation between Canada and Japan at the agency level, especially involving law enforcement, immigration, and security and

intelligence agencies. (This paper does not dwell on this agenda.) However, as neither country poses a threat to the other, per se, their bilateral activities are essentially oriented around management of risk from third parties, particularly those seeking to utilize Canada or Japan as bases or transit points for activities against the United States.

Canadian and Japanese cooperation against terrorist threats occurs in the main within multilateral contexts. Their mutual interest is in facilitating greater collaboration among states to create encompassing international networks. In this context, Canada and Japan's common interest is in closing loopholes, in ensuring inclusive coverage, and in bolstering the weak links in the international counter-terrorism safety net. Thus, much of their *bilateral* cooperation in combating terrorism involves collaboration and joint efforts within multilateral contexts.

This collaboration has taken a wide range of forms and intense diplomatic activity on the international stage in the post-9/11 context. Figure Two, while by no means providing a comprehensive listing, does highlight key aspects of the Canadian and Japanese joint policy agendas.

One notices the following patterns:

First, in the months after September 11 most multilateral institutions issued statements denouncing international terrorism and pledging cooperation in counter-terrorism. These included the UN General Assembly and the G8 at the global level, and most all regional organizations, such as the ARF, APEC, ASEAN, the OSCE, the OAS, etc. in which one or both of Canada and Japan are members. As statements of solidarity, their value has been in reinforcing an international normative framework that holds international terrorism as unacceptable in any circumstances. However, these declarations did not commit member states, nor have many been translated into comprehensive programs of action.

²⁰ See 2005. *East Asian Strategic Review 2005*. Tokyo: National Institute of Defense Studies. available at http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/east-asian_e05.pdf; and *The Defence of Japan 2004*: Japanese Defence Agency. available at <http://www.jda.go.jp/e/pab/wp2004/>.

Figure 2

Multilateral Cooperation to Combat Terrorism: Selected Examples*

Global Institutions	Type of Action
United Nations Security Council	UNSC Resolutions 1373, 1540, and 1566
United Nations	12 UN Protocols and Conventions concerning terrorism
UN Office on Drugs and Crime	Legislation Drafting Workshops, jointly sponsored by Canada, UNDOC, and regional organizations
ICAO	Conventions and regulations concerning safety and security of air travel, Including agreements on sharing passenger information, etc.
IMO	2004 - International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code Requirements for container shipping
G8	2002 - Counter-terrorism principles and initiatives for cooperation on terrorist financing, supply of weapons, border security, CBRN weapons 2003 - Counter-Terrorism Action Group to coordinate counter-Terrorism capacity building assistance
Regional Institutions	Type of Action
APEC	2001 - Leader's Statement on Counter-Terrorism 2002 - Statement on Fighting Terrorism and Promoting Growth 2003 - Counter-Terrorism Task Force and work plan concerning MANPADS IAEA additional protocol, health security, aviation security, etc 2004 - "Human Security" agenda
ASEAN + 3	2003 Japan-ASEAN Plan of Action 2004 Japan-ASEAN Joint Declaration for Cooperation in the Fight Against Terrorism
APEC	2003 - Workshops on Anti-Money Laundering/Counter-Terrorism Financing, organized by Japan and Canada 2004 - Santiago Declaration – measures concerning machine-readable travel documents
ARF	Intersessional Meeting (ISM) on Counter-Terrorism 2003, 2004 Seminars on Crisis Management of Chemical and Biological Terrorism, Japan sponsored
OAS	Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism
APEC/OAS	2003-04 - Border Management Symposiums, Canada
OSCE/OAS	Legislative Workshops on protecting human rights while combating terrorism

* This list is not intended to be complete, but rather to present examples of the variety of multilateral institutional initiatives undertaken to combat international terrorism. For a more comprehensive review of Japanese activities, see for instance, *Japan's International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation*. 2005. Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; available at <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/terrorism/cooperation.html>. For a listing of Canadian and Canadian-Japanese activities, see Ian Trites' paper for this Symposium. With the exception of ASEAN+3, of which Canada is not a member, both countries belong to all the institutions listed.

Second, in this regard, the UN plays a dual role. On the one hand, it is the builder of normative consensus, for example with the UN High Level Panel's offering of a definition of terrorism, and as a creator of international obligations. On the other hand, it is an international law-making authority through Security Council resolutions, such as UNSC 1373, which impose binding obligations on all member states. In addition, UN conventions and protocols once ratified by a specified number of states come into force binding all those who have signed. To date there have been a total of twelve such conventions put forward concerning international terrorism, many covering matters transnational criminal activities, such as money laundering. Canada and Japan have been vigorous champions of the creation of such instruments and are pushing hard to see them come into force.

Third, the international agencies responsible for regulating air travel and maritime transportation, such as the ICAO and IMO, have moved quickly to devise and see implemented more comprehensive and rigorous procedures to prevent the movement of suspect persons or any goods of potential service to international terrorist. Of significant note is the establishment of the ISPS code requirements and associated procedures covering maritime container traffic, (in effect 90% of international trade movement).

Fourth, APEC is of particular interest, in part of course because Canada and Japan have been among its most active participants in advancing the opening of regional trade in the Asia Pacific. But, also because of the transformation of APEC as a regional economic institution, one that historically avoided any mention of security matters, to one that now explicitly accepts a security mandate.²¹ As one Canadian official puts it

APEC has expertise in the fields of transportation, energy, health and other areas that impinge directly upon the economic health of the region. That expertise is also crucial to an understanding of the

issues that relate to the region's security. Canada believes that APEC offers a forum whose relatively lean and efficient structure can be driven by its Leaders' agenda to make significant advances in the area of security. APEC has led in the area of securing transportation; it has developed a comprehensive initiative on secure trade; its members have now agreed on guidelines with respect to the control of MANPADS; they have identified best practices in the area of export controls. APEC has also taken steps on corruption that are relevant to the security and counter-terrorism challenges APEC has taken up.²²

Thus, as noted in Figure Two, since 2001 APEC leaders have committed themselves to a vigorous counter-terrorist program and have proclaimed a "human security" agenda encompassing the spread of WMD, international health risks, and aviation security (with specific attention to eliminating the threat posed by MANPADS).

What is significant, in the broader multilateral context, is that it is proving to be easier to motivate cooperation on counter-terrorism when framed in functional terms, i.e. the facilitation of commerce, the prevention of disease, etc., rather than in political terms. Multilateral bodies that have continued their consideration of terrorism from this perspective, including many bodies of the UN and regional Track 1 and Track 2 institutions (the ARF and CSCAP come to mind, for instance) have remained largely frustrated in moving beyond debates about "root causes" and "historical grievances".

Fifth, the critical need for capacity-building is apparent. Many states, while committed in principle to new protocols and regulatory requirements, in practice are unable to implement them, because they lack the equipment, the technical infrastructure, the human expertise, or sound systems of governance and law enforcement. Realizing this capacity-building has become a central priority in the Canadian and Japanese

²¹ See Jager, Ed. 2005. "APEC's Security Agenda: A Paradigm Shifts." *CANCAPS Bulletin*:12-13. available at <http://www.cancaps.ca/cbul45.pdf>.

²² *Ibid.* p. 12.

counter-terrorism programs and has been seized upon by their governments as an effective mode of mutually-beneficial cooperation.²³ Figure Two provides examples of this expanding range of opportunities for the pooling of finances and expertise in joint Canadian-Japanese capacity-building activities.

The above being considered, there remain several very difficult problems and gaps in the international counter-terrorism network. One, of course, is the potential for international terrorists to obtain and utilize CBRN materials. The case of Aum Shinriko provides a salient reminder of both the need for vigilance and the difficulties involved in monitoring the acquisition and use of dual use materials and technologies by extremist groups. The A.Q. Khan case made apparent (a) the relative ease with which a determined and knowledgeable actor, with state complicity, could utilize a clandestine supply network of states and corporations, and (b) the flawed logic of ignoring (or supporting) a state's attempts to acquire WMD on the basis of political expediency.

There is little disagreement regarding the need to solidify international non-proliferation regimes concerning weapons of mass destruction. However, recent developments in this regard have not been positive. The NPT is in disarray. One sees the acquisition of nuclear weapons by states such as North Korea and possibly Iran, both of whose possession of these weapons will be destabilizing and whose possible distribution of technology and material to international terrorist actors raise very serious concerns.

On the other hand, there have been a number of more positive developments in this area. There has been progress in gaining accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol requirements. Key states, such as China, are bringing their national policies into alignment with the MTCR and various supplier regime protocols. Finally, an ad hoc multilateral

initiative sponsored by the United States, i.e., the Proliferation Security Initiative, has gained the support of a substantial number of states, including relevant flag-states such as Liberia and Panama. All of these efforts have the support of Canada and Japan.²⁴

7. Challenges and Opportunities for Future Collaboration

The overall argument for Canadian-Japanese cooperation to defeat and prevent international terrorism is obvious. Through their joint efforts within the contexts of regional and global multilateral institutions, Canada and Japan have and can continue to attain positive results. From this point of view, there appear to be a number of areas where focusing Canada-Japan efforts will bring added value. The list below is suggestive and opens an agenda to be pursued as this Symposium moves to become a regular, annual component in the Canada-Japan relationship.

First, as noted above, is the priority to halt, turn back, and control the proliferation of CBRN materials and technologies (and of course weapons and associated delivery systems.) This requires the redoubling of efforts, particularly concerning support for the IAEA, in general terms, and for the implementation of Additional Protocol agreements, in particular. It also directs attention to strengthening the international networks of states and key corporate actors established to control the sales and distribution of dual-use technologies and materials. To be frank, it is questionable as to how much can be achieved in the short term in the NPT framework itself, given the stance of the US and specifically interested other states. That being said, working on gaining the cooperation of key states to its norms and principles and working to achieve solutions to particularly difficult situations, such as are presented by North Korea and Iran, is called for. With regard to the PSI: Canada and Japan are

²³ Canada has recently established a Counter-Terrorism Capacity Building Program under the auspices of its DFAIT, part of the agenda of action announced with the National Security Policy statement. Capacity building is a key component of the Japanese counter-terrorism program as well.

²⁴ For an overview of the PSI see the Canadian Department of National Defense at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/prof_e.asp.

both cooperating states in this network. While its scope certainly needs to be increased, what is also called for is development of clearer understandings concerning where, when, how and against whom PSI actions will be undertaken. Reassurance that PSI is not an idiosyncratically targeted initiative could serve to bring many other states on board.

The second area for intensified Canadian-Japanese collaboration, at both official and expert, unofficial, levels concerns peacebuilding in “post-conflict” environments. While traditionally an activity that Canada and Japan have regarded as an international priority, the former more as peacekeeping, the latter as development assistance, this agenda has taken on additional significance in light of both countries’ commitments to Afghanistan and Iraq. Applying the term “post-conflict” to these environments is a misnomer; while interstate war, *per se*, has ceased, conditions remain anything but peaceful for those charged with rebuilding and reconstruction. The security of peacekeepers, international and national aid agency personnel, and NGO workers is constantly threatened. Terrorist tactics and terrorist and transnational criminal group activities have become a daunting aspect of today’s peacebuilding missions. These circumstances create the opportunity, indeed with regard to locales such as Kandahar, Afghanistan one can say “the necessity”, for official Canadian-Japanese sharing of resources and coordination of activities.²⁵

There are also many important unanswered questions regarding the rebuilding of postconflict societies that present productive avenues for policy-relevant studies by Canadian and Japanese experts and academics. Japanese Ambassador Kamono, reflecting on his extensive experience in Afghanistan, pointed to one such topic, namely gaining an understanding of the role of “illegal armed groups” in postconflict societies.²⁶ Another topic of primary concern is the rebuilding of economies after devastating conflicts, particularly

those such as Afghanistan, (posing the challenge of restoring sustainability without dependence on growing poppies), or Iraq (where the challenge is to restore and appropriately allocate the revenues of oil production.) Finally, there is the overarching challenge of gaining a better understanding of how Islamic societies function and how countries like Canada and Japan can and should function within them as peacebuilders and agents of poverty reduction and development. Both of our countries find our current peacebuilding efforts largely focused in Islamic contexts: Afghanistan, Iraq, Sudan, and Indonesia. Canada and Japan (as other western, industrialized countries), find themselves in particularly delicate dilemmas. At the same time as they seek to engage productively within these complex and dynamic societies abroad, they confront the difficulties that arise from having to combat extremist movements within their own—movements often labeled by themselves or the media as Islamic. Careful and thoughtful examination of these issues, concerning both domestic and foreign contexts, is called for.²⁷

Third, while stated briefly its importance can not be over-emphasized in terms of its relevance and effectiveness in counter-terrorism. This is the continuance of Canadian and Japanese coordination in providing capacity-building assistance to states presently lacking the resources and expertise to implement regulations and standards involved in the transport of goods and persons, the control over the production and shipment of sensitive materials, and the establishment and maintenance of efficient and uncorrupt police and government bureaucracies. To a large extent, this involves “training the trainers” and provision of expertise and expensive equipment. Figure Two presents what is already a wide agenda of such activities; these should certainly be sustained and broadened.

Fourth, in geographic terms, the Asia Pacific presents an especially appropriate context for

²⁵ As of summer 2005, the Canadian Forces have assumed responsibility for a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, a locale in which Japan is committed to substantial reconstruction and DDR programs. Certainly, conducting these activities will require the establishment and maintenance of secure environments.

²⁶ See Ambassador Kamono’s presentation to this Symposium, page 6.

²⁷ David Dewitt raises this issue in his presentation to this Symposium.

Canadian and Japanese cooperation. A specific target of opportunity in this regard continues to be joint action with the context of APEC. Indeed, now is a particularly timely junction at which to redouble joint efforts within the organization. Implementation of APEC's action plans on security needs to be pressed, as there have been signals that states are now balking at implementing agreed upon commitments concerning MANPADS and other transportation security related procedures.²⁸

Fifth, in general terms, Canada and Japan must continue to support the advancement of international norms that underpin the frameworks for multilateral cooperation. This is of special relevance concerning the combating of international terrorism. The post-911 momentum exhibited in international fora is dissipating as states' have begun to equivocate on commitments in light of considerations of cost, domestic circumstances, or political expediency. The potential for "slippage" in APEC was noted above. At the systemic level, efforts need to be redoubled at the UN. Thus, for

instance, most all of the 12 UN conventions and protocols concerning international terrorism have not been brought into force because they lack sufficient numbers of ratifications. Joint efforts by Canada and Japan should be applied in this regard to relevant states – including perhaps the introduction of aid conditionalities, a controversial step but one worth selective consideration.

Finally, Canada and Japan must not lose sight of the human security imperative that underlies achievement of progress in combating international terrorism. Over-emphasis on the use of force is already proving to be counter productive. The "war on terrorism" rhetoric and associated programs of military occupation must be altered; renewed effort to ameliorate the conditions of life for affected populations is necessary. Ambassador Kamono's characterization of Afghanistan as a "real test case for applying the concept of human security and realizing it on the ground" resonates across the broad spectrum of the Canadian-Japanese agenda of peace and security cooperation.²⁹

²⁸ See Jager, p. 12.

²⁹ See Ambassador's presentation to this Symposium, page 1.

Session IV

Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament: Asian Perspective

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1. Introduction

Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament is a relatively new vocabulary, which could give an impression that emphasis is now placed on nonproliferation than disarmament. In a way, such impression could be corroborated by the fact that a series of new nonproliferation schemes have been introduced and proved to be effective to the extent that it was an important factor in finding out the “nuclear black market” located in various countries including South Africa, Pakistan, Malaysia, North Korea, and the UAE.¹ Such schemes include Container Security Initiative (CSI), Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI), and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). On the other hand, little progress has been made in recent years with regard to arms control and disarmament. Modest, but positive event is a UN action plan adopted to prevent, combat and eliminate the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons (SALW), but it goes without saying that much efforts have to be undertaken, internationally and regionally, before yielding a positive result. NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) Review Conference, just completed, betrays the rapidly decreasing power of arms control.

Such trends seems to have begun in the late 1990's; while the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons Treaty and Canada-led Personal Landmine Treaty were made into effect, respectively in 1997 and 1999, that was the last major accomplishments in the disarmament field. It is sometimes pointed out that increasing unilateralism by the US has largely

contributed to the decay of disarmament. Certainly, following the US decision not to be a party to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999, Draft Verification Protocol on Biological Weapons Ban Treaty was also killed by the US decision in 2001 after years of consideration. Negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) has not started as of today. In addition, concern is expressed over the failed attempts to ban weaponization of outer space in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Such concern has been proved by a series of US Air Force documents, in particularly by “Counterspace Operations” published in August 2004,² which refers to the possibility of destroying third-party's commercial satellites once an armed conflict occurs either on the earth or in outer space.³

Stagnation of arms control and disarmament seems to have occurred less because of the US increasing unilateralism than because of the change of the world structure. Entering the 21st century, because major threats to the developed countries have shifted to the non-state actors, the effectiveness of traditional disarmament treaties is considerably undermined. Since arms control and disarmament treaties could bind only international legal persons, or sovereign states, unless a state party is competent to implement the treaty provisions to prevent, suppress, and legally punish non-state actors, such treaty is useless at best, dangerous at the worst. Thus, it is understandable that more emphasis is put on nonproliferation to prevent non-state actors from obtaining sensitive materials, equipments and technology for weapons of mass destruction (WMD). However, nonproliferation measures tend

¹ See, e.g., Jacquelyn S. Porth, “Rice Says Proliferation Security Initiative is Yielding Results”, *Washington File* 1140 (2 Jun. 2005).

² USAF, *Counterspace Operations: Air Force Document 2-2.1* (2 Aug.2004).

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-34.

to be interpreted that the main goal for such efforts is the determination to maintain the privilege of great powers unless it proceeds hand-in-hand with disarmament. Disarmament, equally requires sovereign states to relinquish some of their sovereignty, thereby convincing less privileged states as well. Thus, nonproliferation has to proceed simultaneously with arms control and disarmament efforts to keep the global society as one integral platform to work for the common interests. Also, it has to be taken note that, after all, nonproliferation is an instrument to accomplish disarmament; an ultimate goal.

Taking into account the importance of nonproliferation that interacts closely with disarmament, in this presentation, I would like to explore the recent trends in nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament with emphasis in Asian nations. Using broader definition, when I refer to Asia, it is not only East Asia and Southeast Asia, but also South Asia and nations in central parts of Eurasia, as well as western Asia, often referred to as Middle East, are included. Russia is also covered by the study, because some parts of Russia are in Asia geographically and its security influence remains great. Also, since no substantial arms control could be attained in any area of the world without the constructive acquiescence, if not an active support, of the United States, the US is to be included in studying Asian perspective.

2. Asia as Center of Suspicion on the WMD Proliferation

Asia as a region has not experienced a distinguished change in security environment in the post-Cold War era. For example, East Asia has been an area where much more efforts have been put to contain conflicts among neighboring states than finding out the common security interests. Asia is also an area where a series of crisis on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have happened; examples would include Iraq, North Korea, India, Pakistan, and Iran. Iraq, Iran and North Korea are categorized

in the case in which they did not abide by their commitments to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Such cases betray the limitation of the effectiveness of INFCIRC/153-type IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards agreements. Latest nuclear crisis on North Korea, which began in October 2002, has not been resolved in any manner; on the contrary, currently, even a possible nuclear experiment is referred to. Cases of India and Pakistan are different. They have become nuclear-states outside the NPT regime.

The year 2004 was not eventless in Asia on the nuclear proliferation. In February, the existence of Dr. Khan's network, "nuclear black market" was confirmed. "Nuclear black market" disclosed finally forced this region to collectively combat the common threat of the spread of WMD. Then in August, Korea's past non-compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement was found out. Korea's clandestine experiments on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing between 1980's and 2000 also were an embarrassment to the NPT regime and a blow to the six-party consultation. Korea's case, however, seems to have been resolved by now, because the amount of the nuclear material concerned was no more than 200 milligrams, and because Korean government was quick to sincerely cooperate with the IAEA inspection; a nice gesture rarely found in other nation's nuclear suspicion.⁴ The fact that Korea's secret experiments were discovered in the process of the first verification in accordance with the Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/540) to which Korea recently became a party, reassured the effectiveness of the new INFCIRC/540-type verification. INFCIRC/540-type verification in the Additional Protocol strengthens intrusive on-site inspections. Accordingly, IAEA, more strongly than ever, recommends the nations around the world to become a party to the Protocol.

Currently, among 64 nations which are parties to the Additional Protocol, 11 are Asian nations including Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Tajikistan,

⁴ IAEA Board of Governors, held in November 2004, decided that no sanction be imposed on to Korea based on the report by the IAEA Director-General.

Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Jordan.⁵ Indonesia and Japan are now subject to the Integrated Safeguards by the IAEA; the burden of on-site inspection is lessened under such safeguards as a model member which successfully proved the intention not to develop nuclear weapons.⁶

3. Nonproliferation Measures

(1) World-Wide Trends: PSI as “Activity not Organization”

As already mentioned, Asia as a region has not particularly been active in initiating universal arms control and disarmament. Rather, each nation of this area tends to select either to cooperate or not with the US or European-led initiatives. Proliferation Security Initiative, or PSI, launched by US President in May 31, 2003 in Krakov, Poland, is one of the examples. “Interdiction Principles” of PSI, adopted in Paris in September 2003 requires a participating state to visit, search and even confiscate sensitive materials and equipments concerning WMD on the land, at sea and in the air under its jurisdiction. Traditional international law framework is intact as long as law enforcement measures may be taken based on territorial jurisdiction or nationality jurisdiction of vessel or aircraft. Awkward situation would occur if a vessel, the flag state of which is not a participant of PSI, is stopped, visited, or even inspected on the high seas by one of the PSI members, for only flag-state can execute jurisdiction on the high seas. Accordingly, the US made mutual ship-boarding agreements with Liberia (Feb. 2004), Panama (May 2004), Marshall Islands (Aug. 2004) and Croatia (June, 2005) by which the US can, based on reciprocity, inspect vessel under the jurisdiction of such countries on the high seas.

While often underscored by the US high-ranking officials that PSI is “activity not organization”,⁷ and that they have no intention to

develop PSI into a certain form of international institution, looking at the things proceeding, a question can be raised if it really could stay as only an activity. US Presidential proposals at the UN General Assembly in September 2003 as well as at the National Defense University in February 2004 have largely contributed to lead to UN Security Council Resolution 1540 adopted in April 2004, which could function as an instrument to actively support PSI. Resolution 1540 requires UN member states to make considerable efforts to forbid non-State actors to obtain WMD by strengthening national legislation on export and transshipment controls, border controls and law enforcement (item 1-3 & 6), and to present a first report to the 1540 Committee on the steps they had taken for that purposes by 28 October 2004 (item 4). Adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, Resolution 1540 is legally binding on UN member states. As a result, PSI member or not, a state has to conduct activities in line with the PSI, if it is not as intensive as core participants.

In making Resolution 1540, it is reported that the US proposal to insert a provision on the right of visit onto a suspected vessel on the high seas was rejected by China as a derogation of current international law. Resolution 1540 being only a first step, there seems a possibility that the resolution would develop into an international treaty to criminalize the proliferation of WMD that provides for universal jurisdiction on the crime suspect. While it is considerably difficult to legally define “proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery”, there are precedents of UN adopted anti-terrorism treaties for 35 years ranging from high-jacking and unlawful acts to civil aviation, to kidnapping of diplomatic agents, and to terrorist bombings. US Department of State (DOS) Fact Sheet published on 27 December 2004 states that Resolution 1540 is not needed as authority of PSI measures since PSI is an activity of like-minded nations and not an organization, and that the US

⁵ <http://www.iaea.org/> (date accessed: 9 Apr. 2005).

⁶ See, e.g., “Integrated Safeguards to Japan”(in Japanese), *Nuclear Material Control Center News*, Vol. 33, No.9 (Sept.2004), pp. 1-5.

⁷ See, e.g., David Anthony Denny, “Bolton Says Proliferation Security Initiative has “Twofold Aim””, *Washington File* (19 Dec. 2003), p. 3.

does not have the intention to make it a treaty in the future. My impression is, however, that it might be translated into an UN treaty of universal jurisdiction in the future.

(2) Asian Cooperation on PSI and Other Transport Security Initiatives

Asian nations have been, in general, cooperative with US-led nonproliferation activities in recent years. In this regard, outstanding points are as follows: one would be the active cooperation of China to global nonproliferation, which is relatively a new development. Also notable is the stronger presence of India in this field. Japan's growing leadership in the nonproliferation field should be emphasized as well.

By the time G8 summit was held in June 2004, all G8 nations are included in the core members to the PSI, then being 15 nations (since then Argentina, Iraq, and Georgia were added).⁸ In Asia, Japan is an original member and Singapore decided to participate in February 2004. First formal participation by Japan's Self Defense Forces in law enforcement training was carried out in October 2004 when Japan hosted PSI at sea training at Yokosuka and Yokohama ports ("team samurai 04"). Not only Singapore participated as a core member, but Cambodia, the Philippines, and Thailand for the first time participated in that training as an observer in October 2004. That is regarded as an enlarging nonproliferation network in the Southeast Asia.⁹

China and Korea have not participated in the PSI.¹⁰ China's positive contribution to the PSI is, however, well appreciated by the US. In summer of 2003, China stopped on its soil an illicit trafficking of TBP, solvent to reprocess weapons-grade plutonium from spent fuel, to North Korea,

after having received information from the US CIA. Then Undersecretary of States, Mr. Bolton, made a statement of appreciation over China's conduct as a proof of sharing the same purposes with the PSI members.¹¹

Concerning other initiatives on counter-proliferation, Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Transshipment Country Export Control Initiative (TECI) are of more importance. Led by Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) of Department of Homeland Security (DHS), CSI has been developed to identify and target containers that pose a risk for terrorism, using intelligence, automated information and prescreening. CSI allows US inspectors in foreign ports, based on reciprocity, to screen high-risk shipping containers before they are loaded in ships bound for the US. Currently, 37 ports (35 are in operation) of 20 countries are in various stages of CSI implementation. Customs and border protection authorities of 20 countries exchanged agreements for CSI with BCBP of the US DHS. In Asia, the following ports are in operation of the CSI: Singapore (10 March 2003), Yokohama, Japan (24 March 2003), Hong Kong (5 May 2003), Pusan, Korea (4 August 2003), Port Klang, Malaysia (8 March 2003), Tokyo, Japan (21 May 2004), Nagoya and Kobe, Japan (6 August 2004), Laem Chabang, Thailand (13 August 2004), Tanjung Pelepas, Malaysia (16 August 2004), Dubai, UAE (26 March 2005) and Shanghai, China (28 April 2005). Among 35 ports in operation, 12 are in Asia, while 20 being in Europe, 2 South America, and 1, Africa. China's cooperation with US-led initiative is well accepted by the US.¹²

Department of Commerce (DOC) has adopted TECI agreements with trade and export control agencies in key transshipment countries which are

⁸ <http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/tp> ; <http://www.state.gov/t/np/>; latest information is [state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm](http://www.state.gov/t/np/c10390.htm). ("Croatia Sign Mutual Shipboarding Pact with United States" (1 Jun. 2005)).

⁹ http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofa/gaiko/fukaku_j/psi (date accessed: between 1 Jun. 2003 and 20 May 2005).

¹⁰ China's position was explained in, e.g., *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.15, No.2 (Nov. 2004), p. 34.

¹¹ <http://asahi.com/international/update/0221/001.html> (date accessed: 21 Feb.2003).

¹² <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ComplianceAndEnforcement/> ; and http://www.customs.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/international_act/ ; (Both accessed between 1 Nov. 2003 and 20 May 2005.) See also, e.g., *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol. 12, No.2 (Nov. 2001) – Vol.15, No.7 (Apr. 2005).

not members to international export control regimes, in order to assist effective export control measures. DOC also works with industry, including companies involved in the transportation of goods through transshipment country hubs, major consignees and end-users of goods located in hubs for preventing illicit transshipments. In Asia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Cyprus and the UAE made agreements with DOC for better enforcement of US export control laws.¹³

(3) Stronger Presence of China and India

(a) Nonproliferation Efforts of China

15 years ago, it was a difficult task to make China abide by nonproliferation regime. Strategy of the US was to make economic cooperation agreements in the fields of *e.g.*, space trade (1988) and nuclear cooperation (1990).¹⁴ In return for granting preferable economic conditions to China, such agreements required China to comply with the parameters of export control regimes, in particular those of Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). However, until the end of 1990's, the following pattern repeated; China's noncompliance was found out, the US resorted to sanctions or at least made statements for that possibility, which was followed by the pledge of compliance for the future by China and sanction lifted. Then again, China's noncompliance was...¹⁵ Such situation changed. In November 2000, China announced that security

trade and export control laws would be enacted with the export licensing catalogues of sensitive items and technologies. By October 2002, China has the whole range of export control laws of "catch-all" principle with end-user and end-use certification system, licensing system, and list control method.¹⁶ China's national regulations met with the standards of MTCR, NSG, and Australia Group (AG), which was proudly announced by the first China's white paper on national nonproliferation policy, in December 2003.¹⁷

China was one of the first countries which supported seven points proposal on nonproliferation in a speech made by President Bush at National Defense University in February 2004.¹⁸ In May 2004, China became a member of NSG, and continues to apply for the membership of MTCR.¹⁹

On operational level, however, not everything was rosy. After 2002, US Sanctions have been imposed on to China's proliferation of sensitive materials and technology to Iran.²⁰ However, the difference is that China is now a firm believer that nonproliferation is a national interests to China, in order not to have potential military rivals, thus building a peaceful Asia in which China can focus on its economic development as well as to be the regional leader representing the global justice.²¹ Confidence-Building measures between China and Russia also continues to work.²²

¹³ See, *e.g.*, <http://www.bis.doc.gov/ComplianceAndEnforcement/ExecutiveSummary.htm> (date accessed: 4 May 2005.).

¹⁴ See, *e.g.*, Congressional Hearings, 10 Apr. 1997; China-United States 3 Agreements Regarding Commercial Satellite Launches, 17 Dec. 1988 & 26 Jan. 1989. Cited in *International Legal Materials*, Vol.28 (1989), pp. 596-610.

¹⁵ See, *e.g.*, Setsuko Aoki, "Commercial Utilization of Outer Space: Current Legal Problems on Communication Satellites" (in Japanese), *Kuho (Journal of Air Law)*, No.40, (1999), pp. 1-28.

¹⁶ See, *e.g.*, Table of China's laws and regulations on export control is seen in Jing-Dong Yuan, "Strengthening China's Export Control System" (4 Oct. 2002), p. 6. <http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/china/chiexp/pdfs/jdmemo.pdf> (date accessed: 3 March 2005).

¹⁷ See, *e.g.*, Stephanie Lieggi, "China's White Paper on Nonproliferation: Export Control Hit the Big Time", (Dec., 2003) http://www.nti.org/e_research/e3_36.html (date accessed: 1 May 2005).

¹⁸ *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.14, No.5 (Feb. 2004), p. 33.; see, also, Paul Kerr, "China Stresses Common Approach with Bush Administration's Nonproliferation Policy", *Arms Control Today*, (Jan./Feb. 2004), http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_01_02/China (date accessed: 14 Jan. 2005).

¹⁹ *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.14, No.4 (Jan. 2004), p. 30; *idem*, Vol.14, No.5 (Feb.2004), p. 33.

²⁰ See, *e.g.*, *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.15, No.4 (Jan. 2005), p. 34.

²¹ *China Daily*, (3 Dec. 2003), pp. 1-2.

²² *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.14, No.2 (Sept. 2004), p. 39.

(b) India's Surge: Improving Relationship with the US

With the nuclear explosion in May 1998, India and Pakistan became nuclear states outside the NPT. India's nuclear doctrine was published in January 2003 to reassure international community.²³ Pakistan promulgated national laws to prevent illicit trafficking of materials and equipments for WMD and their means of delivery. Pakistan announced that it would become a party to the CTBT provided that India accedes to that treaty. Both nations, however, have not signed the treaty yet. Among 44 nations the ratification of which is necessary for the entering into force of the CTBT, only 3 countries are now non-signatory: India, Pakistan and North Korea.

Recently, the US-India ties have been steadily strengthened especially in the fields of hi-technology trade and antiterrorism measures. Promising results yielded through a bilateral High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) established in November 2002, led to the setting up of a strategic framework, known as the Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) in January 2004 in order to expand cooperation in four specific areas: high-technology trade, civilian space program, civilian nuclear activities, and missile defense.²⁴ First phase of the NSSP included measures to assure that exported goods and technologies from the US would be made available in India in accordance with US export control laws and regulations.²⁵ On September 17th of 2004, second phase agreement was concluded as an international cooperation based on Security Council Resolution 1540. Thus, will India also be a core member of PSI? It is reported in Indian media that in March 2004, the US asked India to participate in PSI. Currently India seems rather hesitant to become an active participant. Reasons would include that core members are mostly

US close allies the labeling of which India does not want, and that relationship with Iran is likely to be damaged by becoming an active member.²⁶

(c) Japan's Growing Leadership in Nonproliferation

Japan has been more actively involved with nonproliferation efforts beginning in 1990's. Asian Senior-level Talks on Non-Proliferation (ASTOP), held twice in Tokyo, in November 2003 and in February 2005, is one such example. Although increasing necessity exists against terrorism measures in Asia, many nations in this area have not equipped with appropriate national legislation on security trade and export control laws. That is partly because they have been outside the export control regimes including NSG, MTCR, AG, and Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), and thus, until recently they did not find a reason to be bothered by such laws and regulations to harm the benefits of the free trade. As a part of regional cooperation, Japan invited senior-level officials from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 10 nations, China (participated only in the second ASTOP), Korea, the US and Australia to confirm a shared goal, to provide information concerning the measures already taken by countries with more experiences. At the first ASTOP, detailed information on PSI and its Interdiction Principle were provided to the participants for future consideration.

Outreach activities on security trade and export control laws have been steadily undertaken by Japan. Since 1993, Asian Export Control Seminar has been held for 12 times in Japan that has constructed a firm framework on which oversea seminars were held twice hosted by the local governments and Japan.²⁷ UAE and Pakistan participated for the first time in 2004 in Asian

²³ Aug. 17, 1999, India released a draft report on Indian nuclear doctrine. Full text is cited in "India's Draft Nuclear Doctrine" *Arms Control Today*, (Jul./Aug. 1999).

²⁴ See, e.g., Peter Slevin, "US to send India Nuclear, Space Technology", *Washington Post*, (13 Jan. 2004) p.A14. See, also, Kenneth I. Juster, Undersecretary of Commerce, "Cybersecurity: A Key to US-India Trade", <http://www.state.gov/p/sa/rls/rm/37039.htm> (date accessed: 3 Apr. 2005).

²⁵ See, "US and India: Building Global Partnership", *FICCI News*, (21 Apr. 2004).

²⁶ Reshmi Kazi, "Proliferation Security Initiative and India". *Peace & Conflict*, Vol. 7, No. 10 (Oct. 2004), pp. 20-21; Subhash Kapila, "India Should not Join Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)", South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 969 (1 Apr. 2004). <http://www.saag.org/papers10/paper969.html> (date accessed: 30 Apr. 2005).

²⁷ Beijing Seminar was held in 2004 and Seoul Seminar in 2005.

Export Control Seminar, thereby 21 nations gathered including China and Mongolia.

Asian Export Control Policy Dialogue has been already twice held in Tokyo,²⁸ in 2003 and 2004, which led to the basic principles for improvement of the national legislation (“catch-all”) and implementation in accordance with export control regimes. Further, based on ASEAN-Japan Action Program in 2002, 7 export control seminars were conducted in 7 different ASEAN countries between 2004 and 2005. Similar engagement, outreach activities and cooperation measures have been taken in various mechanisms of the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) as well.

An example of Positive outcomes of such interacting efforts includes bilateral agreements to prevent indirect or circumventive trade between Singapore (April 2004) and Hong Kong (May 2004).

4. Little Progress in Arms Control

(1) Chilling Relationship between the US and Russia

In 2004, not a single meeting of an offensive transparency working group of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) was held for the latest US-Russia Strategic Offensive Capabilities Reduction Treaty (SORT), or Moscow Treaty, signed in May 2002. Since Moscow Treaty does not provide for how to count the reductions on both side for purposes of the Treaty, nor does it contain verification provisions different from the traditional bilateral arms control treaties, regular consultation and exchange of information at CGSS could have been treated as a more important

mechanism to build mutual confidence and expand transparency.²⁹ Although no longer an enemy to each other, nuclear rivalry continues. Responding to the termination of ABM treaty in June 2002 and the US MD to be deployed, Russia is now developing new offensive strategic capabilities designed to countermeasure US MD. On the US part, it is studying the feasibility of developing smaller nuclear weapons that can penetrate deep under ground, known as “bunker busters”.³⁰

Under the circumstances, positive results in Russian-US arms control would include the Arrangement on Cooperation in Enhancing Control on Manportable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) that was signed in February 2005.³¹

(2) FMCT and PAROS

Differences remain to be solved between the US on one side and Russia and China on the other in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). The US has not and would not accept the strategy that Russia and China have employed in the CD, linking the start of a negotiation of the FMCT with the re-establishment of *ad hoc* Committee on Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). Russia and China aim to negotiate or at least, try to discuss on the possibility of negotiating a treaty to ban weaponization of outer space.³² The obvious target is missile defense program by the US and its allies. A series of joint proposals by Russia and China on banning space weapons in the CD have not attracted enthusiastic support, for it is Russia and China, other than the US, who have tested and maintained Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons- a type of space weapons- program. Although the US basically supports the start of negating a FMCT, its objection to provide for verification provisions in a treaty could pose a threat to reach a satisfactory draft treaty

²⁸ Eight countries participated: Australia, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Thailand and the US.

²⁹ See, e.g., “US-Russian Nuclear Rivalry lingers”, *Arms Control Today*, (Jan/Feb 2005), p. 2. See, also “US-Russian Arms Reduction Body Yet to Meet”, *Arms Control Today* (Mar. 2004) http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_3/newsbriefs.asp#Export (date accessed: 8 Mar.2004).

³⁰ See, e.g., “US not hypocritical in Pursuing Nuclear “Bunker Buster” Option: Rumsfeld”, *Space War* (4 Jun. 2005). <http://www.spacewar.com/2005/05060453902.ikj1aw1i.html> (date accessed: 4 Jun. 2005).

³¹ *Export Control News* (in Japanese), Vol.15, No.5 (Feb. 2005), p. 31.

³² See, e.g., CD Press Document (7 Sept. 2004); Press Release (7 Aug. 2003); CD/1725 (27 Jan. 2004); CD/PV.933 (13 Jul. 2003); CD/1687 (8 Oct. 2002).

in the future. At present, nuclear states but China declare their moratorium on producing weapons-grade fissile materials.

(3) G8 Global Partnership and other Threat Reduction Initiatives

Russian weapons-grade fissile materials have been the focus of the concerns since the dissolve of the Soviet Union, and the situation has not been dramatically improved up until now. Considerable period has elapsed since cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program began in accordance with Nunn-Lugar Act of 1991.³³ CTR had been developed into various forms of multilateral cooperation, finally into G8 Global Partnership in June 2002 Kananaskis Summit. G8 and 13 additional cooperative states are now engaging this Partnership for the purposes of preventing terrorists or states that support them from acquiring WMD. Such efforts remain to be evaluated a success. The fear is commonly shared in the international community that loosely managed WMD, nuclear materials and equipments in the former Soviet Union might be unwittingly put in the hands of terrorists. In May 2004, US Secretary of Energy announced “Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRS)”, which aims to retrieve all the high-enriched uranium (HEU) having exported to approximately 40 countries from Russia and the US within a decade. Arms control experts are, in general, of the opinion that it is a hard task to really accomplish.³⁴

(4) Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaties

Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Treaty (SEANWFZ), or Bangkok Treaty, was a long-desired instrument as a part of Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) declared by original five members of the ASEAN in 1971. While all ten ASEAN nations are currently parties

to Bangkok Treaty, some of its value, at least, is compromised by the fact that none of five nuclear weapon states (NWS) has signed the Protocol in which NWS are to pledge not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within SEANWFZ. The main reason for unsuccessful “negative security assurances” by NWS is that SEANWFZ covers continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of the states parties within the Zone, which implies NWS would be under the obligation that neither the Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention (1982) nor other NWFZ treaties have imposed on once ratifying the Protocol. LOS Convention provides that while each coastal state has sovereign rights on continental shelf and in the EEZ over natural resources, otherwise such areas are treated as high seas. Ongoing consultations have been held between ASEAN and NWS, but no nation has signed as of yet.³⁵

As another NWFZ treaty, Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty was adopted five years after five Central Asian States, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, launched an initiative of setting up of a NWFZ in 1997. The negotiation of the text was concluded in Samarkand meeting in September 2002. Then came the first consultative meeting between five Central Asian nations and NWS in order to facilitate the agreement on the Protocol annexed to the Treaty with respect to negative security assurances.³⁶ Pledges by the NWS have not been granted to the five Central Asian states, for the sphere of obligation of NWS is somewhat vague. A question remains to be solved if other commitments of the future parties to CANWFZ including the possibility of allowing Russia to introduce nuclear weapons in emergencies should overrule the CANFWZ treaty (Article 12).

³³ Concrete results in the Clinton administration was published on 20 Nov. 2003 “Lugar wants Expanded Nunn-Lugar Program to Combat Proliferation”. <http://uninfo.state.gov/topical/pol/arms/03111902.htm> (date accessed: 9 Dec. 2003); see, also, “US, Russia Hail First Joint Venture in Closed Nuclear City” *Washington File* (6 Nov. 2003).

³⁴ Latest concrete results yielded from CTR is cited in USDOS, *United States Initiatives to Prevent Proliferation*, DOS Pub. No.11254, (1 Jun. 2005), pp. 3-4. See, e.g., Claire Applegarth “U.S. Says it Will Complete Russian Nuclear Security Upgrades by 2008, *Arms Control Today*, (Jan/Feb. 2005). <http://www.armscontrol.org>. (date accessed: 3 May 2005).

³⁵ See, e.g., “Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Bangkok)” *CNS Inventory*, SEANWFZ-2.

³⁶ See, e.g., UNDoc. A/C.1/57/L.24/Rev.1 (2 Oct. 2002); “Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ)” <http://www.disarmament.un.org.8080/rcpd/centasia.htm> (date accessed: 4 Apr. 2004).

Mongolia, since 1992, has been declaring itself a nuclear weapons free zone; UN General Assembly has been making a biannual welcoming resolution since 1998.

Surrounded by nuclear states, and having complicated history and resources implications, establishing NWFZ is a desirable step to develop at least a part of Asia into a more stable region.

5. Conclusion

More than a decade, progress of arms control and disarmament has been slow in Asia. Dr. Khan's nuclear network found out in February 2004 and subsequent UNSC resolution 1540 forced Asian region to collectively combat WMD proliferation through export and border control laws, strengthened law enforcement system and active involvement with a variety of transport security mechanisms. Since improvement of security trade and export control laws has just begun in many countries in this region, it is necessary that adequate

cooperation and guidance be provided in regional frameworks including in various organs and mechanisms of ARF (Asian Regional Forum), ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting) and APEC. Efforts have been already made in that direction, thus it is desirable in the next decade, a further promotion on regional cooperation must be intensively pursued. It would also constitute an ongoing confidence-building steps in this region.

Simultaneously, disarmament efforts have to be steadily made in order to produce a result, however modest it may be. First, differences must be resolved on the scope of the Bangkok Treaty as well as the interpretation of Article 12 of the Central Asia NWFZ Treaty to make NWS ratify the Protocol thereto. More compromise should be made on the part of NWS, considering their privileged status tolerated by the non-nuclear weapons states. Second, continuous work has to be undertaken to prevent the illicit trafficking of SALW and MANPADS. Under the present circumstances, modest but steady efforts are strongly needed.

New Horizons in Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Research

Dr. Robert Lawson

This paper outlines a number of new and exciting horizons for research on Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament. While it concentrates on areas that are important for Canada, many of these issues are also priorities for Japan. Indeed, our two countries share many similar perspectives in this field and a number of the areas covered in this presentation seem to offer good opportunities for Canada-Japan collaboration. In particular, areas such as space security, proliferation security, and verification and compliance would seem to hold significant potential for joint work. Canada and Japan have worked together closely in the multilateral context and we look forward to exploring how we can continue and strengthen this cooperation with Japan in the future.

1. INTRODUCTION – NEW RESEARCH METHODS

The International Security Research and Outreach Programme (ISROP) is located within the International Security Bureau of Foreign Affairs Canada. The mandate of ISROP is provide timely, high quality policy relevant research on international security, non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament issues to support Canadian policy development and the efforts of Canadian officials in their work abroad. ISROP provides this policy research through research partnerships involving experts from Canada and abroad with an emphasis upon developing Canadian capacities to engage with these issues.

New research tools developed within ISROP such as ‘Fast Talk’ and ‘Quick Click’_teams are designed to provide a range of research perspectives on a specific research questions in a timely and efficient manner by using teleconferencing and web-based applications. Over the past year ISROP has used these new research tools to advance Canadian NACD research in the areas of Space Security and the verification of and compliance with weapons of mass destruction treaties and regimes. This presentation provides two executive summaries of recent research work completed by ISROP in

these two areas.

2. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION – VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE

ISROP recently completed a two-part study on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) verification and compliance. The first part of the study entitled *WMD Verification and Compliance: The State of Play* (October 2004) was completed for ISROP by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC). This study was designed to provide a baseline analysis of the principal WMD agreements and the mechanisms by which compliance with their obligations is verified and, when required, suspected and verified non-compliance issues are resolved.

Building on VERTIC’s analysis, the second portion of the study entitled *Weapons of Mass Destruction Verification and Compliance: Challenges and Responses* (November 2004), was commissioned from 59 Canadian and international experts by ISROP and addressed two forward looking questions. What are the challenges currently facing our WMD verification and compliance mechanisms? What are some of the practical and potentially achievable responses to

these challenges? To develop responses to these questions, ISROP utilized an integrated consultation process which combined an expert questionnaire of 72 questions on general WMD-related verification and compliance issues, nuclear and radiological-, chemical-, and biological weapons verification and compliance issues, and missile verification and compliance issues. Following the questionnaire, a series of 5 conference calls took place and a two-day workshop with approximately 20 Canadian and international government and non-government experts was held.

The findings from both parts of this study were presented to the third meeting of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) in Vancouver, Canada in November 2004. Complete copies of these studies can be found at <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No19.pdf> and <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/No20.pdf>.

Part I -WMD Verification and Compliance: The State of Play

This study considers the current state of play of verification and compliance arrangements in respect of multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements relating to so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It covers the principal WMD agreements and the means by which compliance with them is monitored and verified, along with the means by which compliance is ensured in case of a suspected violation. It will provide a snapshot of the current state of the art and science of verification and compliance not just for its own sake, but as background to consideration of future needs in the evolving international security environment.

It is assumed that WMD comprise nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. The study does not deal with export/import controls on WMD or their components, international controls on ballistic or other types of missiles, or multilateral treaties dealing with the deployment of weapons in outer space.

Verification

Verification is the process of gathering and analyzing information to make a judgement about compliance or non-compliance with a treaty or agreement. It aims to build trust between the parties or participants, assuring them that their agreement is being implemented effectively and fairly. Verification achieves its objectives by three means: detection; deterrence; and confidence-building. Monitoring, which is sometimes equated with verification, is in this study meant to refer to the technical process of gathering information, whether by technology or by humans.

Compliance

When a party is abiding by its obligations under an agreement it is said to be in compliance. 'Compliance' is also used to describe the process used to deal with questions relating to compliance and non-compliance, which, for some, runs the whole spectrum from monitoring at one end through to attempts to enforce compliance at the other. A compliance process should enable parties to successfully address all types of compliance issues and be able to take action or recommend the taking of action to deal with them.

The relationship between verification and compliance

Verification and compliance processes cannot always be clearly separated. A verification mechanism may be used to verify ongoing compliance by parties. It should also be able to inform or trigger a compliance process, as well as providing information to confirm or refute an allegation of non-compliance.

Above all, verification and compliance processes should be mutually reinforcing. If conducted well, they should give states increasing levels of confidence about treaty implementation and about the commitment of other parties to the fulfillment of their obligations. As in the case of an effective verification system, the existence of a credible compliance system can be an incentive to states to join a treaty (although in a small number

of cases it may be a disincentive).

Multilateral WMD verification is currently better governed, organized, funded and supported by the requisite technical and technological means than ever before. Enormous advances have been made since 1972, when the NPT, the first major multilateral WMD treaty with a matching verification system, entered into force. Compliance mechanisms for multilateral WMD regimes, in contrast, are underdeveloped, untested and subject to doubt and confusion. There remains much work to be done to clarify how non-compliance cases should be dealt with and to broaden the range of incentives and disincentives that may be employed to bring a recalcitrant state back into compliance.

The regimes

Multilateral WMD verification today is a substantial international enterprise. Recurrent annual expenditure on multilateral verification currently totals more than \$300 million. More than 3,000 people are employed by international verification bodies, not counting the hundreds more employed by national implementing authorities and regional organizations. The number of full-time arms control/disarmament inspectors employed by multilateral agencies exceeds 700, while a further 380 are on UNMOVIC's roster (in addition to a notional number on the roster of the UN Secretary-General for CBW use investigations).

The great lacuna here is BW: attempts to provide the BWC with a verification agency have failed utterly. Only UNMOVIC has anything approaching what would be needed for BW and it is mandated only to deal with Iraq, while the UN Secretary-General's mechanism is hyper-virtual. Without strong US support and advocacy there is currently no prospect of this situation changing dramatically despite the earnest discussion among BWC states parties.

Governance and organization

Much has been learned by now about the organizational structures required for effective verification, especially when a comprehensive

system is envisaged. There is now a standard model of a conference of states parties, an executive body and a technical secretariat, including where necessary a standing inspectorate. International verification organizations still, however, rarely adopt best management practices, as used in business or in the more effective national governments. There would appear to be no a priori reason why the highest managerial standards—including those relating to finance and human resources—should not be expected of our verification systems. International security is too important to be waylaid by distracting organizational problems that have ready solutions.

Funding

The question of the funding of verification is perennially fraught. While no one expects verification systems to be given a blank cheque, verification cannot be expected to be done on the cheap lest it discredit the whole enterprise. All of the multilateral verification organizations are experiencing funding challenges as more effective and intrusive verification is demanded of them and technological possibilities grow. Verification regimes themselves, where possible, should seek for new funding possibilities, including foundations and commercial spin-offs.

Techniques and technologies

The extent to which the latest and most appropriate techniques and technologies can be used in multilateral verification systems is, perhaps surprisingly, often controversial. To begin with, there is always a trade-off between effectiveness and cost. States parties will naturally want to keep the costs of verification as low as possible, while still giving the verification system the requisite degree of credibility.

Another difficulty is that verification technology can be so specialised that it must be researched and developed by verification bodies themselves: no commercial company will invest in research for such a limited market and potentially low profit. This can be a heavy burden on verification organisations, although creative

partnerships with universities and less commercially-driven organisations should be possible.

National technical and technological incapacity for self-monitoring and for implementing treaty commitments is also a major issue in many regimes. Many developing countries, especially in Africa, and those that used to be part of the Soviet empire, struggle to report on their own compliance with international treaties and to adopt national implementation measures.

As a multilateral verification technique, on-site inspections have come a long way. There are now bodies of professional on-site inspectors, detailed protocols, procedures and technologies for on-site inspections, and a useful corpus of experience in making them effective. UNSCOM and UNMOVIC vastly increased our experience of the power and challenges of OSIs. The difficulties that the CTBTO is facing in reaching agreement on its OSI manual indicate, however, the sensitivities surrounding on-site inspections and the need for an educational process about them.

Use of information

One of the most pleasing verification developments in recent years has been the realization that multilateral verification organizations can and should use the vast array of open source material to their advantage. Commercial satellite imagery and the internet are just the most obvious of the new information tools available.

Similarly, the use of information provided by states from their national technical means (NTM) is a significant development. The experience of UNMOVIC, however, should be a warning for the standing verification bodies. The intelligence information provided to UNMOVIC and the IAEA about Iraq was late and much of it was of dubious character. While there are clearly enormous difficulties in states obtaining credible information from closed, autocratic regimes through NTM, those states that are able to provide NTM-derived information should be more honest and transparent

in doing so.

Building the international verification community

One of the critical lessons that can be drawn from the experience of multilateral verification and compliance regimes over recent years has been the need to sustain political support and relevance. Political support can, naturally, wax and wane after a verification system has been put in place. While this might seem to be an unavoidable fact of international political life, there are steps that verification bodies can take to cushion themselves. They could start by cultivating stakeholders elsewhere, including in civil society and among NGOs, the general public, the media and the philanthropic foundation world, and even in business. The multilateral organizations need to do better at promoting an appreciation of the contribution they make to international peace and security.

Part II – WMD Verification and Compliance: Challenges and Responses

This section provides the major conclusions and recommendations of the integrated expert consultations on WMD-related verification and compliance issues, organized thematically rather than by weapons type.

Expanding the Scope of WMD Verification and Compliance Mechanisms

Well planned and fully resourced efforts should be undertaken to universalize existing WMD verification and compliance regimes. UN verification and compliance capabilities should be reinforced by creating a new independent WMD investigative unit designed to complement existing WMD verification and compliance mechanisms.

The UN Security Council should ensure effective implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which mandates compliance with WMD obligations at the national level related to preventing the proliferation of WMD to non-state

actors.

Options for expanding the application of verification and compliance mechanisms to WMD related activities should be explored, including measures applying to cooperative threat reduction efforts, nuclear export control guidelines, the security of chemical and biological relevant facilities, the end-use of exported missiles and related technology, and the Hague Code of Conduct.

All states that have not yet signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a key element in the global nuclear verification and compliance regime, should do so immediately. This applies especially to states listed in the treaty's Annex II. Meanwhile, work should continue, with urgency, to prepare all elements of the CTBT's verification system.

Nuclear weapons states should consider contributing to global nuclear verification and compliance efforts by submitting all of their civilian nuclear activities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and extending their Additional Protocols to all domestic civilian activities. They should also move forward on the removal of fissile material from weapons programmes under IAEA verification (e.g., implementation of the trilateral initiative) and ensure that nuclear disarmament agreements/arrangements, including existing bilateral agreements, are subject to effective verification mechanisms, including multilateral involvement.

Consideration should be given to encouraging states outside the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to accept more comprehensive multilateral commitments and safeguards relating to their civilian nuclear cycles, including negotiation of a full-scope safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol with the IAEA.

To support UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and strengthen the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) verification capabilities, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) states parties should be required to report to the OPCW on the measures they are

taking to meet their 1540 obligations as they relate to chemical weapons. To the extent possible, the Secretariat of the OPCW should, in cooperation with the 1540 Committee, monitor compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of 1540 insofar as they are related to chemical weapons.

Renewed efforts to develop an effective verification and compliance regime for biological weapons should be high priority. Support should be provided to proposals to strengthen the UN Secretary-General's power to verify alleged use of biological and toxin weapons as well as suspect biological facilities. States should release publicly their confidence building measures, and the establishment of a small secretariat to monitor BTWC confidence building measures should be considered. This secretariat could also monitor reports submitted by states in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1540, as they relate to biological weapons. States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) should be encouraged to hold annual meetings between review conferences beyond the 2006 Review Conference to address 'compliance management' issues and important biological weapons-related developments.

States should be urged to consider the negotiation of regional measures on missile-related non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament, focusing initially on confidence-building measures including transparency and voluntary mutual monitoring of commitments.

The UN should be encouraged to continue its efforts in the missile field, with special attention to norm-building and confidence building measures, as a first step towards fully developed verification and compliance mechanisms.

Addressing Emerging Verification Challenges

The IAEA Additional Protocol should become the new compulsory standard for nuclear safeguards. States should not receive nuclear technology or materials transfers unless they conclude such agreements. The adoption of higher standards for verifying nuclear accounting, safety

and physical protection should be given a high priority. Negotiations on strengthening the Convention on Physical Protection should be concluded as soon as possible. The Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, including sections relating to the import and export guidelines, should be made obligatory and legally binding. The IAEA should verify compliance with both the Physical Protection Convention and the Code of Conduct.

The IAEA should commission an expert study to develop a standardized system of accounting for all fissile material for all states. To enhance the verifiability of peaceful nuclear programmes, consideration should be given to the internationalization of all uranium reprocessing and enrichment capabilities, beginning with any new facilities and progressively encompassing all reprocessing and enrichment facilities.

The Conference on Disarmament (CD) should re-start negotiations towards a fully verified Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) as soon as possible. In the meantime, the CD should establish a group of experts to review and develop mechanisms and procedures for effectively verifying compliance with such a treaty.

The CWC Scientific Advisory Board should study the impact of recent scientific and technological developments in order to make recommendations to the Conference of States Parties on new chemicals that should be added to the schedules of chemicals subject to verification and compliance.

The OPCW should explore new techniques to monitor CW stockpile destruction, such as non-human monitoring arrangements, freeing resources for verification of production of CWC Schedule 2 and 3 chemicals and discrete organic chemicals.

An independent expert study should examine the implications of the development of new biochemical agents, including “non-lethal” biochemicals, for the effectiveness of verification and compliance measures under the CWC, including aspects related to the “law enforcement”

exemption.

An independent expert study should examine scientific and technological advances in the biological sciences and related fields and their implications for BTWC verification and compliance.

Compliance Management

There is a need to develop “rules of the road” for dealing with difficult compliance issues at both treaty regime and UN Security Council levels, including greater commitment to verification assessments by independent professional bodies.

Greater focus should be placed upon WMD compliance management issues, including the development of more nuanced assessments of compliance situations and efforts to explore a wider range of options to restore compliance, including greater utilization of existing compliance management mechanisms.

The 2005 NPT Review Conference should mandate a standardized formal reporting, consultation and clarification mechanism for all states regarding their status of compliance with the NPT.

Investing in Smart WMD Verification and Compliance Mechanisms

Periodic independent expert reviews of the performance of WMD verification and compliance implementation agencies should be undertaken, and recommendations for reforms prepared for the consideration of states parties.

A world-class centre of excellence focused on the analysis of WMD verification and compliance issues should be established to encourage cross-fertilization of experience and expertise within and between existing and emerging WMD verification and compliance mechanisms.

States, private donors and foundations should be called upon to invest more resources in WMD verification and compliance capacities, including UN and treaty implementing organizations, national

programs and non-governmental organizations active on these issues.

In cooperation with treaty implementing institutions, greater resources should be devoted to financial and technical assistance for capacity-building within selected states to assist them in fulfilling their WMD verification and compliance commitments and obligations.

Non-governmental organizations should be actively encouraged, where appropriate, to assist in the development and implementation of WMD verification and compliance mechanisms, particularly through track II type contacts and initiatives.

3. SPACE SECURITY 2004

History may well judge 2004 to have been a watershed year for space security. It marked the first privately funded launch of a person into space to win the "X Prize." Commercial space revenues exceeded \$100 billion for the first time in 2004. The US articulated a bold new vision for human space flight back to the Moon and on to Mars. China completed more space launches than any previous year. The resolution of the EU/US dispute over Galileo/Global Positioning System frequency allocation in 2004 opened the way for further development of an unprecedented global utility that has become essential to millions of civil, commercial, and military space actors and applications. In a few years, the US will have as much invested in space as it does in Europe.

Under the Outer Space Treaty, space is open to everyone and belonging to no one. Space is also a global commons that borders every community on Earth and secure access to and use of space has been critical to its development as a new center of strategic social, economic, and military power. Space has also become a critical part of our national and international infrastructure; it supports our medical systems, our public services, our communications systems, our financial institutions, and our militaries. Indeed, today it is difficult to imagine our societies and economies functioning

without the support of space-based assets. However, the dynamics of space security remain poorly understood. Space is uniquely fragile as an environment and the resources of Earth's orbital space are limited. It is not clear how we can best balance today's competing civil, commercial, and military interests against the need for sustainable uses of space that will ensure its utility for future generations.

The following section provides a summary of *Space Security 2004*, the first comprehensive set of assessments of the longer term trends and annual developments that shape the dynamics of space security, defined as ***secure and sustainable access to and use of space, and freedom from space-based threats***. *Space Security 2004* is based wholly on open source material which does impose some unavoidable limitations. For example, our analysis is inevitably more focused on those states and other actors that publish more about their space activities. We have tried to be as objective as possible, both in presenting the facts contained in this volume and in providing assessments of trends and developments.

However, assessments of the impact of these trends and developments upon space security are, of course, inherently subjective. How someone views the status of space security very often depends on where one stands. US experts have a tendency to view space security developments differently from EU, Chinese, or Russian expert participants, and this is equally true of experts from the civil, commercial, and military space sectors. Thus, we believe that one of the unique features of *Space Security 2004* is the provision, through the Space Security Survey and Space Security Working Group, of space security assessments from various space sectors and a range of space faring states. A full copy of this research report can be found at <http://spacesecurity.org/SSI2004.pdf>.

I. The Space Environment

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

Growing debris threats to spacecraft, but annual rate of new debris production is decreasing – The number of objects in Earth orbit has increased steadily since the dawn of the space age. Approximately 13,000 objects large enough to seriously damage or destroy a spacecraft are in orbit today – over 90 percent of which are space debris. While this represents a growing threat to spacecraft, the annual rate of new debris production has been decreasing since the early 1990s, due in large part to national space agency debris mitigation efforts.

The space debris population continued to grow in 2004. Work continued on US technologies to mitigate debris production, by de-orbiting non-operational satellites (e.g. the Terminator Tether) and extending the operational life of satellites (e.g. the ConeXpress). The US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) released an environmental impact statement that examined the anticipated space debris impacts of its planned missile defense space-based interceptors.

Increasing awareness of space debris threats and continued efforts to develop international guidelines for debris mitigation – There is widespread recognition that space debris is a growing threat. There have already been a number of on-orbit collisions with space debris. Since the mid-1990s, many space-faring states, including China, the EU, Japan, Russia, and the US, have developed national debris mitigation standards. In 2001, the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) mandated the Inter-Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) to develop a set of voluntary international debris mitigation guidelines.

While the IADC submitted proposed debris mitigation guidelines to COPUOS in 2004, they were sent back to the IADC for more work after several states suggested significant modifications. At the national level, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new

regulations in 2004, requiring geostationary satellite operators to move satellites into ‘graveyard orbits’ 200 to 300 kilometers above GEO at the end of their operating life.

Growing demand for radio frequency spectrum – Expanding satellite applications are driving growing demand for radio frequency spectrum. The number of satellites operating in the 7-8 gigahertz band commonly used by GEO satellites has been increasing. Satellite operators now spend about five percent of their time addressing frequency interference issues. The growth in military bandwidth consumption has been dramatic. The US military used some 700 megabytes per second of bandwidth during Operation Enduring Freedom in 2003, compared to just 99 megabytes per second during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

In 2004, the US and EU reached an agreement on their long-standing dispute over frequency allocation between the US Global Positioning System (GPS) and the proposed EU Galileo navigational system. The US FCC agreed to allow spectrum sharing between certain Low Earth Orbit (LEO) operators. Plans by Vietnam to launch its first telecommunications satellite in 2005 were delayed when negotiations on frequency use with the operators of neighboring satellites failed.

Growing demand for orbital slot allocations – There are more than 620 operational satellites in orbit today: about 270 in LEO, 50 in Medium Earth Orbit, and slightly more than 300 in GEO. Demand is greatest for GEO orbital slots, where most communications satellites operate. Competition for orbital slot assignments has increased, and disputes between satellite operators seeking slots are more frequent.

In reaction to this scarcity of orbital slots, some actors agreed to exchange or share rights to certain slots in 2004. Telesat Canada agreed to allow a DirecTV satellite to move into one of its slots in exchange for Telesat Canada’s use of a DirecTV satellite in another orbital slot. New Skies sold the rights to an orbital slot to Intelsat, which had acquired a satellite that would be too close to avoid

interference if New Skies were ever to launch to that slot. Pakistan announced plans to launch an indigenous satellite in a slot that it had maintained with a place-keeping satellite. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) delayed internal reforms designed to address slot allocation backlogs and related financial challenges.

Space surveillance capabilities to support collision avoidance slowly improving – The US Space Surveillance Network uses 25 sites worldwide to monitor over 9,000 space objects in all orbits, providing the primary capability used by space actors for collision avoidance purposes. Russia maintains its Space Surveillance System with 14 sites, and monitors some 5,000 objects (mostly in LEO), but does not widely disseminate this information. The EU, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan are all developing new space surveillance capabilities.

In 2004, the US began restricting access to its space surveillance information, citing concerns about the potential for the information to be used for adversarial purposes. Japan's new space debris radar became operational and can detect objects one meter in diameter at a distance of 600 kilometers.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

Half of all Space Security Survey respondents and a majority of Space Security Working Group participants assessed that there was little or no effect on space security in 2004 with respect to this indicator. A strong minority of experts assessed that space security was somewhat enhanced, citing progress on debris mitigation efforts and the conclusion of an agreement on GPS-Galileo frequency interoperability. Many considered that cooperative measures to coordinate the use of radio frequency spectrum, such as the new US FCC regulations on frequency sharing, would improve the availability of these resources. Some experts also noted that while competition over scarce resources could lead to significant conflicts in the future, such conflicts were currently still rare. Many experts who assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced cited as cause for concern the continued growth in the

amount of space debris, and new US limitations on the Space Surveillance Network's provision of information to others on the orbital characteristics of satellites and debris. The potential for debris creation by kinetic energy space weapons, including the proposed testing of US space-based missile defense interceptors, was also mentioned as a cause for a negative assessment by several experts.

II. Laws, Policies, and Doctrines

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

Progressive development of legal framework for outer space activities – Since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, the international legal framework related to space has grown to include the Astronaut Rescue Agreement (1968), the Liability Convention (1972), the Registration Convention (1979), and the Moon Agreement (1979), as well as a range of other international and bilateral agreements and relevant customary international law. This legal framework establishes the principle, primarily through the Outer Space Treaty, that space should be used solely for 'peaceful purposes' and that space is not subject to claims of national sovereignty.

This legal framework prohibits the deployment anywhere in space of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002 eliminated a long-standing US/USSR-Russia prohibition on space-based conventional weapons, stimulating renewed concerns about the potential negative implications of space weaponization for space security.

Since 1981, the UN General Assembly (UNGA) has passed an annual resolution asking all states to refrain from actions contrary to the peaceful use of outer space and calling for negotiations within the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a multilateral agreement related to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS). In 2004, the UNGA once again passed a PAROS resolution, with 178 in favor, none against, and abstentions from Haiti, Israel, Palau,

and the US. This vote was consistent with several years of voting patterns on earlier UN PAROS resolutions, suggesting a consistent and widespread desire on the part of states to expand international law to include prohibitions against weapons in space.

COPUOS remains active, but the CD has been deadlocked on space weapons issues since 1998 – A range of international institutions, such as the UNGA, COPUOS, the ITU, and the CD, have been mandated to address space security issues. However, most critically for space security, the CD has been deadlocked since 1998 and unable to address the PAROS issue.

The CD remained deadlocked in 2004 and unable to undertake formal work on the PAROS issue. However, useful discussions were conducted on the margins of the CD. During an informal closed session on PAROS, several states called for the establishment of a CD expert group to discuss the broader technical questions surrounding space weapons. An additional informal meeting on 26 August 2004 provided states with an opportunity to make more detailed comments on issues related to space security and PAROS. COPUOS reached agreement in 2004 on the definition of a launching state, which could have a positive effect on issues associated with the application of the Liability Convention.

Space-faring states' national space policies consistently emphasize international cooperation and the peaceful uses of outer space – All space-faring states emphasize the importance of cooperation and the peaceful uses of space, including the use of space to promote national commercial, scientific, and technological advances. China, Brazil, and India tend to place a focus within their national space policies on the utility of space cooperation for social and economic development.

The trend toward greater international space cooperation continued in 2004. There was a deepening of space cooperation in Europe, with an expansion of European Space Agency (ESA) membership to include Luxembourg and Greece, and a partnership with Turkey. The draft EU

constitution also explicitly called for a European space policy and space program. The US announced plans in 2004 for peaceful space exploration on the Moon and Mars. The US vision proposed fulfilling commitments to the International Space Station; restoring the Space Shuttle to flight, but retiring it by 2010; undertaking robotic and human exploration of the Moon, Mars, and the Solar System; developing a Crew Exploration Vehicle for missions beyond Earth orbit; and pursuing commercial and international cooperation.

Growing focus within national military doctrine on the security uses of outer space – Fueled by the revolution in military affairs, the military doctrine of a growing number of states, led by China, Russia, the US, and key EU members, is increasingly emphasizing the use of military space systems to support terrestrial military operations. Dependence on space systems has led several of these states to view space assets as national security critical infrastructure. US military space doctrine has also begun to focus on the need to ensure US freedom of action in space, while preventing adversaries from accessing and using space when necessary.

Several states continued to place a greater emphasis on military space applications in 2004. The EU, France, Japan, and Russia articulated new policies designed to increase the uses of space for national security purposes. The US Air Force (USAF) released a doctrine document that outlined in greater detail the practice of 'counterspace operations.' To the extent that the USAF vision of counterspace doctrine is accepted by the US Government, this represents a significant departure from the broadly accepted international legal norm that space should be preserved as an environment that is open to all and belonging to none.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A majority of Space Security Survey respondents and Space Security Working Group participants assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced or reduced in 2004 with respect to this indicator. The most commonly cited

argument for this assessment was a strong sense that the apparent drive within US military space doctrine toward space control and counterspace capabilities could lead to the weaponization of space, and encourage other space actors to take countermeasures, such as the development of space systems negation capabilities. Some experts cited progress at COPUOS as a positive development with respect to space security. The deadlock at the CD, coupled with the perception that space-related international legal regimes are poorly enforced, was underscored by other experts as detrimental to space security. Finally, some experts pointed out that international space law has not been able to keep pace with the development of new national civil, commercial, and military space policies and capabilities.

III. Civil Space Programs and Global Utilities

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

Growth in the number of actors gaining access to space – By 2003, there were 10 actors with an independent orbital launch capacity, with an average of one new actor developing such a capability every eight years. A total of 44 states have accessed space through an independent launch capability or the launch capabilities of others. In the 1990s, the rate of increase in this capability doubled from just less than one to just less than two per year, mostly for civil space programs. Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd. of the UK has enabled seven countries to build their first civil satellite over the last 12 years.

2004 saw this trend toward greater civil space access continuing, with Iran announcing plans to launch a satellite in 2005, and South Korea and Russia signing an agreement on the joint development of a launch vehicle planned for use in 2007. The US Boeing Delta IV-Heavy launcher completed its first launch. While the Delta-IV Heavy launcher was developed primarily for the USAF, it will also provide new civil launch capabilities. Overall, a total of 28 civil assets, including satellites and human spaceflights, were

launched in 2004, in addition to five launches involving the deployment of seven global utility satellites.

Changing priorities and funding levels within civil space programs – The general trend in recent years has seen civil space expenditures increase in India and China and decrease in the US, Russia, and the EU. The budget of the Indian Space Research Organisation grew over 60 percent in real terms between 1990 and 2000, while the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and ESA budgets dropped by 25 percent and nine percent respectively between 1992 and 2001. The annual number of civil space missions has generally held steady for the past decade, with a decreasing number of manned missions, and an increasing number of missions involving small satellites and micro-satellites. Civil space programs are increasingly including security and development applications. India has designed 19 telecommunications and remote sensing satellites for development applications, and Malaysia, Thailand, Chile, Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa are all placing a priority on satellites to support social and economic development.

In 2004, China announced its intention to establish a manned space station in Earth orbit within 15 years. The US announced a new NASA plan that included returning humans to the moon by 2020 and on to Mars. The US Congress granted NASA its full budget request of \$16.2 billion for FY2005 — an increase of five percent over FY2004. China, France, Italy, Spain, and Saudi Arabia launched micro-satellites for civil applications in 2004, and India launched Edusat, its first dedicated educational satellite.

Steady growth in international cooperation in civil space programs – There have been a range of international civil space cooperation efforts over the past decades. These include the US-USSR Apollo-Soyuz docking of manned modules, USSR flights to the MIR space station with foreign representatives, joint NASA-ESA projects such as Skylab, and the Hubble Space Telescope. The most prominent example of international cooperation is the International Space Station, involving 16 partner

states, 44 launches, and an estimated cost of over \$100 billion. International civil space cooperation has played a key role in the proliferation of technical capabilities for states to access space.

This trend toward greater international cooperation in civil space programs continued in 2004. A 10-Year Implementation Plan was agreed by the 47 countries within the Global Earth Observation System of Systems initiative. In May, Israel selected India to launch its first astronomy satellite. In October, France and Russia reached an agreement to allow the Soyuz rocket to be launched from the ESA spaceport in French Guyana.

Dramatic growth in global utilities as states acknowledge strategic importance of satellite-based navigation systems – The use of space-based global utilities, including navigation, weather, and search and rescue systems, has grown significantly over the last decade. For example, GPS unit consumption grew by approximately 25 percent per year between 1996 and 1999, generating sales revenue of \$6.2 billion in 1999. Today, these systems have grown into space applications that have become almost indispensable to the civil, commercial, and military sectors, as well as most modern economies. Since 2001, satellite-based search and rescue systems have saved the lives of approximately 1,500 people per year, double the 1996 rate. The number of states developing satellite-based navigation capabilities has grown, from Russia and the US in 1990, to include three new systems led by China, the EU, and Japan in 2003. The strategic value of satellite navigation was underscored by the conflict over frequencies for Galileo and GPS.

A total of seven new global utilities satellites were launched in 2004, including one communications satellite and six navigation satellites. The longstanding EU/US conflict over Galileo/GPS frequencies was resolved in 2004. Progress was made on construction of the first two Galileo satellites, and agreements were reached between the EU and Israel and Ukraine on their formal participation in the program.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A significant minority of Space Security Survey respondents and Space Security Working Group participants assessed that there was little or no effect on space security in 2004 with respect to this indicator. Respondents who assessed that space security had been somewhat enhanced in 2004 tended to cite the resolution of the GPS/Galileo dispute, as well as new agreements with Ukraine and Israel that will enlarge the Galileo partnership. General growth in the use of global utilities, and corresponding growth in the number of space security stakeholders, was also emphasized as being positive for space security. The role of international civil cooperation in enhancing space security was also frequently noted.

Respondents who assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced in 2004 tended to cite as an issue of concern increased civil-military cooperation — particularly in the US but also in the EU — suggesting that this could encourage some actors to view civil space assets as potential targets for space system negation efforts. Some experts expressed concern about developments associated with the use of nuclear power on civil space missions.

IV. Commercial Space

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

Continued overall growth in the global commercial space industry – The commercial space sector, including manufacturing, launch services, space products, and operating insurance, accounted for an estimated \$2.1 billion in revenues in 1980 and \$91 billion in 2003. Given recent declining revenues within the manufacturing and launch sectors, this growth is currently being driven by the satellite services industry, including telecommunications, which accounted for 60 percent of 2003 commercial space revenues. Major commercial satellite telecommunications companies today include PanAmSat, Loral, SES Americom, Intelsat, and News Corporation.

The commercial space sector continued to grow in 2004, with sector-wide revenues topping \$100 billion. By June 2004, the number of Direct-to-Home television subscribers reached 23.4 million. The US FCC reported in January 2004 that satellites had overtaken cable broadcasters in the competition to provide television service. Military contracts continued to be a source of predicted growth for commercial space actors, second only to sustained telecommunications growth. The privatization of Intelsat in 2004 added a major new player to the commercial space sector. Consolidation appeared to be the priority for the Russian space industry. The Isle of Man announced a zero-tax policy for the space industry in an effort to attract commercial space activities.

Declining commercial launch costs support increased commercial access to space – Commercial space launches now account for about one-third of the total 60-70 yearly space launches. The costs to launch a satellite into GEO have declined from an average of about \$40,000/kilogram in 1990 to \$26,000/kilogram in 2000, with prices still falling. In 2000, payloads could be placed into LEO for as little as \$5,000/kilogram. The European and Russian space agencies are the most active space launch providers. Today's top commercial launch providers include Lockheed Martin and Boeing Launch Services in the US, Ariespace in Europe, Energia in Russia, and two international consortia — Sea Launch and International Launch Service. Cheaper space access has become a key factor in the growth of high-resolution commercial satellite imagery.

There were 20 commercial space assets launched in 2004. Mojave Aerospace Ventures' SpaceShipOne became the first private sub-orbital spacecraft in 2004, winning a \$10-million competition designed to spur innovation in commercial space access. Virgin Galactic announced a \$100-million investment in SpaceShipOne flights, to begin in 2007. Bigelow Aerospace announced the \$50-million America's Space Prize for the first private orbital flight in 2004. Space Exploration Technologies sold the first contract for its Falcon V rocket, reportedly 60-70 percent less expensive than Boeing's Delta II and

Delta IV launchers. US Congress passed into law the Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act of 2004, intended to promote the development of the emerging commercial human space industry.

Government subsidies and national security concerns continue to play an important role in the commercial space sector – The 1998 US Space Launch Cost Reduction Act and the 2003 European Guaranteed Access to Space program provide for significant government subsidization of the space launch and manufacturing markets, including insurance costs. The US space industry reportedly receives 80 percent of the total value of its space contracts from government funds, and in Europe this figure stands at 50 percent. The 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to restrict the proliferation of missile technology, has tended to encourage actors outside the regime to develop capabilities that are restricted by the regime itself. In 1999, the US transferred control of satellite export licensing from the Commerce Department to the State Department's US Munitions List, bringing satellite product export licensing under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations regime and significantly complicating the way US companies participate in international collaborative satellite launch and manufacturing ventures.

In 2004, the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company signed an estimated \$1.3-billion deal with ESA as part of the European Guaranteed Access to Space program, and signed a second contract with Ariespace for the production of 30 Ariane 5 launchers. Officials openly discussed the possibility of ending the Ariane rocket program after government subsidies run out in 2009. The US National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency also awarded a contract to ORBIMAGE Inc. large enough to secure its role in the industry in the coming years. In February 2004, the MTCR held an initial round of consultations with China regarding its intention to join the regime.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A significant minority of Space Security Survey respondents and a majority of Space

Security Working Group participants assessed that there was little or no effect on space security in 2004 with respect to this indicator. A significant minority of experts assessed that the continued growth of the commercial space sector had a positive impact upon space security, often noting that this growth, combined with increasing military-commercial interdependence, would underscore the importance of secure and sustainable access to, and uses of, space. The continued vulnerabilities of commercial space assets and the minimal incentives for commercial actors to protect their satellites were highlighted by a number of experts who assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced with respect to this indicator.

Some respondents noted that growth in the commercial space sector was encouraging the development of new regulatory frameworks which could help to encourage the sustainability of space security. Further, some respondents noted that SpaceShipOne's successful sub-orbital space flight was a positive development related to growing access to space. Some respondents pointed out that, although they felt export controls may have a negative impact on the US commercial space sector, such controls were likely to motivate other space actors to develop their own capabilities, thus increasing secure access for the international community writ large.

V. Space Support for Terrestrial Military Operations

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

The US and USSR/Russia lead in developing military space systems – By the end of the Cold War, the US and USSR had developed extensive military space systems designed to provide military attack warning, communications, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence, as well as navigation and weapons guidance applications. By the end of 2003, the US and USSR/Russia had together launched more than 2,000 military satellites, while the rest of the world had launched only 30 to 40.

The US has dominated the military space arena since the end of the Cold War. The US currently accounts for 95 percent of total global military space expenditures and maintains approximately 135 operational military-related satellites — over half of all military satellites in orbit. Russia is believed to have some 61 operational military satellites in orbit. The US is, by all major indicators, the actor most dependent on its space capabilities. The 2001 *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization* warned that the US' dependence on space systems made it uniquely vulnerable to a 'space Pearl Harbor' and recommended that the US develop enhanced space control (protection and negotiation) capabilities. The US has also begun to pursue responsive space lift capability, aiming to reduce the time to deploy new space systems.

While the US continued to lead in the development of military space programs in 2004, several key programs encountered cost overruns and delays. The US Space-Based Infrared System-High, the Space-Based Radar, the Transformational Satellite Communications System, and the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle were all over budget. In reaction, the US Congress cut funding for the Space-Based Radar and the Transformational Satellite Communications System. The US small satellite programs TacSat1 and XSS-11, both initially scheduled to launch in 2004, were delayed until 2005. The Responsive Access, Small Cargo, Affordable Launch Vehicle (RASCAL) program also encountered difficulties.

2004 also saw successes for some US military space programs. The 11th Ultra High Frequency Follow-On satellite was handed over to the USAF after successful on-orbit testing by Boeing in March 2004. The Wideband Gapfiller satellite reported being on track to launch at the end of 2005. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System was noted to be ahead of schedule, and the Next-Generation GPS system reported being on track.

In June 2004, the Russian Space Forces launched the second of a projected four Tselina-2 signals intelligence satellites. In July 2004, the commander of the Russian Space Forces noted that

Russia will focus on “maintaining and protecting” its fleet of satellites, including launching the remaining seven satellites needed to complete the GLONASS navigation system by 2008. In October 2004, Russian Federation Armed Forces announced that their troops had begun to receive GLONASS navigation units. Russia’s space chief claimed in July 2004 that the government had been too slow to fund the Angara rocket as a replacement for the Proton, delaying the final development of the new rocket until 2008 at the earliest.

More states developing military space capabilities – Declining costs for space access and the proliferation of space technology are enabling more states to develop and deploy their own military satellites via the launch capabilities and manufacturing services of others, including the commercial sector.

China provides military communications through its Feng Huo series satellite, and has deployed a pair of Beidou navigational satellites to ensure it can maintain navigational capability in the face of US efforts to deny GPS services in times of conflict. China also maintains two Zi Yuan series satellites in LEO for tactical reconnaissance and surveillance functions, and is believed to be purchasing additional commercial satellite imagery from Russia to suit its intelligence needs.

EU states have developed a modest range of military space systems. France, Germany, Italy, and Spain jointly fund the Helios 1 military observation satellite system in LEO, which provides images with a one-meter resolution. France, Germany, and Italy are planning to launch six low orbit imagery intelligence systems to replace the Helios series by 2008. The UK maintains a constellation of three dual-use Skynet 4 communications satellites in GEO. The EU Galileo satellite navigation program, initiated in 1999, is intended to operate principally for civil and commercial purposes, but will have a dual military function.

Israel operates a dual-use Eros-A imagery system as well as the military reconnaissance and surveillance OFEQ-5 system. India maintains its Technology Experimental Satellite as well as a naval

satellite, both of which provide military reconnaissance capabilities. Japan operates the commercial Superbird satellite, which also provides military communications and has two reconnaissance satellites, one optical and one radar, which it launched in 2003.

A total of 26 military space assets were launched in 2004, including 21 by the US and Russia, and 12 by other states. China reportedly launched three military reconnaissance satellites in 2004. In December 2004, France launched four 120-kilogram Essaim signals intelligence satellites. The Israeli Air Force changed its name to the Israeli Air and Space Force in 2004, while the launch of its OFEQ-6 reconnaissance satellite failed in its third stage in September. South Korea announced the creation of an Air Force Space Command, and Thailand signed a deal with a French company for production of its first intelligence and defense satellite.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A majority of Space Security Survey respondents and Space Security Working Group participants assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced, or reduced, in 2004 with respect to this indicator. The most common supporting argument for this assessment was that the growing importance of military space systems, combined with perceptions of their vulnerabilities, was driving a new space systems protection-negation dynamic which was undermining the sustainability of space security. While it was clear that a majority of expert respondents assessed that space systems had improved terrestrial military operations, a lack of transparency and trust between key military space actors remained a significant problem.

VI. Space Systems Protection

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

The US and Russia lead in general capabilities to detect rocket launches, while the

US leads in the development of advanced technologies to detect direct attacks on satellites

– One key element of space system protection is the timely detection and warning of attacks to enable defensive responses. US Defense Support Program satellites provide some warning of conventional or nuclear ballistic missile-based anti-satellite (ASAT) attacks. Russia began rebuilding its aging missile launch warning system in 2001 by replacing its Oko series satellites with three early-warning satellites (two in HEO and one in GEO). France is due to launch two missile-launch early-warning satellites, Spirale-1 and 2, in 2008. Most actors have a basic capability to detect a ground-based electronic attack, such as jamming, by sensing an interference signal or by noticing a loss of communications. Directed energy attacks such as laser dazzling or blinding, or microwave attacks, move at the speed of light, making it very difficult to obtain advance warning. The US is also developing capabilities to detect in-orbit attacks on satellites through its Rapid Attack Identification, Detection and Reporting System (RAIDRS) program.

In 2004, the US allocated \$189 million for a contract to produce a Pathfinder satellite for its new Space-Based Space Surveillance System. The US RAIDRS program received \$6.6 million in FY2004, and \$16.4 million was requested for its development in FY2005. The 2004 US Defense Authorization Act included restrictions on the provision of satellite orbital information to other actors, a move which could restrict the abilities of other actors to maintain space situational awareness for protection purposes.

Protection of satellite ground stations is a concern, while protection of satellite communications links is poor but improving

– Many space systems lack protection from attacks on their ground stations and communications links. For example, a second primary ground station for the critical US GPS system was only put in place some six years after the system itself was operational. The vast majority of commercial space systems have only one operations center and one ground station, leaving them vulnerable to negation efforts. While many actors employ passive electronic protection capabilities, such as shielding and directional antennas, more advanced measures,

such as burst transmissions, are generally unique to military systems and the capabilities of more technically advanced states. The US has been developing a variety of jamming protection capabilities, including its Global Positioning Experiments project, which would use airborne pseudo-satellites to provide GPS signals with the capability to overpower jammers.

2004 saw evidence of greater efforts to address the protection of satellite ground stations and communications links. China announced that it would launch a ‘jam-proof’ communications satellite in 2005. The US completed testing of a jam resistant phased array antenna for its Advanced Extremely High Frequency defense communications satellites. In March 2004, a US National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee study emphasized that the most likely threats to commercial satellites are attacks on ground facilities, from computer hacking or, possibly but less likely, jamming of communications.

Protection of satellites against some direct threats is improving, largely through radiation hardening, system redundancy, and greater use of higher orbits

– Both the range of actors employing satellite protection capabilities and the depth of these capabilities are increasing. China, the EU, and Japan are developing navigation satellites that will increase the global redundancy of such critical systems. States are increasingly placing military satellites into higher orbits where vulnerability from various attacks is lower than in LEO, due to greater warning times and difficulty of access. Most key US/NATO and Russian military satellites are already hardened against the effects of a high-altitude nuclear detonation. Reflecting concerns about the protection of commercial satellites, in 2002, the US General Accounting Office recommended that “commercial satellites be identified as critical infrastructure.”

This growing emphasis on protection capabilities continued in 2004. The EU and US agreement on Galileo-GPS helped to secure greater redundancy of satellite navigation systems through interoperability. The US is reportedly developing a stealth satellite, known as Misty-3, with enhanced

protection through its ability to evade detection by the space surveillance systems of other actors.

Russia and the US lead in capabilities to rapidly rebuild space systems following a direct attack on satellites – Russia and the US maintain critical space systems protection capabilities through the ability to responsively re-constitute satellite systems. The US is supporting two responsive initiatives. The FALCON - Force Application and Launch from CONUS (CONTinental US) program seeks to develop a rocket capable of placing 100-1,000 kilograms into LEO within 24 hours, and the RASCAL program seeks to deliver 50-130 kilograms into LEO on short notice. The US is also supporting the High Frequency Active Auroral Research Program, focused on measures to mitigate the environmental impact of a nuclear attack in space.

In 2004, Russia conducted a military exercise which included launches to simulate “the replacement of satellites lost in action.” In the US, contracts worth \$41 million were signed for Phase II of the FALCON program.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A majority of Space Security Survey respondents assessed that there was little or no effect on space security in 2004 with respect to this indicator, while the largest number of Space Security Working Group participants assessed that space security had been ‘somewhat enhanced.’ Several expert respondents made the point that this positive assessment was justified by a growing awareness of the need for protection capabilities, coupled with enhanced capabilities to resist jamming of communications links. A number of expert respondents argued that threats to satellites are being inflated. Most agreed that there was insufficient effort being focused on efforts to protect satellite ground stations from attacks, where vulnerabilities are greatest. Experts frequently noted concerns associated with a nuclear attack in space related to the announcement by North Korea that it now possesses nuclear weapons.

VII. Space Systems Negation

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

Proliferation of capabilities to attack ground stations and communications links – Ground segments and communications links remain the most vulnerable components of space systems, susceptible to attack by conventional military means, computer hacking and electronic jamming. A number of electronic jamming incidents targeting communications satellites have been reported in recent years, with interruptions in US broadcasting service blamed on Iran working within Cuba, Turkey blocking Kurdish news broadcasts, and the Falun Gong group in China. Iraq’s acquisition of GPS-jamming equipment for use against US GPS-guided munitions during Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 suggested that jamming capabilities are proliferating. The US appears to be the leader in developing advanced technologies to temporarily negate space systems by disrupting or denying access to satellite communications.

US leadership in developing capabilities to negate satellite communications continued in 2004 with the deployment of the US Counter Satellite Communications System, a mobile system designed to target satellite communications signals. A December 2004 US *Presidential Directive on Space-Based Positioning, Navigation and Timing Systems* called for the development of US capabilities to deny local access to GPS signals, without disrupting other services.

The US leads in the development of space situational awareness capabilities to support space negation – Several space actors are increasingly investing in space surveillance capabilities for debris monitoring, satellite tracking and telemetry, and asteroid detection. The US and Russia maintain the most extensive space surveillance capabilities. China and India also have satellite tracking, telemetry, and control assets essential to their civil space programs. Canada, France, Germany, and Japan are all actively expanding their ground-based space surveillance capabilities. Although this technology enhances transparency and enables space collision avoidance,

it also provides capabilities for targeting and space negation. For example, the US has explicitly linked its development of enhanced space surveillance systems to its efforts to enable offensive counterspace operations.

The US continued development of a range of space surveillance capabilities linked to space control applications in 2004, including the Orbital Deep Space Imager, designed to operate in GEO to provide a near real-time operating picture in support of space control operations; the Rapid On-Orbit Anomaly Surveillance and Tracking system, which will use lightweight components to provide low-cost space situational awareness; the Deep View program, designed to provide images of smaller objects in orbit; and, the Space Surveillance Telescope, designed to identify harder-to-detect orbital objects.

Ongoing proliferation of ground-based capabilities to attack satellites – A variety of US and USSR/Russian programs throughout the Cold War and into the 1990s sought to develop ground-based ASAT weapons employing conventional, nuclear, and directed energy capabilities. The capability to launch a payload into space to coincide with the passage of a satellite in orbit is a basic requirement for conventional satellite negation systems. Some 28 states have demonstrated sub-orbital launch capabilities, and of those, 10 have an orbital launch capability. As many as 30 states may already have the capability to use low-power lasers to degrade unhardened satellite sensors.

The US leads in the development of more advanced ground-based kinetic-kill systems with the capability to directly attack satellites. It has intensified its efforts to deploy a ground-based ballistic missile defense system, widely assessed to provide an inherent LEO satellite negation capability.

In 2004, the first kill vehicles for the US ground-based missile defense system were deployed to Fort Greely, Alaska. The US Airborne Laser, designed for boost-phase missile defense, successfully generated a laser beam and is moving to flight testing — a key milestone for another

system with an inherent satellite negation capability. The USAF “Counterspace Operations” doctrine released in 2004 recommended the development of satellite negation options, including kinetic-kill ASATs and directed energy weapons. The US Congress cut funding for the Counter Surveillance/ Reconnaissance System, believed to be a mobile system designed to use lasers to disrupt the sensors of surveillance satellites.

Increasing access to space-based negation enabling capabilities – Space-based negation efforts require sophisticated capabilities, such as precision in-orbit maneuverability and space tracking. Many of these capabilities have dual-use potential. For example, micro-satellites provide an inexpensive option for many space applications, but could be used as kinetic-kill vehicles. The US leads in the development of most of these enabling capabilities, though none appear to be integrated into space-based negation systems.

US programs in this area experienced some setbacks in 2004. Tests for the NASA Demonstration for Autonomous Rendezvous Technology satellite and the Air Force Experimental Spacecraft System-11 were delayed. Other actors, both commercial and governmental, have made recent advances in acquiring access to space — the basic enabling technology for both ground-based direct ascent and space-based ASATs. SpaceShipOne of the American company Mojave Aerospace Ventures, became the first private manned spacecraft by successfully completing a test flight into space on a sub-orbital trajectory. The Iranian Defense Minister was reported in 2004 announcing Iran’s intentions to launch a satellite into orbit using indigenous launch capacity based on its extensive missile program.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A majority of Space Security Survey respondents and Space Security Working Group participants assessed that space security was somewhat reduced or reduced with respect to this indicator in 2004. Deployment of the US Counter Satellite Communications System was

frequently cited as a significant development, as was continued pursuit of enabling technologies for permanent negation of space systems, including those developed through US ballistic missile defense programs. Several participants acknowledged the current US emphasis on temporary and reversible negation techniques, but noted that retaining the option of using space negation systems, particularly kinetic-kill weapons, negatively impacts space security. Some respondents noted that budget limitations on many US programs for negation enabling technologies limited the potential negative impact of these systems.

VIII. Space-Based Strike Weapons

Key Trends and 2004 Developments

While no space-based strike weapons (SBSW) have yet been tested or deployed in space, the US continues to develop a space-based interceptor for its missile defense system – Although the US and USSR developed and tested ground-based and airborne ASAT systems between the 1960s and 1990s, there has not yet been any deployment of space-to-Earth or space-to-missile SBSW systems. Under the Strategic Defense Initiative in the 1980s, the US invested several billion dollars in the development of a space-based interceptor (SBI) concept called Brilliant Pebbles, and tested targeting and propulsion components required for such a system. The US and USSR were both developing directed energy SBSW systems in the 1980s, although today these programs have largely been halted.

US research and development efforts associated with the SBI program declined in the 1990s, but were revived by the US MDA in 2000. The Near-Field Infrared Experiment (NFIRE), due for launch in 2006, was planned to be the first fully integrated SBSW spacecraft with a sensor platform and a kinetic-kill vehicle. Further MDA plans include the deployment of a test-bed of three to six integrated SBI by 2011-2012. The annual SBI budget is estimated to be only about \$100 million within a broader MDA budget of \$10 billion.

However, even at these funding levels, the timeline for developing the technical capabilities for SBI appears to be decreasing. While such a system would have limited strategic utility, it would represent the first deployment of weapons in space.

In February 2004, the MDA requested \$68 million for FY2005-2006 for the development and deployment of the NFIRE satellite. It would include a sensor package which would test lightweight infrared sensors for missile tracking, as well as a kill vehicle planned to simulate missile intercept maneuvers, demonstrating necessary attitude control, high-G thrust maneuvering, and autonomous missile tracking.

In May 2004, the US Senate Armed Services Committee authorized funding for NFIRE, but added the condition that the test be conducted in such a way as to avoid intercepting the target. In June 2004 the US House of Representatives cut funding for NFIRE. By August 2004, the House of Representatives and the Senate settled to maintain funding for NFIRE at the requested amount.

In August 2004, citing technical difficulties, the MDA announced that the NFIRE kill vehicle main thruster had been removed and that the launch date had been pushed back from the first quarter of 2006 to the last quarter, with test missile flybys moved to 2007. Presently, NFIRE is planned to perform a test with a 20-kilometer flyby of one or two missiles to simulate a kill operation. These developments suggest that the MDA considers itself just a few years away from being able to deploy a fully integrated SBSW system.

A growing number of actors are developing SBSW precursor technologies outside of SBSW programs – A majority of SBSW prerequisite technologies are dual-use. They are not related to dedicated SBSW programs, but are developed through other civil, commercial, or military space programs. While there is no evidence to suggest that states pursuing these enabling technologies intend to use them for SBSW systems, their development does bring these actors technologically closer to such a capability.

Both the number of such technologies being pursued in non-SBSW programs and the number of actors doing so are increasing. For example, India and Israel are developing precision attitude control and large deployable optics for civil space telescope missions. In the last 12 years, a total of nine states have deployed a first small or micro-satellite — a key SBI precursor technology. China and the EU are developing re-entry technologies which are also required for the delivery of mass-to-target weapons from space to the Earth.

The trend toward the progressive development of dual-use capabilities that are also prerequisite SBSW capabilities continued in 2004. On 22 March and 18 October respectively, Israel and the Ukraine joined the EU Galileo project, providing the basis for their future access to a key, high-precision satellite navigation capability. French micro-satellites were launched in the joint civil-military Myriade micro-satellite program in June and December. On 24 October, China announced a civilian space telescope mission that will demonstrate precision attitude control capabilities.

Space Security 2004 Survey Results

A majority of Space Security Survey respondents and Space Security Working Group participants assessed that there was little or no effect on space security in 2004 with respect to this indicator. One of the most common comments supportive of a more negative assessment was related to the potential of SBSW to stimulate an

arms escalation dynamic, in particular by encouraging the development of space systems negation capabilities by other states. Another frequently mentioned concern expressed by experts was related to the apparent determination of the US MDA to pursue the development and deployment of interceptors for a space-based anti-ballistic missile system. Others noted that the scale of US spending on SBSW was relatively modest. Many respondents welcomed the decision by the MDA to remove the kill vehicle on NFIRE, noting that this was a positive development with respect to space security.

Overall Space Security 2004 Assessment

Overall, a strong majority of 71 percent of Space Security Working Group experts assessed that space security had been somewhat reduced in 2004. The most common reason for this assessment was the view that developments in military space doctrine, particularly in the US, could limit the secure access to space and lead to negative strategic reactions internationally. Many experts also pointed to the development of ASAT technology through funded military and dual-use civil programs. Some 8 percent of SSWG respondents assessed that space security had been somewhat enhanced in 2004 referring to increased international cooperation, budget cuts in certain ASAT-capable military space programs, and commercial sector growth. Finally a solid minority of 21 percent assessed that, on a balance, developments in 2004 had had little or no effect on space security.

Session V

Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

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1. The state of the regional flash points

(1) The North Korean nuclear issue: Not stalemate but deterioration

When the six party talks began in 2003 as the new approach to the re-emerged North Korean nuclear weapons problem, the general atmosphere was quite positive. It looked like a more effective mechanism to force North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program and to engage key parties to the post-crisis aid programs for North Korea. The Bush administration, which was critical of the Framework Agreement arrived at under the Clinton administration, was highly appreciative of Chinese initiative for starting it. South Korea and Japan, which were expected to be the major provider of the post-crisis economic assistance to North Korea, were happy to be involved in the negotiation which would lead to their heavy burden. North Korea, which had insisted on negotiation only with the United States, was not happy but was effectively persuaded by the Chinese to take part in it. China was even hopeful that upon successful solution of the problem it could be evolved into a multilateral security mechanism for Northeast Asia.

However, after it deadlocked in the third meeting in June 2004, where the gap between the United States' demand for the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement (CVID) of all nuclear programs and the North Korean demand for cessation of hostility and economic compensation in exchange for freezing of nuclear facilities could not be narrowed, it was not held almost one year. Unfortunately, what has happened since June last year was worse than a stalemate, serious deterioration of the situation. Having seen the passage of the North Korean Human Rights legislation and heard Secretary of State Rice call them one of the "outposts of tyranny," North Korea

judged that the United States under the second Bush administration was not likely to give them the guarantee not to pursue the regime change. Probably based on this judgment, they announced on February 10 this year that they would "suspend participation in the six-party talks for an indefinite period," and declared that they had manufactured nuclear weapons and would take measures to increase nuclear weapons arsenal. More recently, they even said that now that they had become a nuclear-weapon state the six party talks should no longer be the deal of freezing for compensation but a "disarmament conference."

As far as the development to this point is concerned, the six-party talks functioned as the mechanism to avoid referring the case to the U.N. Security Council, which would have led to drastic reaction from North Korea, while allowing North Korea time to develop its nuclear arsenal by failing to freeze their nuclear program, let alone dismantle it. The situation looks like the one in which we are faced with a dire choice between removing the North Korean nuclear arsenal by some coercive means, ranging from some kind of sanctions to surgical strike, and resignation to living with it. The chance of finding a solution in between these two extremes looks increasingly slim. If we do not to accept the North Korean nuclear arsenal, maybe, we should start thinking about the consequence of the coercion. The coercive means against North Korea, even in the case of milder ones, could lead to serious domestic instability. One of the consequences with international implications, maybe not the most serious one, of domestic instability would be outflow of refugees to South Korea and Northeastern part of China. If this happens the two countries would have tremendous difficulty bearing the cost, not just in terms of money. There should be some international support

mechanism for them, for which both Japan and Canada could make meaningful contribution.

(2) Across the Taiwan Straits

On the Taiwan question there were apparently reverse developments in Taiwan and the PRC in the first quarter of this year. On the Taiwan side, in spite of the re-election of Chen Shuibian as the president in March last year, there have been repeated expressions of prudence, mainly by the electorate, on the unification vs. independence issue. The referendum, which was considered to be a step toward independence, was held simultaneously with the presidential election, but it did not manage to collect sufficient votes to validate it. The legislative election in December did not result in the government coalition's majority in spite of President Chen Shuibian's repeated attempt to use the identity card. The long-awaited meeting of Chen Shuibian and James Soong, president of the opposition People First Party, resulted in a very prudent "consensus." It includes Chen Shuibian's pledges that he would not declare independence, change the title of the state, include the two-state theory into the new constitution, and conduct referendum on the independence-unification issue during his term.

Meanwhile in the PRC, the movement to create the legal foundation for the use of force against Taiwan's move toward independence followed the due course. In spite of international expressions of concern, including the Secretary Rice's plea to stop the process, it led to the passage with overwhelming majority of the Anti-Secession Law at the National People's Congress in March. The law certainly has several menacing components. It states that its purpose is to oppose and check Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of "Taiwan independence" and that "non-peaceful means" shall be employed in the event that they should act under any name or by any means to cause the "fact" of Taiwan's secession. Needless to say, the "fact" is subject to the interpretation by the Chinese side. However, a close examination of the law reveals subtle expressions of flexibility on the part of PRC. The law repeats the formulation of the 16th Party Congress that both mainland and Taiwan belong to unspecified "one China" rather than the formulation

in the Constitution that "Taiwan is a part of People's Republic of China." It mentions the need of personnel exchange for "greater mutual understanding and mutual trust." Its reference to items for negotiation between both sides includes official ending of the state of hostility between the two sides and Taiwan's proper "room of international operation." It says that the negotiation would be "on equal footing" and "may be conducted in steps and phases and with flexible and varied modalities." As one of the conditions for the use of non-peaceful means it mentions that "possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted" (underline by the author), which is almost logically impossible even with Taiwan's declaration of independence. In fact, the most noteworthy aspect of flexibility is in what are not said. It does not mention the acceptance of the "principle of one China" as the condition for the negotiation with Taiwan. Its omission of the term "one country two systems" from the text might signal departure from the Deng Xiaoping's legacy. Gone from its list of conditions for the use of "non-peaceful means" is the indefinite postponement of the negotiation for reunification mentioned in the Taiwan White Paper of few years ago.

The simultaneous existence of signs of rigidity and flexibility in the same text seems to suggest the working of inertia behind the process leading to its adoption and existence of contending forces, with contending very different ideas, who had to compromise with each other. This, in turn, suggests the extremely delicate nature of the issue and wide open future possibilities.

The post Anti-Secession Law evolution of Chinese moves toward Taiwan seems to represent further extension of the flexible side of the law. With obvious purpose of putting pressure on Chen Shuibian, China welcomed the visit of Lien Chan, the leader of the biggest opposition party, the Kuomintang, or the Nationalist Party in April. After his meeting with Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, a joint press communiqué was issued, in which China expressed willingness to accept hitherto unthinkable measures accommodating the wishes of Taiwanese people. It does emphasize both parties' opposition to

“Taiwanese independence”, which is no surprise and does set the limit to Chinese flexibility. However, it also mentions the “1992 consensus,” as the first item to be upheld. Since the “1992 consensus” is considered, at least in Taiwan, to mean that the meaning of “one China” can be “respectively stated,” China’s willingness to mention it in the joint statement with a political leader from Taiwan is quite remarkable. In the joint press communiqué China also agrees to put on agenda of cross-strait negotiations Taiwan’s “participation in international activities with which Taiwanese common people are concerned.”

Even more significant is that the communiqué says that the formal end to the hostility between the two sides of the straits should be promoted, the framework of peace, stability, and development, “including the mechanism of military mutual confidence,” should be constructed and the military clash should be avoided. For China to accept, even though just in principle, something like the military confidence mechanisms with Taiwan represents their coming much close than before to renouncing the use of force against Taiwan. For them to accept the idea of military confidence-building with Taiwan means that they have accepted Taiwan as a “military entity,” just as they accepted as an economic entity when both China and Taiwan joined the APEC in 1991. Needless to say, this flexibility is coupled with the opposition to Taiwanese independence as mentioned above. The idea of having China commit to renouncing the use of force against Taiwan and making Taiwan commit to refraining from the declaration of independence was the core of several proposals for the interim agreement for the stability in the Taiwan straits put forward by the Americans in the late 1990s. It seems that China is slowly moving to accepting some kind of “interim agreement.” A similar press communiqué was issued when James Soong, the leader of the People First Party, the second opposition party, visited China in early May.

Although these moves are still too preliminary to make us fully optimistic about the future of the Taiwan Straits, they do suggest that we do not have to be totally pessimistic either.

2. Recent developments in the regional strategic landscape

(1) China’s “rise” and military modernization

China’s rise, which started to attract world-wide attention in the mid-1990s and continued to this day, is arguably the most significant factor of the on-going transformation of the regional strategic landscape and it is increasingly assuming global significance. However, since China is still at a relatively early stage of its development, in spite of its high economic growth rate which was maintained over two decades, it is safe to assume that the on-going evolution will continue for some time to come and that the process may not be smooth and linear. If these assumptions are sound the determination of exact implications of China’s rise for regional peace and security can not be a simple task. China’s lack of transparency in many aspects, especially its decision-making process and the state of military modernization program, further complicates the task, leading some to espouse the “theory” of China threat.

Given the magnitude of the problem it would be foolhardy to claim that any specific approach could function as a crystal ball. But examination of the discourse among China’s specialists in international and strategic affairs would provide a useful clue to the essence of the issue or a starting point for getting there. In this regard, there was an interesting development since late 2003, the rise and fall of the notion of China’s “Peaceful (precipitous) Rise,” or *heping jueqi* in Chinese. When the notion was first introduced by Zheng Bijian, former permanent vice principal of the Central Party School, the highest educational institution for the Chinese Communist Party, at the Boao Forum conference in November 2003 it did not attract much attention both domestically and internationally. But after Prime Minister Wen Jiabao discussed it in his speech at Harvard University and Party General Secretary Hu Jintao mentioned it at conference commemorating the birth of Mao Zedong, both in December 2003, it was quickly considered as the emerging strategic formula of the new Hu Jintao-Wen Jia bao regime, which was established in late 2002 to early 2003 and led to a considerable debate within China. However, after

Hu Jintao failed to make reference to this notion in his keynote speech at the Boao Forum in April 2004, it became increasingly clear that the “Peaceful Rise” was now replaced by “Peaceful Development” as the term used by the top leaders. However, this did not mean the end of the use of the term in strategic discourse. In fact, the debate on the meaning and the conditions of China’s peaceful rise or development continued to evolve with increasingly wider ramifications.

The proponents of the peaceful rise/development argue that it should be credible because China has made the strategic decision to be actively involved in the process of globalization and multilateral institutions, which should make China’s development possible without external expansion. Another critical component of this notion is the judgment that China is provided with a rare strategic opportunity for such development in the first two decades of this century, the judgment first put forward by Jiang Zemin in May 2002 in a Central Party School speech and was included in his political report to the 16th Party Congress in the fall that year. This is the period in which, he proposed, China should build a “relatively well-off society.” One of the most important reasons for this optimistic judgment is the perception that after the 9.11 the strategic priorities of the United States are anti-terrorism, counter-proliferation and homeland defense, and that its principal spearhead is not directed against China “for substantially long period,” which allows China to enjoy a wider room for strategic maneuver.

This line of thinking suggests the critical importance to China of successful management of the relationship with the United States. In fact, whether or not China’s rise leads to the confrontation with the United States is another key issue in the theorization of the peaceful rise/development. Concerning this question a widely different views have been expressed in China. On the one end of the continuum, those who argue that it would never lead to the confrontation mention such reasons as the Chinese awareness of undeniable power differential, the popular pacifism of the U.S., multi-polarization of the world power structure and globalization of capitalist system,

which make colonial possession unnecessary. On the other extreme are “realists” who argue that China’s rise would inevitably become the challenge to the current hegemonic power, the United States. They argue that peace is possible only when the gap in the military strength between China and the U.S. is narrow enough to make the costs of the U.S. war for the purpose of suppressing China’s rise unacceptably high.

Whether or not the rise of China leads to the confrontation with the United States, one of other factors which affect the credibility of Chinese claim that their rise/development is peaceful is the extent to which the new strategic formula is reflected in their military doctrine and force planning. One useful source for obtaining a clue to this question is the new Defense White Paper published in December 2004. Published after Hu Jintao had succeeded to Jiang Zemin as the chairman of the CCP Military Affairs Commission in September that year it can be safely treated as the more direct reflection of the strategic thinking of the Hu-Wen regime.

Compared with the last white paper published in December 2002, when Jiang had just handed over the position of the CCP general secretary to Hu but retained the CMC chairmanship, the latest white paper has some distinct characteristics. Its discussion of the defense policy has two new contents: One is the declaration of the “Peaceful Development” strategy with particular emphasis of the “important strategic opportunities” in the first two decades of this century. In this sense, it is a reaffirmation of the notion put forward by Jiang Zemin. The other is the announcement of the RMA “with Chinese characteristics,” with particular emphasis on incorporation of the modern information technology, or “informationization,” to use their term. The kind of warfare they are supposed to be prepared for is now reformulated from the “local war under the condition of high technology” in the 2002 white paper into the “local war under the condition of informationization.” The “dual historical task” of mechanization and informationization in the 2002 white paper is now replaced by the “transition from mechanization and semi-mechanization to informationization” and

“informatization as the driving force to bring forward mechanization.”

Clearly reflecting the second characteristics mentioned above, a rather flat factual description of all services in the 2002 white paper now gave way to clear presentation of priority of three services, Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Force. Concerning the PLA Navy the latest white paper claims that it now “has expanded the space and extended the depth for offshore defensive operations,” and that the capabilities of offshore campaigns and nuclear counter-attacks are enhanced. The priority in the updating weaponry and equipment in the Navy is now given to new combat ships, special purpose aircraft and long-range precision strike capability. The PLA Air Force is now described as going through the gradual shift from the territorial-air-defense type to the type capable of both offensive and defensive operations. The Second Artillery Force is the major strategic force responsible for nuclear counter-attacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles. The latest white paper claims that it has built such capabilities “in its initial form” and markedly increased power and efficiency. The white paper gives no specifics in terms of kind of munitions and numbers. But we can still point out that this line of reasoning is quite consistent with their enhanced maritime activities by PLA Navy and “civilian” vessels within and near Japanese territorial waters and their desire for the capabilities to raise costs for the U.S. attempts to check China’s rise. Although it is both premature and unfair to detect a design of a power projection capability in the recent white paper, it does clearly indicate the PLA’s move toward the operations further and further away from its legal border.

Consistent with the notion of “Peaceful Development” the latest white paper also emphasizes China’s involvement in regional multilateral mechanisms. But it also reveals that their approach to different regional processes varies according to the extent to which they can influence them. In the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which they took lead in creating three year ago, they are predictably active. The SCO conducted the first multilateral joint military

exercise for counter-terrorism in August 2003 and established the secretariat in Beijing and the regional counter-terrorism center in Tashkent in 2004. On the other hand, they insist that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) should maintain its “forum nature” and adhere to “the basic principle of decision-making through consensus.” Although they have proposed the participation of the military personnel in the forum, China has been one of the major obstacles to its evolution from confidence-building mechanism to preventive diplomacy mechanism as stipulated in the 1995 concept paper. Clearly reflecting this attitude the white paper insists that the preventive diplomacy should be “suitable to the region and fitting the current needs.” Needless to say, the white paper makes no mention of the role of the APEC, in which Taiwan is a member, in spite of the fact that it was the first regional institution to hold the counter-terrorism summit.

(2) Continued evolution of the Japan-U.S. security alliance

Another important dynamics affecting the regional strategic landscape is continued strengthening of the Japan-United States Security Treaty (JUSST) system under the influence of the transformation of the U.S. military and concomitant transformation of the role of Japan’s Self Defense Force (SDF).

The JUSST system was drifting in the early 1990s because the end of the cold war made the anchor of the commonly felt threat of the Soviet Union disappear while the festering economic frictions were pulling the parties apart. Even in this situation, realization that contribution of \$12 billion to the international effort to deal with the Gulf crisis was not only unappreciated but also criticized as the checkbook diplomacy led Japan to take a cautious but critical step toward transforming the role of the SDF. The International Peace Cooperation Law of 1992 enabled the SDF to participate in the UN-sanctioned peace keeping operations, though limited to the logistic support operations. After the legislation the SDF participated in the U.N. peace keeping operations in Cambodia in 1992, Mozambique in 1993 and in Golan Heights in 1996, and in the U.N. refugee relief operations in Rwanda in 1994. The drift of

the JUSST system was arrested with the separate official reaffirmation of the alliance in 1995 and the Joint Declaration on the Japan-U.S. Alliance in 1996, which also meant the redefinition of the system. The Joint Declaration was preceded by the signing of the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the interim report by the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO).

After the 1996 Joint Declaration the JUSST system continued to be strengthened. The next step was the revision of the Defense Cooperation Guideline in 1997 to include the category of cooperation in case of contingency in “the area surrounding Japan” that has significant bearing on Japan’s national security. In May 1999 the law was passed in Japan to provide legal foundation for the SDF’s cooperation with the U.S. forces in the “situation in the area surrounding Japan” (SIASJ). In August the cooperation on missile defense, which had been in the stage of joint feasibility study, move one step further to the joint technological study. The SDF participation in the U.N. peace keeping operations was now extended to East Timor in November that year.

The 9.11 terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 pushed the evolution discussed above even further. The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law of October 2001 enabled the SDF to participate in the operation of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan. Although the main SDF operation which is to provide petroleum in the Indian Ocean was not limited to the U.S. forces, the alliance solidarity was a critical motivation for the legislation. This legislation led to the revision of the International Peace Cooperation Law in December 2001 to lift the limitation to the SDF participation in the U.N. peace-keeping operations to logistic support. The 9.11 also led to domestic diffusion of the sense of vulnerability in Japan, which, in turn, led to the emergency legislations in June 2003. The Iraqi Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance Special Measures Law of July 2003 represented the merger of the two strands the post-cold war evolution of the Japan’s involvement in the regional (and increasingly global) security environment, the strengthening of the JUSST system and expansion of the SDF

participation in the U.N. peace-keeping operations. The Japanese government also decided to push the missile defense programs to the deployment stage in December 2003. It also decided to revise the National Defense Planning Outline (NDPO) with fundamental re-examination of the function of the SDF.

The issuing of revised NDPO (now called National Defense Planning Guideline, NDPG) in December last year and the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (2+2) meeting in February this year are two major developments to follow the evolution sketched above. But they are not simple follow up. They involve some important qualitative changes, which mark the new stage in the evolution.

In addition to traditional state-to-state military confrontation, the new NDPG notes the emergence of the non-state actors as a “direct threat” to today’s security environment. It emphasizes the seriousness of “new threats” to peace and security,” including the proliferation of WMD and ballistic missiles as well as international terrorist activities. With regard to the situation around Japan, it continues to emphasize the danger of North Korean, referring to its WMD and special operation forces. What is new in the NDPG is its added explicit expression of concern with China, referring to its continued modernization of nuclear forces and missile capabilities as well as its naval and air forces. It also notes China’s expansion of its area of operation at sea. The NDPG tells us to be “attentive” to China’s future actions. Predictably, China’s accused this statement as the notion of “China threat.”

On the basis of these assessments, the NDPG proposes the departure from the Basic Defense Force Concept (BDFC), which had been the foundation of Japan’s force planning since 1976, when the first NDPO was issued. The BDFC spelled out the significance of Japan’s defense capabilities in not creating a power vacuum that could be a destabilizing factor in the region. In other words, what was important was its existence itself rather than actual activities. Now, the now NDPG says that the SDF should be capable of “effective response to the new threats and diverse situations” and “proactive efforts to improve the international

security environment.” In other words, its significance is now in its actions. In terms of the former, it specifically mentions the need for the SDF to be capable of responding to ballistic missile attacks, guerrillas and special operation forces attacks, and the invasion of Japan’s offshore islands, as well as patrol and surveillance in the sea and airspace around Japan and responding to large-scale disasters. In terms of the latter, it elevates the participation in the peace-keeping operations to the level of major function of the SDF. In order for the SDF to perform these functions effectively the NDPG argues for the need of developing “multi-functional, flexible, and effective forces that are highly ready, mobile, adaptable and multi-purpose,” departing from the emphasis on the cold-war type anti-tank warfare, anti-submarine warfare and anti-air warfare, and reducing the personnel and equipment earmarked for a full-scale invasion.

The Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (“2+2”) meeting in February this year made clear that strengthening of the JUSST system in the current phase is intricately related to the transformation of the U.S. military. Especially significant is the implications of the transformation for the U.S. basing in Japan. The consultation and negotiation on this issue is still on-going and the contour of the end product is still unclear to the outsiders. What was more immediately clear was the significance of the Joint Statement issued after the meeting. The central element of the joint statement is the part which lists the common strategic objectives, which sets the stage preceding to the examination of the “roles, missions, and capabilities” of the SDF and U.S. forces, which, in turn, is supposed to lead to the re-examination of the U.S. forces in Japan.

The part on the common strategic objectives lists both global and regional objectives. Among them what immediately drew attention was the reference to China in the list of regional objectives, to which China took significant offense. Since the section lists twelve regional objectives it would be unnatural if China is not mentioned at all. It contains three references to China: 1) development of “a cooperative relationship”, welcoming China’s “responsible and constructive role regionally as well

as globally,” 2) encouraging “the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue,” and 3) encouraging transparency in military affairs. Among the three China reacted most violently to the second item. In fact, China reacted to what had been reported by the *Washington Post* as the draft of the joint statement the day before the actual joint statement was issued. According to the report the United States and Japan were going to include Taiwan in the list of “common security concerns” and Japan was going to take part in the U.S. Taiwan policy. Predictably, China’s accusation of the two countries’ involvement in its domestic affairs, with serious implication for sovereignty and territorial integrity, was focused on Japan.

Chinese reactions to the references to China in the NDPG and the recent Japan-U.S. joint statement clearly indicate that the transformation of the SDF and the strengthening of the JUSST system have set the vicious dynamics of the security dilemma in motion. Whether or not we can overcome this dynamics will seriously affect what kind of security environment we will have in the near future.

(3) Dynamics of Japan-China relations

Another bilateral relationship which has critical significance for regional peace and security, the relationship between Japan and China, is increasingly governed by the factors which basically had not existed during the cold war. The first such factor is relative equalization of the international standing of the two countries. In the 1980s it was customary to characterize Japan as an economic giant and a political dwarf (and militarily almost non-existent). China, on the other hand, was recognized as significant both politically and militarily with its permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council and nuclear arsenal but was considered quite undeveloped economically. In other words, both were uneven powers with each side strong in the aspect in which the other was weak. Although it is not realistic to say that the international standing of the two countries has become completely equal, these characterizations have become less and less appropriate. With its phenomenal economic growth

since the early 1990s, China now has become a formidable economic power at least in the gross terms. Japan, on the other hand, has steadily expanded its security role during the 1990s, with increasing participation in the U.N. peace keeping operations and continued upgrading of its role in the JUSST system.

During the 1980s each side could find consolation for its weakness in one aspect in its strength in other aspect, where the other side was weak. This is no longer possible today, making the management of the bilateral relations much more demanding than before. It should also be noted that this relative equalization has no historical precedent. Seeking the model of a friendly bilateral relationship for today in the three-thousand-year history of cultural ties, treating the history of first half of the 21st century as an aberration, would not help because of the lopsided power balance between the two during this long historical period.

This equalization trend also extends to the moral dimension, making the management of the bilateral relations even more difficult. Until late 1980s China could claim almost one-sided moral superiority in the minds of most Japanese because of the history of Japan's invasion into China in the first half of the 20th century. When China accused Japan of the atrocities committed by its army during the invasion most Japanese were resigned to having to apologize to them, though repetition of this practice caused frustration and resentment among growing minority. However, after the Tiananmen incident of June 1989 the Japanese increasingly responded to Chinese criticisms on Japan's past record by asking, "what about China's present?" China's continuation of the nuclear testing in the backdrop of its successive freeze by the Soviet Union, France and the United States in the early 1990s further eroded China's moral position in the Japanese minds. Although it is premature to say that the both side are completely equal it is clear that China no longer enjoys one-sided moral superiority in the mind of the Japanese. Added to this is Japan's increasingly official admission of its guilt in the 1990s, such as the statements by Prime Minister Hosokawa in 1993 and Prime Minister Murayama, which led to make more and more Japanese feel an

"apology fatigue."

The second new factor is economic interdependence between the two countries. This does not require much explanation. Already in 1992 Japan was China's No.2 trading partner and China was Japan's No.5 trading partner. In 2004, China became Japan's No.1 trading partner and Japan has been China's No.1 trading partner most of 1990s and 2000s except last year when Japan fell behind the US and the EU. China is heavily dependent on Japan's direct investment and the economic assistance, though dependence on the latter is falling. In the 1990s Japanese manufacturing industries invested in China for labor intensive production of export products. More recently China's growing market became the prime target for both Japanese export and production in China. Generally speaking, interdependence between the two countries raises the cost of complete rupture of the relationship for both sides, thus making it rather unlikely. At the same time it raises the incidence of frictions between the two societies because of rapid expansion of contact points. Although each economy as a whole benefit from interdependence, the benefit is not shared across sectors and sub-sectors in each economy, which leads to economic frictions between the two. The Japan-China relations today are clearly bedeviled by this dynamics, too.

The third new factor is the increasing importance of China's public opinion. Although full-fledged freedom of expression and association is still a far cry the public space is clearly expanding in China with rapidly improving information base. This is made possible by loosening of the party control and development of modern information technology, especially internet. At the same time the Chinese leadership's dependence on nationalism and economic performance as the basis of the legitimacy of their rule made it increasingly difficult for them to ignore public sentiment. This is especially the case when the expression of the public sentiment takes the form of nationalistic fervor, of which Japan is often an easy target.

Finally, the way the Japan-China relationship today is connected to its international environment

is very different from the cold war days. The relationship between Japan and the People's Republic of China (China) began severed by the dynamics of the cold war, with China allied with the Soviet Union right after the founding of the new regime and Japan incorporated in the U.S. camp as it ended the allied occupation. Thus, during the cold war what exerted overwhelming influence on the bilateral relations was the cold war dynamics. There were many factors which pulled the two countries closer such as geographical proximity, historically formed cultural ties, economic interdependence formed in the 1930s, Japanese guilt feelings toward the Chinese, Chinese political calculation to drive a wedge into the U.S.-Japan relations. But as soon as the working of these factors hit the ceiling, as in the case of the Fourth Private Trade Agreement of 1958, which stipulated the establishment of trade representative's office with semi-diplomatic status, the development had to be reversed. Japan and China could establish a normal diplomatic relationship only after the U.S.-China cold war was ended by Nixon's China trip in 1972. Even after the normalization the Japan-China relationship was seriously affected by the remaining cold war between China and the Soviet Union as in the case of the negotiation for the Peace and Friendship Treaty.

In essence the Japan-China relationship was a dependent variable with the cold war dynamics as the independent variable. This is no longer the case. The turning point was the Tiananmen Incident of June 1989. In response to the Chinese military suppression of the peaceful demonstration, many western nations imposed sanctions on China but Japanese government was reluctant to do so because of concerns for the consequence of isolating China internationally. But as it realized the danger of Japan's own isolation in the course of preparation for the upcoming G-7 summit, Japanese government decided to follow suit in late June. However, unlike during the cold war, Japanese government did not stop here. During the G-7 summit in mid-July it persuaded the other members to include a passage on the danger of isolating China in the joint statement and not to impose additional sanctions. In the following year Japan persuaded the other G-7 members to let it take lead in lifting economic sanctions. Needless to say, the post-Tiananmen developments in Eastern Europe, which led to the collapse of the cold war system, further reinforced this tendency. The Japan-China relationship is no longer the dependent variable of the international environment but has become an independent variable. This is why the development of this bilateral relationship is closely watched now by the international community, especially in the East Asian region, the state of which would very likely be the dependent variable.

“Peace and Security in the Asia Pacific Region”

David B. Dewitt¹

1. Introduction

In the recently released overview document that introduces the four parts of the *International Policy Statement* published by the Government of Canada, the Prime Minister begins by noting that Canada intends “to make a difference”. Scholars and analysts alike of Canada’s foreign, defence, and security policies have many times raised the challenge of how, given its modest size and capabilities yet also its global interests and engagements, Canada can or should continue to present itself as a country that has a global reach. Indeed, the facts suggest that for some time now the so-called “commitment-capability” gap that has bedeviled Canadian policy-makers for many years is now no longer merely a comment or criticism, but a fact. Data on most of Canada’s foreign policy sectors, and especially diplomacy, development, and defence, support the contention that our declaratory policies, while stating important principles and objectives, all too often are not matched by operational or performance capabilities.

Yet, Canadians wish to believe that Canada does “make a difference” on the international stage. There are concerns over our military capabilities, our aid and development commitments, and our long-admired diplomatic capacity. While most within Canada and beyond understand why, even before 9/11 and certainly since, much of Canada’s efforts are consumed or in other ways affected by our relationship with the United States, the *International Policy Statement* does confirm that while the Canada-USA relationship is fundamental,

so too is the Canadian interest in bilateral, regional, and global affairs beyond North America. The challenge facing Canadians is, yet again, how to translate that declaratory position of principle and of need into action and commitments with capabilities. It is necessary both for the well-being of Canada given our interdependencies on trade, investment, demography, cultural flows, environmental and ecological vulnerabilities, etc. but also to ensure that regional and multilateral politics reflect and support the norms and principles to which Canada aspires. The issue, in other words, is not whether Canada should be more or less engaged in foreign affairs but rather how to and where to engage in ways that will contribute to peace and security as well as to well-being. It is relatively easy to identify and to pursue narrow sectoral areas of national self-interest; it is rather more difficult to do so in the context of a more generalized desire to “make a difference”.

During the period of the Cold War, Canada arguably made a difference through its contribution to peacekeeping operations, its commitment to multilateral cooperation, and its efforts to serve as a bridge between smaller and often less developed countries and the major powers. In the more complex post-Cold War world, while continuing its commitment to multilateralism and to peacekeeping albeit in the more robust forms now required, successive Canadian governments have become engaged by the challenges of human security, including peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction, while also maintaining concern with the long-standing security issues involving

¹ This is a revised draft of the paper prepared for The Fourth Symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation, held 10-12 June 2005 in Tokyo. The author acknowledges with thanks participants who provided helpful comments. The author, a professor of Political Science at York University, also serves as Director of York’s Centre for International and Security Studies and, since July 2005, assumed the new position of Associate Vice-President Research (Social Sciences & Humanities) for the University.

proliferation of weapons and related technologies, the increase as well as transformation in the numbers and types of security threats. To “make a difference” in such a complex security-challenged world is no simple task, yet that is no reason to shirk from the effort. It is for these reasons that the ongoing Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation undertaking is to be welcomed. This paper attempts to outline some opportunities for Canadian-Japanese peace and security cooperation within the Asia-Pacific theatre.

Much has been written on various aspects of Canada’s ties to and place within the Asia Pacific community and geo-strategically as part of the North Pacific sub-region. Suffice to note that Asian migration to Canada, trade and investment flows between Canada, numerous countries of Northeast, Southeast, and South Asia, and long-standing diplomatic relations between Canada and most Asian countries obviate the need to make the case. Rather, what may be useful is to identify areas in which matters of peace and security in or related to Asia are relevant to Canada and, further, to note ways in which Canadian involvement bilaterally, regionally, or multilaterally is consistent both with Canadian as well as Asian concerns and principles. Further, in this effort particular attention will be focused on areas propitious for Canada-Japan cooperative security activities.

2. The Evolving Context of Asia Pacific Peace and Security

The late John Holmes, distinguished Canadian diplomat and scholar, is known to have lamented more than once that Canada is a regional power without a region. He was, of course, reflecting on the fact that Canada shares North America with the United States and Mexico. Unlike Australia in the South Pacific, Indonesia in Southeast Asia, India in South Asia, Egypt in the Arab world, Nigeria or South Africa in Africa, or Brazil and Argentina in South America, while Canada has equivalent capacities to exert interests and influence, it exists in the shadow of the USA with overwhelming distributive and integrative ties with it. Moreover, Canada has such widely distributed and diffused

connections and commitments that whatever regional potential it might have is dissipated to the point of marginal impact. Further, this undermines whatever sense of regional identity could be forged through preferential engagements.

Might the past thirty years or so of growing connections across the Pacific have begun to alter this sense of anomie, where the overwhelming presence of the United States has made everything for Canada other than this dominant bilateral relationship marginal? Previous Canadian governments have asserted that Canada is a three-ocean country, and while the North Atlantic certainly dominated the growth and development of the Canadian state and identity through until the mid-20th century, since then both the Arctic and the Pacific have become the focal point of new declaratory policies and some new commitments, reflecting the remarkable growth in arenas of diplomatic, economic, environmental, demographic, cultural, and security interests and linkages. Although it is not appropriate to argue that either the Arctic or the Pacific have become zones of regional power for Canada, it is at least reasonable to note that both have become arenas of Canadian focus and concentration not previously seen in Canadian history. Without pursuing this argument further in this paper, let me simply assert that while the Canada-US relationship continues to overwhelm, Canada’s evolving engagement with the countries of the Pacific littoral and of continental Asia are of growing relevance in most areas of Canadian foreign affairs and of increasing importance domestically. Although it may be that in many cases these are still asymmetric relationships wherein they are more important for Canada than for the Asian partner, for a variety of reasons they do energize the Canadian state and specific sectors within Canadian society.

Issues of peace and security within and among the countries and peoples of Asia often draw the attention, concern, and involvement of others due to the simple concern over the management and resolution of the dispute, the perceived violation of internationally accepted norms and principles, the dangers that escalation may bring, the direct national interests which are challenged, or the

regional or even global threats that are implied, both immediate and in the longer term. A simple albeit not comprehensive listing of peace and security challenges across and within the Asia Pacific highlights the considerable breadth of issues and range of concerns:

nuclear proliferation, proliferation of other weapons of mass destruction; compliance with the various UN treaties and conventions which address these WMD and proliferation challenges; terrorism and counter-terrorism; the dangers of identity politics including Islamic fundamentalism; bilateral and sub-regional security architecture; the Proliferation Security Initiative; transnational organized crime including money laundering, illicit movement of peoples and drugs; small arms proliferation; anti-personnel land mines; illegal intellectual property and associated (dual use) technology transfers; missile technology; spread of infectious diseases; economic impact of invasive non-indigenous species; the place of particular states – e.g., North Korea, Burma – as actual or potential spoilers in the creation and maintenance of cooperative security regimes; missile defence; ongoing territorial disputes over boundaries, borders, and islands; the Korean Peninsula; the Taiwan Straits; the South China Sea; the Straits of Malacca; coastal as well as deep sea piracy; the politics of humanitarian interventions and the contested issue around the ICISS and the Responsibility to Protect; the concerns involved in UN reform, especially regarding the Security Council, permanent members, and the veto; the changing nature of the politics of development assistance; the implications of the ASEAN + three, of the emerging East Asian Community, and of Free Trade Agreements; the roles for ASEAN, the ARF and APEC in peace and security matters; the resolution of the Kashmir conflict and future of India-Pakistan relations; resolution of the Sinhalese-Tamil conflict within Sri Lanka; concerns over the expanding military capabilities of principal Asian countries, notably China, Japan, and India; the implications of energy

demand and hence also the control over and vulnerability of various types of energy sources as well as transport; uneven economic growth exacerbating the already considerable and potentially destabilizing movement of large numbers of people both within countries (e.g., China) and across state boundaries (e.g., peninsula Southeast Asia); the legacy of history and its impact on core bilateral relations (e.g., China-Japan, Japan-ROK/DPRK, China-Russia, Cambodia-Vietnam, India-Pakistan, China-USA, DPRK-USA).

Each of these issues is complex, requiring bilateral, regional, and possibly global cooperation. The purpose of this paper is not to address all of them but rather to focus on a few which, either due to their overarching nature or to the fit between Canadian and Japanese capabilities, would seem to be of common concern to Canada and to Japan and might be amenable to national policies which include various types of bilateral cooperation as well as cooperation in larger forums. Given the knowledge of the participants in this Symposium, there seems little purpose to rehearsing the litany of threats to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region.

3. Issues for Possible Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation²

The 2005 *Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* released during the January 2005 meeting between Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Canadian Prime Minister Martin in Tokyo identified seven areas for enhanced bilateral cooperation and dialogue: responding to terrorism, fighting transnational organized crime, enhancing regional stability and human security, advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament objectives, increasing bilateral security and defence exchanges, enhancing the ability of the United Nations to deal with new threats, and cooperating to achieve a comprehensive

² Much of the material in this section is drawn directly from research notes prepared for me as background for the symposium by Natalie Poirier, a graduate student in Political Science who has served as my research assistant at YCISS during this academic year. It is a pleasure to acknowledge her excellent work overall and especially her contribution to eight of the nine peace and security issue areas briefly presented in this text.

resolution of North Korea issues. Informed by both the *Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* of 1999 and the more recent 2005 declaration, a previous panel in this symposium addressed in greater detail the record and future prospects for Canada-Japan peace and security cooperation. Rather than repeat that, drawing from the long list of issues concerning peace and security in the Asia Pacific let me set out but a few of these which need to be addressed and to which both Canada and Japan might be drawn. One could select any or all of those previously listed. What I offer below is merely a sample drawn from areas relevant to military and strategic issues, to human security, to political economy, to regional security architecture, and to non-traditional areas which engage politics and diplomacy because they can become trip-wires to security challenges, all part of the peace and security context of the Asia Pacific. In my view, they draw on competencies available in both Canada and Japan and thus should be viewed as strengthening the existing commitments both nations have in these security areas while furthering the important norm of transnational cooperation.

#1 – Revamp the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

Since the end of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear war has accumulated a muted presence because of a fifty-year period of non-use.³ Today, however, nuclear arms are no longer the only concern as chemical and biological weapons have become contenders for the forefront of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Although there appears to be a lessened guarantee of complete annihilation, there is an enhanced threat of mass destruction.⁴

Where nuclear weapons have great killing capacity, but are difficult to acquire, chemical and biological weapons are easy to obtain, but are less effective.

The use of biological material as a weapon is not a new method of inflicting terror. What is surprising is how infrequently it has been used.⁵ Biological agents enable terrorists to preserve their anonymity because of their delayed impact and can be confused with natural disease outbreaks. The emergence of roughly one new infectious disease every year for the past twenty years, as well as pandemic outbreaks of SARS, Ebola, Avian Flu and the persistence of HIV/AIDS, reveals increasingly sophisticated viruses which are resistant to treatment.⁶

The shift from conventional warfare to “out-of-the-box” thinking demonstrated by recent acts of terror calls to attention that the very few controls that are indeed in place against the weaponization of biological agents have been continually violated. With the birth of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) from the 1925 Geneva Protocol, signatories pledged not to “develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain” biological agents, toxins or weapons.⁷ For example, state governments, notably Russia, have long been known to have a covert weaponization programme.

In an attempt to address these mass violations of the BWC, the Australia Group formed in order to harmonize the export controls on chemicals for poisonous gas, hazardous pathogens and biological dual-use equipment.⁸ Despite best intentions,

³ Fred Charles Iklé, “The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74 No.1 Jan-Feb 1996 p119.

⁴ Richard K. Betts, “The New Threat of Mass Destruction”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.77 No.1 Jan-Feb 1998 p.29

⁵ The delivery of anthrax through the U.S. Postal Service in the weeks subsequent to September 11 made the threat of biological terrorism into reality. However, this was not the first time that biological weapons had been used. In 1984, the Rajneeshees, a religious cult from Oregon, sought to win a local election by running its own candidates and intentionally poisoning a total of 751 local townspeople who they expected would vote against them. The Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult launched an unsuccessful anthrax attack in 1993. Following this failure, in 1995 the cult released liquid sarin nerve gas in a Tokyo subway.

⁶ Christopher F. Chyba and Alex L. Greninger, “Biotechnology and Bioterrorism: An Unprecedented World,” *Survival*, Vol.46, No.2 Summer 2004 p.144

⁷ For the complete text of the *Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction*, See: <http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hsp/1972.html> Accessed: May 27, 2005

⁸ Please refer to: www.australiagroup.net for more information.

however, the Australia Group has been charged by developing nations as being discriminatory as these controls prohibit them from acquiring that which affluent nations can without suspicion of mal intent.⁹

There are two very large gaps within the BWC which may be easily exploited. First, there is no restriction in the use of pathogens for the research and development of medicine and defense capabilities. Second, the BWC does not provide conditions for any on-site inspections which have arguably been linked to the weaponization of pathogens.¹⁰ In 2001, the concern over the non-compliance with the BWC saw an international negotiation of an additional compliance protocol of which both Canada and Japan were part. The US pulled out of negotiations, however, stating that it would not support any legally binding protocol to strengthen the BWC for fear of this infringing on the capacity of the United States' biotechnology industry. It is not only the US which is investing in biotechnology; China, Pakistan and Singapore all have invested unprecedented amounts of capital into the potentials of biotechnology. The internationalization of biotech contracts is proving to complicate the ability to control dangerous pathogens.

Although the terms of the talks on the BWC rule out any multilateral action prior to the 2006 BWC Review Conference, Japan and Canada have been working together bilaterally on terrorism, as the agenda of the "Third Canada-Japan Symposium on Peace and Security Cooperation" called for. Specifically, Canada was invited to present on

responses to bio-terrorism at the Crisis Management of Chemical and Biological Terrorism seminar in Tokyo in 2003.¹¹ Japan has paid direct attention to the removal of Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China and both Canada and Japan have called for the strengthened cooperation of both countries to *respond* to chemical, biological radiological and nuclear terrorism.¹² Canada and Japan might be able to initiate a dialogue in order to bolster the BWC and to ensure that "unpoliced" scientists do not leave pathogens and dual-use equipment open to the hands of proliferators.¹³ Japan and Canada could draft template legislation on controls for presentation and discussion at the 2006 BWC Review Conference which might then be implemented at the national level of each signatory state.

As Canada is chairing the Asia Regional Forum's Confidence Building Measure (CBM) meeting on Export Licensing Experts Meeting in Singapore in November 2005, the discriminatory nature of the Australia Group's export controls could be addressed in order to increase the solidarity of the movement and therefore the universality of the BWC.

#2 – Legislation and Best Practises in Combating Human Trafficking

Generating over \$10 billion a year in revenues, the trafficking of humans is the world's fastest growing international crime.¹⁴ In Southeast Asia human trafficking accounts for between two and fourteen per cent of the entire region's cumulative GDP.¹⁵ In attempting to combat human trafficking in this area, six Asian countries of the Greater

⁹ Amy E. Smithson, "Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overcome Inaction?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.1 Winter 2004-2005 p.168

¹⁰ These two gaps are identified by Amy E. Smithson, "Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overcome Inaction?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.1 Winter 2004-2005 p.168

¹¹ Foreign Affairs Canada, *Counter-Terrorism Cooperation* Available: www.dfait.maeci.gc.ca/asia/japan/Peace_Security_Counter-Terrorism-en.asp Accessed: May 10, 2005

¹² As stated in the *2005 Canada-Japan Agenda For Peace and Security Cooperation*, Available: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/asia/japan/2005_Peace_Security_Agenda-en.asp Accessed: May 10, 2005

¹³ These two gaps are identified by Amy E. Smithson, "Biological Weapons: Can Fear Overcome Inaction?" *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol.28, No.1 Winter 2004-2005 p.174

¹⁴ Speech made by the Honourable Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada at the *Forum on Human Trafficking*, Ottawa, Ontario 30 March, 2004. Available: www.justice.gc.ca/en/news/sp/2004/doc_31158.html Accessed: May 27, 2005

Mekong sub-region – Cambodia, China, Laos, Burma, Thailand and Vietnam – are collaborating on the criminalization of the traffickers as well as social service provision for the victims.¹⁶ With nearly half of all immigrants coming to Canada from the Asia-Pacific region, human traffickers are able to profit from people desperate to circumvent the immigration process or who are trafficked into forced labour.¹⁷

Human trafficking is yet another link in the chain of organized crime. Organized crime and, more specifically, the trafficking of narcotics is increasingly overlapping into the terrorist realm. The connection between the levels is most often purely logistical; however, it also can prove to be more strategic as in sharing ideologies and trafficking routes. Many terrorists finance their work by the sale of humans or narcotics and rely on criminal organizations to acquire their needed weaponry and to move their equipment. Thus, any focus on combating the trafficking of humans will also most likely lead to international criminal organizations dealing in fraudulent money, narcotics and terrorism.

Japan is similar to Canada in that it is also a destination country for mainly women and children who are trafficked into Japan to work in the “entertainment” (sex) industry. Approximately one-tenth of all forced labour in Asia in commercial sexual exploitation and one-fifth of forced labour

is actually enforced by states like China and Myanmar.¹⁸ People are trafficked to Japan from Thailand, the Philippines, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Colombia, Russia, and Central Asia and the numbers are increasing.¹⁹ As a recipient country, Japan has moved to adopt an “Action Plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons” in order to successfully curb the problem of illegal immigrants.²⁰ Although Japan has yet to introduce any legislation expressly criminalizing human trafficking, Canada has just announced the tabling of amendments to the *Criminal Code* which are designed to exclusively ban the trafficking of persons.²¹ These motions made by both governments are consistent with the requirements under the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime” (the Protocol).

Just as the six Mekong sub-regional countries have formed a working group to prosecute traffickers and support repatriation projects for victims, Japan and Canada would do well to work together to establish an intergovernmental dialogue on “best practices” as destination countries for illegal immigrants. This would assist in fostering dialogue and coordination between origin and destination countries. A roundtable on how to best prosecute, protect and prevent human trafficking with both Canadian and Japanese governmental

¹⁵ Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, *Fact Sheet: Trafficking in Human Beings*, Available: http://www.psepc.gc.ca/policing/organized_crime/FactSheets/trafficking_e.asp Accessed: May 27, 2005

¹⁶ “Six Asian nations act to stop human trafficking,” *Reuters*, 31 March 2005

¹⁷ For figures on Canadian immigration by region see: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Facts and Figures 2003: Immigration Overview*, Available: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/facts2003.pdf> Accessed: May 25, 2001

¹⁸ Steven Greenhouse, “12.3 million are seen as doing labour under force,” *The International Herald Tribune*, May 13, 2005 Available: www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/05/12/news/labor.php Accessed: May 26, 2005

¹⁹ See: Human Trafficking: Japan, Available: www.humantrafficking.org/countries/eap/japan/ Accessed: May 25, 2001. In 2004 a record 79 cases of human trafficking involving foreign women were reported the highest number ever recorded by Japan’s National Police Agency although the numbers are thought to be well into the thousands. See: “Human-trafficking at record 79 cases but number more likely in thousands,” *The Japan Times*, April 15, 2005, Available: www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/makeprfy.pl5?nn20050415a5.htm Accessed: May 25, 2005

²⁰ This is in response to pressure from the United States who placed Japan on the Tier 2-Watch List of the U.S. State Department Trafficking in Persons report issued in June 14, 2004. Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan’s Action Plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in Persons*, December 2004. Available: http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/i_crime/people/action.pdf Accessed: May 27, 2005

²¹ Department of Justice Canada, *Minister of Justice Introduces Bill Targeting Trafficking in Persons*, Ottawa, Ontario May 12, 2005. Available: http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2005/doc_31482.html Accessed: May 25, 2005

agencies and relevant NGO bodies would be beneficial for both countries. The *2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* document notes that point of coordinated effort for both countries is on transnational organized crime and as both countries are running inter-ministerial task forces within their respective governments, the exchange of ideas and the introduction by these countries of legislation would provide a template for other countries in the region. Many of the Southeast Asian nations still do not have anti-trafficking laws and there are very few protections afforded for the foreign victims.²² It was only in 2004 that the Government of Japan changed its policy towards victims which previously had been immediately to deport all illegally trafficked humans. Thus, with the successful implementation of this new Action Plan, Japan and Canada can provide a framework on which other Southeast Asian countries could base their policies. The cooperation of Japan and Canada on this issue and the insertion of compliance legislation to adhere to the Protocol might encourage further agreement and submission to the Protocol and would provide a starting point to advance dialogue on human rights in Asia.

#3 – Environmental Degradation and the Quest for Sustainable Energy

The impressive economic and military growth rates of both China and India are creating a destabilization and perhaps even a bipolarization of the entire Asian continent.²³ In addition to providing an insecure regional environment it is also contributing to much more dangerous and long-term ecological problems. Encroaching catastrophic desertification, water and food shortages, cross-

border pollution and acid rain are all becoming more threatening. In China alone, 70% of all urbanites are exposed to heavy air pollution and 70% of China's seven major waterways are seriously polluted.²⁴

Although such environmental degradation must be actively targeted by the producer states unilaterally, this is neither sufficient nor practical. The sheer amount of pollutants being produced by China and India are having ramifications for cross-border pollution in other Asian countries and the food shortages and resource competition are globally unsustainable.

Japan is the world leader in the development of sustainable energy sources including product development and production control in advanced energy saving and various pollution control techniques. It has much to offer the Chinese environment and economy. The Second China-Japan Dialogue on Climate Change took place in Beijing on 26 April where both countries pledged to work more closely on combating climate change.²⁵ Canada has signed an MOU on Climate Change with China which calls for bilateral cooperation in measuring greenhouse gas measurement strategies and setting reduction targets.²⁶ As well, Canada has signed a joint statement with China on energy cooperation for the 21st century and was a participant in the Nuclear Power Asia Pacific 2005 Conference this July 12-15 in Hong Kong.²⁷

A joint effort between Canada and Japan to target climate change in not only China but also India and other large producers of greenhouse

²² Baradan Kuppusamy, "Trafficked Women in Malaysia Seek Protection" *Asia Times Online*, February 4, 2005 Available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/GB04Ae01.html Accessed: May 10, 2005

²³ Among other things, this destabilization is attributed to both a growing arms race and China and India's thirst for natural resources and energy deposits. See: Chietigj Bajpae, "Indian, China locked in energy game," *The Asia Times Online*, March 17, 2005 Available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/GC17Dk01.html Accessed: May 25, 2005

²⁴ Tanabe Toshinori, "Start with Cooperation on Energy and the Environment," *Japan Echo*, Vol.31, No.2, April 2004, p.33

²⁵ See: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, "The Second China-Japan Climate Change Dialogue" Available: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/warm/cop/dialogue0504.html> Accessed May 10, 2005

²⁶ Other bilateral relationships between Canada and China on climate change are the "Canada-China Cooperation in Climate Change Project (C 5)" and the issue of a "Joint Statement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Strengthened Dialogue and Cooperation on Climate Change". For more information on these agreements see: http://www.ec.gc.ca/international/bilat/china_e.htm Accessed: May 27, 2005

gasses could draw attention to the energy concerns around the ASEAN+3 nations. With the merging of the ASEAN+3 nations into the East Asian Community, Tanabe Toshinori envisions an “East Asian Clean Energy Community” which would help serve to cool tensions around dwindling supplies of oil due to the region’s rapid consumption of fossil fuels.²⁸ As well, Japanese and Canadian technology could be used to create energy grids in order to quell the massive oil shipping around the region in order to save on costs and dependency on Middle Eastern energy sources.

The emerging East Asian Community has a distinct opportunity to implement environmental policies for their member states in order to slow environmental degradation in the region. This collaboration between Canada and Japan would fulfill the Priority Area of Cooperation for the “Launching an Innovative Canada-Japan Economic Framework” found at point (h) “Science and Technology” (ii) “fostering collaboration in leading areas of scientific and technological innovation such as life sciences, information communication technologies, earth sciences, environment, space, renewable energy and advanced materials.” Additionally, there is room for cooperation at point (m) of the Framework “Climate Change” which calls for closer consultations between Canada and Japan for the post-2012 period and the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol.²⁹

Canada is in a unique position to coordinate leadership on the issue of climate change. It is hosting the Montréal Conference on Climate in November 2005 in order to begin international consultations on how to expand the current Kyoto targets past their current deadline of 2012. Canada’s “Climate Fund” contains funds specifically

earmarked for the exportation of Canadian “green technology” to be exported around the world in order to help other countries to reduce their greenhouse emissions. Working together on sustainable energy with China would not only strengthen Canada-Japan ties, but may also prove fruitful to the evolution of the always difficult Sino-Japanese relations.

#4 – Theatre Missile Defense, the Weaponization of Space and the NPT

For some, a significant threat to the balance of power status quo in Asia remains the Japanese involvement in the United States’ Theatre Missile Defense (TMD) plan which has the potential to see both Russia and China “rethink” their current military and space policies and programmes.³⁰ Despite the concerted efforts made by China and Russia to oppose the weaponization of space through proposals made at the UN’s Conference on Disarmament (CD), the Bush administration has opposed negotiations for a treaty banning space weapons, stating that the Outer Space Treaty (OST) is sufficient as it does not prohibit programmes the US is pursuing. The US also has opposed the CD agenda item, “Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space” (PAROS), and has actively vetoed any negotiations under this heading. In response, Russia and China, strong proponents of PAROS, have refused to move ahead on negotiations for Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) without progress on PAROS. At the open plenary session of the CD in 2004 Canada, China, France, Russia, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and the UK all made statements in support of PAROS. However, because of the deadlock, there has been no progress in CD or other international fora for the design of a space weapons ban.

²⁷ For the full text of the “Canada-China Statement on Energy Cooperation in the 21st Century” see: <http://www.news.gc.ca/cfmx/CCP/view/en/index.cfm?articleid=122289> Accessed May 10, 2005. Nuclear power is being increasingly acknowledged as the definitive answer to both the energy-dependency crisis and the curbing of greenhouse emissions. The Conference Programme of Nuclear Power Asia Pacific 2005 has further details to this end: www.powergenerationworld.com/2005/nps_au/confprog.stm Accessed: May 26, 2005

²⁸ Tanabe Toshinori, “Start with Cooperation on Energy and the Environment,” *Japan Echo*, Vol.31, No.2, April 2004, p.33

²⁹ The entire “Launching an Innovative Canada-Japan Economic Framework” may be found at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/canada/visit0501/frame.pdf> Accessed: May 27, 2005

³⁰ Ghazala Yasmin, “Space Weapons: the Need For Arms Control” *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, 2005. Available: http://www.issi.org.pk/strategic_studies_htm/2005/no_1/article/5a.htm Accessed: May 26, 2001

Throughout this impasse, negotiations between Japan and the United States have been ongoing. Japan is interested in pursuing a TMD programme with the United States as a deterrent against North Korea, the military build up of China, and in preparation of facing a potentially unified nuclear Korea.³¹ However, in signing on to TMD Japan will have to negotiate around its constitution's prohibition of defending anything except its home islands including any sort of "collective defense". Thus, for example, as the Japanese Aegis system can only function dependently with US assets, would this qualify as collective defense?³² Although Japan has just recently renewed its security agreement with the United States, with their own military build-up and increased participation in peacekeeping operations they have asserted a somewhat greater independence from the US in an attempt to solidify their national identity.

With Canada's recently declined participation in North American Ballistic Missile Defense there appears, at first glance, to be little common ground where Canada and Japan may work together. However, the development of an additional protocol to the OST (of which the US is already party) explicitly banning space weaponry might be a step in the direction towards the prohibition of an arms race in outer space.³³

Further, the recent failure of the NPT Review Conference was a disappointment to both Canada and Japan. There was massive disagreement on what was a more perilous danger: proliferation or nuclear arsenals? As well, is the spread of nuclear fuel-cycle technology part of the proliferation paradigm and, even if so, should access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology be encouraged?³⁴

Canada and Japan may be able to work together to lead a coalition of other states to discuss these issues and to bolster the NPT at the opening of the UN General Assembly in September 2005. Canadian Foreign Minister Pierre Pettigrew stated that "Canada will redouble its efforts with partners from all regions to address the non-proliferation and disarmament challenges that confront the international community."³⁵ This is a fundamental area which would comply with the 2005 *Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* criteria D, "advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) objects."³⁶ Furthermore, active cooperation on managing the challenges faced by the IAEA would strengthen both Canadian and Japanese resolve to pursue cooperative, rules-based procedures and could also contribute to ensuring enhanced coordination among principals.

#5 – Islamic Fundamentalism in Southeast Asia

Indonesia is home to a number of powerful Islamic fundamentalist groups, including the Jemaah Islamiah (JI), Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). Although Islamic fundamentalist groups in Indonesia and indeed elsewhere in Southeast Asia are relatively few in number, some such as Jemaah Islamiah have an admittedly radical agenda in the name of Islam which encompass a vision of a pan-Islamic theocracy throughout most of Southeast Asia. Despite post-9/11 arrangements of American supplies of military training and arms to Indonesia, the second largest Islamic state in the world remains vulnerable. Indonesia has been under increasing pressure to tackle these activities, though for some the light sentencing awarded to those responsible for the 2002 Bali bombings indicates a massive

³¹ Amy L. Freedman and Robert C. Gray, "Implications of Missile Defense for Northeast Asia," *Orbis*, Spring 2004, pp.343-344.

³² *Ibid.* p.344

³³ Ghazala Yasmin, "Space Weapons: the Need For Arms Control" *Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad*, 2005. Available: http://www.issi.org.pk/strategic_studies_htm/2005/no_1/article/5a.htm Accessed: May 26, 2001

³⁴ Kofi A. Annan, "Break the nuclear deadlock," *International Herald Tribune*, May 30, 2005 Available: www.iht.com/bin/print_ipub.php?file=/articles/2005/05/29/news/edannan.php Accessed: May 30, 2005

³⁵ Pierre Pettigrew, "Minister Pettigrew Calls For Renewed Efforts On Disarmament And Non-Proliferation Following NPT Review Conference" May 27, 2005. Available: http://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/MinPub/Publication.asp?Language=E&publication_id=382598 Accessed: May 29, 2005

³⁶ As stated in the 2005 *Canada-Japan Agenda For Peace and Security Cooperation*, Available: http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/asia/japan/2005_Peace_Security_Agenda-en.asp Accessed: May 10, 2005

discrepancy in political rhetoric and national judicial proceedings.

Indonesia is caught between targeting Islamic militants and maintaining democratic values which are being inculcated as an integral part of its efforts to consolidate a new democratic Indonesia since the 1998 end of the authoritarian government. Because of this, Indonesia has been rather hesitant in pursuing counter-terrorism efforts in line with the US War on Terror. While Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines have taken significant steps towards fighting terrorism, Indonesia has as yet made no outwardly significant effort towards dispelling the alleged Muslim militant networks that are said to be rife throughout the country.

In attempting to govern a complex ethnic and religious mosaic, the former Indonesia president Megawati was attempting to be all things to all people. Her successor, former army General Susila Bambang Yudhoyono, faces much the same. In leading a Muslim population of 210 million, he must grapple with a multi-ethnic, multi-religious citizenry and be able to distinguish between those who oppose the Bush Administration (and other Western symbols) and genuine extremists who are eager to actively target Western images in order to further their cause. These complex factors combined with the omnipresent fear of Islamic fundamentalist networks thriving within Indonesian state borders and connected with a larger sympathetic Islamic fundamentalist network contributed to the former President's loss of ground in fighting terrorism and the subsequent dismissal of charges that any Al-Qaeda cells operate within their territory. It may still come to bedevil her successor.

The complex task of fighting terrorism on one hand and attempting to foster a young democracy on the other has resulted in the combating of terrorist organizations as being only one of a very long list of priorities for the Indonesian state. Fostering economic growth, development, and (re-) distribution is a much more tangible, politically resonant, and long-standing priority, well ahead of fighting terrorism. Both China and India are aware of these dynamics and of the enormous potential

benefits to accrue in the longer term from having close relations with a re-emergent, politically stable and economically more progressive Indonesia. While the United States has concentrated its efforts on arming and training military personnel, China and India have been negotiating trade agreements with Indonesia, thereby developing a more favourable image than the Americans as a bilateral partner in the region.

Although politicized and violent Islamic fundamentalists still remain in the minority in Indonesia, without constant monitoring of network activities and inflammatory rhetoric, these militant groups can continue to destabilize or undermine the renewal of the Indonesian federal system and its economy. The destructiveness of the tsunami and the failure of Jakarta to adequately address the attendant results of that tragedy, most notably the massive destruction in Aceh, further exacerbated the fragility of the Indonesian state.

Although not a direct threat to Japan or Canada, Islamic fundamentalism in Indonesia should be monitored closely for the security of the Indonesian people and state, for concerns that neighbouring ASEAN partners have about both Islamic fundamentalism and the importance of a stable and secure Indonesia in terms of their own prosperity, and ultimately as a responsible part of a cooperative security effort which recognizes the problematic impact of the trans-national network of fundamentalist-inspired actors. ASEAN, APEC, and the ARF all have roles here, and in this context as well as bilaterally, there are opportunities for Canada and Japan to cooperate not simply on the normal areas of human security and development, but even on some more sensitive issues, such as in jointly sharing intelligence and monitoring this situation closely. Not to be forgotten is that Islamic fundamentalism is a political force elsewhere in Southeast Asia, especially but not only in Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, and the Philippines.

#6 – HIV/AIDS in the Asia-Pacific Region

Often overlooked, the HIV/AIDS infection rates in both China and India, the two most populous countries in the world, constitute a serious human security threat.³⁷ India recently has been counted as

having the second largest population living with HIV/AIDS after South Africa. Both India and China are on the verge of full-blown epidemics which have the potential to endanger economic, personal and social growth within the countries, exacerbating already existing differences while creating new areas of vulnerability. In China and India, the many millions who face HIV today do not belong to small, isolated groups within society. Rather, vulnerable pockets of population interact extensively with the general population, a precursor for epidemic diffusion.³⁷ Despite this, stigmatization about the virus has resulted in ignorance, compounding the difficulties of creating a preventive programme, contributing further to widespread infection.

Although China and India have been long aware of HIV/AIDS within their countries, the response has been sluggish. This has been mainly to do with a lack of openness in confronting the epidemic on the part of China, and with India not engaging its public in a timely fashion due to the stigmatization associated with the contraction of the virus (ie. via intravenous drug use, sex workers, homosexuality). There has been, however, a lack of genuine commitment and leadership at all government levels, a lack of adequate resources, a crumbling public health system, and the problem of discrimination once infection has been confirmed. Cultural taboos make it difficult to speak about the problem in the necessary detail and transcending these taboos in order to promote prevention programmes is exceptionally difficult.

As China and India are both at the early stage of the epidemic, there are still possibilities for prevention in order to off set an African-type pandemic. It is particularly ironic that India is one of the major producers of the generic brands of anti-retroviral HIV/AIDS pharmaceuticals which are sold to developing countries all over the world; however, these drugs are only affordable to a fraction of the Indian population and thus, most

have to do without.

Japan and Canada, through their respective development agencies, could urge China and India to take their growing HIV/AIDS infection rates more seriously and instigate transparency measures. Through both bilateral action and multilateral commitments (UNDP, WHO) one could envisage our two countries moving this portfolio forward in cooperation with governmental and NGO partners. If the infection rates are not able to be curbed, this will seriously hamper the economic and social development of not only India and China but of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole.

#7 – The Challenges of the East Asian Community

At the end of the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) Summit in Vientiane, Laos in 2004 the foundation had been set for a more economically robust East Asian Community (EAC). The current proposed EAC would include ASEAN+3 and India, Australia and New Zealand. Although the move towards such integration is primarily motivated by the desire to contend with the economic powerhouses of the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), many other non-conventional issues may come into the fore.

The embrace of two major economies – Japan and China – as well as the recent acceptance of India into the EAC is indicative of the trend towards greater intra-regional economic transactions. To this end, China and Japan are each eager to capture the potential of the Southeast Asian countries by way of accelerated pursuit of bilateral trade agreements. As well, the agreements being negotiated are what Noordin Sopiee calls “Do it Quick” agreements.³⁸ The speed in which these agreements are implemented without the usual laborious process of negotiation is noticeably striking.

³⁷ Laurie Garrett, “The Lessons of HIV/AIDS”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.84, No.4, July/August 2005, p.55

³⁸ An example of this is the increasingly high infection rates among the national armed forces. In May 2005, the Indian Minister of Defence stated that the HIV/AIDS was the fifth largest cause of death within the nation’s 1.33 million strong armed forces. Ibid.

³⁹ Noordin Sopiee, “The New Paradigm of East Asian Cooperation,” *Japan Echo*, April 2004 p.29

Although the desire for deeper economic integration is increasingly apparent, ASEAN+3 and the eventual EAC currently are void of dispute resolution mechanisms. Thus despite the attempt to integrate on a economic level, the numerous territorial disputes and current race for natural resources and energy in order to fuel the economic growth may potentially undermine any sort of economic integration into a regional bloc.⁴⁰ The long-standing territorial disputes are also undermining the confidence-building measures incorporated by ASEAN which, in turn, is preventing cooperation in “addressing shared security threats, such as international terrorism, piracy in the Strait of Malacca ... as well as less conventional security threats such as AIDS, SARS, bird flu, and tsunamis.”⁴¹

ASEAN’s policy of non-intervention and non-confrontation on issues pertaining to internal state matters (e.g., the Bandung Spirit, the ASEAN Way, the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and China’s Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), even with the limited changes inferred by an approach of constructive engagement, emphasizes the requirement to avoid confrontation. Yet with this proposed increased economic integration, confrontation may prove unavoidable. Note, for instance, that despite the increased and deepening economic relations between China and Japan of late, tensions and strong nationalistic rhetoric have persisted.

Progress may be afoot, however. The coming accession of Burma (Myanmar) to chair ASEAN has led to both the European Union and the United States stating that they will not attend any ASEAN meetings due to non-recognition of the junta and of Myanmar’s abhorrent human rights record. This has subsequently opened a debate between the ASEAN members as to whether or not to allow the chairmanship to proceed. This is a moment for ASEAN and a chance to experiment with a conflict resolution mechanism which perhaps may be suitable for a future EAC.

Although Canada has not yet been slated to be included in a future EAC, it may prove beneficial as a moderating third party where territorial disputes and other conflicts have the potential to be resolved in regional or multilateral settings. It appears as though the installation of such a mechanism would be essential to the longevity of any regional body as pure economic interests may either lead to significant disputes or, contrary to conventional wisdom, not be able to prevent the emergence of conflicts.

#8 – Nuclear Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

The *2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* document calls for cooperation to dispel the multilateral impasse over a now allegedly nuclear armed North Korea.

America’s unwillingness to negotiate bilaterally with North Korea, its reliance on China to coerce DPRK back to the table, and China’s refusal to apply sanctions to Pyongyang has brought tension to the Northeast Asia region. Additionally, the Bush Administration has been critical of South Korea’s evolving policy of deepening engagement with North Korea which has in turn strained relations. As a result of the DPRK nuclear impasse, bilateral relationships among the members of the multilateral Six Party Talks in the region (China, Russia, South Korea, North Korea, the USA and Japan) have been shifting.

After thirteen months of deadlock, the North Koreans have agreed to engage in a fourth round of six-party talks set to commence July 25, 2005. As the Bush Administration is disinterested in engaging in the tit-for-tat strategy that the DPRK was awarded under the Clinton Administrations, the United States has largely been dependent on China to bring North Korea back to the negotiation table. This was preceded by a massive energy aid package recently granted to Pyongyang from Seoul and by extensive meetings between Pyongyang and US Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill.

⁴⁰ Chietigi Bajpaee, “The Price of Asian Conflict,” *The Asian Times Online*, May 24, 2005 Available: www.atimes.com/atimes/Asian_Economy/GE24Dk01.html Accessed: May 27, 2005

⁴¹ Ibid.

Although the reconvening of the six-party talks is a positive step and American rhetoric towards Pyongyang has softened in recent months, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has indicated that any concessions from the US will only be awarded upon the agreement of Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons programme. As Seoul has now provided the initial carrot of two million kilowatts of electricity as part of a package to encourage a de-nuclearized North Korea, it remains to be seen what progress, if any, may be accomplished.⁴²

Japan's policy towards North Korea remains irrevocably tied to the United States through bilateral security agreements and the plans for Theatre Missile Defense (TMD), though tempered by its interests in the return of abductees. Canada as yet has not been publicly involved in the quest to diffuse the nuclear crisis. While a very modest player, for fifteen years Canada has carefully explored relations with North Korea, including the establishment of formal diplomatic recognition albeit constrained by the North's violation of its non-nuclear commitments.

With a nuclearized North Korea, any sort of regional military mobilization or surgical bombing campaigns on North Korea's nuclear reactors runs the risk of an all-out war on the peninsula as well as a pre-emptive attack on Seoul. As Canada has remained disengaged from the negotiation process with North Korea, should the Six Party talks deadlock again, Canada may do well to act as an intermediary in order to keep the process moving forward. In the meantime, in an effort to address the human security aspects of the tragedy of the DPRK, Canada and Japan could do more to enhance its coordination in the areas of selected NGO humanitarian and educational assistance. Moreover, they could convene a working group of experts to

prepare options in anticipation of a negotiated resolution to at least some of the major impediments sufficient to allow further incremental opening of the North to international engagement.

#9 – Maritime Threats and the Opportunities for Cooperative Security⁴³

While land, air and space security continue to be factors for individual country defence and security as well as more broadly sub-regional and regional security in Southeast, South, and Northeast Asia, increasingly the classic aspects of naval capacity and maritime geography are emerging as major factors in the diplomatic, political, economic and security calculus of the Asia Pacific. Sea lanes of communication remain as potential choke points for transit of commercial goods, especially energy but also strategic minerals and manufactures, not least weapons, highlighting the ongoing vulnerabilities that are experienced by most of the coastal and island states of Asia. Piracy is an ongoing problem, possibly abetted by interested governments. Control of territorial zones brings naval deployments into possible zones of conflict. The illicit movement of people, drugs, and weapons challenges the operational capabilities of littoral states and, fundamentally, require bi- and multi-lateral cooperation. Fisheries, deep sea mining, and energy exploration all call on maritime commercial and naval capabilities, and if not managed through various legal regimes and operational principles increase the likelihood of accidental as well as purposeful incidents at sea.

Although there are a number of promising areas for Canada-Japan naval and maritime cooperation, any initiative must always be weighed against the impact it will have on regional security dynamics. In the Asia Pacific waters, changes to the status quo have the potential to be destabilizing. That noted, there are some important areas worthy

⁴² Jonathan Beale, "US sees N Korea challenges ahead," *BBC News World Service*, July 13, 2005 Available: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4680975.stm>, Accessed: July 13, 2005

⁴³ This section on maritime issues is informed by and for some aspects draws from a draft working paper by Ryerson Christie, an advanced PhD student in Political Science and researcher at YCISS, who has both academic and operational knowledge of the maritime security environment and of East Asia. Entitled "Possibilities for Canadian-Japanese Maritime Cooperation," (Toronto: YCISS, 20 May 2005) the paper was prepared as a background for this symposium draft. It offers a fairly thorough examination of a range of bilateral, regional, and multilateral areas of maritime peace and security operations that might be amenable to enhanced cooperation between the Canadian and Japanese navies.

of consideration. Most of these build on existing experience and regimes, though some have the potential for creative partnerships as yet underdeveloped. RIMPAC, WPNS, anti-piracy, and coast guard activities all offer such opportunities. The post-tsunami experience suggests an important area of using naval and other military assets in a cooperative manner for humanitarian purposes.

Within Japan's National Defence Programme Outline (NDPO) released in 1995, an evolution in the role of its Maritime Security and Defence Force (MSDF) has occurred. The MSDF has seen a dramatic shift in its responsibilities from its previous role of defending Japan and surrounding Sea-Lanes of Communication (SLOCs) to its current mandate of defence of Japan, responding to disasters in and around Japan, and to contribute to a stable regional and global security environment.⁴⁴ Japan's active engagement with Southeast Asia on security issues has been reinforced with the Koizumi doctrine, which has made specific reference to the need for further cooperation on security matters between Japan and ASEAN.⁴⁵ Japan is quite aware of the difficulty it will face managing a return to a leadership role in the Asia Pacific; it must constantly move in carefully measured steps to avoid any backlash, both internally and abroad.

As with Canada, Japan has extensive bilateral agreements with the United States. Today the two fleets that are most closely integrated into United States Navy (USN) task groups are Japan and Canada.⁴⁶ Currently the focus of the US-Japan alliance has shifted from the defence of Japan to

regional security, motivated to some degree by a common concern with China's long-term strategic direction.⁴⁷ Although Japan and Canada are both concerned with China's growth, and both are core participants in American naval operations, Canada is unlikely to participate in patrols oriented towards countering the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

With that stark limitation, there are a number of areas of maritime vulnerability or threats to peace and security of the Asia Pacific extending around to include Southeast and South Asia that offer the need to consider ways in which Canada and Japan might cooperate, whether bilaterally or more likely within an overarching multilateral context. These include, given our respective relations with the United States, our inter-operability capacities and in some cases our similar platforms, such areas as mine counter measures and anti-submarine warfare, disaster assistance, counter-terrorism and anti-proliferation roles. One could also envisage hosting regular meetings on these topics as well as undertaking joint lessons-learned assessments, such as with the tsunami relief efforts.

Ocean peacekeeping (OPK) provides an expanded role to maritime forces "...to assure the stable and sustainable development of oceans.... In other words, OPK is coordinated activities by the regional maritime forces to assure the stable utilization of the oceans."⁴⁸ The main thrust of OPK is the protection of SLOCs, which has remained a central preoccupation of Japan, even during the period of the American dominance of Japanese

⁴⁴ The MSDF began to participate outside of Japan's waters in 1991 when naval elements were sent to support the United Nations Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Subsequently the role of MSDF expanded when Japan enacted a special law on antiterrorism measures in October 2001 allowing Japan, for the first time since World War II, to send its MSDF ships to the Indian Ocean in November 2001 to support the U.S.-led war against terrorism. Yann-Huei Song, "The Overall Situation in the South China Sea in the New Millennium: Before and After the September 11 Terrorist Attacks" in *Ocean Development and International Law*, Vol.34, no.3-4 (2003). pp. 229-277.

⁴⁵ National Institute for Defense Studies Japan. *East Asian Strategic Review - 2003*. Tokyo: The Japan Times, 2003, 211.

⁴⁶ The Canadian Forces is continuing to integrate with the USN, and are now pursuing the possibility of combined patrols of their respective waters. This is comparable to the manner in which Japan and US naval forces have been integrated.

⁴⁷ Anthony Bergin, "East Asian naval developments - sailing into rough seas," in *Marine Policy*, Vol. 26 (2002), pp. 121-131.

⁴⁸ Susumu Takai and Kazumine Akimoto. "Ocean-Peace Keeping and New Roles for Maritime Force" in *National Institute for Defense Studies*, Vol. 1 (March 2000), p. 58. The basis of the utilization of oceans is UNCLOS II, which Japan argues supports the global sustainable use of resources, even if they fall within the EEZ of other states. OPK refers to a set of international cooperative activities by the navies and the marine police of coastal states in the region. By implementing in this way laws and regulations enacted in accordance with their international obligations under UNCLOS, these states aim to maintain order in the

defence roles. Japan continues to see the role of the United States as being at the core of OPK. Canada, currently working towards greater integration of the defence of maritime North America, needs to be engaged in any initiative that might alter the regimes governing the use of the maritime environment. Further work therefore needs to be done on this area to determine the degree to which OPK is likely to coincide with Canadian interests.

Unlike OPK, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) has been formally ratified by the Canadian government. As a signatory to the agreement there is clear space for further cooperation with Japan. The current political environment is favourable to the implementation of regimes that can provide a counter to terrorism, piracy, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There is potential in jointly pushing states in Southeast Asia to ratify this agreement. This would serve to further reinforce a growing consensus that merchant vessels on the high seas can be searched for prohibited materials. Canada and Japan are both well situated to make a strong case for PSI without raising the same concern that a similar push by the United States might have. Canada and Japan, both which have been advocates for the systemic application of international law, are less likely to be perceived as seeking further power for their own sake.

Related to the PSI, there is a need for further exercises to acquire the expertise in coordinating the tracking of merchant ships between participating

states, as well as the joint-combined interdiction of suspect vessels. As the PSI requires an erosion of the normal division of duties between coast guard and naval forces these evolutions must include more than just naval elements.⁴⁹ Japan has been using the PSI as a means to expand the role of its MSDF, as seen by the recent Team Samurai PSI Exercise (October 2004), a tri-nation exercise hosted by Japan, within which the JMSDF played an active role. If Canada wishes to continue its participation in PSI, then participating in PSI exercises is a necessity; bilateral PSI exercises between Canada and Japan, including both the naval and coast guard elements, would be a valuable endeavour.⁵⁰

An organization that the two states could focus their efforts on is the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS).⁵¹ Recently the WPNS has begun conducting exercises focussed on capabilities that most of the participating members share. The WPNS provides an opportunity for Canada (an observer) and Japan (a member) to push an agenda that is to their mutual advantage.⁵² Due to its comprehensive membership the WPNS is limited in its ability to be effective in the actual conduct of operations. However, as a means of confidence building, of correlating activities of member states, and forming the basis of cooperation in relatively low-risk issue areas, the WPNS has excellent potential. In particular, the management of merchant shipping and the interdiction of pirates as well as merchant vessels suspected of trafficking in nuclear weapons materials and other WMD would be a valuable use of this symposium. A workshop for senior working level officers from the respective states around these topics

⁴⁹ Jamie Miyazaki, "Japan deploys self-defence forces to Aceh" in *Jane's Defence Weekly* (online edition: 17-Feb-2005).

⁵⁰ There is a significant gap in our knowledge of the impact of PSI on regional security issues. Further investigation is needed to explore whether PSI is stabilizing regional maritime security in the Asia Pacific, or eroding the willingness of states to cooperate with PSI signatories. For Canada it is unclear whether being a signatory to the agreement has affected perceptions of the government's independence from the United States in maritime policy. As well, the degree to which PSI fits in with the emerging maritime shipping security regime needs to be carefully examined.

⁵¹ This symposium has held yearly workshops for working level officers since 1992. The agenda is set by the officers and they are generally free to explore a wide range of topics. "In its early stages, the WPNS provided a forum for discussion to deepen mutual understanding among member navies. In the 1990s, with Russia as a new participant, maritime confidence-building measures were introduced to the forum for discussion and debate." Toru Ishikawa, (Admiral, MSDF) "There are No Borders at Sea" in *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol. 128, no.6 (2002), pp. 70-72.

⁵² The first Western Pacific mine counter-measures exercise was hosted by the Republic of Singapore Navy in 2001. A further Mine Counter-Measures Exercise (MCMEX) was co-hosted by Singapore and Indonesia; both Canada and Japan participated. The other significant development was the agreement reached in 2001 where the larger navies of the WPNS agreed to provide assistance to states with small naval forces in cases of natural disasters.

might be well received.

The maritime environment, from coastal waters to straits to the high seas, offers a variety of opportunities for responsible contributions to Asia Pacific peace and security in terms of policy, operations, and in some cases most significantly in terms of the sharing of knowledge, technology, and related expertise. Included in the agenda, in addition to that already mentioned, would be peace operations, coast guard activities, search and rescue, incidents at sea, the security of shipping including port surveillance and security, the Container Security Initiative. These latter issues are of particular importance to both Northeast and Southeast Asia, and given also the transit ties of importance to North America, provide a reasonable access to Canadian participation and contribution. Fisheries, of course, is an area of long standing concern to both within-region and extra-territorial states given the characteristics of modern fishing fleets, the trans-regional and global ecological sensitivity and economic costs to man-induced stock depletions, and the contested legal aspects of territorial zones of control.

4. The Promises offered through Security Cooperation

The end of the Cold War did not bring with it the declared “peace dividend” and while there is no need to rehearse the empirical evidence or the reasons — these are generally well known albeit somewhat contested — it is helpful to recall that conventional wisdom often has spoken of the continuation of a Cold War type of inter-state relations across East Asia. Unlike Africa or even Central Europe, where conflicts have been principally internal or intra-state, in East Asia states continue to dispute boundaries, contest rights, challenge principles and norms, and use threat-based policies to engage, to challenge, to deter, or to coerce. Military establishments continue to absorb significant — and in some cases growing — portions of the state’s GDP, and while confidence-building measures often are part of the process of inter-state, sub-regional and regional diplomacy, so too are constraints on transparency, intelligence sharing, movement of people and even goods and services.

In some cases in Northeast and Southeast Asia all this may be true. But what is remarkable is that over the past fifteen years or so, there has been a notable shift towards overcoming much of these ways of engaging others. With some notable exceptions — the Taiwan Straits, the Korean Peninsula, the uncertainty concerning the intent and capabilities of China both within and beyond Northeast Asia, Kashmir, nuclear proliferation — there has evolved a programme and a record of engagement and cooperation. Informal and formal inter-governmental organizations have emerged which tie governments together across politics, economics and even security. Civil society organizations and networks both reinforce and promote such changes. Multi-track diplomacy is increasingly evident. Military exercises increasingly include observers from other countries, and military officers are sent abroad to participate in workshops, symposia and longer-term training and education programmes. Countries from beyond Asia are partners or co-sponsors with national governments and agencies or international bodies in a broad and eclectic range of activities, and other than perhaps when the lead external actor is the United States (or Japan, China or Russia and possibly India) few seem threatened.

While there is no denying that there remains a disturbingly large array of unresolved problems, some of which are profoundly serious (weapons proliferation, trafficking, population growth and uneven demographics, escalating energy demands, vast economic disparities, potential fundamental extremism and other destabilizing identity politics, and those few crucial geo-strategic flashpoints which could escalate into horrific proportions), nor should we fail to acknowledge that in a remarkably brief period East Asia and the Asia Pacific have moved from a vast arena of many types of violent conflicts and instabilities to a remarkably diverse region of comparatively stable countries and even, in places, tranquility and economic and social development.

Given the widely acknowledged importance for both East and West of ensuring that the principal countries of East Asia and South Asia move forward in terms of political stability, economic development,

and security, it is not unreasonable to assert that Canada, in cooperation with others, commit knowledge, skills and resources to Asia. The past fifteen years has seen the evolution towards a cooperative security environment in the Asia Pacific, and though many issues remain to be resolved, much already has been accomplished. Canada and Japan have the requisite assets and capabilities to contribute meaningfully to ensuring an increasingly peaceful, secure, and prosperous 21st Century and thus an obligation to participate responsibly in the evolution of the Asia Pacific region.

If Canada truly wishes to “make a difference” then it must determine which of the multiple issues challenging peace and security of the Asia Pacific it is prepared to engage, how it will do so, and with whom. Canadian military assets are modest but of professionally high standing and with a long history of effective interoperability with the United States and cooperation with others in various coalitions. Recent decisions by the government along with the pronouncements of the current Chief of the Defence Staff suggest that Canada is gearing up to make a renewed and, over the next few years, strengthened commitment to its own military capabilities and hence its capacity to operate effectively in hostile environments. The maritime environment provides an appropriate focus for responsible participation as previously noted, but so too do certain types of land and air situations. Certainly the Canadian involvement in Kabul and soon Kandahar, in the Gulf, and earlier in Bosnia testify to these developments. Canada’s strong commitment to the NPT and to the processes of arms control and disarmament, along with its advanced science and technology, make it a suitable interlocutor for WMD-related commitments; similarly with small arms proliferation, energy sector development, and other high technology areas. Canada’s contribution to leadership in the Human Security agenda, whether through the ICC, post-conflict reconstruction, human rights, R2P, or trafficking or illegal movement of people, drugs, property or finances provides intellectual and policy space to move creatively in these areas, all of which are directly relevant to the future of the Asia Pacific. These, along with the other issues areas and contexts which were noted previously in this paper, indicate

that Canadian expertise in the diplomatic, legal, security sector, science and technology, and military sectors all offer candidate opportunities for the deepening of Canada’s capacities to engage issues of peace and security. In all of these Japan has its own substantial capabilities, expertise, interests and commitments, much of it compatible with Canada’s.

The Asia Pacific region is but one part of the globe that requires sustained engagement by countries like Japan and Canada. That noted, unlike Africa the Asia Pacific region mixes the challenges of development, of environmental degradation, of poverty, and of transitional regimes with the harsh realities of very large militaries possessing extensive modern weaponry including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, as well as missiles. Further, the politics of Southeast, South, and Central Asia connect intimately with the politics of Southwest Asia and the Middle East, making parts of Asia integral to the likely disposition of peace and security in much of the Middle East. Moreover, Asia touches directly on the strategic interests of all the major global powers. If anything, both its problems and its promises make it significantly more vulnerable and more valuable.

Therefore, it would seem that the opportunities for significant cooperation between Japan and Canada in support of peace and security in the Asia Pacific are not of marginal or even secondary importance. Although starting from different places, in order for both countries “to make a difference” in global peace and security, the Asia Pacific region is paramount. What is now required are political will and material capacity sufficient to sustain operational commitments to the people and nations of the Asia Pacific region. One way to pursue that is for Canada and Japan to work cooperatively and collaboratively in areas and in ways that build on complementary strengths and mutual interests.

Public Symposium ■

Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation.

Dr. Akiko Fukushima

I would like to commence by offering a brief overview of my personal association with Canada, which I can summarize in three key terms, namely (1) the United Nations, (2) peacebuilding, and (3) human security. I conducted the research for my doctoral dissertation at the University of Toronto, comparing UN-centered diplomacy in Canada and Japan. My interest in pre- and post-conflict peacebuilding brought me to the first Symposium on Japan-Canada Peace and Security Cooperation. Most recently, I was a visiting fellow at the University of British Columbia, and wrote a paper comparing concepts of human security in Canada and Japan. It is therefore a great honor and privilege for me to be able to speak today on the relationship between Japan and Canada.

In the interest of time, I would like to focus on three points: the current security cooperation between the two countries, the rationales for cooperation in the security area, and the prospects for future security cooperation. Let's start with the first point, the evolution of Japan-Canada security cooperation. In a relationship that was reaffirmed and extended in scope by Prime Minister Martin and Prime Minister Koizumi in January 2005 in the "2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation," Japan and Canada are cooperating in peacekeeping operations, the elimination of anti-personnel mines, and efforts towards non-proliferation, arms control and peacebuilding. Bilateral relations between Canada and Japan, which once meant trade in lumber, coal and beef, extended into the field of security in 1993, after the PKO law of 1992 was enacted in Japan and Japanese Self Defense Force personnel were dispatched to UNTAC in Cambodia. Given Canada's brilliant record in peacekeeping, having sent its troops to all the major UN peacekeeping operations, Japan asked Canada for advice and for

assistance in training its personnel. This was the beginning of security cooperation between the two countries. Cooperation was furthered in 1996 with Canadian and Japanese contingents working together in UNDOF in the Golan Heights. This cooperative effort continues today.

After 9/11, security policy underwent changes in both Japan and Canada. The security relationship between the two countries subsequently broadened in scope. Japan's MSDF has been dispatched to the Indian Ocean to refuel vessels involved in Operation Enduring Freedom. Initially, they were refueling mainly US vessels, but now provide fuel to the vessels of other nations involved in the operation, including Canada. As of the end of March 2005, Japan had supplied 8,000 kiloliters of fuel to Canadian vessels. Canada ranks fourth in terms of the quantity of oil supplied, after the US, France, and the UK.

Peacebuilding in Afghanistan is another area in which Japan and Canada are both currently engaged, and in which they can enhance security cooperation in future. Mutual visits have been made by the prime ministers, foreign ministers and other ministers of the two countries. There have been politico-military dialogues and defense dialogues on a regular basis, and mutual visits of vessels. I think such dialogues and defense exchanges are good opportunities for us to understand commonalities and differences in the respective security policies of the two countries. While there may be differences on the surface, such as positions on UN Security Council reform and participation in Missile Defense, these differences are not as significant as they at first appear when we look more closely at Japanese and Canadian policies. As I mentioned earlier, Prime Minister Martin's visit to Japan led to the adoption of Agenda 2005, which

identified various areas for cooperation: counter-terrorism, transnational organized crime, regional stability and human security, non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, bilateral security and defense exchanges, UN reform and North Korean issues.

Let us now consider why the two countries need to cooperate in security and diplomacy. What are the rationales? I believe that the most significant rationale is the fact that the two countries share similar policies and ways of thinking on peace and security. We are both allies of the United States, and we are like-minded in our approaches to international security. Dr. Watanabe used the analogy that Japan and Canada are both in the same ship but in different cabins. For example, last year Japan announced the new National Defense Program Guideline (formerly called the National Defense Program Outline), and we can find commonalities if we compare this document with Canada's International Policy Statement, announced in May 2005. Namely, the two countries emphasize national defense, the alliance with the US and cooperation with the international community. In terms of international security issues, non-proliferation, arms control, disarmament, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and human security are areas of common interest. Both Canada and Japan are trying to play active roles in international and regional institutions and as a result, there is considerable room for the two nations to further cooperation.

However, Japan and Canada are of course different countries and are situated in different security environments, and we therefore have differing policies. Canada did not send troops to Iraq, while Japan has dispatched Self Defense Force personnel to Samawah to assist in reconstruction. Japan is participating in missile defense with the US, while Canada has so far decided not to do so, despite the fact that it is a participant in NORAD. With regard to UN reform, Canada is a member of the Uniting for Consensus group, and does not support the framework resolution for an increase in the number of both permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council put forward by the G4, of which Japan is a member.

Here we see again a situation in which we are on the same ship but in different cabins. However, the differences are indeed narrowing. One representative example is human security, which both countries consider a particular focus of their diplomacy. Japan emphasizes freedom from want while Canada emphasizes freedom from fear. Use of force and intervention to achieve human security has been a major divide between the two. However, Japan now perceives that that Canada interprets the use of force in human security as a last resort. Both Japanese and Canadian governments now agree that practical action matters in promoting human security rather than its definitions. While there are limitations on the capacity of both countries, there is room for them to complement each other on human security. In the 2005 Canada-Japan Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation, the Canadian government acknowledged the final report of the Commission on Human Security which was supported by the Japanese government. The Japanese government meanwhile acknowledged the recommendations on the responsibility to protect which Canada has been promoting and which have been included in the recommendations of the UN High-level Panel report. We are both allies of the US and we can supplement the US's endeavors for international peace and security.

I will conclude with the prospects of the future. Japan has a very deep trust in Canada, and I think that Canada has the same attitude towards Japan. The number of people in the audience at this symposium on peace and security today indicates the concern that Japanese people feel toward this topic and I hope that it will also indicate to our Canadian friends the level of interest in Japan with regard to the Japan-Canada relationship.

Japan and Canada can make unique contributions in the area of security, and these contributions can have synergistic effects. I think that this is also true in the case of UN reform. With the UN celebrating its 60th anniversary, now is the time to bring the institution into line with the contemporary situation. Although we differ in our positions on UN Security Council reform, we can cooperate to recommend other functional reforms of the United Nations, for example peacebuilding

based on our respective experiences in Afghanistan.

With all this in mind, I think that we can also make positive contributions to international security in other multilateral forums such as G8, APEC, ARF, and OSCE. As Japan tries to take a more proactive role in international security forums, we look to Canada. Canada has experience of a wide range of activities, and so I think there is a great deal of room for cooperation in the future. Thank you very much.

Briefing of the last four symposiums

Dr. Masashi Nishihara

Thank you for the kind introduction. I would like to quickly introduce the history of this symposium as well as its significance. Why is it that there is significance in the cooperation in the Japanese-Canadian relationship? As has been explained, the very first symposium was held in 1998 and it has been bi-annual symposiums. Starting from here, it will be an annual symposium. About fifteen to twenty members on each side—in total about 35-40 participants—are from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Defense Agency, and academia. Some are commentators from media, sometimes we had politicians, and members from aid organizations like JICA. This is called the second track approach where participants address issues that are in most cases difficult to be addressed at the government level. We hope to have a very constructive input into the governmental process.

At the fourth symposium, as Dr. Fukushima said, we have been addressing peacekeeping, peacebuilding, human security, disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control, and conflict management. By looking back, I can say that the way we address these different issues were quite influenced by the surrounding environment. For instance, small weapons and landmines were taken up at the first symposium. But then in 2001, there was 9/11. At the symposium in 2002, we addressed fight against terrorism as well. In other words, our discussion was always influenced by what was happening in the international community, which is not surprising. At our first meeting, there was a question asked about what is the significance of peace and security cooperation between the two countries. However, we did not really address that question much at the second symposium.

At our fourth symposium this year, we looked back on the bilateral relations and reviewed Canada-

Japan cooperation. In addition to that, four themes were chosen which would be reported to you later. We have been trying to identify where the two countries can cooperate in our past symposiums. Let me give you one example. In the area of fight against terrorism, there is PSI. This is the initiative for non-proliferation and security. If one country had a clandestine operation transporting nuclear materials, and if that is suspected and identified, countries can cooperate to stop that. Already, several countries have participated in the exercise for this, including Canada, Japan and other countries. We addressed the issue of feasibility of PSI. Also, we discussed our cooperation in Afghanistan. Furthermore, we discussed peace and security in Asia and the Pacific region and we identified several specific issues, including the Korean Peninsula, China, the relations with India, HIV/AIDS issue, piracy, and many other issues.

To engage in these discussions by representatives of governments and public sectors of the two countries is truly meaningful. In fact, we had fruitful discussions this year. As already mentioned by Dr. Fukushima, there are two types of cooperative arrangements between the two countries. One is cooperation involving only two countries which includes defense exchanges. In other words, Japan Self Defense Forces and Canadian forces engage in exchange programs to meet each other. This mutual visit between two forces is one type of cooperation. The other type is the cooperation in which the two countries try to promote international multilateral initiatives, that is, cooperation of the two countries as a subset of multilateral initiatives. For example, there are PKO forces in Golan Heights where Japan and Canada are cooperating within the framework of PKO. The same applies to anti-personnel landmine. Refueling in the Indian Ocean is also bilateral cooperation

within a larger international multilateral cooperation. Therefore, we need pursue to solidity and strengthen our specific relations within the framework of multilateral framework.

Now, what is the significance of bilateral cooperation? Dr. Fukushima has already discussed it but let me share my own thoughts. When we address security in Japan, people tend to think about the US-Japan security regime as well as the UN. When we ask the question of what Japan can do for international security, we find that there are a lot of things that we can learn from Canada. Canada has a long history of aggressively pursuing multilateral diplomacy, and Japan is pursuing the same task. Canada is a member of many international arrangements of which Japan is not a member, for instance, NATO. Therefore, through our relationship with Canada, there are many aspects that we can learn. Another example is Commonwealth. By maintaining good relations

with Canada, we can broaden our diplomatic horizon as well. This is the evidence that we can show the value of pursuing peace and security cooperation between the two countries.

From the Canadian perspective, Japan is one of the centers in Asia. There are many ways in which we can cooperate, and in fact, there is a necessity for doing so. We have expanded our efforts at our fourth symposium. Again, it was proven that it was a very good forum for exchanging our views. There are several factors that contribute to this success. One is that all participants were very candid. For another, we were successful in exploring various possibilities. In addition, we saw a progress in our discussion on how well we can have our input reflected in political process within each country. When moving forward, we will be able to assess the progress made in the government at our future symposium. Thank you very much.

Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation

HE Kinichi Komano

Thank you very much. My name is Komano. During the symposium, I think the topic of post conflict peace consolidation was the area that we spent most time. The conference on Afghan reconstruction support was held in Tokyo in 2002, and immediately after the conference, I went to Afghanistan. I used to work with Ms. Eileen Olexiuk who came to participate in this fourth symposium. I am so grateful for her visit and glad that we were able to have a fruitful discussion with her. Also, concerning post conflict reconstruction, Dr. Timothy Donais from York University spoke on the role of police in post conflict countries and the need for supporting policing activities. Indeed, information was very valuable and I am sure we can use it as a reference in a future. We appreciate their contributions to this symposium.

Taking the example of Afghanistan, I would like to discuss why we have to emphasize efforts for re-construction and peace building. Also, I wish to share with you about what is actually happening in Afghanistan, what contributions were made by Japan and Canada, and what Japan should do from now on. For the past twenty-three years, Afghanistan was in civil war. They had gone through bitter years under the control of Soviet Union and others, and had virtually no infrastructure in the country. There is now a government in place but what they all have is ministers and nothing else. Moreover, the authority and power of the ruling government is actually limited and warlords are still ruling rural areas. The human development index issued by the UNDP indicates that Afghanistan ranks almost at the bottom of all 176 countries. Thus, both national and human security are lacking in Afghanistan. This is the background of Afghanistan whose people are in need of our help. The question is what we can do for Afghanistan.

We need to go beyond the area of humanitarianism. As you know, Afghanistan was the hub for the terrorists group, Al Qaeda. Of course, there was a significant impact on Canada, a neighboring country of the US that was attacked by terrorists. I think the terrorist attack was a major catastrophic event, and therefore, Afghanistan is associated not only to the humanitarian issue but also to international security and peace. According to the record of the UNHCR, 6 million people were displaced as refugees in this country. Also, 85% of total heroin produced in the world was from Afghanistan. In addition, kidnapping and human trafficking are often observed in this country. These are the things happening in Afghanistan when the overall international security environment is undergoing some changes. In Afghanistan we have activities by international terrorists, refugees, organized crime, narcotics, trafficking, etc. These are the difficult and negative developments that are actually centering on Afghanistan, and they have had significant impact on regional and international peace and security. This is why the matter of Afghanistan is not unrelated to our lives in the international society. Instead, it is indeed closely related to international peace and stability. In fact, that is the recognition of the Japanese government and the realization of human security has been placed at the center of Japan's diplomacy. Accordingly, for the development and peace building in Afghanistan, Japan together with Canada has been making most efforts.

Now I would like to talk about the next aspect, namely, what has been done in Afghanistan and what is to be expected for the Afghan future. As I mentioned, infrastructure and the government institution have failed, therefore, they had to start from scratch or even start from the negative level. This was the daunting task rebuilding so many

things needed to be done at the same time. In politics, democratic government has to be evolved. Based on various efforts, a lot of people, who had been once victimized by militia and other insurgents, went to elections. Although Taliban continues their activities, they no longer have enough capability to topple everything that we and new government have established. Still, they remain active. Ultimately, Afghans themselves have to maintain peace and security of their own country. In the meantime, we need to disband warlords and try to help the development of Afghanistan.

In the area of development, there are virtually no more people dying of hunger in the country. But we need to do more, and if we do more, we can bring Afghanistan a better country as it was in the past. There are so many things and challenges lying ahead. For one, police function is important in post conflict countries as was pointed out in the presentation by Dr. Timothy Donais. I agree that the role of police is very important. As to disbanding warlord organizations, it is not complete and needs to be continued. Also, the country needs true economic development, and regional and rural area development where the majority of the population is living is yet to be pursued.

However, security has to be a precondition for development, because without security and stability, people assisting the country cannot go into the rural area. Moreover, Afghan people in such a region may turn away from efforts and may cooperate with militias or warlords, if aid will not come. Therefore, whether it is a political reform, or a development issue, security matters and all requires long-term perspective for the sake of the overall reconstruction of the country.

Despite what has already been done in Afghanistan, international society cannot and should not lessen efforts, otherwise we will go back to where we started. While international society might lose interest in matters related to Afghanistan, the expectation of the Afghan people continues to rise and to be unmet. This could lead to some antagonistic responses from the general public. This is something that we have to avoid, since we had past experiences in other countries that expectation

of the public turned into disillusionment and antagonism. Thus, we need to watch out for the transition in Afghanistan.

Japan and Canada have made extensive efforts especially in security areas, such as anti-personal mine related activities and dismantling warlords. I think these efforts have born some fruits, but there are new issues to be addressed. For example, heavy weapons, missiles, and tanks need to be recovered. In fact, such heavy weapons has been cantoned and extensively contributed by Canada. In promoting human security, Japan has made lots of efforts by focusing on communities in rural areas. However, human security is possible only after a certain degree of security of the country is assured. Therefore, in order to ensure public security, Japan and Canada has made extensive efforts and should continue to do so in various aspects.

There are some negative and hostile feelings toward the US and other countries in this area, but such resentment or negative feelings are not found among local people toward Japan or Canada. Thus, there is much room for the two countries to work in Afghanistan. I think the expectation toward Japan and Canada to help the Afghan people has never been declined, but instead, is actually increasing. As in the past, Japan and Canada should take initiatives in supporting the reconstruction of Afghanistan, by which successful implementation of human security can be secured in Afghanistan.

By posing Afghanistan case as a successful one, we hopefully make further contribution not only to Afghanistan but also the international society. With this in mind, I hope that we can extend further support and cooperation in the future. Thank you very much.

Fight against Terrorism

Dr. Brian Job

I would like to address issues of challenges for Canada and Japan in responding threats from international terrorism. As Professor Watanabe suggested, both Canada and Japan take common attitudes on many issues, including the fight against international terrorism.

Both Canada and Japan have had experiences themselves with terrorism. One example was a terrorist group fighting against the government of India used Canada as a funding and operational base. In 1985 they placed bombs in planes, and one of the planes landed in Tokyo International Airport killed two individuals. These bombs also killed hundreds of Canadian citizens in another incident. So we have had a joint experience with regard to terrorism much before 9.11.

Both Canada and Japan regard terrorism as a criminal activity that cannot be justified on political grounds. In that regard, the both countries work on a number of fronts against terrorism, certainly in a direct attack against international terrorists, but also more broadly in attempting to address the conditions and circumstances that provide support for terrorism. So certainly there is substantial bilateral Canada-Japan cooperation on terrorism as necessary between agencies of the governments.

But Canada and Japan also work together in combating terrorism in multilateral contexts. That is what we talked about in this symposium. I will talk a little bit about APEC as one example in which that is occurred.

Both Canada and Japan have been very strong supporters of APEC, since APEC was important to both of our countries, and we see economic advances, opening markets, and thus more and more trade among the countries in the Asia-Pacific.

However, for many years Canada and Japan saw APEC only as an economic institution. When I would ask colleagues in my Foreign Ministry or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan if they saw APEC as a security institution, their answers five or six years ago were always “No.” APEC was only an economic institution.

The September 11, 2001 attacks changed that quite dramatically. APEC has moved to become a very important institution regarding to our joint efforts countering terrorism. In 2001 immediately after the incident, the leaders made a statement on counter-terrorism. That was not particularly unusual, since every organization understandably made statements against terrorism in 2001. APEC then has begun to move substantially beyond that. In 2002, the leaders made a statement on fighting terrorism and promoting growth, but more importantly in 2003 APEC moved to create a counter-terrorism task force. This task force then proceeded to establish work plans and in particular to concentrate on making economic transactions within the Asia-Pacific safe, transactions of trade and movement of peoples to make them safe. Thus, the issues of importance to this counter-terrorism task force and Canada-Japan effort within it concern health security, aviation security, export controls on sensitive materials, etc.. Also there are regulations with regard to what we call MANPADS, that is hand-held missiles that could be used to attack airplanes. This is significant transformation for APEC, one that is also reflected in the way in which APEC regard the role of their organization. Indeed in 2004 APEC declared a human security agenda, speaking to the needs to address the whole range of issues with regard to terrorism.

This is important for two reasons. One is that it is necessary for Canada, Japan and other members

of APEC not to lose momentum and to sustain action on this working plan. Unfortunately we are beginning to see a bit of slippage on the APEC agenda, not on the part of Canada and Japan, but on the part of countries that may not want to move that quickly. Some countries see reasons to attempt to be cooperative, but they do not have the capacity. Thus, Canada and Japan can work together within APEC to sponsor training and capacity building to help other countries sustain their commitment so that the agenda continues.

The second thing to notice about APEC is that as you see multilateral cooperation on terrorism when it is framed in economic terms. Terrorism is addressed in a sense of making functional movement of people, safe commerce, safe things go forward, which our economies very much need, and in an organization like APEC without the political debate that has stalled many other organizations that have attempted to deal with

terrorism. I think it is important to note that is a mode in which one should look to cooperation throughout the system regard to terrorism.

I would conclude by saying that it is important to remember that addressing terrorism requires more than a military approach. Indeed, over-reliance on military means to address terrorism, such as a “war on terrorism” that stresses only a military approach, has the problem of becoming counterproductive. It is very necessary to remember in our joint efforts and in forums in which we participate as two countries that it is necessary to address the economic, social, and political concerns of people in affected countries. Ambassador Komano has emphasized this with regard to Afghanistan, but this applies to other environments as well. Terrorism for Canada and Japan has to be addressed directly, but it also has to be addressed within a broader human security framework. (end)

Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

Dr. Setsuko Aoki

As introduced, I am Setsuko Aoki from Keiko University. I am going to talk about non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament. Due to time constraint, I will share a segment of discussions that took place. I will mainly speak on what the issues are, what directions we should take into the future, and I will express my personal views on this topic.

From mid 1990s, arms control and disarmament were said to be ineffective. If you look at page one in my handout, multilateral conventions entered into force in 1990s are listed. , Last successful multilateral treaty is anti-personal mine agreement (1999) in which Canada played a key role.

Beginning in the 1990s nuclear non-proliferation arrangement have been detected.

While some countries like South Africa gave up nuclear development program, other countries were suspected of producing nuclear weapons. Also, India and Pakistan, non-parties to the NPT, became "nuclear states" in 1998 . Israel did not identify whether or not they possess nuclear weapons, yet it is very likely that they already own nuclear weapons.

In sum, arms control and disarmament are not so successful but stagnant. It has long been said there are many reasons behind this. Partly, unilateralism by the US is often blamed, but I think as a fundamental reason, the structure of international society has been changed. Major threats shifted from state to non-state actors, which I believe have been causing the stagnated situation. Because conventions for arms control and disarmament imply state-to-state commitments, their effectiveness is, inevitably, now in question.

To combat the crisis of nuclear proliferation, various approaches have been taken. One approach is through IAEA verification measures, which is called "safeguard". Originally, IAEA safeguards agreements were conducted based on voluntary reports by individual non-nuclear countries. Disclosure of clandestine nuclear weapons programs by Iraq and North Korea, led to the strengthening of the IAEA safeguard agreements by the adoption of the additional protocol thereto, and today, far-reaching on-site inspections can be carried out by the IAEA. In addition to the verification by the international organization, like-minded countries- Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)- have been taking cooperative measures since 1970s including strictly restricting the transfer of sensitive facilities, equipments, materials and technologies which are of vital use to produce nuclear weapons. Export control by NSG was also strengthened in 1990s. In 2004, China joined NSG as the first major export control regime into which China participated. Prior to that, it was only Japan and Korea in Asian countries that were accepted as members of NSG.

It is needless to say that arms and export control of chemical and biological weapons as well as means of delivery for weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been respectively conducted by various treaties and regimes. In addition to such efforts, a new way of counterproliferation was introduced in May 2003 by US President. It is called "Proliferation Security Initiative" (PSI), which virtually stops and captures the materials and equipments for WMD on the land, at sea and in the air.

Originally started with eleven countries including Japan, now the member of PSI is enlarged to 15. Since both Canada and Japan are core members of joined PSI, this is the area where the

two countries can cooperate together.. As "activity not organization", member states of PSI are required to cooperate to visit, search and confiscate goods of the vessel under their jurisdiction subject to the current international law through individual domestic laws. Without changing the present international law, vessel of non-member states cannot be inspected on the high seas, which could be a fatal restriction as far as PSI is concerned. One of the measures to address such obstacle is mutual ship-boarding agreements the US adopted with states of flag of convenience such as Liberia. Other measures would include UN Security Council resolution 1540, adopted in April 2004, which requires UN members to establish domestic laws and regulations to better implement export and border control against materials and equipments for

WMD. Since SC resolutions are legally binding, such order could be considerably effective.

PSI is to be conducted in accordance with the present international law, and now such international law contains SC1540- imposed rules, PSI as activity could have more latitude to carry out its functions if proliferation of WMD does not set up universal jurisdiction as an "international crime" as some of the anti-terrorism treaties have already so provided.

To deal with the issue of arms control and disarmament, we need an integrated approach and this is the task that Canada and Japan should tackle in extending security cooperation. Thank you very much.

Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

Dr. David Dewitt

I am here to make a few introductory remarks on what was discussed during the closing panel of our symposium on Canada-Japan Peace and Security Cooperation where, unlike the preceding panels that looked primarily at thematic areas regardless of geographic or state constraints, Professor Takagi and I were asked specifically to focus on challenges or problems of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. I think the first thing to note is the context: that especially for the last fifteen years since the end of Cold War, there have been remarkably positive occurrences in the Asia-Pacific, including efforts to address long-standing challenges to peace and security. Although at times with less success than we would like — the situation in Korean Peninsula for instance, or the problems of human rights issues in Myanmar — there are many other areas in which there has been remarkable progress. Governments have found ways bilaterally and multilaterally to cooperate in spite of ongoing differences. They have learned to pursue management and even resolution through negotiations and diplomacy, to have sufficient trust and confidence to share information, and in some areas one can see movement toward transparency so that peoples and governments feel less threatened. These are important things to remember when facing some of the harsh realities which do continue to plague the region.

Building on the limited but nevertheless significant areas of success, we have to consider what some of the more important challenges to peace and security remain for us to address. In the very limited period available to me, let me identify three or four that are perhaps most obvious and most classic, drawing on comments from others in our symposium. In particular I would like to acknowledge my colleague Professor Takagi who participated with me on this panel and has

remarkable expertise and insight on the peace and security challenges of Northeast Asia.

Obviously, the Korean Peninsula remains one of the main issues of greatest concern. It is a concern because of the instability and uncertainty that affects current and future political and economic development in Northeast Asia in terms of trade and investment and people-to-people exchanges. It is a concern to the Japanese people because of the unresolved issues related to abductees and to the Korean community in Japan. It is of heightened concern because of the protracted conflict that involves great powers, exacerbated by the recent revelations around nuclear proliferation, fuel cycles, and the stated position of the North Korean government that it does have a nuclear capability. Related to that is the uncovering of the illicit nuclear network headed by A. Q. Khan, important in its own right but also in recognizing that if there is one that has been uncovered, there may be others. If networks like that have existed, surely we have to be worried about other kinds of illicit developments, including transfers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

The Korean Peninsula is a concern because it engages South Korea, China, Japan and the US in ways that while creating opportunities for political cooperation, also introduce enormous stresses and strains. Ultimately, there is a sense that the situation in the Korean Peninsula is somewhat more sensitive right now, and perhaps it has indeed gone through a bit of deterioration. But that does not mean there will not be opportunities to resuscitate, whether through a revitalized six-party talks or other avenues to try to bring the parties to the table.¹

The Taiwan Strait remains a concern to all. And again like the Korean Peninsula it is not just a

regional issue of those who live nearby, but it is an issue that concerns all of us because of the terrible consequences if military conflict broke out. As one looks at the evolution of the range of political-security and socio-economic issues, and the political statements that recently have been made by officials of both Taiwan and Beijing, one has to be concerned that these things remain unresolved. At the same time people like Professor Takagi who knows more about this particular issue than I do would suggest that there is a degree of some flexibility and perhaps some political space for positive movement. Therefore, for those concerned with peace and security in this area of the world, it is terribly important to look for opportunities to move things forward.

For everyone attending this public forum, Japanese or Canadian, regardless of whether you reside in Northeast Asia, in Southeast Asia, or in North America, the fundamental uncertainty in Asia-Pacific security and yet also the major opportunity is China. All of us will have to address the implications of an emergent China: its military development, its economic expansion, its demographic pressures, its environmental challenges, and its political transformations. These profound changes will bring both opportunities as well as serious stresses and strains. For example, on the one hand we have China's recent accession to the WTO, and that is generally positive; but on the other hand, not only has this exacerbated existing internal divisions between the more productive and wealthier eastern economic zones and the western part of the country, WTO accession also has highlighted the continuation of intellectual property rights, questions of dumping, the issue of laboring, and human rights. So China remains a major issue. China is a peace and security issue, not only due to its military developments, its great power strategic relations, Taiwan, or other unresolved territorial issues, but because of tremendous internal demographic pressures aggravated by its uneven economic growth, which also affects opportunities for domestic political change.

The very special and important relationship between Japan and the United States is another

fundamental factor for the pursuit and consolidation of peace and security in the Asia Pacific. This security alliance has long been one of the principal pillars upon which Japan has built its political security and thereby contributed to its economic capacity. It has been revised a number of times as regional contexts and domestic interests determined. At the same time, the Japanese government and people are exploring new ways to be responsible regional and international actors and to be an active participant in the international community. How those activities and new roles — whether it is in Afghanistan, Iraq, East Timor, or earlier in Cambodia, or in the multilateral arenas such as the United Nations, the ASEAN Regional Forum, or APEC — play in the broader issue of Asia-Pacific security both for good and for ill, is an important issue.

We all live with legacies of our past, and Japan has tried to address those issues of great sensitivity to the larger East Asian community, though not always with success. Yet we know those sensitivities have to be addressed openly and transparently if in fact peace and security is to move forward. Over the past fifteen years or so there has been substantial success moving forward along those lines. One must hope that the discomfort we currently view between China and Japan is part of the process to better understanding and achieving a secure relationship, important for its own sake but also because of the strategic importance of the Japan-China-US triangle.

Domestic politics in one country often affects its relations and interests with others. When there is a change in government or a change in administration in Washington or in Tokyo, that may lead to altered policies which affect the other. During the Clinton administration in Washington, there was a sense of greater positive engagement between the US and China; a strategic partnership. Among some of us who observe Asia Pacific security issues, there is some concern right now that it is not quite so positive. How does that affect not only China-US relations, but Japan-US relations and Japan-China relations? The triangulation is a very important concern to which this Forum should be giving further consideration.

But let me mention some other points that are not issues of current events but issues of underlying structure in the Asia-Pacific community. Because of the dramatic growth of the economies in various countries in Northeast, Southeast and South Asia, you have dramatic growth and demand for energy that provides opportunities but also enhances vulnerabilities. It is the access to energy. It is the control of energy. It is the transport of energy. And it is the vulnerability of societies and economies to energy disruptions. Those show the interchange between economic concerns, demographic concerns, and security issues.

There are environmental and ecological matters. Energy consumption becomes often environmental degradation. Population growth and challenges to natural resources harm environmental degradation. How our governments address such challenges can in fact introduce new security stresses and strains. These need to be examined.

As my final opening comment to this public forum, I would like to acknowledge my colleague from Foreign Affairs Canada, Dr. Bob Lawson, who

gave a very important presentation at our symposium on two areas that also relate to our concerns about peace and security in the Asia-Pacific. One is the ongoing challenges that we seem to have forgotten about for sometime, but are now re-emerging: ensuring compliance and verification of international agreements, whether that is the Kyoto Accord, or arms control agreements, or the NPT. All of us, certainly in Canada and in Japan, who believe in instruments of law and norms are concerned about treaty compliance and verification. Without compliance and verification, you have insecurity. The other area Dr Lawson addressed was the securitization of space. How is that going to come and what impact will it have on us? Of course we know China and India have space programs and space interests as many other countries do. We need to address these issues as well.

1 Note that shortly after these remarks were offered, it was announced that the Americans and the North Koreans, with the assistance of the Chinese, had agreed to resume the Six Party Talks, likely in August 2005.

Supplementary Presentation

Ms. Eileen Olexiuk

[Transcript]

I appreciate very much the opportunity to participate in this symposium. It has brought the experience of the last three years in Afghanistan with building peace and security into a more global outlook for me regarding the challenges that Canada and Japan and indeed all countries in the world face. Ambassador Komano has given you a very good description of the state of affairs in Afghanistan. He has a longer experience there. I would like to add some practical examples from my point of view, of where Canada and Japan can make some of the recommendations mentioned in the global policy area that we have discussed in this symposium, into practical examples to help make Afghanistan a successful case in testing out our areas of cooperation.

First of all, on a more global scale Canada and Japan can work to ensure Afghanistan stays on the agenda of international community discussions, whether at the UN General Assembly or in the issues that may come up in an UN Commission on Security, or at the G8 Meeting in London in June where I believe Afghanistan is on the agenda. Let's ensure that the issue of Afghanistan stays on the agenda. It was a failed state and is slowly climbing out of decades of war. It is still in a very difficult position. It is by no means secure. We need a secure, stable, and peaceful Afghanistan especially because of the neighborhood where it finds itself. Afghanistan's geo-strategic position is such that it is not like Japan surrounded by water which can help with border security, or like Canada that also has a lot of water as border areas and has neighbours I think we understand very well. Afghanistan has common borders with Pakistan, Iran, the Central Asian Republics, and China. It has a neighborhood that is not known for its long term peace and security environment. We want to keep our eyes on

Afghanistan. We want to ensure that our own citizens do so, and that the global community does as well.

In a recent development, Canada will be establishing a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar, in the southwest region of Afghanistan. For almost two years there has been a US-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Kandahar. We will hopefully be changing some of the orientation of that team. I understand that Kandahar is an area of concentration for JICA's regional development approach in Afghanistan. The objective of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams is to provide a secure environment so that reconstruction and development activities can take place, the central government can operate, and NGOs, bilateral donors, and the UN agencies can do their jobs to reconstruct and develop certain parts of the country, in our Canadian PRT case, Kandahar.

There are opportunities for Japan to assist the Canadian team there and for us to work together. One area that we will be concentrating on in the security sector is the development of the Afghan police. We will be having Canadian police trainers and mentors embedded within the PRT. We will have CIDA, an equivalent of JICA of Canada. We will also have political representatives from our Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). So there is an opportunity for the Japanese government to second individuals to work within the PRT. At the very minimum, I would suggest that we have a very close cooperation and dialogue on the ground. As one of your participants here mentioned, we are on the same boat in Afghanistan even if in different cabins. There is no question about it. I think that we are also in the same cabin when it comes to disarmament and demobilization of the Afghan

military forces. Because of our approach to reconstruction and development, we are in adjacent cabins, so we have to talk a lot more often in the dining room or in the living room to ensure that the boat is going in the right direction. I hope we find some practical means to cooperate. We can see that positive aspects of that cooperation will further inform policy dialogues between the governments. (end)

Based upon my experience of the last three years with building peace and security in Afghanistan, I would like to add some practical examples of where Canada and Japan can cooperate in the global policy area so that Afghanistan will become a successful case in testing out our close cooperation.

First, on a global scale, Canada and Japan can work to ensure that Afghanistan stays on the agenda of international discussions, whether at the UN General Assembly, in a new UN Commission on Security, or at the G8 Meeting in London in June 2005. Afghanistan was a failed state, and is slowly climbing out of decades of war. Yet, it is by no means secure and is still in a very difficult position. It is particularly important to secure a stable and peaceful Afghanistan due to its geographic position. Unlike Japan surrounded by the sea or Canada surrounded by like-minded neighbours, the neighbors of Afghanistan - Pakistan, Iran, China, and the Central Asian Republics are not necessarily known for their long-term peace and security.

Second, Japan has opportunities to assist Canada in Afghanistan. On the ground Canada will be establishing a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Kandahar which is an area of concentration for JICA's regional development approach in Afghanistan. The objective of the PRT is to provide a secure environment so that the central government, NGOs, UN agencies can do their jobs to reconstruct and develop the country. One area of concentration in the security sector is the development of the Afghan police. We will have Canadian police trainers and mentors, members of Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA, an equivalent of JICA), and representatives from Canada's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, there is an opportunity for the Japanese government to second individuals to work within the PRT.

Canada and Japan are on the same boat in Afghanistan, since we have close cooperation and dialogue. We are absolutely in the same cabin when it comes to issues of disarmament and demobilization of the Afghanistan military forces. Because of our shared approach in reconstruction and development, we are in adjacent cabins. Therefore, we have to talk a lot more often to ensure that the boat is going in the right direction. I hope we can find some practical means to cooperate. We can see that positive aspects of that cooperation will further inform policy dialogues between the two governments. (end)

Question and Answer

To Dr. Nishihara:

Q: There are various benefits for Japan to cooperate with Canada. But what is the benefit for Canada in cooperating with Japan? We feel that it does not have to be Japan that refuels Canadian vessels.

A: My expectation is as follows. It is important that Canada engages in diplomatic activities in the Asia-Pacific region, because Canada is a member of Asia. Japan could be a core part of that dimension. I am sure there are other various advantages for Canada to cooperate with Japan, in addition to refueling in the Indian Ocean.

To Dr. Job:

Q: What is your take on the hawkish stance on the part of the Bush administration which is represented by the Bush Doctrine? As Solana Paper indicates, EU clearly distinguishes itself from the US. One could argue that the “preemptive strike” approach advocated by President Bush is wrong, since it misunderstands the causes of terrorism. The unfair Middle East policies of President Bush have resulted in what’s happening today. So just punishing wrongs would not resolve the issue, which would indicate that Canada and Japan should cooperate with EU on such concepts as written in Solana Paper, rather than cooperate with the US. What do you think?

A: It is quite clear in my remarks and views expressed in this symposium that no single approach will be an answer to handling the question of terrorism. In a very short term, one sees a need for a direct action against what are known to be terrorists or terrorist supporters. As we have seen in the immediate response to 9.11, almost all the states supported the actions against Taliban regime or AL-Qa’ida. This approach was probably appropriate at that time, because there was a very identifiable and immediate perceived threat. In a broader sense, however, one cannot

continue to use a “war on terrorism” approach that stresses only military force. One cannot simply suggest that you have right to preempt on the basis of suspicion against others who you believe may in the future possibly become terrorist actors. In that sense, it is very important that you do address the concerns of populations and situations in which populations find themselves not necessarily as terrorist actors but more importantly they will perceive unfair circumstances and thus be willing to provide supportive environments for terrorism. In that context, the approach of war on terrorism has caused some backlash, instead of removing the possibilities of support from the broader populations.

To Dr. Dewitt:

Q1: Canada has spent most of its time focusing on the Atlantic region or the UN. Indeed, Canada participated in almost all the UN PKO activities in the past, but there have been some changes in a way that more nationally oriented approaches have become more important than international ones, including the UN. In other words, would Canada be turning to the Asia-Pacific with the similar kind of commitment given its history with the North Atlantic Alliance?

A: I would say that on the first part of the question, I do not think there at all is an issue here. Canadian demography over the last thirty years has changed. The largest number of new immigrants to Canada had been for over three decades now from the Asia-Pacific world. Therefore there is a natural constituency if one is concerned about national reasons. But I also think that the history of Canada’s roles and responsibilities in the international security have not been overly constrained by our history with the North Atlantic Alliance that took place in the particular historical moment and context. That context has changed. Indeed, NATO is acting more in outside area as in Afghanistan today. So, wherever there is a perceived reason and we have capabilities, Canada’s role and responsibilities in the military sphere continue.

It is true that over the last decade our capacity has been less, compared with many other countries. We no longer seem to be as active. Yet, our overseas commitment compared to our size of our armed forces is still as significant as has been. In fact, the recent white paper from the Canadian government indicates that the government is turning to refresh and revitalize Canadian commitment.

Q2: Are Canadian interests in the Asia-Pacific really driven by economics?

A: I think the simplest answer is driven by many things which economic interest is certainly one, but in many cases it would not be. Certainly our relationship with Japan, or South Korea, or China, has enormous economic component to it. But our roles in Afghanistan, in parts of Southeast Asia, or our contribution to East Timor, and our diplomatic efforts in North Korea are not being driven by economic imperatives. It is not only inappropriate but is overly simplified and dangerous to literally and artificially disentangle economic, political, and diplomatic security.

To Dr. Aoki:

Q: I believe Canada and Japan should exercise political and diplomatic leadership in reconstructing the NPT regime and in reinstating the significance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy (approved?) by the UN General Assembly. I think Canada and Japan can play greater roles in restoring the NPT regime, since both countries are the best students. Could you suggest what kind of measure the Japanese government can take to restore confidence in the NPT regime?

A: Both Canada and Japan could have become a nuclear power, but chose not to. We both strongly support the NPT regime. NPT was adopted in 1968. The right of the peaceful use of nuclear energy has been promoted, but now we are seeing more and more cases of countries taking advantages of this. Of course we need

to maintain the NPT regime, but it is becoming more and more difficult to do that. Of course, I cannot give any advice to the government, but I would suggest that we need to retain our right to peacefully use nuclear energy and to have a solid verification regime. I think Canada and Japan need to cooperate to build that system. Canada has the best accumulation of expertise in verification. Japan has been a strong supporter for NPT and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol. So we can cooperate to solidify the NPT regime.

To Ambassador Komano and Ms. Olexiuk:

Q: The question pertains to the role of NGOs. The dilemma of security and development is an interesting area that Ambassador Komano touched on. In the case of Afghanistan, not only the inter-governmental support but also NGOs play a role in community rehabilitation and support for the people there. So both governments and NGOs must cooperate in short, middle and long terms. How can they effectively link with each other?

Ambassador Komano:

A: I think there is a big role for NGOs to play. When we started our efforts for reconstruction, there was no capacity to implement on the part of the Japanese and the Afghan governments. Only institutions that had capacity were the UN specialized agencies and NGOs which were both already active in providing assistance during the Taliban regime. So the governments depended on these institutions at the beginning.

When the conflict is still continuing, the biggest challenge is to ensure security. And in doing so of course, there are a lot of limitations especially for NGOs. So should you just provide support in areas that are safe? No, that is not the right way to go. Rather the challenge is where to or how to provide support to those unsafe regions. As Ms. Olexiuk mentioned, the PRT and aid experts going together into an unsafe area is one thing. In doing so, they can understand the needs of the local people for a safe environment. I think this is what the PRT

is trying to do and this is the first time that such activities are undertaken.

In that regard, the relationship with NGOs has to be developed. That is, however, not easy to do at present. We need to continue our efforts in that area to try to find areas of potential cooperation with NGOs. In any case, immediately after conflicts when we try to provide support, we need people who know the locality, and who can go into the local communities. I think the role of NGOs will be quite important. That is exactly how I feel after I have witnessed the situation there.

Ms. Olexiuk:

A: Everyone has a role there: the military, the police, the government and the NGOs. But NGOs should not forget that the Afghan government must be in the driver seat to the reconstruction and development process. This is what NGOs sometimes forget. Because they are NGOs, they would like to do their own things. But they do get themselves in trouble, and then blame the insecure environment. Since there is no secure environment, the PRT is extremely important. At the same time, our military is not going there to be undertaking reconstruction projects themselves. We will keep the Afghan government in the driver's seat. We will try to build up the provincial development committees that are stronger, are led by the governor, and relevant ministries are represented. NGOs would be invited as well as some of the security forces to ensure that we are again maybe in different cabins but are all on the same boat.

To Dr. Job or Dr. Dewitt:

Q1: Between Japan and Canada, there are differences in their relations with the US, for example, missile defense and Iraq. What are the reasons for the differences? Why does Canada seem to maintain an arm's-length relationship with the US.

Dr. Job on the Q1

A: The question is in some way unusual, because

one cannot suggest that the US and Canada is at arm's-length. The US-Canada relationship is intimate and direct within the North American context. For instance, the trade that goes on between Canada and the US from one province, Ontario, is greater than trade between the US and Japan. In that sense, the relationship of economics, movement of peoples, and in the post 9.11 context the relationship of security with regard to Canada and Japan and Canada and the US, in terms of protecting ourselves against the threats we talked about this afternoon are direct and absolutely parallel. Thus, Canada works extremely closely with the US in order to protect our joint security with regard to the North American landmass in which we both operate. That also extends to close cooperation going on for many years with regard to monitoring and surveillance of Canadian air territories to NORAD and also increasingly now joint actions with regard to our maritime borders. So in that sense, there is no division, or no difference.

Yet, Canada and the US have had differences with regard to US foreign policy abroad. For example, Canada took a different relationship with regard to China decades ago: we traded with China and recognized China. Canada did not participate in the Vietnam War that led to frictions even at that moment. Canada did not participate in SDI. Canada did not participate in the Reagan administration's policies and activities in Central America. In that sense, decision not to participate in the Iraq War is not that exceptional. It represents a view on the part of the Canadian people that this is not an enterprise that they wish to be engaged in. At the same time, Canada is a very major participant in the post-conflict Afghanistan situation where we are working in a NATO context and we would be seeing as a parallel to the US interests in their activities in the southern part of Afghanistan.

Q2: The second question is about the national defense of Canada. Canadian security policy seems to be based on the principle that

Canada's national defense can be maintained through the international cooperation. In the case of contingency can you really defend yourself? The underlying question would be that maybe Canada does not have enough capability to defend itself. In Japan do we have the capability? We have threats, living in the dangerous neighborhood. But perhaps Canada does not feel immediate threats.

Dr. Dewitt on the Q2

A: Canada defeated the US at the war of 1812. There was a sense that when there was the basic threat to the emerging Canadian identity, Canadian states, people and economy, it was from the south of the border. Around the period of World War I, we finally took out the war plans we had against the US and put them aside in our archives. My point here is that by the 1930s, there was a clear sense that the extent to which Canada as a natural identifiable community, to the extent that the country existed and threatened, it was no longer threatened from the continent, but from across

the oceans and across the airspace. So we entered into a relationship with the US, Great Britain, and eventually after World War II, we had a security relationship as a part of NATO on the one hand, and NORAD dealing with North American airspace and North American defense on the other hand.

The third pillar is through the UN. The extent to which there is a perceived threat many Canadians would say, our security threat is a cultural one, not a physical one from military invasion. But the extent to which we have a military capability to respond, we respond in coalition either bilaterally with the US when there is a threat to the northern part of the Western hemisphere or through NATO alliance, or through the UN collective security arrangements, or through the ad hoc coalition of like-minded, when for whatever reasons we cannot go through either one alliance or one collective security organization. So Canada can work together to deal with security problems.

ANNEXES ■

2005 Canada-Japan Agenda For Peace and Security Cooperation

Peace and security is an area in which the Governments of Canada and Japan have made a considerable international contribution, and continue to share much in common in their foreign policy objectives, and therefore, have a potential for working more closely and more effectively. In their meeting today, Prime Minister Koizumi and Prime Minister Martin reaffirmed their commitment to continued joint efforts under the *Action Agenda for Peace and Security Cooperation* of 1999, and confirmed their determination to intensify bilateral cooperation and dialogue by sharing ideas and resources particularly in the following areas:

A) Responding to terrorism

The Governments of Canada and Japan share a keen interest in combating the threat of terrorism. Particularly following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, coordinated efforts to build capacity to counter terrorism have been a priority for both Governments. The Governments of Canada and Japan, recognizing the need to help build a wide range of capacities in countries of the Asia Pacific region to fight terrorism, will also strengthen cooperation in assisting them, in particular, to strengthen their legal frameworks and enhance law enforcement capacity to counter terrorism, to ensure transport security, and to better respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism. In addition to strengthening bilateral consultation and cooperation, both Governments will work to strengthen multilateral cooperation in the United Nations, G8, APEC and other fora. Both Governments underscore the importance of observing legal norms concerning human rights and refugees' rights in taking actions against terrorism.

B) Fighting transnational organized crime

Convinced of the need for an international

response to transnational organized crimes, the Governments of Canada and Japan will further strengthen their coordinated efforts against these crimes. Both Governments welcome the entry into force of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and resolve to contribute to the successful implementation of this landmark treaty, together with its protocols.

Both Governments will continue their joint efforts in the fight against illicit drugs, including at the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and through the work of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime.

C) Enhancing regional stability and human security

To facilitate their global partnership, both Governments will enhance policy dialogue in such areas as Afghanistan, the Middle-East Peace Process (MEPP), and human security. In Afghanistan, the Governments of Canada and Japan will explore the possibility of further cooperation in their peace-building efforts such as security sector reform and assistance to the government and relevant organizations.

In the Middle-East Peace Process, the

Governments of Canada and Japan recognize the importance of a just, fair and comprehensive resolution of the issue, and to this end, reaffirm their commitment to supporting the Palestinian Authority under its newly elected Raees, Mr. Abbas. Both Governments reaffirm their shared stake in a secure and stable Asia-Pacific region, and confirm their determination to continue to work together in regional multilateral fora, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, which make an important contribution to regional peace and stability. In addition to these regional issues, the Governments of Canada and Japan recognize the importance of a people-centered approach to foreign policy and reaffirm that human security is a major pillar in their foreign policies and a meaningful topic for further bilateral consultation and joint activity. Both Governments acknowledge the final report of the Commission on Human Security and will explore the coordination of approaches and activities on human security to protect and empower people threatened in their survival, livelihood and dignity. Both governments also acknowledge, in line with the recommendations on the responsibility to protect by the UN High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, that the impact of internal conflict on the security of civilians presents a fundamental challenge to the system of collective security, one which requires an international response beyond traditional efforts to prevent inter-state war.

D) Advancing non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament (NACD) objectives

Given the threat posed to the world by the proliferation and excessive accumulation of arms, especially nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, small arms and light weapons (SALW), and landmines, the Governments of Canada and Japan will continue to work together to strengthen international non-proliferation and disarmament mechanisms through: 1) active efforts to assist states in acceding to, implementing, and complying with international NACD treaties; 2) support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency; 3) support for the establishment of robust national export control regimes in all states,

especially in reference to conventional weapons including SALW; 4) participation in other multilateral efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, such as the G8 Sea Island Summit Action Plan on Non-Proliferation and the Proliferation Security Initiative; and 5) pursuit of a more comprehensive and effective implementation of the UN Programme of Action on SALW.

E) Increasing bilateral security and defence exchanges

Peacekeeping cooperation and other bilateral security and defence relations have grown steadily in recent years. Successful joint naval counter-terrorism efforts in the Indian Ocean under Operation Enduring Freedom are indicative of the extent to which these relations have developed. In order to further facilitate bilateral security and defence relations, dialogues and exchanges between the experts of both Governments are essential. The Governments of Canada and Japan will seek to hold a Japan-Canada Peace and Security Symposium every year, which has so far been held every two years to complement the bilateral Political-Military Talks. Also, the Department of National Defence of Canada and the Japan Defense Agency will promote their defence relations through Military to Military Talks and other frameworks in order to enhance Canada-Japan defence exchanges. Both Governments continue to increase their dialogue on peacekeeping and peace support issues with a view to identifying areas for enhanced cooperation in support of international peace support operations. Both Governments also reiterate their support for international efforts to build global peacekeeping capacity.

F) Enhancing the ability of the United Nations to deal with new threats

As partners in international organizations, the Governments of Canada and Japan will work together toward the early realization of UN reform, particularly reform of the Security Council, toward achieving substantial results at the Leaders Summit

in September 2005. The Governments of Canada and Japan look forward to a successful, reform-driven, UN Summit in September 2005. Both Governments welcome the report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, as a major contribution to the international community's ongoing consideration of reforms needed to enable the UN to respond effectively to the challenges of the new century.

Both Governments look forward to forthcoming reports by the Millennium Project and the Secretary-General and from other processes as essential elements to the reform process culminating in the Leaders' Summit in September 2005 and commit to active cooperation on the reform of all areas of UN activities -peace and security, development, and UN institutional reform.

G) Cooperating to achieve a comprehensive resolution of North Korea issues

Both Governments call for an early resumption of the Six Party Talks and urge North Korea to promptly come into compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to fully implement its comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Both Governments emphasize the need to achieve a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and will promote this end through all means at their disposal. The Government of Canada also supports efforts by the Japanese side to resolve the issue of abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea.

The Governments of Canada and Japan urge North Korea to act in good faith and urgently to resolve this issue.

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Session IV Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament

- 16:10-17:40 Presentation
 Dr. Setsuko Aoki, Professor, Keio University
 Dr. Robert Lawson, Senior Policy Advisor, Non-proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament,
 Foreign Affairs Canada
 Open Discussion
- 17:40-18:00 Wrap-up and prep. for the next workshop
 Japanese Co-Chairman
- 18:30 Reception hosted by Minister-Counsellor David Drake, Canadian Embassy in Japan
 (@ Canadian Embassy 4th floor Hall)

Day Two: 2005/06/12 (Sun.) - Workshop - in Room “Houou”

Session V Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region

- 09:00-10:30 Presentation
 Dr. Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
 Dr. David Dewitt, Director, Centre for International and Security Studies, York University
 Open Discussion
- 10:30-10:40 Coffee-break
- 10:40-11:20 Review
 Open discussion
 Closing remark by Co-Chairmen
- 11:20-11:30 Prep. for lunch
- 11:30-12:30 Lunch-break
- 12:30-13:00 All adjourn to Open Symposium

- Public Symposium - in Room “Fuji”

- 13:00-15:00 Public Symposium
 Opening Remark
 -Japanese Co-Chairman, Mr. Kazuyoshi Umemoto
- Overall review
 Review of Japan-Canada Cooperation
 -Dr. Akiko Fukushima
 Briefing of the last four symposiums
 -Dr. Masashi Nishihara
- Presentation of each session
 Post-Conflict Peace Consolidation
 -Ambassador Kinichi Komano
 Fight against terrorism
 -Dr. Brian Job
 Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament
 -Dr. Setsuko Aoki
 Peace and Security in the Asia-Pacific Region
 -Dr. David Dewitt
- Question and Answer
- Closing Remark
 Canadian Co-Chairman, Mr. Paul Chapin



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