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The Fifth Meeting of the Eminent Persons' Group on UN Reform
(Summary)

1. Date and Time

March 17, 2004 (Wednesday) 15:00~16:30

2. Venue

Ministerial Reception Room, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (4th floor)

3. Participants

Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi (Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Ichiro Aisawa (Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Yozo Yokota (Chair) (Professor, Chuo University, Special Advisor to the Rector of the United Nations University)
Mr. Yoshinori Imai (Chief Executive Editorialist, Program Host, NHK)
Ms. Yuki Osa (Former Secretary-General, Association for Aid and Relief, Japan)
Mr. Yuji Kato (President, Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Union (JAW))
Mr. Kazuya Sakamoto (Professor, Faculty of Law, Osaka University)
Mr. Minoru Makihara (Chairman of the Board, Mitsubishi Corporation)
Ms. Akiko Yuge (Director, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Tokyo office)
Mr. Kaoru Ishikawa (Director-General for Multilateral Cooperation Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Koji Tsuruoka (Deputy Director-General for Foreign Policy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Kazutoshi Aikawa (Director of the UN Policy Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Mr. Hiroshi Minami (Director of the UN Administration Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

4. Background of Discussion

(1) Opening remarks by Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ichiro Aisawa

Senior Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs Ichiro Aisawa began by indicating his expectation for the group to discuss Japan's rate of assessed contributions to the United Nations (UN), noting that some Japanese citizens regard Japan's assessed contributions as excessive and beyond its economic power, while it still cannot participate in the Security Council discussions as long as Security Council Reform does not progress.

After the secretariat's briefing on the schedule for the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel the group members entered into discussions on the issue of the assessment rate.

(2) Comments from members

  • Although Japan's assessed contributions to the UN are indeed exceedingly high, the payment rate does not drive Japan into penury. On the other hand, for some African countries, even an assessment rate of 0.001% is difficult to afford, and, therefore, they perceive that "wealthy countries should pay." Therefore, emphasizing the height of Japan's assessment rate would not be duly understood in those countries.
  • Japan has two major UN issues to tackle, one being its assessment contributions, the other being its permanent membership in the Security Council, which should be negotiated as a package. Even though the ways to proceed with these issues are different, it should be borne in mind that these two are inter-linked. While of course there would be nothing better than for both issues to be solved, I wonder if there could be such a case in which the permanent membership of the Security Council is obtained at the expense of the assessment rate.
  • The power to decide on the financial and administrative matters of the UN lies with the General Assembly. In the General Assembly, each country has one vote and important issues including budgetary issues are decided by a two-thirds majority. On the other hand, peacekeeping operations (PKO) are handled in the Security Council, while it is not in a position to decide on budgetary matters. The allocation of power is also something to be considered. In other words, if the Security Council decides on a PKO dispatch, is it the case that the General Assembly follows such a decision and requests assessed contributions accordingly or not? This should be made clear.
  • Although I am dissatisfied with as high as 22% assessment rate of the United States, the rate for other countries is calculated on the proportion of gross national income (GNI), and does probably mark a rational figure therefore. The assessment rate and the volume of contributions to the UN are, however, separate issues.
  • It is regular assessed contributions and not PKO contributions that are normally known to the Japanese public. Over 50 years since its accession to the UN, Japan has come to pay high contributions to the organization, and as such its presence and evaluation of its contributions to the UN has patently increased.
  • To date, there have been times when Japan has served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, while in those periods it has failed to excel in its activities on the Security Council. The possible reduction in assessed rate is likely to be only a small amount, which would be of no great benefit to Japan. On the other hand, Japan's reduced rate even by a small amount would impose significant damages on developing countries. This would therefore lead to an adverse impact on Japan's diplomacy on both the multilateral and bilateral levels. From this perspective, without a policy volte-face to achieve Japan's assessment rate being significantly reduced to a third or halved, a very slight reduction for the sake of home consumption would be meaningless.
  • Assessed contributions to the UN are obligatory and must be paid. As stated in Article 19 of the UN Charter, if the amount of a member's arrears equals or exceeds its due amount for the preceding two full years, that member has its voting rights in the General Assembly suspended and non-payment would be highly criticized from a moral perspective. Even the United States appears to avoid non-payment equivalent to two full years of assessed contributions. There are also a number of developing countries that are in arrears, not paying for more than two years, but have received special permission due to conditions beyond their control, and thus have maintained their voting rights. However, it would not be an option for Japan to consider entering into arrears.
  • Japan's assessment rate of contributions to the UN regular and PKO budgets is almost entirely calculated on the basis of GNI, and is a rational figure, enough to preclude counterargument. The issue of balance of privileges and obligations then comes to the fore. With regard to the enemy clause, its elimination should be sought most directly and openly. On top of that, it is of utmost importance that Japan is assured of arranging institutional backup to become vocal at the UN. It is with such assurance that we adopt such a posture that is committed to paying assessed contributions to the UN, while emphasizing the importance of the Security Council Reform.
  • The assessment rate may remain high, depending on the period of GNI calculation and the fluctuations in exchange rates. Even if successful, the assessment rate would drop at most by 0.7% and would certainly not exceed 1%. We should think long and hard as to whether such a minimal decrease would be of strategic importance or improve our hand at the UN.
  • The ideal position for Japan in the international community has occasionally been pointed out as being "a small country that nonetheless stands out," although it is somewhat natural that a small country should stand out. The issue is what Japan should do as a big country. There are aspects of "money is power" and "no representation, no taxation." There is another discussion that some countries have suffered large numbers of fatalities in PKO operations. Hence it is natural to wish that people did not die in such a manner, and I would like such discussion to be kept separate from the issue of financial burden. A major loss of life in PKO operations does not lead to a lower assessment rate being allowed. Such human sacrifices should be reduced by all means and even in the case of no lives being lost, assessed contributions must still be paid. Just because Canada, for example, dispatches many personnel, does not degrade Japan's financial contributions because it does not.
  • Japan should stress that it is also expanding its participation in PKO. In accession to the Security Council a balance between privileges and obligations is important, although obligations, particularly military obligations are not made clear in the UN Charter. On the other hand, the people of Japan feel that a military obligation is in fact required. This represents a gap between the understanding of the people and discussions among experts, and it is therefore necessary to jointly discuss and share understanding.
  • The current level of Japan's assessed contributions seems acceptable. However, the rate of 19.468% of total contributions is extraordinary, given that the difference between the US and Japan's assessed rates is only around 2%. In particular, knowing that the US contributions are being capped by a ceiling, due to the sentiment among UN members wishing to subdue the US's undue influence, I cannot help feeling frustrated that Japan is being taken advantage of just because it can and will pay instead.
  • No convincing explanations would be possible as to the US assessment rate of 22%.
  • Possible options for Japan should be: (i) to accept financial contributions as necessary costs; (ii) to reduce financial contributions as much as possible, although another choice may exist between the two. Also, at around the time of the terrorist attacks in the US, the people's perceptions of the role of the UN and the relationship between the UN and the US might have changed.
  • The idea of "money is power" is too hard-nosed. Japan should rather consider what it can do in proportion to its strength. The issue of Japanese staff is not limited merely to the UN. The case is the same at the World Bank, which shares a common reason in that Japan cannot provide ample and qualified human resources.
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