




CONSORTIUM OF BANGSAMORO CIVIL SOCIETY





Presentation Outline

- The CBCS and its Thrusts
 - The Armed Conflict in Mindanao: Causes and Human Costs
 - The Prospects of the Peace Process
 - The Role of the CSOs in Peace Building
 - The Role of Development Assistance
 - Community Development and its links to Peace Building
 - Some Concluding Remarks
- 

The Consortium of Bangsamoro Civil Society (CBCS)

A solidarity network of Bangsamoro NGOs and POs and other civil society organizations committed to a more sustained advocacy for Peace, Human Rights, Good Governance and Development. It is a network that engenders cooperation, collaboration and coordination among Moro civil society organizations in facing the challenges of creating a peaceful and just society.

Internal displacement in the Philippines

-  Provinces affected by displacement (2006-2007)
-  Main flashpoints of conflict & displacement (2006-2007)
-  Capital city
-  Regional centre

0 100 Km

IDMC

January 2008



Main conflict-induced displacement incidents (2006-2007)

2006	Municipality, Province	Nb. displaced
Jan.	Mamasapano, Maguindanao.....	32,000
Feb.	Sta. Ignacia, Tarlac.....	3,000
March	Paquibato, Davao City.....	3,700
April	San Jose de Buan, Samar.....	1,200
May	Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur.....	3,436
June-July	Mamasapano, Maguindanao.....	39,934
Aug-Sept.	Indanan, Sulu.....	3,000
Oct.	Calatrava, Negros Occ.....	5,635
TOTAL.....		91,905
2007		
Jan.-March	Midsayap, Cotabato.....	25,000
April	Aroroy & Baleno, Masbate.....	2,600
April	Pagalungan, Maguindanao.....	7,800
April-May	Panamao & Patikul, Sulu.....	60,000
July-Aug.	Basilan, Basilan.....	24,000
Oct.	Baras, Catanduanes.....	1,250
Oct.	Calatrava, Negros Occidental.....	3,000
Nov.	Kalingalan, Sulu.....	5,500
Nov.	St Augustin, Surigao del Sur.....	2,500
Dec.	Pikit, Cotabato.....	3,000
TOTAL.....		134,650

Source

These estimates are based on a combination of governmental, non-governmental and media sources, details of which may be found in the IDMC database (www.internal-displacement.org).

CONFLICT-INDUCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES


Main displacement incidents in Mindanao during 2005

1. Palimbang (Sultan Kudarat), January, 8,886 IDPs, AFP-ASG
2. Mamasapano (Maguindanao), January, 35,381 IDPs, AFP-MILF
3. Panamano (Sulu), February-March, 85,500 IDPs, AFP-MNLF/MBG
4. Andap valley (Surigao del Sur), March-May, 3,900 IDPs, AFP-NPA
5. Guindulungan (Maguindanao), July, 7,200 IDPs, AFP-ASG
6. Midsayap (North Cotabato), August, 5,000 IDPs, family feud

AFP: Armed Forces of the Philippines
 ASG: Abu Sayyaf Group
 MILF: Moro Islamic Liberation Front
 MNLF/MBG: Moro National Liberation Front/ Misuari Breakaway Group
 NPA: New People's Army

Number of people displaced

A total of 158,000* people have reportedly been displaced by conflicts in the Philippines between January and September 2005. The majority of the incidents have taken place in Mindanao and led to short term displacements with the majority of the displaced returning after a few weeks. It is estimated that 60,000 people remain currently displaced, mainly in the ARMM. This figure includes people who were displaced by the 2000 and 2003 wars. 4.🔥



* Cumulative figure based on available data from government and national media sources

** The JNA was conducted during 2004 by national and international experts with the aim to determine the assistance needs of communities affected by the 2000 and 2003 conflicts in Mindanao. It is to serve as a basis for designing a reconstruction and development strategy.

The Armed Conflict In Mindanao

The post world war 11 armed conflict in Mindanao has been dragging for 3 decades. It has become the longest running insurgency in South East Asia.

A recent study revealed that during the period 1986-2004, of the 21 provinces in the Philippines with the largest number of armed encounters, 15 are in Mindanao. Of these 15 provinces in Mindanao, the following 9 provinces recorded the highest number of armed encounters involving the MILF or MNLF:
Maguindanao, North Cotabato, Basilan, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, and Zamboanga del Sur.

Causes of the Armed Conflict

- ***[v] exploitation and marginalization of indigenous cultural communities, including lack of respect for and recognition of ancestral domain and indigenous legal and political systems.***
- ***[iv] structural inequities in the political system, including control by an elite minority, traditional politicians and political dynasties, and enforcement of such control through private armies; and***
- ***[iii] injustice, abuse of those in authority and power, violations of human rights; and inequity, corruption and delays in the administration of justice;***
- ***[ii] poor governance*** , including lack of social services, absenteeism of elected local officials, corruption and inefficiency in government bureaucracy, and poor implementation of laws, including those to protect the environment;
- ***(1) massive and abject poverty and economic inequity***, particularly in the distribution of wealth and control over the resource base for livelihood;

Human Costs of Armed Conflict

➤ **Loss of Lives**

The World Bank [Schiavo-Campo and Judd: 2005] estimated that a total of **120,000 lives** (civilians and combatants) were lost in the Mindanao conflict from the 1970s to the present. A recent study showed that over the 18-year period 1986-2004, some 4,700 combatants have been killed and 1,500 wounded in military encounters. Of the total combatants lost, 58 percent were due to armed encounters with the NPA, 35 percent to the encounters with the MILF, and 7 percent to the encounters with the MNLF. [P. Abinales, et al: 2005].

Internal Displacement

- The outbreaks of armed hostilities between the government forces and the Moro liberation forces inevitably led to the displacement of communities. The escalation of fighting and heavy bombardment compelled people to seek refuge in evacuation centers, where living conditions are harsh. Normal social life and productive activity came to a halt. The most vulnerable, infants and the elderly, succumbed to various illnesses due to lack of immediate medical attention, medicines and food.
- The World Bank estimated that the number of internally displaced persons in Mindanao fluctuated from 800,000 in year 2000 at the height of the “all-out war” ordered by President Joseph E. Estrada against the MILF, to 438,000 in 2003 during another “all-out war” called by President Gloria M. Arroyo against the MILF, and to 60,000 at the end of 2004.

Broken Relationships

Many Muslims communities and societies were driven by the prolonged and intense war to completely relocate to cities and provinces outside of Mindanao. For major ethnic groups such as the Maranao, Maguindanao, Tausug, Yakan and Iranon, anywhere from one-fifth to one-third now live in areas outside of their ancestral homelands, some reduced to virtual Muslim ghettos in places such as Metro Manila, Tanay and Baguio.

The exodus of Mindanao Muslims has reached neighboring countries – thousands of Muslim Filipinos now work illegally in Sabah, Malaysia, exposed to police harassment, periodic crackdowns, and deportation.

Poverty and Underdevelopment

The challenges of social, economic, and human rehabilitation and development are daunting in conflict affected areas in Mindanao, particularly in areas belonging to the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Poverty and illiteracy rates are high. In 2000, the incidence of poverty in ARMM was almost twice that for the Philippines as a whole: 63% of the population in the region was considered poor compared with 34% for the whole country. The average annual household income in ARMM was only 57% of the national average (P81,519 against P144,039). While the net enrollment rate in primary education in 2001 in ARMM was fairly high (82% in ARMM compared to 96% for the whole country), net enrollment in secondary education was only 39%, and substantially lower than the 72% national average.[\[1\]](#)

Selected Human Development Indicators, from 1997 to 2003
 (culled from Philippine Human Development Report, 2005)


Component Province	HDI Rank*			Poverty Incidence		
	1997	2000	2003	1997	2000	2003
Basilan	69	74	74	30.2	63.0	65.6
Lanao del Sur	73	72	68	40.8	48.1	38.8
Maguindanao**	72	75	76	24	36.2	55.8
Sulu	77	77	77	87.5	92.0	88.8
Tawi-Tawi	75	76	75	52.1	75.3	69.9

- Out of 77 provinces; Rank 1 is the best or the highest
- **This was before the division of the province into two - Maguindanao and Shariff Kabunsuan

Selected Human Development Indicators, from 1997 to 2003
 (culled from Philippine Human Development Report, 2005)

Component Province	Per capita income (PhPesos, yearly)		Life Expectancy (years)	
	2000	2003	2000	2003
Basilan	13,026	13,265	60.2	60.3
Lanao del Sur	15,211	20,016	56.9	57.9
Maguindanao	15,508	14,198	52.6	52
Sulu	7,675	8,430	52.3	52.8
Tawi-Tawi	11,121	10,780	50.8	51.2

Simple & functional literacy rates



Simple Literacy Rate


Functional Literacy Rate

Sources: MCW & NCRFW

Prospect of the GRP-MILF Peace Process


- The problem of peace and security in Mindanao has remained in spite of the past agreements and the present peace processes. Sporadic clashes take place resulting in the displacement of communities, notwithstanding the on-going ceasefire between the MILF and the GRP and the peace agreement signed by the government and the MNLF in 1996
- The Bangsamoro peace negotiation between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), hosted by the Government of Malaysia, is now in the final stage of discussion. The outstanding issues to settle pertain to the most sensitive issue under the agenda of “ancestral domain” – the scope of “territories” that will comprise the new “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity”. While the current talks are suspended due to disagreements between the two negotiating panels as to the “scope of territories” as well as on the “manner of implementation of a future agreement on territories”, hopes remain that the resumption of the peace talks will lead to the signing of a Peace Compact between the GRP and the MILF.

**TRENDS IN GRP-MILF ARMED SKIRMISHES vs.
TRENDS IN GROSS REG. DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GRDP): R-IX – ARMM**



TRENDS: ARMED SKIRMISHES

YEAR	REDUCTION DIFFERENCE	% REDUCTION
2002 – 2003	139 (-)	19.9
2003 – 2004	544 (-)	97.3
2004 – 2005	5 (-)	33.3
2005 – 2006	9 (-)	90



TRENDS: GRDP GROWTH RATE
(Source: NSCB at constant 1985 prices)

REGION	02-03	03-04	04-05	05-06
R – IX	4.4	4.1	7.2	2.1
R – X	5.4	7.2	3.8	6.8
R – XI	4.7	6.5	5.0	4.4
R – XII	4.4	5.8	2.3	6.7
ARMM	2.2	5.2	3.9	4.1

The Civil Society

- In her speech on human security in Mindanao on September 20, 2006, JICA President Sadako Ogata said that peacebuilding “entails numerous societal reconstruction tasks” far beyond the capacity of official diplomacy and reconstruction programs to address. Recognizing the key and potential role of CSOs on this matter, she stressed the need to “interlink piecemeal projects with the overall context of community development.”

The Civil Society Organizations Approach to Peace Building and Development

A. Advocacy

Advocacy work -- whether related to the respect for and protection of human rights, promotion of peace, good governance, or to people's participation in the peace process -- has remained one of the key CSO approaches to peacebuilding. Through lobbying, networking, protest actions, public forum, as well as conflict-sensitive journalism, Philippine CSOs are able to raise public awareness and interest on pressing issues related to peace and development. The projection of the Mindanao conflict and peace process to the national and international community, as well as the success of localized peace pacts and mechanisms, could be largely credited to this advocacy work.

B. Monitoring and grassroots peacekeeping

- Meanwhile, monitoring the implementation of ceasefire agreements, whether related to the ongoing peace talks or to local peace pacts, has become an integral part of CSO peacebuilding work together with the installation of an early warning system in selected conflict-prone areas. The Bantay Ceasefire (Ceasefire Watch) and Tiyakap Kalilintad (Care for Peace) volunteers, for example, are working closely with the GRP-MILF Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH) in Mindanao in monitoring and reporting political tensions as well as violations of existing ceasefire agreements.

C. Promoting the Culture of Peace

- The prevailing 'culture of war' in conflict areas or regions is being addressed by CSOs through peace education, especially by propagating the Culture of Peace modules. Taking the lead in this effort are the academe, church, media and NGOs. Peace courses at the graduate level are now being offered in selected universities and a lot of researches on the peace process, traditional peace mediation and settlement approaches as well as on grassroots peacebuilding, have already been published. Likewise, peace radios are getting popular and attracting audience, and seminars and trainings on peace, conflict resolution and interfaith dialogue are regularly being conducted in parishes, mosques and communities. Lately, a number of NGOs have embarked on training officers and members of the Philippine military and police on conflict management and transformation
- The Mindanao Peace Institute has been annually conducting its Summer Peace Course aimed at providing local and international participants an in-depth knowledge of and training on the different theories, approaches and praxis of peacebuilding and conflict transformation.

D. Service Delivery


Linking community development work with peacebuilding is being done by CSOs through the provision of basic social services to impoverished and conflict-affected communities. Notwithstanding some gaps in organizing work, projects like water and health system, basic education, and livelihood have helped the communities survive grinding poverty and the ravages of war. For many CSOs, the introduction of development projects, or even of emergency relief, is just an entry point for peacebuilding activities and for establishing cooperation with local government agencies.

The Role of Development Assistance

Since the 80s, the international donor community has taken much interest on conflict prevention and management, as well as on peacebuilding in their development policies. From “peace and development” framework, it has further developed into “global security and human security.” After the signing of the 1996 Peace Accord, the Muslim Mindanao has seen the onslaught of international donors and aid agencies all willing to support post-conflict reconstruction programs and development projects within the SZOPAD areas.

The Role of Development Assistance

While some of these aid packages contributed to the strengthening of autonomous structures, reduction of violence and improvement of lives in selected Moro communities, we also have seen how they, in general, failed in sustaining peace due to some gaps in the implementation of the Accord, as well as in the design and actual delivery of the aid packages themselves.



The Role of Development Assistance

- The fact that 4 of the ARMM provinces topped the list of 10 poorest provinces in the 2005 Philippine Human Development Report, and are also among the provinces with the highest reported cases of armed encounters, says much how the international community, especially the funding agencies, could have made a difference.
- If there is one important lesson to be learned from the role of international donor community in its engagement in Mindanao after the signing of 1996 Peace Accord, it is that partnership alone with the government and the MNLF was not enough; the need to tap and strengthen CSOs in the whole peacebuilding and reconstruction work should also have been given equal importance and priority.

DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FOR GRP-MILF PEACE PROCESS

Snapshot: Resources deployed mainly for GRP-MILF peace process (as of 2007):

PARTNER	AMOUNT (US\$)
JICA	3,090,235.18
Embassy of Japan (J-BIRD)	624,000.00
UN-World Food Program	19,100,000.00
UNICEF	300,000.00
MTF-1: AusAid contribution	369,850.00
MTF-1: CIDA contribution	1,563,336.00
MTF-1: NZAid contribution	199,977.00
MTF-1: World Bank contribution	1,525,000.00
MTF-1: SIDA contribution	1,092,021.00
MTF-1: European Commission contribution	1,400,000.00
US government	750,000.00
TOTAL	\$ 30,014,419.18


Community Development: Bridging the Gaps

- The ongoing GRP-MILF peace process has already achieved significant gains in terms of improving the security situation and it has given new hope to the Bangsamoro people that their deep historical grievances would soon be met should a new peace accord be forged. But while the top-level negotiation is reaching its critical stage and is experiencing its usual ups and downs, the need to address the basic socio-economic problems of people in conflict-affected areas must be also done to prevent these problems from developing into another source of conflict.

Conclusion

- The peace and security situation in the ARMM, by all indicators, can be safely said to be still intractable in spite of the 1996 Peace Accord between the GRP and the MNLF, and the on-going peace talks between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). While some small-scale gains can be observed, especially in the proliferation of socio-economic infrastructure due mainly to ODA and the support of some international NGOs, much has yet to be done to bring the region to a state of stability and social rehabilitation. Since the GRP-MILF peace talks started in 1997, three major violent wars took place. All these violent wars happened amidst the ceasefire entered into by the government and the rebel group. Major violent clashes also occurred between the MNLF forces and the AFP in Jolo, which many analysts attributed to the unsettled issue of the controversial 1996 peace agreement.

In the context of Mindanao, the challenge ahead is how to blend development and sustained cessation of hostilities while working for a more comprehensive political agreement as a condition towards attaining a state of human security where there is a substantial reduction of freedom from want, fear and more respect to the rule of law. Community development becomes strategically relevant when it supports attainment of hostilities and moves to the direction of empowering communities to sustain development process itself. It can prevent armed conflict when it supports equality and justice and self-determination. Development is not only measured in terms of economic growth but also equity in growth. It must promote democracy, good governance, thus peace.



THANK YOU
MARAMING SALAMAT
SUKHRAN

THANK YOU
MARAMING

