
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Transparency of nuclear weapons: the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative

Working paper submitted by Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates

1. Increased transparency of information related to nuclear weapons is an important precondition for further progress in nuclear disarmament and verification. This notion was reflected in the 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve complete disarmament adopted by the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)). In step 9 (b), the Review Conference called for increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament, and, in step 12, the States parties committed themselves to reporting regularly on the implementation of article VI of the Treaty.

2. In its Final Document (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), the 2010 Review Conference recognized that nuclear disarmament and achieving the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons would require openness and cooperation, and affirmed the importance of enhanced confidence through increased transparency and effective verification. Action 5 (g) of the action plan adopted by consensus by the Conference called upon the nuclear-weapon States to further enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence, and action 21 encouraged them to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security.

3. The Review Conference noted the increased transparency of some nuclear-weapon States with regard to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories. Their contributions, and the entry into force of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, on 5 February 2011, must be

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welcomed. There is, however, a greater need for and expectation of more detailed information related to nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States. This holds especially true with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons, which to date have not formed part of arms control and disarmament processes. Additional information would be seen not only as an important security and confidence-building measure, but would also facilitate further progress in nuclear disarmament.

4. The Review Conference called upon the nuclear-weapon States to report on their nuclear disarmament undertakings to the Preparatory Committee in 2014. Action 21 provides a framework in that regard by introducing the idea of a standard reporting form. In this context, efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to coordinate the implementation of their commitments under the action plan are welcomed. In support of that process, the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, which are non-nuclear-weapon States, proposed a draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form, which was shared with the nuclear-weapon States in June 2011. The draft form is set out in the annex to the present working paper.

5. For the purpose of the 2015 review cycle, we would like to restate our expectations with regard to greater transparency of information related to nuclear weapons, which might be taken into consideration by the nuclear-weapon States. First, the standard reporting form might include, without prejudice to the national security of the nuclear-weapon States, information on:

- (a) The number, types (strategic or non-strategic) and status (deployed or non-deployed) of nuclear warheads;
- (b) The number and, if possible, types of delivery vehicles;
- (c) The number and types of weapons and delivery systems dismantled and reduced as part of nuclear disarmament efforts;
- (d) The amount of fissile material produced for military purposes;
- (e) The measures taken to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies.

6. The elements suggested above are included in the draft reporting form. The draft form is, however, indicative and thus neither exhaustive nor definitive. For example, in the final form agreed upon by the nuclear-weapon States, standardized reporting might also include national budgets and other resources devoted to the maintenance of nuclear arsenals. Other States parties, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike, may well have additional views on the elements of the form.

7. Second, although action 5 of the action plan calls upon the nuclear-weapon States to report on nuclear disarmament undertakings to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, we encourage them to consider voluntarily presenting preliminary reports, subject to future updates, at each session of the Preparatory Committee.

8. Third, to facilitate transparency and information exchange, we encourage the nuclear-weapon States to continue discussions on definitions and terminology related to nuclear weapons.

9. Lastly, we encourage all States parties, including non-nuclear-weapon States, to submit regular reports on the implementation of the 2010 action plan and other relevant documents, in accordance with action 20.

Annex

Draft standard nuclear disarmament reporting form: [name of country], 20xx

At the 2010 Review Conference, the States parties adopted an unprecedented set of actions pertaining to the three pillars of the Treaty. Of particular significance was action 21, in which, as a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States were encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The present draft reporting form seeks to provide exploratory input into the process of specifying and developing a standard reporting form for the meeting of the five permanent members of the Security Council in Paris. This exercise seeks to provide a possible standard form for reporting on some of the most critical information, so as to enhance transparency regarding the efforts of the nuclear-weapon States in relation to nuclear disarmament, as mentioned, in particular, in actions 3 and 5 (a) of the action plan. In that action plan, the nuclear-weapon States also committed themselves to a wide range of other disarmament measures, and their efforts in relation to those measures should also be reported. The present draft form contains possible elements in that regard. Under this proposal, the nuclear-weapon States are expected to report on their efforts at each session of the Preparatory Committee. Although action 5 calls upon them to report those undertakings to the Preparatory Committee in 2014, nothing prevents them from presenting such a report, albeit in a preliminary form, at each session of the Preparatory Committee held before 2014.

Nuclear warheads	State response
Total number of nuclear warheads ^a	
Aggregate number of nuclear warheads in stockpile ^b	
Number of strategic or non-strategic nuclear warheads	Strategic Non-strategic
Number of strategic or non-strategic deployed nuclear warheads	Strategic Non-strategic
Number of strategic or non-strategic non-deployed nuclear warheads	Strategic Non-strategic
Reductions (in numbers) of nuclear warheads in 20xx	
Aggregate number of nuclear warheads dismantled in 20xx	
Delivery vehicles	State response
Number of nuclear warhead delivery systems by type (missiles, aircraft, submarines, artillery, other)	Deployed: Non-deployed:

^a This refers to all the nuclear warheads that exist in or are under the control of the reporting State, including those awaiting dismantlement.

^b This refers to nuclear warheads in service, deployed and reserved for active duty.

Reduction (in numbers) of delivery systems in 20xx	
Aggregate number of delivery systems dismantled in 20xx	
Nuclear disarmament since 1995^c	State response
1995-2000	
2000-2005	
2005-2010	
Nuclear doctrine	State response
Measures taken or in process to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, doctrines and policies	
Measures taken or in process to reduce the operational readiness of the reporting State's nuclear arsenal	
Measures taken or in process to reduce the risk of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons	

^c This item allows the nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate their disarmament efforts since the 1995 Extension and Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, at which a major set of nuclear disarmament steps was agreed to in exchange for the Treaty's indefinite extension. As mentioned in action 21, reporting will take place without prejudice to national security. The nuclear-weapon States are nevertheless highly encouraged to report on the above items to the extent possible.

Description of negative security assurances (including status and definition) by reporting States	
Current status and future prospect of the ratification of the relevant protocols to nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties	
Current status of consultations and cooperation on entry into force of the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties	
Current status of review of any related reservations about the relevant protocols of nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties by concerned States	
Nuclear testing	State response
Current status of ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	
Current status of the reporting State's policy on continued adherence to the moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions	
Activities to promote the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the national, regional and global levels	
Scheduled policy reviews	State response
Scope and focus of policy reviews, scheduled or under way, relating to nuclear weapon stocks, nuclear doctrine or nuclear posture	

Fissile material	State response
Aggregate amount of plutonium produced for national security purposes (in metric tons)	
Aggregate amount of highly enriched uranium produced for national security purposes (in metric tons)	
Amount of fissile material ^d declared excess for national security purposes (in metric tons)	
Current status (and any future plan), including the amount and year, of declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency of all fissile material designated by the reporting State as no longer required for military purposes and placement of such material under Agency or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes	
Current status of the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements to ensure the irreversible removal of such fissile material	
Current status (and any future plan) of the dismantlement or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons	
Other measures in support of nuclear disarmament	State response
Any cooperation among Governments, the United Nations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities	

^d For all instances of its use in the present reporting form, the term “fissile material” is defined as highly enriched uranium (enriched to 20 per cent uranium-235 or greater); or separated weapons-grade plutonium (Pu), uranium-233 (U-233), neptunium (Np) or americium (Am).

<p>Year and official document symbol of regular reports on the implementation of Article VI, paragraph 4 (c), of the 1995 decision entitled “Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”, and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference</p>	
<p>Activities to promote disarmament and non-proliferation education</p>	