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**JAPAN**

**CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION REVIEW CONFERENCE**

**STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION**

**1. Strengthening the Chemical Weapons Convention**

- 1.1 The Chemical Weapons Convention (hereinafter “the Convention”) is the first verifiable ban on a whole category of weapons of mass destruction. Therefore, its successful implementation has particular importance for the future of multilateral disarmament efforts. Promotion of universality and strengthening of national implementation by States Parties are two essential elements in ensuring successful implementation of the Convention. Effectiveness, transparency and fairness in implementation of the provisions of the Convention enhance trust among States Parties and between the States Parties and the OPCW Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”), which contributes to the strengthening of the Convention.
- 1.2 Japan welcomes the steady progress that has been made towards universal adherence to the Convention. In March 2002, Japan organised a regional seminar on universality and implementation for ASEAN countries. Japan will continue its efforts to promote universality, especially in the Asian region, in cooperation with the Secretariat and other States Parties in the region.
- 1.3 The assistance and protection each State Party has the right to request in accordance with paragraph 8 of Article X may form a passive defence and deterrent against a chemical attack by letting the aggressor know that the damage of the attack will be limited by this protection and assistance. Japan calls upon States Parties which have not yet elected the measures they will take to provide assistance according to paragraph 7 of Article X to do so without delay.
- 1.4 Challenge inspection is an indispensable mechanism for the Convention to remain as a viable multilateral disarmament treaty that is capable of clarifying questions on non-compliance swiftly by inspection. Japan considers this particular mechanism as part of the mission assigned by the international community to the Convention. The request for a challenge inspection should not be abused, nor should it be regarded in unduly pejorative terms. Challenge inspection works as a deterrent against non-

compliance. For that deterrent to be effective, the OPCW, particularly the Executive Council and the Secretariat, must stand ready to consider and, when necessary, act upon a request for a challenge inspection at any time.

## **2. National implementation**

- 2.1 Article 7 of the Convention obligates States Parties to adopt necessary measures to implement the Convention. National implementation of the Convention also contributes to the global fight against terrorism. Implementation support offered within the framework of the OPCW reinforces national implementation and provides an incentive for States not Party to accede to the Convention.
- 2.2 Submitting accurate declarations on all declarable plant sites is not an easy task for any State Party. Prior to entry into force of the Convention, the National Authority of Japan undertook an extensive information campaign aimed at the industrial sector, which included distributing pamphlets to all plant sites that were deemed declarable. The understanding of the Convention's verification system and its objectives thus gained in the industrial sector and among individual plant sites contributed greatly to the successful implementation of the Convention in Japan.
- 2.3 Japan shared such experience with the participants of the Regional Seminar on Universality and Implementation of the Convention it organised for ASEAN countries in March 2002. Japan hopes to continue its exchanges with countries inside and outside the region with the aim of sharing good practices. Japan welcomes the First Regional Meeting of National Authorities of States Parties in Asia to be held in Singapore as a valuable opportunity for such exchanges.

## **3. Strengthening the OPCW**

- 3.1 Since the OPCW operates on a budget contributed by States Parties, it is the responsibility of both the Secretariat and States Parties to ensure the financial efficiency of the Organisation's operations. Cost-effectiveness must be sought in all aspects of OPCW operations ranging from administrative costs to such activities as verification and international cooperation and assistance (ICA). In this context, Japan welcomes the introduction of results-based budgeting in parts of the 2004 OPCW budget. Japan also welcomes the efforts by the Secretariat to improve efficiency by discussing with States Parties specific cost-saving measures such as those listed in the Director-General's report entitled *The Optimisation and Efficiency of Verification Activities* (EC-32/DG.12, dated 6 March 2003). Japan hopes such efforts will continue.
- 3.2 It is truly encouraging that the tenure policy of the staff members of the Secretariat is to be decided upon shortly in the Second Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties. This is the result of dedicated efforts by States Parties and the Secretariat. The decision will remove considerable uncertainty in maintaining the effective functioning of the Secretariat. It is important that States Parties continue to assist the Director-General in implementing the new tenure policy.

- 3.3 Training of the staff of the Secretariat is also very important for strengthening the effectiveness of the Secretariat. In 2002 and 2003, Japan contributed in this area by making available voluntary funds for Secretariat staff training that included live agent training, investigation of alleged use and challenge inspection exercises.
- 3.4 Active participation by States Parties is also essential for strengthening the implementation of the Convention. Japan has been making the following contributions:
- (a) Sending an expert to the Confidentiality Commission;
  - (b) Sending an expert to the Security Audit Team;
  - (c) Providing spectrum data of chemicals to the OPCW Central Analytical Database and sending an expert to the Validation Group; and
  - (d) Sending experts to the Scientific Advisory Board.

#### **4. New threat**

- 4.1 Although the Cold War has ended, a new threat has emerged from the fact that terrorist organisations have become interested in acquiring and using chemical weapons. Japan has learned from the chemical attacks on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 how real this new threat is.
- 4.2 Disarmament and non-proliferation are the two main objectives of the Convention. Prevention of terrorists' acquisition of chemical weapons adds a new dimension to the Convention's endeavour for non-proliferation. Strengthened national implementation of the Convention is effective in preventing such acquisition. Progress in the destruction of stockpiled chemical weapons is also important, as it decreases the possibility of terrorists coming into possession of those weapons.
- 4.3 In the global fight against terrorism, the OPCW should seek closer cooperation with other relevant international and regional organisations and national authorities, since the OPCW will have to allocate significant resources for the verification of national chemical weapons destruction programmes in the coming years. In this context, Japan welcomes the relationship the OPCW has established with the Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC) of the United Nations Security Council.
- 4.4 Japan has been assisting countries in the Asia Pacific region to strengthen their capacity to fight terrorism in areas such as export control and law enforcement. Japan will seek to cooperate with the OPCW on future assistance programs for the fight against terrorism.