Managing Global Insecurity - Japanese Response
Keynote Speech by Ms. Sadako Ogata
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on Multilateral Approaches to Peace and Security
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Let me start by welcoming the presence of co-directors, Bruce Jones and Stephen Stedman, who came to Japan to introduce the recently launched report of the Managing Global Insecurity Project. I am happy that the Foreign Ministry has taken the initiative to invite the MGI directors, for I believe the report has important messages for Japan as a leading world player.

The MGI project represents the joint initiative of the Brookings Institution, the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. As the world faces unprecedented transnational threats from financial crisis to climate change, nuclear proliferation and terrorism, the report presents convincing arguments on both the solutions to be sought on a diverse range of global threats and the need for renewal of existing institutional structures.

While the project itself has been prepared by the co-directors representing these organizations, there were two groups of members who served as advisors — the U.S. group and the international group. It may be important to trace back a little further, and to recognize the role played by the two directors Bruce Jones and Stephen Stedman, who served as research directors for the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. The report that was presented in 2004 following the disastrous 9/11 terror attack in New York, concentrated on the security challenges faced by the United Nations, and served as precursor for the MGI findings and proposals. The installment of the U.S. advisory group for MGI shows how strongly the initiators believed in the importance of U.S. engagement if we were to draw up a meaningful and effective arrangement for international cooperation. As to myself, I had the good chance to serve on both projects, and I hold the greatest trust and respect for Bruce and Stave.

At the outset, I would like to emphasize that both the High-level Panel report and the MGI report shared the recognition that the twenty-first century must be built on the realities of the transnational world where technology, capital, labor, diseases, pollution and terrorism cross sovereign state borders. While enormous progress and advantages derive from the benefits of rapid information and communication flows, the one clear outstanding fact is that no state can by itself remain invulnerable from external impacts and threats. The world in the twenty-first century, therefore, is in need of constructing a collective security structure that meets the dual requirements of interdependence and state security.

The High-level Panel report sought answers to a variety of impending challenges facing the United Nations. It examined and identified a host of threats — inter-state war, internal conflict in failed state, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction organized crime. While recognizing that the Charter does not prohibit state action in self-defense in imminent situations, it emphasized that it was the Security Council that is expected to take measures to maintain international peace and security. The Panel argued that what is required is not to find alternatives to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make it work better than it has.

Of all the recommendations presented by the High-level Panel, what drew the greatest interest from member states as well as the wide public related to the organizational reform of the Security Council. Both the effectiveness and the credibility of the Security Council had to be reestablished. The Panel believed that the enlargement of the Council was inevitable, as the issue had been debated for many years. When the membership of the United Nations had virtually grown threefold since its establishment in 1945, and especially when the nature and spread of insecurity had turned global, the limited composition of the 15 member Security Council had somewhat seemed to undermine the legitimacy and representational character of the organization itself.

The Panel started its exercise by analyzing the contribution of

individual states to international peace and security functions of the United Nations, as well as the established practices of regional consultation to select Security Council members. The Panel proposed two alternative formulae for expanding the membership, model A and model B, both involving the increase of the membership to 24, and redistribution of seats between the four major regional areas of Africa, Asia and Pacific, Europe and the Americas. While model A provided for six new permanent seats with no veto, and three new two year term non-permanent seats, model B introduced the novel formula of establishing a category of four years renewable-term seats for 8 members. Japan responded actively to the initiatives taken by the Panel.

For some time, Japan had the aspiration to gain a more permanent presence in the Security Council, and the Panel report seemed to provide the awaited opportunity to launch its reform bid. In terms of both the assessed and voluntary contributions for security and development operations, Japan was the second largest financial contributor to the UN. While its participation in peace keeping operations lagged in human terms, it considered itself fully qualified to be permanently represented on the Security Council. Together with Germany, India and Brazil which also aspired to become permanent members of the Security Council, Japan launched the "four power resolution" that proposed to increase 6 new permanent members, and 4 new non-permanent members. Japan found much support for its bid to permanent membership, but at the end, the G4 resolution failed to gain the necessary support, and the Security Council composition remained unchanged.

I personally think that the direct cause for the debacle of Security Council reform was the intense group politics that played out among various regional groups. There was also severe competition among specific individual member states that vied for power. Though the need for reform in principle was generally agreed upon, the one serious cause that undermined any agreement for change was the reserved attitude of the United States. The existing Security Council size and structure assured continued power and influence for the United States. The United States saw no benefit in a United Nations in which its position would be weakened, and forestalled the possibility for endless expansion of issues and members.

Focusing on the continuing rise of transnational threats, and convinced of the need to establish multilateral systems of response, groups of concerned leaders and policymakers joined hands, with a clear view to mobilizing U.S. engagement and leadership. Together they launched the Managing Global Insecurity project, with Bruce Jones and Steve Stedman together with Carlos Pascual, of the Brookings Institution serving as co-directors. The time seemed ripe, as the United States presidential election provided opportunity to review and renew American leadership. Security threats unconstrained by borders were getting upfront, from climate change, nuclear proliferation, terrorism and internal conflict, disease and food to financial crisis.

The project installed two groups of advisers. The US Advisory Group had the clear objective to reengage the United States to play a leadership role against global security threats of the kind that affected all states and peoples. In order to play such role internationally, the United State had to commit itself to respect and abide by the existing international norms and institutions. MGI group believed that the recent US action of torture in Iraq, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib had damaged American credibility. The report advocated the early closure of the Guantanamo Detention facility, and urged the US to "declare its commitment to uphold the Geneva Conventions, the Convention against Torture and other laws of war."

The role of the International Advisory Group was to prepare the international ground for creating bodies that could strengthen the process of rule making. The MGI group noted that the existing G7 or G8 set ups consisting of major economic powers proved insufficient. Although these bodies had begun to extend their reach to Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico and thereby incorporate the rising economic powers, MGI proposed to organize a new group of sixteen emerging powers by further adding Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt and Nigeria. It observed that the collective weight of G16 economies and military and diplomatic influence would provide a stronger platform for planning and negotiating international agenda formulation and decisions. It expects such a body to be able to exert strong impact on ongoing global negotiating bodies such as the Doha round of WTO, or the 2009

Conference on the Framework Convention on Climate Change or the review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The MGI project expresses its strong dissatisfaction over the decision-making structure of existing international institutions. The expansion of the United Nations Security Council would allow the organizational adjustment for the effective management of global peace and security. The initiation of voluntary veto reform would also add to confidence building for the possibility of change. The MGI report refers to the need for management reform in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. It advocates a host of capacity building efforts for the African Union and other regional bodies. It expresses its belief that the G 16, in cooperation with leading regional players would be forced to address security issues especially in fragile states.

In preparing for the launch of the report, it is important to note that the MGI was not only mobilizing international support for global institutions and partnership. The transnational world of the twenty-first century not only undermines the invulnerability of state but also the varied range of threats directly affects the people living within national borders. MGI introduced a revised notion of sovereignty to emphasize that sovereign states have obligation towards other states and peoples as well as to their own citizens that the threats do not endanger or destabilize their lives. The concept of "responsible sovereignty" expands the implications of state action to cover the conditions of the people, the respect and protection of their rights and wellbeing. The notion of "responsible sovereignty" veers closely to the concept of upholding "human security." This concept focuses on the protection and empowerment of people in conflict as well as in need of economic and social development assistance.

The issue of globalization and the management of security require fundamental reexamination at both the international and internal levels. MGI report proposes a global agenda with time line starting immediately following the election of the new American President. I trust and hope that some of the members of the US Advisory group are already working out the agenda for US leadership. The international agenda are equally long and

challenging, and would require piecemeal division of work to get started. I trust that the Security Council expansion would be again on the agenda with Japan on the Security Council from January 1st, serving again on a non-permanent member seat. The Bretton Woods institutions, both the Bank and the IMF seem already to be engaged in a reform process. There too, replenishment of financial resources and reallocation of quotas and voting rights are under review. The expansion of a G16 from the current G7 or G8 would not be simple. Adjustments will have to be made between the existing set up and criteria for selection of additional membership. Above all, the enlargement of negotiation bodies will have to be examined in the context of cost-effectiveness and efficiency.

Of all the global security challenges that face the United Nations, regional organizations and individual states, the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq require urgent attention and action. The mammoth terrorist attacks on Munbai of last week, the renewed insecurity in the tribal areas of Pakistan, the continuing instability in Darfur and eastern Congo, all press for concentrated attention. While military interventions are required in certain places and at certain times, the new paradigm of war is "war among the people" in which all sides to the conflict are mostly "non-state," to refer to the insightful analysis of Rupert Smith. In such situations, winning the support of the people becomes crucial to gaining peace. Social and economic reconstruction and development work also play an indispensable partner to peace building. The questions to be raised are as follows. Are the instruments for peace keeping and peace building in line with the demands of the times? Are we profiting enough from the knowledge and confidence of local experts? Can the enhanced capacity of regional organizations complement the over stretched deployment of UN forces?

I hope the questions to be raised in the course of the afternoon debate will clarify some of the inadequacies of my presentation, and also bring out Japanese perspectives on managing global threats and establishing rule based international systems for collaboration.

Thank you.