The Security Triangle (Acceptance, Deterrence, Protection)
Thursday 17th November 2005
10:45 – 12:15

Objectives

- Discuss three strategies to enhance organizational and individual security:
  1. Improving image and acceptance within the community
  2. Physical protection of oneself, property and premises
  3. Deterring violence by promise of reprisal
How do we define the signs of “acceptance”?
- Objects (hats, flags), symbols, organizational messages, image and perception (smiles)
- One must increase the level of acceptance by the community/society in order to create a secure environment for the operations.
PROTECTION STRATEGIES

- Personal protection
- Office / residence protection

DETERRENCE STRATEGIES
In order for an organization to conduct a secure operation in the conflict/post-conflict regions, the concepts of Acceptance, Deterrence and Protection need to be addressed to increase the overall security level.

**Case Practice**

Read the short case study from Suremia. Take 10 minutes to read the case and make note of the main points.

After reviewing the facts provided, prepare a security strategy based on the 3 elements of the security triangle - acceptance, protection, or deterrence.

Take 20 minutes to meet with your group and determine actions you might take to improve security for NGOs working in Suremia.
Case Practice: “Car Trouble in Suremia”

The internationally known and respected health-oriented NGO “Quick Medical Delivery” or QMD has operated clinics and outreach health programmes in the Western parts of Suremia for a few years. They have built up their programmes over time using skilled workers from the community, many of whom they have trained in their local capacity building programmes. QMD became an operational partner of UNHCR in support of the refugees from Mardon last year. As an organization, they historically have resisted close association with military (of any country) as a core part of their operating principles and a belief that “the military can never be truly humanitarian”.

As the security situation has worsened steadily over the past 2 years, QMD, along with virtually all other NGOs operating in the country moved closer to the government-run refugee relief service and have also accepted Suremian military escorts in particularly dangerous areas.

Last week, an unmarked car belonging to QMD and a plainly marked UNHCR car, driving in convoy, were hijacked somewhere on the road between Xynas and Mink. Both cars and all of the passengers are listed as “missing”. The QMD car was driven by local QMD staff (accompanied by 1 international – from USA – and 2 national medical staff). The UNHCR car was driven by a Suremian national UNHCR driver, and included 2 programme officers from Japan and New Zealand).

For the last 4 days there have been no reports or any communication from either the hijackees or the hijackers. Today, the UNHCR received a small package at their field office in Xynas. The package included the note written below (in Suremian) and the bullet-riddled license place of the UNHCR car.

To all UN and other foreigners,
We will kill your people, and all who work with you We will take your cars, we will eat your food, we will destroy you day by day until you cannot live in Suremia any more. Do not worry to find us, we will take care of you.
You help yourselves to our land, you help even refugees from other lands, but you never help us. All you bring is ruin to our country. You already own the Government in Vares, and your dogs bark for you on command. We will not stop until we are once again given freedom to rule in our own place.”

People’s Command Force 1
The organizational headquarters of QMD has issued a statement saying that they will not leave the country while there is such great need in Suremia. The Office of the Suremian Premiere has issued a statement calling for peace and time to talk and work together with all factions, and has begun a thorough review of troops for possible redeployment. UNHCR has temporarily halted all staff travel to Xynas, and the Field office staff all now being relocated to Vares (the capital.)

Presentations by four groups:

**Group 1:**

**Improve acceptance by...**
- Improve connection with locals
- Confidence building with locals
- PR (radio, media, newspaper (leaflets))

**Use protection by...**
- Develop local security capacity
- Hire local guards for clinics etc.
- Evaluation of security management
- Decrease land movement → use air if possible
- Security briefing and training

**Use deterrence by...**
- More visible QMD marks
- Pressure the authorities for the security (through the government)
- Act with local staff (military escort or armed escort if necessary)
- Minimize international staff
**Group 2:**

**Improve acceptance by...**
- Statement/announcement of
  - a. Independent from UN & Central government
  - b. Neutrality
  - c. Working policy targeting the community in need including local community for possible assistance to the area/community of PCFI

**Use protection by...**
- Review team formations → assignment of locals to all posts
- Putting logo for IDs (after acceptance of all parties)
- Protected guard by community people (no military guard)
- Identify alternative routes to the project site

**Use deterrence by...**
- QMD head from HQ negotiates for hostage release (cancellation of future assistance if hostages are not released)
- Suggest PKFI intervention after release of hostages

**Group 3:**

**Improve acceptance by...**
- Put QMD logo on cars
- Public information (ex. Newspaper, other medias, make strong relationship with community leaders)

**Use protection by...**
- Avoid moving with UNHCR
- Collect information (place situation)??
- Changing the moving routes
- Make network with other INGOs, local communities

**Use deterrence by...**
- Military escort?

**Group 4:**

**Improve acceptance by...**
- PR through the local media
- Message that QMD is organized for humanitarian aid and provides service for the people as well

**Use protection by...**
- Information gatherings and update them
- Military escort?
Use protection by… (continued)
- Don’t move with UN??
- Increase local staff capacity
- Change routes and operation patterns
- Keep operation plans confidential

Use deterrence by…
- Set up communication channels with hijackers and locals etc.
- Hold field operation
- PR and negotiation through the media

Conclusions

Improving staff (aid workers) security requires an appropriate approach that embeds multiple strategies. These may be summarized as:

• improving acceptance of staff and agency in the field

• Improving physical protection of staff, vehicles, premises and properties

• Deterring violence through use - or credible threat of use - of force or other means to “repay” any violence against staff or property

Questions raised by the participants:
- What are you implying, when you say “using force” in deterrence when it comes to the NGO operations?
  ➔ Use of guards, protection, police, etc.
- How do you prevent the inflation of the cost of protection?
  ➔ Cooperate with other NGOs, keep the benchmark down at certain level.
- Questions on neutrality/independence of NGOs
- Where does the funding come from? And how to keep a certain image/perception, depends on whom you are funded by?
  ➔ Many Strategies required to reduce risk
  ➔ Managing organizational risk
  ➔ Protection measures
  ➔ Deterrence measures