
Preparatory Committee for the 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Poland, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates)

1. The 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons emphasized in its action plan the urgency of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (see NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I), actions 10-14). This principle was stressed also at the 2000 Review Conference (see NPT/CONF.2000/28 (Parts I and II)), the Final Declaration of the 2011 Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the 2012 Joint Ministerial Statement of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and General Assembly resolution 67/76.

Importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime

2. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is intrinsically linked to the goals and objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and in this regard is an invaluable component of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Conclusion of negotiations on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was an integral part of the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995. The early entry into force of the Treaty was identified as the first of 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", agreed by the Review Conference in 2000. Additionally, the basic obligations under article I of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty represent the contemporary standard by which the provisions of article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty on peaceful applications of any nuclear explosions will now be interpreted.

3. The obligations under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty contribute to the limitation of the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. The



Treaty helps to constrain those States intent on developing a nuclear capability and inhibit the development of more advanced forms of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States and other States possessing nuclear weapons.

4. The widespread condemnation that has followed nuclear tests since the negotiation of the Treaty, demonstrated most recently by the response to the test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 12 February 2013, is testament to the normative strength of the Treaty's provisions. Together with the existing voluntary moratoriums on nuclear test explosions, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has proved to be beneficial to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation by stigmatizing nuclear test explosions. However, this is not a substitute for a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear weapon testing and all other nuclear explosions, which can only be achieved by the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

5. Continuing with the development of the Treaty's verification regime is vital to the effectiveness of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This includes the International Monitoring System (IMS) and preparedness by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to conduct on-site inspections, as well as the development of verification-related technical capacity in States. The International Monitoring System, which is at the core of the verification regime, is capable of accurately detecting and identifying explosions larger than 1 kiloton worldwide, in the atmosphere, under water or under ground, and has already proved its effectiveness. Additionally, data from IMS has important civil and scientific benefits, especially in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations, such as tsunami alerts. IMS stations were able to detect signatures from the damage to the Fukushima nuclear power plant following the devastating earthquake and tsunami on 11 March 2011.

6. Confidence in the ability of the verification regime to meet the requirements of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is fundamental to the success of the Treaty as it gives States the assurance of adherence to the test ban. In this regard, further international cooperation in the development of the regime should be encouraged.

Status of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

7. We welcome the recent ratifications by Brunei Darussalam, Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Guatemala and Indonesia, as well as the signature by Niue. We particularly commend the leadership demonstrated by Indonesia's ratification of the Treaty on 6 February 2012, the first Annex 2 State to ratify the Treaty since 2008; this reduces the number of Annex 2 States yet to ratify the Treaty to eight. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has now been signed by 183 States, of which 159 States have ratified the Treaty.

8. Ratification by the eight remaining Annex 2 States — China, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Israel, Pakistan and the United States of America — is required for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to enter into force. There is also a small number of non-Annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty.

9. The International Monitoring System, consisting of 321 monitoring stations and 16 laboratories built in 89 countries worldwide, is currently 85 per cent complete.

Promotion of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

The review cycle of 2015 should:

10. Urge all States that have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to do so without delay, in particular the remaining eight Annex 2 States. Annex 2 States should not wait for other States to ratify the Treaty.

11. Reiterate that nuclear-weapon States have a particular responsibility, as agreed in action 10 of the action plan, to encourage ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and call upon them to take the initiative in this regard. Ratification by nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so would provide further impetus towards entry into force of the Treaty.

12. As stipulated in action 11 of the action plan, pending the Treaty's entry into force, call upon all States to uphold and maintain a moratorium on nuclear-weapon test explosions and any other nuclear explosions.

13. In accordance with action 14, encourage all States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to assist the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in its work in anticipation of and preparing for the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. This includes the early completion and provisional operation of the International Monitoring System, which serves as an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory element of the verification system globally and helps to provide assurance of compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
