

A New Package of Practical Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Measures for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

The Government of Japan and the Government of Australia propose that States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) endorse the following practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures at the 2010 Review Conference, while reaffirming the importance of the Treaty and stressing the necessity to strengthen the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regimes through the universalisation of the Treaty,

1. Reaffirm an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under Article VI of the Treaty;
2. Welcome the nuclear disarmament steps taken by the French Republic, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, including the progress of negotiations for the START follow-on treaty between the United States and Russia, and call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to pursue negotiations on nuclear disarmament bilaterally and/or multilaterally;
3. Call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to make an early commitment to reducing, or at least not increasing, their nuclear arsenals, pending the conclusion of such negotiations, in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all;
4. Call on the nuclear-weapon States and on all other states possessing nuclear weapons to commit themselves to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies, and call on the nuclear-weapon States to take, as soon as possible, such measures as providing stronger negative security assurances that they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States that comply with the NPT;
5. Call on all states possessing nuclear weapons to take measures to reduce the risk of their accidental or unauthorized launch and to further reduce the

operational status of nuclear weapon systems in ways that promote international stability and security;

6. Emphasise the importance of applying the principles of irreversibility and verifiability to the process of reducing nuclear weapons;
7. Call for increased transparency by all states possessing nuclear weapons with regard to their nuclear weapons capabilities, including by reporting regularly such information as the numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and on their deployment status in a format to be agreed among States parties to the Treaty;
8. Urge all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) at the earliest opportunity with a view to its early entry into force, and emphasise the importance of maintaining the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing pending the entry into force of the CTBT;
9. Call for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), while urging all states possessing nuclear weapons to declare and maintain a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, to declare voluntarily fissile material that is no longer required for military purposes and to place such material under IAEA safeguards or other relevant international verification;
10. Reaffirm the threat posed to international peace and security by nuclear weapons proliferation and the need for strict compliance by all states with their non-proliferation obligations, including compliance with their IAEA safeguards agreements and relevant UN Security Council resolutions;
11. Emphasise that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) accompanied by an Additional Protocol based on the model additional protocol (AP) should be the internationally recognised safeguards standard, urge all states that have yet to do so to conclude and bring into force a CSA and an AP as soon as possible and call on all states to apply this safeguards standard to the supply of nuclear material and equipment;

12. Underline the importance of appropriate international responses to notice of withdrawal from the Treaty, including consultations on a bilateral, regional or international basis. In particular, in the case of notice of withdrawal by a state which has been found by the IAEA to be in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, the United Nations Security Council should convene immediately in accordance with the body's role under the UN Charter;
13. Emphasise that a State withdrawing from the NPT is not free to use for non-peaceful purposes nuclear materials or equipment acquired while party to the Treaty, as well as special nuclear material produced through the use of such material or equipment;
14. Reaffirm the right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I, II and III of the Treaty, and support the work of the IAEA in assisting states, particularly developing countries, in the peaceful use of nuclear energy;
15. Urge all states commissioning, constructing or planning nuclear power reactors to become party to the four international conventions relating to nuclear safety, namely, Convention on Nuclear Safety, Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management; and
16. Urge all states to take further measures to strengthen the security of nuclear materials and facilities, such as conclusion of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material including its 2005 Amendment and the International Convention for the Suppression of Nuclear Terrorism as soon as practicable.